Tanglewood HOA v. Fagen: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

HOA Lien Foreclosure | Default Packet | CV2014-094190

The court rejected the association’s lien-foreclosure default packet because the case had already been dismissed and reinstatement had been denied.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Tanglewood HOA v. Molly Fagen, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094190.

Scope note: This page covers Tanglewood HOA v. Molly Fagen, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094190) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from five filed minute entries, especially the August 11, 2015 dismissal, the January 7, 2016 ruling denying reinstatement, and the February 4, 2016 order rejecting the default packet. Currency caveat: the collected record ends with the February 4, 2016 order. Any later refiling, payment, settlement, or title activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

An HOA lien-foreclosure default packet is not enough if the case has already been dismissed. The association first needed a successful reinstatement order; without that, the commissioner rejected the default package because there was no pending case in which to enter judgment.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Tanglewood HOA (Plaintiff)
    Association that filed the lien-foreclosure and money-judgment action.
  • Molly Fagen (Defendant)
    Named defendant in the association’s foreclosure case.
  • Jason Fagen (Defendant)
    Named defendant in the association’s foreclosure case.
  • James Portman Webster (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Tanglewood HOA in the minute entries.
  • Hon. Robert H. Oberbillig (Judge)
    Judge who dismissed the case and denied the motion to reinstate.
  • Comm. Margaret Benny (Commissioner)
    Commissioner who rejected the default packet after dismissal.

What happened

Tanglewood HOA filed a lien-foreclosure and money-judgment case against the defendants. Early minute entries show the court directing the association to pursue default judgment through the commissioner’s default-judgment process.

In April 2015, the assigned judge noted that the defendants had not answered or otherwise appeared. Because no default judgment had been entered, the court continued the case on the dismissal calendar and warned that unadjudicated claims would be dismissed unless default judgment was entered before the deadline.

No default judgment was entered before the deadline. On August 11, 2015, the court dismissed all unadjudicated claims without prejudice and signed the minute entry as a final Rule 54(c) order.

The association later moved to reinstate the case. On January 7, 2016, the court denied reinstatement because the motion contained no grounds for reinstatement. The next month, Commissioner Benny received the association’s default packet for a lien foreclosure and money judgment, but rejected it because the case had already been dismissed and reinstatement had been denied.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Tanglewood HOA v. Fagen (CV2014-094190 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA default packet for lien foreclosure was rejected after the case had already been dismissed. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Tanglewood HOA v. Fagen. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-09-16 The court explains the default-judgment packet process for the association’s application for entry of default.
Step 2015-04-22 The court continues the case on the dismissal calendar unless default judgment is entered by the deadline.
Step 2015-08-11 The court dismisses all unadjudicated claims without prejudice after no default judgment is entered.
Step 2016-01-07 The court denies Tanglewood HOA’s motion to reinstate because the motion states no grounds.
Step 2016-02-04 The commissioner rejects the association’s lien-foreclosure and money-judgment default packet because the case has been dismissed.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/tanglewood-hoa-v-fagen/raw/: 5 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2014-09-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2015-04-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2015-08-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Final dismissal minute entry dismissing all unadjudicated claims without prejudice after no default judgment was entered by the dismissal-calendar deadline.

Download source file
Source 4 2016-01-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Tanglewood HOA’s motion to reinstate because the motion contained no grounds for reinstatement.

Download source file
Source 5 2016-02-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Order rejecting Tanglewood HOA’s default packet for lien foreclosure and money judgment because the case had already been dismissed without prejudice.

Download source file

FAQ

Did the HOA obtain a foreclosure judgment in the collected record?

No. The final collected order rejected the association’s default packet because the case had already been dismissed without prejudice.

Why was the case dismissed?

The court had placed the matter on the dismissal calendar and warned that unadjudicated claims would be dismissed unless default judgment was entered by the deadline. No default judgment was entered before that deadline.

Why did the court deny reinstatement?

The January 2016 ruling states that the motion to reinstate contained no grounds for reinstatement.

What did the default-packet order decide?

The commissioner rejected the packet for lien foreclosure and money judgment because the case had been dismissed and reinstatement had been denied.

Is this a broad HOA-law ruling?

No. It is a narrow procedural superior-court order about dismissal, reinstatement, and default-judgment procedure in an HOA lien-foreclosure case.

Why is this case classified as standard?

It involved an HOA lien foreclosure, but the collected record does not include a substantive merits ruling interpreting HOA statutes or governing documents.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2014-094190 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateFebruary 4, 2016
Judge / panelHon. Robert H. Oberbillig, Hon. Mark F. Aceto, Comm. Margaret Benny
PartiesTanglewood HOA (Plaintiff) v. Molly Fagen and Jason Fagen (Defendants)
Topics
ForeclosureLiensAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court denied the association’s motion to reinstate because it stated no grounds for reinstatement. It then rejected the association’s default packet for a lien foreclosure and money judgment because the case had already been dismissed without prejudice.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewTanglewood HOA v. Fagen
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Tanglewood HOA filed a lien-foreclosure and money-judgment case. After the case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to obtain default judgment by the dismissal-calendar deadline, the court denied the association’s motion to reinstate and later rejected its default packet because no case remained pending.

Key Issues & Findings

The April 2015 minute entry put the case on the dismissal calendar because defendants had not answered or otherwise appeared and default judgment had not been entered. The court warned that unadjudicated claims would be dismissed unless default judgment was entered by the new deadline.

No qualifying action was taken before the deadline, so on August 11, 2015 the court dismissed all claims without prejudice under Rule 54(c). When the association later moved to reinstate, the court denied the motion because it contained no grounds for reinstatement. Commissioner Benny then rejected the default packet for lien foreclosure and money judgment because the underlying case had already been dismissed and reinstatement had been denied.

Why It Matters

This case is a narrow procedural reminder for HOA assessment and lien-foreclosure practice: a default packet cannot revive a dismissed case. If an association misses a dismissal-calendar deadline, it needs an adequate basis for reinstatement before default judgment can be considered.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Lafleur v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Architectural Committee | TRO Dissolved | Fees | CV2008-054299

This short superior-court record shows a TRO dispute over architectural committee decisions ending by stipulation and voluntary dismissal, followed by fee judgments against the plaintiffs. It does not include a merits interpretation of the governing documents.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Gary Lafleur, et al. v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association Inc., The, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2008-054299.

Scope note: This page covers Gary Lafleur, et al. v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association Inc., The, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2008-054299) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the November 6, 2008 TRO hearing entry and the January 5, 2009 fee judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with denial of reconsideration of the fee judgment. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court did not decide whether Val Vista Lakes’ architectural committee was right or wrong. Instead, the TRO request became moot after the association stipulated that no deference would be given to architectural committee decisions when evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims, and the TRO was dissolved. After voluntary dismissal, the court awarded attorneys’ fees to the association and the neighboring defendants.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary Lafleur (Plaintiff)
    Plaintiff who, with Diane Chambers, sought TRO relief and later voluntarily dismissed the matter.
  • Diane Chambers (Plaintiff)
    Plaintiff who, with Gary Lafleur, became subject to the later fee judgments.
  • Charles P. Franklin (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the plaintiffs in later minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Val Vista Lakes Community Association Inc., The (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant that stipulated no deference would be given to architectural committee decisions and later received a fee judgment.
  • Gordon Jensen (Defendant)
    Neighboring defendant; the court later awarded the Jensen defendants attorneys’ fees after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.
  • Janet Jensen (Defendant)
    Neighboring defendant represented with Gordon Jensen.
  • Melanie C. McKeddie (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Val Vista Lakes Community Association at the TRO return hearing.
  • Steven W. Cheifetz (Counsel)
    Counsel later listed for Val Vista Lakes Community Association.
  • John L. Lohr Jr. (Counsel)
    Counsel for the Jensen defendants.

Neutral Parties

  • Brian R. Hauser (Judge)
    Judicial officer for the TRO return hearing entry.
  • Robert Budoff (Judge)
    Judge who entered the fee judgment and denied reconsideration.

What happened

Gary Lafleur and Diane Chambers sued Val Vista Lakes Community Association and Gordon and Janet Jensen. The available minute entries do not reproduce the complaint, but the first substantive entry links the TRO dispute to architectural committee decisions and the plaintiffs’ claims.

On November 6, 2008, the court held a return hearing on an order to show cause. Counsel appeared for the plaintiffs, Val Vista Lakes, and the Jensen defendants. The court ordered that the plaintiffs’ requested relief was moot because Val Vista Lakes stipulated on the record that no deference would be given to architectural committee decisions when evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims. The court dissolved the previously granted TRO.

After the case was voluntarily dismissed, Val Vista Lakes sought attorneys’ fees and costs against Lafleur and Chambers. No objection or response was filed to that application. On January 5, 2009, the court found Val Vista Lakes was entitled to fees, found the requested amount reasonable, and entered judgment for the association.

The Jensen defendants also sought fees. The plaintiffs objected, but the court found the application timely because it was filed within 20 days of the plaintiffs’ notice of dismissal after suit and a TRO hearing. The court found the matter arose out of contract, determined the Jensen defendants were the successful party, found their fees reasonable, and entered a separate fee judgment for them.

The plaintiffs then moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court division was not the proper division to enter the fee judgment. After receiving responses and replies, the court denied reconsideration and signed that minute entry as an order of the court.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Gary Lafleur, et al. v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association Inc., The, et al. (CV2008-054299 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). TRO over architectural committee decisions dissolved, then HOA won fees after voluntary dismissal. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Gary Lafleur, et al. v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association Inc., The, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2008-11-06 At the TRO return hearing, the court finds the plaintiffs’ request moot based on Val Vista Lakes’ stipulation about architectural committee deference and dissolves the TRO.
Step 2009-01-05 After voluntary dismissal, the court awards Val Vista Lakes attorneys’ fees against Gary Lafleur and Diane Chambers.
Step 2009-01-05 The court also awards the Jensen defendants attorneys’ fees, finding the matter arose out of contract and the Jensens were successful parties.
Step 2009-01-26 The court orders briefing on the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the fee judgment.
Step 2009-02-24 The court denies reconsideration of the January 5, 2009 fee judgment.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/lafleur-v-val-vista-lakes-community-association/raw/: 5 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2008-11-06

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dissolving the previously granted TRO after Val Vista Lakes Community Association stipulated that architectural committee decisions would receive no deference when evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims.

Download source file
Source 2 2008-11-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2009-01-05

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment awarding Val Vista Lakes Community Association attorneys’ fees against Gary Lafleur and Diane Chambers after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the matter following a TRO hearing.

Source 4 2009-01-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 5 2009-02-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the January 5, 2009 attorneys’ fee judgment.

Download source file

FAQ

Did the court decide the merits of the architectural committee dispute?

No. The minute entries do not include a merits ruling on whether the architectural committee decisions were correct. The TRO request was deemed moot because Val Vista Lakes stipulated that no deference would be given to architectural committee decisions when evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims.

What happened to the TRO?

The court dissolved the previously granted TRO at the November 6, 2008 return hearing after finding the plaintiffs’ requested relief moot in light of the association’s stipulation.

Why did Val Vista Lakes receive attorneys’ fees?

After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the matter, Val Vista Lakes filed an unopposed application for fees and costs. The court found the association was entitled to fees and that the requested amount was reasonable.

Why did the Jensen defendants receive fees?

The court found the Jensen application timely and concluded that the matter arose out of contract and that the Jensens were the successful party, making a fee award appropriate.

Did the plaintiffs undo the fee judgment?

No. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration based on the proper-division issue, but the court denied reconsideration after briefing.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This case is mainly useful as a short example of TRO dissolution, architectural-committee stipulations, voluntary dismissal, and post-dismissal fee exposure.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2008-054299 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateJanuary 5, 2009
Judge / panelHon. Brian R. Hauser, Hon. Robert Budoff
PartiesGary Lafleur and Diane Chambers (Plaintiffs) v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association Inc., The, Gordon Jensen, and Janet Jensen (Defendants)
Topics
Architectural ReviewCC&RsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court dissolved the TRO after Val Vista Lakes stipulated that architectural committee decisions would receive no deference in evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims, then awarded post-dismissal attorneys’ fees to the association and the neighboring defendants after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the matter.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewGary Lafleur, et al. v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association Inc., The, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Gary Lafleur and Diane Chambers sued Val Vista Lakes Community Association and the Jensen defendants. The available minute entries tie the dispute to architectural committee decisions but do not reproduce the complaint. At a TRO return hearing, the court held that the plaintiffs’ request for relief was moot because Val Vista Lakes stipulated that no deference would be given to architectural committee decisions when evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims, and the court dissolved the TRO. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, the court awarded attorneys’ fees to Val Vista Lakes and to the Jensen defendants and later denied reconsideration of the fee judgment.

Key Issues & Findings

The TRO ruling did not reach the merits of the architectural committee dispute. The court found the requested relief moot because Val Vista Lakes stipulated on the record that no deference would be given to architectural committee decisions when evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims. Based on that stipulation, the court dissolved the previously granted TRO.

For fees, Val Vista Lakes filed an application after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the matter, and no objection or response was filed. The court found the association entitled to attorneys’ fees and found the requested amount reasonable. The court also granted the Jensen defendants fees over objection, finding their application timely, the matter arose out of contract, the Jensens were successful parties, and the requested amount was reasonable. The plaintiffs’ later reconsideration challenge to the fee judgment was denied.

Why It Matters

The case is a caution about temporary HOA litigation relief and fee exposure. A TRO can disappear quickly when the association makes a narrowing stipulation, and voluntary dismissal after a TRO hearing may still leave homeowners facing fee applications from the association and related defendants.

The case does not give broader guidance on architectural committee powers because the court did not interpret the governing documents or decide the underlying architectural dispute. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association v. Bey: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

HOA Foreclosure | Excess Proceeds | CV2013-015763

The court kept the association foreclosure judgment intact and later handled applications for excess proceeds from the judicial sale.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Malik Bey, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-015763.

Scope note: This page covers Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Malik Bey, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-015763) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the July 29, 2014 oral-argument entry, the October 21, 2014 emergency-motion ruling, the October 22, 2015 ruling denying a motion to vacate default judgment, and the later excess-proceeds entries. Currency caveat: the collected record ends with the July 10, 2020 minute entry stating that an order releasing excess proceeds to the United States had already been entered. Any later collection, title, bankruptcy, or appeal activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Once the association foreclosure judgment had been entered, the superior court repeatedly declined to reopen it. Later proceedings shifted away from the merits of the HOA lien and toward who could receive excess proceeds from the judicial sale and what notice had to be given.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that brought the lien-foreclosure action and obtained the foreclosure judgment.
  • Malik Bey (Defendant)
    Defendant who filed post-judgment motions seeking to set aside, stay, or vacate the foreclosure judgment and proceedings.
  • M. Tariq-Bey (Defendant)
    Named defendant in the foreclosure action.
  • United States of America (Intervenor)
    Intervened in later proceedings concerning release of excess proceeds from the judicial sale.
  • Dolores Wallace (Claimant)
    Appeared in the later excess-proceeds phase.
  • Beth Mulcahy (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the association in the minute entries.
  • Anne E. Nelson (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the United States in the later excess-proceeds proceedings.
  • Hon. David W. Garbarino (Judge)
    Judge who handled the later excess-proceeds proceedings after remand.
  • Commissioner James R. Morrow (Commissioner)
    Superior Court Commissioner who denied the October 22, 2015 Motion to Vacate Default Judgment (the featured ruling) and decided most of the post-judgment motions.
  • Hon. James T. Blomo (Judge)
    Judge who ruled on the defendant’s June 2015 emergency petition for a temporary restraining order.
  • Hon. Randall H. Warner (Judge)
    Civil Presiding Judge who denied the November 6, 2015 motion for change of judge for cause, finding no showing of judicial bias.

What happened

The association filed a lien-foreclosure case and obtained a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. The collected minute entries begin around the post-judgment stage, when defendants sought to set aside or stop foreclosure-related proceedings.

On July 29, 2014, the court heard oral argument and denied Malik Bey’s motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. On October 21, 2014, the court denied an emergency motion seeking to stay or vacate foreclosure proceedings, stating that judgment had been entered on May 28, 2014 and that the motion to set aside had already been denied.

The post-judgment challenges continued. In October 2015, the court denied a motion to vacate default judgment. The ruling addressed the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff had failed to attach necessary documents to the complaint to foreclose a lien. The court found that the record did not support the argument because the association attached the Cottonflower-Goodyear Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions as an exhibit to its complaint.

A later phase concerned excess proceeds from the judicial sale. In 2017, the court denied an application for release of excess proceeds without prejudice if the applicant filed and served a proper application. In 2019, after remand from federal court, the court allowed the United States to pursue an excess-proceeds application and ordered service on affected defendants.

The final collected minute entry, dated July 10, 2020, states that the court had already entered an order releasing the excess proceeds to the United States and therefore took no further action on the amended application.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey (CV2013-015763 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA foreclosure judgment stood after challenges, with later excess-sale proceeds handled through court process. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-05-28 Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is referenced in later minute entries as having been entered on this date.
Step 2014-07-29 The court denies Malik Bey’s motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure after oral argument.
Step 2014-10-21 The court denies an emergency motion to stay or vacate foreclosure proceedings.
Step 2015-10-22 The court denies a motion to vacate default judgment and rejects the argument that the association failed to attach the declaration to the foreclosure complaint.
Step 2017-02-08 The court denies an application for release of excess proceeds without prejudice if a proper application is filed and served.
Step 2019-04-29 After remand, the court permits the United States to file an application for release of excess proceeds and requires service on all defendants.
Step 2020-04-03 The court grants the United States a new service-by-publication schedule for the excess-proceeds application.
Step 2020-07-10 The court states it has already entered an order releasing the excess proceeds to the United States and takes no further action.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/cottonflower-goodyear-community-association-v-bey/raw/: 23 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2014-05-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2014-05-14

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 3 2014-06-26

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 4 2014-07-03

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 5 2014-07-29

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry denying Malik Bey’s motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure after argument.

Download source file
Source 6 2014-09-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2014-10-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying an emergency request to stay or vacate the foreclosure proceedings because judgment had already been entered and the set-aside motion had been denied.

Download source file
Source 8 2014-11-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 9 2015-01-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 10 2015-06-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying multiple post-judgment requests, including renewed efforts to enjoin, vacate, or otherwise disrupt the foreclosure judgment and related proceedings.

Download source file
Source 11 2015-10-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the motion to vacate default judgment and rejecting the argument that the association failed to attach the Cottonflower-Goodyear declaration to the foreclosure complaint.

Download source file
Source 12 2015-11-06

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the request for change of judge for cause after finding no showing of judicial bias or prejudice under A.R.S. § 12-409(B)(5).

Download source file
Source 13 2016-04-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 14 2017-01-18

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 15 2017-02-08

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry denying an application for release of excess proceeds without prejudice to filing a procedurally proper application.

Source 16 2019-04-10

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 17 2019-04-11

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 18 2019-04-29

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 19 2019-08-05

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 20 2019-09-16

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 21 2020-03-11

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 22 2020-04-03

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry granting the United States a new service-by-publication schedule for its excess-proceeds application.

Source 23 2020-07-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry stating that the court had already entered an order releasing the judicial-sale excess proceeds to the United States and took no further action.

Download source file

FAQ

Was this a published appellate decision?

No. This is a Maricopa County Superior Court case built from minute entries. It binds only the parties and is not precedent.

What was the main HOA issue?

The collected entries concern an association lien foreclosure judgment and later efforts to set aside, stay, or vacate that foreclosure judgment.

Did the court reopen the foreclosure judgment?

No. The collected rulings denied motions to set aside, stay, or vacate the judgment and default judgment.

What did the October 2015 ruling say about the declaration?

The court rejected the argument that the association failed to attach necessary foreclosure documents, finding that the Cottonflower-Goodyear declaration was attached as Exhibit B to the complaint.

Why were there later entries after the foreclosure judgment?

Later entries concerned applications for excess proceeds from the judicial sale, including notice and service issues and an application by the United States after remand from federal court.

Why is this case classified as standard?

The record is useful procedurally, but it does not include a broad merits ruling interpreting HOA statutes or CC&R provisions for general application.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2013-015763 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateOctober 22, 2015
Judge / panelCommissioner James R. Morrow, Hon. James T. Blomo, Hon. Randall H. Warner, Hon. David W. Garbarino
PartiesCottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. (Plaintiff) v. Malik Bey, et al. (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 33-812
Topics
ForeclosureLiensAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court left the HOA foreclosure judgment in place. It denied motions to set aside, stay, or vacate the judgment and later denied a motion to vacate default judgment after finding that the record did not support the argument that the association failed to attach the governing declaration to its foreclosure complaint.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package23 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap8 roadmap entries
Video overviewCottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association obtained a foreclosure judgment and sale. The superior court later denied repeated efforts to set aside or vacate the judgment and handled competing post-sale excess-proceeds requests, including an application by the United States after remand from federal court.

Key Issues & Findings

The key post-judgment rulings treated the association foreclosure case as already reduced to judgment and sale. On July 29, 2014, the court denied Malik Bey’s motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. On October 21, 2014, it denied an emergency request to stay or vacate the foreclosure proceedings, noting that judgment had been entered on May 28, 2014 and that the motion to set aside had already been denied.

In the October 22, 2015 ruling, the court addressed a renewed argument that the plaintiff failed to attach necessary documents to the complaint to foreclose a lien. The court rejected that challenge because the record showed that the association attached a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Cottonflower-Goodyear as Exhibit B to the complaint. Later entries focused on excess sale proceeds, including service requirements and the United States’ application after federal-court remand.

Why It Matters

This case is useful mainly as a procedural example of a superior-court HOA lien foreclosure that survived multiple post-judgment challenges. It also shows how excess proceeds from an association foreclosure sale can remain in court and require separate notice and application practice after the foreclosure judgment itself is no longer being revisited.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Val Vista Lakes Community Association v. Rodriguez: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessments | Rule 56 Response | CV2024-090662

A routine assessment-collection case became a useful procedural example: the court gave homeowners additional time to retain counsel and file a proper summary-judgment response, then granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association summary judgment when no compliant response followed.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-090662.

Scope note: This page covers Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-090662) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 21, 2025 extension order and the April 14, 2025 summary-judgment ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with the court granting summary judgment and inviting a proposed judgment, fee application, and cost statement; this draft does not include a later signed judgment. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

In an assessment-collection case, disputing a statement of facts in general terms is not enough to defeat summary judgment. After the court gave the homeowners extra time to retain counsel and file a Rule 56-compliant response, no additional response was filed. The court held the association met its initial burden and the homeowners did not meet their responsive burden, so it granted summary judgment.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association seeking judgment for past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and other fees.
  • Charles B. Sellers (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Respondent Side

  • Ben J. Rodriguez (Defendant)
    Homeowner defendant listed as self-represented in the minute entries.
  • Stephanie L. Cox (Defendant)
    Homeowner defendant listed as self-represented in the minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Driggs (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the extension order and the summary-judgment ruling.
  • Meggan Elizabeth Medina (Arbitrator)
    Arbitrator listed in later minute entries after an earlier appointed arbitrator was excused.

What happened

Val Vista Lakes Community Association sued Ben J. Rodriguez and Stephanie L. Cox. The available minute entries do not include the complaint, but the summary-judgment ruling says the association sought judgment for past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and other fees.

The early entries were procedural. In April 2024, the court granted the homeowners additional time to answer. In August 2024, the court excused an appointed arbitrator for good cause and sent the case back to Civil Court Administration for appointment of a new arbitrator.

The association filed a motion for summary judgment on October 2, 2024. The homeowners filed a response titled as a motion to deny summary judgment or, alternatively, to extend time. The court found in January 2025 that the homeowners raised questions about whether the association’s counsel adequately communicated during efforts to resolve the dispute and whether sufficient information had been provided, but that their response did not conform to Rule 56.

Rather than immediately grant the motion, Judge Driggs allowed the homeowners 30 more days to retain counsel, file a proper Rule 56 response, and/or attempt to resolve the dispute without further increasing attorneys’ fees. The court specifically told them that, if they remained self-represented, they still needed to identify the numbered paragraphs in the association’s statement of facts they disputed and the facts creating a genuine dispute or otherwise precluding summary judgment.

No additional response was filed by the February 21, 2025 deadline. In the April 14, 2025 ruling, the court recited Arizona summary-judgment standards and found that the association met its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and explain why summary judgment was warranted. Because the homeowners did not meet their burden under Rule 56 despite the extra time, the court granted the association’s motion and allowed it to submit a proposed judgment, fee application, and cost statement.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al. (CV2024-090662 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA won assessment-collection summary judgment after homeowners missed Rule 56 response requirements. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2024-04-15 The court grants the homeowners’ motion to extend time to answer.
Step 2024-08-22 The court excuses the appointed arbitrator for good cause and sends the case for appointment of a new arbitrator.
Step 2024-10-02 Val Vista Lakes Community Association files the summary-judgment motion later addressed in the rulings.
Step 2025-01-21 The court gives the homeowners additional time, until February 21, 2025, to retain counsel and file a Rule 56-compliant response.
Step 2025-04-14 After no additional response is filed, the court grants the association summary judgment and permits a proposed judgment, fee application, and cost statement.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/val-vista-lakes-community-association-v-rodriguez/raw/: 4 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2024-04-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2024-08-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2025-01-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2025-04-14

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Val Vista Lakes Community Association summary judgment for claimed past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and other fees after the homeowners did not file a Rule 56-compliant response despite extra time.

Download source file

FAQ

What was the association seeking?

The summary-judgment ruling says Val Vista Lakes Community Association sought judgment for $1,003.64, representing past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and/or other fees.

Why did the court give the homeowners more time?

The court found it reasonable to allow 30 additional days for the homeowners to retain counsel, file a proper Rule 56 response, and/or try to resolve the dispute without further increasing attorneys’ fees.

What was wrong with the homeowners’ first response?

The court said the response did not conform to Rule 56. It reminded the homeowners that a proper response must specify which numbered facts are disputed and identify facts showing a genuine dispute or otherwise precluding summary judgment.

Why did the association win summary judgment?

After the court granted extra time, the homeowners did not file an additional response. The court found that the association met its burden to show no genuine issue of material fact and that the homeowners did not meet their responsive burden under Rule 56.

Did the court enter a final money judgment in the collected entries?

Not in the collected entries for this draft. The April 14, 2025 ruling granted summary judgment and allowed the association to submit a proposed judgment with a fee application and statement of costs.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA assessment cases?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is mainly useful as a procedural example of how Rule 56 applies in a routine assessment-collection dispute.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2024-090662 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateApril 14, 2025
Judge / panelHon. Adam D. Driggs
PartiesVal Vista Lakes Community Association, The (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Ben J. Rodriguez and Stephanie L. Cox (Defendants)
Topics
AssessmentsProcedureAttorney FeesCC&Rs
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association summary judgment in an assessment-related collection case after finding the association met its Rule 56 burden and the homeowners did not file a compliant response showing a genuine dispute of material fact despite being given extra time.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package4 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewVal Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Val Vista Lakes Community Association sued Ben J. Rodriguez and Stephanie L. Cox for a claimed $1,003.64 balance made up of past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and other fees. The homeowners disputed breach and factual issues, including questions about communications and information provided during settlement efforts, but their response did not comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Judge Adam D. Driggs gave them additional time to retain counsel and file a proper response. When no additional response was filed, the court granted the association summary judgment and permitted the association to submit a proposed judgment, fee application, and cost statement.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first gave the homeowners a procedural opportunity to fix their response. Their filing disputed breach of contract and raised questions about communication and information provided during settlement efforts, but the court found it did not conform to Rule 56. Judge Driggs extended the response deadline and explained that any response needed to identify the specific numbered facts disputed and the facts creating a genuine issue or otherwise defeating summary judgment.

When no additional response was filed, the court applied the ordinary summary-judgment burden framework. The moving party must produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and explain why judgment is warranted; if that burden is met, the nonmoving party must point to competent evidence justifying trial. The court found the association met its burden and the homeowners did not meet theirs. On that basis, it granted summary judgment and allowed the association to pursue a form of judgment, fees, and costs.

Why It Matters

For homeowners, the case is a practical Rule 56 warning: even in a small assessment dispute, a response must do more than generally dispute the association’s claim. The homeowner must identify evidence and specific factual disputes in the form required by the rule.

For associations, the ruling shows a routine path to judgment where the ledger claim is supported and the owner does not make a competent evidentiary response after a fair opportunity to do so. It is not must-read authority because it does not interpret Title 33 or any CC&R provision; as a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Val Vista Lakes Community Association v. Aziz: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Injunctive Relief | Uncontested Summary Judgment | CV2021-001880

The court record available here is limited. It shows Val Vista Lakes Community Association brought a civil action against Safwat S. Aziz and Glenna L. Kincheloe, that the complaint sought injunctive relief, and that Judge Randall H. Warner granted the association an uncontested motion for summary judgment after finding the motion supplied a legal and factual basis for the requested relief.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-001880.

Scope note: This page covers Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-001880) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 21, 2021 arbitration minute entry and the August 3, 2021 uncontested summary-judgment ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with the court granting the association’s uncontested summary-judgment motion and giving the parties 30 days to lodge a final judgment or obtain an extension; this draft does not include a later final judgment. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The available minute-entry record is narrow. The court treated the case as one seeking injunctive relief, held it was not subject to compulsory arbitration, and later granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association an uncontested motion for summary judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(b). The ruling does not describe the underlying covenant, assessment, or property dispute, so this page should be read as a procedural case note rather than a substantive interpretation of HOA law.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that filed the civil action and obtained an uncontested summary-judgment ruling.
  • Gregory A. Stein (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Val Vista Lakes Community Association in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Safwat S. Aziz (Defendant)
    Named defendant. The minute entries list this defendant as self-represented.
  • Glenna L. Kincheloe (Defendant)
    Named defendant. The minute entries list this defendant as self-represented.

Neutral Parties

  • Randall H. Warner (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the default-procedure minute entry, the arbitration minute entry, and the uncontested summary-judgment ruling.
  • Susan White (Commissioner)
    Commissioner identified in the April 12, 2021 minute entry as handling Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings.

What happened

Val Vista Lakes Community Association filed a Maricopa County Superior Court action against Safwat S. Aziz and Glenna L. Kincheloe. The minute entries identify the association as the plaintiff and Gregory A. Stein as its counsel; the defendants are listed as self-represented. The entries do not describe the underlying property facts or the covenant provisions at issue.

On April 12, 2021, Judge Randall H. Warner addressed the association’s e-filed application or motion for default. The court took no action on that filing in the judge’s division and advised the parties that commissioners handle Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings. The minute entry also explained that the documents needed to support default judgment had to be e-filed and that a paper default-judgment packet had to be submitted to the assigned commissioner before a commissioner would act.

On April 21, 2021, the court addressed conflicting certificates about compulsory arbitration. Because the complaint sought injunctive relief, the court ruled that the case was not subject to arbitration under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). That entry is the only collected minute entry that identifies the type of relief sought.

The dispositive ruling came on August 3, 2021. The association had filed a June 17, 2021 motion for summary judgment, no response had been filed, and the court said it would summarily grant the motion as uncontested under Rule 7.1(b). Judge Warner added that he had reviewed the motion and that it provided a legal and factual basis for the requested relief.

The court ordered the summary-judgment motion granted. It also ordered that the matter would be dismissed without prejudice in 30 days unless a form of final judgment was lodged with an appropriate notice of lodging or the deadline was otherwise extended by the court. The collected minute entries for this draft stop there.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al. (CV2021-001880 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA obtained uncontested summary judgment in an injunctive-relief case, with final judgment still to be lodged. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2021-04-12 The court takes no action in Judge Warner’s division on the association’s application or motion for default and directs the parties to the commissioner process for Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings.
Step 2021-04-21 The court rules that the case is not subject to compulsory arbitration because the complaint seeks injunctive relief.
Step 2021-06-17 Val Vista Lakes Community Association files the motion for summary judgment referenced in the later ruling.
Step 2021-08-03 The court grants the association’s uncontested motion for summary judgment under Rule 7.1(b) and gives the parties 30 days to lodge a final judgment or obtain an extension.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/val-vista-lakes-community-association-v-aziz/raw/: 3 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2021-04-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2021-04-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2021-08-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Val Vista Lakes Community Association’s uncontested motion for summary judgment and warning that the matter would be dismissed without prejudice unless a final judgment was lodged or the deadline extended.

Download source file

FAQ

What did the association win in this case?

The collected minute entries show that the court granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association’s uncontested motion for summary judgment. The ruling says the motion provided a legal and factual basis for the requested relief, but it does not describe the underlying covenant facts or the exact judgment terms.

Why was the case not sent to compulsory arbitration?

The April 21, 2021 minute entry says the parties filed conflicting arbitration certificates. The court ruled the case was not subject to arbitration under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) because the complaint sought injunctive relief.

Did the court analyze any HOA statute or CC&R provision?

No such analysis appears in the collected minute entries. The dispositive ruling grants an uncontested summary-judgment motion under Rule 7.1(b), but it does not quote or interpret a statute, declaration, or CC&R provision.

Why is this page marked standard rather than must-read?

The record confirms an HOA plaintiff and an injunctive-relief case, but the dispositive minute entry is short and procedural. It does not provide substantive analysis of Title 10, Title 33, or a recorded declaration, so it does not meet the must-read standard used for broader HOA-law guidance.

What happened with default judgment?

The April 12, 2021 minute entry did not enter default judgment. It said Judge Warner’s division would take no action on the default filing and explained that commissioners handle Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings once the required filings and paper packet are submitted.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This entry is mainly useful as a procedural example of an uncontested HOA summary-judgment ruling where the complaint sought injunctive relief.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2021-001880 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateAugust 3, 2021
Judge / panelHon. Randall H. Warner
PartiesVal Vista Lakes Community Association, The (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Safwat S. Aziz and Glenna L. Kincheloe (Defendants)
Topics
ProcedureCovenantsCC&Rs
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association’s uncontested motion for summary judgment under Rule 7.1(b) after finding the motion supplied a legal and factual basis for the requested relief, and it set a 30-day deadline to lodge a final judgment or obtain an extension before dismissal without prejudice.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package3 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap4 roadmap entries
Video overviewVal Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Val Vista Lakes Community Association sued Safwat S. Aziz and Glenna L. Kincheloe in Maricopa County Superior Court. The available minute entries show the complaint sought injunctive relief, which made the case ineligible for compulsory arbitration under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). After the association moved for summary judgment and no response was filed, Judge Randall H. Warner granted the motion as uncontested under Rule 7.1(b), finding that the motion provided a legal and factual basis for the requested relief. The collected entries end with the court warning that the matter would be dismissed without prejudice in 30 days unless a final judgment was lodged or the deadline was extended.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first resolved a procedural issue: because the complaint sought injunctive relief, the case was not subject to compulsory arbitration under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). That minute entry does not describe the underlying injunction request, but it confirms the case involved equitable relief rather than only a money claim.

The dispositive ruling turned on the association’s June 17, 2021 motion for summary judgment. No response was filed, so the court treated the motion as uncontested and granted it summarily under Rule 7.1(b). Judge Warner also stated that he reviewed the motion and found it provided a legal and factual basis for the requested relief. The minute entry contains no substantive interpretation of an HOA statute or governing document, and the court left final-judgment lodging as the next step.

Why It Matters

This is a narrow procedural HOA case note. It shows that an association case seeking injunctive relief will not be routed to compulsory arbitration, and it illustrates the effect of failing to respond to a summary-judgment motion: the court may summarily grant the motion as uncontested if it finds a legal and factual basis for the requested relief.

The case is not a strong source for homeowner or board guidance on the merits because the collected ruling does not identify the covenant dispute or interpret any HOA statute or CC&R provision. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment Litigation | Mandatory Counterclaims | CV2025-060700

This case shows the procedural risk of filing a separate lawsuit over HOA foreclosure and assessment issues while another case about the same property and assessments is already pending: the court dismissed the separate action because the subject matter belonged as a mandatory counterclaim in the earlier assessment case.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-060700.

Scope note: This page covers Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-060700) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the December 16, 2025 litigation-privilege ruling and the February 2, 2026 dismissal ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with denial of a motion to vacate dismissal; they also note a separate pending case, CV2023-013780, involving the same property and assessments. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A homeowner who is already litigating unpaid assessments cannot safely split related foreclosure, fraud, bankruptcy, or de-annexation theories into a new lawsuit. The court dismissed this separate case because the subject matter was a mandatory counterclaim in the pending assessment case involving the same property and assessments. The court also protected the association’s lawyers with the litigation privilege for acts in the course and scope of representing the HOA.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Steve Pandi (Plaintiff)
    Self-represented homeowner plaintiff who filed the separate action and multiple emergency, sanctions, and post-dismissal motions.

Respondent Side

  • Crown Point Homeowners Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant. The dismissal ruling states that a separate case was already pending in which the association sought to recover unpaid assessments involving the same property and assessments.
  • Beth Mulcahy (Defendant / Counsel)
    Attorney defendant; the court held the claims against the Mulcahy defendants were barred by the litigation privilege because they acted in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association.
  • Mulcahy Law P.C. (Defendant)
    Law firm defendant dismissed under the litigation privilege.
  • Joseph A. Brophy (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Crown Point Homeowners Association in later minute entries.
  • Wm Michael Yohler (Counsel)
    Counsel name appearing for defendants in earlier minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the TRO, sanctions, litigation-privilege, dismissal, and post-dismissal rulings.
  • Richard Albrecht (Commissioner)
    Commissioner identified for any Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings after the plaintiff sought default against the association.

What happened

Steve Pandi sued Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. The January 22, 2026 minute entry identifies the attempted amended pleading as asserting fraud, fraudulent foreclosure, bankruptcy violations, and permanent de-annexation from the association. The court later stated that another case, CV2023-013780, already involved the same property and the same assessments, with the association seeking to recover unpaid assessments there.

The first ruling denied Pandi’s emergency request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Judge Michael J. Herrod wrote that the request was based on a damages complaint, asked the court to order the defendants to stop doing things the plaintiff said were bad, and did not seek equitable relief. The court later quashed the related order to show cause and denied another emergency TRO request.

The court dismissed Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. on December 16, 2025. It held that Pandi’s claims against the Mulcahy defendants were barred by the litigation privilege because they were acting in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association. The court also found the fraud claims were not pleaded with specificity and that bankruptcy-violation claims were outside the superior court’s jurisdiction. Crown Point’s joinder in that motion was denied because many defenses did not apply to the association, but the court gave Crown Point leave to file its own dismissal motion.

January 2026 brought several procedural rulings. The court denied sanctions motions against Mulcahy, the firm, Crown Point, and a nonparty; denied a motion to strike bankruptcy assertions; denied a third TRO application because Pandi could not identify an actor for the alleged vandalism; denied a motion to strike or file a sur-reply; struck a first amended complaint filed without leave; and denied discovery and deadline motions while Crown Point’s dismissal motion was pending.

On February 2, 2026, the court granted Crown Point Homeowners Association’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court found that Pandi had a pending case involving the same property and same assessments, that the association was seeking to recover unpaid assessments in that case, and that the subject matter of this separate action was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised there. Because no defendants remained, the court dismissed the matter in its entirety and deemed all pending motions moot. It later denied a sanctions motion and a motion to vacate the dismissal.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al. (CV2025-060700 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Separate HOA foreclosure claims were dismissed as mandatory counterclaims in a pending assessment case. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2025-12-01 The court summarily denies Pandi’s emergency TRO/preliminary-injunction motion because it does not seek equitable relief.
Step 2025-12-16 The court dismisses Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. under the litigation privilege and allows Crown Point to file its own dismissal motion.
Step 2026-01-13 The court denies sanctions against Crown Point, noting no substantive ruling yet supported sanctions and service was improper.
Step 2026-01-22 The court denies a third TRO request, denies a strike/sur-reply motion, and strikes the first amended complaint filed without leave.
Step 2026-02-02 The court grants Crown Point’s motion to dismiss because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in pending case CV2023-013780 involving the same property and assessments.
Step 2026-02-10 The court denies Pandi’s motion to vacate the dismissal order and for relief from judgment.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/pandi-v-crown-point-homeowners-association/raw/: 14 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2025-12-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling summarily denying Steve Pandi’s emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction because the motion did not seek equitable relief.

Download source file
Source 2 2025-12-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2025-12-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing the claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. under the litigation privilege while denying Crown Point Homeowners Association’s joinder and allowing it to file its own motion to dismiss.

Download source file
Source 4 2026-01-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling quashing the order to show cause and denying Steve Pandi’s December 10, 2025 emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Download source file
Source 5 2026-01-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi’s motion for sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. as procedurally improper, unsupported, and legally deficient.

Download source file
Source 6 2026-01-13

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi’s sanctions motion against Crown Point Homeowners Association because no substantive ruling supported sanctions and service was improper.

Download source file
Source 7 2026-01-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi’s motion to strike Crown Point Homeowners Association’s bankruptcy assertions for the reasons stated in the association’s response.

Download source file
Source 8 2026-01-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi’s motion to deem a nonparty’s nonresponse consent to sanctions because the sanctions motion was not properly served and the person was not a party.

Download source file
Source 9 2026-01-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi’s third application for temporary restraining order, denying his motion to strike or seek leave for a sur-reply, and striking his first amended complaint filed without leave.

Download source file
Source 10 2026-01-23

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi’s motion to compel as premature while Crown Point Homeowners Association’s motion to dismiss was pending and denying his request to maintain existing deadlines.

Download source file
Source 11 2026-01-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2026-02-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Crown Point Homeowners Association’s Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in the pending unpaid-assessments case involving the same property and assessments.

Download source file
Source 13 2026-02-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi’s post-dismissal sanctions motion against the defendants and defense counsel because the matter had been dismissed.

Download source file
Source 14 2026-02-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi’s motion to vacate the dismissal order and for relief from judgment.

Download source file

FAQ

Why did the court dismiss the claims against the HOA lawyers?

The court held the claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. were barred by the litigation privilege because the Mulcahy defendants were acting in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association. It also found the fraud allegations lacked specificity and bankruptcy-violation claims were outside superior-court jurisdiction.

Why did the court dismiss the claims against Crown Point Homeowners Association?

The court found that another case, CV2023-013780, already involved the same property and the same assessments, with the association seeking unpaid assessments there. The subject matter of this separate lawsuit was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised in that pending case.

Did the court decide whether the HOA foreclosure or assessment allegations were true?

No. The January 13, 2026 sanctions ruling expressly said no motion for summary judgment had been filed by the plaintiff or granted on any factual issue, and the February 2 dismissal rested on the mandatory-counterclaim problem rather than merits findings on foreclosure or assessment liability.

What happened to the TRO requests?

The court denied repeated emergency TRO or preliminary-injunction requests. It said the first request did not seek equitable relief, later quashed an order to show cause, and denied the third TRO request because the plaintiff could not identify an actor who committed the alleged vandalism.

What is the practical lesson for homeowners?

If an HOA has an active lawsuit over unpaid assessments involving the same property, related claims about foreclosure, fraud, or association status may need to be raised as counterclaims in that case. Filing a separate lawsuit can lead to dismissal without a merits ruling.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This case is useful primarily as a procedural example of litigation privilege and mandatory-counterclaim treatment in an HOA assessment dispute.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2025-060700 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateFebruary 2, 2026
Judge / panelHon. Michael J. Herrod
PartiesSteve Pandi (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. (Defendants)
Topics
AssessmentsForeclosureLiensProcedureFDCPABankruptcy
Outcome / holding

The superior court dismissed the separate lawsuit against Crown Point Homeowners Association because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in a pending case involving the same property and assessments, and it dismissed the association’s lawyers under the litigation privilege for acts within the course and scope of representing the HOA.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package14 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewSteve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Steve Pandi sued Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. over alleged fraud, fraudulent foreclosure, bankruptcy violations, and permanent de-annexation from the association. The court denied repeated emergency TRO requests and sanctions motions. It dismissed the Mulcahy defendants because the litigation privilege protected acts taken in the course and scope of representing Crown Point, because fraud was not pleaded with specificity, and because bankruptcy-violation claims were outside superior-court jurisdiction. The court then granted Crown Point’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because Pandi already had a pending case involving the same property and assessments, so the subject matter belonged as a mandatory counterclaim in that assessment case.

Key Issues & Findings

For the lawyer defendants, the court held that the litigation privilege barred claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. because they were acting in the course and scope of their representation of Crown Point Homeowners Association. The court added that fraud claims were not pleaded with specificity and that bankruptcy-violation claims were not within superior-court jurisdiction.

For the association, the court focused on claim splitting. It found that Pandi already had a pending case involving the same property and the same assessments, CV2023-013780, where the association was seeking to recover unpaid assessments. The subject matter of the new case therefore was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised in the pending assessment case. The court granted Crown Point’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissed the matter in its entirety because no defendants remained, and later denied post-dismissal sanctions and relief-from-judgment motions.

Why It Matters

This case is a procedural caution for HOA assessment litigation. When an association has already sued over unpaid assessments involving the same property, related homeowner theories about foreclosure, fraud, bankruptcy effects, or association status may have to be raised in that action as counterclaims. A separate lawsuit can be dismissed before the court reaches the merits.

The case also illustrates how the litigation privilege can protect HOA collection counsel for conduct within the representation, even when the homeowner names the lawyer and law firm as defendants. It is standard rather than must-read because it does not interpret Title 33 or a declaration provision on the merits; as a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment Dispute & Derivative Standing | A.R.S. §§ 10-3631, 10-3632 | CV2015-053962

This Maricopa County Superior Court case shows three recurring limits on owner litigation against an association, its board, and its counsel. Individual board-member claims failed because board duties were owed to the association, not directly to the owner, and any claim on the association’s behalf had to satisfy Arizona’s nonprofit derivative-action statutes. Claims against association counsel failed because the lawyer owed duties to the association, not individual members. The remaining claims then failed on summary judgment because the court accepted the defendants’ reading of the CC&R annual-assessment provision.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Wayne L. Mullins v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-053962.

Scope note: This page covers Wayne L. Mullins v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-053962) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 19, 2016 partial dismissal ruling, the March 31, 2016 fiduciary-duty dismissal ruling, the September 19, 2016 summary-judgment ruling, and the November 10, 2016 judgment entry; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the November 10, 2016 entry approving formal written judgment against Mullins; any later appellate or collection history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court drew a line between claims an HOA member may bring directly and claims that belong to the association. Duties of board members were owed to Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, so an owner could pursue those claims only derivatively and only by satisfying A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. The association’s lawyer likewise owed duties to the association, not to individual members. After those claims were dismissed, the remaining contract-related claims failed because the court accepted the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs regarding the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wayne L. Mullins (Plaintiff)
    Homeowner plaintiff who represented himself and brought claims against the association, board-member defendants, neighboring individuals, Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm.

Respondent Side

  • The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc. (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant. Some contract-related claims initially survived dismissal, but the association and other defendants later won summary judgment on the remaining claims.
  • Bill Stevens, Ira Rose, Steven Scholfield, Kay Lynne Jacobson, Tina Stevens, and Kathleen Baughman (Board-member defendants)
    Defendants described in the January 2016 ruling as board members; the court dismissed personal claims against them because their duties were owed to the association and any association claim had to be derivative.
  • Andrea Stevens (Defendant)
    Individual defendant listed in the caption and later included in the defendants entitled to seek fees or costs after summary judgment.
  • Beth Mulcahy (Defendant / Association counsel)
    Attorney defendant. The court dismissed claims against her with prejudice, holding that an association lawyer has no duty to individual association members and generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct.
  • Mulcahy Law Firm, P.C. (Defendant)
    Law-firm defendant whose claims were dismissed with prejudice along with Beth Mulcahy’s claims; the March 2016 ruling also denied Mullins’s sanctions request against the firm and Mulcahy.
  • Mark E. Lines (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the association and several defendants in the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the dismissal, summary-judgment, reconsideration, and judgment-related entries.

What happened

Wayne L. Mullins sued The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., several board-member defendants, other individuals, attorney Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The collected minute entries do not reproduce the full complaint, but the January 19, 2016 ruling identifies claims against board members, claims against association counsel, breach-of-contract claims against the association, statutory-violation counts, tort claims, unjust enrichment, and an extortion theory.

The first ruling substantially narrowed the case. Judge John R. Hannah Jr. held Mullins lacked standing to bring claims personally against the board-member defendants because their duties were owed to the association. A member could bring causes of action on behalf of the association only as derivative claims under A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632, and Mullins had not pleaded derivative claims or satisfied the statutory prerequisites. The court dismissed the claims against the board-member defendants on that basis.

The court also dismissed claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm with prejudice. It held that the association’s lawyer had no duty to individual members of the association. It also stated that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct, and that no narrow exception was alleged. Several other counts were dismissed as well: statutory-violation counts seeking damages because the sole remedy was injunctive relief, an extortion count because Arizona does not recognize a civil cause of action for extortion as such, emotional-distress and punitive-damages counts because the alleged facts were not outrageous enough, and aiding-and-abetting because no tort claim remained.

Some claims against the association initially survived. The January ruling allowed factually distinct breach-of-contract claims, an unjust-enrichment claim, and at first a fiduciary-duty count against the association because the association had not developed its argument. On March 31, 2016, however, the court granted a renewed motion to dismiss Count 6 for breach of fiduciary duty and denied Mullins’s sanctions and reconsideration-related requests.

The dispositive ruling came on September 19, 2016. The court considered the defendants’ summary-judgment motion and agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. That interpretation controlled both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because all remaining claims depended on Mullins’s contrary interpretation of the CC&Rs, the court held the claims failed as a matter of law and granted summary judgment to the defendants.

Mullins moved for reconsideration and asked the court to rule on leave to amend his complaint. The court denied that motion on October 5, 2016. On November 10, 2016, the court approved and settled a formal written judgment against Mullins.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association (CV2015-053962 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Owner claims failed because board duties were derivative and the CC&Rs allowed the assessment increases. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2016-01-19 The court grants dismissal in part: board-member personal claims, Mulcahy claims, statutory damages counts, extortion, emotional-distress, punitive-damages, and aiding-and-abetting theories are dismissed; selected contract-related claims against the association survive.
Step 2016-03-31 The court dismisses the fiduciary-duty count, denies sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm, and denies reconsideration or extension relief from the January ruling.
Step 2016-09-19 The court grants defendants summary judgment because Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs supports defendants’ interpretation of annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.
Step 2016-10-05 The court denies Mullins’s motion to reconsider the summary-judgment ruling and to rule on leave to amend.
Step 2016-11-10 The court approves and enters formal written judgment against Mullins.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/mullins-v-nisbet-greens-homeowners-association/raw/: 5 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2016-01-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing claims against board-member defendants, dismissing claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm with prejudice, dismissing several statutory and tort counts, and allowing specified contract-related claims against the association to proceed.

Download source file
Source 2 2016-03-31

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing Count 6 for breach of fiduciary duty, denying sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm, and denying reconsideration or extension relief from the January 19, 2016 order.

Download source file
Source 3 2016-09-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting defendants summary judgment because the court agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on maximum annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.

Download source file
Source 4 2016-10-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Wayne Mullins’s motion to reconsider the summary-judgment order and to rule on his motion for leave to amend the complaint.

Download source file
Source 5 2016-11-10

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry approving and settling formal written judgment against plaintiff Wayne L. Mullins.

FAQ

Why were the claims against individual board members dismissed?

The court held Mullins lacked standing to bring those claims directly because the board members’ duties were owed to the association. If Mullins wanted to assert claims on the association’s behalf, he had to plead derivative claims and satisfy A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632, which the court found he had not done.

Can an association member sue the association’s lawyer for duties owed to the HOA?

Not on the theory pleaded here. The court held that the association’s lawyer has no duty to individual members of the association, and that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct absent a narrow exception not alleged in the complaint.

Which claims survived the first dismissal ruling?

The January 2016 ruling allowed selected breach-of-contract claims against the association, an unjust-enrichment claim, and initially a fiduciary-duty count because the association had not developed that argument. The fiduciary-duty count was later dismissed on March 31, 2016.

What did the summary-judgment ruling decide?

The court agreed with the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because all remaining claims depended on Mullins’s contrary interpretation, the court held they failed as a matter of law.

Did the court award sanctions against Beth Mulcahy or the Mulcahy Law Firm?

No. The March 31, 2016 ruling denied Mullins’s request for sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful because it shows how one court handled direct-versus-derivative owner claims, claims against association counsel, and CC&R annual-assessment interpretation at summary judgment.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2015-053962 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateSeptember 19, 2016
Judge / panelHon. John R. Hannah Jr.
PartiesWayne L. Mullins (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., board-member defendants, Andrea Stevens, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law Firm, P.C. (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 10-3631
  • A.R.S. § 10-3632
Topics
AssessmentsCC&RsBoard GovernanceProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court dismissed the direct board-member and association-counsel claims, held that claims belonging to the association had to satisfy Arizona’s derivative-action statutes, and granted defendants summary judgment because Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs supported their interpretation of annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewMullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Wayne L. Mullins sued Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, board-member defendants, attorney Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm over claims that included breach of contract, statutory violations, fiduciary duty, tort theories, unjust enrichment, and alleged attorney misconduct. The superior court dismissed direct personal claims against board members because their duties were owed to the association and any claim on the association’s behalf had to be derivative under A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. It dismissed claims against association counsel with prejudice because an HOA lawyer owes duties to the association, not individual members. After narrowing the case, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants because it agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on maximum annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates, making all remaining claims fail as a matter of law.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first separated direct owner claims from claims belonging to the association. Board members owed their duties to the association, not directly to Mullins, so Mullins could sue on the association’s behalf only through derivative claims satisfying A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. The court found he had not pleaded derivative claims and, even if he had tried, the statutory prerequisites were not satisfied. It dismissed the board-member claims on that basis.

The same dismissal ruling rejected claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The court held the association’s lawyer had no duty to individual association members and that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct. The ruling also dismissed statutory damages counts because the sole remedy for those alleged statutory violations was injunctive relief, dismissed extortion because Arizona does not recognize a civil cause of action for extortion as such, and dismissed emotional-distress, punitive-damages, and aiding-and-abetting theories.

After the fiduciary-duty count was dismissed in March 2016, the remaining claims turned on the CC&Rs. At summary judgment, the court agreed with the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions on both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because every remaining claim depended on Mullins’s contrary reading, the court held the claims failed as a matter of law, granted summary judgment, denied reconsideration, and entered judgment against Mullins.

Why It Matters

This case is a compact roadmap for several limits on owner suits against an HOA ecosystem. Members generally cannot convert alleged wrongs to the association into direct claims against board members; if the claim belongs to the association, Arizona’s nonprofit derivative-action statutes matter. Likewise, association counsel represents the association, not each individual member, so claims against HOA lawyers require more than dissatisfaction with counsel’s work for the association.

The merits ruling also matters for assessment disputes. The court treated the CC&R text, not the owner’s contrary assessment theory, as dispositive. Once it accepted the defendants’ interpretation of the annual-assessment provision, all remaining claims failed together. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but it is useful reading for assessment, board-governance, and association-counsel disputes.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Boles v. Tarrell: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

HOA Foreclosure, Sheriff’s Sale & Quiet Title | A.R.S. §§ 12-1802, 12-341.01 | CV2018-053929

This Maricopa County Superior Court case shows the limits of trying to unwind an HOA-related foreclosure after a sheriff’s sale. The court refused to stop a later eviction action, then granted Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly summary judgment because Boles did not prove any valid chain of title or right of possession, had notice of the sheriff’s sale, and lost any possible property interest when the sale occurred. A later fee ruling denied the association’s contract-fee request because the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, not the essential basis of Boles’s title and wrongful-foreclosure claims.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Sky Boles v. Jason Tarrell, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-053929.

Scope note: This page covers Sky Boles v. Jason Tarrell, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-053929) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the May 12, 2020 preliminary-injunction ruling, the October 9, 2020 summary-judgment ruling, the November 30, 2020 Rule 60 ruling, and the December 1, 2020 fee-and-cost ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the January 5, 2021 order denying Boles’s renewed motion to vacate; any later appellate or enforcement history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court treated Boles’s title and possession theories as defeated by the recorded title chain, an earlier foreclosure action, the sheriff’s sale, and Boles’s failure to challenge those events in time. It refused to enjoin Maricopoly’s separate eviction case under A.R.S. § 12-1802(1), then granted Northern Manor and Maricopoly summary judgment because Boles had not shown ownership, title, or possession rights. The court also rejected Northern Manor’s contract-fee request: the CC&Rs were at most a factual predicate to Boles’s title and wrongful-foreclosure theories, not the essential basis of claims “arising out of contract” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sky Boles (Plaintiff)
    Claimant who sought title, possession, injunctive relief against an eviction proceeding, and later relief from summary judgment.
  • Mark W. Horne (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Boles in the 2020 injunction proceedings.

Respondent Side

  • Jason Tarrell (Defendant)
    Defendant from whom Boles claimed a title transfer; the court found Tarrell had testified he never transferred title to Boles and had provided an affidavit to the same effect.
  • Northern Manor Townhouse Association (Defendant / Intervenor)
    Homeowners association that intervened, sought summary judgment, opposed the title and possession claims, requested vexatious-litigant relief, and later sought attorney fees and costs.
  • Maricopoly, LLC (Defendant in consolidated action)
    Entity that bought the property at sheriff’s sale and pursued a separate eviction proceeding; the court found the sheriff’s sale was conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title ownership.
  • Erik Wright (Defendant)
    Defendant referenced in the court’s title-chain analysis; the court found no deed from Wright to Tarrell to support Boles’s claims.
  • Kathryn A. Battock, Emily H. Mann, Joseph M. Hoffman, and Troy B. Stratman (Counsel)
    Attorneys appearing for Northern Manor in the collected minute entries.
  • Mark Zinman (Counsel)
    Counsel for Maricopoly, LLC in the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the key 2020 injunction, summary-judgment, fee, and post-judgment rulings.
  • John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
    Judge who issued early 2018 service and voluntary-dismissal entries.

What happened

Sky Boles sued Jason Tarrell and others in 2018. Northern Manor Townhouse Association later appeared as an intervenor, and the case was eventually consolidated with Boles’s 2020 action against Northern Manor and Maricopoly, LLC. The consolidated dispute centered on whether Boles had title, ownership, or possession rights in a Northern Manor property after an earlier foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale.

The first major merits ruling came after a May 12, 2020 evidentiary hearing. Boles asked the court to preliminarily enjoin an eviction proceeding brought by Maricopoly against Tarrell and Boles. Judge Theodore Campagnolo denied the injunction. He ruled that A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) gave the court little discretion to stop an eviction case filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction action, and that consolidating the later action with the 2018 quiet-title case did not change each action’s filing date or party rights.

The court also found Boles had not shown the injunction factors. Based on the title chain, the prior foreclosure action, the sheriff’s sale, and Boles’s failure to timely challenge those events, the evidence showed Maricopoly had a legitimate claim of possession. The court found no substantial likelihood of success, no irreparable harm because the possible damages were monetary, hardships favoring Maricopoly, and public policy favoring speedy resolution of the earlier eviction proceeding.

Northern Manor’s dispositive motion was first filed as a motion to dismiss, then converted to a summary-judgment motion because the association attached exhibits outside the pleadings. After several scheduling and filing-protocol entries, the court heard argument on October 9, 2020. Boles had notice but did not appear. The court found she had wholly failed to show any ownership, title, or right of possession. It specifically found there was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn he never transferred title to Boles, and even if the purported Tarrell deed were genuine, Tarrell had not been shown to hold legal title that he could transfer.

The court granted summary judgment to Northern Manor and Maricopoly. It found no genuine issue of material fact, held that any ownership or possession right had been lost at the sheriff’s sale, found the sheriff’s sale conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title ownership as bona fide purchaser, and held future claims by Boles about the property were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. The court dismissed the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashed Boles’s lis pendens, barred further title or possession filings about the property, and denied a broader vexatious-litigant designation as unnecessary and procedurally confusing.

Post-judgment rulings followed. The court denied Boles’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate because a nonlawyer could not appear for her, the medical note submitted did not establish excusable neglect, and Boles had not shown a meritorious claim. It denied Northern Manor attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because Boles’s claims did not arise out of contract: the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, while the essential basis of the claims was Boles’s alleged title transfer from Tarrell. The association did recover $73.70 in taxable costs as the successful party.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Boles v. Tarrell (CV2018-053929 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Quiet-title claimant lost after a sheriff’s sale cut off any ownership or possession rights. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Boles v. Tarrell. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2018-06-07 The court grants alternative service on Tarrell and signs an order granting Boles’s voluntary-dismissal motion as to unspecified defendants.
Step 2018-12-18 At a status conference, Northern Manor appears through counsel; the court denies Boles’s motion to serve by publication and continues the dismissal calendar.
Step 2020-04-13 The court consolidates CV2018-053929 with CV2020-051900 and sets proceedings on Boles’s injunction request.
Step 2020-04-29 The court converts Northern Manor’s motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 summary-judgment motion because exhibits outside the pleadings were attached.
Step 2020-05-12 After an evidentiary hearing, the court denies Boles’s application to preliminarily enjoin Maricopoly’s eviction proceeding.
Step 2020-10-09 The court grants Northern Manor and Maricopoly summary judgment, dismisses the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashes the lis pendens, and bars further title or possession filings about the property.
Step 2020-11-30 The court denies Boles’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate and denies her Rule 62 stay request as moot.
Step 2020-12-01 The court denies Northern Manor attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 but awards $73.70 in taxable costs.
Step 2021-01-05 The court denies Boles’s renewed motion to vacate for the reasons stated in the December 2020 minute entry.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/boles-v-tarrell/raw/: 39 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2018-06-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2018-06-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2018-08-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2018-09-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 5 2018-09-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 6 2018-09-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2018-10-24

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 8 2018-12-17

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 9 2018-12-18

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 10 2019-02-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 11 2019-03-20

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 12 2019-07-17

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 13 2020-04-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 14 2020-04-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 15 2020-04-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling converting Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 summary-judgment motion because the association attached exhibits outside the pleadings.

Download source file
Source 16 2020-04-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling again converting Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 summary-judgment motion and setting a hearing-management path for pertinent materials.

Download source file
Source 17 2020-05-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Sky Boles’s application for a preliminary injunction to stop Maricopoly’s eviction proceeding and denying reconsideration under A.R.S. § 12-1802(1).

Download source file
Source 18 2020-05-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 19 2020-05-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 20 2020-05-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 21 2020-06-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 22 2020-06-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s motion to declare Sky Boles a vexatious litigant because A.R.S. § 12-3201(C) applies only to self-represented litigants and Boles was then represented by counsel.

Download source file
Source 23 2020-06-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 24 2020-06-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Boles’s motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law and request for entry of order in connection with the preliminary-injunction hearing.

Download source file
Source 25 2020-06-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 26 2020-06-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 27 2020-06-30

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s reconsideration motion without prejudice to re-urge it after the court ruled on the pending summary-judgment motion.

Download source file
Source 28 2020-08-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 29 2020-08-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 30 2020-08-13

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly’s request for a telephonic hearing regarding attorney Mark Horne as moot.

Download source file
Source 31 2020-08-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 32 2020-08-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 33 2020-08-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 34 2020-10-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting summary judgment to Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly, dismissing the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashing Boles’s lis pendens, and barring further title or possession filings about the property.

Download source file
Source 35 2020-11-30

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Boles’s Rule 60(b)(1) motions to vacate summary judgment and denying her Rule 62 stay request as moot.

Download source file
Source 36 2020-12-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 but awarding the association $73.70 in taxable costs.

Download source file
Source 37 2020-12-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s motion for reconsideration on its request to declare Boles a vexatious litigant.

Download source file
Source 38 2020-12-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 39 2021-01-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Boles’s renewed motion to vacate for the reasons stated in the court’s December 2020 minute entry.

Download source file

FAQ

Why did the court refuse to stop the eviction case?

The eviction action was filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction action, and the court found A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) generally precluded the requested injunction. It also found Boles had not shown likelihood of success, irreparable harm, favorable hardship balancing, or public policy supporting an injunction.

Why did Northern Manor and Maricopoly win summary judgment?

The court found Boles had not shown ownership, title, or possession rights. There was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn he never transferred title to Boles, and even a genuine Tarrell-to-Boles deed would not help if Tarrell lacked title to transfer. The sheriff’s sale then cut off any possible ownership or possession rights and made Maricopoly the bona fide purchaser.

Did the court declare Boles a vexatious litigant?

No. The court denied a broader vexatious-litigant designation. It reasoned that Boles’s repeated filings concerned this property, and the court had already barred future filings claiming title, ownership, or possession about the property, so a broader A.R.S. § 12-3201 order would add procedural confusion.

Why were Northern Manor’s attorney fees denied?

Northern Manor sought fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which applies to actions arising out of contract. The court held Boles’s claims did not arise out of a contract with the association. The CC&Rs were only a factual predicate; the essential basis was Boles’s alleged title transfer and wrongful-foreclosure theory. The association did receive taxable costs.

What happened to Boles’s motion to vacate?

The court denied it. A nonlawyer had filed the motions for Boles, the submitted note did not establish excusable neglect for missing the summary-judgment argument, and Boles did not show a meritorious claim as required for Rule 60(b)(1) relief.

Is this decision binding on other HOA foreclosure disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful for understanding how one court handled title-chain proof, sheriff’s-sale consequences, eviction-injunction limits, and contract-fee requests after an HOA-related foreclosure.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2018-053929 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateOctober 9, 2020
Judge / panelHon. Theodore Campagnolo, Hon. John R. Hannah Jr.
PartiesSky Boles (Plaintiff) v. Jason Tarrell, Northern Manor Townhouse Association, Erik Wright, and Maricopoly, LLC through consolidated proceedings (Defendants or Intervenor)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-1802
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics
ForeclosureLiensCC&RsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court denied Boles’s request to enjoin a related eviction proceeding, granted summary judgment to Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly because Boles failed to prove title or possession rights after the sheriff’s sale, dismissed the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashed Boles’s lis pendens, and later denied Northern Manor attorney fees while awarding taxable costs.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package39 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewBoles v. Tarrell
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Sky Boles sued Jason Tarrell and others, and Northern Manor Townhouse Association intervened in litigation later consolidated with Boles’s action against Northern Manor and Maricopoly, LLC. Boles sought to stop Maricopoly’s eviction proceeding and claimed ownership, title, or possession rights after an earlier foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale. The court denied the preliminary injunction under A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) and the traditional injunction factors, then granted summary judgment to Northern Manor and Maricopoly because Boles did not prove a valid chain of title, any right of possession was lost through the sheriff’s sale, and Maricopoly was the bona fide purchaser. It later denied Boles Rule 60 relief, denied Northern Manor attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because the claims did not arise out of contract, and awarded the association $73.70 in taxable costs.

Key Issues & Findings

On the preliminary-injunction request, the court found A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) left little discretion to enjoin an eviction action filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction case. Consolidation with the older 2018 quiet-title action did not change filing dates or party rights. The court also found Boles failed the injunction factors: Maricopoly had a legitimate possession claim based on the title chain, foreclosure action, and sheriff’s sale; monetary damages would not be irreparable harm; hardships favored allowing the eviction case to proceed; and public policy favored speedy resolution of the earlier eviction proceeding.

On summary judgment, the court found Boles had wholly failed to show ownership, title, or possession. There was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn that he never transferred title to Boles, and even a genuine Tarrell deed would not establish Boles’s title if Tarrell had no legal title to convey. The court found no genuine issue of material fact, held that the sheriff’s sale cut off any ownership or possession interest, and treated the sale as conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title as bona fide purchaser.

The court denied broader vexatious-litigant relief but barred future filings by Boles claiming title, ownership, or possession of the property. It then denied Rule 60(b)(1) relief because Boles did not prove excusable neglect or a meritorious claim. On fees, the court held A.R.S. § 12-341.01 did not apply because Boles’s claims were not essentially contract claims: the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, and the core dispute was her alleged title transfer and wrongful-foreclosure theory. Northern Manor recovered taxable costs as the successful party.

Why It Matters

This case is a practical example of how difficult it is to use a later quiet-title or injunction case to stop an eviction after an HOA-related foreclosure and sheriff’s sale. The court separated possession in the eviction case from title claims in the civil action, then held that Boles’s chain-of-title proof failed and that the sheriff’s sale cut off any title or possession claim.

The fee ruling is also useful. Even though CC&Rs may be contractual between an association and an owner, the court would not award contract fees where the plaintiff was not claiming under a contract with the association and the essential basis of the case was title and wrongful foreclosure. The result was summary judgment and taxable costs for the association, but no attorney-fee award under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Blakley v. Parker: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Contractual Enforcement Duties | Fees & Costs | CV2023-014388

The superior court resolved all claims against Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association through summary-judgment rulings after oral argument, then entered judgment awarding the association fees and costs. The written fee ruling matters because it held that the homeowner’s claims against the association arose out of contract for A.R.S. § 12-341.01 purposes, even though CC&R 5.15 itself did not authorize fees when the association was defending rather than bringing an enforcement action.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Shawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-014388.

Scope note: This page covers Shawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-014388) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the February 27, 2026 oral-argument ruling and the June 1, 2026 judgment-and-fee entry; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries show that all claims against Litchfield Vista Views III were resolved and judgment was entered for that association, while scheduling continued as to remaining parties. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

When a homeowner sues an association for allegedly failing to perform contractual enforcement duties, the association may be able to recover fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 if it prevails, even if the CC&R fee clause itself is limited to offensive enforcement actions by the association. Here, the court granted Litchfield Vista Views III summary judgment on all claims against it, then awarded fees and costs under § 12-341.01 while rejecting CC&R 5.15 as a standalone basis for fees.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Shawn Blakley (Plaintiff)
    Plaintiff represented by Sean Woods. The later fee ruling describes his claims against the association as alleging failure to fulfill contractual enforcement duties.
  • Sean Woods (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Plaintiff Shawn Blakley in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Roosevelt G. Parker (Defendant)
    Individual defendant represented by J. Gary Linder.
  • Patricia L. Parker (Defendant)
    Individual defendant represented by J. Gary Linder.
  • Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant that obtained summary judgment on all claims against it and later received an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
  • J. Gary Linder (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Roosevelt G. Parker and Patricia L. Parker.
  • Mark E. Lines (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association and affiant supporting the association’s fee application.

Neutral Parties

  • John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge assigned during the scheduling and amended-complaint phase.
  • Joseph Kreamer (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the association’s summary-judgment motions and entered the fee-and-cost judgment.

What happened

Shawn Blakley filed suit against Roosevelt Grover Parker, Patricia L. Parker, and Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint or identify the property-level facts, but the June 2026 fee ruling describes the claims against the association as claims that it failed to fulfill contractual enforcement duties rather than claims that it committed the underlying alleged torts.

The early minute entries are mostly procedural. Judge John R. Hannah Jr. entered trial-scheduling orders, reset scheduling conferences after stipulations to extend deadlines, and in November 2024 allowed Blakley to file and serve a First Amended Complaint. The case later moved before Judge Joseph Kreamer.

The association filed a June 17, 2025 motion for partial summary judgment. The Parkers joined that motion in July 2025, and the association later filed an October 27, 2025 motion for summary judgment on Counts V and VI of the First Amended Complaint. Several entries reset oral argument on those motions before the court heard argument on February 27, 2026.

At the February 27, 2026 oral argument, the court granted Litchfield Vista Views III’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts II and IV, denied the Parkers’ joinder in that motion as to Counts II and IV, and granted Litchfield Vista Views III’s summary-judgment motion as to Counts V and VI. The minute entry states that those rulings resolved all claims against Litchfield Vista Views III.

The association then sought attorneys’ fees and costs. On June 1, 2026, Judge Kreamer rejected CC&R 5.15 as a fee basis because, on its face, it applied only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action. The court nevertheless held that A.R.S. § 12-341.01 supported a fee award because, regardless of claim labels, Blakley sued the association for allegedly failing to fulfill contractual enforcement duties. The court found the claims intertwined, applied Associated Indemnity and China Doll, made a limited fee reduction, and entered judgment awarding the association fees and costs.

Procedural timeline

Step 2024-04-01 The court enters trial-scheduling and pretrial-practice orders.
Step 2024-11-22 By stipulation, the court allows Plaintiff to file and serve the First Amended Complaint.
Step 2025-06-17 Litchfield Vista Views III files the motion for partial summary judgment later heard by the court.
Step 2025-10-27 Litchfield Vista Views III files a summary-judgment motion on Counts V and VI of the First Amended Complaint.
Step 2026-02-27 After oral argument, the court grants Litchfield Vista Views III summary judgment on the association-targeted counts and states that all claims against the association are resolved.
Step 2026-03-09 The association files its application for attorneys’ fees and costs.
Step 2026-06-01 The court grants the association fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, rejects CC&R 5.15 as an independent fee basis, and enters judgment for the association.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/blakley-v-parker/raw/: 12 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2024-04-01

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2024-11-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2024-11-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2025-03-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 5 2025-05-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 6 2025-08-15

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 7 2025-10-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 8 2025-11-19

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 9 2026-01-13

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 10 2026-02-12

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 11 2026-02-27

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling after oral argument granting Litchfield Vista Views III partial summary judgment on Counts II and IV and summary judgment on Counts V and VI, resolving all claims against the association.

Download source file
Source 12 2026-06-01

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry granting Litchfield Vista Views III attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 while rejecting CC&R 5.15 as a fee basis because it applies only to offensive enforcement actions by the association.

FAQ

Who won the association part of the case?

Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association won the claims against it. The February 27, 2026 minute entry says the court granted the association partial summary judgment on Counts II and IV, granted summary judgment on Counts V and VI, and that this resolved all claims against the association.

What did the court say the claims against the HOA were about?

The June 1, 2026 fee ruling says that, regardless of how the claims were labeled, Plaintiff sued the association for allegedly failing to fulfill contractual enforcement duties, not for committing the alleged underlying torts.

Did the CC&Rs themselves authorize the fee award?

Not under the clause the association cited. The court held that CC&R 5.15 did not provide a basis for fees because, on its face, it applies only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action.

Why did the association still receive fees?

The court held that A.R.S. § 12-341.01 supported the award because the claims against the association arose out of contract. It also found the claims intertwined, that the Associated Indemnity factors supported fees, and that the submitted billing materials were sufficient under China Doll.

Did the individual homeowner defendants also win summary judgment on the same HOA counts?

Not through the association’s motion. The February 27, 2026 minute entry denied Roosevelt and Patricia Parker’s joinder in the association’s partial summary-judgment motion as to Counts II and IV, while granting the association’s motions.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA cases?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful as an example of how a court may separate a CC&R fee clause from A.R.S. § 12-341.01 when a homeowner’s claims against an association are contractual in substance.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2023-014388 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateFebruary 27, 2026
Judge / panelHon. John R. Hannah Jr., Hon. Joseph Kreamer
PartiesShawn Blakley (Plaintiff) v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, Patricia L. Parker, and Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics
CC&RsCovenantsAttorney FeesSelective Enforcement
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Litchfield Vista Views III summary judgment on all claims against it and later awarded the association attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, holding that the plaintiff’s claims against the association arose out of alleged contractual enforcement duties even though CC&R 5.15 did not itself authorize fees for a defensive win.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package12 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Shawn Blakley sued individual homeowners and Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association. The collected minute entries do not reproduce the complaint, but the court later described the claims against the association as alleging failure to fulfill contractual enforcement duties. After oral argument, Judge Joseph Kreamer granted the association partial summary judgment on Counts II and IV and summary judgment on Counts V and VI, resolving all claims against the association. The court later entered judgment awarding the association attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, while rejecting CC&R 5.15 as an independent fee basis because it applied only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action.

Key Issues & Findings

The merits minute entry is limited because the court stated that its reasons were set forth on the oral-argument record. The written order confirms the result: Litchfield Vista Views III obtained partial summary judgment on Counts II and IV and summary judgment on Counts V and VI, and those rulings resolved all claims against the association. The Parkers’ joinder in the association’s partial summary-judgment motion was denied as to Counts II and IV.

The later fee ruling supplies the most detailed written reasoning. Judge Kreamer first rejected CC&R 5.15 as a fee basis because, on its face, that provision applies only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action. The court then held that A.R.S. § 12-341.01 supported fees because the plaintiff’s claims, however labeled, accused the association of failing to perform contractual enforcement duties rather than committing the alleged underlying torts.

Applying Associated Indemnity and China Doll, the court found the claims against the association arose out of contract and were intertwined, making apportionment unnecessary; the discretionary factors supported fees; the association’s materials were sufficient; and most fees and all costs were reasonable, subject to a limited reduction before judgment entered.

Why It Matters

This case is useful for the fee question that often follows failed enforcement-duty claims against an HOA. A CC&R fee clause may be too narrow if it applies only when the association sues to enforce the documents, but A.R.S. § 12-341.01 can still support a fee award when a homeowner’s claims against the association are contractual in substance.

The case is less useful on the merits of association enforcement duties because the summary-judgment minute entry does not reproduce the court’s oral reasoning or the factual record behind Counts II, IV, V, and VI. As a superior-court case, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment Liens & Foreclosure | A.R.S. § 33-1807 | CV2012-094261

In this Maricopa County Superior Court assessment-lien case, the court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) does not let an escrow agent extinguish an HOA lien merely by requesting a payoff statement outside any pending escrow transaction. Later, the same court denied the association summary judgment on foreclosure under § 33-1807(A), rejecting the association’s argument that a foreclosure claim survives once filed even after the delinquent assessments themselves have been paid. The fee ruling treated the case in four parts: the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and the dismissed CC&R-violation claims.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-094261.

Scope note: This page covers Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-094261) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 12, 2014 ruling on Forange’s payoff-statement lien-extinguishment theory, the November 24, 2014 ruling on the association’s foreclosure motion, the March 11, 2015 dismissal-stipulation ruling, and the June 9, 2015 fee ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 9, 2015 fee ruling, which continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first; any later docket activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court read A.R.S. § 33-1807 in two different lien contexts. First, it rejected Forange’s argument that an HOA lien disappeared because an escrow agent requested a payoff statement and the association did not respond within ten days: the court held the escrow-agent penalty in § 33-1807(I) is meant to facilitate actual sale, transfer, lease, or other escrow transactions, not to give escrow agents a freestanding power to make liens disappear. Second, when the association later sought summary judgment on foreclosure, the court denied it under § 33-1807(A) because late fees and attorney fees do not count toward the foreclosure threshold and the delinquent assessment amount had been paid. The case later ended through a stipulation that found for defendants on foreclosure and through a fee ruling awarding Forange costs and $18,000 in fees while denying the association’s fee applications.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association (Plaintiff / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Homeowners association that sued over unpaid assessments, lien foreclosure, and alleged CC&R violations; the court later found it succeeded on the unpaid-assessment claim and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, but not on lien foreclosure.
  • Lindsey O. Stearns (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney listed for the association in later minute entries and one of the attorney defendants in Forange’s consolidated complaint; the August 2014 ruling granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.
  • Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney listed for the association in multiple caption entries and one of the attorney defendants in Forange’s consolidated complaint.
  • Javier Delgado (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney defendant named by Forange in the consolidated action, according to the August 2014 ruling.
  • Bradley R. Jardine (Counsel)
    Attorney who filed the April 2015 motion for attorney fees on behalf of the association.

Respondent Side

  • 4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendant)
    Entity defendant in the association’s action; its answer was struck in December 2012 because a nonlawyer could not represent the LLC.
  • Forange, LLC (Defendant / Plaintiff in consolidated action)
    Entity that filed the consolidated action against the association and its attorneys, arguing that an escrow-agent payoff request extinguished the association lien under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I); it lost that claim but later prevailed on the association’s foreclosure claim and received fees and costs.
  • Michael D. Ripson (Defendant / LLC member)
    Individual listed as a defendant and as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC in the early order-to-show-cause minute entry.
  • Scottsdale Community Association (Defendant)
    Entity listed as a defendant in the association’s action; the collected minute entries do not show a merits ruling against it.
  • Citibank South Dakota N.A. (Defendant)
    Lienholder defendant listed in the caption; the collected minute entries do not show a substantive ruling about it.
  • Johnson Bank (Defendant (dismissed))
    Defendant dismissed with prejudice in August 2014 after no party responded to the court’s notice of possible dismissal.
  • Elijah W. Rosov (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for 4AAR Holdings, LLC and Forange, LLC in the later minute entries and fee applications.
  • Andrew J. Van Loon (Counsel)
    Attorney listed in several caption entries for the defense side before the later fee ruling noted that the court declined to award Forange fees incurred while represented by Van Loon.

Neutral Parties

  • Emmet J. Ronan (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled early order-to-show-cause and LLC-representation rulings.
  • Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the key August 2014 payoff-statement ruling, the November 2014 foreclosure ruling, the March 2015 dismissal-stipulation ruling, and the June 2015 fee ruling.
  • Ruth H. Hilliard (Judge)
    Judge who signed the March 2013 consolidation order for Judge Ronan.

What happened

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued 4AAR Holdings, LLC and others in Maricopa County Superior Court over a planned-community assessment lien. The early minutes show an order-to-show-cause hearing where Michael Ripson appeared as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC, followed by a December 2012 ruling striking the LLC’s answer because a corporation or LLC cannot appear in court through a nonlawyer. In March 2013, the court consolidated this action with CV2012-018064, the related case brought by Forange, LLC against the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns.

Forange’s consolidated complaint turned on a payoff-statement theory. The August 12, 2014 ruling says Forange moved for partial summary judgment on its claims, while the association and its attorneys cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them. The court identified the undisputed facts this way: A.R.S. § 33-1807 creates an HOA lien for unpaid assessments; subsection I requires an association to furnish a payoff statement within ten days after a request from a unit owner, lienholder, or escrow agent; and the special penalty for failure to answer an escrow-agent request is extinguishment of the lien. Here, an escrow agent asked for a payoff statement, but the request was not made in the context of any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction.

Judge Aceto rejected Forange’s statutory theory. The ruling framed the issue as whether § 33-1807(I) gives escrow agents a special power to make liens disappear simply because they are escrow agents, or whether the penalty provision is meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions by requiring prompt payoff responses. Applying a rational-interpretation approach, the court held the penalty provision was directed at real pending transactions. It denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

The association then moved for partial summary judgment on its own foreclosure claim. On November 24, 2014, the court denied that motion. The ruling noted that A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) allows foreclosure only if the owner “has been” delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count when deciding whether the right to foreclose exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that a homeowner cannot avoid foreclosure once the complaint has been filed. The court expressly left open the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments.

A March 11, 2015 ruling accepted the parties’ stipulation regarding dismissal, vacated the scheduled trial, and found for defendants on Count I to the extent it sought foreclosure on the property. The June 9, 2015 fee ruling divided the consolidated case into four parts: the association’s unpaid-assessment claim, the association’s lien-foreclosure claim, the association’s CC&R-violation allegations, and Forange’s groundless-document claims. The court found the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations.

The fee ruling made Forange the prevailing party overall. It awarded Forange $994.05 in taxable costs, denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01, and awarded Forange $18,000 in attorney fees under § 12-341.01 to mitigate the expense of establishing just defenses. The last collected entry continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC (CV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Escrow payoff requests do not erase HOA liens absent a real transaction; paid assessments defeated foreclosure. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2012-09-12 At an order-to-show-cause hearing, the court gives 4AAR Holdings, LLC until October 12, 2012 to obtain counsel.
Step 2012-12-12 The court strikes 4AAR Holdings, LLC’s answer because a nonlawyer cannot represent the LLC in court.
Step 2013-03-01 The court consolidates CV2012-094261 with CV2012-018064.
Step 2013-08-26 The court denies the association’s motion to enforce settlement and request for Rule 11 sanctions, finding there was no enforceable settlement.
Step 2014-08-12 The court denies Forange partial summary judgment and grants the association and its attorneys summary judgment on Forange’s A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) payoff-statement lien-extinguishment theory.
Step 2014-11-24 The court denies the association partial summary judgment on lien foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), while leaving monetary claims for penalties and fees unresolved.
Step 2014-11-24 The court separately denies the defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion after finding they had not shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Step 2015-03-11 The court accepts the parties’ dismissal stipulation, vacates trial, and finds for defendants on the association’s foreclosure claim.
Step 2015-06-09 The court awards Forange $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, denies the association’s fee requests, and continues the case on the dismissal calendar.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/troon-ridge-estates-v-4aar-holdings/raw/: 35 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2012-09-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2012-12-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling striking 4AAR Holdings, LLC’s answer because Michael Ripson could not represent the LLC and no attorney had appeared for it.

Download source file
Source 3 2013-01-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2013-03-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling consolidating CV2012-094261 with CV2012-018064 on the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate.

Download source file
Source 5 2013-03-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 6 2013-07-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2013-08-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling accepting the parties’ July 2013 stipulation and ordering the association’s application for default judgment due by August 23, 2013.

Download source file
Source 8 2013-08-26

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association’s motion to enforce settlement and request for Rule 11 sanctions because there was no enforceable settlement.

Download source file
Source 9 2013-08-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 10 2013-10-31

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 11 2013-10-31

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2013-12-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2014-05-09

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 14 2014-08-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing with prejudice any remaining unadjudicated claims against Johnson Bank because no party responded to the court’s notice of possible dismissal.

Download source file
Source 15 2014-08-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion and granting summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s payoff-statement lien-extinguishment claims under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I).

Download source file
Source 16 2014-08-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling clarifying that attorney-fee requests from the summary-judgment motions would be decided after all claims in the consolidated case were resolved.

Download source file
Source 17 2014-08-22

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 18 2014-09-18

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 19 2014-10-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange’s request for an evidentiary hearing and sanctions and allowing the association to respond to its motion to quash.

Download source file
Source 20 2014-11-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange leave to submit a late cross-motion for partial summary judgment on Count 1 lien foreclosure after the dispositive-motion deadline.

Download source file
Source 21 2014-11-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado and Bolen’s motion to quash for the reasons argued by the movant.

Download source file
Source 22 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 23 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association partial summary judgment on lien foreclosure because A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) did not allow foreclosure after the delinquent assessment amount had been paid.

Download source file
Source 24 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion after finding they had not established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Download source file
Source 25 2014-12-16

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 26 2015-01-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 27 2015-02-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 28 2015-03-05

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 29 2015-03-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 30 2015-03-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling accepting the parties’ stipulation regarding dismissal, vacating trial, finding for defendants on the association’s foreclosure claim, and setting a fee-application deadline.

Download source file
Source 31 2015-03-11

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 32 2015-03-25

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 33 2015-04-27

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 34 2015-05-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 35 2015-06-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling awarding Forange $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, denying the association’s fee requests, and continuing the case on the dismissal calendar.

Download source file

FAQ

Did the escrow-agent payoff request extinguish the HOA lien?

No. The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I)’s escrow-agent penalty was intended to facilitate actual pending escrow transactions. Because the escrow agent’s request was not connected to a pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction, the request did not extinguish the association’s lien.

Why did the association win the August 2014 summary-judgment ruling?

Forange’s theory depended on treating any escrow-agent payoff request as enough to erase the lien if the association did not respond within ten days. The court rejected that interpretation as inconsistent with the statute’s purpose, denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion, and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

Why did the association lose its later foreclosure motion?

The court read A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) to look only at the delinquent assessment amount when deciding whether foreclosure is available. Late fees, attorney fees, and costs may be part of a lien, but they do not count toward the foreclosure threshold. Because the delinquent assessments had been paid, the court denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure.

Did the ruling eliminate all claims by the association?

No. The November 2014 foreclosure ruling expressly said it was not suggesting the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments was not viable. The June 2015 fee ruling later found the association succeeded on its unpaid-assessment claim because Forange paid the previously unpaid assessments in July 2013.

Who received attorney fees at the end?

Forange did. The court treated the consolidated case as mixed, found Forange the prevailing party overall, awarded it $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, and denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Is this decision binding in other HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful because it shows how one Arizona superior-court judge interpreted the escrow-payoff and foreclosure portions of A.R.S. § 33-1807 in a planned-community assessment-lien dispute.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateAugust 12, 2014
Judge / panelHon. Mark F. Aceto, Hon. Emmet J. Ronan, Hon. Ruth H. Hilliard
PartiesTroon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association (Plaintiff; defendant in consolidated action) v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, Forange, LLC, Michael D. Ripson, Scottsdale Community Association, Citibank South Dakota N.A., and Johnson Bank (Defendants or related parties); Forange, LLC also sued the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns in the consolidated action.
Governing law
Topics
LiensForeclosureAssessmentsCC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) did not extinguish an HOA assessment lien when an escrow agent requested a payoff statement outside any pending escrow transaction, so Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion was denied and summary judgment was granted to the association and its attorneys. The court later denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because foreclosure eligibility depends on the unpaid assessment amount, excluding late fees and attorney fees, and the delinquent assessments had been paid.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package35 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewTroon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued over unpaid assessments, lien foreclosure, and alleged CC&R violations, while the consolidated Forange action attacked the association lien and its attorneys based on an escrow-agent payoff request under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I). In August 2014, Judge Mark F. Aceto held that § 33-1807(I)’s escrow-agent payoff-statement penalty applies to actual pending escrow transactions, not to a request made outside any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction, and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s lien-extinguishment claims. In November 2014, the court denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure under § 33-1807(A), holding that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count toward foreclosure eligibility and that the delinquent assessment amount had been paid. The case ended through a dismissal stipulation and a fee ruling that awarded Forange taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees while denying the association’s fee requests.

Key Issues & Findings

On the payoff-statement claim, the court focused on the purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1807(I). The statute requires associations to furnish payoff statements within ten days after requests from specified actors and creates a lien-extinguishment penalty for an unanswered request by an escrow agent. But the court found the undisputed escrow request here was not made in connection with any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction. Reading the statute rationally and in light of the policy behind it, the court concluded the penalty provision was meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions, not to give escrow agents a special power to erase HOA liens whenever someone asks them to request payoff information.

On the association’s foreclosure motion, the court applied A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) differently. It noted that foreclosure is available only if the owner has been delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs may be included in the lien but are excluded when deciding whether the foreclosure right exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that filing a foreclosure complaint locks in the right to foreclose regardless of later payment.

The fee ruling treated the consolidated case as mixed. The association succeeded on its unpaid-assessment claim because Forange ultimately paid the overdue assessments, and it also defeated Forange’s groundless-document claims. Forange prevailed on the lien-foreclosure issue and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations. Weighing those results, the court found Forange the prevailing party overall, awarded it taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, and denied the association’s fee applications.

Why It Matters

This case is useful because it cuts in both directions on HOA assessment liens. It rejects a payoff-request strategy aimed at extinguishing an HOA lien through an escrow agent when there is no real pending escrow transaction, making the statutory penalty in A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) depend on the transaction context.

At the same time, it gives homeowners and associations a concrete reading of § 33-1807(A): for foreclosure eligibility, the court counted only delinquent assessments, not late fees, collection charges, or attorney fees. Once the delinquent assessments were paid, the association still could pursue monetary penalties and fees, but it did not receive summary judgment authorizing foreclosure. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but the reasoning addresses recurring assessment-lien and payoff-statement disputes.

← Back to Superior Court cases