Vance Gribble v. Legend Trail Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Vance Gribble Counsel
Respondent Legend Trail Community Association Counsel Josh Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808(E); Article 1 § 18 of the Declaration; Article 3 § 5 of the Declaration

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1808(E), A.R.S. § 33-1808(F), or the cited Declaration Articles.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1808(E), A.R.S. § 33-1808(F), or Article 3 § 5/Article 1 § 18 of the Declaration.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA rule adoption/enforcement regarding motorized vehicle use (ATVs/scooters)

Petitioner alleged the Association improperly prohibited the use of ATVs and motorized scooters on Association streets via e-mails (March 31, 2021, and June 21, 2021). The Association contended these were not rules and no formal enforcement action was taken.

Orders: Petitioner Vance Gribble’s petition against Respondent Legend Trail Community Association is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808(E)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1808(F)
  • Article 1 § 18 of the Declaration
  • Article 3 § 5 of the Declaration

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Recreational Activity, Motorized Vehicles, ATVs, Scooters, Rule Adoption, Declaration, Common Area
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808(E)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1808(F)
  • Article 1 § 18 of the Declaration
  • Article 3 § 5 of the Declaration
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.R.S. §§ 33-3101 to 33-11702
  • A.R.S. § 10-3140
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221004-REL Decision – 922828.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:39:42 (100.5 KB)





Study Guide – 22F-H2221004-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221004-REL”, “case_title”: “Vance Gribble vs. Legend Trail Community Association”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-04”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “What is the burden of proof required to win a hearing against an HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The petitioner must prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.””, “detailed_answer”: “Homeowners filing a petition bear the responsibility of proving that the HOA violated the law or the CC&Rs. The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning the claim must be shown to be more probably true than not.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “burden of proof”, “procedure” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA prohibit children from playing or riding scooters on residential streets?”, “short_answer”: “No, state law prevents HOAs from banning children’s recreational activities on residential roadways with speed limits of 25 mph or less.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that notwithstanding community documents, an association cannot prohibit resident children from engaging in recreational activity on residential roadways under the association’s jurisdiction where the speed limit is 25 mph or less.”, “alj_quote”: “Notwithstanding any provision in the community documents, an association shall not prohibit children who reside in the planned community from engaging in recreational activity on residential roadways that are under the jurisdiction of the association and on which the posted speed limit is twenty-five miles per hour or less.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1808(F) (cited as § 1803(F) in decision footnote)”, “topic_tags”: [ “homeowner rights”, “children”, “recreation” ] }, { “question”: “Does an email sent by the HOA automatically count as an official rule?”, “short_answer”: “No, an email does not constitute a formal rule if it was not adopted through an official act of the board.”, “detailed_answer”: “To be an official act, the board must usually vote at a meeting or provide written consent in accordance with statutes. In this case, emails sent in error or for clarification were not considered adopted rules or formal enforcement actions.”, “alj_quote”: “There was no evidence that the Association adopted a rule or took enforcement action against the residents… There was no evidence presented that the Association took formal action pursuant to A.R.S. §10-3140.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 10-3140”, “topic_tags”: [ “procedural requirements”, “HOA communications”, “rulemaking” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA enforce traffic or safety violations on public streets?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no, unless the restriction is specifically in the CC&Rs (like parking).”, “detailed_answer”: “On public streets, the HOA’s authority is limited to enforcing restrictions explicitly contained in the CC&Rs. They do not have general authority to police moving violations or safety concerns; those are matters for local law enforcement.”, “alj_quote”: “Legend Trail Community Association may only enforce public street restrictions that are contained in the CC&R Declaration… the Association does not have the authority to address any moving violations or safety concerns on the public streets.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Declaration”, “topic_tags”: [ “public streets”, “enforcement”, “jurisdiction” ] }, { “question”: “What defines a ‘preponderance of the evidence’?”, “short_answer”: “It is proof that convinces the judge that a claim is ‘more probably true than not.'”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard does not require removing all doubt. It requires evidence that has superior weight and is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”, “alj_quote”: “A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal definitions”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “How are CC&Rs and restrictive covenants interpreted by the judge?”, “short_answer”: “They are interpreted as a whole to give effect to the underlying purpose and the intent of the parties.”, “detailed_answer”: “If a covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced based on the intent. The document is viewed in its entirety rather than isolating specific clauses.”, “alj_quote”: “Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.”, “legal_basis”: “Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553”, “topic_tags”: [ “CC&Rs”, “legal interpretation” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 22F-H2221004-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221004-REL”, “case_title”: “Vance Gribble vs. Legend Trail Community Association”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-04”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “What is the burden of proof required to win a hearing against an HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The petitioner must prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.””, “detailed_answer”: “Homeowners filing a petition bear the responsibility of proving that the HOA violated the law or the CC&Rs. The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning the claim must be shown to be more probably true than not.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “burden of proof”, “procedure” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA prohibit children from playing or riding scooters on residential streets?”, “short_answer”: “No, state law prevents HOAs from banning children’s recreational activities on residential roadways with speed limits of 25 mph or less.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that notwithstanding community documents, an association cannot prohibit resident children from engaging in recreational activity on residential roadways under the association’s jurisdiction where the speed limit is 25 mph or less.”, “alj_quote”: “Notwithstanding any provision in the community documents, an association shall not prohibit children who reside in the planned community from engaging in recreational activity on residential roadways that are under the jurisdiction of the association and on which the posted speed limit is twenty-five miles per hour or less.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1808(F) (cited as § 1803(F) in decision footnote)”, “topic_tags”: [ “homeowner rights”, “children”, “recreation” ] }, { “question”: “Does an email sent by the HOA automatically count as an official rule?”, “short_answer”: “No, an email does not constitute a formal rule if it was not adopted through an official act of the board.”, “detailed_answer”: “To be an official act, the board must usually vote at a meeting or provide written consent in accordance with statutes. In this case, emails sent in error or for clarification were not considered adopted rules or formal enforcement actions.”, “alj_quote”: “There was no evidence that the Association adopted a rule or took enforcement action against the residents… There was no evidence presented that the Association took formal action pursuant to A.R.S. §10-3140.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 10-3140”, “topic_tags”: [ “procedural requirements”, “HOA communications”, “rulemaking” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA enforce traffic or safety violations on public streets?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no, unless the restriction is specifically in the CC&Rs (like parking).”, “detailed_answer”: “On public streets, the HOA’s authority is limited to enforcing restrictions explicitly contained in the CC&Rs. They do not have general authority to police moving violations or safety concerns; those are matters for local law enforcement.”, “alj_quote”: “Legend Trail Community Association may only enforce public street restrictions that are contained in the CC&R Declaration… the Association does not have the authority to address any moving violations or safety concerns on the public streets.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Declaration”, “topic_tags”: [ “public streets”, “enforcement”, “jurisdiction” ] }, { “question”: “What defines a ‘preponderance of the evidence’?”, “short_answer”: “It is proof that convinces the judge that a claim is ‘more probably true than not.'”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard does not require removing all doubt. It requires evidence that has superior weight and is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”, “alj_quote”: “A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal definitions”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “How are CC&Rs and restrictive covenants interpreted by the judge?”, “short_answer”: “They are interpreted as a whole to give effect to the underlying purpose and the intent of the parties.”, “detailed_answer”: “If a covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced based on the intent. The document is viewed in its entirety rather than isolating specific clauses.”, “alj_quote”: “Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.”, “legal_basis”: “Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553”, “topic_tags”: [ “CC&Rs”, “legal interpretation” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Vance Gribble (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Josh Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
  • Terri Klein (witness)
    Association's Board of Directors
    President of the Association's Board of Directors

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Ronna Biesecker, v. 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association,

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-06-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Ronna Biesecker Counsel
Respondent 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1247 and CC&Rs § 10(c)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs or Arizona statutes; therefore, the petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as evidence suggested the water leak was caused by the sliding glass door of the unit above, not a flaw in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain all Common Elements (Water Leak Dispute)

Petitioner alleged the Respondent HOA failed to maintain Common Elements, leading to water leaks in her unit. Respondent denied the violation, asserting the leak originated from the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or track assemblies, which are the responsibility of that unit owner.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1247
  • CC&Rs § 10(c)
  • Article II.E, Section 1 of the Bylaws
  • Article C of the CC&Rs

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, maintenance dispute, common elements, water damage, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1247
  • CC&Rs § 10(c)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020050-REL Decision – 802352.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:09 (103.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020050-REL


Administrative Hearing Brief: Biesecker v. 6100 Fifth Condominium HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020050-REL, wherein Petitioner Ronna Biesecker alleged that the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association (HOA) failed to fulfill its maintenance responsibilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof required to substantiate her claim.

The central conflict involved recurring water leaks in Ms. Biesecker’s condominium unit (A113). The Petitioner contended that the leaks originated from cracks in the building’s exterior stucco, which are defined as “Common Elements” and are therefore the HOA’s responsibility to repair under its governing documents and Arizona state law. In contrast, the HOA argued that the source of the water was the sliding door assembly of the upstairs unit, making its maintenance the responsibility of that unit’s owner.

The final decision rested on the weight of evidence presented. Multiple expert inspections, conducted by Olander’s and another inspector retained by the HOA, concluded that the leaks were attributable to the upstairs unit’s sliding doors. This evidence was deemed more convincing than the Petitioner’s own assessment regarding the stucco. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Biesecker failed to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the damage was caused by a flaw in the common elements, leading to the dismissal of her case.

Case Overview

Case Name

Ronna Biesecker, Petitioner, vs. 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

20F-H2020050-REL

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

June 5, 2020

Decision Date

June 25, 2020

Petitioner

Ronna Biesecker, owner of unit A113

Respondent

6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, represented by Robert Eric Struse, Statutory Agent

Core Allegations and Defenses

Petitioner’s Claim (Ronna Biesecker)

Core Allegation: The Petitioner filed a petition on March 10, 2020, alleging that the Respondent (HOA) violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 10(c) and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1247 by failing to maintain the common elements of the condominium community.

Specifics of Claim: Ms. Biesecker asserted that persistent water leaks into her unit were caused by cracks in the exterior stucco surrounding the sliding doors.

Basis of Responsibility: She argued that because the exterior stucco is a “common element,” the HOA was legally responsible for its repair and any subsequent damage to her unit.

Requested Action: The Petitioner had previously requested that the HOA repair the exterior leaks and had attempted to have the HOA mediate the issue with the owner of the upstairs unit.

Respondent’s Position (6100 Fifth Condominium HOA)

Core Defense: The HOA denied any violation of its CC&Rs or state statutes.

Specifics of Defense: The HOA maintained that the source of the water leaks was not a common element. Instead, it attributed the leaks to the sliding doors or track assemblies of the condominium unit located directly above the Petitioner’s.

Basis of Responsibility: According to the HOA’s governing documents and state law, the maintenance of elements belonging to an individual unit (such as a sliding door) is the responsibility of that unit’s owner, not the association.

Actions Taken: The HOA declined to “arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party” in the dispute between the Petitioner and the owner of the upstairs unit. It also conducted an inspection which supported its position.

Evidentiary Timeline and Key Findings

The decision was based on a sequence of events and expert assessments presented as evidence.

January 5, 2019: Petitioner experiences the first water leak in her unit (A113) near the sliding glass door.

January 18, 2019: An employee from Olander’s, a door installation company contacted by the Petitioner, inspects the unit. The employee’s opinion was that “the leak was coming from the unit above Petitioner and that the sliding door above Petitioner’s unit had large gaps under the threshold which allowed water to get in.”

February 8, 2019: Nathan’s Handyman Service repairs plaster damage in the Petitioner’s unit and notes in a report that the damage was “the result of an old leak coming from above Petitioner’s unit.” The report also identified rusted wire mesh, indicating previous repairs to the area.

March/April 2019: The HOA’s Property Manager formally refuses the Petitioner’s request to mediate the dispute with the owner of the upstairs unit.

May 1, 2019: Petitioner emails the HOA, proposing that new cracks in the stucco pop-out at the roof level could be the source of the leak.

October 28, 2019: A “Roof Opinion Report” from Roof Savers Locke Roofing states that no roof repairs are needed but notes the presence of “server [sic] cracking at the stucco.” The report recommends contacting a stucco or window contractor.

November 27, 2019: Another leak occurs in the same area of the Petitioner’s unit.

December 9, 2019: The HOA’s Property Manager and an inspector assess the water damage in the Petitioner’s unit.

December 23, 2019: An invoice from the inspector states: “After inspecting the shared roof and building interior/exterior it appears the water damage to the lower unit is coming from the upstairs unit sliding doors or their track assemblies.”

June 5, 2020 (Hearing Testimony):

◦ The Petitioner stated it was “obvious” the leak originated from the stucco crack.

◦ The HOA’s Statutory Agent, Robert Eric Struse, testified that the December 2019 inspection included the interior of the upstairs unit. He argued that if the stucco crack were the cause, the upstairs unit would also show internal water damage, which it did not.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case revolved around the interpretation of responsibility as defined by the following legal framework:

Bylaws (Article II.E, Section 1) & CC&Rs (Article C): These documents obligate the HOA to collect assessments to meet common expenses, including the “maintenance, upkeep, care, repair, [and] reconstruction… for the common elements.”

A.R.S. § 33-1247: This Arizona statute codifies the division of maintenance responsibility. It states that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

Conclusions of Law and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the application of the legal standard of proof to the evidence presented.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to demonstrate, by a “preponderance of the evidence,” that the HOA violated the applicable statutes or CC&Rs. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Central Legal Finding: The judge determined that if the water damage was caused by a flaw in the common elements, the HOA would be responsible. However, the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof in establishing this causal link.

Reasoning for Decision: The ruling states: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the water leak and damage was attributable to the condition of the common elements. Rather, the opinions of the companies that inspected the area concluded that the leak was coming from the sliding glass door of the unit above Petitioner’s.” The collective weight of the expert opinions from Olander’s and the HOA’s inspector outweighed the Petitioner’s personal theory about the stucco cracks.

Final Order: Based on these findings, the judge issued a final order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.” This order is binding unless a rehearing is granted.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020050-REL


Study Guide: Biesecker v. 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 20F-H2020050-REL, concerning a dispute between condominium owner Ronna Biesecker and the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association. The case centers on determining responsibility for water leaks affecting the Petitioner’s unit. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What was the central claim made by the Petitioner against the Respondent?

3. According to the Respondent, what was the source of the water leaks and who was responsible for the repair?

4. What legal standard, or “burden of proof,” did the Petitioner need to meet to win her case?

5. What two key community documents, in addition to Arizona state law, define the Respondent’s responsibility for maintaining “common elements”?

6. Summarize the findings of the two inspection reports mentioned in the evidence (from Olander’s and the December 23, 2019 invoice).

7. What was the Petitioner’s theory about the source of the leak, as stated during the hearing?

8. How did Robert Eric Struse, the Respondent’s Statutory Agent, counter the Petitioner’s theory about the stucco crack?

9. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

10. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Ronna Biesecker, who owned condominium unit A113. The Respondent was the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, of which the Petitioner was a member.

2. The Petitioner filed a petition alleging the Respondent violated its CC&Rs (§ 10(c)) and Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1247 by failing to maintain the common elements, which she believed were the source of water leaks in her unit.

3. The Respondent argued that the source of the water leaks was the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or track assemblies. Therefore, the responsibility for maintenance and repair belonged to the owner of that specific unit, not the Homeowners Association.

4. The Petitioner had the burden of proof to establish her claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires providing proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

5. The Respondent’s responsibility is defined in Article II.E, Section 1 of the community Bylaws and Section C of the CC&Rs. Both documents state the association is responsible for the maintenance and repair of common elements using assessments paid by owners.

6. An employee from Olander’s opined that the leak was coming from the unit above Petitioner’s, specifically from large gaps under the sliding door’s threshold. Similarly, the inspector’s invoice from December 23, 2019, concluded that the water damage appeared to be coming from the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or their track assemblies.

7. During the hearing, the Petitioner stated that it was “obvious” the leak was coming from a crack in the stucco in the pop-out surrounding the sliding doors at the roof level. She posited this was a common element and therefore the Respondent’s responsibility to repair.

8. Mr. Struse testified that if water were leaking through the crack in the stucco, the upstairs unit would have also sustained internal damage. He confirmed that an inspection of the inside of the upstairs unit showed this was not happening, undermining the Petitioner’s theory.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed.

10. The judge concluded the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof because the credible evidence, particularly the opinions of the companies that inspected the area, concluded the leak was coming from the sliding glass door of the unit above. The Petitioner did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the leak was attributable to the condition of the common elements.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and legal principles from the case document to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the distinction between “common elements” and an individual “unit” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1247 and the community’s governing documents. How was this distinction central to the judge’s final decision in this case?

2. Discuss the role and weight of evidence presented during the hearing. Compare the Petitioner’s testimony and personal observations with the professional opinions from Olander’s and the inspector. Why did the judge find the professional opinions more convincing in determining the outcome?

3. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case document’s Conclusions of Law. Using specific examples from the hearing evidence, detail why Ronna Biesecker failed to meet this standard.

4. Based on the referenced community documents, what are the primary maintenance responsibilities of the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association? How did the Respondent’s stated refusal to “arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party” in the dispute between unit owners align with or diverge from these responsibilities?

5. Imagine you are advising the Petitioner before the hearing. What additional evidence or types of expert testimony could she have presented to potentially change the outcome of the case and successfully prove the leak was the Respondent’s responsibility?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presides over the evidentiary hearing and issues a legally binding decision and order.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The statutes referenced (e.g., § 33-1247) govern the responsibilities of condominium associations and the legal procedures for disputes.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal operations of an organization. In this case, Article II.E, Section 1 of the Bylaws obligates the Association to maintain the common elements using assessments paid by owners.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A legal document that outlines the rights and obligations of property owners and the homeowners association. Section C of the CC&Rs required the Association to maintain, repair, and care for the common elements.

Common Elements

Areas of the condominium property for which the homeowners association is responsible for maintenance, upkeep, care, and repair, as distinguished from an individual owner’s unit.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Ronna Biesecker, the condominium owner who alleged the homeowners association violated its duties.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is established by evidence with the most convincing force.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association.

Statutory Agent

An individual designated to receive legal notices and appear on behalf of a business entity. In this case, Robert Eric Struse appeared and testified on behalf of the Respondent association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020050-REL


Your HOA Isn’t Your Landlord: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Condo Water Leak Lawsuit

Introduction: The Dreaded Drip

It’s a scenario that strikes fear into the heart of any condo owner: the tell-tale stain on the ceiling, the damp spot on the wall, the dreaded drip of a mysterious water leak. The immediate anxiety is followed by a pressing question: “Who is responsible for fixing this, and who pays for the damage?” Many assume the answer is straightforward, but as a recent lawsuit involving the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association demonstrates, the lines of responsibility in a condominium community are often more complicated than they appear.

This article explores a real-life court case between a condo owner and her HOA to uncover three surprising truths about condo ownership, liability, and the true role of your HOA.

——————————————————————————–

1. It’s Not Where the Damage Is, It’s Where the Leak Starts

In the case, condo owner Ronna Biesecker experienced persistent water leaks in her unit (A113) around her sliding glass door. On May 1, 2019, after observing new cracks in the exterior stucco, she “posited that the cracks could be a source of the leak.” This became the foundation of her claim: if the water was coming from the stucco—a “Common Element”—then the HOA was responsible for the repairs.

However, a year-long trail of evidence pointed in a different direction. As early as January 18, 2019, an employee from the door installation company opined that the leak was “coming from the unit above.” On February 8, 2019, a handyman repairing plaster damage stated the issue was from “an old leak coming from above.” Even a roofing report from October 28, 2019, which noted the stucco cracking, stopped short of blaming it, instead recommending the owner contact a “stucco contractor or Window Company.”

This evidence culminated in a formal inspector’s report on December 23, 2019, which concluded the water was “coming from the upstairs unit sliding doors or their track assemblies.” Because the source of the leak originated from a part of the neighbor’s private unit, the legal responsibility shifted. Based on Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1247, the HOA was not liable. The key lesson here is unambiguous: legal responsibility follows the source of the problem, not the location of the resulting damage.

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2. “More Probably True Than Not”: The Burden of Proof Is on You

In any lawsuit, the person bringing the complaint—in this case, the homeowner—carries the “burden of proof.” This means she had to provide enough evidence to meet a specific legal standard, which the court defined as “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal decision offers a clear definition of this standard:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

In simple terms, Ms. Biesecker had to convince the judge that her theory—that the leak came from the common element stucco—was more likely to be true than the HOA’s theory that it came from the neighbor’s door.

Her claim was undone by simple logic. The HOA’s Statutory Agent, Mr. Struse, provided devastating testimony, arguing that “if water was leaking through the crack in the stucco, the upstairs unit would have also had internal damage, which was not happening.” This single point made the petitioner’s theory far less probable. The judge ultimately ruled that the petitioner “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the provisions of the CC&Rs or Arizona statutes,” proving that an owner’s belief isn’t enough without convincing evidence.

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3. Your HOA Won’t (and Often Can’t) Settle Neighbor-to-Neighbor Fights

Before filing the lawsuit, the petitioner attempted to resolve the issue directly. On or about February 11, 2019, she contacted the owner of the unit above hers to request repairs but “did not receive a response.” Frustrated, she turned to the HOA for help. In March or April 2019, she asked the Property Manager to “help mediate the issue” between her and her neighbor.

The HOA’s response was direct and legally sound: the Property Manager “responded that it would not arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party to the dispute.” This is a crucial and often misunderstood takeaway for condo owners. While an HOA’s role is to manage common elements and enforce community-wide rules, it is not legally obligated—and often not permitted—to intervene in private disputes between two homeowners over damage originating from private property. Your HOA is not a landlord or a mediator for personal conflicts; it’s an administrative body with a specific and legally defined scope of authority.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Know Your Lines

The lessons from this case are clear: condo living involves a complex web of overlapping responsibilities. The line between what constitutes a common element, your private property, and your neighbor’s property is legally significant and determines who is ultimately responsible when things go wrong. Understanding these distinctions isn’t just helpful—it’s essential for protecting your investment and resolving issues effectively.

Before the next problem arises, have you read your community documents to know exactly where your responsibility ends and your neighbor’s begins?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Ronna Biesecker (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on her own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Robert Eric Struse (statutory agent)
    6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association
    Appeared and presented testimony on behalf of Respondent.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Ronna Biesecker, v. 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association,

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-06-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Ronna Biesecker Counsel
Respondent 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1247 and CC&Rs § 10(c)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs or Arizona statutes; therefore, the petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as evidence suggested the water leak was caused by the sliding glass door of the unit above, not a flaw in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain all Common Elements (Water Leak Dispute)

Petitioner alleged the Respondent HOA failed to maintain Common Elements, leading to water leaks in her unit. Respondent denied the violation, asserting the leak originated from the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or track assemblies, which are the responsibility of that unit owner.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1247
  • CC&Rs § 10(c)
  • Article II.E, Section 1 of the Bylaws
  • Article C of the CC&Rs

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, maintenance dispute, common elements, water damage, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1247
  • CC&Rs § 10(c)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020050-REL Decision – 802352.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:05 (103.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020050-REL


Administrative Hearing Brief: Biesecker v. 6100 Fifth Condominium HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020050-REL, wherein Petitioner Ronna Biesecker alleged that the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association (HOA) failed to fulfill its maintenance responsibilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof required to substantiate her claim.

The central conflict involved recurring water leaks in Ms. Biesecker’s condominium unit (A113). The Petitioner contended that the leaks originated from cracks in the building’s exterior stucco, which are defined as “Common Elements” and are therefore the HOA’s responsibility to repair under its governing documents and Arizona state law. In contrast, the HOA argued that the source of the water was the sliding door assembly of the upstairs unit, making its maintenance the responsibility of that unit’s owner.

The final decision rested on the weight of evidence presented. Multiple expert inspections, conducted by Olander’s and another inspector retained by the HOA, concluded that the leaks were attributable to the upstairs unit’s sliding doors. This evidence was deemed more convincing than the Petitioner’s own assessment regarding the stucco. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Biesecker failed to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the damage was caused by a flaw in the common elements, leading to the dismissal of her case.

Case Overview

Case Name

Ronna Biesecker, Petitioner, vs. 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

20F-H2020050-REL

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

June 5, 2020

Decision Date

June 25, 2020

Petitioner

Ronna Biesecker, owner of unit A113

Respondent

6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, represented by Robert Eric Struse, Statutory Agent

Core Allegations and Defenses

Petitioner’s Claim (Ronna Biesecker)

Core Allegation: The Petitioner filed a petition on March 10, 2020, alleging that the Respondent (HOA) violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 10(c) and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1247 by failing to maintain the common elements of the condominium community.

Specifics of Claim: Ms. Biesecker asserted that persistent water leaks into her unit were caused by cracks in the exterior stucco surrounding the sliding doors.

Basis of Responsibility: She argued that because the exterior stucco is a “common element,” the HOA was legally responsible for its repair and any subsequent damage to her unit.

Requested Action: The Petitioner had previously requested that the HOA repair the exterior leaks and had attempted to have the HOA mediate the issue with the owner of the upstairs unit.

Respondent’s Position (6100 Fifth Condominium HOA)

Core Defense: The HOA denied any violation of its CC&Rs or state statutes.

Specifics of Defense: The HOA maintained that the source of the water leaks was not a common element. Instead, it attributed the leaks to the sliding doors or track assemblies of the condominium unit located directly above the Petitioner’s.

Basis of Responsibility: According to the HOA’s governing documents and state law, the maintenance of elements belonging to an individual unit (such as a sliding door) is the responsibility of that unit’s owner, not the association.

Actions Taken: The HOA declined to “arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party” in the dispute between the Petitioner and the owner of the upstairs unit. It also conducted an inspection which supported its position.

Evidentiary Timeline and Key Findings

The decision was based on a sequence of events and expert assessments presented as evidence.

January 5, 2019: Petitioner experiences the first water leak in her unit (A113) near the sliding glass door.

January 18, 2019: An employee from Olander’s, a door installation company contacted by the Petitioner, inspects the unit. The employee’s opinion was that “the leak was coming from the unit above Petitioner and that the sliding door above Petitioner’s unit had large gaps under the threshold which allowed water to get in.”

February 8, 2019: Nathan’s Handyman Service repairs plaster damage in the Petitioner’s unit and notes in a report that the damage was “the result of an old leak coming from above Petitioner’s unit.” The report also identified rusted wire mesh, indicating previous repairs to the area.

March/April 2019: The HOA’s Property Manager formally refuses the Petitioner’s request to mediate the dispute with the owner of the upstairs unit.

May 1, 2019: Petitioner emails the HOA, proposing that new cracks in the stucco pop-out at the roof level could be the source of the leak.

October 28, 2019: A “Roof Opinion Report” from Roof Savers Locke Roofing states that no roof repairs are needed but notes the presence of “server [sic] cracking at the stucco.” The report recommends contacting a stucco or window contractor.

November 27, 2019: Another leak occurs in the same area of the Petitioner’s unit.

December 9, 2019: The HOA’s Property Manager and an inspector assess the water damage in the Petitioner’s unit.

December 23, 2019: An invoice from the inspector states: “After inspecting the shared roof and building interior/exterior it appears the water damage to the lower unit is coming from the upstairs unit sliding doors or their track assemblies.”

June 5, 2020 (Hearing Testimony):

◦ The Petitioner stated it was “obvious” the leak originated from the stucco crack.

◦ The HOA’s Statutory Agent, Robert Eric Struse, testified that the December 2019 inspection included the interior of the upstairs unit. He argued that if the stucco crack were the cause, the upstairs unit would also show internal water damage, which it did not.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case revolved around the interpretation of responsibility as defined by the following legal framework:

Bylaws (Article II.E, Section 1) & CC&Rs (Article C): These documents obligate the HOA to collect assessments to meet common expenses, including the “maintenance, upkeep, care, repair, [and] reconstruction… for the common elements.”

A.R.S. § 33-1247: This Arizona statute codifies the division of maintenance responsibility. It states that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

Conclusions of Law and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the application of the legal standard of proof to the evidence presented.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to demonstrate, by a “preponderance of the evidence,” that the HOA violated the applicable statutes or CC&Rs. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Central Legal Finding: The judge determined that if the water damage was caused by a flaw in the common elements, the HOA would be responsible. However, the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof in establishing this causal link.

Reasoning for Decision: The ruling states: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the water leak and damage was attributable to the condition of the common elements. Rather, the opinions of the companies that inspected the area concluded that the leak was coming from the sliding glass door of the unit above Petitioner’s.” The collective weight of the expert opinions from Olander’s and the HOA’s inspector outweighed the Petitioner’s personal theory about the stucco cracks.

Final Order: Based on these findings, the judge issued a final order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.” This order is binding unless a rehearing is granted.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020050-REL


Study Guide: Biesecker v. 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 20F-H2020050-REL, concerning a dispute between condominium owner Ronna Biesecker and the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association. The case centers on determining responsibility for water leaks affecting the Petitioner’s unit. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What was the central claim made by the Petitioner against the Respondent?

3. According to the Respondent, what was the source of the water leaks and who was responsible for the repair?

4. What legal standard, or “burden of proof,” did the Petitioner need to meet to win her case?

5. What two key community documents, in addition to Arizona state law, define the Respondent’s responsibility for maintaining “common elements”?

6. Summarize the findings of the two inspection reports mentioned in the evidence (from Olander’s and the December 23, 2019 invoice).

7. What was the Petitioner’s theory about the source of the leak, as stated during the hearing?

8. How did Robert Eric Struse, the Respondent’s Statutory Agent, counter the Petitioner’s theory about the stucco crack?

9. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

10. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Ronna Biesecker, who owned condominium unit A113. The Respondent was the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, of which the Petitioner was a member.

2. The Petitioner filed a petition alleging the Respondent violated its CC&Rs (§ 10(c)) and Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1247 by failing to maintain the common elements, which she believed were the source of water leaks in her unit.

3. The Respondent argued that the source of the water leaks was the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or track assemblies. Therefore, the responsibility for maintenance and repair belonged to the owner of that specific unit, not the Homeowners Association.

4. The Petitioner had the burden of proof to establish her claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires providing proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

5. The Respondent’s responsibility is defined in Article II.E, Section 1 of the community Bylaws and Section C of the CC&Rs. Both documents state the association is responsible for the maintenance and repair of common elements using assessments paid by owners.

6. An employee from Olander’s opined that the leak was coming from the unit above Petitioner’s, specifically from large gaps under the sliding door’s threshold. Similarly, the inspector’s invoice from December 23, 2019, concluded that the water damage appeared to be coming from the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or their track assemblies.

7. During the hearing, the Petitioner stated that it was “obvious” the leak was coming from a crack in the stucco in the pop-out surrounding the sliding doors at the roof level. She posited this was a common element and therefore the Respondent’s responsibility to repair.

8. Mr. Struse testified that if water were leaking through the crack in the stucco, the upstairs unit would have also sustained internal damage. He confirmed that an inspection of the inside of the upstairs unit showed this was not happening, undermining the Petitioner’s theory.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed.

10. The judge concluded the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof because the credible evidence, particularly the opinions of the companies that inspected the area, concluded the leak was coming from the sliding glass door of the unit above. The Petitioner did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the leak was attributable to the condition of the common elements.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and legal principles from the case document to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the distinction between “common elements” and an individual “unit” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1247 and the community’s governing documents. How was this distinction central to the judge’s final decision in this case?

2. Discuss the role and weight of evidence presented during the hearing. Compare the Petitioner’s testimony and personal observations with the professional opinions from Olander’s and the inspector. Why did the judge find the professional opinions more convincing in determining the outcome?

3. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case document’s Conclusions of Law. Using specific examples from the hearing evidence, detail why Ronna Biesecker failed to meet this standard.

4. Based on the referenced community documents, what are the primary maintenance responsibilities of the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association? How did the Respondent’s stated refusal to “arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party” in the dispute between unit owners align with or diverge from these responsibilities?

5. Imagine you are advising the Petitioner before the hearing. What additional evidence or types of expert testimony could she have presented to potentially change the outcome of the case and successfully prove the leak was the Respondent’s responsibility?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presides over the evidentiary hearing and issues a legally binding decision and order.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The statutes referenced (e.g., § 33-1247) govern the responsibilities of condominium associations and the legal procedures for disputes.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal operations of an organization. In this case, Article II.E, Section 1 of the Bylaws obligates the Association to maintain the common elements using assessments paid by owners.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A legal document that outlines the rights and obligations of property owners and the homeowners association. Section C of the CC&Rs required the Association to maintain, repair, and care for the common elements.

Common Elements

Areas of the condominium property for which the homeowners association is responsible for maintenance, upkeep, care, and repair, as distinguished from an individual owner’s unit.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Ronna Biesecker, the condominium owner who alleged the homeowners association violated its duties.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is established by evidence with the most convincing force.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association.

Statutory Agent

An individual designated to receive legal notices and appear on behalf of a business entity. In this case, Robert Eric Struse appeared and testified on behalf of the Respondent association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020050-REL


Your HOA Isn’t Your Landlord: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Condo Water Leak Lawsuit

Introduction: The Dreaded Drip

It’s a scenario that strikes fear into the heart of any condo owner: the tell-tale stain on the ceiling, the damp spot on the wall, the dreaded drip of a mysterious water leak. The immediate anxiety is followed by a pressing question: “Who is responsible for fixing this, and who pays for the damage?” Many assume the answer is straightforward, but as a recent lawsuit involving the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association demonstrates, the lines of responsibility in a condominium community are often more complicated than they appear.

This article explores a real-life court case between a condo owner and her HOA to uncover three surprising truths about condo ownership, liability, and the true role of your HOA.

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1. It’s Not Where the Damage Is, It’s Where the Leak Starts

In the case, condo owner Ronna Biesecker experienced persistent water leaks in her unit (A113) around her sliding glass door. On May 1, 2019, after observing new cracks in the exterior stucco, she “posited that the cracks could be a source of the leak.” This became the foundation of her claim: if the water was coming from the stucco—a “Common Element”—then the HOA was responsible for the repairs.

However, a year-long trail of evidence pointed in a different direction. As early as January 18, 2019, an employee from the door installation company opined that the leak was “coming from the unit above.” On February 8, 2019, a handyman repairing plaster damage stated the issue was from “an old leak coming from above.” Even a roofing report from October 28, 2019, which noted the stucco cracking, stopped short of blaming it, instead recommending the owner contact a “stucco contractor or Window Company.”

This evidence culminated in a formal inspector’s report on December 23, 2019, which concluded the water was “coming from the upstairs unit sliding doors or their track assemblies.” Because the source of the leak originated from a part of the neighbor’s private unit, the legal responsibility shifted. Based on Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1247, the HOA was not liable. The key lesson here is unambiguous: legal responsibility follows the source of the problem, not the location of the resulting damage.

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2. “More Probably True Than Not”: The Burden of Proof Is on You

In any lawsuit, the person bringing the complaint—in this case, the homeowner—carries the “burden of proof.” This means she had to provide enough evidence to meet a specific legal standard, which the court defined as “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal decision offers a clear definition of this standard:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

In simple terms, Ms. Biesecker had to convince the judge that her theory—that the leak came from the common element stucco—was more likely to be true than the HOA’s theory that it came from the neighbor’s door.

Her claim was undone by simple logic. The HOA’s Statutory Agent, Mr. Struse, provided devastating testimony, arguing that “if water was leaking through the crack in the stucco, the upstairs unit would have also had internal damage, which was not happening.” This single point made the petitioner’s theory far less probable. The judge ultimately ruled that the petitioner “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the provisions of the CC&Rs or Arizona statutes,” proving that an owner’s belief isn’t enough without convincing evidence.

——————————————————————————–

3. Your HOA Won’t (and Often Can’t) Settle Neighbor-to-Neighbor Fights

Before filing the lawsuit, the petitioner attempted to resolve the issue directly. On or about February 11, 2019, she contacted the owner of the unit above hers to request repairs but “did not receive a response.” Frustrated, she turned to the HOA for help. In March or April 2019, she asked the Property Manager to “help mediate the issue” between her and her neighbor.

The HOA’s response was direct and legally sound: the Property Manager “responded that it would not arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party to the dispute.” This is a crucial and often misunderstood takeaway for condo owners. While an HOA’s role is to manage common elements and enforce community-wide rules, it is not legally obligated—and often not permitted—to intervene in private disputes between two homeowners over damage originating from private property. Your HOA is not a landlord or a mediator for personal conflicts; it’s an administrative body with a specific and legally defined scope of authority.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Know Your Lines

The lessons from this case are clear: condo living involves a complex web of overlapping responsibilities. The line between what constitutes a common element, your private property, and your neighbor’s property is legally significant and determines who is ultimately responsible when things go wrong. Understanding these distinctions isn’t just helpful—it’s essential for protecting your investment and resolving issues effectively.

Before the next problem arises, have you read your community documents to know exactly where your responsibility ends and your neighbor’s begins?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Ronna Biesecker (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on her own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Robert Eric Struse (statutory agent)
    6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association
    Appeared and presented testimony on behalf of Respondent.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Paul L Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul L Moffett Counsel Richard M. Rollman
Respondent Vistoso Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.

Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.

Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
  • CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:33 (48.3 KB)

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:33 (109.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019014-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

Executive Summary

On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.

The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.

The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.

Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.

Detail

Information

Case Name

Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association

Case Number

20F-H2019014-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petition Filed

On or about September 25, 2019

Hearing Date

December 16, 2019

Decision & Order Date

January 27, 2020

Petitioner

Paul L. Moffett

Petitioner’s Counsel

Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.

Respondent

Vistoso Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC

The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments

Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.

The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:

Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.

Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.

Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.

Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions

The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.

Key Governing Document Provisions

Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.

Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)

The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:

• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.

• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.

• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.

Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)

The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:

• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.

• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.

• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.

Established Findings of Fact

The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.

March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.

March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.

October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.

March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.

Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Legal Interpretation

The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.

The decision states:

“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”

The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.

Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy

The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”

Final Order

Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.

Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2019014-REL


Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?

3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?

5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?

6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?

8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.

3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.

4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.

6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.

8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.

9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.

2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?

4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.

5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1

The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3

The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Declarant

The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.

Developer Owner

An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2019014-REL


The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head

For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.

This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.

The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote

The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.

The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:

Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.

On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.

The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years

The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.

• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.

• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.

The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole

This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.

In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.

The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:

Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.

The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.

The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).

While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.

This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.

Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details

This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.

The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul L Moffett (petitioner)
    Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
  • Richard M. Rollman (petitioner attorney)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
  • Alyssa Leverette (legal staff)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
    Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
  • Kimberly Rubly (witness)
    Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
  • Sean K. Moynihan (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
    Recipient of Order

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order

Other Participants

  • Sarah Nelson (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Patrick Straney (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Dennis Ottley (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election

Paul L Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul L Moffett Counsel Richard M. Rollman
Respondent Vistoso Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.

Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.

Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
  • CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:28 (48.3 KB)

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:31 (109.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019014-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

Executive Summary

On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.

The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.

The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.

Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.

Detail

Information

Case Name

Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association

Case Number

20F-H2019014-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petition Filed

On or about September 25, 2019

Hearing Date

December 16, 2019

Decision & Order Date

January 27, 2020

Petitioner

Paul L. Moffett

Petitioner’s Counsel

Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.

Respondent

Vistoso Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC

The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments

Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.

The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:

Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.

Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.

Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.

Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions

The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.

Key Governing Document Provisions

Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.

Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)

The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:

• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.

• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.

• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.

Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)

The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:

• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.

• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.

• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.

Established Findings of Fact

The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.

March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.

March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.

October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.

March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.

Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Legal Interpretation

The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.

The decision states:

“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”

The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.

Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy

The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”

Final Order

Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.

Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2019014-REL


Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?

3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?

5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?

6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?

8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.

3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.

4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.

6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.

8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.

9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.

2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?

4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.

5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1

The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3

The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Declarant

The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.

Developer Owner

An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2019014-REL


The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head

For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.

This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.

The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote

The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.

The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:

Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.

On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.

The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years

The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.

• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.

• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.

The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole

This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.

In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.

The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:

Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.

The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.

The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).

While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.

This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.

Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details

This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.

The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul L Moffett (petitioner)
    Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
  • Richard M. Rollman (petitioner attorney)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
  • Alyssa Leverette (legal staff)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
    Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
  • Kimberly Rubly (witness)
    Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
  • Sean K. Moynihan (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
    Recipient of Order

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order

Other Participants

  • Sarah Nelson (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Patrick Straney (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Dennis Ottley (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election

John A Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918010-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John A Sellers Counsel
Respondent Rancho Madera Condominium Association Counsel Edward D. O'Brien

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.10

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the HOA (Respondent) did not violate CC&R Section 3.10. The CC&Rs imposed the duty of keeping the drainage area clear primarily on the Unit Owners, and the HOA only retained the right to enforce this requirement, not an explicit obligation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the CC&Rs because the HOA did not have an obligation to enforce clearance requirements against unit owners under the cited covenant provisions.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to require unit owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel behind their homes.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to compel unit owners to clear vegetation and debris (including chicken wire) from the stormwater drainage channel, asserting this failure created a flood risk to unit 12. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs placed the primary maintenance responsibility on Unit Owners, and the HOA only had the right, but not the obligation, to enforce clearance requirements.

Orders: The petition was denied and dismissed. No action was required of Respondent because Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated the CC&Rs regarding maintenance of the drainage easement.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • Title 33, Chapter 9
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Drainage, Maintenance, Enforcement, Condominium
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • Title 33, Chapter 9
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 667122.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:27 (50.0 KB)

19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 678371.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:27 (129.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918010-REL


Briefing Document: Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case John A Sellers, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association, Respondent (Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a claim by Petitioner John Sellers that his homeowner’s association (HOA) violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to compel other homeowners to remove vegetation and fencing from a common stormwater drainage channel, which he alleged created a flood risk to his property, Unit 12.

The petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful. It was denied first in an initial evidentiary hearing and again in a subsequent rehearing. The central finding of the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in both decisions was a critical distinction between an HOA’s right to enforce rules and an obligation to do so. The ALJs determined that the CC&Rs placed the primary responsibility for maintaining the drainage easement on the individual unit owners. The HOA’s mandatory duty to intervene was found to be triggered only by actual damage resulting from an owner’s negligence, not by the mere potential for future damage. As no flooding or damage had ever occurred, the HOA was found to have acted within its authority and had not violated the CC&Rs. The petitioner’s personal circumstances, including a contentious divorce and court-ordered sale of the property, were noted but deemed legally irrelevant to the determination of a CC&R violation.

Case Chronology and Procedural History

The case progressed through an initial petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final decision on rehearing. A notable procedural anomaly occurred when a hearing scheduled for November 5, 2018, was officially vacated due to a withdrawal notice from the petitioner, yet the hearing proceeded on that date as originally planned.

Details

Aug 23, 2018

Petition Filed

John A. Sellers filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated CC&R § 3.10.

Oct 23, 2018

Hearing Vacated

An order was issued by ALJ Diane Mihalsky vacating the November 5 hearing because the petitioner had notified the Department of his wish to withdraw the petition.

Nov 5 & Dec 12, 2018

Initial Hearing

Despite the prior vacating order, an evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ Mihalsky.

Dec 26, 2018

Initial Decision

ALJ Mihalsky issued a decision finding that the petitioner failed to prove his case. The petition was denied.

Feb 1, 2019

Rehearing Requested

The petitioner filed a request for a rehearing, alleging procedural irregularities and errors in the initial decision.

Feb 22, 2019

Rehearing Granted

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

Apr 15, 2019

Rehearing Held

A rehearing was held before a new judge, ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer.

May 7, 2019

Post-Hearing Filing Stricken

The petitioner submitted an unauthorized supplemental argument after the rehearing. ALJ Eigenheer issued an order striking the filing from the record and closing the record.

May 10, 2019

Final Decision on Rehearing

ALJ Eigenheer issued a final decision, again finding for the respondent and dismissing the petition.

Core Dispute Analysis

Petitioner’s Position and Allegations

Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent) violated CC&R § 3.10 by failing to enforce its rules. Specifically, the Association did not require owners of “Drainage Easement Units” to remove obstructions—such as large succulents, cacti, shrubs, and chicken wire fencing—from a 3′ x 3′ stormwater drainage canal located behind their homes.

Perceived Risk: The petitioner testified that these items could catch storm debris, clog the channel, and cause flooding that would damage his property, Unit 12. He submitted videos of heavy rains to support his concern.

Evolving Legal Argument: In the rehearing, the petitioner’s argument shifted. He acknowledged that the CC&Rs gave the Association the right to enforce maintenance standards but argued that “at a certain point exercising a right becomes an obligation,” particularly when matters of safety and property values are implicated.

Claimed Financial Damages: The petitioner testified he was undergoing a contentious divorce and his condominium was being sold by order of the Maricopa County Superior Court. He asserted that due to the unresolved flood risk, which he was obligated to disclose, the sale price of Unit 12 was “$40,000 less than it would have been.”

Respondent’s Position and Actions

Denial of Violation: The Association denied it had violated any CC&Rs by its handling of the drainage channel.

Evidence and Testimony: The Association, represented by its President, Jeffrey Kaplan, presented several key points:

No History of Flooding: Mr. Kaplan testified that Unit 12 had never sustained any flood damage since the development was built in 2012, including during a “100-year storm” in 2014. After a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he personally inspected the easement and saw no water in it.

Origin of Plants: Mr. Kaplan stated that the builder had originally planted the vegetation in the drainage easement that the petitioner was concerned about.

No Other Complaints: No other members of the 46-unit Association had expressed any concerns about drainage.

Proactive Communication: To assuage the petitioner’s concerns, the Association’s management company sent letters to the relevant homeowners on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminding them of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions.

Due Diligence: Mr. Kaplan contacted officials at the Maricopa County Flood Control District and the Town of Cave Creek, who confirmed the drainage area was not on any official floodplain maps and that the Association was solely responsible for its maintenance.

Key CC&R Provisions and Legal Interpretation

The ALJs’ decisions hinged on a close reading of the Rancho Madera CC&Rs. The analysis consistently differentiated between the duties of individual owners and the duties of the Association.

CC&R § 3.10.2 — Unit Owner Responsibility: This section places the primary maintenance burden directly on the homeowners of the Drainage Easement Units.

Interpretation: The legal conclusion was that this provision unambiguously makes individual owners responsible for keeping their portion of the easement clear.

CC&R § 3.10.4 — Association Responsibility: This section defines the specific circumstance under which the Association is required to act.

Interpretation: Both ALJs found that this clause creates a reactionary, not a proactive, duty for the Association. Its obligation to repair is triggered by actual damage occurring, not by a perceived risk of future damage.

CC&R § 13.1.1 — Association Enforcement Power: This section, highlighted in the rehearing, grants the Association authority to act.

Interpretation: The ALJ in the rehearing ruled that this language grants a discretionary right, not a mandatory obligation. The CC&Rs contain no provision that converts this right into a duty under the circumstances presented by the petitioner.

Judicial Findings and Rulings

Initial Decision (ALJ Diane Mihalsky, Dec 26, 2018)

Burden of Proof: The petitioner failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Findings of Fact: The petitioner successfully established that plants and chicken wire existed in the stormwater canal. However, he failed to establish that these items actually impeded the flow of water.

Conclusion: The respondent proved that the drainage canal had functioned as intended since 2012 and that Unit 12 had never flooded. The petitioner’s divorce was noted to have “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint” but was irrelevant to the legal issue. The petition was denied.

Rehearing Decision (ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer, May 10, 2019)

Central Legal Finding: The CC&Rs clearly intend for unit owners to bear the primary responsibility for keeping the drainage area clear. The Association’s only specified obligation is to repair damage after it has occurred and bill the responsible owner.

Right vs. Obligation: The decision explicitly states, “While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”

Final Order: The petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Section 3.10 of the CC&Rs. The petition was dismissed.

Notable Evidence

A key piece of evidence submitted by the respondent was a June 22, 2018, email from the petitioner’s wife, Debborah Sellers, which directly refuted the petitioner’s claims. In the email, she stated:

“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”






Study Guide – 19F-H1918010-REL


Study Guide for Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation John A. Sellers made against the Rancho Madera Condominium Association in his petition filed on August 23, 2018?

2. Identify the key responsibilities assigned to individual unit owners of Drainage Easement Units according to Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs.

3. Who is Jeffrey Kaplan, and what key testimony did he provide on behalf of the Respondent?

4. What specific actions did the Respondent’s management company take in April and July of 2018 to address the Petitioner’s concerns?

5. According to the decision by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, what did the Petitioner fail to establish regarding the plants and chicken wire in the drainage canal?

6. On what grounds did John A. Sellers file his Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request on February 1, 2019?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument regarding the Association’s “right to enforce” the CC&Rs versus an “obligation to enforce” them?

8. What was the final conclusion of Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer regarding the Association’s responsibilities under the CC&Rs?

9. What occurred after the April 15, 2019 rehearing when the Petitioner attempted to submit supplemental information to the Office of Administrative Hearings?

10. Describe the evidence presented in an email from Debborah Sellers and its relevance to the case.

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Answer Key

1. John A. Sellers alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated Section 3.10 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He claimed the Association failed to require condominium owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel, creating a flood risk for his unit.

2. Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs requires each Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit to keep their respective Drainage Easement Area free of weeds and other debris. The purpose is to ensure that stormwater can flow freely and that no improvement, including plant materials, impedes this flow.

3. Jeffrey Kaplan is the President of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association. He testified that the drainage easement had never failed, even during a 100-year storm in 2014, that the original builder had planted the vegetation in question, and that he had consulted with county and town officials about the drainage area.

4. To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent’s management company sent letters to the owners of the Drainage Easement Units. Letters sent on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminded owners of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions, weeds, and debris.

5. Judge Mihalsky’s decision on December 26, 2018, concluded that the Petitioner established the presence of plants and chicken wire but failed to establish that these items actually impede the flow of water. The judge found that the drainage system functions as intended and there was no unreasonable risk of flooding.

6. The Petitioner filed for a rehearing based on several alleged issues with the original proceeding. These included an irregularity in the proceedings, the existence of newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, and a belief that the findings of fact or decision were arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence.

7. The Petitioner argued that while the CC&Rs grant the Association the “right to enforce” maintenance requirements, this right becomes an “obligation” when issues of property values and safety are at stake. He maintained that the potential for flooding created such an obligation for the Association to act.

8. Judge Eigenheer concluded that the CC&Rs intend for unit owners to bear the responsibility of keeping the Drainage Easement Area clear. She determined that while the Association has the right to enforce this, nothing in the CC&Rs creates an obligation for it to do so, and its only specified responsibility is to repair damage after it occurs, billing the responsible unit owner.

9. After the rehearing, the Petitioner submitted supplemental authority and argument without having requested leave to do so. The Respondent’s counsel argued this filing was untimely and introduced new arguments, requesting it be struck. On May 7, 2019, Judge Eigenheer ordered the filing struck from the record and closed the record.

10. The Respondent submitted a June 22, 2018 email from Debborah Sellers, the Petitioner’s wife. In the email, she stated there had never been an issue with the storm drain, called his concerns “nonsense,” and noted that the developer had done a good job, undermining the Petitioner’s claim of a significant and obvious flood risk.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer to dismiss the petition after the rehearing. Contrast her interpretation of the Association’s duties under the CC&Rs with the findings presented by Judge Diane Mihalsky in the initial decision.

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal documents. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explaining why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet this burden of proof in both hearings.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 19F-H1918010-REL. Identify and explain the significance of key events, including the initial petition, the vacated hearing, the first Administrative Law Judge Decision, the request for rehearing, and the final order dismissing the case.

4. Examine the role and responsibilities of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association versus the individual unit owners as defined by Sections 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4, and 13.1.1 of the CC&Rs. How did the interpretation of these sections form the basis of the final legal decision?

5. Evaluate the different types of evidence presented in the hearings, including witness testimony (Sellers, Kaplan), documentary evidence (CC&Rs, letters, emails), and physical evidence (photographs, videos). How did each type of evidence contribute to the final outcome of the case?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Tammy L. Eigenheer served as ALJs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium association. In this case, the CC&Rs for Rancho Madera were the central document in the dispute.

Drainage Easement

A perpetual, non-exclusive legal right created over a specific portion of property (the eastern five feet of Units 9-18) for constructing and maintaining a stormwater drainage channel.

Drainage Easement Area

The specific portion of land encumbered by the Drainage Easement, defined as the eastern five feet of the designated units.

Drainage Improvements

The physical components of the drainage system, such as the channel, decomposed granite, rip rap (large stones), or concrete, as originally constructed by the developer.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, John A. Sellers.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, making a contention more probably true than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted by the Commissioner in this instance, to re-examine the issues based on claims such as procedural irregularities, newly discovered evidence, or errors in the original decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.

The Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium unit owners’ associations.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918010-REL


I Read an Entire HOA Lawsuit. Here Are 4 Shocking Lessons About Power, Rules, and Reality.

The Anatomy of a Neighborhood War

Living under a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex world of rules, regulations, and neighborhood politics. For most, disagreements are minor annoyances. But sometimes, a seemingly small issue can escalate into a full-blown legal war.

This is the story of one homeowner’s single-minded crusade against his HOA over a stormwater drainage channel he believed was a serious flooding risk. After filing a formal petition, the dispute escalated into a multi-stage legal battle that spanned nearly a year. The official court documents reveal that even after a judge ruled decisively against him, the homeowner doubled down, demanding a rare rehearing.

A deep dive into this protracted case reveals a fascinating and cautionary tale. The legal reasoning that ultimately settled the matter highlights several surprising lessons that apply to anyone living in a planned community.

1. Proving a Rule Was Broken Isn’t the Same as Proving Harm

The initial hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky in late 2018, centered on a seemingly straightforward argument from the petitioner, John Sellers. He pointed out that his neighbors had placed plants—including large succulents, shrubs, and cacti—as well as chicken wire in a stormwater drainage channel. This, he argued, was a clear violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which stated that no improvement “shall be constructed, installed or allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water.”

But in her December 26, 2018 decision, the judge ruled against him. While Sellers successfully proved the obstructions existed, he failed to meet the legal burden of proof that they actually “impede the flow of water.” His claim was defeated by testimony from the HOA President, Jeffrey Kaplan, who stated that the unit had never sustained any flood damage, not even during a “100-year storm in 2014.”

The lesson from this first round is stark: in this legal context, simply pointing out a technical rule break was not enough. The petitioner had to prove that the violation was causing a tangible, negative impact. Without evidence of actual harm or impeded water flow, the theoretical risk was insufficient to win the case.

2. An HOA’s “Right” to Enforce Is Not an “Obligation”

After losing the first round on a question of evidence, Sellers’ argument evolved. He requested a rehearing, which was granted, and the case landed before a new judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, in the spring of 2019. This shifted the legal focus from physical proof of impeded water flow to a more fundamental question of the HOA’s duties.

Sellers argued that because safety and property values were at stake, the association had a duty to enforce the CC&Rs and compel his neighbors to clear the drainage channel. He contended that at a certain point, an organization’s “right” to act becomes an “obligation.”

The judge’s final decision on May 10, 2019, was clear, absolute, and is where the most powerful lesson of the entire case lies.

“While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”

This distinction is critical for any homeowner. An HOA can possess the legal power to act but may not be legally compelled to use it. According to the judge’s interpretation, the governing documents placed the responsibility for keeping the channel clear on the individual unit owners. The association’s only stated obligation was to repair damage after it happened, with the cost being billed back to the responsible party.

3. Outside Conflicts Can Cast a Long Shadow

Legal disputes are rarely just about the facts of the case. During the initial hearing, it was revealed that the petitioner was going through a “contentious divorce” and that the condo unit at the center of the dispute was a community asset being sold by the court.

The most dramatic evidence, however, came from an email written by the petitioner’s own wife, Debborah Sellers. The email, submitted as evidence by the HOA, directly undermined his claims about the severity of the drainage issue.

“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”

In her decision, Judge Mihalsky officially stated that the divorce was “not relevant” to the technical question of whether the HOA violated the CC&Rs. However, she immediately added that the situation “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint,” suggesting that the personal context, and especially the damaging email, severely harmed the petitioner’s credibility.

4. Writing Letters Isn’t the Same as Being Heard

Throughout the dispute, the petitioner made his concerns known by writing “many letters” to the HOA president. He was persistent in his written communications, attempting to force the issue onto the association’s radar.

Yet, this effort was contrasted with a notable lack of direct participation. According to the testimony of HOA President Kaplan during the first hearing, Sellers “never attended any of Respondent’s noticed Board meetings” where his concerns could have been discussed among the board members.

The HOA’s response to his letters was limited; it sent two general reminder letters to all residents in the affected area but did not take direct enforcement action against any specific homeowner. The practical takeaway is that to effect change or be taken seriously in an HOA dispute, visibility and participation are critical. Writing letters is a start, but attending official meetings to present a case in person can be a more effective strategy for ensuring an issue is formally addressed.

A Cautionary Tale for Any Homeowner

What began as a seemingly straightforward complaint about drainage and rule enforcement devolved into a legal battle that consumed nearly a year, involving two multi-day hearings before two different administrative law judges. The petitioner lost his case on the evidence, then lost it again on the law.

It serves as a potent cautionary tale, demonstrating that in the world of HOA disputes, the obvious path is not always the winning one. It leaves every homeowner with a final, thought-provoking question to ponder: When you see a problem in your community, how do you decide if a fight is worth the cost—not just in money, but in time, credibility, and peace?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John A Sellers (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Edward D. O’Brien (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Edith I. Rudder (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Jeffrey Kaplan (HOA President/witness)
    Rancho Madera Condominium Association
    Testified on behalf of Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    OAH
    ALJ for initial proceedings
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    ALJ for rehearing
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • c. serrano (Clerical staff)
    Transmitted document
  • F. Del Sol (Clerical staff)
    Transmitted document

Other Participants

  • Debborah Sellers (witness)
    Petitioner's wife, email submitted as evidence

John A Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918010-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John A Sellers Counsel
Respondent Rancho Madera Condominium Association Counsel Edward D. O'Brien

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.10

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the HOA (Respondent) did not violate CC&R Section 3.10. The CC&Rs imposed the duty of keeping the drainage area clear primarily on the Unit Owners, and the HOA only retained the right to enforce this requirement, not an explicit obligation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the CC&Rs because the HOA did not have an obligation to enforce clearance requirements against unit owners under the cited covenant provisions.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to require unit owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel behind their homes.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to compel unit owners to clear vegetation and debris (including chicken wire) from the stormwater drainage channel, asserting this failure created a flood risk to unit 12. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs placed the primary maintenance responsibility on Unit Owners, and the HOA only had the right, but not the obligation, to enforce clearance requirements.

Orders: The petition was denied and dismissed. No action was required of Respondent because Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated the CC&Rs regarding maintenance of the drainage easement.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • Title 33, Chapter 9
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Drainage, Maintenance, Enforcement, Condominium
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • Title 33, Chapter 9
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 667122.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:17 (50.0 KB)

19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 678371.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:21 (129.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918010-REL


Briefing Document: Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case John A Sellers, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association, Respondent (Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a claim by Petitioner John Sellers that his homeowner’s association (HOA) violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to compel other homeowners to remove vegetation and fencing from a common stormwater drainage channel, which he alleged created a flood risk to his property, Unit 12.

The petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful. It was denied first in an initial evidentiary hearing and again in a subsequent rehearing. The central finding of the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in both decisions was a critical distinction between an HOA’s right to enforce rules and an obligation to do so. The ALJs determined that the CC&Rs placed the primary responsibility for maintaining the drainage easement on the individual unit owners. The HOA’s mandatory duty to intervene was found to be triggered only by actual damage resulting from an owner’s negligence, not by the mere potential for future damage. As no flooding or damage had ever occurred, the HOA was found to have acted within its authority and had not violated the CC&Rs. The petitioner’s personal circumstances, including a contentious divorce and court-ordered sale of the property, were noted but deemed legally irrelevant to the determination of a CC&R violation.

Case Chronology and Procedural History

The case progressed through an initial petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final decision on rehearing. A notable procedural anomaly occurred when a hearing scheduled for November 5, 2018, was officially vacated due to a withdrawal notice from the petitioner, yet the hearing proceeded on that date as originally planned.

Details

Aug 23, 2018

Petition Filed

John A. Sellers filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated CC&R § 3.10.

Oct 23, 2018

Hearing Vacated

An order was issued by ALJ Diane Mihalsky vacating the November 5 hearing because the petitioner had notified the Department of his wish to withdraw the petition.

Nov 5 & Dec 12, 2018

Initial Hearing

Despite the prior vacating order, an evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ Mihalsky.

Dec 26, 2018

Initial Decision

ALJ Mihalsky issued a decision finding that the petitioner failed to prove his case. The petition was denied.

Feb 1, 2019

Rehearing Requested

The petitioner filed a request for a rehearing, alleging procedural irregularities and errors in the initial decision.

Feb 22, 2019

Rehearing Granted

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

Apr 15, 2019

Rehearing Held

A rehearing was held before a new judge, ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer.

May 7, 2019

Post-Hearing Filing Stricken

The petitioner submitted an unauthorized supplemental argument after the rehearing. ALJ Eigenheer issued an order striking the filing from the record and closing the record.

May 10, 2019

Final Decision on Rehearing

ALJ Eigenheer issued a final decision, again finding for the respondent and dismissing the petition.

Core Dispute Analysis

Petitioner’s Position and Allegations

Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent) violated CC&R § 3.10 by failing to enforce its rules. Specifically, the Association did not require owners of “Drainage Easement Units” to remove obstructions—such as large succulents, cacti, shrubs, and chicken wire fencing—from a 3′ x 3′ stormwater drainage canal located behind their homes.

Perceived Risk: The petitioner testified that these items could catch storm debris, clog the channel, and cause flooding that would damage his property, Unit 12. He submitted videos of heavy rains to support his concern.

Evolving Legal Argument: In the rehearing, the petitioner’s argument shifted. He acknowledged that the CC&Rs gave the Association the right to enforce maintenance standards but argued that “at a certain point exercising a right becomes an obligation,” particularly when matters of safety and property values are implicated.

Claimed Financial Damages: The petitioner testified he was undergoing a contentious divorce and his condominium was being sold by order of the Maricopa County Superior Court. He asserted that due to the unresolved flood risk, which he was obligated to disclose, the sale price of Unit 12 was “$40,000 less than it would have been.”

Respondent’s Position and Actions

Denial of Violation: The Association denied it had violated any CC&Rs by its handling of the drainage channel.

Evidence and Testimony: The Association, represented by its President, Jeffrey Kaplan, presented several key points:

No History of Flooding: Mr. Kaplan testified that Unit 12 had never sustained any flood damage since the development was built in 2012, including during a “100-year storm” in 2014. After a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he personally inspected the easement and saw no water in it.

Origin of Plants: Mr. Kaplan stated that the builder had originally planted the vegetation in the drainage easement that the petitioner was concerned about.

No Other Complaints: No other members of the 46-unit Association had expressed any concerns about drainage.

Proactive Communication: To assuage the petitioner’s concerns, the Association’s management company sent letters to the relevant homeowners on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminding them of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions.

Due Diligence: Mr. Kaplan contacted officials at the Maricopa County Flood Control District and the Town of Cave Creek, who confirmed the drainage area was not on any official floodplain maps and that the Association was solely responsible for its maintenance.

Key CC&R Provisions and Legal Interpretation

The ALJs’ decisions hinged on a close reading of the Rancho Madera CC&Rs. The analysis consistently differentiated between the duties of individual owners and the duties of the Association.

CC&R § 3.10.2 — Unit Owner Responsibility: This section places the primary maintenance burden directly on the homeowners of the Drainage Easement Units.

Interpretation: The legal conclusion was that this provision unambiguously makes individual owners responsible for keeping their portion of the easement clear.

CC&R § 3.10.4 — Association Responsibility: This section defines the specific circumstance under which the Association is required to act.

Interpretation: Both ALJs found that this clause creates a reactionary, not a proactive, duty for the Association. Its obligation to repair is triggered by actual damage occurring, not by a perceived risk of future damage.

CC&R § 13.1.1 — Association Enforcement Power: This section, highlighted in the rehearing, grants the Association authority to act.

Interpretation: The ALJ in the rehearing ruled that this language grants a discretionary right, not a mandatory obligation. The CC&Rs contain no provision that converts this right into a duty under the circumstances presented by the petitioner.

Judicial Findings and Rulings

Initial Decision (ALJ Diane Mihalsky, Dec 26, 2018)

Burden of Proof: The petitioner failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Findings of Fact: The petitioner successfully established that plants and chicken wire existed in the stormwater canal. However, he failed to establish that these items actually impeded the flow of water.

Conclusion: The respondent proved that the drainage canal had functioned as intended since 2012 and that Unit 12 had never flooded. The petitioner’s divorce was noted to have “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint” but was irrelevant to the legal issue. The petition was denied.

Rehearing Decision (ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer, May 10, 2019)

Central Legal Finding: The CC&Rs clearly intend for unit owners to bear the primary responsibility for keeping the drainage area clear. The Association’s only specified obligation is to repair damage after it has occurred and bill the responsible owner.

Right vs. Obligation: The decision explicitly states, “While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”

Final Order: The petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Section 3.10 of the CC&Rs. The petition was dismissed.

Notable Evidence

A key piece of evidence submitted by the respondent was a June 22, 2018, email from the petitioner’s wife, Debborah Sellers, which directly refuted the petitioner’s claims. In the email, she stated:

“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”






Study Guide – 19F-H1918010-REL


Study Guide for Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation John A. Sellers made against the Rancho Madera Condominium Association in his petition filed on August 23, 2018?

2. Identify the key responsibilities assigned to individual unit owners of Drainage Easement Units according to Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs.

3. Who is Jeffrey Kaplan, and what key testimony did he provide on behalf of the Respondent?

4. What specific actions did the Respondent’s management company take in April and July of 2018 to address the Petitioner’s concerns?

5. According to the decision by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, what did the Petitioner fail to establish regarding the plants and chicken wire in the drainage canal?

6. On what grounds did John A. Sellers file his Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request on February 1, 2019?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument regarding the Association’s “right to enforce” the CC&Rs versus an “obligation to enforce” them?

8. What was the final conclusion of Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer regarding the Association’s responsibilities under the CC&Rs?

9. What occurred after the April 15, 2019 rehearing when the Petitioner attempted to submit supplemental information to the Office of Administrative Hearings?

10. Describe the evidence presented in an email from Debborah Sellers and its relevance to the case.

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. John A. Sellers alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated Section 3.10 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He claimed the Association failed to require condominium owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel, creating a flood risk for his unit.

2. Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs requires each Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit to keep their respective Drainage Easement Area free of weeds and other debris. The purpose is to ensure that stormwater can flow freely and that no improvement, including plant materials, impedes this flow.

3. Jeffrey Kaplan is the President of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association. He testified that the drainage easement had never failed, even during a 100-year storm in 2014, that the original builder had planted the vegetation in question, and that he had consulted with county and town officials about the drainage area.

4. To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent’s management company sent letters to the owners of the Drainage Easement Units. Letters sent on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminded owners of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions, weeds, and debris.

5. Judge Mihalsky’s decision on December 26, 2018, concluded that the Petitioner established the presence of plants and chicken wire but failed to establish that these items actually impede the flow of water. The judge found that the drainage system functions as intended and there was no unreasonable risk of flooding.

6. The Petitioner filed for a rehearing based on several alleged issues with the original proceeding. These included an irregularity in the proceedings, the existence of newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, and a belief that the findings of fact or decision were arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence.

7. The Petitioner argued that while the CC&Rs grant the Association the “right to enforce” maintenance requirements, this right becomes an “obligation” when issues of property values and safety are at stake. He maintained that the potential for flooding created such an obligation for the Association to act.

8. Judge Eigenheer concluded that the CC&Rs intend for unit owners to bear the responsibility of keeping the Drainage Easement Area clear. She determined that while the Association has the right to enforce this, nothing in the CC&Rs creates an obligation for it to do so, and its only specified responsibility is to repair damage after it occurs, billing the responsible unit owner.

9. After the rehearing, the Petitioner submitted supplemental authority and argument without having requested leave to do so. The Respondent’s counsel argued this filing was untimely and introduced new arguments, requesting it be struck. On May 7, 2019, Judge Eigenheer ordered the filing struck from the record and closed the record.

10. The Respondent submitted a June 22, 2018 email from Debborah Sellers, the Petitioner’s wife. In the email, she stated there had never been an issue with the storm drain, called his concerns “nonsense,” and noted that the developer had done a good job, undermining the Petitioner’s claim of a significant and obvious flood risk.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer to dismiss the petition after the rehearing. Contrast her interpretation of the Association’s duties under the CC&Rs with the findings presented by Judge Diane Mihalsky in the initial decision.

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal documents. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explaining why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet this burden of proof in both hearings.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 19F-H1918010-REL. Identify and explain the significance of key events, including the initial petition, the vacated hearing, the first Administrative Law Judge Decision, the request for rehearing, and the final order dismissing the case.

4. Examine the role and responsibilities of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association versus the individual unit owners as defined by Sections 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4, and 13.1.1 of the CC&Rs. How did the interpretation of these sections form the basis of the final legal decision?

5. Evaluate the different types of evidence presented in the hearings, including witness testimony (Sellers, Kaplan), documentary evidence (CC&Rs, letters, emails), and physical evidence (photographs, videos). How did each type of evidence contribute to the final outcome of the case?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Tammy L. Eigenheer served as ALJs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium association. In this case, the CC&Rs for Rancho Madera were the central document in the dispute.

Drainage Easement

A perpetual, non-exclusive legal right created over a specific portion of property (the eastern five feet of Units 9-18) for constructing and maintaining a stormwater drainage channel.

Drainage Easement Area

The specific portion of land encumbered by the Drainage Easement, defined as the eastern five feet of the designated units.

Drainage Improvements

The physical components of the drainage system, such as the channel, decomposed granite, rip rap (large stones), or concrete, as originally constructed by the developer.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, John A. Sellers.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, making a contention more probably true than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted by the Commissioner in this instance, to re-examine the issues based on claims such as procedural irregularities, newly discovered evidence, or errors in the original decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.

The Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium unit owners’ associations.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918010-REL


I Read an Entire HOA Lawsuit. Here Are 4 Shocking Lessons About Power, Rules, and Reality.

The Anatomy of a Neighborhood War

Living under a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex world of rules, regulations, and neighborhood politics. For most, disagreements are minor annoyances. But sometimes, a seemingly small issue can escalate into a full-blown legal war.

This is the story of one homeowner’s single-minded crusade against his HOA over a stormwater drainage channel he believed was a serious flooding risk. After filing a formal petition, the dispute escalated into a multi-stage legal battle that spanned nearly a year. The official court documents reveal that even after a judge ruled decisively against him, the homeowner doubled down, demanding a rare rehearing.

A deep dive into this protracted case reveals a fascinating and cautionary tale. The legal reasoning that ultimately settled the matter highlights several surprising lessons that apply to anyone living in a planned community.

1. Proving a Rule Was Broken Isn’t the Same as Proving Harm

The initial hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky in late 2018, centered on a seemingly straightforward argument from the petitioner, John Sellers. He pointed out that his neighbors had placed plants—including large succulents, shrubs, and cacti—as well as chicken wire in a stormwater drainage channel. This, he argued, was a clear violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which stated that no improvement “shall be constructed, installed or allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water.”

But in her December 26, 2018 decision, the judge ruled against him. While Sellers successfully proved the obstructions existed, he failed to meet the legal burden of proof that they actually “impede the flow of water.” His claim was defeated by testimony from the HOA President, Jeffrey Kaplan, who stated that the unit had never sustained any flood damage, not even during a “100-year storm in 2014.”

The lesson from this first round is stark: in this legal context, simply pointing out a technical rule break was not enough. The petitioner had to prove that the violation was causing a tangible, negative impact. Without evidence of actual harm or impeded water flow, the theoretical risk was insufficient to win the case.

2. An HOA’s “Right” to Enforce Is Not an “Obligation”

After losing the first round on a question of evidence, Sellers’ argument evolved. He requested a rehearing, which was granted, and the case landed before a new judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, in the spring of 2019. This shifted the legal focus from physical proof of impeded water flow to a more fundamental question of the HOA’s duties.

Sellers argued that because safety and property values were at stake, the association had a duty to enforce the CC&Rs and compel his neighbors to clear the drainage channel. He contended that at a certain point, an organization’s “right” to act becomes an “obligation.”

The judge’s final decision on May 10, 2019, was clear, absolute, and is where the most powerful lesson of the entire case lies.

“While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”

This distinction is critical for any homeowner. An HOA can possess the legal power to act but may not be legally compelled to use it. According to the judge’s interpretation, the governing documents placed the responsibility for keeping the channel clear on the individual unit owners. The association’s only stated obligation was to repair damage after it happened, with the cost being billed back to the responsible party.

3. Outside Conflicts Can Cast a Long Shadow

Legal disputes are rarely just about the facts of the case. During the initial hearing, it was revealed that the petitioner was going through a “contentious divorce” and that the condo unit at the center of the dispute was a community asset being sold by the court.

The most dramatic evidence, however, came from an email written by the petitioner’s own wife, Debborah Sellers. The email, submitted as evidence by the HOA, directly undermined his claims about the severity of the drainage issue.

“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”

In her decision, Judge Mihalsky officially stated that the divorce was “not relevant” to the technical question of whether the HOA violated the CC&Rs. However, she immediately added that the situation “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint,” suggesting that the personal context, and especially the damaging email, severely harmed the petitioner’s credibility.

4. Writing Letters Isn’t the Same as Being Heard

Throughout the dispute, the petitioner made his concerns known by writing “many letters” to the HOA president. He was persistent in his written communications, attempting to force the issue onto the association’s radar.

Yet, this effort was contrasted with a notable lack of direct participation. According to the testimony of HOA President Kaplan during the first hearing, Sellers “never attended any of Respondent’s noticed Board meetings” where his concerns could have been discussed among the board members.

The HOA’s response to his letters was limited; it sent two general reminder letters to all residents in the affected area but did not take direct enforcement action against any specific homeowner. The practical takeaway is that to effect change or be taken seriously in an HOA dispute, visibility and participation are critical. Writing letters is a start, but attending official meetings to present a case in person can be a more effective strategy for ensuring an issue is formally addressed.

A Cautionary Tale for Any Homeowner

What began as a seemingly straightforward complaint about drainage and rule enforcement devolved into a legal battle that consumed nearly a year, involving two multi-day hearings before two different administrative law judges. The petitioner lost his case on the evidence, then lost it again on the law.

It serves as a potent cautionary tale, demonstrating that in the world of HOA disputes, the obvious path is not always the winning one. It leaves every homeowner with a final, thought-provoking question to ponder: When you see a problem in your community, how do you decide if a fight is worth the cost—not just in money, but in time, credibility, and peace?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John A Sellers (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Edward D. O’Brien (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Edith I. Rudder (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Jeffrey Kaplan (HOA President/witness)
    Rancho Madera Condominium Association
    Testified on behalf of Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    OAH
    ALJ for initial proceedings
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    ALJ for rehearing
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • c. serrano (Clerical staff)
    Transmitted document
  • F. Del Sol (Clerical staff)
    Transmitted document

Other Participants

  • Debborah Sellers (witness)
    Petitioner's wife, email submitted as evidence

Jason West vs. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jason West Counsel
Respondent Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Counsel Stewart F. Salwin, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaw § 3.6

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner’s petition alleging the HOA failed to fill board vacancies (Bylaw § 3.6 violation), finding that the HOA had made reasonable efforts, but vacancies could not be filled because no eligible members were willing to serve, partly due to the Petitioner's actions.

Why this result: Respondent established that the Board performed all reasonable actions to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner's obstructionist tactics, rendering enforcement of the Bylaw impossible as it would lead to an absurdity.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusing to fill vacancies on Respondent’s Board of Directors

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on the Board of Directors. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board had done all it could to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, and Bylaw § 3.6 does not empower the Board to conscript unwilling members.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Board Vacancies, Bylaw 3.6, Obstructionist Tactics, Refusal to Serve
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 572314.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:24 (137.9 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 576049.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:24 (1160.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716031-REL


Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative hearing and final order concerning a petition filed by homeowner Jason West (“Petitioner”) against the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA’s Board of Directors violated its own Bylaw § 3.6 by failing to fill vacant board positions.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition, a decision that was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The central finding was that the Respondent had made repeated and reasonable efforts to fill the vacancies but was unsuccessful due to a lack of willing and eligible candidates. The ALJ concluded that the governing bylaw mandates the appointment of willing members but does not grant the power to conscript individuals to serve against their will. Furthermore, the decision determined that the shortage of volunteers was attributable, in part, to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics,” which created a hostile and dysfunctional environment, leading to a series of board member resignations and deterring potential candidates.

Case Overview

Case Number: 17F-H1716031-REL

Petitioner: Jason West, a homeowner and member of the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

Respondent: Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, representing a small community of approximately 40 homes.

Core Allegation: On April 10, 2017, the Petitioner filed a single-issue petition alleging the Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

Hearing Date: June 21, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

Final Disposition: The Petitioner’s petition was denied in a decision dated June 28, 2017. This decision was adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017, making it binding on the parties.

Governing Bylaw in Dispute

The central issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 3.6 of the HOA’s Bylaws, which states:

Vacancies. Vacancies on the Board caused by any reason other than the removal of a director in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.3 of these Bylaws shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the first regular or special meeting of the Board held after the occurrence of such vacancy, even though the directors present at such meeting may constitute less than a quorum. Each person so elected shall serve the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

Key Parties and Witnesses

Role / Affiliation

Key Testimony / Actions

Jason West

Petitioner, Homeowner, Former Board President

Filed the petition alleging bylaw violation. Previously filed recall petitions against other board members, resigned from the board himself, and proposed a bylaw amendment that disqualified newly elected members.

Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray

Respondent’s Board President

Testified that the board made repeated efforts to find volunteers, but no one was willing to serve, citing the Petitioner’s behavior as a major cause for resignations and lack of interest.

Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla

Community Manager, National Property Service (NPS)

Testified about sending multiple email requests for board candidates on behalf of the board, which yielded no interested parties other than those who would later be disqualified.

Christina Van Soest

Former Board Member

Resigned on Feb. 8, 2017, stating, “I have found the direction of some of the board does not appear to be in the best interest of the community as a whole.” Testified she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner.

Elizabeth Mayhew

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 4, 2017, citing stress directly related to the Petitioner: “I have enough stress daily with my job and cannot handle this or him. It is making me physically ill and he is not worth that.”

Myron (“Ray”) Elmer

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 5, 2017, with the stated reason: “[d]ue to continued problems Jason etc.”

Korey Hjelmeir & Debra Epstein

Former Board Members

Testified for the Petitioner’s rebuttal. Both had previously resigned in June 2016 in response to the Petitioner’s recall petitions and were later disqualified from serving by a bylaw amendment he proposed.

Chronology of Board Destabilization and Resignations

The hearing evidence established a pattern of significant board turnover and dysfunction between June 2016 and June 2017.

June 23, 2016: Board members Adrian Justiniano, Debra Epstein, and Korey Hjelmeir resigned after the Petitioner filed recall petitions against them.

August 3, 2016: The Petitioner, June Thompson, and Christina Van Soest were elected to the Board. The Petitioner served as president.

August 18, 2016: The Board expanded from 3 to 5 members, appointing Gina Murray and Ray Elmer.

August 29, 2016: June Thompson resigned.

February 8, 2017: Christina Van Soest resigned, citing the board’s direction and her discomfort with the Petitioner’s “research into members’ backgrounds and history, and the way he was making Board decisions.”

February 18, 2017: The Petitioner resigned from the Board because he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

April 4, 2017: Elizabeth Mayhew resigned, stating she could not handle the stress caused by the Petitioner and his “verbal assaults, constant lashing out, and personal attacks.”

April 5, 2017: Ray Elmer resigned, attributing his departure to “continued problems Jason etc.” This left Gina Murray as the sole remaining board member.

Respondent’s Efforts to Fill Vacancies

The Respondent provided evidence of multiple, documented attempts to recruit new board members.

February 23, 2017: Following the resignations of Ms. Van Soest and the Petitioner, Community Manager Eddie Padilla sent an email requesting “motivated and dedicated individuals” to serve on the Board. No one responded.

March 31, 2017: At an open Board Meeting with “Board appointments” on the agenda, Gina Murray asked for volunteers and nominations from the floor. No one responded.

April 4 & 18, 2017: Mr. Padilla sent two further emails requesting members interested in serving on the board to submit biographies for an upcoming annual meeting. The only individuals to respond and submit biographies were Mr. Justiniano and Ms. Hjelmeir.

May 15, 2017: At the annual meeting, Ms. Murray again accepted nominations from the floor. Debra Epstein was nominated.

June 5, 2017: After the newly elected board was disqualified, Mr. Padilla sent another email asking for volunteers.

Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision identified the Petitioner’s own actions as a primary cause for the board’s inability to fill vacancies.

Instigation of Resignations: The Petitioner’s recall petitions in June 2016 and behavior cited in the 2017 resignation letters from Van Soest, Mayhew, and Elmer directly contributed to the board vacancies.

Contradictory Claims: The Petitioner testified that four individuals (Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti) were interested in serving. However, the sign-in sheet for the March 31, 2017 meeting, where appointments were to be made, showed none of these individuals were present.

Disqualifying Bylaw Amendment: The Petitioner proposed a new bylaw, § 3.12, which was passed at the May 15, 2017 meeting. It stated:

Attempted Removal of Remaining Director: On June 12, 2017, the Petitioner submitted a petition to remove Gina Murray, the last remaining original board member, which would have left the board entirely vacant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The ALJ’s conclusions of law were decisive in denying the petition.

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated its bylaws.

2. Interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6: The Judge ruled that while the bylaw requires the Board to appoint members to fill vacancies, “it does not empower the Board to conscript members who are not willing to serve on the Board.”

3. Principle of Absurdity: Citing legal precedent, the decision stated that bylaws must be construed to avoid an absurd result. Forcing an HOA to operate without a board because no eligible members are willing to serve, especially when the situation is exacerbated by the Petitioner, would be such an absurdity.

4. Respondent’s Due Diligence: The Judge found that “Respondent established that the Board has done all it could to fill vacancies.”

5. Petitioner’s Culpability: The final conclusion explicitly states that “at this time, no eligible members are willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner’s obstructionist tactics, including Petitioner and his claimed supporters.”

Based on these findings, the ALJ ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The order became final and binding upon adoption by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716031-REL


Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1716031-REL, Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Jason West, in his April 10, 2017 petition?

2. According to the text of Bylaw § 3.6, how are vacancies on the Board of Directors supposed to be filled?

3. Who was the sole remaining member of the Board of Directors at the time of the mass resignations in April 2017, and what was her stated reason for not resigning?

4. Describe the circumstances that led to the resignations of board members Christina Van Soest and Jason West in February 2017.

5. What was the immediate and paradoxical outcome of the May 15, 2017 annual meeting election?

6. Explain the purpose and effect of the proposed Bylaw § 3.12, which was sponsored by the Petitioner.

7. What efforts did the Respondent’s management company, National Property Service (NPS), make to recruit new board members?

8. On what grounds did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky deny the Petitioner’s petition?

9. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, why were certain individuals he named hesitant to volunteer for the Board?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate take regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Jason West’s single-issue petition alleged that the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (the Respondent) had violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

2. Bylaw § 3.6 states that vacancies on the Board (for reasons other than removal) shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the next meeting. The person elected serves the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

3. Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray was the sole remaining board member. She stated she had no intention of resigning because it was important for someone to serve the community’s interests, such as negotiating the insurance contract and handling other community affairs.

4. Christina Van Soest resigned on February 8, 2017, stating the board’s direction was not in the community’s best interest and she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner’s methods. On February 18, 2017, Jason West resigned, citing his belief that he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

5. At the May 15, 2017 meeting, Eugenia Murray, Debra Epstein, Adrian Justiniano, and Korey Hjelmeir were elected to the Board. However, a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner also passed at the same meeting, which made Epstein, Justiniano, and Hjelmeir ineligible to serve because they had resigned within the previous year.

6. The proposed Bylaw § 3.12 was designed to ban any director who resigns or is removed from serving on the board again for one year. Its passage at the May 15, 2017 meeting had the immediate effect of disqualifying three of the four newly elected board members.

7. NPS, through Community Manager Edward Padilla, sent out multiple emails requesting that interested individuals submit biographies to be considered for board positions. These requests were sent on February 23, April 4, April 18, and June 5, 2017.

8. Judge Mihalsky denied the petition because the Respondent had established that the Board did all it could to fill the vacancies. The judge concluded that the Bylaws cannot be construed to empower the Board to conscript unwilling members and that the lack of volunteers was due in part to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics.”

9. The Petitioner testified that Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti were interested but had two conditions. They were concerned about serving with certain other members (Murray, Hjelmeir, Justiniano, or the Epsteins) and wanted assurance that the directors’ insurance policy would be renewed, which was questionable due to petitions filed by West himself.

10. On July 12, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order made the denial of the Petitioner’s petition binding on the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of Jason West in the series of board resignations and the difficulty in finding new board members, citing specific evidence presented by the Respondent and testimony from former board members.

2. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6. How does the judge balance the literal requirement to fill vacancies with the practical realities faced by the Board, and what legal principles support this interpretation?

3. Trace the timeline of board membership from March 2016 to May 2017. What patterns emerge regarding appointments, resignations, and elections, and how do these events illustrate the internal conflict within the Desert Sage Two community?

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Bylaw amendment (§ 3.12) proposed by Jason West. Did it achieve its likely intended purpose, and what were its immediate, perhaps unintended, consequences for the governance of the homeowners’ association?

5. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument for why the Respondent, Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, successfully defended itself against the Petitioner’s claim. Your answer should focus on the actions taken by the Board and its management company and the legal conclusions drawn by the judge.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Bylaw § 3.12 (Proposed)

An amendment proposed by the Petitioner that would ban any director who resigns or is removed from the board from serving again for a period of one year. This amendment was passed at the May 15, 2017 annual meeting.

Bylaw § 3.6

The section of the Respondent’s bylaws that was the central issue of the petition. It requires the remaining directors to fill board vacancies by a majority vote at the next regular or special meeting.

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; a small homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 40 condominium homes.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which formally adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order makes the ruling effective and outlines the process for requesting a rehearing.

Jason West

The Petitioner in the case. He is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a petition alleging the Board violated Bylaw § 3.6.

National Property Service (NPS)

The management company employed by the Respondent, represented in the hearing by Community Manager Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for cases referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Jason West.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has the greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716031-REL


Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1716031-REL, Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Jason West, in his April 10, 2017 petition?

2. According to the text of Bylaw § 3.6, how are vacancies on the Board of Directors supposed to be filled?

3. Who was the sole remaining member of the Board of Directors at the time of the mass resignations in April 2017, and what was her stated reason for not resigning?

4. Describe the circumstances that led to the resignations of board members Christina Van Soest and Jason West in February 2017.

5. What was the immediate and paradoxical outcome of the May 15, 2017 annual meeting election?

6. Explain the purpose and effect of the proposed Bylaw § 3.12, which was sponsored by the Petitioner.

7. What efforts did the Respondent’s management company, National Property Service (NPS), make to recruit new board members?

8. On what grounds did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky deny the Petitioner’s petition?

9. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, why were certain individuals he named hesitant to volunteer for the Board?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate take regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Jason West’s single-issue petition alleged that the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (the Respondent) had violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

2. Bylaw § 3.6 states that vacancies on the Board (for reasons other than removal) shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the next meeting. The person elected serves the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

3. Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray was the sole remaining board member. She stated she had no intention of resigning because it was important for someone to serve the community’s interests, such as negotiating the insurance contract and handling other community affairs.

4. Christina Van Soest resigned on February 8, 2017, stating the board’s direction was not in the community’s best interest and she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner’s methods. On February 18, 2017, Jason West resigned, citing his belief that he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

5. At the May 15, 2017 meeting, Eugenia Murray, Debra Epstein, Adrian Justiniano, and Korey Hjelmeir were elected to the Board. However, a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner also passed at the same meeting, which made Epstein, Justiniano, and Hjelmeir ineligible to serve because they had resigned within the previous year.

6. The proposed Bylaw § 3.12 was designed to ban any director who resigns or is removed from serving on the board again for one year. Its passage at the May 15, 2017 meeting had the immediate effect of disqualifying three of the four newly elected board members.

7. NPS, through Community Manager Edward Padilla, sent out multiple emails requesting that interested individuals submit biographies to be considered for board positions. These requests were sent on February 23, April 4, April 18, and June 5, 2017.

8. Judge Mihalsky denied the petition because the Respondent had established that the Board did all it could to fill the vacancies. The judge concluded that the Bylaws cannot be construed to empower the Board to conscript unwilling members and that the lack of volunteers was due in part to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics.”

9. The Petitioner testified that Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti were interested but had two conditions. They were concerned about serving with certain other members (Murray, Hjelmeir, Justiniano, or the Epsteins) and wanted assurance that the directors’ insurance policy would be renewed, which was questionable due to petitions filed by West himself.

10. On July 12, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order made the denial of the Petitioner’s petition binding on the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of Jason West in the series of board resignations and the difficulty in finding new board members, citing specific evidence presented by the Respondent and testimony from former board members.

2. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6. How does the judge balance the literal requirement to fill vacancies with the practical realities faced by the Board, and what legal principles support this interpretation?

3. Trace the timeline of board membership from March 2016 to May 2017. What patterns emerge regarding appointments, resignations, and elections, and how do these events illustrate the internal conflict within the Desert Sage Two community?

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Bylaw amendment (§ 3.12) proposed by Jason West. Did it achieve its likely intended purpose, and what were its immediate, perhaps unintended, consequences for the governance of the homeowners’ association?

5. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument for why the Respondent, Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, successfully defended itself against the Petitioner’s claim. Your answer should focus on the actions taken by the Board and its management company and the legal conclusions drawn by the judge.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Bylaw § 3.12 (Proposed)

An amendment proposed by the Petitioner that would ban any director who resigns or is removed from the board from serving again for a period of one year. This amendment was passed at the May 15, 2017 annual meeting.

Bylaw § 3.6

The section of the Respondent’s bylaws that was the central issue of the petition. It requires the remaining directors to fill board vacancies by a majority vote at the next regular or special meeting.

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; a small homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 40 condominium homes.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which formally adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order makes the ruling effective and outlines the process for requesting a rehearing.

Jason West

The Petitioner in the case. He is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a petition alleging the Board violated Bylaw § 3.6.

National Property Service (NPS)

The management company employed by the Respondent, represented in the hearing by Community Manager Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for cases referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Jason West.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has the greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jason West (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; testified on his own behalf
  • Linda Siedler (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Teresa Price (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Bret Morse (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; submitted absentee ballot; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Bryan Brunatti (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; attended meeting and counted ballots; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray

Respondent Side

  • Stewart F. Salwin (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Represented the Respondent
  • Eugenia Murray (board president, witness)
    Only current Board member at the time of hearing; testified for Respondent
  • Edward Padilla (property manager, witness)
    National Property Service (NPC)
    Community Manager; testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    ADRE Commissioner who adopted the ALJ Decision

Other Participants

  • Korey Hjelmeir (witness, former board member)
    Testified for Petitioner as former Board member; resigned and later sought re-election
  • Debra Epstein (witness, former board member)
    Testified for Petitioner as former Board member; resigned and later sought re-election; appeared via Skype at a meeting
  • Adrian Justiniano (former board member)
    Resigned and later sought re-election
  • June Thompson (former board member)
    Elected and resigned in 2016
  • Christina Van Soest (former board member)
    Elected and resigned in 2017
  • Myron Elmer (former board member)
    Appointed and resigned in 2017
  • Elizabeth Mayhew (former board member)
    Appointed and resigned in 2017
  • David Epstein (member)
    Appeared via Skype at a meeting; expressed interest in serving on Board
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Individual to whom requests for rehearing should be addressed

Jason West vs. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jason West Counsel
Respondent Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Counsel Stewart F. Salwin, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaw § 3.6

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner’s petition alleging the HOA failed to fill board vacancies (Bylaw § 3.6 violation), finding that the HOA had made reasonable efforts, but vacancies could not be filled because no eligible members were willing to serve, partly due to the Petitioner's actions.

Why this result: Respondent established that the Board performed all reasonable actions to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner's obstructionist tactics, rendering enforcement of the Bylaw impossible as it would lead to an absurdity.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusing to fill vacancies on Respondent’s Board of Directors

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on the Board of Directors. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board had done all it could to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, and Bylaw § 3.6 does not empower the Board to conscript unwilling members.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Board Vacancies, Bylaw 3.6, Obstructionist Tactics, Refusal to Serve
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 572314.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:29 (137.9 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 576049.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:32 (1160.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716031-REL


Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative hearing and final order concerning a petition filed by homeowner Jason West (“Petitioner”) against the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA’s Board of Directors violated its own Bylaw § 3.6 by failing to fill vacant board positions.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition, a decision that was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The central finding was that the Respondent had made repeated and reasonable efforts to fill the vacancies but was unsuccessful due to a lack of willing and eligible candidates. The ALJ concluded that the governing bylaw mandates the appointment of willing members but does not grant the power to conscript individuals to serve against their will. Furthermore, the decision determined that the shortage of volunteers was attributable, in part, to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics,” which created a hostile and dysfunctional environment, leading to a series of board member resignations and deterring potential candidates.

Case Overview

Case Number: 17F-H1716031-REL

Petitioner: Jason West, a homeowner and member of the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

Respondent: Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, representing a small community of approximately 40 homes.

Core Allegation: On April 10, 2017, the Petitioner filed a single-issue petition alleging the Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

Hearing Date: June 21, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

Final Disposition: The Petitioner’s petition was denied in a decision dated June 28, 2017. This decision was adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017, making it binding on the parties.

Governing Bylaw in Dispute

The central issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 3.6 of the HOA’s Bylaws, which states:

Vacancies. Vacancies on the Board caused by any reason other than the removal of a director in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.3 of these Bylaws shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the first regular or special meeting of the Board held after the occurrence of such vacancy, even though the directors present at such meeting may constitute less than a quorum. Each person so elected shall serve the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

Key Parties and Witnesses

Role / Affiliation

Key Testimony / Actions

Jason West

Petitioner, Homeowner, Former Board President

Filed the petition alleging bylaw violation. Previously filed recall petitions against other board members, resigned from the board himself, and proposed a bylaw amendment that disqualified newly elected members.

Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray

Respondent’s Board President

Testified that the board made repeated efforts to find volunteers, but no one was willing to serve, citing the Petitioner’s behavior as a major cause for resignations and lack of interest.

Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla

Community Manager, National Property Service (NPS)

Testified about sending multiple email requests for board candidates on behalf of the board, which yielded no interested parties other than those who would later be disqualified.

Christina Van Soest

Former Board Member

Resigned on Feb. 8, 2017, stating, “I have found the direction of some of the board does not appear to be in the best interest of the community as a whole.” Testified she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner.

Elizabeth Mayhew

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 4, 2017, citing stress directly related to the Petitioner: “I have enough stress daily with my job and cannot handle this or him. It is making me physically ill and he is not worth that.”

Myron (“Ray”) Elmer

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 5, 2017, with the stated reason: “[d]ue to continued problems Jason etc.”

Korey Hjelmeir & Debra Epstein

Former Board Members

Testified for the Petitioner’s rebuttal. Both had previously resigned in June 2016 in response to the Petitioner’s recall petitions and were later disqualified from serving by a bylaw amendment he proposed.

Chronology of Board Destabilization and Resignations

The hearing evidence established a pattern of significant board turnover and dysfunction between June 2016 and June 2017.

June 23, 2016: Board members Adrian Justiniano, Debra Epstein, and Korey Hjelmeir resigned after the Petitioner filed recall petitions against them.

August 3, 2016: The Petitioner, June Thompson, and Christina Van Soest were elected to the Board. The Petitioner served as president.

August 18, 2016: The Board expanded from 3 to 5 members, appointing Gina Murray and Ray Elmer.

August 29, 2016: June Thompson resigned.

February 8, 2017: Christina Van Soest resigned, citing the board’s direction and her discomfort with the Petitioner’s “research into members’ backgrounds and history, and the way he was making Board decisions.”

February 18, 2017: The Petitioner resigned from the Board because he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

April 4, 2017: Elizabeth Mayhew resigned, stating she could not handle the stress caused by the Petitioner and his “verbal assaults, constant lashing out, and personal attacks.”

April 5, 2017: Ray Elmer resigned, attributing his departure to “continued problems Jason etc.” This left Gina Murray as the sole remaining board member.

Respondent’s Efforts to Fill Vacancies

The Respondent provided evidence of multiple, documented attempts to recruit new board members.

February 23, 2017: Following the resignations of Ms. Van Soest and the Petitioner, Community Manager Eddie Padilla sent an email requesting “motivated and dedicated individuals” to serve on the Board. No one responded.

March 31, 2017: At an open Board Meeting with “Board appointments” on the agenda, Gina Murray asked for volunteers and nominations from the floor. No one responded.

April 4 & 18, 2017: Mr. Padilla sent two further emails requesting members interested in serving on the board to submit biographies for an upcoming annual meeting. The only individuals to respond and submit biographies were Mr. Justiniano and Ms. Hjelmeir.

May 15, 2017: At the annual meeting, Ms. Murray again accepted nominations from the floor. Debra Epstein was nominated.

June 5, 2017: After the newly elected board was disqualified, Mr. Padilla sent another email asking for volunteers.

Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision identified the Petitioner’s own actions as a primary cause for the board’s inability to fill vacancies.

Instigation of Resignations: The Petitioner’s recall petitions in June 2016 and behavior cited in the 2017 resignation letters from Van Soest, Mayhew, and Elmer directly contributed to the board vacancies.

Contradictory Claims: The Petitioner testified that four individuals (Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti) were interested in serving. However, the sign-in sheet for the March 31, 2017 meeting, where appointments were to be made, showed none of these individuals were present.

Disqualifying Bylaw Amendment: The Petitioner proposed a new bylaw, § 3.12, which was passed at the May 15, 2017 meeting. It stated:

Attempted Removal of Remaining Director: On June 12, 2017, the Petitioner submitted a petition to remove Gina Murray, the last remaining original board member, which would have left the board entirely vacant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The ALJ’s conclusions of law were decisive in denying the petition.

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated its bylaws.

2. Interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6: The Judge ruled that while the bylaw requires the Board to appoint members to fill vacancies, “it does not empower the Board to conscript members who are not willing to serve on the Board.”

3. Principle of Absurdity: Citing legal precedent, the decision stated that bylaws must be construed to avoid an absurd result. Forcing an HOA to operate without a board because no eligible members are willing to serve, especially when the situation is exacerbated by the Petitioner, would be such an absurdity.

4. Respondent’s Due Diligence: The Judge found that “Respondent established that the Board has done all it could to fill vacancies.”

5. Petitioner’s Culpability: The final conclusion explicitly states that “at this time, no eligible members are willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner’s obstructionist tactics, including Petitioner and his claimed supporters.”

Based on these findings, the ALJ ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The order became final and binding upon adoption by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716031-REL


Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1716031-REL, Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Jason West, in his April 10, 2017 petition?

2. According to the text of Bylaw § 3.6, how are vacancies on the Board of Directors supposed to be filled?

3. Who was the sole remaining member of the Board of Directors at the time of the mass resignations in April 2017, and what was her stated reason for not resigning?

4. Describe the circumstances that led to the resignations of board members Christina Van Soest and Jason West in February 2017.

5. What was the immediate and paradoxical outcome of the May 15, 2017 annual meeting election?

6. Explain the purpose and effect of the proposed Bylaw § 3.12, which was sponsored by the Petitioner.

7. What efforts did the Respondent’s management company, National Property Service (NPS), make to recruit new board members?

8. On what grounds did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky deny the Petitioner’s petition?

9. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, why were certain individuals he named hesitant to volunteer for the Board?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate take regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Jason West’s single-issue petition alleged that the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (the Respondent) had violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

2. Bylaw § 3.6 states that vacancies on the Board (for reasons other than removal) shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the next meeting. The person elected serves the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

3. Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray was the sole remaining board member. She stated she had no intention of resigning because it was important for someone to serve the community’s interests, such as negotiating the insurance contract and handling other community affairs.

4. Christina Van Soest resigned on February 8, 2017, stating the board’s direction was not in the community’s best interest and she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner’s methods. On February 18, 2017, Jason West resigned, citing his belief that he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

5. At the May 15, 2017 meeting, Eugenia Murray, Debra Epstein, Adrian Justiniano, and Korey Hjelmeir were elected to the Board. However, a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner also passed at the same meeting, which made Epstein, Justiniano, and Hjelmeir ineligible to serve because they had resigned within the previous year.

6. The proposed Bylaw § 3.12 was designed to ban any director who resigns or is removed from serving on the board again for one year. Its passage at the May 15, 2017 meeting had the immediate effect of disqualifying three of the four newly elected board members.

7. NPS, through Community Manager Edward Padilla, sent out multiple emails requesting that interested individuals submit biographies to be considered for board positions. These requests were sent on February 23, April 4, April 18, and June 5, 2017.

8. Judge Mihalsky denied the petition because the Respondent had established that the Board did all it could to fill the vacancies. The judge concluded that the Bylaws cannot be construed to empower the Board to conscript unwilling members and that the lack of volunteers was due in part to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics.”

9. The Petitioner testified that Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti were interested but had two conditions. They were concerned about serving with certain other members (Murray, Hjelmeir, Justiniano, or the Epsteins) and wanted assurance that the directors’ insurance policy would be renewed, which was questionable due to petitions filed by West himself.

10. On July 12, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order made the denial of the Petitioner’s petition binding on the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of Jason West in the series of board resignations and the difficulty in finding new board members, citing specific evidence presented by the Respondent and testimony from former board members.

2. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6. How does the judge balance the literal requirement to fill vacancies with the practical realities faced by the Board, and what legal principles support this interpretation?

3. Trace the timeline of board membership from March 2016 to May 2017. What patterns emerge regarding appointments, resignations, and elections, and how do these events illustrate the internal conflict within the Desert Sage Two community?

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Bylaw amendment (§ 3.12) proposed by Jason West. Did it achieve its likely intended purpose, and what were its immediate, perhaps unintended, consequences for the governance of the homeowners’ association?

5. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument for why the Respondent, Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, successfully defended itself against the Petitioner’s claim. Your answer should focus on the actions taken by the Board and its management company and the legal conclusions drawn by the judge.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Bylaw § 3.12 (Proposed)

An amendment proposed by the Petitioner that would ban any director who resigns or is removed from the board from serving again for a period of one year. This amendment was passed at the May 15, 2017 annual meeting.

Bylaw § 3.6

The section of the Respondent’s bylaws that was the central issue of the petition. It requires the remaining directors to fill board vacancies by a majority vote at the next regular or special meeting.

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; a small homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 40 condominium homes.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which formally adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order makes the ruling effective and outlines the process for requesting a rehearing.

Jason West

The Petitioner in the case. He is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a petition alleging the Board violated Bylaw § 3.6.

National Property Service (NPS)

The management company employed by the Respondent, represented in the hearing by Community Manager Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for cases referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Jason West.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has the greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716031-REL


Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1716031-REL, Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Jason West, in his April 10, 2017 petition?

2. According to the text of Bylaw § 3.6, how are vacancies on the Board of Directors supposed to be filled?

3. Who was the sole remaining member of the Board of Directors at the time of the mass resignations in April 2017, and what was her stated reason for not resigning?

4. Describe the circumstances that led to the resignations of board members Christina Van Soest and Jason West in February 2017.

5. What was the immediate and paradoxical outcome of the May 15, 2017 annual meeting election?

6. Explain the purpose and effect of the proposed Bylaw § 3.12, which was sponsored by the Petitioner.

7. What efforts did the Respondent’s management company, National Property Service (NPS), make to recruit new board members?

8. On what grounds did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky deny the Petitioner’s petition?

9. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, why were certain individuals he named hesitant to volunteer for the Board?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate take regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Jason West’s single-issue petition alleged that the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (the Respondent) had violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

2. Bylaw § 3.6 states that vacancies on the Board (for reasons other than removal) shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the next meeting. The person elected serves the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

3. Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray was the sole remaining board member. She stated she had no intention of resigning because it was important for someone to serve the community’s interests, such as negotiating the insurance contract and handling other community affairs.

4. Christina Van Soest resigned on February 8, 2017, stating the board’s direction was not in the community’s best interest and she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner’s methods. On February 18, 2017, Jason West resigned, citing his belief that he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

5. At the May 15, 2017 meeting, Eugenia Murray, Debra Epstein, Adrian Justiniano, and Korey Hjelmeir were elected to the Board. However, a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner also passed at the same meeting, which made Epstein, Justiniano, and Hjelmeir ineligible to serve because they had resigned within the previous year.

6. The proposed Bylaw § 3.12 was designed to ban any director who resigns or is removed from serving on the board again for one year. Its passage at the May 15, 2017 meeting had the immediate effect of disqualifying three of the four newly elected board members.

7. NPS, through Community Manager Edward Padilla, sent out multiple emails requesting that interested individuals submit biographies to be considered for board positions. These requests were sent on February 23, April 4, April 18, and June 5, 2017.

8. Judge Mihalsky denied the petition because the Respondent had established that the Board did all it could to fill the vacancies. The judge concluded that the Bylaws cannot be construed to empower the Board to conscript unwilling members and that the lack of volunteers was due in part to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics.”

9. The Petitioner testified that Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti were interested but had two conditions. They were concerned about serving with certain other members (Murray, Hjelmeir, Justiniano, or the Epsteins) and wanted assurance that the directors’ insurance policy would be renewed, which was questionable due to petitions filed by West himself.

10. On July 12, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order made the denial of the Petitioner’s petition binding on the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of Jason West in the series of board resignations and the difficulty in finding new board members, citing specific evidence presented by the Respondent and testimony from former board members.

2. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6. How does the judge balance the literal requirement to fill vacancies with the practical realities faced by the Board, and what legal principles support this interpretation?

3. Trace the timeline of board membership from March 2016 to May 2017. What patterns emerge regarding appointments, resignations, and elections, and how do these events illustrate the internal conflict within the Desert Sage Two community?

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Bylaw amendment (§ 3.12) proposed by Jason West. Did it achieve its likely intended purpose, and what were its immediate, perhaps unintended, consequences for the governance of the homeowners’ association?

5. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument for why the Respondent, Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, successfully defended itself against the Petitioner’s claim. Your answer should focus on the actions taken by the Board and its management company and the legal conclusions drawn by the judge.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Bylaw § 3.12 (Proposed)

An amendment proposed by the Petitioner that would ban any director who resigns or is removed from the board from serving again for a period of one year. This amendment was passed at the May 15, 2017 annual meeting.

Bylaw § 3.6

The section of the Respondent’s bylaws that was the central issue of the petition. It requires the remaining directors to fill board vacancies by a majority vote at the next regular or special meeting.

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; a small homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 40 condominium homes.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which formally adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order makes the ruling effective and outlines the process for requesting a rehearing.

Jason West

The Petitioner in the case. He is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a petition alleging the Board violated Bylaw § 3.6.

National Property Service (NPS)

The management company employed by the Respondent, represented in the hearing by Community Manager Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for cases referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Jason West.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has the greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jason West (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; testified on his own behalf
  • Linda Siedler (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Teresa Price (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Bret Morse (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; submitted absentee ballot; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Bryan Brunatti (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; attended meeting and counted ballots; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray

Respondent Side

  • Stewart F. Salwin (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Represented the Respondent
  • Eugenia Murray (board president, witness)
    Only current Board member at the time of hearing; testified for Respondent
  • Edward Padilla (property manager, witness)
    National Property Service (NPC)
    Community Manager; testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    ADRE Commissioner who adopted the ALJ Decision

Other Participants

  • Korey Hjelmeir (witness, former board member)
    Testified for Petitioner as former Board member; resigned and later sought re-election
  • Debra Epstein (witness, former board member)
    Testified for Petitioner as former Board member; resigned and later sought re-election; appeared via Skype at a meeting
  • Adrian Justiniano (former board member)
    Resigned and later sought re-election
  • June Thompson (former board member)
    Elected and resigned in 2016
  • Christina Van Soest (former board member)
    Elected and resigned in 2017
  • Myron Elmer (former board member)
    Appointed and resigned in 2017
  • Elizabeth Mayhew (former board member)
    Appointed and resigned in 2017
  • David Epstein (member)
    Appeared via Skype at a meeting; expressed interest in serving on Board
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Individual to whom requests for rehearing should be addressed

Jason West vs. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jason West Counsel
Respondent Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Counsel Stewart F. Salwin, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaw § 3.6

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner’s petition alleging the HOA failed to fill board vacancies (Bylaw § 3.6 violation), finding that the HOA had made reasonable efforts, but vacancies could not be filled because no eligible members were willing to serve, partly due to the Petitioner's actions.

Why this result: Respondent established that the Board performed all reasonable actions to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner's obstructionist tactics, rendering enforcement of the Bylaw impossible as it would lead to an absurdity.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusing to fill vacancies on Respondent’s Board of Directors

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on the Board of Directors. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board had done all it could to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, and Bylaw § 3.6 does not empower the Board to conscript unwilling members.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Board Vacancies, Bylaw 3.6, Obstructionist Tactics, Refusal to Serve
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 572314.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:30 (137.9 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 576049.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:31 (1160.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716031-REL


Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative hearing and final order concerning a petition filed by homeowner Jason West (“Petitioner”) against the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA’s Board of Directors violated its own Bylaw § 3.6 by failing to fill vacant board positions.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition, a decision that was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The central finding was that the Respondent had made repeated and reasonable efforts to fill the vacancies but was unsuccessful due to a lack of willing and eligible candidates. The ALJ concluded that the governing bylaw mandates the appointment of willing members but does not grant the power to conscript individuals to serve against their will. Furthermore, the decision determined that the shortage of volunteers was attributable, in part, to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics,” which created a hostile and dysfunctional environment, leading to a series of board member resignations and deterring potential candidates.

Case Overview

Case Number: 17F-H1716031-REL

Petitioner: Jason West, a homeowner and member of the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

Respondent: Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, representing a small community of approximately 40 homes.

Core Allegation: On April 10, 2017, the Petitioner filed a single-issue petition alleging the Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

Hearing Date: June 21, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

Final Disposition: The Petitioner’s petition was denied in a decision dated June 28, 2017. This decision was adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017, making it binding on the parties.

Governing Bylaw in Dispute

The central issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 3.6 of the HOA’s Bylaws, which states:

Vacancies. Vacancies on the Board caused by any reason other than the removal of a director in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.3 of these Bylaws shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the first regular or special meeting of the Board held after the occurrence of such vacancy, even though the directors present at such meeting may constitute less than a quorum. Each person so elected shall serve the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

Key Parties and Witnesses

Role / Affiliation

Key Testimony / Actions

Jason West

Petitioner, Homeowner, Former Board President

Filed the petition alleging bylaw violation. Previously filed recall petitions against other board members, resigned from the board himself, and proposed a bylaw amendment that disqualified newly elected members.

Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray

Respondent’s Board President

Testified that the board made repeated efforts to find volunteers, but no one was willing to serve, citing the Petitioner’s behavior as a major cause for resignations and lack of interest.

Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla

Community Manager, National Property Service (NPS)

Testified about sending multiple email requests for board candidates on behalf of the board, which yielded no interested parties other than those who would later be disqualified.

Christina Van Soest

Former Board Member

Resigned on Feb. 8, 2017, stating, “I have found the direction of some of the board does not appear to be in the best interest of the community as a whole.” Testified she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner.

Elizabeth Mayhew

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 4, 2017, citing stress directly related to the Petitioner: “I have enough stress daily with my job and cannot handle this or him. It is making me physically ill and he is not worth that.”

Myron (“Ray”) Elmer

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 5, 2017, with the stated reason: “[d]ue to continued problems Jason etc.”

Korey Hjelmeir & Debra Epstein

Former Board Members

Testified for the Petitioner’s rebuttal. Both had previously resigned in June 2016 in response to the Petitioner’s recall petitions and were later disqualified from serving by a bylaw amendment he proposed.

Chronology of Board Destabilization and Resignations

The hearing evidence established a pattern of significant board turnover and dysfunction between June 2016 and June 2017.

June 23, 2016: Board members Adrian Justiniano, Debra Epstein, and Korey Hjelmeir resigned after the Petitioner filed recall petitions against them.

August 3, 2016: The Petitioner, June Thompson, and Christina Van Soest were elected to the Board. The Petitioner served as president.

August 18, 2016: The Board expanded from 3 to 5 members, appointing Gina Murray and Ray Elmer.

August 29, 2016: June Thompson resigned.

February 8, 2017: Christina Van Soest resigned, citing the board’s direction and her discomfort with the Petitioner’s “research into members’ backgrounds and history, and the way he was making Board decisions.”

February 18, 2017: The Petitioner resigned from the Board because he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

April 4, 2017: Elizabeth Mayhew resigned, stating she could not handle the stress caused by the Petitioner and his “verbal assaults, constant lashing out, and personal attacks.”

April 5, 2017: Ray Elmer resigned, attributing his departure to “continued problems Jason etc.” This left Gina Murray as the sole remaining board member.

Respondent’s Efforts to Fill Vacancies

The Respondent provided evidence of multiple, documented attempts to recruit new board members.

February 23, 2017: Following the resignations of Ms. Van Soest and the Petitioner, Community Manager Eddie Padilla sent an email requesting “motivated and dedicated individuals” to serve on the Board. No one responded.

March 31, 2017: At an open Board Meeting with “Board appointments” on the agenda, Gina Murray asked for volunteers and nominations from the floor. No one responded.

April 4 & 18, 2017: Mr. Padilla sent two further emails requesting members interested in serving on the board to submit biographies for an upcoming annual meeting. The only individuals to respond and submit biographies were Mr. Justiniano and Ms. Hjelmeir.

May 15, 2017: At the annual meeting, Ms. Murray again accepted nominations from the floor. Debra Epstein was nominated.

June 5, 2017: After the newly elected board was disqualified, Mr. Padilla sent another email asking for volunteers.

Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision identified the Petitioner’s own actions as a primary cause for the board’s inability to fill vacancies.

Instigation of Resignations: The Petitioner’s recall petitions in June 2016 and behavior cited in the 2017 resignation letters from Van Soest, Mayhew, and Elmer directly contributed to the board vacancies.

Contradictory Claims: The Petitioner testified that four individuals (Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti) were interested in serving. However, the sign-in sheet for the March 31, 2017 meeting, where appointments were to be made, showed none of these individuals were present.

Disqualifying Bylaw Amendment: The Petitioner proposed a new bylaw, § 3.12, which was passed at the May 15, 2017 meeting. It stated:

Attempted Removal of Remaining Director: On June 12, 2017, the Petitioner submitted a petition to remove Gina Murray, the last remaining original board member, which would have left the board entirely vacant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The ALJ’s conclusions of law were decisive in denying the petition.

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated its bylaws.

2. Interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6: The Judge ruled that while the bylaw requires the Board to appoint members to fill vacancies, “it does not empower the Board to conscript members who are not willing to serve on the Board.”

3. Principle of Absurdity: Citing legal precedent, the decision stated that bylaws must be construed to avoid an absurd result. Forcing an HOA to operate without a board because no eligible members are willing to serve, especially when the situation is exacerbated by the Petitioner, would be such an absurdity.

4. Respondent’s Due Diligence: The Judge found that “Respondent established that the Board has done all it could to fill vacancies.”

5. Petitioner’s Culpability: The final conclusion explicitly states that “at this time, no eligible members are willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner’s obstructionist tactics, including Petitioner and his claimed supporters.”

Based on these findings, the ALJ ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The order became final and binding upon adoption by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017.