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Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 741807.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:05:18 (78.9 KB)

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:23 (69.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

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I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

• Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

• Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

• Decision Date: January 30, 2020

• Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

• May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

• June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

• January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

• Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

• Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

• Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

• The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

• Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

• Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
• Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
• Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

• Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

• Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

• Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

• Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919071-REL


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG). The guide includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information in the provided source text.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action taken by Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen initiated the dispute with the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association?

3. What was Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument for why the HOA’s Flag Display Rule was invalid?

4. On what authority did the Carter Ranch HOA claim it had the right to create and enforce its Flag Display Rule?

5. According to the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule,” which specific flags are homeowners permitted to fly?

6. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this hearing, and how is it defined in the decision?

7. What protection does Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1808(C) provide for “political signs”?

8. What were the two key failures of the petitioner’s case, as identified in the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law?

9. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

10. What are the next steps for a party wishing to challenge the Administrative Law Judge’s order?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Van Dan Elzen represented himself, while the HOA was represented by its attorney, Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

2. The dispute began on or about May 21, 2019, when the Carter Ranch HOA notified Mr. Van Dan Elzen that he had violated its rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag in his front yard. This notice of violation prompted Mr. Van Dan Elzen to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument was that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the community’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He contended that because CC&R section 3.14 only defines “SIGNS” and makes no reference to “Flags,” the HOA had no basis in the CC&Rs to regulate his flag.

4. The Carter Ranch HOA asserted its authority based on Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the HOA Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to the health, safety, or welfare of the owners and restrictions on the use of Lots.

5. The HOA’s Flag Display Rule prohibits flying any flag other than the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian National flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

6. The petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) prevents an HOA from prohibiting the display of political signs on a member’s property, although it allows for regulation. An HOA cannot prohibit political signs earlier than 71 days before an election or later than three days after, and its rules on size and number can be no more restrictive than applicable city or county ordinances.

8. The Judge concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the Flag Display Rule was improperly adopted or inconsistent with the CC&Rs. Furthermore, the Judge concluded that the petitioner had not actually alleged that Carter Ranch violated the specific statute he cited, A.R.S. § 33-1808.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by state statutes.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are designed to encourage a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the word “flag” does not appear in the CC&Rs. Why was this argument ultimately unconvincing to the Administrative Law Judge?

2. Explain the legal distinction between a “flag” and a “political sign” as presented in A.R.S. § 33-1808. How might the petitioner’s case have differed if he had argued his “Trump 2020” flag was a “political sign” instead of a flag?

3. Discuss the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and why was this justification accepted by the court?

4. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the petitioner “has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” How can this be true when the petitioner’s initial filing explicitly cited this statute?

5. Based on the provided text of A.R.S. § 33-1808, under what specific circumstances could a homeowner in Carter Ranch successfully challenge the HOA’s rules on outdoor displays?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ in the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. The case centered on an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or subdivision. The Carter Ranch CC&Rs grant the HOA Board the authority to adopt rules and regulations.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.

Flag Display Rule

The specific rule created by the Carter Ranch HOA that prohibits flying any flag other than the American, military, POW/MIA, Arizona Indian National, Arizona State, and Gadsden flags.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Carter Ranch Homeowners Association is the Respondent in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, the petitioner is Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

Defined by A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.” HOAs are restricted in their ability to prohibit the display of such signs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it,” meaning the fact is more probable than not.

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent (Carter Ranch HOA) to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues. This case was decided as a result of a rehearing held on January 10, 2020.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the complaint. In this case, the respondent is the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919071-REL


He Fought the HOA Over a Political Flag—And Lost. Here Are 3 Surprising Reasons Why.

Introduction: The Pride and the Problem

Imagine this: You want to display a flag on your own property to support a political candidate. It feels like a fundamental right, an expression of free speech on your home turf. But then, a letter arrives from your Homeowners Association (HOA) citing you for a violation. This exact scenario happened to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who displayed a “Trump 2020” flag and promptly received a violation notice from the Carter Ranch HOA in Arizona.

Believing the HOA was overstepping its authority, Mr. Van Dan Elzen took them to court. He lost. The outcome might seem counter-intuitive, but the court’s decision reveals crucial lessons for any homeowner living under an HOA. Here are the three surprising legal reasons why the HOA won.

1. The Power of the Fine Print: Why a “Loophole” Wasn’t Enough

Mr. Van Dan Elzen built his case on a clever textual argument. He alleged that the HOA’s rule against his flag was invalid because the section of the master community documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—he believed it was based on only regulated “SIGNS” and made no mention of “FLAGS.” He argued that since the document didn’t explicitly prohibit flags, the rule against his was unenforceable.

This seemingly logical “loophole” argument failed. The HOA countered by pointing to a different, much broader clause in their CC&Rs. Article V, Section 5.3, gave the HOA board expansive power to create new rules.

The Board may, from time to time, adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to: … (iii) the health, safety or welfare of the owners, Lessees and Residence, or (iv) restrictions on the use of Lots…

This general power to create rules for the “welfare of the owners” was enough to give the HOA the legal authority to regulate flags, even if the word “flag” wasn’t in the specific section the homeowner cited. The broad power to govern trumped the narrow, semantic argument.

2. A Flag Is Not a Sign (At Least, Not According to the Law)

While the homeowner’s flag was political in nature, it did not receive the legal protections granted to “political signs” under Arizona law. This distinction proved fatal to his case.

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808, is highly specific about which flags an HOA is forbidden from prohibiting. The protected list includes: the American flag, official military branch flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, Arizona Indian nations flags, and the Gadsden flag. Critically, the Carter Ranch HOA’s own Flag Display Rule mirrored this state-approved list exactly, demonstrating they had aligned their regulations with the law. A political campaign flag, like “Trump 2020,” is not on this protected list.

The same law does protect political signs, but it defines them very precisely:

“political sign” means a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.

The key takeaway is that the law treats a political flag differently from a political sign. Because the “Trump 2020” item was a flag and not on the state’s protected flag list, the HOA was well within its rights to restrict its display based on its own community rules.

3. A Critical Misstep: Arguing the Wrong Point

The most decisive reason for the loss was not a procedural error, but a substantive legal failure. Mr. Van Dan Elzen filed his petition with the state on the grounds that the HOA had violated a specific state law, A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and political signs.

However, his entire case was built on arguing that the HOA’s internal rules were inconsistent with its own CC&Rs—the “sign” versus “flag” argument. This was the wrong legal target. To win, he had to prove that the HOA had violated the state statute. But the statute explicitly allows an HOA to regulate any flag not on the protected list. By regulating his “Trump 2020” flag, the HOA was doing exactly what the state law permitted. His argument about internal documents, even if correct, did not add up to a violation of the state law he sued under.

The Administrative Law Judge recognized this fundamental flaw, concluding that the homeowner hadn’t actually made a case for a statutory violation at all.

Moreover, Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

This is a crucial lesson: it’s not enough to feel wronged. Your argument must directly prove that the specific law you cite in your complaint has actually been broken. The homeowner’s claim was dismissed because his central argument was irrelevant to the law he needed to prove was violated.

Conclusion: Know Your Rights, and Your Rules

The case of the “Trump 2020” flag is a powerful illustration for homeowners everywhere. It highlights three critical realities of living in an HOA: the broad rule-making power granted by community documents can override perceived loopholes; state laws make very specific and narrow distinctions between protected items like signs and flags; and a sound legal strategy is paramount.

This case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, your property rights are defined not by what you feel is right, but by what is written down. Before you make a stand, are you certain you’re fighting the right battle on the right legal ground?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines LLC
    Appeared for Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Dustin Snow (property manager)
    SNOW PROPERTY SERVICES
    Recipient of order transmission

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:10 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:11 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

– Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
– Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
– Rehearing: April 1, 2019
– Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

• Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

• Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

• 2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

• May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

• Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

• Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

• Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

• Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

• Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

• Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

• No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

• Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

• Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

• Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

• Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

• Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

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1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:39 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:49:25 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

– Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
– Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
– Rehearing: April 1, 2019
– Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

• Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

• Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

• 2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

• May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

• Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

• Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

• Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

• Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

• Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

• Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

• No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

• Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

• Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

• Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

• Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

• Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

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1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel —
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Notice Violation, A.R.S. 33-1242, Statutory Construction, Homeowner Petition Dismissed
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
  • Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:08 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918009-REL/671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:10 (85.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”). The core of the dispute was Mr. Garcia’s allegation that Villagio violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 in its handling of violation notices related to an alleged breach of short-term rental policies.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that he failed to meet the burden of proof. The decisions consistently hinged on a critical point: Mr. Garcia did not respond to Villagio’s violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period prescribed by the statute. This failure meant that the HOA’s subsequent obligations under the statute—specifically, to provide the name of the violation’s observer and to give notice of the right to a state administrative hearing—were never triggered. Villagio successfully argued that by including its own internal appeal process in the violation notices, it had fulfilled its legal requirements under the circumstances. The final ruling deemed Villagio the prevailing party, with the decision after rehearing being binding on both parties.

Background of the Dispute

The case, No. 19F-H1918009-REL, was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, following a petition filed by Mr. Garcia with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Timeline of Notices and Fines

Villagio issued a series of notices to Mr. Garcia alleging that his unit was being rented in violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) regarding short-term leases.

Date of Notice

Allegation / Action Taken

Instructions Provided to Homeowner

March 8, 2018

Alleged violation of short-term lease provisions.

“If you wish to contest this notice… file an appeal with the Board of Directors… Requests for an appeal must be received within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

March 22, 2018

A fine of $1,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days. The notice also included the phrase, “Please bring this issue into compliance within 10 days of this notice.”

April 5, 2018

A fine of $2,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days.

Procedural History

1. Violation Notices: Villagio sent the three notices in March and April 2018.

2. Homeowner Inaction (Statutory): Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the notices by sending a certified letter within the 21-day period allowed by A.R.S. § 33-1242(B).

3. Homeowner Action (Internal): Mr. Garcia did eventually file an appeal with Villagio regarding the violation and fines, but the HOA did not change its position.

4. Petition Filed: On or about August 17, 2018, Mr. Garcia filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Villagio violated state statutes.

5. Initial Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on October 30, 2018.

6. First Decision: On November 19, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

7. Rehearing Granted: Mr. Garcia requested a rehearing, which was granted and scheduled.

8. Rehearing: The rehearing was held on February 12, 2019, with testimony from Mr. Garcia and Tom Gordon, Villagio’s Community Manager.

9. Final Decision: On March 4, 2019, the ALJ issued a final decision again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition. This order was declared binding and appealable only to the superior court.

Core Legal Arguments and Statutory Interpretation

The case centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs the process for notifying and responding to violations of condominium documents.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1242

• Section (B): A unit owner receiving a violation notice may provide the association with a written response via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice date.

• Section (C): If the owner sends a response as described in Section (B), the association must then respond within 10 business days with specific information, including the name of the person who observed the violation and the process to contest the notice.

• Section (D): An association must give a unit owner written notice of their option to petition for a state administrative hearing unless the information regarding the contest process (required in Section C, paragraph 4) is already provided in the initial violation notice.

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 on several grounds:

• The violation letters did not allow him to respond by certified mail within 21 days.

• The notices failed to include the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

• The notices failed to inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

• During the rehearing, he contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from using the 21-day statutory response period. He claimed the rapid succession of notices (14 days apart) and the language demanding compliance “within 10 days” led him to believe he “would only be 10 days before he would acquire another violation.”

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio disputed all of Mr. Garcia’s allegations, arguing that its actions were fully compliant with the statute:

• The obligation to provide the observer’s name under Section (C) is only triggered after the homeowner first submits a timely certified mail response, which Mr. Garcia failed to do.

• The obligation to provide notice of the right to a state administrative hearing under Section (D) was not applicable because Villagio did provide its internal process for contesting the notice in every letter sent.

• They did not prevent Mr. Garcia from responding. At the rehearing, Mr. Garcia admitted under cross-examination that he was not prohibited by any court order from sending a response.

• Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified that while the HOA’s policy gives homeowners 10 days to contest internally, the association does not restrict them from also using the 21-day statutory response period.

• As a further defense in the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 was not applicable at all, asserting the statute addresses violations concerning the “condition of the property,” whereas Mr. Garcia’s violation concerned the “use of his property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ruling decisively in favor of the Respondent, Villagio.

Burden of Proof

In both decisions, the Judge established that Mr. Garcia, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof to show that a violation occurred. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the “most convincing force.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Homeowner’s Failure to Respond Was Decisive: The Judge found it was “undisputed” that Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-day period via certified mail. This failure was the central reason his petition was dismissed.

2. HOA Obligations Were Not Triggered: Because Mr. Garcia did not initiate the process described in A.R.S. § 33-1242(B), Villagio’s corresponding obligation under Section (C) to provide the observer’s name was never activated.

3. Internal Appeal Process Satisfied Statutory Requirement: The Judge concluded that because Villagio included instructions on how to contest the notice (i.e., appeal to the Board of Directors) in its letters, it was not required under Section (D) to provide separate notice of the right to a state administrative hearing.

4. No Evidence of Prevention: The Judge found that Mr. Garcia “provided no evidence to establish that Villagio prevented him from responding.” The issuance of subsequent notices and fines before the 21-day period had lapsed was not found to constitute a legal barrier that prevented Mr. Garcia from exercising his statutory right to respond.

5. Final Order: Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. His petition was ordered to be dismissed, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party. The order issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties and can only be appealed by seeking judicial review in the superior court within 35 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia?

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C?

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices?

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property?

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent?

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department?

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia? The initial violation alleged by Villagio was that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of the short-term lease provisions located in Villagio’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The first notice of this violation was mailed to Mr. Garcia on March 8, 2018.

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C? To trigger the association’s obligations, a unit owner who receives a written notice of violation must provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required? The petitioner, Mr. Garcia, bears the burden of proof to show that the respondent committed the alleged violation. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with the most convincing force that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation? The judge ruled that Villagio was not required to provide the observer’s name because that obligation is only triggered after a unit owner responds to the violation notice in writing by certified mail within 21 days. It is undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the notices within the 21-day period, so Villagio’s obligation was never activated.

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices? Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio prevented him from responding by certified mail within 21 days because it failed to wait 21 days before issuing additional notices and imposing fines. He stated that the notices’ language requiring compliance within 10 days made him believe he would acquire another violation before the 21-day statutory response period had passed.

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property? Villagio contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 does not apply to this case at all because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition” of the property. Villagio argued that it notified Mr. Garcia that the “use” of his property violated its short-term rental policy, not that a physical condition of the property was in violation.

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent? A fine of $1,000 was posted to Mr. Garcia’s account, with the notice being sent on March 22, 2018. Subsequently, a $2,000 fine was posted to his account for the same violation, and that notice was sent on April 5, 2018.

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department? The Judge concluded that Villagio was not obligated to provide this information because A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) only requires it if the association fails to provide the unit owner with the process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s notices all contained instructions on how to contest the violation, specifically by filing an appeal with the Board of Directors via a provided website.

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice? Tom Gordon testified that homeowners are provided with 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio, pursuant to Villagio’s short-term rental policy. When asked if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” (A.R.S. § 33-1242) if Mr. Garcia had responded in twenty-one days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.”

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019? In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party.

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Essay Questions

Develop detailed essay-format answers to the following prompts, drawing evidence and examples exclusively from the provided source documents.

1. Analyze the central arguments presented by both Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association regarding the application of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statute in relation to these arguments in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

3. Trace the timeline of events from the first notice sent by Villagio on March 8, 2018, to the final order on March 4, 2019. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s actions, or lack thereof, at key moments influenced the legal obligations of the association and the ultimate outcome of the case.

4. Evaluate Villagio’s argument that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge’s decision did not ultimately hinge on this point, discuss the potential implications of this distinction in homeowner association disputes.

5. Explain the two distinct procedural paths available to a unit owner after receiving a violation notice as outlined in this case: the association’s internal appeal process and the statutory process under A.R.S. § 33-1242. Why did the path Mr. Garcia chose fail to trigger the statutory protections he sought?

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Glossary

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing and rehearing, evaluates evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona that regulate condominiums and planned communities.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency that has authority over homeowner association disputes and with which homeowners may petition for a hearing.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents of the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, which contain the short-term lease provisions Mr. Garcia was alleged to have violated.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the evidentiary hearing and rehearing for this matter were held.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing on a matter, granted in this case at Mr. Garcia’s request after the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


He Fought His HOA and Followed Their Rules. Here’s Why He Still Lost.

1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded Letter

For many homeowners, it’s a familiar and unwelcome sight: a crisp envelope from the Homeowners Association (HOA) containing a formal, intimidating violation notice. Your first instinct is to act, to follow the instructions, and to fight back against what feels like an unfair accusation. You read the letter, see a process for an appeal, and dutifully follow it, believing you are protecting your rights. But what if the process outlined in the letter isn’t the one that truly matters under the law?

This isn’t a theoretical warning. It’s the hard lesson learned by a real homeowner in Arizona, Rogelio A. Garcia, who took on his HOA, Villagio at Tempe. He believed the association had violated his rights, and unlike many homeowners, he didn’t ignore the notices—he took action. He filed an appeal with the HOA, just as their letter instructed. Yet, he lost his case, not because he was wrong on the facts, but because he fell into a subtle procedural trap, following the HOA’s internal process while missing a separate, more powerful one defined by state law.

This article breaks down the top three legal takeaways from that court decision. It reveals how taking the wrong action can be just as costly as taking no action at all, offering crucial strategic insights for any homeowner facing a dispute with their association.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Your Rights Often Have an ‘On’ Switch You Must Flip First

Mr. Garcia’s primary complaint was that the HOA failed to provide him with the name of the person who reported his alleged violation—a requirement under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1242. On the surface, this seems like a clear-cut right afforded to homeowners.

However, the court revealed a counter-intuitive legal reality. The HOA’s legal obligation to provide the reporter’s name was not automatic. That right only became active—the obligation was only triggered—if the homeowner first took a specific, formal step: sending a written response to the violation notice via certified mail within 21 calendar days. The record was clear that Mr. Garcia did not send such a response to the March 8, March 22, or April 5 notices. This single procedural failure was fatal to his claim.

The judge’s finding on this point was direct and unambiguous:

“Because Mr. Garcia did not respond in the 21 day period, Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the first and last name of the person or persons who observed the violation.”

This illustrates a critical principle: your most important legal rights may exist in state law, but they often lie dormant. To activate them, you must flip the “on” switch by taking the precise action required by statute, which may be entirely different from the process described in the HOA’s notice.

3.0 Takeaway 2: An Internal Process Can Legally Replace—and Distract From—a State-Level One

So why would an engaged homeowner like Mr. Garcia, who went so far as to file an appeal, neglect to send the critical 21-day certified letter? The answer lies in the second key takeaway: the HOA’s violation notice offered its own, separate appeal process with a much shorter deadline, creating a critical and costly distraction.

Mr. Garcia’s second major argument was that Villagio violated the law by not informing him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department. Again, the law contained a crucial nuance. Under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), an HOA is only required to notify a homeowner of the state hearing option if it fails to provide its own process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s letters did include a process: the homeowner could “file an appeal with the Board of Directors… within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

Court records show Mr. Garcia followed this path and “filed an appeal with Villagio.” By doing so, he engaged with the HOA on their terms, likely focusing all his energy on meeting that urgent 10-day deadline. Because Villagio provided this internal process, the judge concluded it had met its legal obligation and was not required to inform Mr. Garcia about the alternative state-level hearing. This created a procedural trap: the HOA satisfied its legal requirement by offering an internal process that simultaneously diverted the homeowner’s attention from the more powerful, but less obvious, 21-day statutory deadline that would have unlocked his other rights.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Conflicting Deadlines Can Create a Legal Minefield

During a rehearing, Mr. Garcia argued that the HOA’s communication style effectively “prevented” him from using his full 21-day statutory response window. The notices demanded compliance within 10 days and were sent every 14 days with escalating fines. He felt the rapid succession of notices created a pressure cooker, making it impossible to properly exercise his rights.

The court flatly rejected this argument, highlighting a harsh legal truth. The judge found no evidence that Villagio had explicitly told Mr. Garcia he could not respond or had physically prevented him from sending a certified letter. The issuance of a second notice with a demanding 10-day timeline did not legally nullify the 21-day window he had to respond to the first. When asked directly if he was prohibited by a court order from sending a response, Mr. Garcia answered, “No.”

This reveals a common tactic, whether intentional or not, in HOA disputes. The violation notices contained two conflicting timelines: a prominent, urgent “10 days to comply” demand and the less obvious, but legally superior, 21-day statutory right to respond. This conflict creates confusion and pressure, causing homeowners to focus on the immediate threat (the 10-day deadline) while missing the most important legal one. The court, however, places the burden squarely on the homeowner to navigate this minefield, as feeling pressured is not a legal defense for failing to meet a statutory deadline.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Play the Game

The case of Mr. Garcia versus the Villagio at Tempe HOA is a powerful reminder that successfully challenging an HOA is not about being “right,” or even about taking action. It is about taking the correct, procedurally perfect action defined by law.

Mr. Garcia was not passive; he engaged and appealed the violation. His case was lost because he followed the path laid out for him by the HOA, not the one laid out for him by state statute. This crucial distinction—between an association’s internal process and the homeowner’s statutory rights—can mean the difference between victory and defeat. Before you act on any violation notice, you must first understand the precise rules of engagement, which may not be written in the notice itself.

If you received a violation notice today, would you know whether the appeal process in the letter is your only option, or a potential distraction from the legal first step required to truly protect your rights?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rogelio A. Garcia (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
  • Tom Gordon (community manager)
    Villagio / AAMAZ
    Testified as witness for Villagio
  • Amanda Shaw (property manager/agent)
    AAM LLC
    Listed as agent for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel —
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition based on a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 because the Petitioner's failure to respond by certified mail within 21 days meant the HOA's duties to provide further information or notice of the right to petition ADRE were never triggered.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof to show that the Respondent committed the alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was deemed not obligated to provide the specific statutory disclosures because the Petitioner did not respond to the notices of violation by certified mail within 21 calendar days.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA notice requirements

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to provide specific information (observer name, notice of ADRE petition right) and restricting the 21-day response period in violation notices concerning short term lease provisions. The ALJ found that because the Petitioner did not respond by certified mail within 21 days, the HOA was not required to provide the information under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) or the notice of administrative hearing option under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, notice of violation, statutory interpretation, right to respond, administrative hearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:25 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918009-REL/671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:37 (85.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”). The core of the dispute was Mr. Garcia’s allegation that Villagio violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 in its handling of violation notices related to an alleged breach of short-term rental policies.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that he failed to meet the burden of proof. The decisions consistently hinged on a critical point: Mr. Garcia did not respond to Villagio’s violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period prescribed by the statute. This failure meant that the HOA’s subsequent obligations under the statute—specifically, to provide the name of the violation’s observer and to give notice of the right to a state administrative hearing—were never triggered. Villagio successfully argued that by including its own internal appeal process in the violation notices, it had fulfilled its legal requirements under the circumstances. The final ruling deemed Villagio the prevailing party, with the decision after rehearing being binding on both parties.

Background of the Dispute

The case, No. 19F-H1918009-REL, was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, following a petition filed by Mr. Garcia with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Timeline of Notices and Fines

Villagio issued a series of notices to Mr. Garcia alleging that his unit was being rented in violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) regarding short-term leases.

Date of Notice

Allegation / Action Taken

Instructions Provided to Homeowner

March 8, 2018

Alleged violation of short-term lease provisions.

“If you wish to contest this notice… file an appeal with the Board of Directors… Requests for an appeal must be received within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

March 22, 2018

A fine of $1,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days. The notice also included the phrase, “Please bring this issue into compliance within 10 days of this notice.”

April 5, 2018

A fine of $2,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days.

Procedural History

1. Violation Notices: Villagio sent the three notices in March and April 2018.

2. Homeowner Inaction (Statutory): Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the notices by sending a certified letter within the 21-day period allowed by A.R.S. § 33-1242(B).

3. Homeowner Action (Internal): Mr. Garcia did eventually file an appeal with Villagio regarding the violation and fines, but the HOA did not change its position.

4. Petition Filed: On or about August 17, 2018, Mr. Garcia filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Villagio violated state statutes.

5. Initial Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on October 30, 2018.

6. First Decision: On November 19, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

7. Rehearing Granted: Mr. Garcia requested a rehearing, which was granted and scheduled.

8. Rehearing: The rehearing was held on February 12, 2019, with testimony from Mr. Garcia and Tom Gordon, Villagio’s Community Manager.

9. Final Decision: On March 4, 2019, the ALJ issued a final decision again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition. This order was declared binding and appealable only to the superior court.

Core Legal Arguments and Statutory Interpretation

The case centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs the process for notifying and responding to violations of condominium documents.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1242

• Section (B): A unit owner receiving a violation notice may provide the association with a written response via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice date.

• Section (C): If the owner sends a response as described in Section (B), the association must then respond within 10 business days with specific information, including the name of the person who observed the violation and the process to contest the notice.

• Section (D): An association must give a unit owner written notice of their option to petition for a state administrative hearing unless the information regarding the contest process (required in Section C, paragraph 4) is already provided in the initial violation notice.

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 on several grounds:

• The violation letters did not allow him to respond by certified mail within 21 days.

• The notices failed to include the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

• The notices failed to inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

• During the rehearing, he contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from using the 21-day statutory response period. He claimed the rapid succession of notices (14 days apart) and the language demanding compliance “within 10 days” led him to believe he “would only be 10 days before he would acquire another violation.”

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio disputed all of Mr. Garcia’s allegations, arguing that its actions were fully compliant with the statute:

• The obligation to provide the observer’s name under Section (C) is only triggered after the homeowner first submits a timely certified mail response, which Mr. Garcia failed to do.

• The obligation to provide notice of the right to a state administrative hearing under Section (D) was not applicable because Villagio did provide its internal process for contesting the notice in every letter sent.

• They did not prevent Mr. Garcia from responding. At the rehearing, Mr. Garcia admitted under cross-examination that he was not prohibited by any court order from sending a response.

• Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified that while the HOA’s policy gives homeowners 10 days to contest internally, the association does not restrict them from also using the 21-day statutory response period.

• As a further defense in the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 was not applicable at all, asserting the statute addresses violations concerning the “condition of the property,” whereas Mr. Garcia’s violation concerned the “use of his property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ruling decisively in favor of the Respondent, Villagio.

Burden of Proof

In both decisions, the Judge established that Mr. Garcia, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof to show that a violation occurred. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the “most convincing force.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Homeowner’s Failure to Respond Was Decisive: The Judge found it was “undisputed” that Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-day period via certified mail. This failure was the central reason his petition was dismissed.

2. HOA Obligations Were Not Triggered: Because Mr. Garcia did not initiate the process described in A.R.S. § 33-1242(B), Villagio’s corresponding obligation under Section (C) to provide the observer’s name was never activated.

3. Internal Appeal Process Satisfied Statutory Requirement: The Judge concluded that because Villagio included instructions on how to contest the notice (i.e., appeal to the Board of Directors) in its letters, it was not required under Section (D) to provide separate notice of the right to a state administrative hearing.

4. No Evidence of Prevention: The Judge found that Mr. Garcia “provided no evidence to establish that Villagio prevented him from responding.” The issuance of subsequent notices and fines before the 21-day period had lapsed was not found to constitute a legal barrier that prevented Mr. Garcia from exercising his statutory right to respond.

5. Final Order: Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. His petition was ordered to be dismissed, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party. The order issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties and can only be appealed by seeking judicial review in the superior court within 35 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia?

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C?

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices?

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property?

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent?

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department?

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia? The initial violation alleged by Villagio was that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of the short-term lease provisions located in Villagio’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The first notice of this violation was mailed to Mr. Garcia on March 8, 2018.

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C? To trigger the association’s obligations, a unit owner who receives a written notice of violation must provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required? The petitioner, Mr. Garcia, bears the burden of proof to show that the respondent committed the alleged violation. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with the most convincing force that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation? The judge ruled that Villagio was not required to provide the observer’s name because that obligation is only triggered after a unit owner responds to the violation notice in writing by certified mail within 21 days. It is undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the notices within the 21-day period, so Villagio’s obligation was never activated.

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices? Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio prevented him from responding by certified mail within 21 days because it failed to wait 21 days before issuing additional notices and imposing fines. He stated that the notices’ language requiring compliance within 10 days made him believe he would acquire another violation before the 21-day statutory response period had passed.

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property? Villagio contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 does not apply to this case at all because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition” of the property. Villagio argued that it notified Mr. Garcia that the “use” of his property violated its short-term rental policy, not that a physical condition of the property was in violation.

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent? A fine of $1,000 was posted to Mr. Garcia’s account, with the notice being sent on March 22, 2018. Subsequently, a $2,000 fine was posted to his account for the same violation, and that notice was sent on April 5, 2018.

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department? The Judge concluded that Villagio was not obligated to provide this information because A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) only requires it if the association fails to provide the unit owner with the process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s notices all contained instructions on how to contest the violation, specifically by filing an appeal with the Board of Directors via a provided website.

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice? Tom Gordon testified that homeowners are provided with 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio, pursuant to Villagio’s short-term rental policy. When asked if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” (A.R.S. § 33-1242) if Mr. Garcia had responded in twenty-one days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.”

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019? In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Develop detailed essay-format answers to the following prompts, drawing evidence and examples exclusively from the provided source documents.

1. Analyze the central arguments presented by both Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association regarding the application of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statute in relation to these arguments in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

3. Trace the timeline of events from the first notice sent by Villagio on March 8, 2018, to the final order on March 4, 2019. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s actions, or lack thereof, at key moments influenced the legal obligations of the association and the ultimate outcome of the case.

4. Evaluate Villagio’s argument that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge’s decision did not ultimately hinge on this point, discuss the potential implications of this distinction in homeowner association disputes.

5. Explain the two distinct procedural paths available to a unit owner after receiving a violation notice as outlined in this case: the association’s internal appeal process and the statutory process under A.R.S. § 33-1242. Why did the path Mr. Garcia chose fail to trigger the statutory protections he sought?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing and rehearing, evaluates evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona that regulate condominiums and planned communities.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency that has authority over homeowner association disputes and with which homeowners may petition for a hearing.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents of the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, which contain the short-term lease provisions Mr. Garcia was alleged to have violated.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the evidentiary hearing and rehearing for this matter were held.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing on a matter, granted in this case at Mr. Garcia’s request after the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


He Fought His HOA and Followed Their Rules. Here’s Why He Still Lost.

1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded Letter

For many homeowners, it’s a familiar and unwelcome sight: a crisp envelope from the Homeowners Association (HOA) containing a formal, intimidating violation notice. Your first instinct is to act, to follow the instructions, and to fight back against what feels like an unfair accusation. You read the letter, see a process for an appeal, and dutifully follow it, believing you are protecting your rights. But what if the process outlined in the letter isn’t the one that truly matters under the law?

This isn’t a theoretical warning. It’s the hard lesson learned by a real homeowner in Arizona, Rogelio A. Garcia, who took on his HOA, Villagio at Tempe. He believed the association had violated his rights, and unlike many homeowners, he didn’t ignore the notices—he took action. He filed an appeal with the HOA, just as their letter instructed. Yet, he lost his case, not because he was wrong on the facts, but because he fell into a subtle procedural trap, following the HOA’s internal process while missing a separate, more powerful one defined by state law.

This article breaks down the top three legal takeaways from that court decision. It reveals how taking the wrong action can be just as costly as taking no action at all, offering crucial strategic insights for any homeowner facing a dispute with their association.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Your Rights Often Have an ‘On’ Switch You Must Flip First

Mr. Garcia’s primary complaint was that the HOA failed to provide him with the name of the person who reported his alleged violation—a requirement under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1242. On the surface, this seems like a clear-cut right afforded to homeowners.

However, the court revealed a counter-intuitive legal reality. The HOA’s legal obligation to provide the reporter’s name was not automatic. That right only became active—the obligation was only triggered—if the homeowner first took a specific, formal step: sending a written response to the violation notice via certified mail within 21 calendar days. The record was clear that Mr. Garcia did not send such a response to the March 8, March 22, or April 5 notices. This single procedural failure was fatal to his claim.

The judge’s finding on this point was direct and unambiguous:

“Because Mr. Garcia did not respond in the 21 day period, Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the first and last name of the person or persons who observed the violation.”

This illustrates a critical principle: your most important legal rights may exist in state law, but they often lie dormant. To activate them, you must flip the “on” switch by taking the precise action required by statute, which may be entirely different from the process described in the HOA’s notice.

3.0 Takeaway 2: An Internal Process Can Legally Replace—and Distract From—a State-Level One

So why would an engaged homeowner like Mr. Garcia, who went so far as to file an appeal, neglect to send the critical 21-day certified letter? The answer lies in the second key takeaway: the HOA’s violation notice offered its own, separate appeal process with a much shorter deadline, creating a critical and costly distraction.

Mr. Garcia’s second major argument was that Villagio violated the law by not informing him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department. Again, the law contained a crucial nuance. Under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), an HOA is only required to notify a homeowner of the state hearing option if it fails to provide its own process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s letters did include a process: the homeowner could “file an appeal with the Board of Directors… within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

Court records show Mr. Garcia followed this path and “filed an appeal with Villagio.” By doing so, he engaged with the HOA on their terms, likely focusing all his energy on meeting that urgent 10-day deadline. Because Villagio provided this internal process, the judge concluded it had met its legal obligation and was not required to inform Mr. Garcia about the alternative state-level hearing. This created a procedural trap: the HOA satisfied its legal requirement by offering an internal process that simultaneously diverted the homeowner’s attention from the more powerful, but less obvious, 21-day statutory deadline that would have unlocked his other rights.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Conflicting Deadlines Can Create a Legal Minefield

During a rehearing, Mr. Garcia argued that the HOA’s communication style effectively “prevented” him from using his full 21-day statutory response window. The notices demanded compliance within 10 days and were sent every 14 days with escalating fines. He felt the rapid succession of notices created a pressure cooker, making it impossible to properly exercise his rights.

The court flatly rejected this argument, highlighting a harsh legal truth. The judge found no evidence that Villagio had explicitly told Mr. Garcia he could not respond or had physically prevented him from sending a certified letter. The issuance of a second notice with a demanding 10-day timeline did not legally nullify the 21-day window he had to respond to the first. When asked directly if he was prohibited by a court order from sending a response, Mr. Garcia answered, “No.”

This reveals a common tactic, whether intentional or not, in HOA disputes. The violation notices contained two conflicting timelines: a prominent, urgent “10 days to comply” demand and the less obvious, but legally superior, 21-day statutory right to respond. This conflict creates confusion and pressure, causing homeowners to focus on the immediate threat (the 10-day deadline) while missing the most important legal one. The court, however, places the burden squarely on the homeowner to navigate this minefield, as feeling pressured is not a legal defense for failing to meet a statutory deadline.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Play the Game

The case of Mr. Garcia versus the Villagio at Tempe HOA is a powerful reminder that successfully challenging an HOA is not about being “right,” or even about taking action. It is about taking the correct, procedurally perfect action defined by law.

Mr. Garcia was not passive; he engaged and appealed the violation. His case was lost because he followed the path laid out for him by the HOA, not the one laid out for him by state statute. This crucial distinction—between an association’s internal process and the homeowner’s statutory rights—can mean the difference between victory and defeat. Before you act on any violation notice, you must first understand the precise rules of engagement, which may not be written in the notice itself.

If you received a violation notice today, would you know whether the appeal process in the letter is your only option, or a potential distraction from the legal first step required to truly protect your rights?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rogelio A. Garcia (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
  • Tom Gordon (community manager)
    Villagio / AAMAZ
    Testified as witness for Villagio
  • Amanda Shaw (property manager/agent)
    AAM LLC
    Listed as agent for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Charles P. Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County

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Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:59 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918006-REL/669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:02 (91.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the conflict involves Mr. Mandela’s multiple failed attempts to gain approval for a 150-square-foot patio structure on his property, which already contained a tool shed.

Blue Ridge denied Mr. Mandela’s three separate requests on distinct grounds: the first for exceeding the size limit for a “play structure,” the second for submitting incomplete plans for an “attached structure,” and the third for violating the “one detached structure” rule. In response, Mr. Mandela filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Blue Ridge had violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and engaged in discriminatory practices.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge conclusively denied Mr. Mandela’s petition. The judge found that Mr. Mandela failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation by Blue Ridge. The decisions affirmed that the HOA’s denials were consistent with its governing documents, that Mr. Mandela’s interpretation of key terms like “detached structure” and “temporary structure” was incorrect, and that his allegations of discrimination were unsubstantiated by evidence. The final order from the rehearing is binding on both parties.

Case Overview

This case documents a series of requests and denials between a homeowner and his HOA, culminating in a formal legal dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties Involved

Name/Entity

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

Respondent’s Counsel

Paul Frame, Esq. (FRAME LAW PLLC)

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Timeline of Key Events

Date (Approx.)

Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request: a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied for exceeding the 80 sq. ft. size limit.

Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his second request: to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans.

Mar 8, 2018

Mr. Mandela’s second request is formally denied due to “incomplete information.”

Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an appeal with Blue Ridge regarding the denial, which is subsequently denied.

Undisclosed

Mr. Mandela submits his third request: to build a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied because he already has a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure.

Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a).

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, once again denying the petition. This order is binding.

Analysis of Petitioner’s Requests and HOA Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed patio structure, each of which was denied for violating a different set of rules.

Request 1: Play Structure Application

Mr. Mandela first attempted to gain approval by using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form from the Blue Ridge website.

• Request Details: Construction of a cedar patio structure of approximately 150 square feet.

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied because the structure’s size exceeded the established limit. The application form explicitly states that play structures such as a “Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort” cannot exceed 80 square feet.

Request 2: Attached Patio Shade Application

Mr. Mandela next submitted a request to attach the cedar patio shade directly to his home.

• Request Details: The proposal involved attaching a structure to the main residence.

• HOA Actions: Blue Ridge Chairman John Hart requested documents, such as plans and materials, to verify the structure would not be free-standing.

• Petitioner’s Response: In a March 3, 2018 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof. The structures will be attached.”

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied on March 8, 2018, due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter specified that Mr. Mandela needed to provide detailed drawings matching the proposed construction and use the official 9-page form as required by CC&R guidelines. The subsequent appeal was also denied, with the board noting a need for an “elevation drawing of your specific construction” showing dimensions, materials, and foundation/attachment methods.

Request 3: Detached Patio Structure Application

Finally, Mr. Mandela submitted a request to build the 150-square-foot structure as a detached unit.

• Request Details: A free-standing, detached patio structure in his backyard.

• Reason for Denial: This request was denied because Mr. Mandela already had a tool shed on his property. According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one detached structure is permitted on a lot.

Core Legal Arguments and Adjudication

In the hearings, Mr. Mandela presented several arguments to challenge the HOA’s decisions. The Administrative Law Judge addressed each claim and found that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Definition of a “Detached Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Argued that the proposed patio structure was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, unlike a shed, it could not be “easily converted into a second residence.” He claimed this interpretation was supported by a prior ALJ decision involving Blue Ridge.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The Judge found this argument unpersuasive. The decision states that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.” It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela already had a shed, and the judge concluded the proposed patio was a “barred detached structure” under the governing rules.

Allegations of Discrimination and Unequal Enforcement

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela contended that Blue Ridge was discriminating against him. His claims included:

1. The play structure rule allowing a second detached structure under 80 sq. ft. unfairly discriminates against residents without children.

2. Blue Ridge was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. limit against other homeowners.

3. Blue Ridge had previously approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member, showing unequal enforcement.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The petitioner failed to provide credible evidence for these claims. Testimony from Blue Ridge Vice President Joseph Hancock refuted Mandela’s specific examples, showing that cited lots either had no violations or contained structures predating the relevant rules. The judge found Hancock’s testimony credible and noted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over potential constitutional equal protection claims.

Definition of a “Temporary Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela argued his proposed structure was not a prohibited temporary structure. He cited the product’s 5-year warranty against rot and his plan to use concrete pavers at the base, which he asserted constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules.

• HOA’s Position: Joseph Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.”

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The judge agreed with the HOA. The decision states: “The preponderance of the evidence shows that the proposed play structure is a temporary structure under the Blue Ridge CC&Rs because it does not have a cement or block foundation. The preponderance of the evidence shows that concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

Governing Rules and Regulations

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of specific sections of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs and the Architectural Committee’s aligned regulations.

Regulation

Summary of Provision

CC&R § 3.1

Restricts property use to “Single Family Residential Use.” Prohibits any building or structure separate from the main residence, with the exception of a garage.

Arch. Committee Reg. 3(D)

Modifies CC&R § 3.1 by allowing one detached structure to be constructed on a property with prior committee approval.

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Reg.

Prohibits temporary structures. Defines a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

CC&R § 3.24

Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any structure to be “commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered.”

Modified Rules (April 6, 2016)

Establishes rules for “Play Structures.” Allows for one of each type but no more than two total. Limits Tree Houses, Viewing Stands, and Play Houses/Forts to a maximum of 80 square feet.

Final Orders and Outcome

The legal proceedings resulted in a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association.

• Initial Decision (November 6, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

• Rehearing Decision (February 28, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision on the rehearing is noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”






Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,.

Respondent Side

  • Paul K. Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Blue Ridge Estates HOA,.
  • John Hart (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Chairman of Blue Ridge,.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member/witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Vice President of Blue Ridge; presented testimony,.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision.

Charles P. Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a); Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition alleging violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by the HOA. The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation, specifically concluding that the proposed cedar patio structure was a second detached structure or a temporary structure, both prohibited under the CC&Rs given the Petitioner already had a tool shed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by failing to prove that his proposed cedar patio structure was not a barred detached structure (since he already had a shed) or a barred temporary structure.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by HOA for denial of detached patio structure construction

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying his request to construct a approximately 150 square feet detached patio structure because he already had a tool shed on his property, while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16
  • CC&Rs § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:21 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918006-REL/669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:30 (91.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the conflict involves Mr. Mandela’s multiple failed attempts to gain approval for a 150-square-foot patio structure on his property, which already contained a tool shed.

Blue Ridge denied Mr. Mandela’s three separate requests on distinct grounds: the first for exceeding the size limit for a “play structure,” the second for submitting incomplete plans for an “attached structure,” and the third for violating the “one detached structure” rule. In response, Mr. Mandela filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Blue Ridge had violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and engaged in discriminatory practices.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge conclusively denied Mr. Mandela’s petition. The judge found that Mr. Mandela failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation by Blue Ridge. The decisions affirmed that the HOA’s denials were consistent with its governing documents, that Mr. Mandela’s interpretation of key terms like “detached structure” and “temporary structure” was incorrect, and that his allegations of discrimination were unsubstantiated by evidence. The final order from the rehearing is binding on both parties.

Case Overview

This case documents a series of requests and denials between a homeowner and his HOA, culminating in a formal legal dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties Involved

Name/Entity

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

Respondent’s Counsel

Paul Frame, Esq. (FRAME LAW PLLC)

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Timeline of Key Events

Date (Approx.)

Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request: a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied for exceeding the 80 sq. ft. size limit.

Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his second request: to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans.

Mar 8, 2018

Mr. Mandela’s second request is formally denied due to “incomplete information.”

Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an appeal with Blue Ridge regarding the denial, which is subsequently denied.

Undisclosed

Mr. Mandela submits his third request: to build a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied because he already has a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure.

Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a).

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, once again denying the petition. This order is binding.

Analysis of Petitioner’s Requests and HOA Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed patio structure, each of which was denied for violating a different set of rules.

Request 1: Play Structure Application

Mr. Mandela first attempted to gain approval by using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form from the Blue Ridge website.

• Request Details: Construction of a cedar patio structure of approximately 150 square feet.

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied because the structure’s size exceeded the established limit. The application form explicitly states that play structures such as a “Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort” cannot exceed 80 square feet.

Request 2: Attached Patio Shade Application

Mr. Mandela next submitted a request to attach the cedar patio shade directly to his home.

• Request Details: The proposal involved attaching a structure to the main residence.

• HOA Actions: Blue Ridge Chairman John Hart requested documents, such as plans and materials, to verify the structure would not be free-standing.

• Petitioner’s Response: In a March 3, 2018 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof. The structures will be attached.”

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied on March 8, 2018, due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter specified that Mr. Mandela needed to provide detailed drawings matching the proposed construction and use the official 9-page form as required by CC&R guidelines. The subsequent appeal was also denied, with the board noting a need for an “elevation drawing of your specific construction” showing dimensions, materials, and foundation/attachment methods.

Request 3: Detached Patio Structure Application

Finally, Mr. Mandela submitted a request to build the 150-square-foot structure as a detached unit.

• Request Details: A free-standing, detached patio structure in his backyard.

• Reason for Denial: This request was denied because Mr. Mandela already had a tool shed on his property. According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one detached structure is permitted on a lot.

Core Legal Arguments and Adjudication

In the hearings, Mr. Mandela presented several arguments to challenge the HOA’s decisions. The Administrative Law Judge addressed each claim and found that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Definition of a “Detached Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Argued that the proposed patio structure was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, unlike a shed, it could not be “easily converted into a second residence.” He claimed this interpretation was supported by a prior ALJ decision involving Blue Ridge.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The Judge found this argument unpersuasive. The decision states that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.” It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela already had a shed, and the judge concluded the proposed patio was a “barred detached structure” under the governing rules.

Allegations of Discrimination and Unequal Enforcement

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela contended that Blue Ridge was discriminating against him. His claims included:

1. The play structure rule allowing a second detached structure under 80 sq. ft. unfairly discriminates against residents without children.

2. Blue Ridge was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. limit against other homeowners.

3. Blue Ridge had previously approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member, showing unequal enforcement.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The petitioner failed to provide credible evidence for these claims. Testimony from Blue Ridge Vice President Joseph Hancock refuted Mandela’s specific examples, showing that cited lots either had no violations or contained structures predating the relevant rules. The judge found Hancock’s testimony credible and noted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over potential constitutional equal protection claims.

Definition of a “Temporary Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela argued his proposed structure was not a prohibited temporary structure. He cited the product’s 5-year warranty against rot and his plan to use concrete pavers at the base, which he asserted constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules.

• HOA’s Position: Joseph Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.”

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The judge agreed with the HOA. The decision states: “The preponderance of the evidence shows that the proposed play structure is a temporary structure under the Blue Ridge CC&Rs because it does not have a cement or block foundation. The preponderance of the evidence shows that concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

Governing Rules and Regulations

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of specific sections of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs and the Architectural Committee’s aligned regulations.

Regulation

Summary of Provision

CC&R § 3.1

Restricts property use to “Single Family Residential Use.” Prohibits any building or structure separate from the main residence, with the exception of a garage.

Arch. Committee Reg. 3(D)

Modifies CC&R § 3.1 by allowing one detached structure to be constructed on a property with prior committee approval.

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Reg.

Prohibits temporary structures. Defines a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

CC&R § 3.24

Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any structure to be “commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered.”

Modified Rules (April 6, 2016)

Establishes rules for “Play Structures.” Allows for one of each type but no more than two total. Limits Tree Houses, Viewing Stands, and Play Houses/Forts to a maximum of 80 square feet.

Final Orders and Outcome

The legal proceedings resulted in a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association.

• Initial Decision (November 6, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

• Rehearing Decision (February 28, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision on the rehearing is noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”






Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,.

Respondent Side

  • Paul K. Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Blue Ridge Estates HOA,.
  • John Hart (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Chairman of Blue Ridge,.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member/witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Vice President of Blue Ridge; presented testimony,.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision.

William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:00 (118.5 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:03 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

• Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

• Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

• Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

• Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

• Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

• No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

• Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

• No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

• Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

• Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

• Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

• Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

• Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

• Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

• Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

• Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

• Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

• Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL



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