Susannah Sabnekar v. Four Peaks Vista Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H006-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-10-26
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susannah Sabnekar Counsel
Respondent Four Peaks Vista Owners Association Counsel Maria McKee

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1252 and 33-1217

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the statutes cited by the petitioner regarding conveyance of common elements (A.R.S. §§ 33-1252 and 33-1217) do not apply to the leasing of common elements, which was the action taken by the Respondent HOA.

Why this result: The statutes cited by the Petitioner apply to conveyances, but the disputed action was determined to be a lease, which is treated separately under Arizona's Condominium Act.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Board violated statute by conveying a portion of common elements without a vote from all homeowners.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1252 and 33-1217 by approving a lease agreement granting the Declarant (Four Peaks) the right to use a portion of the clubhouse as a management office, arguing this action constituted a conveyance requiring an 80% homeowner vote. The ALJ ruled that the statutes apply only to conveyances, not leases, and found no violation.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • 33-1252
  • 33-1217
  • 33-1242
  • 33-1225

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium Act, Lease vs Conveyance, Common Elements, Declarant Rights, Motion to Dismiss
Additional Citations:

  • 33-1252
  • 33-1217
  • 33-1242
  • 33-1225
  • 33-1226

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H006-REL Decision – 1097274.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:00:57 (52.7 KB)

24F-H006-REL Decision – 1099296.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:01:00 (50.8 KB)

24F-H006-REL Decision – 1099320.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:01:04 (48.2 KB)

24F-H006-REL Decision – 1106232.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:01:09 (118.8 KB)

Questions

Question

Does leasing a common area count as 'conveying' it, requiring a supermajority vote?

Short Answer

No. Leasing and conveying are separate legal concepts in Arizona, and leasing does not trigger the voting requirements of a conveyance.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that Arizona law distinguishes between leasing real property and conveying it. While a conveyance (transfer of title) of common elements often requires an 80% vote under A.R.S. § 33-1252, granting a lease does not. The Association has the specific statutory right to grant leases over common elements without meeting the stricter requirements for a conveyance.

Alj Quote

Plainly, Arizona law distinguishes between leasing real property and conveying it. These are two separate legal concepts. … The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. §§ 33-1252 and A.R.S. 33-1217 do not apply to leases, but rather conveyances.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(9); A.R.S. § 33-1252

Topic Tags

  • common elements
  • leasing
  • voting requirements

Question

Can the HOA board authorize a lease of common elements without a vote of all homeowners?

Short Answer

Yes. The Board generally has the authority to grant leases, whereas conveying the property would require a homeowner vote.

Detailed Answer

The decision highlights that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(9) expressly gives the Association the right to lease common elements. This section does not reference the voting requirements found in A.R.S. § 33-1252, which applies only when the Association conveys or encumbers the property (like a mortgage).

Alj Quote

Notably, subsection (A)(9) expressly provides the Association the right to enter into the Lease, without any mention of A.R.S. § 33-1252, while the right to 'convey' Common Elements is subject to the requirements imposed in A.R.S. § 33-1252.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(9)

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • leasing
  • common elements

Question

Is a Declarant allowed to use common elements for management offices?

Short Answer

Yes, a Declarant may maintain offices on common elements unless the Declaration specifically prohibits it.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited A.R.S. § 33-1225, which explicitly permits a declarant to maintain sales and management offices on common elements unless the community's declaration says otherwise or another law prohibits it.

Alj Quote

A declarant may maintain sales offices, management offices and models in units or on common elements in the condominium unless: 1. The declaration provides otherwise. 2. Such use is prohibited by another provision of law or local ordinances.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1225

Topic Tags

  • declarant rights
  • common elements
  • offices

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a petition against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the statute. The standard is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more probable than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the A.R.S. §§ 33-1252 and A.R.S. 33-1217 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal procedure
  • burden of proof

Question

What qualifies as a 'conveyance' of HOA property?

Short Answer

A conveyance is generally interpreted as a total transfer of fee title, usually evidenced by a recorded deed.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that a conveyance involves a permanent transfer of interest, such as through a deed, and must be recorded. A lease, which is for a set period and does not transfer title, does not qualify as a conveyance.

Alj Quote

The Legislature… made clear its intent that a conveyance is a total transfer of fee title. … Furthermore, once any such 'conveyance' occurs, it must be evidenced by the execution and recording of the document in the same manner as a deed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1252(A); A.R.S. § 33-1252(B)

Topic Tags

  • definitions
  • conveyance
  • property rights

Question

How are ambiguous restrictive covenants in CC&Rs interpreted?

Short Answer

If they are unambiguous, they are enforced according to the intent of the parties.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that restrictive covenants must be viewed as a whole and interpreted based on their underlying purpose. If the text is clear (unambiguous), it is enforced to uphold the parties' intent.

Alj Quote

In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. 'Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.'

Legal Basis

Case Law (Powell v. Washburn)

Topic Tags

  • CC&Rs
  • interpretation
  • legal standards

Case

Docket No
24F-H006-REL
Case Title
Susannah Sabnekar vs. Four Peaks Vista Owners Association
Decision Date
2023-10-26
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Does leasing a common area count as 'conveying' it, requiring a supermajority vote?

Short Answer

No. Leasing and conveying are separate legal concepts in Arizona, and leasing does not trigger the voting requirements of a conveyance.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that Arizona law distinguishes between leasing real property and conveying it. While a conveyance (transfer of title) of common elements often requires an 80% vote under A.R.S. § 33-1252, granting a lease does not. The Association has the specific statutory right to grant leases over common elements without meeting the stricter requirements for a conveyance.

Alj Quote

Plainly, Arizona law distinguishes between leasing real property and conveying it. These are two separate legal concepts. … The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. §§ 33-1252 and A.R.S. 33-1217 do not apply to leases, but rather conveyances.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(9); A.R.S. § 33-1252

Topic Tags

  • common elements
  • leasing
  • voting requirements

Question

Can the HOA board authorize a lease of common elements without a vote of all homeowners?

Short Answer

Yes. The Board generally has the authority to grant leases, whereas conveying the property would require a homeowner vote.

Detailed Answer

The decision highlights that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(9) expressly gives the Association the right to lease common elements. This section does not reference the voting requirements found in A.R.S. § 33-1252, which applies only when the Association conveys or encumbers the property (like a mortgage).

Alj Quote

Notably, subsection (A)(9) expressly provides the Association the right to enter into the Lease, without any mention of A.R.S. § 33-1252, while the right to 'convey' Common Elements is subject to the requirements imposed in A.R.S. § 33-1252.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(9)

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • leasing
  • common elements

Question

Is a Declarant allowed to use common elements for management offices?

Short Answer

Yes, a Declarant may maintain offices on common elements unless the Declaration specifically prohibits it.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited A.R.S. § 33-1225, which explicitly permits a declarant to maintain sales and management offices on common elements unless the community's declaration says otherwise or another law prohibits it.

Alj Quote

A declarant may maintain sales offices, management offices and models in units or on common elements in the condominium unless: 1. The declaration provides otherwise. 2. Such use is prohibited by another provision of law or local ordinances.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1225

Topic Tags

  • declarant rights
  • common elements
  • offices

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a petition against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the statute. The standard is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more probable than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the A.R.S. §§ 33-1252 and A.R.S. 33-1217 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal procedure
  • burden of proof

Question

What qualifies as a 'conveyance' of HOA property?

Short Answer

A conveyance is generally interpreted as a total transfer of fee title, usually evidenced by a recorded deed.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that a conveyance involves a permanent transfer of interest, such as through a deed, and must be recorded. A lease, which is for a set period and does not transfer title, does not qualify as a conveyance.

Alj Quote

The Legislature… made clear its intent that a conveyance is a total transfer of fee title. … Furthermore, once any such 'conveyance' occurs, it must be evidenced by the execution and recording of the document in the same manner as a deed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1252(A); A.R.S. § 33-1252(B)

Topic Tags

  • definitions
  • conveyance
  • property rights

Question

How are ambiguous restrictive covenants in CC&Rs interpreted?

Short Answer

If they are unambiguous, they are enforced according to the intent of the parties.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that restrictive covenants must be viewed as a whole and interpreted based on their underlying purpose. If the text is clear (unambiguous), it is enforced to uphold the parties' intent.

Alj Quote

In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. 'Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.'

Legal Basis

Case Law (Powell v. Washburn)

Topic Tags

  • CC&Rs
  • interpretation
  • legal standards

Case

Docket No
24F-H006-REL
Case Title
Susannah Sabnekar vs. Four Peaks Vista Owners Association
Decision Date
2023-10-26
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susannah Sabnekar (petitioner)
    Homeowner
  • Amy Watier (witness)
    Homeowner, current board member, and previous board member

Respondent Side

  • Maria McKee (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Council for Respondent
  • Chad P. Miesen (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Council for Respondent
  • Charlie Markle (HOA attorney)
    Council for the Association
  • Kathy Gower (property manager)
    Four Peaks Vista Owners Association
    Community manager
  • Shelley Kobat (board member)
    Four Peaks Vista Owners Association
    Associate board president

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission list
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission list
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission list
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission list

James Dutton vs. Cielo Noche Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-05
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James Dutton Counsel Steven W. Cheifetz
Respondent Cielo Noche Community Association Counsel Lydia Linsmeier; Nicholas Nogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the petition, finding that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by failing to notice at least one meeting which was improperly held in closed session. The Tribunal noted that while some executive sessions regarding pending litigation were permissible, meetings regarding vendor changes (management and landscaping) required open session and notice. The filing fee was refunded, but no civil penalty was assessed as the conduct was not found to be intentional or in bad faith.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide notice of meetings and acting on results of secret meetings

Petitioner alleged the Association violated open meeting laws by failing to provide notice of meetings held between November 2017 and May 2018, specifically regarding the hiring of new management and landscaping companies in executive session without community input or proper notice.

Orders: The Tribunal found the Respondent held at least one closed meeting that should have been open/noticed. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 6
  • 7
  • 48
  • 49
  • 50

Decision Documents

19F-H1918014-REL Decision – 693361.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:15:40 (45.6 KB)

19F-H1918014-REL Decision – 699583.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:15:40 (194.0 KB)

**Case Summary: James Dutton vs. Cielo Noche Community Association**
**Case No.** 19F-H1918014-REL
**Forum:** Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)
**Administrative Law Judge:** Jenna Clark

**Overview and Main Issues**
This case involved a dispute between Petitioner James Dutton, a homeowner and former Board President, and the Respondent, Cielo Noche Community Association. The central legal issue was whether the Association violated **A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law)** by failing to provide notice of Board meetings and conducting business in secret executive sessions between November 2017 and May 2018,.

**Key Facts and Arguments**
* **Petitioner’s Position:** Dutton argued that the Board improperly utilized executive sessions to make significant financial and operational decisions without community input. Specifically, he presented evidence that the Board voted to replace the management company (Trestle with Tri-City) and the landscaping vendor (Peak) during closed sessions,,. Dutton noted that the new management contract cost the community 3% more than the previous one. He further alleged that the Board failed to read minutes from emergency meetings held in September and November 2018 at subsequent open meetings, as required by law,.
* **Respondent’s Position:** The Association contended that the closed sessions were necessary and privileged. Witnesses testified that discussions regarding the management company involved "employee performance" and that other closed sessions concerned pending litigation and settlement negotiations with the developer, K. Hovnanian Homes (KHOV), regarding construction defects,,.
* **Testimony on Compliance:** Kari Moyer, the community manager from Tri-City, admitted that a July 2018 meeting was not noticed due to a miscommunication. She also testified that she subsequently had to inform the Board that they were not permitted to hold executive sessions for the reasons they had been using and instructed them to hold such discussions in open session moving forward.

**Legal Analysis**
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) evaluated the evidence under **A.R.S. § 33-1804**. This statute mandates that all meetings of a planned community association be open to members, with limited exceptions for legal advice, pending litigation, and personnel matters,. The law also requires that minutes from emergency meetings be read and approved at the next regularly scheduled meeting.

The Tribunal found that while the Board claimed privilege regarding the developer negotiations, the Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent held at least one closed meeting that should have been open. Furthermore, the lack of proper notice for these meetings constituted a violation of the state's Open Meeting Law.

**Final Decision and Order**
* **Ruling:** The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by failing to properly notice meetings and holding discussions in closed sessions that required open deliberation,.
* **Financial Outcome:** The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00.
* **Civil Penalties:** The Tribunal declined to assess a civil penalty against the Association. The Judge determined that the record did not reflect that the Board’s conduct was intentional, negligent, or committed in bad faith.

**Date of Order:** April 05, 2019.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • James Dutton (petitioner)
    Cielo Noche subdivision
    Former Board President; property owner
  • Steven W. Cheifetz (attorney)
    Cheifetz Law, PLLC
    Counsel for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C. Nogami (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Lydia Linsmeier (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Kari Moyer (witness)
    Tri-City Property Management Services
    Community Manager
  • David Hibler (witness)
    Cielo Noche Community Association
    Board Treasurer

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Signed minute entries/transmission

Other Participants

  • Cindo Dutton (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Aaron Smith (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Bob Willis (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Thomas Pruit (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Kenny Shepherd (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Luke Clesceri (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Carol Clesceri (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Derek Zeigler (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Carole Cozzi (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Anthony Cozzi (observer)
    Attended hearing

Brown, William M. vs. Terravita Country Club Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 11F-H1112007-BFS
Agency Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2012-05-08
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua M. Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) because, although it provided the policy, it did not do so within the mandatory ten business days. The late delivery was attributed to an unintentional computer error. Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party and awarded the $550.00 filing fee, but no civil penalties were assessed against the Respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records (Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy) within ten business days

Petitioner requested a copy of the Respondent's Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy. Respondent failed to provide the policy within the statutory ten business day period, allegedly due to a computer error where the email became stuck in an outbox.

Orders: Respondent shall pay Petitioner his filing fee of $550.00. No civil penalty imposed as Respondent attempted to comply.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Decision Documents

11F-H125885-BFS Decision – 292130.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:25:36 (81.4 KB)

11F-H125885-BFS Decision – 295358.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:25:36 (60.5 KB)

Based on the provided sources, here is a summary of the administrative hearing for *William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.* (Case No. 11F-H1112007-BFS). Please note that the case number in the provided documents differs from the one listed in your query.

### Case Overview
**Petitioner:** William M. Brown
**Respondent:** Terravita Country Club, Inc.
**Case Number:** 11F-H1112007-BFS
**Tribunal:** Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
**Date of Decision:** May 8, 2012 (Certified Final on June 14, 2012),

### Key Facts and Proceedings
The dispute arose from a records request made by the Petitioner, a resident of the Respondent's planned community. On October 21, 2011, the Petitioner emailed the Respondent requesting a copy of the "Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy".

The Respondent’s Custodian of Records initially provided a "Certificate of Insurance Liability" rather than the full policy. The Petitioner clarified his request later that day. On November 4, 2011, the Custodian attempted to email the correct policy to the Petitioner. However, she testified that the email became "stuck" in her outbox due to a computer error and was not successfully delivered until November 7, 2011,,.

The Petitioner filed a complaint alleging the Respondent failed to provide the records within the ten-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona law. During the proceedings, the Petitioner also alleged that the Respondent's witness committed perjury regarding her involvement in other civil litigation and the spelling of her name,.

### Main Legal Issues
1. **Statutory Compliance:** Whether the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which requires community associations to make records available within ten business days of a request.
2. **Defense of Error:** Whether the Respondent's unintentional "computer error" excused the failure to meet the statutory deadline,.
3. **Witness Credibility:** Whether the Respondent’s witness provided false testimony regarding her personal details,.

### Final Decision and Outcome
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Lewis D. Kowal issued the following ruling:

* **Violation Found:** The ALJ concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Although the Respondent eventually provided the policy, it failed to do so within the required ten business days,.
* **Sanctions and Penalties:** The ALJ determined that civil penalties were not warranted. The judge accepted the testimony that the Respondent attempted to comply in good faith on November 4, 2011, and that the delay was caused by technical difficulties.
* **Perjury Allegations Dismissed:** The ALJ found the witness's explanations regarding her name and litigation history to be reasonable and truthful, determining that these issues did not impact her credibility,.

### Order
Because the Petitioner prevailed in proving the statutory violation, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner's filing fee of **$550.00** within 30 days. No further action was required regarding the records, as the policy had already been provided. The decision was certified as the final administrative decision by the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety on June 14, 2012.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Joshua M. Bolen (Attorney)
    Carpenter Hazelwood, Delgado, & Bolen, PLC
    Representing Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Cici Rausch (Custodian of Records)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
    Also identified as Celia Anne Rausch; testified at hearing
  • Tom Forbes (General Manager)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Raquel Shull (Controller)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Gene Palma (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
  • Cliff J. Vanell (Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Certified the decision
  • Beth Soliere (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of transmitted copy

Brown, William M. vs. Terravita Country Club Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 11F-H1112007-BFS
Agency Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2012-05-08
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua M. Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) because, although it provided the policy, it did not do so within the mandatory ten business days. The late delivery was attributed to an unintentional computer error. Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party and awarded the $550.00 filing fee, but no civil penalties were assessed against the Respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records (Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy) within ten business days

Petitioner requested a copy of the Respondent's Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy. Respondent failed to provide the policy within the statutory ten business day period, allegedly due to a computer error where the email became stuck in an outbox.

Orders: Respondent shall pay Petitioner his filing fee of $550.00. No civil penalty imposed as Respondent attempted to comply.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win