The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.
Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 583987.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:29 (53.0 KB)
17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 585505.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:30 (385.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL
Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.
The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.
In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.
Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings
Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation
On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.
Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.
This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:
• Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”
• Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.
• Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.
• Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.
Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing
On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”
• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.
• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”
• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”
• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute
The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.
Respondent’s (HOA) Case
The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:
• Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”
• Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.
◦ Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).
◦ Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.
◦ Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.
◦ Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.
Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case
The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.
• Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.
• Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:
◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.
◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.
• Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.
• Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.
Final Administrative Law Judge Decision
On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.
Key Findings and Conclusions of Law
Finding/Conclusion
Details
Standard of Review
The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.
Reasonableness of HOA Action
Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.
HOA Authority
CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”
Patio Cover Classification
The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).
Cost Responsibility
The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”
Final Order
Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:
“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”
The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.
The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.
Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 583987.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:46 (53.0 KB)
17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 585505.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:46 (385.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL
Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.
The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.
In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.
Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings
Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation
On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.
Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.
This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:
• Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”
• Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.
• Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.
• Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.
Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing
On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”
• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.
• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”
• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”
• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute
The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.
Respondent’s (HOA) Case
The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:
• Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”
• Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.
◦ Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).
◦ Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.
◦ Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.
◦ Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.
Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case
The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.
• Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.
• Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:
◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.
◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.
• Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.
• Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.
Final Administrative Law Judge Decision
On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.
Key Findings and Conclusions of Law
Finding/Conclusion
Details
Standard of Review
The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.
Reasonableness of HOA Action
Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.
HOA Authority
CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”
Patio Cover Classification
The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).
Cost Responsibility
The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”
Final Order
Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:
“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”
The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.
Study Guide – 17F-H1717038-REL
Study Guide: Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the provided source documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?
2. What was the initial reason given by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil for recommending the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition?
3. Why did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, reject the initial recommendation for dismissal?
4. What was the central dispute that was ultimately decided in the November 20, 2017, hearing?
5. According to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision, what is the legal classification of the petitioners’ patio cover?
6. Which specific sections of the CC&Rs did the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, cite as the basis for its authority?
7. What key reasons did project manager Wayne King provide to justify the necessity of removing the patio covers for the painting project?
8. Describe the significant difference in the cost estimates for removing and replacing the patio cover as presented by the Petitioners versus the Respondent’s project manager.
9. What was the final ruling regarding who was financially responsible for the removal and potential reinstallation of the patio cover?
10. What was the ultimate outcome of the Larsons’ petition following the final hearing, and which party was deemed the “prevailing party”?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners James and Shawna Larson, and the Respondent, the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which is their homeowner’s association (HOA). The dispute arose from the HOA’s plan to repair and paint the building exteriors.
2. ALJ Marwil initially recommended dismissal due to a “lack of justiciable controversy.” She found that the Petitioners had failed to cite any provision of the CC&Rs that the Respondent had currently violated, as the threatened action to remove the patio cover was speculative and had not yet occurred.
3. Commissioner Lowe rejected the dismissal because she found the matter was “ripe for adjudication.” Her decision was based on a June 1, 2017 letter from the Respondent that questioned whether “the presence of the awning [is] a violation of the Association’s governing documents,” which she interpreted as the Respondent alleging a violation.
4. The central dispute was whether the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation had the authority to mandate that homeowners, specifically the Larsons, remove their patio covers at their own expense to facilitate a building repair and painting project.
5. The final decision classifies the Petitioners’ patio cover as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4). This classification was crucial to determining financial responsibility.
6. The Respondent cited sections 9 and 9(b) of the CC&Rs. Section 9(b) makes the Respondent responsible for maintaining building exteriors, and section 9 grants it the authority to take “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep” of those exteriors.
7. Wayne King testified that removal was necessary to properly and safely complete the work using scaffolding, as required by modern safety laws. He also stated that removal was needed to repair improperly flashed areas behind the covers and to ensure the painting contractor would provide a warranty for the project.
8. The Petitioners presented bids showing the cost to remove and rebuild the cover would be between $3,980 and $5,975. In contrast, Mr. King opined these estimates were very high and that the cost should be closer to $1,000 if existing materials were reused.
9. The final ruling, based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), was that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, if they choose, the cost of reinstalling it. This is because the patio cover is a limited common element assigned specifically to their unit.
10. The final outcome was the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition. The Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis. Use the provided documents to construct a detailed, evidence-based response.
1. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial filing to the final decision. Discuss the key turning points, including the initial recommendation for dismissal, its rejection by the Commissioner, and the reasoning behind the final judgment.
2. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent in the November 2017 hearing. On what specific statutes and CC&R provisions did each side rely, and how did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately interpret these documents?
3. Evaluate the role of expert testimony in this case, specifically focusing on the evidence provided by project manager Wayne King. How did his testimony regarding safety, project requirements, and cost estimates influence the Administrative Law Judge’s findings on the reasonableness of the Respondent’s actions?
4. Discuss the legal concept of a “limited common element” as defined and applied in the source documents. Explain how this classification was central to the final decision regarding financial responsibility for the patio cover’s removal and reinstallation.
5. The initial Administrative Law Judge found no “justiciable controversy,” while the Commissioner later found the matter “ripe for adjudication.” Based on the details in all three documents, explain the arguments for both positions and analyze why the case ultimately proceeded to a full hearing.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official in the Office of Administrative Hearings who adjudicates complaints regarding condominium and planned community documents and ensures compliance with relevant statutes.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The documents that govern the community and are described as a contract between the homeowner’s association and the homeowners.
Justiciable Controversy
A real dispute that a tribunal has the authority to resolve. The initial petition was recommended for dismissal for a lack of a justiciable controversy because the Respondent’s threatened actions were deemed speculative.
Limited Common Element
A legal classification for property defined under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4). In this case, the Petitioners’ patio cover was classified as such, meaning any common expense associated with its maintenance, repair, or replacement is assessed against the unit to which it is assigned.
Petition
The formal document filed with the Department of Real Estate to initiate a complaint against a homeowner’s association.
Petitioner
The party that files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowners James and Shawna Larson.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party that is successful in a legal dispute. In the final order, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.
Ripe for Adjudication
A term used by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate to indicate that a dispute is ready to be formally heard and decided by the Administrative Law Judge.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717038-REL
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3 sources
These documents chronicle the legal dispute between James and Shawna Larson (Petitioners) and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (Respondent) concerning the removal of the Larsons’ patio cover for building maintenance. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissal because the Petitioners did not allege a current violation of the governing documents, thus lacking a justiciable controversy since the association had only threatened action. However, the Department of Real Estate Commissioner rejected this recommendation, asserting that a violation of the governing documents was alleged by the Respondent, making the matter ripe for adjudication. Following a rehearing, a different ALJ issued a final decision finding that the Respondent acted reasonably in requiring the patio cover removal for safe and proper painting and repairs, concluding that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation as the cover is a limited common element.
Based on 3 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
James Larson(petitioner)
Shawna Larson(petitioner)
Lisa M. Hanger(attorney) Counsel for Petitioners
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(attorney) Brown Alcott PLLC Counsel for Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Wayne King(witness) Project manager hired by Respondent for the painting project; provided testimony
Neutral Parties
Suzanne Marwil(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Authored Recommended Order Dismissal dated August 25, 2017
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Authored Administrative Law Judge Decision dated December 11, 2017
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Rejected Recommendation of Dismissal
Dan Gardner(HOA coordinator) Transmitted documents (Order Rejecting Recommendation of Dismissal)
Other Participants
Chris Morga(contractor) Jacob and Co. Mentioned as a vendor who could remove patio covers
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.
Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.
Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.
Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 1-243
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (67.9 KB)
17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (154.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL
Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.
The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.
After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
Parties and Jurisdiction
Representation
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ
Core Allegation and Governing Statute
• Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.
• Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.
——————————————————————————–
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
March 2, 2015
The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.
May 18, 2016
The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.
August 9, 2016
Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
November 14, 2016
The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
November 29, 2016
ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
December 13, 2016
The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.
February 7, 2017
A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.
June 9, 2017
A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
June 26, 2017
ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
August 1, 2017
The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.
August 10, 2017
The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)
• Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Evidence Presented:
◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”
◦ HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.
• Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”
Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)
• Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.
◦ Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.
◦ May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.
——————————————————————————–
Judicial Findings and Final Disposition
Standard and Burden of Proof
Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.
Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)
• Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.
• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.
Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)
• Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.
• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.
Final Administrative Disposition
The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.
Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.
Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.
Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 1-243
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:23 (67.9 KB)
17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:24 (154.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL
Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.
The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.
After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
Parties and Jurisdiction
Representation
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ
Core Allegation and Governing Statute
• Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.
• Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.
——————————————————————————–
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
March 2, 2015
The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.
May 18, 2016
The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.
August 9, 2016
Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
November 14, 2016
The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
November 29, 2016
ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
December 13, 2016
The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.
February 7, 2017
A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.
June 9, 2017
A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
June 26, 2017
ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
August 1, 2017
The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.
August 10, 2017
The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)
• Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Evidence Presented:
◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”
◦ HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.
• Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”
Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)
• Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.
◦ Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.
◦ May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.
——————————————————————————–
Judicial Findings and Final Disposition
Standard and Burden of Proof
Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.
Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)
• Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.
• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.
Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)
• Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.
• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.
Final Administrative Disposition
The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.
Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.
Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.
Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 1-243
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:39 (67.9 KB)
17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:40 (154.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL
Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.
The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.
After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
Parties and Jurisdiction
Representation
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ
Core Allegation and Governing Statute
• Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.
• Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.
——————————————————————————–
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
March 2, 2015
The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.
May 18, 2016
The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.
August 9, 2016
Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
November 14, 2016
The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
November 29, 2016
ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
December 13, 2016
The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.
February 7, 2017
A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.
June 9, 2017
A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
June 26, 2017
ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
August 1, 2017
The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.
August 10, 2017
The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)
• Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Evidence Presented:
◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”
◦ HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.
• Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”
Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)
• Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.
◦ Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.
◦ May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.
——————————————————————————–
Judicial Findings and Final Disposition
Standard and Burden of Proof
Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.
Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)
• Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.
• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.
Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)
• Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.
• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.
Final Administrative Disposition
The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.
Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.
Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.
Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 1-243
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:50 (67.9 KB)
17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:51 (154.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL
Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.
The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.
After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.
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Case Overview
Parties and Jurisdiction
Representation
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ
Core Allegation and Governing Statute
• Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.
• Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.
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Chronology of Legal Proceedings
March 2, 2015
The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.
May 18, 2016
The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.
August 9, 2016
Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
November 14, 2016
The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
November 29, 2016
ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
December 13, 2016
The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.
February 7, 2017
A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.
June 9, 2017
A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
June 26, 2017
ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
August 1, 2017
The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.
August 10, 2017
The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.
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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)
• Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Evidence Presented:
◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”
◦ HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.
• Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”
Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)
• Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.
◦ Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.
◦ May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.
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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition
Standard and Burden of Proof
Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.
Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)
• Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.
• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.
Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)
• Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.
• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.
Final Administrative Disposition
The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.
Study Guide – 17f-H1716004-REL
Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences in length.
1. What specific Arizona Revised Statute did petitioner Brian Sopatyk allege that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated, and what is the core requirement of that statute?
2. Identify the two fees charged in connection with Mr. Sopatyk’s unit purchase, the amount of each fee, and how they were documented on the HUD-1 disclosure statement.
3. What was the Association’s central argument for why the $660 fee did not violate the statute in question?
4. Who was the Association’s manager, and what explanation did she provide for the labeling of the $660 fee?
5. According to the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs), what is the purpose of the fee outlined in section 8.13?
6. What was the outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?
7. During the rehearing, a discrepancy was noted between Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn petition and his testimony regarding the payment of the $660 fee. What was this discrepancy?
8. What corrective actions did the Association’s Board vote to take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, after Mr. Sopatyk raised the issue?
9. What is the standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and did the Administrative Law Judge find that he met it?
10. What was the final, certified administrative decision in this matter after the rehearing on June 9, 2017?
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Answer Key
1. Brian Sopatyk alleged a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260. This statute requires a condominium association to provide specific disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser and limits the aggregate fee for preparing these documents and other related services to no more than four hundred dollars.
2. The two fees were a $660 “Transfer Fee” and a $30 “Resale Statement Fee.” The HUD-1 disclosure statement shows the $660 fee was split, with $330 paid by the borrower (Sopatyk) and $330 paid by the seller, while the seller alone paid the $30 fee.
3. The Association’s central argument was that the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was actually a “working capital fee” collected pursuant to section 8.13 of its CC&Rs. They contended that the fee had been incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error.
4. The Association’s manager was Amy Telnes. She testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee, and these fees had been mislabeled since that time.
5. According to CC&R section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”), each new unit owner is to be assessed a fee of at least twice the average monthly assessment. These fees are to be deposited into the working capital fund, which the Association refers to as its Reserve Fund.
6. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The Judge’s decision was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition, and this decision was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate.
7. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 fee was split between him and the seller. However, at the hearing, he testified that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit, meaning one of his statements had to be false.
8. The Board directed Ms. Telnes to account for all working capital fees and transfer them to the Reserve Account to correct the error. The Board also determined its system was confusing and voted to assess a single transfer fee of $400 (and no other fees) on all future transactions.
9. The petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof and was required to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both hearings that Mr. Sopatyk did not meet this burden.
10. The final decision was that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed again. On August 10, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate because the Department took no action to reject or modify it.
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Suggested Essay Questions
1. Analyze the legal concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain in detail why the evidence presented by the Association was deemed to have greater convincing force than the evidence presented by the Petitioner, leading to the dismissal of his petition.
2. Discuss the critical role of the Association’s governing documents, specifically CC&R section 8.13, in its successful defense. How did the language of this section allow the Association to re-characterize the disputed $660 fee and differentiate it from the fees regulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260?
3. Trace the procedural history of case No. 17F-H1716004-REL, from the filing of the petition to the final certified order. Identify the key dates, participants (judges, legal counsel, witnesses), and the function of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in the process.
4. Examine the actions taken by the Association’s Board during its May 18, 2016, meeting. Evaluate whether these actions demonstrated good-faith governance and a proactive attempt to correct a procedural error, and discuss how the minutes from this meeting were used as evidence in the hearing.
5. Despite losing the case, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition prompted significant changes in the Association’s fee structure. Argue whether the petitioner’s actions ultimately served the public interest for future condominium purchasers in the Lakeshore Village community, even though he did not prevail in his specific legal claim.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on the evidence presented.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260
The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to furnish a prospective purchaser with disclosure documents and other information. It explicitly limits the fee an association can charge for these services to “no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars.”
Burden of Proof
The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk.
The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, which are the governing documents for the condominium association. Section 8.13 of the Lakeshore Village CC&Rs authorizes the collection of a fee for a working capital fund.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Brian Sopatyk.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party defending against a petition. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Reserve Fund
The account into which the Association deposits its working capital fees. It is also referred to as the Working Capital Fund.
Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee
A $30 fee, separate from the disputed $660, that was paid by the seller to the Association for the preparation of the resale statement. This fee was considered part of the allowable charges under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260.
Transfer Fee
The label erroneously applied to the $660 fee on the disclosure statement and HUD-1 form. The central dispute of the case was whether this was a true transfer fee subject to the statutory cap or a mislabeled working capital fee.
Working Capital Fee
A fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13 to be assessed from each new unit owner for the purpose of funding the Association’s working capital fund (Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued the $660 charge was this type of fee.
Blog Post – 17f-H1716004-REL
How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute
We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?
For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.
1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm
A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.
The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.
Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.
The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.
2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form
Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.
The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.
3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War
How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.
Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.
In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”
As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.
4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase
What it really means to have to prove your case.
In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:
The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.
5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility
When every word you say (and write) is on the record.
A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.
There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”
The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.
Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details
This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.
The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brian Sopatyk(petitioner)
Nathan Andrews(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Jill M. Kennedy(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Chance Peterson(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Judy Sopatyk(party) Wife of petitioner and co-purchaser of the unit
Respondent Side
Bradley R. Jardine(HOA attorney) Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston Attorney for Respondent
Amy Telnes(property manager/witness) The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Association manager who testified
Michael Cibellis(association president/witness) The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Association president who testified at rehearing
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) ADRE Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner
Greg Hanchett(Interim Director) OAH Signed Certification of Decision
Abby Hansen(HOA Coordinator) ADRE Administrative contact for rehearing requests
Rosella J. Rodriguez(administrative staff) Involved in copy mailing/distribution
