Tag Archives: CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla vs. Village of Oakcreek Association

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Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-09
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla Counsel —
Respondent Village of Oakcreek Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition, finding that the Petitioner waived the right to challenge the outcome of the November 10, 2016 vote concerning the faulty ballot (Issue 2) because he failed to object before the vote proceeded. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims regarding the required vote count (Issue 1) and unauthorized fines (Issue 3).

Why this result: Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection after receiving the ballot, and failed to prove the claims for issues 1 and 3.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide separate voting opportunity for each proposed action in absentee ballot

Petitioner alleged the November 10, 2016 vote was invalid because the absentee ballot combined two distinct proposed amendments (Leasing restrictions and Schedule of Fines) into a single vote, contravening the requirement that ballots set forth and provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.

Orders: Claim failed because Petitioner waived the right to object to the faulty ballot by allowing the vote to proceed without objection.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA elections, absentee ballots, waiver doctrine, amendment procedure, fines
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
  • Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297
  • Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 673729.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:15 (40.8 KB)

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 673828.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:15 (48.5 KB)

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 680738.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:15 (103.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association (Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Scott S. Servilla versus the Village of Oakcreek Association. The final order, issued on January 9, 2019, following a rehearing, denied the petitioner’s claims. The central issue revolved around a homeowners association vote held on November 10, 2016, where two distinct amendments—one concerning property leasing and another a schedule of fines—were combined into a single item on the ballot.

The petitioner argued this ballot format violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A), which requires a separate opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action. However, the ALJ’s decision did not rule on the merits of this statutory violation. Instead, the petition was denied based on the legal doctrine of waiver. The ALJ concluded that the petitioner, having received the allegedly defective ballot more than a month before the vote, had forfeited his right to challenge the procedure by failing to raise any objection until after the vote was completed and the unfavorable outcome was known. The decision heavily relies on the precedent set by the Arizona Supreme Court in Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, which established that a party cannot knowingly allow a flawed election to proceed and then protest only after receiving an undesirable result. The ALJ’s decision is binding, with any appeal required to be filed in superior court.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was a dispute brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the validity of an amendment to the association’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla

Respondent

Village of Oakcreek Association

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

November 29, 2018

Record Held Open Until

December 20, 2018

Decision Issued

January 9, 2019

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Petition: On or about November 13, 2017, Scott S. Servilla filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Village of Oakcreek Association, an HOA with 2436 homeowners.

2. Expansion of Claims: The petitioner initially filed a single-issue petition with a $500 fee but was ordered by the ALJ to either specify the single issue or pay for a multi-issue hearing. The petitioner paid an additional $1,000 and proceeded with three distinct claims.

3. First ALJ Decision: Following an initial hearing, the ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove two of his three claims. On the second claim—the improper ballot format—the judge found a statutory violation had occurred but concluded that “because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism to the Administrative Law Judge, no remedy could be ordered.”

4. Request for Rehearing: The petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, arguing that the conclusion of “no remedy” was contrary to law.

5. Rehearing Granted: On or about September 21, 2018, the Commissioner for the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing, which was held on November 29, 2018.

III. The Central Dispute: The November 10, 2016 Vote

The core of the dispute was the validity of a vote taken during a Special Meeting of Members on November 10, 2016.

• Bundled Amendments: The vote’s stated purpose was to approve the “Leasing and Schedule of Fines Assessment.” This single proposal combined two separate and substantive changes to the Master Declaration:

1. Addition of Section 4.23: Leasing of Lots and Units; Restrictions and Limitations, which established a minimum lease term of 30 days and prohibited leasing less than an entire unit.

2. Replacement of Section 5.08: Schedule of Fines, which permitted the association’s committee to adopt a new schedule specifying fines for violations.

• Ballot Format: The absentee ballot provided members with only a single voting choice: “FOR THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT” or “AGAINST THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT.”

• Statutory Violation Alleged: The petitioner contended this format violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A), which requires that a ballot “shall set forth each proposed action” and “shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

• Vote Outcome: A total of 1,067 ballots were received (approximately 44% of members). Of those, 564 voted in favor of the amendment, constituting approximately 53% of the votes cast.

IV. Key Arguments at Rehearing

• Statutory Violation: The ballot was legally defective because it combined two distinct proposed actions into one vote, denying members the right to vote on each separately as required by statute.

• Evidence of Dissent: The petitioner argued that a subsequent vote in April 2017, in which members rejected a proposal to eliminate the By-Laws’ $50 fine limit, demonstrated that “had the proposed amendment been broken into two parts, the part of the proposed amendment dealing with the fines most likely would have failed.”

• Requested Remedy: The petitioner argued that based on case law, the ALJ was authorized to declare the entire amendment void and unenforceable.

• Waiver of Objection: The respondent’s primary argument was that the petitioner had waived any right to object to the ballot format. The petitioner received the absentee ballot on or about October 4, 2016, but did not raise an objection until April 2017, long after the November 10, 2016 vote was completed.

• Lack of Enforcement Provision: The respondent also maintained its earlier position that even if a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(2) occurred, the statute itself provides no enforcement mechanism or remedy.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s final decision denied the petitioner’s petition in its entirety, based solely on the legal principle of waiver.

The ALJ found that the petitioner’s failure to object to the ballot’s format in a timely manner was fatal to his claim.

• Awareness of Defect: The petitioner received the absentee ballot on October 4, 2016, over a month before the November 10, 2016 vote. This provided sufficient time to identify the procedural issue and raise an objection.

• Failure to Act: By not objecting before the vote, the petitioner allowed the flawed process to proceed. He only lodged a complaint after the results were not in his favor.

• Forfeiture of Rights: The ALJ concluded, “As Petitioner was or should have been aware of the alleged issues with the ballot, he waived his right to bring forth a complaint about the ballot when he allowed the vote to proceed on November 10, 2016.”

The decision rested on the Arizona Supreme Court case Zajac v. City of Casa Grande (2004), which itself relied on Allen v. State (1913). This precedent establishes that a party cannot remain silent about a known procedural defect in an election process and then challenge the process only after an unfavorable outcome.

• Key Principle: The ALJ articulated the principle from Zajac: “one cannot knowingly let a defective vote proceed only to complain and seek redress if the results are not to the individual’s liking.”

• Direct Quotation: The decision directly quotes the ruling in Zajac to finalize its point: “He cannot have it both ways; that is, he cannot allow the [vote] to proceed without objection, and then be permitted thereafter to assert his protest.”

• Petition Denied: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

• Binding Decision: As the decision was issued as a result of a rehearing, it is legally binding on the parties.

• Appeal Process: Any party wishing to appeal the order must file for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served (January 9, 2019).






Study Guide – 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association (Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal case involving Petitioner Scott Servilla and Respondent Village of Oakcreek Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of January 9, 2019. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, a corresponding answer key, suggested essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based entirely on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what roles did they play?

2. What were the two distinct proposed changes that were combined into a single voting item on the November 10, 2016 absentee ballot?

3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute did the Petitioner allege was violated by the format of the ballot, and what does that statute require?

4. What was the numerical outcome of the November 10, 2016 vote on the proposed amendment?

5. What was the Respondent’s primary legal argument for why the Petitioner’s complaint about the faulty ballot should be dismissed?

6. What key legal precedent, specifically the case of Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rely upon in the final decision?

7. According to the decision, when did the Petitioner receive the ballot, and why was this date critical to the ALJ’s final ruling?

8. What was the finding in the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision regarding the ballot issue, and why did it lead to a request for a rehearing?

9. Describe the separate vote that occurred in April 2017 and explain how the Petitioner used it to support his argument regarding the 2016 vote.

10. What was the final order issued by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on January 9, 2019, and what was the legal basis for this order?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Scott S. Servilla (who appeared on his own behalf), and the Respondent, the Village of Oakcreek Association (a homeowners association represented by Mark Sahl). The Petitioner filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. The two proposed changes were the addition of a new section, 4.23, concerning “Leasing of Lots and Units; Restrictions and Limitations,” and the complete replacement of an existing section, 5.08, titled “Schedule of Fines.” The ballot presented these as a single item called the “LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT.”

3. The Petitioner alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(2) and A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2). The statute requires that an absentee ballot “shall set forth each proposed action” and “shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

4. A total of 1067 ballots were received, representing approximately 44 percent of the members. Of those who voted, 564 (approximately 53 percent) voted in favor of the proposed amendment.

5. The Respondent’s primary argument was that the Petitioner had waived any right to object to the ballot’s format. The Respondent contended that the Petitioner should have raised his objection before the vote occurred, rather than waiting until after the results were known.

6. The ALJ relied on the precedent set in Zajac v. City of Casa Grande. This Arizona Supreme Court case established the principle that an individual aware of a procedural issue with an election cannot wait to see the results before lodging a complaint.

7. The Petitioner acknowledged receiving the absentee ballot on or about October 4, 2016, more than a month before the November 10, 2016 vote. This date was critical because it demonstrated that the Petitioner had ample time to object to the ballot’s format before the vote took place, supporting the ALJ’s waiver finding.

8. In the initial decision, the ALJ found that a violation of the statute had occurred regarding the ballot but concluded that no remedy could be ordered because the statute lacked an enforcement mechanism. The Petitioner requested a rehearing, alleging that this conclusion was contrary to the law and that the ALJ did have the authority to declare the amendment void.

9. In April 2017, a separate proposed amendment to eliminate the By-Laws’ $50 fine limitation was voted down by the members. The Petitioner argued this subsequent vote demonstrated that the fines portion of the November 2016 amendment would likely have failed if members had been given a separate opportunity to vote on it.

10. The final order, issued January 9, 2019, denied the Petitioner’s petition. The legal basis was the doctrine of waiver; the ALJ ruled that because the Petitioner was aware of the alleged issues with the ballot before the vote and failed to object, he waived his right to complain about it after the results were announced.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive essay responses based on the details and legal reasoning presented in the source documents.

1. Explain the legal doctrine of waiver as applied in this case. How did the timeline of events, from the receipt of the ballot to the filing of the petition, support the Administrative Law Judge’s application of the principles from Zajac v. City of Casa Grande?

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of “proposed action” under A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Although the Judge ultimately ruled on procedural grounds, which party’s interpretation of the statute appears more consistent with the law’s text and intent?

3. Discuss the procedural history of this case, from the initial filing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate through the first decision, the request for reconsideration, and the final ruling on rehearing. What does this progression reveal about the administrative hearing process and the remedies available to petitioners?

4. The Petitioner attempted to use the results of an April 2017 vote to argue that the fines portion of the November 2016 amendment would likely have failed if voted on separately. Evaluate the strength and relevance of this argument within the legal context of the case.

5. Imagine the Petitioner had raised his objection to the ballot format before the November 10, 2016 vote. Based on the information in the decision, how might the proceedings and the ultimate outcome have been different?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The Petitioner alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 and § 33-1812.

Absentee Ballot

A ballot that allows a member to vote without being physically present at a meeting. The format of this ballot was the central issue of the rehearing.

By-Laws

The rules that govern the internal operations of an association. The Petitioner cited a violation of By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII concerning a $50 fine limit.

Department (The Department)

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency where the Petitioner first filed his petition against the homeowners association.

Master Declaration

A core governing document for a homeowners association that establishes rules, restrictions, and obligations for homeowners. The November 10, 2016 vote was to amend this document.

A formal, binding decision issued by a judge. The final document in this case was an order denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Scott Servilla & Heidi H. Servilla.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than the evidence offered in opposition.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case granted to reconsider the initial decision. A rehearing was granted after the Petitioner argued that the initial finding of “no remedy” was contrary to law.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Village of Oakcreek Association.

Waiver

A legal doctrine where a party intentionally or through inaction gives up a known right or claim. The ALJ ruled the Petitioner waived his right to object to the ballot by not raising the issue before the vote.

Zajac v. City of Casa Grande

An Arizona Supreme Court case that established a key legal precedent used in this decision. It holds that a party cannot knowingly allow a defective vote to proceed and then complain only if the results are unfavorable.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG


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{ “rehearing”: { “is_rehearing”: true, “base_case_id”: “18F-H1817018-REL”, “original_decision_status”: “affirmed”, “original_decision_summary”: “In the original decision, the Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to prove claims regarding issues one and three1. For issue two (faulty ballot), the ALJ established a statutory violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2), but concluded that no remedy could be ordered because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism1.”, “rehearing_decision_summary”: “The Commissioner granted the rehearing to address the legal conclusion that no remedy could be ordered for the violation found in Issue 22. Following the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition3, concluding that Petitioner waived the right to complain about the faulty ballot because he was aware of the alleged issues but allowed the November 10, 2016 vote to proceed without objection4….”, “issues_challenged”: [ { “issue_number”: 2, “description”: “Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2) because the written ballot used did not provide a separate opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action7.”, “challenge”: “Petitioner challenged the original conclusion that no remedy could be ordered, alleging this was contrary to the law and arguing that the Administrative Law Judge was authorized to declare the amendment void and unenforceable28.”, “rehearing_outcome”: “Denied/Failed. The claim failed because the ALJ ruled that Petitioner waived his right to bring forth a complaint about the ballot by allowing the vote to proceed without objection36.” } ] } }

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This document summarizes the administrative law judge decision in the rehearing case of Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association, Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG1. This matter was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on November 29, 2018, with the record held open until December 20, 20181.

Procedural History (Original Decision vs. Rehearing)

Petitioner Scott Servilla filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) against the Village of Oakcreek Association (Respondent) alleging multiple violations of statute and the community’s Master Declaration2,3.

Original Decision: The Administrative Law Judge initially ruled on three issues4. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to prove two claims5. However, the ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2) regarding the written ballot, but concluded that because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism, no remedy could be ordered5.

Rehearing Grant: Following this initial decision, Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, arguing the conclusion that no remedy existed was contrary to law6. The ADRE Commissioner granted the request for rehearing6.

Key Facts and Issue for Rehearing

The central issue during the rehearing concerned the statutory violation found in the original decision: whether the November 10, 2016 vote to amend the Master Declaration was invalid because the absentee ballot failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)4,7.

The Ballot Violation: A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) requires that absentee ballots set forth “each proposed action” and provide an opportunity to vote for or against “each proposed action”7. The Respondent’s proposed amendment bundled two distinct actions: the addition of leasing restrictions and the complete replacement of the Schedule of Fines8,9,10. The ballot only allowed members to vote “FOR” or “AGAINST THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT” as a single package9.

Key Legal Argument and Decision

At the rehearing, the core legal debate shifted from whether a violation occurred to whether the Petitioner was entitled to relief, specifically whether the ALJ could declare the amendment void and unenforceable6,11.

Respondent’s Defense and the Doctrine of Waiver: Respondent argued that Petitioner had waived the right to object because he did not raise any complaint about the defective ballot prior to the vote12. Petitioner received the ballot more than one month before the November 10, 2016 vote13.

ALJ Legal Conclusion: Drawing on Arizona Supreme Court precedent (Zajac v. City of Casa Grande)10,14, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that an individual cannot allow a known defective vote to proceed and only complain afterward if dissatisfied with the results15,16. Because Petitioner failed to raise an objection to the faulty ballot prior to the scheduled vote, he waived his right to bring a subsequent complaint about the ballot16.

Based on the application of the waiver doctrine, the ALJ found that Petitioner’s claim as to the ballot must fail16. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner’s petition is denied17. This order, resulting from the rehearing, is binding on the parties17.

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“case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla vs. Village of Oakcreek Association”,
“decision_date”: “2019-01-09”,
“alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”
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“attorney_firm”: null,
“attorney_email”: null,
“attorney_phone”: null
},
{
“party_id”: “R1”,
“role”: “respondent”,
“name”: “Village of Oakcreek Association”,
“party_type”: “HOA”,
“email”: null,
“phone”: null,
“attorney_name”: “Mark K. Sahl”,
“attorney_firm”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”,
“attorney_email”: null,
“attorney_phone”: null
}
],
“issues”: [
{
“issue_id”: “ISS-001”,
“type”: “statute”,
“citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)”,
“caption”: “Vote count required to amend declaration”,
“violation(s)”: “Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and Declaration regarding the required majority vote (1173 votes) for the November 10, 2016 amendment.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner requested an order declaring the amendment invalid due to insufficient vote count.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
“filing_fee_paid”: 500.0,
“filing_fee_refunded”: false,
“civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0,
“orders_summary”: “Claim failed.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner failed to prove the claim.”,
“cited”: []
},
{
“issue_id”: “ISS-002”,
“type”: “statute”,
“citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“caption”: “Absence of separate voting opportunity for proposed actions”,
“violation(s)”: “The written ballot used for the November 10, 2016 amendment violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) and (B)(2) because it bundled two distinct proposed actions (Leasing Restrictions and Schedule of Fines) into a single vote.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner sought an order declaring the amendment invalid because the ballot improperly required a single vote on two separate actions.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
“filing_fee_paid”: 500.0,
“filing_fee_refunded”: false,
“civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0,
“orders_summary”: “Claim denied on rehearing. Petition denied.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the faulty ballot by receiving it over a month prior and allowing the vote to proceed on November 10, 2016, without raising a complaint.”,
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”,
“Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114”
]
},
{
“issue_id”: “ISS-003”,
“type”: “governing_document”,
“citation”: “By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII”,
“caption”: “Unauthorized fines in excess of $50”,
“violation(s)”: “Respondent allegedly violated By-Laws by imposing fines in excess of $50 per violation, especially after a proposed amendment to raise the fines was voted down.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner requested an order that the Association cannot levy fines in excess of $50 per violation.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
“filing_fee_paid”: 500.0,
“filing_fee_refunded”: false,
“civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0,
“orders_summary”: “Claim failed.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner failed to prove the claim.”,
“cited”: []
}
],
“money_summary”: {
“issues_count”: 3,
“total_filing_fees_paid”: 1500.0,
“total_filing_fees_refunded”: 0.0,
“total_civil_penalties”: 0.0
},
“outcomes”: {
“petitioner_is_hoa”: false,
“petitioner_win”: “loss”,
“summarize_judgement”: “The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection, and failed to prove the claims for Issues 1 and 3.”,
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”
]
},
“analytics”: {
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)”,
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”,
“Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114”
],
“tags”: [
“HOA elections”,
“absentee ballots”,
“waiver doctrine”,
“amendment procedure”,
“fines”
]
}
}

{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”,
“case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla, vs. Village of Oakcreek Association”,
“decision_date”: “2019-01-09”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Scott Servilla”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Appeared on his own behalf at the hearing; also listed as Scott S. Servilla [1], [2]”
},
{
“name”: “Heidi H Servilla”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”,
“role”: “ALJ”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Office of Administrative Hearings”,
“notes”: “Administrative Law Judge [3], [4], [1], [2]”
},
{
“name”: “Mark K. Sahl”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”,
“notes”: “Represented Village of Oakcreek Association [2]”
},
{
“name”: “Judy Lowe”,
“role”: “commissioner”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Granted the request for rehearing [5]”
},
{
“name”: “c. serrano”,
“role”: “staff”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitted documents on November 29, 2018 [6], [7]”
},
{
“name”: “Felicia Del Sol”,
“role”: “staff”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitted documents on January 9, 2019 [8]”
},
{
“name”: “LDettorre”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “AHansen”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “djones”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “DGardner”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “ncano”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
}
]
}


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Scott Servilla (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Scott S. Servilla
  • Heidi H Servilla (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmitted documents
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted documents

William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:00 (118.5 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:03 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

• Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

• Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

• Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

• Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

• Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

• No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

• Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

• No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

• Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

• Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

• Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

• Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

• Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

• Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

• Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

• Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

• Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

• Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL



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