JOHN R KRAHN LIVING TRUST / JANET KRAHN LIVING TRUST
Counsel
—
Respondent
TONTO FOREST ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
Counsel
—
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The ALJ ruled that requiring document requests to be submitted through the mail was reasonable, especially since the Respondent had informed the Petitioner of this prescribed manner for future requests via a Cease-and-Desist letter, and the Petitioner disregarded that information.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, as the ALJ found that the HOA provided a reasonably accessible method for submitting document requests (physical mail to the management office) following the Cease-and-Desist letter, and Petitioner disregarded this information by submitting the request via email to the Secretary.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of ARS §33-1805 by failing to provide requested association records within the statutory 10-business-day deadline
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated ARS § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to requested association records (an invoice from CAI LLC) within 10 business days of a written request sent via email on June 1, 2025. Respondent claimed non-receipt and argued Petitioner failed to follow the established request process, which required physical mail submission after a Cease-and-Desist letter was issued.
Orders: Respondent deemed the prevailing party; no order issued against Respondent.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA records request, A.R.S. § 33-1805, Cease-and-Desist Letter, Reasonable access, Burden of proof, Email communication
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
25F-H076-REL Decision – 1356556.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:26:59 (46.4 KB)
25F-H076-REL Decision – 1357642.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:27:05 (49.7 KB)
25F-H076-REL Decision – 1359021.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:27:11 (8.2 KB)
25F-H076-REL Decision – 1369428.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:27:15 (115.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 25F-H076-REL
Briefing Document: Krahn Living Trust v. Tonto Forest Estates HOA (Case No. 25F-H076-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcome of Case No. 25F-H076-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The case centered on a petition filed by the John R Krahn Living Trust (“Petitioner”) against the Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (“Respondent”), alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805 for failing to provide association records within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
The Petitioner’s case was built on the assertion that a valid written request was sent via email on June 1, 2025, to the HOA Secretary, followed by another email and two voicemails. The Petitioner presented extensive arguments based on the legal principle of “rebuttable presumption of receipt” and a statistical analysis claiming the probability of all communication attempts failing was astronomically low, thus evidencing bad faith and intentional non-compliance by the Respondent.
The Respondent’s defense was that they never received the email or voicemails in question. They argued that email is an unreliable communication method and that the burden of proof for delivery and receipt rested solely with the Petitioner. They further contended that established protocol required requests to be made through the community manager.
The final decision, issued by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Samuel Fox, found in favor of the Respondent. The ruling hinged on a Cease and Desist letter issued by the HOA to the Petitioner in March 2025. The ALJ determined this letter established a new, “reasonable” process for communication, requiring the Petitioner to submit all future correspondence via physical mail to the management office. By sending his request via email, the Petitioner disregarded this specific directive. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, as a reasonable method for submitting requests was available but was not used.
Case Overview
Case Number
25F-H076-REL
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Samuel Fox, Administrative Law Judge
Petitioner
John R Krahn Living Trust / Janet Krahn Living Trust (Represented by John R. Krahn)
Respondent
Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (Represented by Dwight A. Jolivette, President)
Core Allegation
Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide requested association records within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
Final Outcome
Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Chronology of Key Events
March 21, 2025
Respondent issues a formal Cease and Desist letter to Petitioner, directing that future correspondence be submitted in writing and mailed to the management office.
June 1, 2025
Petitioner sends an email with a records request to three known email addresses for HOA Secretary Kenneth Riley.
June 3, 2025
Petitioner sends a follow-up email to the same three addresses.
June 16, 2025 (approx.)
The 10-business-day statutory deadline for a response passes.
June 23, 2025
Petitioner leaves voicemail messages for Secretary Riley and Community Manager Barbara Bonilla regarding the overdue request.
July 25, 2025
Petitioner files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.
September 29, 2025
A subpoena is issued in the matter.
October 3, 2025
ALJ Fox issues an order quashing the September 29 subpoena.
October 6, 2025
Petitioner submits a Motion to Reconsider.
October 14, 2025
ALJ Fox denies the Motion to Reconsider and a motion for summary judgment, and sets preliminary disclosure deadlines for October 24, 2025.
October 29, 2025
The administrative hearing is held.
November 18, 2025
ALJ Fox issues the final decision, ruling in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner’s Central Arguments and Evidence
The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise that multiple, redundant communication attempts were made in good faith and that the Respondent’s claim of non-receipt was statistically impossible and indicative of bad faith.
• Statutory Compliance: The Petitioner argued that A.R.S. § 33-1805 simply requires a “written request” and that his emails on June 1 and June 3 satisfied this requirement. He stated, “Email is in writing and is a method used extensively by respondent.”
• Proper Recipient: The request was directed to HOA Secretary Ken Riley, who, according to bylaw 5.5, “shall have charge of all of the association’s books, records, and papers.” The Petitioner included this bylaw in his email to the Secretary.
• Rebuttable Presumption of Receipt: The Petitioner cited Arizona case law (Lee v. State) and the “mailbox rule,” arguing that sending an email to a correct, functioning address without a bounce notification creates a legal presumption of receipt. This, he claimed, shifted the burden to the Respondent to prove non-receipt with evidence such as server logs, which they failed to provide.
• Evidence of Intentional Evasion: The Petitioner introduced an email from Secretary Riley dated October 13, 2025 (Exhibit 6), as proof of intentional obstruction. In it, Mr. Riley stated:
◦ “You are currently blocked from sending emails to my work and will continue to be blocked.”
◦ “since your email earlier email did not bounce you clearly know I have seen it.” The Petitioner argued this was a “direct admission that the absence of a bounce notification to a known good email address confirms receipt.”
• Statistical Improbability of Failure: A core part of the Petitioner’s argument was a mathematical analysis suggesting the probability of all communication attempts failing was infinitesimal.
◦ The odds of four emails failing was calculated as 1 in 6.25 million.
◦ The odds of two independent voicemails failing was calculated as 1 in 10,000.
◦ The combined probability of all six attempts failing was stated to be “approximately 1 in 62.5 billion.”
• Pattern of Non-Compliance: The Petitioner claimed this was the Respondent’s “fourth time they violate 1805” and that this pattern justified a civil penalty to deter future misconduct.
Respondent’s Central Arguments and Evidence
The Respondent’s defense was centered on a simple claim of non-receipt, the unreliability of electronic communication, and the assertion that the Petitioner failed to follow the proper procedure for requests.
• Claim of Non-Receipt: The Respondent’s primary position was, “Our position is very simple, straightforward. We didn’t get it.” They framed the dispute as a “he said she said situation where neither side can definitively prove their position.”
• Unreliability of Technology: Respondent’s representative, Dwight Jolivette, drew on his military background in information systems to argue that technology is not perfectly reliable. He cited potential issues like work-controlled laptops, server filters, travel, and other variables as reasons the email may not have been delivered. He stated, “technology especially in the communications area as much as we like to believe opposite is not as reliable as people think.”
• Burden of Proof: The Respondent consistently maintained that the burden was on the Petitioner to prove that the “email reached its intended destination.” They argued, “How are we supposed to respond to an email that we don’t have?”
• Cease and Desist Directive: The Respondent argued that a cease and desist letter sent in March 2025 established a specific communication protocol for the Petitioner, requiring him to use U.S. mail for all correspondence with the management company.
• Established Protocol: Mr. Jolivette testified that the unwritten “best practice” was for records requests to be sent to the community manager, who holds the documents, rather than the volunteer board secretary.
• Submitted Evidence: Respondent submitted written statements (Exhibits A and B) from Secretary Ken Riley and Community Manager Barbara Bonilla, both stating they had no record of receiving the emails or voicemails in question.
Final Decision and Rationale
ALJ Samuel Fox’s decision on November 18, 2025, sided with the Respondent. The ruling did not focus on the technical arguments about email delivery but on the legal standard of “reasonability” established by A.R.S. § 33-1805.
• Key Findings of Fact:
◦ On March 21, 2025, Respondent issued a Cease and Desist letter demanding the Petitioner stop email communication with the community manager.
◦ The letter specified a new procedure: “any concerns or correspondence must be submitted in written form and mailed to the Association’s management office at the following address.”
◦ The letter also stated that Respondent would continue to comply with records requests.
◦ Prior to this letter, it was undisputed that the community manager was the appropriate recipient for such requests.
• Conclusions of Law and Rationale:
◦ The ALJ determined that A.R.S. § 33-1805 does not prohibit an association from establishing a specific, reasonable process for requesting documents.
◦ The Cease and Desist letter provided a “clear process for future requests” for this specific Petitioner.
◦ The requirement to submit requests via physical mail was deemed “reasonable.”
◦ The decision states, “the preponderance of the evidence established that Respondent informed Petitioner about how to submit future requests, and Petitioner disregarded that information.”
◦ The final conclusion was that the Petitioner “failed to meet his burden that the documents were not made reasonably available and that Respondent failed to meet their requirement to produce those documents within ten days.”
The judge noted that the outcome would have been different if the Petitioner had been completely prohibited from contacting the community manager, but the letter provided a specific, alternative method of contact (mail) which the Petitioner chose not to use.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John R. Krahn(petitioner) JOHN R KRAHN LIVING TRUST / JANET KRAHN LIVING TRUST
Respondent Side
Dwight A. Jolivette(HOA president) Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association Appeared as Respondent's Representative
Kenneth Riley(HOA secretary/board member) Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association Custodian of association records
Barbara Bonilla(property manager) Ogdenre Community Manager
Valio(HOA attorney) Legal counsel mentioned by Petitioner
Neutral Parties
Samuel Fox(ALJ) OAH
Susan Nicolson(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
vnunez(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision recipient
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision recipient
labril(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision recipient
mneat(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision recipient
lrecchia(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision recipient
gosborn(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision recipient
dmorehouse(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision recipient
JOHN R KRAHN LIVING TRUST / JANET KRAHN LIVING TRUST
Counsel
—
Respondent
TONTO FOREST ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
Counsel
—
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The ALJ ruled that requiring document requests to be submitted through the mail was reasonable, especially since the Respondent had informed the Petitioner of this prescribed manner for future requests via a Cease-and-Desist letter, and the Petitioner disregarded that information.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, as the ALJ found that the HOA provided a reasonably accessible method for submitting document requests (physical mail to the management office) following the Cease-and-Desist letter, and Petitioner disregarded this information by submitting the request via email to the Secretary.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of ARS §33-1805 by failing to provide requested association records within the statutory 10-business-day deadline
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated ARS § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to requested association records (an invoice from CAI LLC) within 10 business days of a written request sent via email on June 1, 2025. Respondent claimed non-receipt and argued Petitioner failed to follow the established request process, which required physical mail submission after a Cease-and-Desist letter was issued.
Orders: Respondent deemed the prevailing party; no order issued against Respondent.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA records request, A.R.S. § 33-1805, Cease-and-Desist Letter, Reasonable access, Burden of proof, Email communication
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Briefing Doc – 25F-H076-REL
Briefing Document: Krahn Living Trust v. Tonto Forest Estates HOA (Case No. 25F-H076-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcome of Case No. 25F-H076-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The case centered on a petition filed by the John R Krahn Living Trust (“Petitioner”) against the Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (“Respondent”), alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805 for failing to provide association records within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
The Petitioner’s case was built on the assertion that a valid written request was sent via email on June 1, 2025, to the HOA Secretary, followed by another email and two voicemails. The Petitioner presented extensive arguments based on the legal principle of “rebuttable presumption of receipt” and a statistical analysis claiming the probability of all communication attempts failing was astronomically low, thus evidencing bad faith and intentional non-compliance by the Respondent.
The Respondent’s defense was that they never received the email or voicemails in question. They argued that email is an unreliable communication method and that the burden of proof for delivery and receipt rested solely with the Petitioner. They further contended that established protocol required requests to be made through the community manager.
The final decision, issued by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Samuel Fox, found in favor of the Respondent. The ruling hinged on a Cease and Desist letter issued by the HOA to the Petitioner in March 2025. The ALJ determined this letter established a new, “reasonable” process for communication, requiring the Petitioner to submit all future correspondence via physical mail to the management office. By sending his request via email, the Petitioner disregarded this specific directive. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, as a reasonable method for submitting requests was available but was not used.
Case Overview
Case Number
25F-H076-REL
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Samuel Fox, Administrative Law Judge
Petitioner
John R Krahn Living Trust / Janet Krahn Living Trust (Represented by John R. Krahn)
Respondent
Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (Represented by Dwight A. Jolivette, President)
Core Allegation
Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide requested association records within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
Final Outcome
Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Chronology of Key Events
March 21, 2025
Respondent issues a formal Cease and Desist letter to Petitioner, directing that future correspondence be submitted in writing and mailed to the management office.
June 1, 2025
Petitioner sends an email with a records request to three known email addresses for HOA Secretary Kenneth Riley.
June 3, 2025
Petitioner sends a follow-up email to the same three addresses.
June 16, 2025 (approx.)
The 10-business-day statutory deadline for a response passes.
June 23, 2025
Petitioner leaves voicemail messages for Secretary Riley and Community Manager Barbara Bonilla regarding the overdue request.
July 25, 2025
Petitioner files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.
September 29, 2025
A subpoena is issued in the matter.
October 3, 2025
ALJ Fox issues an order quashing the September 29 subpoena.
October 6, 2025
Petitioner submits a Motion to Reconsider.
October 14, 2025
ALJ Fox denies the Motion to Reconsider and a motion for summary judgment, and sets preliminary disclosure deadlines for October 24, 2025.
October 29, 2025
The administrative hearing is held.
November 18, 2025
ALJ Fox issues the final decision, ruling in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner’s Central Arguments and Evidence
The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise that multiple, redundant communication attempts were made in good faith and that the Respondent’s claim of non-receipt was statistically impossible and indicative of bad faith.
• Statutory Compliance: The Petitioner argued that A.R.S. § 33-1805 simply requires a “written request” and that his emails on June 1 and June 3 satisfied this requirement. He stated, “Email is in writing and is a method used extensively by respondent.”
• Proper Recipient: The request was directed to HOA Secretary Ken Riley, who, according to bylaw 5.5, “shall have charge of all of the association’s books, records, and papers.” The Petitioner included this bylaw in his email to the Secretary.
• Rebuttable Presumption of Receipt: The Petitioner cited Arizona case law (Lee v. State) and the “mailbox rule,” arguing that sending an email to a correct, functioning address without a bounce notification creates a legal presumption of receipt. This, he claimed, shifted the burden to the Respondent to prove non-receipt with evidence such as server logs, which they failed to provide.
• Evidence of Intentional Evasion: The Petitioner introduced an email from Secretary Riley dated October 13, 2025 (Exhibit 6), as proof of intentional obstruction. In it, Mr. Riley stated:
◦ “You are currently blocked from sending emails to my work and will continue to be blocked.”
◦ “since your email earlier email did not bounce you clearly know I have seen it.” The Petitioner argued this was a “direct admission that the absence of a bounce notification to a known good email address confirms receipt.”
• Statistical Improbability of Failure: A core part of the Petitioner’s argument was a mathematical analysis suggesting the probability of all communication attempts failing was infinitesimal.
◦ The odds of four emails failing was calculated as 1 in 6.25 million.
◦ The odds of two independent voicemails failing was calculated as 1 in 10,000.
◦ The combined probability of all six attempts failing was stated to be “approximately 1 in 62.5 billion.”
• Pattern of Non-Compliance: The Petitioner claimed this was the Respondent’s “fourth time they violate 1805” and that this pattern justified a civil penalty to deter future misconduct.
Respondent’s Central Arguments and Evidence
The Respondent’s defense was centered on a simple claim of non-receipt, the unreliability of electronic communication, and the assertion that the Petitioner failed to follow the proper procedure for requests.
• Claim of Non-Receipt: The Respondent’s primary position was, “Our position is very simple, straightforward. We didn’t get it.” They framed the dispute as a “he said she said situation where neither side can definitively prove their position.”
• Unreliability of Technology: Respondent’s representative, Dwight Jolivette, drew on his military background in information systems to argue that technology is not perfectly reliable. He cited potential issues like work-controlled laptops, server filters, travel, and other variables as reasons the email may not have been delivered. He stated, “technology especially in the communications area as much as we like to believe opposite is not as reliable as people think.”
• Burden of Proof: The Respondent consistently maintained that the burden was on the Petitioner to prove that the “email reached its intended destination.” They argued, “How are we supposed to respond to an email that we don’t have?”
• Cease and Desist Directive: The Respondent argued that a cease and desist letter sent in March 2025 established a specific communication protocol for the Petitioner, requiring him to use U.S. mail for all correspondence with the management company.
• Established Protocol: Mr. Jolivette testified that the unwritten “best practice” was for records requests to be sent to the community manager, who holds the documents, rather than the volunteer board secretary.
• Submitted Evidence: Respondent submitted written statements (Exhibits A and B) from Secretary Ken Riley and Community Manager Barbara Bonilla, both stating they had no record of receiving the emails or voicemails in question.
Final Decision and Rationale
ALJ Samuel Fox’s decision on November 18, 2025, sided with the Respondent. The ruling did not focus on the technical arguments about email delivery but on the legal standard of “reasonability” established by A.R.S. § 33-1805.
• Key Findings of Fact:
◦ On March 21, 2025, Respondent issued a Cease and Desist letter demanding the Petitioner stop email communication with the community manager.
◦ The letter specified a new procedure: “any concerns or correspondence must be submitted in written form and mailed to the Association’s management office at the following address.”
◦ The letter also stated that Respondent would continue to comply with records requests.
◦ Prior to this letter, it was undisputed that the community manager was the appropriate recipient for such requests.
• Conclusions of Law and Rationale:
◦ The ALJ determined that A.R.S. § 33-1805 does not prohibit an association from establishing a specific, reasonable process for requesting documents.
◦ The Cease and Desist letter provided a “clear process for future requests” for this specific Petitioner.
◦ The requirement to submit requests via physical mail was deemed “reasonable.”
◦ The decision states, “the preponderance of the evidence established that Respondent informed Petitioner about how to submit future requests, and Petitioner disregarded that information.”
◦ The final conclusion was that the Petitioner “failed to meet his burden that the documents were not made reasonably available and that Respondent failed to meet their requirement to produce those documents within ten days.”
The judge noted that the outcome would have been different if the Petitioner had been completely prohibited from contacting the community manager, but the letter provided a specific, alternative method of contact (mail) which the Petitioner chose not to use.
Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party as Respondent admitted violating Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500 filing fee and comply with the Bylaws. However, the request for a civil penalty was denied because Petitioner failed to meet their burden of proof.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet its burden to establish that a civil penalty should be imposed.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to require Board Candidate disclosure of familial ties and conflicts of interest.
Respondent admitted that the 2023 Board Candidate Application form failed to comply with Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws by not requiring disclosure of familial ties, business, or conflicts of interest, as required for Board candidates.
Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $500.00 (filing fee refund) within thirty days and directed to comply with Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws. Civil penalty denied.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
25F-H041-REL Decision – 1297701.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:18:56 (46.2 KB)
25F-H041-REL Decision – 1297767.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:19:01 (47.1 KB)
25F-H041-REL Decision – 1301723.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:19:07 (56.1 KB)
25F-H041-REL Decision – 1301746.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:19:12 (45.1 KB)
25F-H041-REL Decision – 1304724.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:19:17 (47.6 KB)
25F-H041-REL Decision – 1314414.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:19:21 (92.7 KB)
Briefing Doc – 25F-H041-REL
Briefing: Case No. 25F-H041-REL, Whittaker v. The Val Vista Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the key events, arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case Jeremy R. Whittaker v. The Val Vista Community Association (No. 25F-H041-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute involved the Association’s failure to comply with its own bylaws during its 2023 Board of Directors election.
The Petitioner, Jeremy R. Whittaker, alleged that the Association violated Article IV, Section 3 of its bylaws by using a candidate application form that did not require the disclosure of familial ties or conflicts of interest. This issue became prominent when two board candidates, Diana Ebertshauser and Brodie Hurtado, did not disclose their familial relationship with a partner at the law firm hired to count election votes until after the election.
The Association admitted to the violation, which significantly narrowed the legal proceedings. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson focused the case exclusively on determining whether a civil penalty against the Association was warranted. Consequently, several motions and requests from the Petitioner to broaden the scope—including a motion to consolidate cases, attempts to argue attorney misconduct, and subpoenas for numerous witnesses—were denied as irrelevant to the single issue at hand.
In the final decision issued on June 5, 2025, the ALJ found that while the Association had indeed violated its bylaws, the Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to justify a civil penalty. Despite the denial of a penalty, the Petitioner was declared the “prevailing party.” The Association was ordered to refund the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to ensure future compliance with its bylaws.
Case Overview and Parties
Detail
Description
Case Number
25F-H041-REL
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Petitioner
Jeremy R. Whittaker
Respondent
The Val Vista Community Association
Respondent’s Counsel
Josh Bolen, Esq. of CHDB Law, LLP
Core Allegation and Admitted Violation
Bylaw at Issue: Article IV, Section 3
The petition centered on a violation of the Association’s bylaws governing the election of its Board of Directors. The relevant section, Article IV, Section 3, mandates specific disclosures from candidates:
“Each candidate for the Board of Directors shall fill out an application which at minimum will require the candidate to disclose any familial, business or ownership relationships with other Directors or candidates; any current or anticipated conflicts of interest with the Association… and whether they have previously served on the on the Board.”
Nature of the Violation
The core of the case was the Association’s use of a non-compliant application form for its 2023 Board election.
• Deficient Application: The 2023 Board Candidate Application form failed to require candidates to disclose familial ties or other conflicts of interest as stipulated by the bylaws.
• Undisclosed Conflict: Board candidates Diana Ebertshauser and Brodie Hurtado did not disclose their familial ties to a partner at the law firm Carpenter Hazelwood. This disclosure was only made after the election, in which the firm was asked to count the votes.
• Respondent’s Admission: The Val Vista Community Association filed a written answer admitting that the candidate application forms supplied by the 2023 Board were not in compliance with Article IV, Section 3. This admission eliminated the need to litigate the facts of the violation itself.
Key Procedural Rulings and Hearing Scope
Following the Association’s admission, ALJ Velva Moses-Thompson strictly limited the scope of the proceedings to the single question of whether a civil penalty was appropriate. This focus resulted in several key rulings that shaped the case.
Narrowing the Hearing’s Scope
During the May 16, 2025 hearing, the ALJ explicitly defined the legal boundaries:
“The only way for the association to violate this bylaw is to fail to require the candidate to disclose any familial uh conflicts of interest. So that is the sole issue for this hearing… I can’t make decisions just about anything, but it’s specifically related to the alleged violation.”
The Petitioner’s attempts to introduce other issues were consistently disallowed. During his opening statement, Mr. Whittaker began to argue for sanctions against the Respondent’s attorneys for alleged discovery violations and harassment. The ALJ interrupted, stating, “these may be important and relevant issues, but not to the alleged violation today,” and clarified that “the attorneys are not the association.”
Denied Motions and Subpoenas
Several requests by the Petitioner were denied on the grounds of relevance to the narrowly defined issue:
• Motion to Consolidate (Denied April 24, 2025): The Petitioner’s motion to consolidate docket No. 25F-H041-REL with a separate case, No. 25F-H046-REL, was denied.
• Subpoena for Laura Tannery (Denied May 6, 2025): A subpoena request for Ms. Tannery was denied because the “Petitioner has not demonstrated the relevance of Ms. Tannery’s testimony to the issue of whether a civil penalty should be imposed.”
• Mass Subpoenas Quashed (May 13, 2025): Subpoenas issued on April 28, 2025, for eight individuals were quashed following a motion from the Respondent. The individuals were Brodie Hurtado, Diana Ebertshauser, Kevin McPhillips, Jonathan Ebertshauser, Esq., Joshua Bolen, Esq., Rob Actis, David Watson, and Laura Tannery.
In contrast, the Respondent’s motion to vacate the hearing was denied on April 24, 2025, with the ALJ affirming that a hearing was necessary to rule on the civil penalty question.
Final Decision and Outcome
The Administrative Law Judge Decision, issued on June 5, 2025, provided a conclusive resolution to the matter.
Ruling on Standing
The Respondent had moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the Petitioner lacked standing because he only became a property owner in June 2024, after the 2023 violation occurred. The ALJ rejected this argument, concluding that the Petitioner had standing because he “was a member of Respondent at the time that the petition was filed.”
Ruling on the Violation and Civil Penalty
• Violation Confirmed: The decision reiterated that “Respondent has admitted that it violated Article IV, Section 3 of Respondent’s Bylaws.”
• Civil Penalty Denied: The ALJ determined that a civil penalty was “not appropriate in this matter.” The official reasoning was that the “Petitioner failed to meet its burden to establish that a civil penalty should be imposed” and “did not present relevant evidence” at the hearing to support such a penalty.
Final Orders
The ALJ’s order contained three key directives:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Jeremy R. Whittaker, was deemed the prevailing party.
2. Reimbursement: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.
3. Future Compliance: The Respondent was directed to comply with Article IV, Section 3 of its bylaws in all future elections.
All other forms of requested relief were denied.
Timeline of Key Events
The Val Vista Community Association holds its Board election using non-compliant candidate applications.
June 2024
Jeremy R. Whittaker becomes a property owner in the Val Vista Lakes development.
May 20, 2019
Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate (as recorded in the final decision).
April 24, 2025
ALJ denies Respondent’s motion to vacate the hearing and Petitioner’s motion to consolidate cases.
April 28, 2025
The tribunal signs subpoenas for eight individuals.
May 6, 2025
A sanctions hearing is scheduled for May 16. The Petitioner’s subpoena request for Laura Tannery is denied.
May 9, 2025
Deadline for parties to provide information regarding the 2023 election and discovery of the conflict.
May 13, 2025
ALJ grants Respondent’s motion to quash all eight subpoenas.
May 16, 2025
A hearing is held to determine the appropriateness of a civil penalty.
June 5, 2025
The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued.
Study Guide – 25F-H041-REL
{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “25F-H041-REL”,
“case_title”: “Jeremy R. Whittaker vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association”,
“decision_date”: “2025-06-05”,
“alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“questions”: [
{
“question”: “Can I file a petition against my HOA for a violation that occurred before I became a homeowner?”,
“short_answer”: “Yes. You have standing to file a petition as long as you are a member of the association at the time you file the paperwork, even if the violation happened prior to your ownership.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The ALJ rejected the HOA’s argument that the homeowner lacked standing because they were not a member at the time of the alleged violation. The ruling established that standing is determined by membership status at the time of filing.”,
“alj_quote”: “The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Petitioner had standing to file the petition. Petitioner was a member of Respondent at the time that the petition was filed.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.01”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Standing”,
“Homeowner Rights”,
“Procedure”
]
},
{
“question”: “If the HOA admits they violated the bylaws, will they automatically be required to pay a civil penalty?”,
“short_answer”: “No. An admission of guilt does not automatically result in a monetary fine. The homeowner must still provide evidence proving that a penalty is necessary or appropriate.”,
“detailed_answer”: “In this case, the HOA admitted that their candidate application forms violated the bylaws. However, the judge ruled that no civil penalty was appropriate because the petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to justify imposing one.”,
“alj_quote”: “Respondent has admitted that it violated Article IV, Section 3 of Respondent’s Bylaws. However Petitioner failed to meet its burden to establish that a civil penalty should be imposed in the above-entitled matter.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Civil Penalties”,
“Violations”,
“Burden of Proof”
]
},
{
“question”: “Does the HOA have to require board candidates to disclose conflicts of interest or family ties?”,
“short_answer”: “Yes, if the association’s bylaws specifically require such disclosures in the candidate application.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The decision affirmed that the HOA violated its bylaws by failing to require candidates to disclose familial relationships. The bylaws stated that the application ‘at minimum’ must require disclosure of familial, business, or ownership relationships.”,
“alj_quote”: “Each candidate for the Board of Directors shall fill out an application which at minimum will require the candidate to disclose any familial, business or ownership relationships with other Directors or candidates…”,
“legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article IV, Section 3”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Elections”,
“Board of Directors”,
“Conflicts of Interest”
]
},
{
“question”: “If I win my case against the HOA, will I get my filing fee back?”,
“short_answer”: “Yes. If the homeowner is deemed the prevailing party, the judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.”,
“detailed_answer”: “Because the petitioner prevailed in establishing that a violation occurred (via the HOA’s admission), the ALJ ordered the HOA to pay the $500 filing fee directly to the petitioner within 30 days.”,
“alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.01”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Fees”,
“Remedies”,
“Prevailing Party”
]
},
{
“question”: “What is the standard of proof required to win a hearing against an HOA?”,
“short_answer”: “The standard is a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning the claim is more likely true than not.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The petitioner bears the burden of proving the violation. This does not require removing all doubt, but providing evidence that has ‘the most convincing force’ to incline a fair mind to one side.”,
“alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated… by a preponderance of the evidence.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Legal Standards”,
“Evidence”,
“Procedure”
]
},
{
“question”: “What happens if the HOA used invalid forms for a past election?”,
“short_answer”: “The judge may order the HOA to comply with the bylaws for future actions, even if they do not impose a fine for the past violation.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The ALJ ordered the HOA to comply with the specific bylaw section regarding candidate applications going forward, ensuring future elections meet the disclosure requirements.”,
“alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent is directed to comply with Article IV, Section 3 of Respondent’s Bylaws.”,
“legal_basis”: “Order”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Remedies”,
“Compliance”,
“Elections”
]
}
]
}
Blog Post – 25F-H041-REL
{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “25F-H041-REL”,
“case_title”: “Jeremy R. Whittaker vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association”,
“decision_date”: “2025-06-05”,
“alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“questions”: [
{
“question”: “Can I file a petition against my HOA for a violation that occurred before I became a homeowner?”,
“short_answer”: “Yes. You have standing to file a petition as long as you are a member of the association at the time you file the paperwork, even if the violation happened prior to your ownership.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The ALJ rejected the HOA’s argument that the homeowner lacked standing because they were not a member at the time of the alleged violation. The ruling established that standing is determined by membership status at the time of filing.”,
“alj_quote”: “The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Petitioner had standing to file the petition. Petitioner was a member of Respondent at the time that the petition was filed.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.01”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Standing”,
“Homeowner Rights”,
“Procedure”
]
},
{
“question”: “If the HOA admits they violated the bylaws, will they automatically be required to pay a civil penalty?”,
“short_answer”: “No. An admission of guilt does not automatically result in a monetary fine. The homeowner must still provide evidence proving that a penalty is necessary or appropriate.”,
“detailed_answer”: “In this case, the HOA admitted that their candidate application forms violated the bylaws. However, the judge ruled that no civil penalty was appropriate because the petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to justify imposing one.”,
“alj_quote”: “Respondent has admitted that it violated Article IV, Section 3 of Respondent’s Bylaws. However Petitioner failed to meet its burden to establish that a civil penalty should be imposed in the above-entitled matter.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Civil Penalties”,
“Violations”,
“Burden of Proof”
]
},
{
“question”: “Does the HOA have to require board candidates to disclose conflicts of interest or family ties?”,
“short_answer”: “Yes, if the association’s bylaws specifically require such disclosures in the candidate application.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The decision affirmed that the HOA violated its bylaws by failing to require candidates to disclose familial relationships. The bylaws stated that the application ‘at minimum’ must require disclosure of familial, business, or ownership relationships.”,
“alj_quote”: “Each candidate for the Board of Directors shall fill out an application which at minimum will require the candidate to disclose any familial, business or ownership relationships with other Directors or candidates…”,
“legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article IV, Section 3”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Elections”,
“Board of Directors”,
“Conflicts of Interest”
]
},
{
“question”: “If I win my case against the HOA, will I get my filing fee back?”,
“short_answer”: “Yes. If the homeowner is deemed the prevailing party, the judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.”,
“detailed_answer”: “Because the petitioner prevailed in establishing that a violation occurred (via the HOA’s admission), the ALJ ordered the HOA to pay the $500 filing fee directly to the petitioner within 30 days.”,
“alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.01”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Fees”,
“Remedies”,
“Prevailing Party”
]
},
{
“question”: “What is the standard of proof required to win a hearing against an HOA?”,
“short_answer”: “The standard is a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning the claim is more likely true than not.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The petitioner bears the burden of proving the violation. This does not require removing all doubt, but providing evidence that has ‘the most convincing force’ to incline a fair mind to one side.”,
“alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated… by a preponderance of the evidence.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Legal Standards”,
“Evidence”,
“Procedure”
]
},
{
“question”: “What happens if the HOA used invalid forms for a past election?”,
“short_answer”: “The judge may order the HOA to comply with the bylaws for future actions, even if they do not impose a fine for the past violation.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The ALJ ordered the HOA to comply with the specific bylaw section regarding candidate applications going forward, ensuring future elections meet the disclosure requirements.”,
“alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent is directed to comply with Article IV, Section 3 of Respondent’s Bylaws.”,
“legal_basis”: “Order”,
“topic_tags”: [
“Remedies”,
“Compliance”,
“Elections”
]
}
]
}
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jeremy R. Whittaker(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of himself
Respondent Side
Josh Bolen(respondent attorney) CHDB Law, LLP
Diana Ebertshauser(board member) The Val Vista Community Association Board candidate who failed to disclose familial ties; subpoena quashed
Brodie Hurtado(board member) The Val Vista Community Association Board candidate who failed to disclose familial ties; subpoena quashed
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) Administrative Law Judge
Susan Nicolson(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
vnunez(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of Order transmission (listed by email handle)
djones(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of Order transmission (listed by email handle)
labril(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of Order transmission (listed by email handle)
mneat(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of Order transmission (listed by email handle)
lrecchia(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of Order transmission (listed by email handle)
gosborn(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of Order transmission (listed by email handle)
Other Participants
Laura Tannery(witness) Subpoena quashed/denied
Kevin McPhillips(witness) Subpoena quashed
Jonathan Ebertshauser(attorney/witness) Subpoena quashed
Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof showing Respondent violated its Community Documents concerning the determination of structural damage required for shared cost repair under CC&R 11.2.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board was unreasonable when determining the wall at issue was structurally damaged.
Key Issues & Findings
Dispute regarding cost sharing for common wall repair (structural damage determination)
Petitioner claimed the wall only required cosmetic repair (HOA responsibility per CC&R 11.2) rather than structural replacement (shared cost). The HOA relied on contractor assessment indicating structural damage. The ALJ found Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs or acted unreasonably in ordering the repair.
Orders: Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Structural Damage, HOA Maintenance, Cost Sharing, HOA Discretion
Additional Citations:
CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.2
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
24F-H056-REL Decision – 1211424.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:12:24 (55.5 KB)
24F-H056-REL Decision – 1235391.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:12:30 (125.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 24F-H056-REL
Briefing Document: Sheakley v. Arizona Hillcrest Community Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal outcome of the dispute between homeowner Justin R. Sheakley (Petitioner) and the Arizona Hillcrest Community Association (Respondent). The central conflict revolves around the required repairs for a common boundary wall at the Petitioner’s property and the associated cost-sharing obligations under the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
The Petitioner alleged the wall only required cosmetic repairs (stucco and paint) and that the Association’s demand for a complete rebuild, with costs split 50/50, constituted a violation of the CC&Rs and was an act of retaliation for his previous opposition to a larger community project. He supported his position with a structural engineer’s report stating there was “no structural reason for the wall to be replaced.”
The Respondent countered that the wall possessed genuine structural damage, including cracking, leaning, and deflection, which necessitated a rebuild rather than a surface-level patch. The Association argued its actions were consistent with CC&R Article 11, Section 11.2, which mandates a 50/50 cost split for repairs involving structural damage. They presented expert testimony from a construction defect specialist and maintained that the Board of Directors acted within its discretionary authority to determine the appropriate level of maintenance.
The matter was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. On October 21, 2024, an Administrative Law Judge issued a decision finding that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association had violated its Community Documents. The judge ruled that the Board’s determination of structural damage was not unreasonable and that it had the authority to order the repairs and require payment from the homeowner. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Case Overview
Details
Case Number
24F-H056-REL
Petitioner
Justin R. Sheakley (Owner of 3234 W. Bajada Dr., Lot 52)
Respondent
Arizona Hillcrest Community Association
Respondent’s Attorney
Quinten Cupps, Vial Fotheringham, LLP
Presiding Judge
Samuel Fox, Office of Administrative Hearings
Hearing Date
September 30, 2024
Decision Date
October 21, 2024
Core Legal Issue
Alleged violation of CC&Rs, Article 11, Section 11.2, concerning maintenance and repair responsibilities for a common wall.
The Central Dispute: The Common Wall at Lot 52
The conflict originated from the Arizona Hillcrest Community Association’s determination that a section of the common boundary wall adjacent to Justin Sheakley’s property (Lot 52) required a complete teardown and rebuild due to structural damage. The Association proposed to undertake the repair through its chosen contractor, Elite Construction and Painting, at a total cost of approximately 4,900,andinvoicedMr.Sheakleyfor502,450), citing cost-sharing provisions for structural damage in the CC&Rs.
Mr. Sheakley disputed the classification of the damage as “structural,” arguing the issues were cosmetic. This disagreement over the scope of necessary work and the interpretation of the CC&Rs formed the basis of his petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, leading to the hearing.
Petitioner’s Position and Arguments (Justin R. Sheakley)
Mr. Sheakley’s case was built on the following key arguments:
• Damage is Cosmetic, Not Structural: He contended that the wall’s issues were limited to “stucco delamination” and peeling paint on the bottom courses, which did not compromise its structural integrity. His position was that the wall simply needed to be “restuckled and repainted.”
• Contradictory Assessments: He highlighted that an initial 2020 assessment by a licensed structural engineering firm, Criterium-Kessler Engineers, recommended only “routine repair of sub repair and painting” for his specific wall. He argued the Association improperly shifted its reliance from this professional engineering opinion to the opinions of general contractors (Evolution Construction and Elite Construction) who advocated for a more drastic and expensive rebuild.
• Retaliation: Mr. Sheakley testified that he believed the Association’s actions were “a retaliation for me stopping the construction in 2020 to the sum of $100,000.” This refers to his successful effort to organize residents to pause a large-scale wall repair project at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Potential Conflict of Interest: He raised concerns about the relationship between the contractors, noting that the owner of Elite Construction, Peter Alesi, was a former employee of Evolution Construction. He stated, “I would suspect that evolution construction was looked over and had this grow report written by the same person that owns the Elite Construction of Painting.”
• Supporting Expert Evidence: Mr. Sheakley commissioned his own report from Bringham Engineering Consultants, dated July 27, 2024, which concluded: “It is our opinion that flaking paint and discoloration of the paint has not affected the structural integrity of the wall. There is no structural reason for the wall to be replace.”
Respondent’s Position and Arguments (Arizona Hillcrest Community Association)
The Association, represented by Quinten Cupps, presented the following defense:
• Presence of Structural Damage: The Association maintained the wall suffered from significant structural issues beyond surface cosmetics. Their expert witness, Peter Alesi, testified to observing a lean towards the homeowner’s property, “deflection” (side-to-side movement), and a linear crack at the bottom course of blocks. He asserted that any simple stucco patch would “just pop right back off due to the deflection of that panel.”
• Authority Under CC&Rs: Their central legal argument rested on Article 11, Section 11.2 of the CC&Rs, which states: “In the case of destruction of both sides of such wall or structural damage, the Owner(s) owning Lots adjacent to the wall shall be responsible for one half of the cost of replacement or repair of the wall and the Association shall be responsible for the other one-half.”
• Board Discretion and Due Process: Community Manager Melanie Page testified that the Board followed a deliberate process. They obtained reports, bids, reviewed a “matrix” from Evolution mapping the damage, personally walked the community to inspect the walls, and held a vote during a board meeting to approve the repairs. The CC&Rs grant the Board sole discretion in determining the appropriate level of maintenance.
• Jurisdictional Challenge: The Association’s counsel argued that the OAH was not the proper forum for the dispute, stating, “it’s not about not a violation of 11.2, it’s an issue of whether or not we should be repairing the wall. And that’s not what for this court to decide in our opinion.” They claimed the Association was actively trying to comply with its maintenance obligations under the CC&Rs.
• Homeowner Contribution to Damage: During cross-examination, it was established that Mr. Sheakley had planted Ficus trees in January 2022 and anchored them to the wall with cables drilled into the structure. Their expert noted that Ficus trees have “very aggressive roots” that can compromise walls, and photos showed the trees touching the wall and support columns.
Key Evidence and Testimony
Witness Testimony
• Justin R. Sheakley (Petitioner): Testified about the history of the wall issue, the 2020 Criterium-Kessler report, his opposition to the initial project, his belief that the current action is retaliatory, and presented his own engineering report from Bringham Engineering.
• Melanie Page (Community Manager for AAM): Described the HOA’s multi-year process of assessing the walls, obtaining bids, and the Board’s review and approval process. She confirmed that multiple notices were sent to Mr. Sheakley regarding the planned repairs and his financial obligation.
• Peter Alesi (Owner, Elite Construction and Painting): Provided expert testimony as a general contractor with 24 years of experience, including 18 years as a certified construction defect expert. He detailed the specific structural failings of the wall, including movement, cracking, and a lean of up to 3/4 of an inch. He stated that a simple stucco repair would not fix the underlying problem.
Documentary and Physical Evidence
• CC&Rs, Article 11, Section 11.2: The foundational document governing the dispute, outlining cost-sharing responsibilities for walls with structural damage.
• Criterium-Kessler Engineers Report (2020): A structural engineering report that identified various wall issues in the community but recommended only “routine repair” for Mr. Sheakley’s lot.
• Evolution Construction Report/Matrix (2022): A report by a general contractor that mapped wall damage lot-by-lot, identifying “moderate damage” and “block cracks” at Lot 52. Mr. Sheakley used this document to point out inconsistencies, such as Elite Construction rebuilding a wall at Lot 111 that Evolution had deemed in “good condition.”
• Bringham Engineering Consultants Report (2024): Commissioned by Mr. Sheakley, this report concluded there was no structural reason to replace the wall, focusing on paint and discoloration. The judge later noted this report did not address the visible cracking.
• Photographs: Both parties submitted photographs showing stucco delamination, peeling paint, a linear crack at the base of the wall, Ficus trees anchored to the wall, and measurements demonstrating the wall’s lean.
• Google Earth Images: Mr. Sheakley presented images from 2011 and 2019 to show the wall had long-standing issues, predating his planting of the Ficus trees.
Legal Proceedings and Final Decision
The hearing was held on September 30, 2024, before Administrative Law Judge Samuel Fox. After hearing testimony and reviewing all evidence, the judge issued a decision on October 21, 2024.
Conclusions of Law
1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, Mr. Sheakley, bore the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated its Community Documents.
2. Definition of “Structural Damage”: As the term was not defined in the CC&Rs, the judge assigned it its ordinary meaning: “damage to the integrity of a structure that is more serious than mere cosmetic damage… damaged beyond the surface.” The judge noted that the documents do not require a specific severity of damage to trigger the repair clauses.
3. Board Authority: The Community Documents grant the Board “significant discretion and authority over walls” and other common areas.
4. Failure to Meet Burden: The judge concluded, “Petitioner did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board was unreasonable when determining the wall at issue was structurally damaged.”
5. No Violation Found: The final conclusion was that “the preponderance of the evidence established that Petitioner failed to meet his burden that Respondent failed to abide by its Community Documents.”
Based on these conclusions, the judge issued the following order:
“IT IS ORDERED that Respondent be deemed the prevailing party in this matter.”
Study Guide – 24F-H056-REL
{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “24F-H056-REL”,
“case_title”: “Justin R. Sheakley v. Arizona Hillcrest Community Association”,
“decision_date”: “2024-10-21”,
“alj_name”: “Samuel Fox”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“questions”: [
{
“question”: “Who is responsible for paying to repair a shared wall between my home and the common area?”,
“short_answer”: “Costs are split 50/50 if the damage is structural, but surface maintenance is individual.”,
“detailed_answer”: “According to the decision, standard surface maintenance (like painting) is the responsibility of the party facing that side of the wall. However, if there is ‘structural damage’ or destruction of the wall, the cost of repair or replacement is shared equally between the homeowner and the HOA.”,
“alj_quote”: “In the case of destruction of both sides of such wall or structural damage, the Owner(s) owning Lots adjacent to the wall shall be responsible for one half of the cost of replacement or repair of the wall and the Association shall be responsible for the other one-half.”,
“legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.2”,
“topic_tags”: [
“maintenance”,
“shared walls”,
“assessments”
]
},
{
“question”: “What is the legal definition of ‘structural damage’ if it isn’t defined in the CC&Rs?”,
“short_answer”: “It means damage to the integrity of the structure that goes beyond mere cosmetic issues.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The ALJ determined that undefined terms should be given their ordinary meaning. Structural damage does not require the structure to be ‘fatally flawed’ or about to collapse; it simply means the damage affects the integrity of the structure and is more serious than surface-level cosmetic issues.”,
“alj_quote”: “Structural damage means damage to the integrity of a structure that is more serious than mere cosmetic damage. … Structural damage does not mean that the structure is fatally flawed; it means that the structure is damaged beyond the surface.”,
“legal_basis”: “Ordinary Meaning / Judicial Interpretation”,
“topic_tags”: [
“definitions”,
“maintenance”,
“legal interpretation”
]
},
{
“question”: “Who has the burden of proof when a homeowner sues their HOA?”,
“short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation occurred.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The homeowner filing the petition bears the burden of proving that the HOA violated the statutes, CC&Rs, or Bylaws. They must prove this by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.”,
“alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)”,
“topic_tags”: [
“procedural”,
“burden of proof”,
“evidence”
]
},
{
“question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge order the HOA to pay for other damages or remediation?”,
“short_answer”: “No, the ALJ’s authority is limited to ordering compliance with documents and levying civil penalties.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The tribunal has limited jurisdiction. It can order a party to abide by the statute or community documents and can levy civil penalties for those specific violations, but it cannot order other types of remediation or penalties for conduct outside that scope.”,
“alj_quote”: “This Tribunal is not authorized to order other remediation or order civil penalties for other conduct.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02”,
“topic_tags”: [
“jurisdiction”,
“remedies”,
“penalties”
]
},
{
“question”: “Does the HOA Board have the authority to decide when a repair is necessary?”,
“short_answer”: “Yes, Boards typically have significant discretion to determine maintenance needs.”,
“detailed_answer”: “Unless the governing documents state otherwise, the Board has significant discretion and authority to determine the appropriate level of maintenance and when repairs or replacements are necessary for areas the Association is responsible for.”,
“alj_quote”: “The Community Documents in the record … grant the Board significant discretion and authority over walls and other areas that Respondent is responsible for maintaining.”,
“legal_basis”: “Community Documents / Board Discretion”,
“topic_tags”: [
“board authority”,
“governance”,
“maintenance”
]
},
{
“question”: “If I hire an engineer who says repairs aren’t needed, will that override the HOA’s decision?”,
“short_answer”: “Not necessarily, if the HOA’s decision was reasonable and supported by evidence.”,
“detailed_answer”: “Even if a homeowner provides a conflicting report, they must prove the Board acted unreasonably. In this case, the homeowner’s report focused on cosmetic issues (paint), while the HOA’s decision was based on evidence of structural damage. The homeowner failed to prove the Board’s determination was unreasonable.”,
“alj_quote”: “Petitioner did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board was unreasonable when determining the wall at issue was structurally damaged.”,
“legal_basis”: “Preponderance of Evidence”,
“topic_tags”: [
“expert testimony”,
“disputes”,
“evidence”
]
}
]
}
Blog Post – 24F-H056-REL
{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “24F-H056-REL”,
“case_title”: “Justin R. Sheakley v. Arizona Hillcrest Community Association”,
“decision_date”: “2024-10-21”,
“alj_name”: “Samuel Fox”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“questions”: [
{
“question”: “Who is responsible for paying to repair a shared wall between my home and the common area?”,
“short_answer”: “Costs are split 50/50 if the damage is structural, but surface maintenance is individual.”,
“detailed_answer”: “According to the decision, standard surface maintenance (like painting) is the responsibility of the party facing that side of the wall. However, if there is ‘structural damage’ or destruction of the wall, the cost of repair or replacement is shared equally between the homeowner and the HOA.”,
“alj_quote”: “In the case of destruction of both sides of such wall or structural damage, the Owner(s) owning Lots adjacent to the wall shall be responsible for one half of the cost of replacement or repair of the wall and the Association shall be responsible for the other one-half.”,
“legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.2”,
“topic_tags”: [
“maintenance”,
“shared walls”,
“assessments”
]
},
{
“question”: “What is the legal definition of ‘structural damage’ if it isn’t defined in the CC&Rs?”,
“short_answer”: “It means damage to the integrity of the structure that goes beyond mere cosmetic issues.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The ALJ determined that undefined terms should be given their ordinary meaning. Structural damage does not require the structure to be ‘fatally flawed’ or about to collapse; it simply means the damage affects the integrity of the structure and is more serious than surface-level cosmetic issues.”,
“alj_quote”: “Structural damage means damage to the integrity of a structure that is more serious than mere cosmetic damage. … Structural damage does not mean that the structure is fatally flawed; it means that the structure is damaged beyond the surface.”,
“legal_basis”: “Ordinary Meaning / Judicial Interpretation”,
“topic_tags”: [
“definitions”,
“maintenance”,
“legal interpretation”
]
},
{
“question”: “Who has the burden of proof when a homeowner sues their HOA?”,
“short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation occurred.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The homeowner filing the petition bears the burden of proving that the HOA violated the statutes, CC&Rs, or Bylaws. They must prove this by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.”,
“alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)”,
“topic_tags”: [
“procedural”,
“burden of proof”,
“evidence”
]
},
{
“question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge order the HOA to pay for other damages or remediation?”,
“short_answer”: “No, the ALJ’s authority is limited to ordering compliance with documents and levying civil penalties.”,
“detailed_answer”: “The tribunal has limited jurisdiction. It can order a party to abide by the statute or community documents and can levy civil penalties for those specific violations, but it cannot order other types of remediation or penalties for conduct outside that scope.”,
“alj_quote”: “This Tribunal is not authorized to order other remediation or order civil penalties for other conduct.”,
“legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02”,
“topic_tags”: [
“jurisdiction”,
“remedies”,
“penalties”
]
},
{
“question”: “Does the HOA Board have the authority to decide when a repair is necessary?”,
“short_answer”: “Yes, Boards typically have significant discretion to determine maintenance needs.”,
“detailed_answer”: “Unless the governing documents state otherwise, the Board has significant discretion and authority to determine the appropriate level of maintenance and when repairs or replacements are necessary for areas the Association is responsible for.”,
“alj_quote”: “The Community Documents in the record … grant the Board significant discretion and authority over walls and other areas that Respondent is responsible for maintaining.”,
“legal_basis”: “Community Documents / Board Discretion”,
“topic_tags”: [
“board authority”,
“governance”,
“maintenance”
]
},
{
“question”: “If I hire an engineer who says repairs aren’t needed, will that override the HOA’s decision?”,
“short_answer”: “Not necessarily, if the HOA’s decision was reasonable and supported by evidence.”,
“detailed_answer”: “Even if a homeowner provides a conflicting report, they must prove the Board acted unreasonably. In this case, the homeowner’s report focused on cosmetic issues (paint), while the HOA’s decision was based on evidence of structural damage. The homeowner failed to prove the Board’s determination was unreasonable.”,
“alj_quote”: “Petitioner did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board was unreasonable when determining the wall at issue was structurally damaged.”,
“legal_basis”: “Preponderance of Evidence”,
“topic_tags”: [
“expert testimony”,
“disputes”,
“evidence”
]
}
]
}
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Justin R. Sheakley(petitioner) Homeowner at 3234 W. Bajada Dr.
Respondent Side
Quinten Cupps(attorney) VIal Fotheringham, LLP
Melanie Veach(community manager, witness) Half management (AAM) Testified for Respondent. Identified herself as Melanie Page during testimony.
Peter Alesi(witness) Elite Construction and Painting Owner of Elite Construction and Painting, testified regarding structural issues.
Neutral Parties
Samuel Fox(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings ALJ for the September 30, 2024 hearing and decision.
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Signed the Order Granting Continuance on August 14, 2024.
Susan Nicolson(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) A.R.S. § 33-1248 (A), (D), (E), and (F); and Tara CC&Rs Section 9(E)
Outcome Summary
Petitioner prevailed on the 'Records' issue (A.R.S. § 33-1258), resulting in a $500.00 filing fee reimbursement. Respondent prevailed on the 'Example 13' issue (A.R.S. § 33-1248 and CC&Rs § 9(E)).
Why this result: The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to sustain her burden regarding the Open Meeting Law allegations, finding that TARA conducted meetings in compliance and the specific volunteer work referenced was not statutorily or contractually required to be placed on an agenda for formal action.
Key Issues & Findings
Records Access Violation
TARA failed to timely provide access to TARA HOA records it possessed, violating the ten business day fulfillment requirement for examination requests.
Orders: TARA was ordered to reimburse Petitioner $500.00.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
Open Meeting Law Violation (Example 13)
Petitioner alleged open meeting violations concerning volunteer work and projects not placed on agendas or formally voted upon by the board (Example 13).
Orders: Petitioner's Petition was dismissed as to alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1248(A), (D), (E), and (F) and/or Tara CC&Rs Section 9(E).
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1248(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1248(D)
A.R.S. § 33-1248(E)
A.R.S. § 33-1248(F)
Tara CC&Rs Section 9(E)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Records, Open Meeting Law, Partial Victory, Filing Fee Reimbursement, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 33-1248
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.R.S. § 33-1801 et seq.
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Tara CC&Rs Section 9(E)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
24F-H054-REL Decision – 1212274.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:11:34 (70.4 KB)
24F-H054-REL Decision – 1212281.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:11:41 (12.4 KB)
24F-H054-REL Decision – 1216809.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:11:49 (50.9 KB)
24F-H054-REL Decision – 1225818.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:11:58 (168.1 KB)
24F-H054-REL Decision – 1226250.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:12:08 (41.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 24F-H054-REL
Briefing Document: Marx v. Tara Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative case Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominium Association (No. 24F-H054-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on two primary allegations brought by homeowner and former board member Lisa Marx against the Tara Condominium Association (TARA): (1) violations of Arizona state law regarding access to association records, and (2) violations of the state’s Open Meeting Law.
The case culminated in a split decision by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). TARA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 by failing to provide timely access to its financial and other records as requested by the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to prove her second claim that TARA violated the open meeting provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1248 when board members and volunteers performed maintenance and repair projects on common areas without formal agenda items and board votes.
Consequently, the ALJ sustained the petition on the records violation and dismissed it on the open meeting violation. TARA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Marx $500, representing the filing fee for the single issue on which she prevailed. A subsequent request for rehearing filed by Ms. Marx was procedurally rejected for being submitted to the incorrect agency.
Case Background and Procedural History
Parties and Context
• Petitioner: Lisa Marx, a homeowner in the Tara Condominium Association and a former board member who served in various capacities, including Secretary, Chairperson, and Vice-Chairperson, from 2021 until her resignation in January 2024.
• Respondent: Tara Condominium Association (TARA), a 50-unit nonprofit management association, represented at the hearing by its Chairman, Mark Gottmann.
The dispute arose following a change in board leadership in early 2024, with Ms. Marx alleging the new board was operating without transparency and in violation of state statutes and the association’s governing documents.
Chronology of Key Events
Jan 2024
Lisa Marx resigns from the TARA board two weeks after being elected for a fourth term.
Feb 1, 2024
Mark Gottmann assumes the role of Chairman of the Board.
Feb–Apr 2024
Marx makes a series of five requests for association records, which are either partially or fully denied by the TARA board.
May 29, 2024
Marx files an HOA Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging two categories of violations and paying a 1,000filingfee(500 per issue).
Aug 8, 2024
TARA files an Amended Response, admitting to several of the alleged violations, offering to reimburse Marx’s $1,000 filing fee, and requesting that the hearing be vacated.
Aug 8, 2024
Marx files a reply rejecting the offer, stating that the “numerous” issues required “a ruling that is binding and definite” to “hopefully prevent further violations.”
Aug 16, 2024
The ALJ issues an order requiring Marx to narrow her petition to two specific issues, categorizing the five records-request instances as one “records” issue and requiring her to select one of the thirteen alleged open-meeting violations.
Aug 19, 2024
Marx selects “Example 13” from her petition as her second issue.
Aug 29, 2024
An administrative hearing is held before ALJ Kay A. Abramsohn.
Sep 20, 2024
The ALJ issues a final decision.
Sep 23, 2024
The ALJ issues a Minute Entry rejecting a request for rehearing filed by Marx, as it was sent to the Office of Administrative Hearings instead of the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Analysis of Disputed Issues and Testimony
The hearing focused on two central issues as narrowed by the ALJ’s order.
Issue 1: Access to Association Records (A.R.S. § 33-1258)
This issue consolidated five instances across multiple dates where Marx alleged she was improperly denied access to or provision of TARA’s records.
Petitioner’s Position (Lisa Marx):
• Marx testified that she made multiple written requests for documents including vouchers, contracts, financial reports (General Ledger, AP Distribution), architectural change forms, and violation letters.
• The board’s responses were statutorily invalid. For example, a February 22, 2024 response stated: “A member of the Association is entitled to see reasonable financial information only. A member does not have a right to see contracts entered into by the Board nor information concerning specific members. We respectfully refuse your request…” Another denial was based on her being “no longer a board member.”
• Marx argued this refusal to provide records blocks transparency, creates distrust, and prevents homeowners from ensuring the governing documents are being enforced impartially. She asserted that all requested documents, such as financial records and contracts related to common areas, are records homeowners are entitled to examine.
Respondent’s Position (Tara Condominium Association):
• Mark Gottmann testified that the board was new and that any mistakes were made out of “enthusiasm” and a desire to better the community, not malicious intent.
• He stated the board acted on advice from outside sources, including a trade association, which led them to believe they were “over-providing” documents compared to their CC&Rs, which only mandate semi-annual financial statements.
• TARA experienced delays in receiving financial reports from its management company, Colby, after it was acquired by another entity, which in turn delayed distribution to homeowners.
• Gottmann argued that some requested documents did not exist (e.g., contracts for volunteer work), while others were justifiably withheld because they contained private information about individual homeowners (e.g., violation letters, architectural change forms).
Issue 2: Open Meeting Law Violations (A.R.S. § 33-1248)
This issue centered on “Example 13” of the petition, which alleged the board undertook several projects without adhering to open meeting requirements.
Petitioner’s Position (Lisa Marx):
• Marx alleged that several projects were performed on common property without being included on a meeting agenda and without a formal vote by the board in an open meeting. These projects included:
◦ Board members spraying weeds.
◦ Board members digging up grass around trees and laying mulch.
◦ A board member refinishing wood shutters.
• She argued these actions violated A.R.S. § 33-1248 and TARA’s own CC&Rs (Section 9(E)), which states, “A majority vote of the Managers shall entitle the Board to carry out action on behalf of the owners of the units.”
• The failure to discuss these items in an open meeting denied members the right to provide input before the board took action on community property.
Respondent’s Position (Tara Condominium Association):
• Gottmann characterized the projects as ongoing operational responsibilities and good-faith efforts by volunteers to save the association money.
• The weed spraying was described as an “experiment” at no cost to TARA. The mulching was done with donated materials in response to a homeowner’s suggestion. The shutter repair was done by volunteers for a nominal cost of less than $150 for materials, which was within the monthly maintenance budget.
• He argued these were not formal actions requiring a board vote but were undertaken with an “enthusiasm and desire to make our community a better place.” TARA’s CC&Rs (Section 12, Part D) grant the board the power “to use and expend the assessments collected to maintain, care for, and preserve the common elements.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order
The ALJ’s decision, issued on September 20, 2024, delivered a split verdict, finding for each party on one of the two core issues.
Finding on Records Violation (A.R.S. § 33-1258):
• Verdict: TARA violated the statute.
• Reasoning: The ALJ concluded that TARA failed to provide access to records it possessed within the statutorily required ten-day timeframe. While TARA had a potential defense for delays related to its management company and a valid reason to withhold records containing personal information of other members, the overall evidence demonstrated a failure to comply with the law.
• Outcome: The petitioner was deemed the prevailing party on this issue.
Finding on Open Meeting Violation (A.R.S. § 33-1248):
• Verdict: TARA did not violate the statute.
• Reasoning: The ALJ found that the petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof. The evidence showed that TARA conducted its formal meetings in compliance with open meeting laws, providing notice and agendas. The ALJ concluded there was “no evidence in the hearing record that… those work circumstances… were required by statute or the CC&Rs to be placed on a TARA agenda for discussion and/or for ‘formal action’ by the Board.”
• Outcome: The respondent was deemed the prevailing party on this issue.
Final Order
Based on the findings, the ALJ issued the following orders:
1. Petitioner’s Petition is sustained as to the TARA violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258 (Records).
2. Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed as to the alleged violations by TARA of A.R.S. § 33-1248 (Open Meetings).
3. TARA is ordered to reimburse Petitioner in the amount of $500.00, representing the filing fee for the single successful claim.
Study Guide – 24F-H054-REL
{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “24F-H054-REL”, “case_title”: “Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominium Association”, “decision_date”: “2024-09-20”, “alj_name”: “Kay A. Abramsohn”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA refuse to provide financial records because they are waiting to receive them from their third-party management company?”, “short_answer”: “No. The HOA is responsible for providing access to records within the statutory 10-day timeframe, regardless of management company delays.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ ruled that waiting for a management company to provide monthly reports does not excuse the association from its statutory obligation to make records reasonably available within 10 business days. Even if the HOA acts in good faith while waiting for a vendor, failure to provide existing records violates the statute.”, “alj_quote”: “TARA has a defense, although unsupported, regarding the time frame only as to the financial documents for which TARA was waiting from its management company. … Overall, as to A.R.S. § 33-1258, there is no evidence that, within the ten day time frame, TARA provided access to the TARA HOA records it did have and which were required to have been provided to Petitioner; therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that TARA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258”, “topic_tags”: [ “records request”, “financial records”, “management company” ] }, { “question”: “Does a group of board members or volunteers doing unpaid maintenance work require an open meeting and a formal vote?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. If the work is volunteer-based and doesn’t require a specific contract or expenditure necessitating a vote under the CC&Rs or statutes, it may not trigger open meeting requirements.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ determined that volunteer work performed by board members (like weeding or painting) to save money did not constitute ‘formal action’ that required placement on an agenda or a formal vote in an open meeting, provided no statute or governing document specifically required it.”, “alj_quote”: “There is no evidence in the hearing record that, prior to the volunteer work described in Example 13, that those work circumstances, or any projected volunteer work circumstances, were required by statute or the CC&Rs to be placed on a TARA agenda for discussion and/or for ‘formal action’ by the Board at the TARA monthly meetings.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1248”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meetings”, “volunteer work”, “board authority” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA withhold violation letters or architectural change forms concerning other homeowners?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if those documents contain personal information about specific members.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision affirms that HOAs can refuse to provide records related to specific units, such as violation notices or contracts containing personal data, under the statutory exception for personal, health, or financial records of individual members.”, “alj_quote”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4) provides an exception to the requirement to provide records for ‘personal, health or financial records of an individual member’ … In this case, because some of the requested ‘repair’ contract information for repairs at certain addresses may have contained personal information of another member, TARA was likely within its statutory authority to refuse to provide that particular information.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4)”, “topic_tags”: [ “privacy”, “violation letters”, “records request” ] }, { “question”: “Can the board deny my records request because I am no longer a board member?”, “short_answer”: “No. The right to examine records belongs to all members of the association.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found the HOA in violation when it declined to provide information on the grounds that the requester was ‘no longer a Board member.’ The statute requires records be made available to ‘any member.'”, “alj_quote”: “TARA declined to provide such, stating that Petitioner was no longer a Board member. … TARA failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1258 regarding provision of access to TARA HOA records.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “homeowner rights”, “records access”, “board membership” ] }, { “question”: “If I file a petition with two issues and only win one, do I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “You may receive a partial reimbursement. The tribunal may order the HOA to reimburse the portion of the fee related to the successful claim.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the petitioner paid 1,000fortwoissues(500 per issue). Since the petitioner prevailed on the records issue but failed on the open meeting issue, the ALJ ordered the HOA to reimburse only $500.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS ORDERED that TARA reimburse Petitioner in the amount of $500.00. … The Administrative Law Judge concludes TARA is the prevailing party regarding the ‘Example 13’ issue and Petitioner bears the filing fee on this issue.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “filing fees”, “dispute resolution”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “Does being a ‘new board’ or ‘learning the ropes’ excuse the HOA from following state laws?”, “short_answer”: “No. Ignorance of the law or being a new board is not a valid defense for violating statutes.”, “detailed_answer”: “The HOA argued they were a new board acting in the best interest of the community and learning better governing practices. The ALJ acknowledged this explanation but still ruled that the failure to provide records was a violation of state statute.”, “alj_quote”: “TARA explained that the Board was a new Board and, believing it was acting in the Board’s best interest, was in the process of learning the procedures for better governing practices. … the Administrative Law Judge concludes that TARA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258”, “topic_tags”: [ “board duties”, “legal compliance”, “defenses” ] } ] }
Blog Post – 24F-H054-REL
{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “24F-H054-REL”, “case_title”: “Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominium Association”, “decision_date”: “2024-09-20”, “alj_name”: “Kay A. Abramsohn”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA refuse to provide financial records because they are waiting to receive them from their third-party management company?”, “short_answer”: “No. The HOA is responsible for providing access to records within the statutory 10-day timeframe, regardless of management company delays.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ ruled that waiting for a management company to provide monthly reports does not excuse the association from its statutory obligation to make records reasonably available within 10 business days. Even if the HOA acts in good faith while waiting for a vendor, failure to provide existing records violates the statute.”, “alj_quote”: “TARA has a defense, although unsupported, regarding the time frame only as to the financial documents for which TARA was waiting from its management company. … Overall, as to A.R.S. § 33-1258, there is no evidence that, within the ten day time frame, TARA provided access to the TARA HOA records it did have and which were required to have been provided to Petitioner; therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that TARA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258”, “topic_tags”: [ “records request”, “financial records”, “management company” ] }, { “question”: “Does a group of board members or volunteers doing unpaid maintenance work require an open meeting and a formal vote?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. If the work is volunteer-based and doesn’t require a specific contract or expenditure necessitating a vote under the CC&Rs or statutes, it may not trigger open meeting requirements.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ determined that volunteer work performed by board members (like weeding or painting) to save money did not constitute ‘formal action’ that required placement on an agenda or a formal vote in an open meeting, provided no statute or governing document specifically required it.”, “alj_quote”: “There is no evidence in the hearing record that, prior to the volunteer work described in Example 13, that those work circumstances, or any projected volunteer work circumstances, were required by statute or the CC&Rs to be placed on a TARA agenda for discussion and/or for ‘formal action’ by the Board at the TARA monthly meetings.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1248”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meetings”, “volunteer work”, “board authority” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA withhold violation letters or architectural change forms concerning other homeowners?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if those documents contain personal information about specific members.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision affirms that HOAs can refuse to provide records related to specific units, such as violation notices or contracts containing personal data, under the statutory exception for personal, health, or financial records of individual members.”, “alj_quote”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4) provides an exception to the requirement to provide records for ‘personal, health or financial records of an individual member’ … In this case, because some of the requested ‘repair’ contract information for repairs at certain addresses may have contained personal information of another member, TARA was likely within its statutory authority to refuse to provide that particular information.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4)”, “topic_tags”: [ “privacy”, “violation letters”, “records request” ] }, { “question”: “Can the board deny my records request because I am no longer a board member?”, “short_answer”: “No. The right to examine records belongs to all members of the association.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found the HOA in violation when it declined to provide information on the grounds that the requester was ‘no longer a Board member.’ The statute requires records be made available to ‘any member.'”, “alj_quote”: “TARA declined to provide such, stating that Petitioner was no longer a Board member. … TARA failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1258 regarding provision of access to TARA HOA records.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “homeowner rights”, “records access”, “board membership” ] }, { “question”: “If I file a petition with two issues and only win one, do I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “You may receive a partial reimbursement. The tribunal may order the HOA to reimburse the portion of the fee related to the successful claim.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the petitioner paid 1,000fortwoissues(500 per issue). Since the petitioner prevailed on the records issue but failed on the open meeting issue, the ALJ ordered the HOA to reimburse only $500.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS ORDERED that TARA reimburse Petitioner in the amount of $500.00. … The Administrative Law Judge concludes TARA is the prevailing party regarding the ‘Example 13’ issue and Petitioner bears the filing fee on this issue.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “filing fees”, “dispute resolution”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “Does being a ‘new board’ or ‘learning the ropes’ excuse the HOA from following state laws?”, “short_answer”: “No. Ignorance of the law or being a new board is not a valid defense for violating statutes.”, “detailed_answer”: “The HOA argued they were a new board acting in the best interest of the community and learning better governing practices. The ALJ acknowledged this explanation but still ruled that the failure to provide records was a violation of state statute.”, “alj_quote”: “TARA explained that the Board was a new Board and, believing it was acting in the Board’s best interest, was in the process of learning the procedures for better governing practices. … the Administrative Law Judge concludes that TARA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258”, “topic_tags”: [ “board duties”, “legal compliance”, “defenses” ] } ] }
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Lisa Marx(petitioner) Tara Condominium Association (Homeowner) Also former HOA Secretary, Vice-Chairperson, and Chairperson.
Brenda Spielder(observer) Tara Condominium Association (Member) Attended hearing with Petitioner.
Cynthia Poland(observer) Tara Condominium Association (Member) Attended hearing with Petitioner.
Respondent Side
Mark Gottmann(board member) Tara Condominium Association Chairman of the Board; represented Tara at the hearing.
Chandler W. Travis(HOA attorney) Travis Law Firm PLC Counsel for Tara Condominium Association until August 27, 2024.
Stephanie Bushart(board member) Tara Condominium Association
Tina Marie Shepherd(board member) Tara Condominium Association Resigned as Chairperson on January 31, 2024.
Dennis Anderson(board member) Tara Condominium Association Involved in volunteer work (weed spraying, trench digging, shutter refinishing).
Judy Rice(board member) Tara Condominium Association Treasurer and CPA.
Ted(board member) Tara Condominium Association Involved in volunteer trench work.
Nikki(volunteer) Tara Condominium Association Involved in volunteer shutter repair.
Neutral Parties
Kay A. Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Susan Nicolson(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Renee Snow(volunteer) Tara Condominium Association Volunteered for landscaping committee.
CC&Rs Section 4.3 Storage, Section 4.17 Motor Vehicles, Community Guidelines 2007
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the North Canyon Ranch Owners Association violated its governing documents regarding the storage of a truck camper.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner's 'truck camper' falls within the scope of prohibited items, specifically as 'other similar equipment' under the CC&Rs and rules, making her argument one of semantics.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the HOA violated its governing documents by issuing a fine for parking a mounted truck camper, based on the Petitioner's claimed 'legal loophole'.
Petitioner claimed a 'legal loophole' existed because the governing documents prohibited 'unmounted pickup camper units' or 'detached campers,' but not her currently mounted/attached truck camper. The ALJ found the truck camper was unequivocally prohibited as 'other similar equipment' under the CC&Rs and Rules, dismissing the petition.
Orders: Petition dismissed. No action is required of Respondent in this matter.
This legal transcript and subsequent judicial decision detail a dispute between homeowner Shawna Townsend and the North Canyon Ranch Owners Association regarding a fine for storing a truck camper in public view. Townsend argued that her equipment fell into a legal loophole because the association’s rules specifically prohibited “unmounted” or “detached” campers, while hers remained attached to her vehicle. In contrast, the Homeowners Association maintained that the camper violated multiple regulations prohibiting the storage of recreational type vehicles and similar equipment in driveways. During the administrative hearing, testimony was provided regarding the enforcement consistency of the community’s governing documents and the specific definitions of recreational vehicles under Arizona law. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the association, determining that the truck camper was clearly prohibited as “similar equipment” regardless of its attachment status. The petition was dismissed, confirming that the association acted within its authority when issuing the violation notices and fines.
What are the core legal arguments regarding the truck camper loophole?
How did the Administrative Law Judge rule on the association’s enforcement?
How do North Canyon Ranch guidelines define recreational vehicles and storage?
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This legal transcript and subsequent judicial decision detail a dispute between homeowner Shawna Townsend and the North Canyon Ranch Owners Association regarding a fine for storing a truck camper in public view. Townsend argued that her equipment fell into a legal loophole because the association’s rules specifically prohibited “unmounted” or “detached” campers, while hers remained attached to her vehicle. In contrast, the Homeowners Association maintained that the camper violated multiple regulations prohibiting the storage of recreational type vehicles and similar equipment in driveways. During the administrative hearing, testimony was provided regarding the enforcement consistency of the community’s governing documents and the specific definitions of recreational vehicles under Arizona law. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the association, determining that the truck camper was clearly prohibited as “similar equipment” regardless of its attachment status. The petition was dismissed, confirming that the association acted within its authority when issuing the violation notices and fines.
What are the core legal arguments regarding the truck camper loophole?
How did the Administrative Law Judge rule on the association’s enforcement?
How do North Canyon Ranch guidelines define recreational vehicles and storage?
Thursday, February 12
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Today • 2:12 PM
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Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Shawna Townsend(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf; also referred to as Shauna Townsen or Miss Townsen
Michael Townsen(co-owner) Co-owner and recipient of violation notices with Petitioner
Respondent Side
Haidyn DiLorenzo(HOA attorney) Represented Respondent North Canyon Ranch Owners Association
Justin DeLuca(HOA attorney) Represented Respondent North Canyon Ranch Owners Association
Josey Perkins(community manager/witness) North Canyon Ranch Owners Association Community Manager for the association, testified as a witness (also referred to as Joy Perkins)
Riner(board member) North Canyon Ranch Owners Association Board of Directors Made motion to deny petitioner's appeal
Robera Holler(board member) North Canyon Ranch Owners Association Board of Directors Seconded motion to deny petitioner's appeal
Petra Paul(Executive VP of Management Services) Management Services Vice President of management services, communicated with Petitioner about the appeal
Beth Mulcahy(HOA attorney) Mulcahy Law Firm, PC Listed as contact for transmission of the decision
Neutral Parties
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) OAH Administrative Law Judge (also referred to as Sandra Vanella)
James Knupp(Acting Commissioner, ADRE) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of the decision
The Petition was dismissed because the Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R Section 11. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioners themselves violated Section 11 by constructing the shed without prior written approval.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated CC&R Section 11; the construction of the shed occurred prior to seeking or obtaining architectural approval, violating Section 11.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged unfair, arbitrary, and capricious rejection of Architectural Change Form based on a non-existent rule (shed must not be higher than patio wall).
Petitioners claimed the HOA violated CC&Rs Section 11 by arbitrarily denying their request to construct a shed based on an unwritten rule regarding shed height (must be 3 inches below the wall). Petitioners acknowledged they constructed the shed prior to obtaining approval.
Orders: Petition dismissed; no action required of Respondent.
These sources document a legal dispute between homeowners Dennis Anderson and Mary Scheller and the Tara Condominiums Association regarding the unauthorized installation of a backyard storage shed. The conflict began when the association denied a retrospective architectural application, citing that the structure was too high and improperly attached to the building. During an evidentiary hearing held in August 2022, the petitioners argued that the board was enforcing non-existent rules, while the association maintained that the homeowners failed to seek the mandatory prior approval required by their governing documents. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the association, determining that the petitioners had violated the community’s CC&Rs by building the shed before obtaining written consent. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and a subsequent attempt by the homeowners to submit further evidence via email was rejected.
How did the lack of written rules influence the case?
Why did the judge ultimately dismiss the petitioners’ claim?
How does CC&R Section 11 impact homeowner architectural changes?
Thursday, February 12
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Blog Post – 22F-H2222062-REL
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These sources document a legal dispute between homeowners Dennis Anderson and Mary Scheller and the Tara Condominiums Association regarding the unauthorized installation of a backyard storage shed. The conflict began when the association denied a retrospective architectural application, citing that the structure was too high and improperly attached to the building. During an evidentiary hearing held in August 2022, the petitioners argued that the board was enforcing non-existent rules, while the association maintained that the homeowners failed to seek the mandatory prior approval required by their governing documents. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the association, determining that the petitioners had violated the community’s CC&Rs by building the shed before obtaining written consent. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and a subsequent attempt by the homeowners to submit further evidence via email was rejected.
How did the lack of written rules influence the case?
Why did the judge ultimately dismiss the petitioners’ claim?
How does CC&R Section 11 impact homeowner architectural changes?
Thursday, February 12
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Today • 1:37 PM
Video Overview
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Data Table
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Dennis Anderson(petitioner)
Mary Scheller(petitioner) Tara Condominiums Association (former board) Former President of the HOA Board; also referred to as Mary Shell
Kiara(Owner) Daughter and co-owner who received violation letter
Respondent Side
Lisa Marks(board member) Tara Condominiums Association Chairperson and Secretary of the Board; testified for Respondent
Renee Snow(board member) Tara Condominiums Association Treasurer and President of the Board; testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) OAH
Louis Dettorre(Commissioner) ADRE
AHansen(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of official transmission
vnunez(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of official transmission
djones(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of official transmission
labril(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of official transmission
c. serrano(Clerk/Staff) OAH/ADRE Transmitting staff member
Miranda Alvarez(Legal Secretary) OAH/ADRE Transmitting staff member
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Condominium Association violated its governing documents or state statute regarding record inspection, specifically because the Association did not possess and was not required to create a Membership Register containing unit owners' email addresses.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the provisions of CC&Rs Section 11.4.8, Bylaws Section 10.3, or A.R.S. § 33-1158 (or § 33-1258) because the requested record (a Membership Register containing email addresses) did not exist, and the Association was not obligated to create it.
Key Issues & Findings
Refusal to provide access to the membership register (Owner Roster with emails)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated governing documents and statute by refusing access to the membership register containing email addresses. Respondent argued email addresses were protected 'personal records' under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4). The ALJ found the Petitioner failed to prove a violation because the requested document (a Membership Register containing emails) did not exist, and Respondent had no obligation to create it.
Orders: The petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1258
CC&Rs 11.4.8
Bylaws 10.3
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records inspection, membership roster, email addresses, HOA records, condominium association, A.R.S. 33-1258
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1158
CC&Rs 11.4.8
Bylaws 10.3
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020055-REL Decision – 807817.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:44 (107.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020055-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Tomisak v. Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in the case of Robert Tomisak versus the Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association (Case No. 20F-H2020055-REL), heard in the Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Mr. Tomisak, alleged that the Association violated its governing documents and Arizona state law by refusing his request for an owner roster that included member email addresses. The Association countered that email addresses constitute protected personal information and, more critically, that a membership register containing such information no longer exists.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed the petition. The decision did not hinge on whether email addresses are “personal records” under the law. Instead, the ruling was based on the factual determination that the Association cannot be compelled to produce a document that it does not maintain. Since the Association had ceased including email addresses in its Membership Register in 2018, the judge concluded that the petitioner had no right to a non-existent record and had failed to meet the burden of proof required to show a violation.
I. Case Overview
Case Name
Robert Tomisak v. Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association
Case Number
20F-H2020055-REL
Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Sondra J. Vanella
Petitioner
Robert Tomisak, Owner of Unit 1902 (Appeared on his own behalf)
Respondent
Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association (Represented by Property Manager Terri Troy)
Hearing Date
July 9, 2020
Decision Date
July 17, 2020
II. Petitioner’s Allegations
On April 15, 2020, Robert Tomisak filed a single-issue petition alleging that the Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association had violated its own governing documents and Arizona state law. The core of the complaint was the Association’s refusal to fulfill his March 11, 2020, email request “to provide access to the membership register” containing owner email addresses.
Mr. Tomisak specifically cited violations of the following provisions:
• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): Article 11, Section 4.8
• Bylaws: Article 10.3
• Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.): § 33-1258
III. Respondent’s Position and Defense
The Association, through its property management company AS&A Property Management, Inc., and represented by Property Manager Terri Troy, denied all allegations. The defense rested on two key arguments:
1. Privacy Exemption: The Association contended that members’ email addresses are “personal records” and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4), which protects the “personal, health or financial records of an individual member.”
2. Non-Existence of the Record: Ms. Troy testified that while the Association would readily provide the official Membership Register (containing names and addresses), this document no longer includes email addresses. This practice of excluding emails from the register began in 2018.
IV. Key Evidence and Testimony
The March 11, 2020 Email Exchange
The dispute originated with a direct email exchange between the petitioner and the property manager.
• Petitioner’s Request (7:33 a.m.): Mr. Tomisak sent an email with the subject line “Owner Roster” stating:
• Respondent’s Denial (8:23 a.m.): Ms. Troy responded with a direct refusal, citing the statutory exemption for personal information:
Hearing Testimony
During the July 9, 2020 hearing, both parties presented their arguments:
• Robert Tomisak (Petitioner): Acknowledged that he already had access to member mailing addresses but specifically required their email addresses. He argued that email addresses are not “personal information” and cited “the internet” and “California case law” as authority for this position.
• Terri Troy (Respondent): Reiterated the Association’s willingness to provide the existing Membership Register, which contains names, addresses, and unit numbers. She explained that email addresses had been removed from this register starting in 2018 and that her refusal was based on the belief that emails are protected “personal records” under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4).
The Administrative Law Judge noted that neither party cited “any relevant or persuasive legal authority” to formally define “personal records” as used in the statute.
V. Legal Framework and Governing Documents
The case centered on the interpretation of three key provisions granting members access to Association records.
Document
Section
Key Provision
11.4.8
“The Association shall make available to Owners… current copies of the Declaration, Articles, Bylaws, rules of the Association and the books, records, and financial statements of the Association.”
Bylaws
“The membership register… shall be made available for inspection and copying by Members of the Association… for a purpose reasonably related to their interests as Members…”
A.R.S.
§ 33-1258(A)
“all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member…”
A.R.S.
§ 33-1258(B)(4)
“Books and records… may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to… Personal, health or financial records of an individual member of the association…”
VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Order
Burden of Proof
The judge established that the petitioner, Mr. Tomisak, bore the burden of proof to demonstrate by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association had committed the alleged violations. A preponderance of evidence is defined as that which is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Central Conclusion
The judge’s ruling was not based on the privacy argument regarding whether email addresses are “personal records.” Instead, the decision was grounded in a more fundamental point of fact regarding the existence of the requested document. The judge’s decisive conclusion of law stated:
While Petitioner has the right to enforce the requirements of the above provisions, Petitioner does not have the right to a record that does not exist, i.e., a Membership Register containing email addresses. Further, there is no requirement in the above provisions that Respondent has an obligation to create such a document.
Final Ruling
Based on this central finding, the judge held that Mr. Tomisak failed to meet his burden of proof and did not establish that the Association had violated its CC&Rs, its Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1158.
IT IS ORDERED that no action is required of Respondent in this matter and that the petition is dismissed. The order is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of its service.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020055-REL
Study Guide: Tomisak v. Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association
This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing decision in case number 20F-H2020055-REL, involving Petitioner Robert Tomisak and Respondent Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to test and deepen understanding of the case.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their established relationship?
2. What specific document and data did the petitioner request from the respondent in his email dated March 11, 2020?
3. On what legal grounds did the respondent deny the petitioner’s request? Cite the specific statutory provision they referenced.
4. Identify the three governing documents or statutes that the petitioner alleged the respondent had violated.
5. What information was the respondent, through its property manager Terri Troy, willing to provide to the petitioner?
6. What was the central reason cited by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Conclusions of Law” for dismissing the petition?
7. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and identify which party had the burden of meeting this standard.
8. What authority did the petitioner cite during the hearing to support his argument that email addresses do not constitute “personal information”?
9. According to Property Manager Terri Troy’s testimony, when and why did the content of the Membership Register change?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on July 17, 2020?
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Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Robert Tomisak, who owns condominium unit 1902 in the Arrowhead Lakes development. The respondent was the Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association, of which the petitioner is a member.
2. The petitioner requested an electronic copy of the “Owner’s Roster with emails.” He specifically wanted a membership list that included the email addresses of the other condominium owners.
3. The respondent denied the request based on A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4). They argued that this provision allows an association to withhold the “personal records of an individual member,” and they considered email addresses to fall under this category.
4. The petitioner alleged the respondent violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) Article 11, Section 4.8; its Bylaws, Article 10.3; and Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1258.
5. The respondent was willing to provide the Membership Register, which included the names, unit numbers, and mailing addresses of the members. However, this register did not contain email addresses.
6. The judge dismissed the petition because the petitioner did not have the right to a record that does not exist—namely, a Membership Register containing email addresses. The judge concluded there was no requirement in the governing provisions for the respondent to create such a document.
7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring the trier of fact to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The petitioner, Robert Tomisak, bore the burden of establishing his claim by this standard.
8. During the hearing, the petitioner cited “the internet” and “California case law” as his authority for the proposition that email addresses were not considered personal information.
9. Terri Troy testified that the Membership Register previously contained email addresses but that this practice was stopped beginning in 2018. The change was made based on the association’s belief that email addresses were the “personal records” of the owners.
10. The final order stated that no action was required of the respondent and that the petition was dismissed.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-style response. Use the case document to formulate a detailed and well-supported argument.
1. Analyze the central legal conflict in this case. Discuss the petitioner’s interpretation of a member’s right to access records under the CC&Rs, Bylaws, and A.R.S. § 33-1258 versus the respondent’s interpretation, focusing on the exemption for “personal records.”
2. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the petitioner and the respondent during the July 9, 2020 hearing. Explain why the judge ultimately found that the petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
3. The judge’s decision rested heavily on the finding that the respondent was not obligated to create a document that did not exist. Discuss the significance of this finding. How might the case outcome have differed if the Membership Register still actively contained member email addresses at the time of the request?
4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this administrative hearing. Explain why this burden fell upon the petitioner and how the failure to meet this evidentiary standard was a determinative factor in the dismissal of the petition.
5. Examine the roles and interaction of the governing documents (CC&Rs, Bylaws) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1258) in this dispute. Which provisions offered the petitioner the right to inspect records, and which specific clause provided the strongest defense for the respondent?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella.
A.R.S. § 33-1258
The Arizona Revised Statute that mandates associations make financial and other records “reasonably available” to members, while also providing exceptions for withholding certain information, such as “personal, health or financial records of an individual member.”
Association
The Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association, a condominium unit owners’ association responsible for managing the Arrowhead Lakes development.
Bylaws
The rules governing the internal operations of the association. Section 10.3 is referenced, which grants members the right to inspect the “membership register” and other books and records.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the primary governing legal documents for the condominium development. Section 11.4.8 is referenced, which requires the association to make its books and records available to owners.
Membership Register
A formal list of the members of the association. The respondent’s register included names and addresses with unit numbers but, as of 2018, no longer included email addresses.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Robert Tomisak, a condominium owner and member of the association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020055-REL
He Sued His Condo Association for an Email List. The Judge’s Reason for Saying No Will Surprise You.
If you live in a condominium or a community governed by a homeowners’ association, you’ve likely wondered what official records you’re entitled to see. From financial statements to meeting minutes, these documents are the backbone of a transparent community. But what happens when the information you want isn’t in a format the association readily provides?
This was the central conflict for Robert Tomisak, a condominium owner in Glendale, Arizona. At 7:33 a.m. on March 11, 2020, he sent an email to his association requesting an electronic copy of the “Owner’s Roster with emails.” Less than an hour later, at 8:23 a.m., the property manager refused. Believing he was legally entitled to the list, Mr. Tomisak sued. When the case went before an administrative law judge, the final decision hinged on a simple but powerful distinction that most people would never see coming. This case reveals some surprising truths about our rights to information and how they are applied in the real world.
1. Takeaway #1: Your right is to inspectexistingrecords, not to have new ones created for you.
The core of the judge’s decision came down to a simple, factual matter. While Mr. Tomisak had a legal right to inspect association records, the specific document he requested—a Membership Register that included email addresses—did not actually exist.
According to testimony from property manager Terri Troy, the association was perfectly willing to provide the official Membership Register, which contained owner names and mailing addresses. However, she clarified that the association had stopped including email addresses in that specific record back in 2018. The judge found this fact to be decisive. While the petitioner had the right to access existing records, the association had no legal duty to create a new one for him. The judge’s “Conclusions of Law” put it in unambiguous terms:
Petitioner does not have the right to a record that does not exist, i.e., a Membership Register containing email addresses. Further, there is no requirement in the above provisions that Respondent has an obligation to create such a document.
This is a counter-intuitive but crucial distinction. Many people assume that if an organization possesses individual pieces of data (like names in one file and emails in another), they are obligated to compile that data into the format you request. This ruling clarifies that the legal obligation is to provide access to records as they are currently maintained, not to perform data-compilation tasks on demand. For association boards, this is a critical clarification of their duties; for homeowners, it’s a lesson in the power of a precise request.
2. Takeaway #2: The legal definition of “personal records” can be surprisingly ambiguous.
The central argument between the two parties revolved around privacy. Mr. Tomisak requested the email list citing an Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1258) that grants members access to association records. In response, Ms. Troy denied the request by citing a specific exemption in that same law—A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4)—which allows an association to withhold “personal… records of an individual member.” Ms. Troy believed email addresses fell under this category; Mr. Tomisak argued they did not.
Crucially, Mr. Tomisak acknowledged during the hearing that he already had access to the mailing addresses for all units. His demand was not about the fundamental ability to communicate with his neighbors, but about the specific method. This reframes the dispute away from pure access-to-information and toward convenience and the definition of privacy.
However, when it came time to define “personal records,” both sides faltered. The petitioner cited “the internet” and “California case law” as his authority—a common mistake litigants make, as vague or non-binding sources hold little weight with a judge focused on specific state statutes. The judge noted that “Neither party cited to any relevant or persuasive legal authority to establish the definition of ‘personal records’ as referenced in the relevant statute.” This failure by both parties essentially forced the judge’s hand, allowing her to bypass the murky privacy debate and settle the case on the much clearer, indisputable fact that the requested record did not exist.
3. Takeaway #3: Even with clear rules, the burden of proof is always on the person making the claim.
On paper, the rules seemed to be in the petitioner’s favor. Section 11.4.8 of the community’s CC&Rs, Section 10.3 of its Bylaws, and the state statute A.R.S. § 33-1258 all grant members the right to inspect association records. So why did he lose?
The answer lies in the legal concept of the “burden of proof.” According to the hearing decision, the petitioner “bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.”
“Preponderance of the evidence” simply means evidence that is more convincing and more likely true than not. In this case, because the petitioner could not prove that the specific document he wanted—a Membership Register containing emails—actually existed, he failed to meet this burden. He could not convince the judge that the association had violated its duties because the duty he claimed they violated (providing a non-existent record) was not one they actually had. This serves as a practical lesson for any homeowner: having a right on paper is not enough; you must be able to prove that the specific right was violated with convincing evidence.
Conclusion: A Lesson in Specificity
The case of Tomisak vs. Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association is a masterclass in how legal rights and obligations are often more specific and literal than we assume. The final decision wasn’t based on broad principles of privacy versus access, but on the simple, verifiable fact that a non-existent document cannot be produced.
The judge’s final order was to dismiss the petition, requiring no action from the condo association. This case forces every resident and board member to ask a crucial question: Are you fighting over a principle, or are you making a specific request for a real, existing document? In the eyes of the law, only one of those will win you the day.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Robert Tomisak(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf; also testified
Respondent Side
Terri Troy(property manager) Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association / AS&A Property Management, Inc. Appeared and testified on behalf of Respondent
Neutral Parties
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Condominium Association violated its governing documents or state statute regarding record inspection, specifically because the Association did not possess and was not required to create a Membership Register containing unit owners' email addresses.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the provisions of CC&Rs Section 11.4.8, Bylaws Section 10.3, or A.R.S. § 33-1158 (or § 33-1258) because the requested record (a Membership Register containing email addresses) did not exist, and the Association was not obligated to create it.
Key Issues & Findings
Refusal to provide access to the membership register (Owner Roster with emails)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated governing documents and statute by refusing access to the membership register containing email addresses. Respondent argued email addresses were protected 'personal records' under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4). The ALJ found the Petitioner failed to prove a violation because the requested document (a Membership Register containing emails) did not exist, and Respondent had no obligation to create it.
Orders: The petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1258
CC&Rs 11.4.8
Bylaws 10.3
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records inspection, membership roster, email addresses, HOA records, condominium association, A.R.S. 33-1258
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1158
CC&Rs 11.4.8
Bylaws 10.3
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020055-REL Decision – 807817.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:16 (107.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020055-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Tomisak v. Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in the case of Robert Tomisak versus the Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association (Case No. 20F-H2020055-REL), heard in the Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Mr. Tomisak, alleged that the Association violated its governing documents and Arizona state law by refusing his request for an owner roster that included member email addresses. The Association countered that email addresses constitute protected personal information and, more critically, that a membership register containing such information no longer exists.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed the petition. The decision did not hinge on whether email addresses are “personal records” under the law. Instead, the ruling was based on the factual determination that the Association cannot be compelled to produce a document that it does not maintain. Since the Association had ceased including email addresses in its Membership Register in 2018, the judge concluded that the petitioner had no right to a non-existent record and had failed to meet the burden of proof required to show a violation.
I. Case Overview
Case Name
Robert Tomisak v. Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association
Case Number
20F-H2020055-REL
Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Sondra J. Vanella
Petitioner
Robert Tomisak, Owner of Unit 1902 (Appeared on his own behalf)
Respondent
Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association (Represented by Property Manager Terri Troy)
Hearing Date
July 9, 2020
Decision Date
July 17, 2020
II. Petitioner’s Allegations
On April 15, 2020, Robert Tomisak filed a single-issue petition alleging that the Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association had violated its own governing documents and Arizona state law. The core of the complaint was the Association’s refusal to fulfill his March 11, 2020, email request “to provide access to the membership register” containing owner email addresses.
Mr. Tomisak specifically cited violations of the following provisions:
• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): Article 11, Section 4.8
• Bylaws: Article 10.3
• Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.): § 33-1258
III. Respondent’s Position and Defense
The Association, through its property management company AS&A Property Management, Inc., and represented by Property Manager Terri Troy, denied all allegations. The defense rested on two key arguments:
1. Privacy Exemption: The Association contended that members’ email addresses are “personal records” and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4), which protects the “personal, health or financial records of an individual member.”
2. Non-Existence of the Record: Ms. Troy testified that while the Association would readily provide the official Membership Register (containing names and addresses), this document no longer includes email addresses. This practice of excluding emails from the register began in 2018.
IV. Key Evidence and Testimony
The March 11, 2020 Email Exchange
The dispute originated with a direct email exchange between the petitioner and the property manager.
• Petitioner’s Request (7:33 a.m.): Mr. Tomisak sent an email with the subject line “Owner Roster” stating:
• Respondent’s Denial (8:23 a.m.): Ms. Troy responded with a direct refusal, citing the statutory exemption for personal information:
Hearing Testimony
During the July 9, 2020 hearing, both parties presented their arguments:
• Robert Tomisak (Petitioner): Acknowledged that he already had access to member mailing addresses but specifically required their email addresses. He argued that email addresses are not “personal information” and cited “the internet” and “California case law” as authority for this position.
• Terri Troy (Respondent): Reiterated the Association’s willingness to provide the existing Membership Register, which contains names, addresses, and unit numbers. She explained that email addresses had been removed from this register starting in 2018 and that her refusal was based on the belief that emails are protected “personal records” under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4).
The Administrative Law Judge noted that neither party cited “any relevant or persuasive legal authority” to formally define “personal records” as used in the statute.
V. Legal Framework and Governing Documents
The case centered on the interpretation of three key provisions granting members access to Association records.
Document
Section
Key Provision
11.4.8
“The Association shall make available to Owners… current copies of the Declaration, Articles, Bylaws, rules of the Association and the books, records, and financial statements of the Association.”
Bylaws
“The membership register… shall be made available for inspection and copying by Members of the Association… for a purpose reasonably related to their interests as Members…”
A.R.S.
§ 33-1258(A)
“all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member…”
A.R.S.
§ 33-1258(B)(4)
“Books and records… may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to… Personal, health or financial records of an individual member of the association…”
VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Order
Burden of Proof
The judge established that the petitioner, Mr. Tomisak, bore the burden of proof to demonstrate by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association had committed the alleged violations. A preponderance of evidence is defined as that which is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Central Conclusion
The judge’s ruling was not based on the privacy argument regarding whether email addresses are “personal records.” Instead, the decision was grounded in a more fundamental point of fact regarding the existence of the requested document. The judge’s decisive conclusion of law stated:
While Petitioner has the right to enforce the requirements of the above provisions, Petitioner does not have the right to a record that does not exist, i.e., a Membership Register containing email addresses. Further, there is no requirement in the above provisions that Respondent has an obligation to create such a document.
Final Ruling
Based on this central finding, the judge held that Mr. Tomisak failed to meet his burden of proof and did not establish that the Association had violated its CC&Rs, its Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1158.
IT IS ORDERED that no action is required of Respondent in this matter and that the petition is dismissed. The order is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of its service.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020055-REL
Study Guide: Tomisak v. Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association
This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing decision in case number 20F-H2020055-REL, involving Petitioner Robert Tomisak and Respondent Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to test and deepen understanding of the case.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their established relationship?
2. What specific document and data did the petitioner request from the respondent in his email dated March 11, 2020?
3. On what legal grounds did the respondent deny the petitioner’s request? Cite the specific statutory provision they referenced.
4. Identify the three governing documents or statutes that the petitioner alleged the respondent had violated.
5. What information was the respondent, through its property manager Terri Troy, willing to provide to the petitioner?
6. What was the central reason cited by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Conclusions of Law” for dismissing the petition?
7. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and identify which party had the burden of meeting this standard.
8. What authority did the petitioner cite during the hearing to support his argument that email addresses do not constitute “personal information”?
9. According to Property Manager Terri Troy’s testimony, when and why did the content of the Membership Register change?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on July 17, 2020?
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Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Robert Tomisak, who owns condominium unit 1902 in the Arrowhead Lakes development. The respondent was the Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association, of which the petitioner is a member.
2. The petitioner requested an electronic copy of the “Owner’s Roster with emails.” He specifically wanted a membership list that included the email addresses of the other condominium owners.
3. The respondent denied the request based on A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4). They argued that this provision allows an association to withhold the “personal records of an individual member,” and they considered email addresses to fall under this category.
4. The petitioner alleged the respondent violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) Article 11, Section 4.8; its Bylaws, Article 10.3; and Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1258.
5. The respondent was willing to provide the Membership Register, which included the names, unit numbers, and mailing addresses of the members. However, this register did not contain email addresses.
6. The judge dismissed the petition because the petitioner did not have the right to a record that does not exist—namely, a Membership Register containing email addresses. The judge concluded there was no requirement in the governing provisions for the respondent to create such a document.
7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring the trier of fact to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The petitioner, Robert Tomisak, bore the burden of establishing his claim by this standard.
8. During the hearing, the petitioner cited “the internet” and “California case law” as his authority for the proposition that email addresses were not considered personal information.
9. Terri Troy testified that the Membership Register previously contained email addresses but that this practice was stopped beginning in 2018. The change was made based on the association’s belief that email addresses were the “personal records” of the owners.
10. The final order stated that no action was required of the respondent and that the petition was dismissed.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-style response. Use the case document to formulate a detailed and well-supported argument.
1. Analyze the central legal conflict in this case. Discuss the petitioner’s interpretation of a member’s right to access records under the CC&Rs, Bylaws, and A.R.S. § 33-1258 versus the respondent’s interpretation, focusing on the exemption for “personal records.”
2. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the petitioner and the respondent during the July 9, 2020 hearing. Explain why the judge ultimately found that the petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
3. The judge’s decision rested heavily on the finding that the respondent was not obligated to create a document that did not exist. Discuss the significance of this finding. How might the case outcome have differed if the Membership Register still actively contained member email addresses at the time of the request?
4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this administrative hearing. Explain why this burden fell upon the petitioner and how the failure to meet this evidentiary standard was a determinative factor in the dismissal of the petition.
5. Examine the roles and interaction of the governing documents (CC&Rs, Bylaws) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1258) in this dispute. Which provisions offered the petitioner the right to inspect records, and which specific clause provided the strongest defense for the respondent?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella.
A.R.S. § 33-1258
The Arizona Revised Statute that mandates associations make financial and other records “reasonably available” to members, while also providing exceptions for withholding certain information, such as “personal, health or financial records of an individual member.”
Association
The Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association, a condominium unit owners’ association responsible for managing the Arrowhead Lakes development.
Bylaws
The rules governing the internal operations of the association. Section 10.3 is referenced, which grants members the right to inspect the “membership register” and other books and records.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the primary governing legal documents for the condominium development. Section 11.4.8 is referenced, which requires the association to make its books and records available to owners.
Membership Register
A formal list of the members of the association. The respondent’s register included names and addresses with unit numbers but, as of 2018, no longer included email addresses.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Robert Tomisak, a condominium owner and member of the association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020055-REL
He Sued His Condo Association for an Email List. The Judge’s Reason for Saying No Will Surprise You.
If you live in a condominium or a community governed by a homeowners’ association, you’ve likely wondered what official records you’re entitled to see. From financial statements to meeting minutes, these documents are the backbone of a transparent community. But what happens when the information you want isn’t in a format the association readily provides?
This was the central conflict for Robert Tomisak, a condominium owner in Glendale, Arizona. At 7:33 a.m. on March 11, 2020, he sent an email to his association requesting an electronic copy of the “Owner’s Roster with emails.” Less than an hour later, at 8:23 a.m., the property manager refused. Believing he was legally entitled to the list, Mr. Tomisak sued. When the case went before an administrative law judge, the final decision hinged on a simple but powerful distinction that most people would never see coming. This case reveals some surprising truths about our rights to information and how they are applied in the real world.
1. Takeaway #1: Your right is to inspectexistingrecords, not to have new ones created for you.
The core of the judge’s decision came down to a simple, factual matter. While Mr. Tomisak had a legal right to inspect association records, the specific document he requested—a Membership Register that included email addresses—did not actually exist.
According to testimony from property manager Terri Troy, the association was perfectly willing to provide the official Membership Register, which contained owner names and mailing addresses. However, she clarified that the association had stopped including email addresses in that specific record back in 2018. The judge found this fact to be decisive. While the petitioner had the right to access existing records, the association had no legal duty to create a new one for him. The judge’s “Conclusions of Law” put it in unambiguous terms:
Petitioner does not have the right to a record that does not exist, i.e., a Membership Register containing email addresses. Further, there is no requirement in the above provisions that Respondent has an obligation to create such a document.
This is a counter-intuitive but crucial distinction. Many people assume that if an organization possesses individual pieces of data (like names in one file and emails in another), they are obligated to compile that data into the format you request. This ruling clarifies that the legal obligation is to provide access to records as they are currently maintained, not to perform data-compilation tasks on demand. For association boards, this is a critical clarification of their duties; for homeowners, it’s a lesson in the power of a precise request.
2. Takeaway #2: The legal definition of “personal records” can be surprisingly ambiguous.
The central argument between the two parties revolved around privacy. Mr. Tomisak requested the email list citing an Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1258) that grants members access to association records. In response, Ms. Troy denied the request by citing a specific exemption in that same law—A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4)—which allows an association to withhold “personal… records of an individual member.” Ms. Troy believed email addresses fell under this category; Mr. Tomisak argued they did not.
Crucially, Mr. Tomisak acknowledged during the hearing that he already had access to the mailing addresses for all units. His demand was not about the fundamental ability to communicate with his neighbors, but about the specific method. This reframes the dispute away from pure access-to-information and toward convenience and the definition of privacy.
However, when it came time to define “personal records,” both sides faltered. The petitioner cited “the internet” and “California case law” as his authority—a common mistake litigants make, as vague or non-binding sources hold little weight with a judge focused on specific state statutes. The judge noted that “Neither party cited to any relevant or persuasive legal authority to establish the definition of ‘personal records’ as referenced in the relevant statute.” This failure by both parties essentially forced the judge’s hand, allowing her to bypass the murky privacy debate and settle the case on the much clearer, indisputable fact that the requested record did not exist.
3. Takeaway #3: Even with clear rules, the burden of proof is always on the person making the claim.
On paper, the rules seemed to be in the petitioner’s favor. Section 11.4.8 of the community’s CC&Rs, Section 10.3 of its Bylaws, and the state statute A.R.S. § 33-1258 all grant members the right to inspect association records. So why did he lose?
The answer lies in the legal concept of the “burden of proof.” According to the hearing decision, the petitioner “bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.”
“Preponderance of the evidence” simply means evidence that is more convincing and more likely true than not. In this case, because the petitioner could not prove that the specific document he wanted—a Membership Register containing emails—actually existed, he failed to meet this burden. He could not convince the judge that the association had violated its duties because the duty he claimed they violated (providing a non-existent record) was not one they actually had. This serves as a practical lesson for any homeowner: having a right on paper is not enough; you must be able to prove that the specific right was violated with convincing evidence.
Conclusion: A Lesson in Specificity
The case of Tomisak vs. Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association is a masterclass in how legal rights and obligations are often more specific and literal than we assume. The final decision wasn’t based on broad principles of privacy versus access, but on the simple, verifiable fact that a non-existent document cannot be produced.
The judge’s final order was to dismiss the petition, requiring no action from the condo association. This case forces every resident and board member to ask a crucial question: Are you fighting over a principle, or are you making a specific request for a real, existing document? In the eyes of the law, only one of those will win you the day.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Robert Tomisak(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf; also testified
Respondent Side
Terri Troy(property manager) Arrowhead Lakes Condominium Association / AS&A Property Management, Inc. Appeared and testified on behalf of Respondent
Neutral Parties
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs or Arizona statutes; therefore, the petition was dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as evidence suggested the water leak was caused by the sliding glass door of the unit above, not a flaw in the common elements.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to maintain all Common Elements (Water Leak Dispute)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent HOA failed to maintain Common Elements, leading to water leaks in her unit. Respondent denied the violation, asserting the leak originated from the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or track assemblies, which are the responsibility of that unit owner.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1247
CC&Rs § 10(c)
Article II.E, Section 1 of the Bylaws
Article C of the CC&Rs
Analytics Highlights
Topics: condominium, maintenance dispute, common elements, water damage, burden of proof
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1247
CC&Rs § 10(c)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Powell v. Washburn
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.
Vazanno v. Superior Court
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020050-REL Decision – 802352.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:05 (103.2 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020050-REL
Administrative Hearing Brief: Biesecker v. 6100 Fifth Condominium HOA
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020050-REL, wherein Petitioner Ronna Biesecker alleged that the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association (HOA) failed to fulfill its maintenance responsibilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof required to substantiate her claim.
The central conflict involved recurring water leaks in Ms. Biesecker’s condominium unit (A113). The Petitioner contended that the leaks originated from cracks in the building’s exterior stucco, which are defined as “Common Elements” and are therefore the HOA’s responsibility to repair under its governing documents and Arizona state law. In contrast, the HOA argued that the source of the water was the sliding door assembly of the upstairs unit, making its maintenance the responsibility of that unit’s owner.
The final decision rested on the weight of evidence presented. Multiple expert inspections, conducted by Olander’s and another inspector retained by the HOA, concluded that the leaks were attributable to the upstairs unit’s sliding doors. This evidence was deemed more convincing than the Petitioner’s own assessment regarding the stucco. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Biesecker failed to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the damage was caused by a flaw in the common elements, leading to the dismissal of her case.
Case Overview
Case Name
Ronna Biesecker, Petitioner, vs. 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, Respondent.
Case Number
20F-H2020050-REL
Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Hearing Date
June 5, 2020
Decision Date
June 25, 2020
Petitioner
Ronna Biesecker, owner of unit A113
Respondent
6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, represented by Robert Eric Struse, Statutory Agent
Core Allegations and Defenses
Petitioner’s Claim (Ronna Biesecker)
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner filed a petition on March 10, 2020, alleging that the Respondent (HOA) violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 10(c) and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1247 by failing to maintain the common elements of the condominium community.
• Specifics of Claim: Ms. Biesecker asserted that persistent water leaks into her unit were caused by cracks in the exterior stucco surrounding the sliding doors.
• Basis of Responsibility: She argued that because the exterior stucco is a “common element,” the HOA was legally responsible for its repair and any subsequent damage to her unit.
• Requested Action: The Petitioner had previously requested that the HOA repair the exterior leaks and had attempted to have the HOA mediate the issue with the owner of the upstairs unit.
Respondent’s Position (6100 Fifth Condominium HOA)
• Core Defense: The HOA denied any violation of its CC&Rs or state statutes.
• Specifics of Defense: The HOA maintained that the source of the water leaks was not a common element. Instead, it attributed the leaks to the sliding doors or track assemblies of the condominium unit located directly above the Petitioner’s.
• Basis of Responsibility: According to the HOA’s governing documents and state law, the maintenance of elements belonging to an individual unit (such as a sliding door) is the responsibility of that unit’s owner, not the association.
• Actions Taken: The HOA declined to “arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party” in the dispute between the Petitioner and the owner of the upstairs unit. It also conducted an inspection which supported its position.
Evidentiary Timeline and Key Findings
The decision was based on a sequence of events and expert assessments presented as evidence.
• January 5, 2019: Petitioner experiences the first water leak in her unit (A113) near the sliding glass door.
• January 18, 2019: An employee from Olander’s, a door installation company contacted by the Petitioner, inspects the unit. The employee’s opinion was that “the leak was coming from the unit above Petitioner and that the sliding door above Petitioner’s unit had large gaps under the threshold which allowed water to get in.”
• February 8, 2019: Nathan’s Handyman Service repairs plaster damage in the Petitioner’s unit and notes in a report that the damage was “the result of an old leak coming from above Petitioner’s unit.” The report also identified rusted wire mesh, indicating previous repairs to the area.
• March/April 2019: The HOA’s Property Manager formally refuses the Petitioner’s request to mediate the dispute with the owner of the upstairs unit.
• May 1, 2019: Petitioner emails the HOA, proposing that new cracks in the stucco pop-out at the roof level could be the source of the leak.
• October 28, 2019: A “Roof Opinion Report” from Roof Savers Locke Roofing states that no roof repairs are needed but notes the presence of “server [sic] cracking at the stucco.” The report recommends contacting a stucco or window contractor.
• November 27, 2019: Another leak occurs in the same area of the Petitioner’s unit.
• December 9, 2019: The HOA’s Property Manager and an inspector assess the water damage in the Petitioner’s unit.
• December 23, 2019: An invoice from the inspector states: “After inspecting the shared roof and building interior/exterior it appears the water damage to the lower unit is coming from the upstairs unit sliding doors or their track assemblies.”
• June 5, 2020 (Hearing Testimony):
◦ The Petitioner stated it was “obvious” the leak originated from the stucco crack.
◦ The HOA’s Statutory Agent, Robert Eric Struse, testified that the December 2019 inspection included the interior of the upstairs unit. He argued that if the stucco crack were the cause, the upstairs unit would also show internal water damage, which it did not.
Governing Documents and Statutes
The case revolved around the interpretation of responsibility as defined by the following legal framework:
• Bylaws (Article II.E, Section 1) & CC&Rs (Article C): These documents obligate the HOA to collect assessments to meet common expenses, including the “maintenance, upkeep, care, repair, [and] reconstruction… for the common elements.”
• A.R.S. § 33-1247: This Arizona statute codifies the division of maintenance responsibility. It states that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”
Conclusions of Law and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the application of the legal standard of proof to the evidence presented.
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to demonstrate, by a “preponderance of the evidence,” that the HOA violated the applicable statutes or CC&Rs. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
• Central Legal Finding: The judge determined that if the water damage was caused by a flaw in the common elements, the HOA would be responsible. However, the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof in establishing this causal link.
• Reasoning for Decision: The ruling states: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the water leak and damage was attributable to the condition of the common elements. Rather, the opinions of the companies that inspected the area concluded that the leak was coming from the sliding glass door of the unit above Petitioner’s.” The collective weight of the expert opinions from Olander’s and the HOA’s inspector outweighed the Petitioner’s personal theory about the stucco cracks.
• Final Order: Based on these findings, the judge issued a final order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.” This order is binding unless a rehearing is granted.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020050-REL
Study Guide: Biesecker v. 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 20F-H2020050-REL, concerning a dispute between condominium owner Ronna Biesecker and the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association. The case centers on determining responsibility for water leaks affecting the Petitioner’s unit. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?
2. What was the central claim made by the Petitioner against the Respondent?
3. According to the Respondent, what was the source of the water leaks and who was responsible for the repair?
4. What legal standard, or “burden of proof,” did the Petitioner need to meet to win her case?
5. What two key community documents, in addition to Arizona state law, define the Respondent’s responsibility for maintaining “common elements”?
6. Summarize the findings of the two inspection reports mentioned in the evidence (from Olander’s and the December 23, 2019 invoice).
7. What was the Petitioner’s theory about the source of the leak, as stated during the hearing?
8. How did Robert Eric Struse, the Respondent’s Statutory Agent, counter the Petitioner’s theory about the stucco crack?
9. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
10. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was Ronna Biesecker, who owned condominium unit A113. The Respondent was the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association, of which the Petitioner was a member.
2. The Petitioner filed a petition alleging the Respondent violated its CC&Rs (§ 10(c)) and Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1247 by failing to maintain the common elements, which she believed were the source of water leaks in her unit.
3. The Respondent argued that the source of the water leaks was the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or track assemblies. Therefore, the responsibility for maintenance and repair belonged to the owner of that specific unit, not the Homeowners Association.
4. The Petitioner had the burden of proof to establish her claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires providing proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
5. The Respondent’s responsibility is defined in Article II.E, Section 1 of the community Bylaws and Section C of the CC&Rs. Both documents state the association is responsible for the maintenance and repair of common elements using assessments paid by owners.
6. An employee from Olander’s opined that the leak was coming from the unit above Petitioner’s, specifically from large gaps under the sliding door’s threshold. Similarly, the inspector’s invoice from December 23, 2019, concluded that the water damage appeared to be coming from the upstairs unit’s sliding doors or their track assemblies.
7. During the hearing, the Petitioner stated that it was “obvious” the leak was coming from a crack in the stucco in the pop-out surrounding the sliding doors at the roof level. She posited this was a common element and therefore the Respondent’s responsibility to repair.
8. Mr. Struse testified that if water were leaking through the crack in the stucco, the upstairs unit would have also sustained internal damage. He confirmed that an inspection of the inside of the upstairs unit showed this was not happening, undermining the Petitioner’s theory.
9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed.
10. The judge concluded the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof because the credible evidence, particularly the opinions of the companies that inspected the area, concluded the leak was coming from the sliding glass door of the unit above. The Petitioner did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the leak was attributable to the condition of the common elements.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and legal principles from the case document to support your arguments.
1. Analyze the distinction between “common elements” and an individual “unit” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1247 and the community’s governing documents. How was this distinction central to the judge’s final decision in this case?
2. Discuss the role and weight of evidence presented during the hearing. Compare the Petitioner’s testimony and personal observations with the professional opinions from Olander’s and the inspector. Why did the judge find the professional opinions more convincing in determining the outcome?
3. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case document’s Conclusions of Law. Using specific examples from the hearing evidence, detail why Ronna Biesecker failed to meet this standard.
4. Based on the referenced community documents, what are the primary maintenance responsibilities of the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association? How did the Respondent’s stated refusal to “arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party” in the dispute between unit owners align with or diverge from these responsibilities?
5. Imagine you are advising the Petitioner before the hearing. What additional evidence or types of expert testimony could she have presented to potentially change the outcome of the case and successfully prove the leak was the Respondent’s responsibility?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presides over the evidentiary hearing and issues a legally binding decision and order.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The statutes referenced (e.g., § 33-1247) govern the responsibilities of condominium associations and the legal procedures for disputes.
Bylaws
A set of rules governing the internal operations of an organization. In this case, Article II.E, Section 1 of the Bylaws obligates the Association to maintain the common elements using assessments paid by owners.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
A legal document that outlines the rights and obligations of property owners and the homeowners association. Section C of the CC&Rs required the Association to maintain, repair, and care for the common elements.
Common Elements
Areas of the condominium property for which the homeowners association is responsible for maintenance, upkeep, care, and repair, as distinguished from an individual owner’s unit.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Ronna Biesecker, the condominium owner who alleged the homeowners association violated its duties.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is established by evidence with the most convincing force.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association.
Statutory Agent
An individual designated to receive legal notices and appear on behalf of a business entity. In this case, Robert Eric Struse appeared and testified on behalf of the Respondent association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020050-REL
Your HOA Isn’t Your Landlord: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Condo Water Leak Lawsuit
Introduction: The Dreaded Drip
It’s a scenario that strikes fear into the heart of any condo owner: the tell-tale stain on the ceiling, the damp spot on the wall, the dreaded drip of a mysterious water leak. The immediate anxiety is followed by a pressing question: “Who is responsible for fixing this, and who pays for the damage?” Many assume the answer is straightforward, but as a recent lawsuit involving the 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association demonstrates, the lines of responsibility in a condominium community are often more complicated than they appear.
This article explores a real-life court case between a condo owner and her HOA to uncover three surprising truths about condo ownership, liability, and the true role of your HOA.
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1. It’s Not Where the Damage Is, It’s Where the Leak Starts
In the case, condo owner Ronna Biesecker experienced persistent water leaks in her unit (A113) around her sliding glass door. On May 1, 2019, after observing new cracks in the exterior stucco, she “posited that the cracks could be a source of the leak.” This became the foundation of her claim: if the water was coming from the stucco—a “Common Element”—then the HOA was responsible for the repairs.
However, a year-long trail of evidence pointed in a different direction. As early as January 18, 2019, an employee from the door installation company opined that the leak was “coming from the unit above.” On February 8, 2019, a handyman repairing plaster damage stated the issue was from “an old leak coming from above.” Even a roofing report from October 28, 2019, which noted the stucco cracking, stopped short of blaming it, instead recommending the owner contact a “stucco contractor or Window Company.”
This evidence culminated in a formal inspector’s report on December 23, 2019, which concluded the water was “coming from the upstairs unit sliding doors or their track assemblies.” Because the source of the leak originated from a part of the neighbor’s private unit, the legal responsibility shifted. Based on Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1247, the HOA was not liable. The key lesson here is unambiguous: legal responsibility follows the source of the problem, not the location of the resulting damage.
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2. “More Probably True Than Not”: The Burden of Proof Is on You
In any lawsuit, the person bringing the complaint—in this case, the homeowner—carries the “burden of proof.” This means she had to provide enough evidence to meet a specific legal standard, which the court defined as “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal decision offers a clear definition of this standard:
“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
In simple terms, Ms. Biesecker had to convince the judge that her theory—that the leak came from the common element stucco—was more likely to be true than the HOA’s theory that it came from the neighbor’s door.
Her claim was undone by simple logic. The HOA’s Statutory Agent, Mr. Struse, provided devastating testimony, arguing that “if water was leaking through the crack in the stucco, the upstairs unit would have also had internal damage, which was not happening.” This single point made the petitioner’s theory far less probable. The judge ultimately ruled that the petitioner “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the provisions of the CC&Rs or Arizona statutes,” proving that an owner’s belief isn’t enough without convincing evidence.
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3. Your HOA Won’t (and Often Can’t) Settle Neighbor-to-Neighbor Fights
Before filing the lawsuit, the petitioner attempted to resolve the issue directly. On or about February 11, 2019, she contacted the owner of the unit above hers to request repairs but “did not receive a response.” Frustrated, she turned to the HOA for help. In March or April 2019, she asked the Property Manager to “help mediate the issue” between her and her neighbor.
The HOA’s response was direct and legally sound: the Property Manager “responded that it would not arbitrate, mediate, or serve as a third party to the dispute.” This is a crucial and often misunderstood takeaway for condo owners. While an HOA’s role is to manage common elements and enforce community-wide rules, it is not legally obligated—and often not permitted—to intervene in private disputes between two homeowners over damage originating from private property. Your HOA is not a landlord or a mediator for personal conflicts; it’s an administrative body with a specific and legally defined scope of authority.
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Conclusion: Know Your Lines
The lessons from this case are clear: condo living involves a complex web of overlapping responsibilities. The line between what constitutes a common element, your private property, and your neighbor’s property is legally significant and determines who is ultimately responsible when things go wrong. Understanding these distinctions isn’t just helpful—it’s essential for protecting your investment and resolving issues effectively.
Before the next problem arises, have you read your community documents to know exactly where your responsibility ends and your neighbor’s begins?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Ronna Biesecker(petitioner) Appeared and testified on her own behalf.
Respondent Side
Robert Eric Struse(statutory agent) 6100 Fifth Condominium Homeowners Association Appeared and presented testimony on behalf of Respondent.
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate