The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the HOA Board had the authority under the CC&Rs and related documents to remove non-Board ARC members and appoint itself to perform the functions of the ARC, thus validating its approval of the homeowner's detached garage application.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated CC&Rs §§ 3.2 or 7.7. The Board, having assumed the developer's rights, was authorized to remove and appoint ARC members.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs regarding ARC dissolution and architectural approval authority.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA Board violated CC&Rs §§ 3.2 and 7.7 by dissolving the ARC and then acting as the ARC to approve a modification (detached garage) for a homeowner.
Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied because he failed to establish that CC&Rs §§ 3.2 or 7.7 prohibited the Respondent HOA from replacing non-Board ARC members, appointing its own members to act as the ARC, or approving the detached garage application.
Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Dwight vs. Whisper Mountain HOA
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 19F-H1918027-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (“Petitioner”) and the Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA Board violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by suspending the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and subsequently approving a homeowner’s construction application.
The ALJ denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the HOA Board acted within its authority. The decision established that upon the departure of the original developer (the “Declarant”), the Board inherited the Declarant’s full rights and responsibilities, including the power to both appoint and remove members of the ARC. The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s argument that ARC members held lifetime appointments, deeming such an interpretation contrary to the democratic principles of HOA governance. Consequently, the Board’s decision to remove the non-Board ARC members and appoint itself to serve as the ARC was ruled a valid exercise of its powers, and its subsequent approval of the construction application was not a violation of the CC&Rs.
Case Overview
Entity
Petitioner
N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (Homeowner and former ARC member)
Respondent
Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (HOA)
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Case Number
19F-H1918027-REL
Hearing Date
January 14, 2019
Decision Date
January 29, 2019
Core Allegation
The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent’s Board violated two sections of the CC&Rs:
1. § 7.7 (Improvements and Alterations): By approving a homeowner’s application to build a detached garage on September 19, 2018, without the approval of a properly constituted ARC.
2. § 3.2 (Appeal): By creating a situation where the body making an architectural decision (the Board acting as the ARC) is the same body that would hear an appeal of that decision, rendering the appeal process meaningless.
This was based on the Petitioner’s central claim that the Board’s action on August 6, 2018, to “dissolve” or “suspend” the ARC was a violation of the governing documents.
Key Factual Background & Timeline
• Prior to 2015: The developer, VIP Homes (“Declarant”), establishes the ARC as required by the CC&Rs.
• 2015: The Declarant turns over control of the HOA to the resident-elected Board of Directors.
• March 15, 2016: The Board adopts an ARC Charter, which explicitly states: “The right to appoint and remove all appointed [ARC] members at any time is hereby vested solely in the Board.” The Petitioner is appointed as one of three non-Board members to the ARC.
• 2017 or 2018: A proposed amendment to the CC&Rs to formally replace references to “Declarant” with “Board” or “Association” is not adopted by the general membership.
• July 17, 2018: The ARC meets to consider a detached garage application from homeowners Mark and Connie Wells. The meeting is contentious, with the Petitioner expressing doubts about the ARC’s authority to grant a variance from city setback requirements. The meeting adjourns abruptly after the applicant allegedly “verbally threatened the committee.”
• August 6, 2018: The HOA Board meets and passes a motion “to suspend the ARC committee for 60 days until guidelines/expectations are clarified.” The motion states that in the interim, the Board will review and approve all ARC submissions.
• August 24, 2018: The Board sends a letter to the non-Board ARC members, including the Petitioner, informing them of the 60-day suspension.
• September 17, 2018: The Board meets and approves a revised application from the Wells, which now aligns with City of Mesa code.
• September 19, 2018: The Board, formally acting as the ARC, reviews and approves the Wells’ revised application.
• October 22, 2018: The Petitioner files his complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• November 19, 2018: The Board adopts a “Resolution Regarding the ARC” to clarify its position. The resolution states the Board had “(i) temporarily removed the current members of the [ARC] (via a suspension) and (ii) chose to act and serve as the current [ARC].” It also formally ratifies the approval of the Wells’ garage.
Central Arguments Presented
Petitioner’s Position (N. Wayne Dwight, Jr.)
• Limited Board Authority: The CC&Rs (§ 3.4) grant the Declarant the “sole right to appoint and remove” ARC members. After the Declarant’s departure, this section states that members “shall be appointed by the Board.” The Petitioner argued this only conferred the power to appoint, not to remove.
• Failed Amendment: The failure of the membership to amend the CC&Rs to explicitly grant the Board the Declarant’s powers proves that the Board does not possess the power of removal.
• Lifetime Appointments: The Petitioner argued that once appointed, ARC members could only be removed for specific cause (e.g., moving out of the community, incapacitation) and were otherwise entitled to serve for life.
• Improper ARC Suspension: The Board’s action to suspend the committee was a violation of the CC&Rs, as the Board lacked the authority to do so.
• Invalid Approval: Because the ARC was improperly suspended, the Board’s subsequent approval of the Wells’ application violated § 7.7, which requires ARC approval for all alterations.
• Meaningless Appeals: If the Board can act as the ARC, the appeal process outlined in § 3.2, which allows a homeowner to appeal an ARC decision to the Board, becomes an “exercise in futility.”
Respondent’s Position (Whisper Mountain HOA)
• Inherited Powers: Upon the Declarant’s departure, the Board assumed all of its rights and responsibilities under the CC&Rs, including the power to both appoint and remove ARC members.
• Authority from ARC Charter: The ARC Charter, adopted in 2016, explicitly grants the Board the sole right to remove ARC members at any time.
• Intent of the Board: The Board’s intent was not to abolish the ARC, but to address concerns about the committee’s conduct, including its “way of questioning applicants” and a need for more civility, fairness, and consistency.
• Clarification of “Suspension”: The use of the word “suspend” in communications by the management company (Mariposa Group) was “unfortunate and inaccurate.” The Board’s true action, clarified in its November 19 resolution, was to remove the non-Board members and appoint its own members to serve as the ARC.
• Valid Approval: The Board was legitimately acting as the ARC when it approved the Wells’ application; therefore, § 7.7 was not violated.
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Conclusions
Interpretation of Governing Documents
The ALJ concluded that restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties. The Judge found the Petitioner’s interpretation of the CC&Rs to be unpersuasive and ultimately harmful to the community.
• The Judge stated that the Petitioner’s interpretation “elevates non-elected members of ARC above elected Board members, abrogates any community control over ARC, and does not serve the underlying purposes of the CC&Rs.”
• This “unelected lifetime appointment” concept was found to be contrary to the “democratic principles underlying HOA law in Arizona.”
On the Board’s Authority
The ALJ affirmed the HOA’s authority to manage the ARC as it did.
• Assumption of Powers: The decision concludes that “When Declarant turned Respondent HOA over to its Board, the Board assumed all of Declarant’s rights and responsibilities under the CC&Rs and related documents.” This included the power to remove ARC members.
• ARC Charter: The Judge noted that the ARC Charter also “expressly provided that the Board had the power to remove as well as to appoint members of the ARC.”
• Legitimacy of Actions: The Board was found to have acted within its authority in August 2018 when it “removed the three non-Board members of the ARC and appointed itself to perform the functions of the ARC.”
On the Alleged Violations
Based on the finding that the Board acted within its authority, the ALJ concluded that no violations occurred.
• Conclusion on CC&R § 7.7 (ARC Approval): The petition failed on this point because the Board was legitimately acting as the ARC when it approved the Wells’ application in September 2018.
• Conclusion on CC&R § 3.2 (Appeals): The petition failed on this point because the CC&Rs do not prohibit Board members from acting as the ARC. While acknowledging that appealing a decision to the same body “may be an exercise in futility,” the Judge noted that under the CC&Rs, the Board is not required to hear appeals in any event.
Final Order and Implications
Order: The petition filed by N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. was denied. The Judge found he had not established that the HOA violated CC&Rs §§ 3.2 or 7.7.
Implications: This decision establishes a strong precedent for interpreting HOA governing documents in a manner that favors functional, democratic governance over literal interpretations that could lead to impractical or absurd outcomes. It affirms that an HOA Board generally inherits the full operational powers of the original developer unless explicitly restricted, and that a Board can act to reform or reconstitute committees to ensure they serve the community’s best interests.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918027-REL
Study Guide: Dwight v. Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. vs. Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918027-REL). It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the context of the legal document.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each of the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the provided source document.
1. What were the two specific allegations made by the Petitioner, N. Wayne Dwight, Jr., in his petition filed on October 22, 2018?
2. Identify the key parties in this case and describe their respective roles or relationships to the dispute.
3. What was the purpose and outcome of the ARC meeting held on July 17, 2018, regarding the Wells’ property?
4. Explain the actions taken by the Respondent’s Board of Directors during its meeting on August 6, 2018, regarding the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).
5. What was the Petitioner’s interpretation of CC&R § 3.4 regarding the removal of ARC members, and what was the potential consequence of this interpretation as noted by the Administrative Law Judge?
6. According to the Respondent’s Board president, Greg Robert Wingert, what were the primary reasons for removing the non-Board members of the ARC?
7. Describe the role of the Mariposa Group LLC in this case and explain how its communications created confusion.
8. How did the Board clarify its actions and ratify its decisions in the November 19, 2018 Resolution?
9. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is it defined in the case documents?
10. What was the final ruling of the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core reasoning behind the decision regarding CC&Rs §§ 3.2 and 7.7?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent’s Board violated Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) §§ 3.2 and 7.7. The specific violations cited were the dissolution or suspension of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) on August 6, 2018, and the subsequent approval of an application from two members to build a detached garage on September 19, 2018.
2. The key parties are N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (the “Petitioner”), a property owner and former ARC member, and the Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The case also involves Greg Robert Wingert, the President of the Respondent’s Board, and Mark and Connie Wells, the homeowners who applied to build a detached garage. The dispute centers on the Respondent’s authority over the ARC, of which the Petitioner was a member.
3. The purpose of the July 17, 2018, meeting was for the ARC, including the Petitioner, to consider Mark and Connie Wells’ application for a detached garage. The meeting was abruptly adjourned after the applicant allegedly threatened the committee, and no formal vote was conducted at that time. However, a letter dated July 30, 2018, later informed the Wells that the ARC had approved their request.
4. At the August 6, 2018, meeting, the Board of Directors discussed the need for more consistency and guidelines for the ARC. Citing these reasons and safety concerns from a prior meeting, the Board passed a motion to “suspend the ARC committee for 60 days” and announced that in the interim, the Board itself would review and approve all ARC submissions.
5. The Petitioner argued that CC&R § 3.4 only allowed the Board to appoint, not remove, ARC members. He contended that once appointed, members could only be removed for cause and were otherwise entitled to serve for life. The Judge noted this interpretation would elevate unelected ARC members above the elected Board and abrogate community control.
6. Greg Robert Wingert testified that the Board removed the non-Board ARC members due to concerns about the “manner in which questioning was done in a public forum.” The Board’s intent was not to eliminate the ARC, but to continue the review process while making it more civil, fair, consistent, and transparent.
7. The Mariposa Group LLC was the Respondent’s management company. Its employees, such as Ed Ericksen, were responsible for drafting official communications like minutes and letters. These communications used inaccurate words like “suspend” and “dissolve” to describe the Board’s actions regarding the ARC, which Mr. Wingert testified was an “unfortunate and inaccurate” choice of words that did not reflect the Board’s true intent.
8. The November 19, 2018, Resolution clarified that the Board had removed the existing ARC members and appointed itself to act and serve as the ARC, as was its right under CC&R § 3.4. The resolution explicitly stated that the Board members were the current members of the ARC and ratified all prior architectural decisions made by the Board while serving in this capacity, including the approval of the garage on Lot 18.
9. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not, representing the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.
10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it removed the non-Board ARC members and appointed itself to perform ARC functions, meaning it did not violate CC&R § 7.7 by approving the Wells’ application. The Judge also found no violation of CC&R § 3.2, noting that the CC&Rs do not prohibit Board members from acting as the ARC.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the facts and legal interpretations presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the CC&Rs, particularly § 3.4. How does this interpretation address the transfer of power from the “Declarant” to the Board, and how does it counter the Petitioner’s argument for lifetime appointments?
2. Discuss the concept of an “appeal” as outlined in CC&R § 3.2. Evaluate the potential conflict of interest and the issue of futility raised when the Board of Directors also serves as the Architectural Review Committee.
3. Trace the timeline of events surrounding the Wells’ application for a detached garage. How did this specific application serve as the catalyst for the broader conflict between the Petitioner and the Respondent’s Board?
4. Examine the role of communication and language in this dispute. How did the specific wording used by the management company in official documents (e.g., “suspend”) differ from the Board’s stated intent, and how did this discrepancy fuel the conflict?
5. Based on the evidence presented, evaluate the argument that the Board’s actions were a necessary measure to ensure a “civil, fair, consistent, and transparent” architectural review process versus the argument that the Board overstepped its authority as defined by the CC&Rs.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition within the Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judicial officer (Diane Mihalsky) from the Office of Administrative Hearings tasked with conducting an evidentiary hearing and rendering a decision on the petition.
Architectural Review Committee (ARC)
A committee established to review and approve or deny any improvements, alterations, or other work that alters the exterior appearance of a property. Per the CC&Rs, its decisions are final unless appealed to the Board.
ARC Charter
A document adopted by the Respondent’s Board on March 15, 2016, which provided that the ARC would consist of up to four members appointed by the Board and that the Board vested itself with the sole right to appoint and remove all appointed ARC members at any time.
Board of Directors (Board)
The elected body that conducts the affairs of the Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association. The document presumes they are elected by members to specific terms.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The governing documents for the Whisper Mountain planned community, recorded on September 7, 2016. They outline the rules for property use, the structure of the HOA, and the functions of bodies like the ARC.
Declarant
The original developer who built the planned community, identified as VIP Homes. The Declarant initially held the sole right to appoint and remove ARC members, a right that transferred to the Board after the developer was no longer involved.
Mariposa Group LLC
The management company employed by the Respondent HOA. Its employees, such as Douglas Egan and Ed Ericksen, were responsible for drafting official communications like meeting minutes and approval letters.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate referred the petition for an evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner
N. Wayne Dwight, Jr., a property owner in the Whisper Mountain development and a former member of the ARC. He filed the petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (“HOA”), the governing body for the development. The Respondent was represented by its Board and legal counsel.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918027-REL
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19F-H1918027-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between a homeowner, N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (Petitioner), and the Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA’s Board violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by dissolving or suspending the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and subsequently approving an application for a detached garage. The decision details the background, evidence presented at the hearing, and the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) findings and conclusions of law. Ultimately, the ALJ denied the petition, finding that the Board acted within its authority under the governing documents to remove non-Board ARC members and appoint itself to fulfill the ARC’s functions. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the specified CC&Rs.
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
N. Wayne Dwight, Jr.(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf; former ARC member; testified on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Troy B. Stratman(attorney) Stratman Law Firm, PLC Represented Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association
Greg Robert Wingert(board member/witness) Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association Board President; Chairman of the ARC; testified for Respondent
Pam Cohen(board member) Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association Seconded motions; identified as 'Pam' in meeting minutes
Ronna(board member) Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association Made motion to suspend ARC
Gary(board member) Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association
Douglas Egan(property manager) Mariposa Group LLC Sent approval letter for garage application
Ed Ericksen(property manager) Mariposa Community Manager; sent approval/clarification letters regarding Wells' request
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(staff) Transmitted decision
Other Participants
Mark Wells(owner/applicant) Whisper Mountain development Submitted application for detached garage (Lot 18)
Connie Wells(owner/applicant) Whisper Mountain development Submitted application for detached garage (Lot 18)
Phil Hoyt(owner/member) Whisper Mountain development (Lot 16)
Andy Horn(owner/member) Whisper Mountain development (Lot 1)
Jason Komorowski(owner/member) Whisper Mountain development (Lot 51)
Connie Harrison(neighbor) Whisper Mountain development Mentioned regarding Lot 18 variance condition
Don Berry(owner/member) Whisper Mountain development (Lot 45)
Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc.
Counsel
Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition upon rehearing, holding that the email chain discussing an incident involving the Petitioner's husband was an informal communication among Board members, not an official record of the association under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), since the Board never took any formal action on the matter. Therefore, the HOA was not required to produce an un-redacted copy.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the email string constituted 'financial and other records of the association' which Respondent was required to provide.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to produce association records (un-redacted email string) upon member request
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce an un-redacted copy of an email chain among Board members concerning an incident where Petitioner's husband allegedly harassed potential buyers, arguing the email constituted an official association record.
Orders: Petition denied and dismissed. The HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) as the email string was determined not to be an official record of the association.
Legal Dispute Briefing: Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between homeowner Patricia Wiercinski and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The case, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, centered on the HOA’s alleged failure to produce official records in violation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805. The dispute originated from a June 19, 2017 incident where Wiercinski’s husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly confronted and verbally abused potential buyers of a neighboring property, causing them to withdraw their interest.
The core of the legal challenge involved an email exchange among HOA board members discussing the incident. Wiercinski’s petition, filed on October 18, 2018, demanded access to what she believed were official HOA documents related to this event. The case proceeded through an initial hearing on January 10, 2019, and a subsequent rehearing on April 22, 2019, both overseen by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.
In both hearings, the Judge ruled decisively in favor of the HOA. The central finding was that the private email communications among board members did not constitute an “official record of the association.” Therefore, the HOA had no statutory obligation to produce them or provide an un-redacted version. The judge upheld the HOA’s decision to redact the names of the potential buyers and their agent, citing credible testimony regarding Mr. Coates’ history of “threatening and bullying neighbors” as a reasonable justification for protecting those individuals from potential harassment. Both of Wiercinski’s petitions were ultimately denied and dismissed.
Case Overview and Parties Involved
The dispute was formally adjudicated within the jurisdiction of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for evidentiary proceedings.
• Case Number: 19F-H1918028-REL
• Initial Hearing Date: January 10, 2019
• Rehearing Date: April 22, 2019
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Key Individuals and Entities
Name/Entity
Patricia Wiercinski
Petitioner; homeowner and member of the HOA.
Wayne Coates
Petitioner’s husband; central figure in the June 19, 2017 incident.
Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.
Respondent; the Homeowners’ Association (“HOA”).
Michael “Mike” Olson
President of the Respondent’s Board of Directors.
Gregg Arthur
Director on the Respondent’s Board and a realtor.
Joe Zielinski
Director on the Respondent’s Board.
Kathy Andrews
Community Manager for the Respondent, employed by HOAMCO.
John Allen
HOA member and owner of the lot being sold.
Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq. (Goodman Law Group)
Legal representative for the Respondent.
Diane Mihalsky
Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.
The Core Incident of June 19, 2017
The legal dispute stemmed from an encounter on June 19, 2017, involving Wayne Coates and a family considering the purchase of a vacant lot on Puntenney Rd., located across the street from the Wiercinski/Coates residence.
According to an email from the prospective buyers, Mr. Coates confronted them, their son, and their architect as they were viewing the property.
• Coates’ Alleged Actions: He “came out of his house and was belligerent and cursing at them,” claiming “nothing was for sale around here.” The potential buyer described him as “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational,” making “rude remarks while cussing” and displaying “extreme aggressive behavior.”
• Impact on the Sale: The confrontation directly caused the potential buyers to withdraw their offer. In their correspondence, they stated:
• Broader Concerns: The incident was seen by some as detrimental to the entire community. Board Director Gregg Arthur noted, “Wayne thru his actions appears to have interfered with and destroyed a property sale. We need to meet and take action on this matter as it will have a broad and chilling effect amongst the realtor community (effecting us all) not to mention the property owners.”
The Initial Hearing and Decision (January 2019)
The initial hearing focused on whether the HOA had withheld official records of its deliberations or decisions regarding the June 19, 2017 incident.
Petitioner’s Position
Patricia Wiercinski argued that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents. Her key assertions were:
• Because an email about the incident was sent to a quorum of the Board, the matter constituted official business.
• The Board was legally required to make a formal motion and arrive at a documented decision, even if that decision was to take no action.
• She had never received any such documentation, such as minutes from an executive session or an open meeting.
• She pointed to a Board resolution regarding the electronic storage of documents as evidence that such records must exist.
Respondent’s Position
The HOA, represented by Ashley N. Moscarello, denied any violation. Their defense included:
• The email chain was an informal communication among neighbors and Board members on their personal email servers, not an official HOA record.
• No member had ever requested the Board take official action on the matter.
• The email string was provided voluntarily to the Petitioner.
• The names of the potential buyers and their real estate agent were redacted specifically because “Mr. Coates had a history of bullying and intimidating people.”
• The Board never formally discussed the incident, held a meeting, voted, or took any official action.
• The Community Manager, Kathy Andrews, testified that no official records (agendas, resolutions, minutes, etc.) pertaining to the incident existed.
Outcome and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition. The key conclusions of law were:
• The burden of proof was on the Petitioner to show a violation occurred.
• The simple fact that a quorum of Board members discussed a topic in private emails “does not make it official Board business,” especially when no action is taken.
• Forcing volunteer board members to formally document every informal discussion would be an “unnecessary and burdensome requirement.”
• Because the Petitioner did not establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed, the petition was dismissed.
The Rehearing and Final Decision (May 2019)
Wiercinski requested and was granted a rehearing, alleging “misconduct by the judge.” In this second hearing, she significantly altered her legal argument.
Petitioner’s Evolved Position
Wiercinski abandoned her claim that the Board was required to create a formal record of inaction. Instead, her new theory was:
• The email string itself, having been voluntarily produced by the HOA, must be considered an “official record of the association.”
• As an official record, A.R.S. § 33-1805 required the HOA to produce a complete, un-redacted copy.
• She argued that she and Mr. Coates had a right to know the identities of those who had accused him of belligerence.
Respondent’s Defense
The HOA’s defense remained consistent:
• The redaction of names was a necessary and reasonable measure to protect the individuals from potential harassment by Mr. Coates.
• The incident was a personal dispute between neighbors and did not violate any of the HOA’s governing documents (CC&Rs, bylaws), placing it outside the Board’s enforcement authority.
• Kathy Andrews again testified that the email was not part of the association’s archived business records, as the Board took no official action.
Final Outcome and Rationale
The Judge once again dismissed the petition. The final ruling reinforced the initial decision and provided further clarity:
• The email string was definitively not a “record of the association.”
• Because it was not an official record, A.R.S. § 33-1805 did not compel the HOA to provide an un-redacted version.
• The Judge explicitly validated the HOA’s motive for the redactions, stating that the Board President’s fear that “Mr. Coates would harass the real estate agent and potential purchaser… does not appear unreasonable.”
Key Evidence and Testimony
The email communications provided the primary evidentiary basis for the case.
Incriminating Email Content
Several emails from June 20, 2017, highlighted the severity of the incident and concerns about Wayne Coates:
• From Real Estate Agent to Potential Buyer: “He [John Allen] knows this person, Wayne Coates, and said he has been an issue in the neighborhood before. He has contacted Hoamco and is seeking legal [counsel] to stop this menace.”
• From Director Joe Zielinski to the Board: “The YCSO [Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office] may file charges against Wayne for disorderly conduct/harassment… given Wayne’s arrest record and prison term and criminal history. … I don’t believe Wayne (and Patricia’s) aggressive and disruptive behavior will stop.”
• From Director Gregg Arthur to the Board: “I was hoping that this would not be a situation we would have to encounter with Wayne Coates and Patricia however here it is on our door step.”
Definition of “Official Records”
Testimony from Community Manager Kathy Andrews was crucial in establishing the distinction between official and unofficial communications. She defined official records as including:
• Governing documents and architectural guidelines.
• Board and general meeting minutes.
• Expenditures, receipts, contracts, and financials.
• Anything submitted to the Board for official action.
She confirmed that because the Board took no action on the June 19, 2017 incident, the related emails were not included in Respondent’s archived records.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918028-REL
Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA: A Case Study
This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative case of Patricia Wiercinski versus the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. The case revolves around a homeowner’s request for association records and the legal definition of what constitutes an official document that a homeowners’ association is required to produce under Arizona law. The material is drawn from two Administrative Law Judge Decisions, dated January 22, 2019, and May 1, 2019.
Key Parties and Individuals
Role / Title
Affiliation
Patricia Wiercinski
Petitioner
Homeowner, Member of Respondent
Wayne Coates
Petitioner’s Husband
Homeowner
Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.
Respondent
Homeowners’ Association (HOA)
Diane Mihalsky
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.
Legal Counsel for Respondent
Goodman Law Group
Michael “Mike” Olson
President of the Board
Respondent (HOA)
Gregg Arthur
Director on the Board
Respondent (HOA)
Kathy Andrews
Community Manager
HOAMCO (Respondent’s management company)
John Allen
Property Owner / HOA Member
Long Meadow Ranch East
Joe Zielinski
Director on the Board
Respondent (HOA)
Jim Robertson
Director on the Board
Respondent (HOA)
Tom Reid
Director on the Board
Respondent (HOA)
Boris Biloskirka
Former Board Member
Respondent (HOA)
Timeline of Key Events
June 19, 2017
An incident occurs where Wayne Coates allegedly acts belligerently toward potential buyers of John Allen’s property.
June 20, 2017
An email exchange regarding the incident occurs between John Allen, his realtor, and members of the HOA Board.
October 18, 2018
Patricia Wiercinski files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805.
January 10, 2019
The initial evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.
January 22, 2019
The ALJ issues a decision denying Wiercinski’s petition.
Post-Jan 22, 2019
Wiercinski requests a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The request is granted.
April 22, 2019
The rehearing is held.
May 1, 2019
The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing Wiercinski’s petition.
The Core Dispute: The June 19, 2017 Incident
On June 19, 2017, potential buyers, along with their builder, architect, and son, were viewing a lot for sale owned by John Allen on Puntenney Rd. The lot was across the street from the home of Patricia Wiercinski and Wayne Coates. An elderly man, later identified as Wayne Coates, came out of the house and was allegedly “belligerent and cursing” at the group, telling them nothing was for sale and they should not be snooping around. The potential buyers described the individual as “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational,” displaying “extreme aggressive behavior.” As a result of this encounter, the potential buyers decided to remove the lot from their list of considerations, stating they were seeking a “quiet, peaceful, and neighborly place to retire. Not a place with hostility and confrontation.”
This incident prompted John Allen to contact his realtor and members of the HOA Board, seeking action to prevent such behavior from interfering with future property sales.
The Legal Proceedings
Petitioner’s Argument: Patricia Wiercinski alleged that the HOA (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents related to its deliberations, decisions, and actions regarding the June 19, 2017 incident. Her core arguments were:
• The email about the incident was sent to a quorum of the Board, making it official business.
• The Board was required to make a formal motion and decision, even if it decided to take no action against her husband.
• She never received documents showing the Board addressed the incident in an executive session or open meeting.
• She did not receive a map referenced in one of the emails or a letter mentioned by board member Joe Zielninski in a video.
• An HOA resolution to electronically store all association business documents meant the requested records must exist.
Respondent’s Argument: The HOA denied violating any statute. Its defense was based on the following points:
• The Board never took any official action against Wiercinski or Coates as a result of the incident.
• The email string was an informal communication among Board Directors on their personal servers and was not kept as an official record. It was provided to Wiercinski voluntarily.
• The names of the potential purchasers and real estate agent were redacted from the emails because Wayne Coates has a known history of “threatening and bullying neighbors and others.”
• No official discussion or vote on the incident ever occurred in an executive session or general meeting.
ALJ’s Decision (January 22, 2019): The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition. The decision concluded that Wiercinski did not meet her burden of proof to establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed that the Respondent failed to produce. The judge reasoned that the mere fact a quorum of Board members informally discusses a topic in private emails does not make it official Board business, especially when no action is taken.
Reason for Rehearing: Wiercinski requested a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request without noting any specific misconduct or stating why it should have changed the result.
Petitioner’s Changed Argument: At the rehearing, Wiercinski changed her theory of the case. She no longer argued that the Board failed to produce a record of a formal decision. Instead, she argued that:
• The email string itself was an official record of the association’s business.
• A.R.S. § 33-1805 therefore required the HOA to produce a fully un-redacted copy of the emails.
• She and Mr. Coates had a right to know the names of the individuals accusing Mr. Coates of belligerence.
Respondent’s Rebuttal: The HOA maintained its position:
• The email string was not an official record because the Board never took any action on the matter. The incident did not violate any of the HOA’s CC&Rs, bylaws, or anything else it was empowered to enforce.
• Community Manager Kathy Andrews testified that official records include governing documents, minutes, and items submitted to the Board for action. Since the Board took no action, the email was not included in the association’s archived records.
• The names were redacted because of Mr. Coates’s history of intimidation, and the Board president feared he would harass the individuals involved.
ALJ’s Final Decision (May 1, 2019): The petition was dismissed again. The ALJ reaffirmed that the email string was not a “record of the association.” Therefore, A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) did not require the Respondent to provide an un-redacted version to the Petitioner. The judge also noted that the fear of harassment by Mr. Coates, which prompted the redactions, “does not appear unreasonable.”
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Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.
1. What specific event on June 19, 2017, initiated the legal dispute?
2. What Arizona statute did Patricia Wiercinski claim the HOA violated, and what does that statute generally require?
3. Why did the HOA state it redacted names from the email chain it provided to Wiercinski?
4. In the initial hearing, what did Wiercinski argue the HOA Board was required to do even if it decided to take no action on the incident?
5. How did Wiercinski’s primary legal argument change between the first hearing and the rehearing?
6. Who is Kathy Andrews, and what was her testimony regarding the HOA’s official records?
7. Did the HOA Board ever hold a formal meeting or take an official vote regarding the incident involving Wayne Coates?
8. According to the ALJ, does an informal email discussion among a quorum of board members automatically constitute “official Board business”?
9. What was the final ruling in the case after the rehearing?
10. What reason did HOA President Mike Olson give for the Board not taking official action on the June 19, 2017 incident?
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Answer Key
1. The event was an alleged confrontation where Wayne Coates was belligerent and verbally abusive toward potential buyers who were viewing a property for sale across the street from his home. This encounter caused the buyers to lose interest in the property.
2. Wiercinski claimed the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. This statute requires that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association be made reasonably available for examination by any member.
3. The HOA stated it redacted the names of the potential purchasers and their real estate agent due to Wayne Coates’s history of “threatening and bullying neighbors and others.” Board President Mike Olson testified he feared Mr. Coates would harass the individuals if their identities were revealed.
4. In the initial hearing, Wiercinski argued that the Board was required to make a formal motion and arrive at a formal, documented decision even if it decided it was not going to take any action against her husband.
5. In the rehearing, Wiercinski’s argument shifted from claiming the HOA failed to produce a record of a decision to arguing the email string itself was an official record. She then demanded that the HOA provide a fully un-redacted version of this email string.
6. Kathy Andrews is the community manager for the HOA, employed by the management company Hoamco. She testified that the association’s official records include items like governing documents, meeting minutes, and anything submitted to the Board for action, and that the email was not an official record because the Board took no action.
7. No. Testimony from multiple witnesses, including Mike Olson and Gregg Arthur, confirmed that the Board never discussed the incident at an executive meeting or general membership meeting and never voted or took any official action as a result of the incident.
8. No. The ALJ’s decision states that the mere fact a quorum of Board members discusses a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not take any action to make it so.
9. The final ruling was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ found that the email string was not an official record of the association, so the HOA was not required by law to provide an un-redacted version.
10. Mike Olson testified that the Board never voted to take any action because the alleged incident did not violate the Respondent’s CC&Rs, bylaws, or anything else that the HOA was authorized or empowered to enforce.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between informal discussions among board members and “official Board business.” How did this distinction shape the outcome of both hearings?
2. Discuss the evolution of Patricia Wiercinski’s legal strategy from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Was the change in argument effective, and why or why not?
3. Examine the roles of A.R.S. § 33-1805 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 in this case. Explain how the Petitioner and Respondent interpreted these statutes differently and how the Administrative Law Judge ultimately applied them.
4. Based on the testimony of Mike Olson and Kathy Andrews, describe the HOA’s official position on record-keeping and its justification for not treating the email string as an official document.
5. Evaluate the Respondent’s decision to redact the names of non-members from the email string. What reasons were given for this action, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this justification in the final ruling?
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Glossary
• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): The impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.
• A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case which provides that “all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member.”
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4): An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case which provides that any quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions.
• Homeowners’ Association (HOA): An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium building that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc.
• Petitioner: The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Patricia Wiercinski.
• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with the “most convincing force.”
• Quorum: The minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly (such as a board of directors) necessary to conduct the business of that group. The petitioner argued that because a quorum of the board was included on the emails, the discussion constituted official business.
• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918028-REL
4 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit About a “Nightmare Neighbor”
Introduction: Behind the Closed Doors of the HOA Board
Many people live in communities governed by a Homeowners’ Association (HOA), navigating the rules and paying the dues as part of modern suburban life. But what happens when a serious dispute between neighbors erupts? What if one resident’s behavior is so aggressive that it costs another the sale of their property? A real-life administrative law case from Prescott, Arizona, provides a rare and fascinating look into the messy reality of HOA governance. The lawsuit, filed by a homeowner against her HOA for allegedly withholding records, reveals surprising truths about what constitutes “official business” and the real-world limits of an HOA’s power.
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1. Not All HOA Talk is “Official Business”—Even When the Whole Board Is In on It.
The case centered on a dramatic incident. A homeowner’s husband, Wayne Coates, was accused of being “belligerent and cursing” at potential buyers viewing a lot across the street, causing them to back out of the sale. The distressed property seller, John Allen, emailed an HOA board member, Gregg Arthur, who then forwarded the complaint to the entire board. The petitioner, Mr. Coates’ wife, argued that this email chain was an official HOA record.
Her argument rested on a profound misunderstanding of board governance that many residents likely share: she claimed the board was legally required to make a motion and arrive at a formal decision even if it decided to do nothing. The administrative law judge firmly rejected this idea. The emails were deemed informal, private communications, not official records.
The judge clarified that “official business” is triggered when a board moves toward a formal decision or action that would bind the association, such as spending funds, issuing a violation, or changing a rule. These emails were purely informational and investigatory, never reaching that threshold. This distinction is a cornerstone of volunteer board governance, as it protects boards from being paralyzed by procedure. The judge’s decision powerfully refutes the notion that boards must formally document every issue they choose not to pursue:
the mere fact that a quorum of Board members may discuss a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not end up taking any action to make a matter board business. Any other result would impose an unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers who are not compensated for their time who are may be neighbors and who may also be friends, in addition to being Board members.
2. A Neighbor’s Behavior Can Kill a Property Sale, and Your HOA Might Be Powerless.
The impact of Mr. Coates’ alleged actions was immediate and severe. The potential buyers, seeking a peaceful retirement, were so shaken by the confrontation that they explicitly withdrew their interest in the property.
An email from the potential buyer, submitted as evidence, vividly illustrates the direct financial consequence of the neighbor’s behavior:
In closing when we returned one thing that stands out is would we want to live next to this type of behavior of [a] neighbor? The answer is no, this lot was one that we had in our top 2 Lots as a consideration for purchase but due to the volatile potential of this man, we have decided at this point to remove it from our list.
Despite the clear harm to a member, the HOA concluded it could not intervene. According to testimony, Community Manager Kathy Andrews explained that the HOA had “no authority to become involved in a personal dispute between neighbors.” Further, Board President Mike Olson testified that the incident did not violate any specific CC&Rs or bylaws the board was empowered to enforce. This highlights a counter-intuitive reality for many homeowners: not all bad neighbor behavior falls under an HOA’s jurisdiction, even when it negatively affects property sales. However, while the HOA was powerless, the situation was not a dead end for the seller, who court records show did eventually sell his lot to someone else.
3. Transparency Has Limits, Especially When a Resident Is Seen as a Threat.
The petitioner demanded an un-redacted copy of the emails, wanting to know exactly who was accusing her husband. The HOA refused, redacting the names of the potential buyers and their real estate agent.
The reason, according to sworn testimony from HOA President Mike Olson, was that Mr. Coates had a “history of threatening and bullying neighbors and others.” This case highlights the inherent tension between a member’s right to information and the board’s fiduciary duty to protect individuals from harm. While members have a right to access official records, that right is not absolute.
The judge validated the board’s exercise of its duty of care, finding its rationale for the redactions to be sound. In a moment of legal irony, the judge noted that the board’s fear was reasonable, “especially given Mr. Coates’ role in causing Petitioner to prosecute this petition at the original hearing and rehearing.” In effect, the petitioner’s own aggressive pursuit of the case in court helped to legally justify the board’s initial decision to protect identities from her husband.
4. Suing Your HOA Can Put Your Own Dirty Laundry on Display.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the lawsuit is what it ultimately accomplished. In her quest to obtain what she believed were improperly withheld documents, the petitioner’s legal action placed deeply unflattering information about her husband directly into the public record for anyone to see.
Emails submitted as evidence contained damaging statements, including an email from board member Joe Zielinski that is now a permanent part of the court file. It contained severe allegations that went far beyond the initial incident.
The YCSO [Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office] may file charges against Wayne for disorderly conduct/harassment, based on what happened to Mr. Allan and the others in attendance, given Wayne’s arrest record and prison term and criminal history. . . . I don’t believe Wayne (and Patricia’s) aggressive and disruptive behavior will stop.
This serves as a powerful “be careful what you wish for” lesson in HOA litigation. The lawsuit, intended to hold the HOA accountable, permanently enshrined the allegations about her husband’s “arrest record and prison term” in the public court record—the very opposite of the privacy and vindication the petitioner was likely seeking.
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Conclusion: The Fine Line Between Community and Controversy
This case peels back the curtain on the complex world of volunteer-run HOAs. It demonstrates that the line between an informal discussion among neighbors and official, actionable HOA business is finer and more consequential than most residents assume. It shows that an HOA’s power has clear limits and that a board’s duty to protect individuals can sometimes override demands for total transparency. It makes you wonder: when you see a problem in your neighborhood, is it truly the HOA’s business to solve, or is it a personal dispute between neighbors?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Patricia Wiercinski(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf
Wayne Coates(petitioner's husband) Central figure in the June 19, 2017 incident
Respondent Side
Ashley N. Moscarello(HOA attorney) Goodman Law Group Represented Respondent
Michael Olson(board president, witness) President of Respondent's board; testified at hearing and rehearing
Gregg Arthur(board director, witness) Director on Respondent's board; testified at hearing
Kathy Andrews(property manager, witness) HOAMCO Respondent's community manager; employed by HOAMCO; testified at hearing and rehearing
John Allen(member/complainant) Owner trying to sell property across the street from Petitioner; member of Respondent
Jim Robertson(board director) Director on Respondent's board
Joe Zielinski(board director, witness) Director on Respondent's board; mentioned conversation with YCSO deputy
Tom Reid(board director) Director on Respondent's board
Boris Biloskirka(former board member) Recipient of emails; identified as a former Board member
Josh(compliance officer) Referenced in emails regarding compliance inspections
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Administrative Law Judge
Shelia Polk(head prosecutor) Head of the office Joe Zielinski sought to contact regarding Wayne Coates
YCSO’s deputy(deputy) Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office Conversed with Joe Zielinski regarding the incident
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
partial
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Tom Barrs
Counsel
—
Respondent
Desert Ranch Homeowners' Association
Counsel
—
Alleged Violations
Bylaw 2.4
Outcome Summary
In the initial decision, Petitioner established violations of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (election materials disposal) and A.R.S. § 33-1804 (closed/improperly noticed meetings), but failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Issue 1). The rehearing only addressed Issue 1, which was ultimately dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 violation) because the ALJ found that while the Bylaw applied to Members, Petitioner failed to show it prohibited a Director from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned, and the investigation was initiated by a Board member immediately following the meeting.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Election Objection Waiver)
Whether Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on an objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting, given that the Bylaw requires members to object to irregularities 'at the meeting' to avoid waiver.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed as to Issue 1.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Dispute, Election Challenge, Bylaw Violation, Meeting Notice, Record Retention, Rehearing
This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative legal dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning the HOA’s board election of March 18, 2017. The core of the dispute involved the HOA board’s decision to investigate and ultimately overturn the initially announced election results, leading to a run-off election.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) overseeing the case and a subsequent rehearing issued a mixed final decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, successfully proved that the Desert Ranch HOA committed two statutory violations:
1. Destruction of Election Materials: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by destroying ballot envelopes shortly after the election, materials which are required to be retained for at least one year.
2. Improper Closed Meeting: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding a board meeting with its attorney at a private residence without providing the required notice to its members.
However, the Petitioner’s primary challenge—that the board violated its own Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned—was dismissed. The ALJ ruled that the bylaw’s waiver of claims applied to general “Members” but not to “Directors” acting in their official capacity. This ruling effectively upheld the board’s authority to investigate the election, which led to the discovery of invalid ballots and the eventual run-off election won by Brian Schoeffler.
As the prevailing party on two of the three issues, Mr. Barrs was awarded a reimbursement of his $1,000.00 filing fee. The judge, however, found that no civil penalty against the HOA was appropriate.
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I. Case Overview
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Tom Barrs
◦ Respondent: Desert Ranch HOA, represented by Catherine Overby (President) and Brian Schoeffler (Vice President)
• Case Number: 18F-H1818035-REL
• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
• Subject of Dispute: Alleged violations of Arizona statutes and HOA bylaws related to the handling and outcome of the March 18, 2017, annual board election.
II. Chronology of the Contested Election
The dispute originated from the following sequence of events surrounding the 2017 election for two vacant seats on the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors.
1. Pre-Election: Absentee ballots were distributed to members, listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates and providing a space for a write-in candidate.
2. March 18, 2017 (Annual Meeting): Ballots were submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger (a write-in) were announced as the winning candidates. No members present objected to the results before the meeting was adjourned.
3. Immediately Following the Meeting: Board member Patrick Rice gathered the ballots and “expressed his concerns with the election results.”
4. Circa March 18, 2017: All ballot envelopes from the election were destroyed.
5. March 19, 2017: Candidate Brian Schoeffler sent an email regarding the election, stating, “I’m asking you to review the situation and make a decision if there is enough concern that there should be a revote.”
6. March 20, 2017: Board President Catherine Overby emailed the members, announcing that the election had been “contested.” In the email, she asserted that the bylaws did not permit write-in candidates and declared that she and Mr. Schoeffler were the new directors.
7. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Ms. Overby and Mr. Rice, held an unannounced meeting with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s home. During this meeting, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot” had been improperly counted.
8. Post-March 29, 2017: After consulting the attorney, the board determined that the valid vote count resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board decided to hold a run-off election.
9. April 29, 2017: The run-off election was held, and Brian Schoeffler was announced as the winner.
10. May 10, 2017: The newly constituted Board of Directors held its organizational meeting.
III. Adjudicated Issues and Rulings
The petition, originally filed as a single issue, was converted to a multiple-issue case. At the hearing, the dispute was clarified into three distinct issues, each with a specific ruling from the ALJ.
Petitioner’s Allegation
Legal Basis
Final Ruling
The HOA improperly overturned the election results based on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned.
Bylaw 2.4
Dismissed
The HOA unlawfully discarded ballot envelopes and related election materials.
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
Violation Found
The HOA held closed board meetings without providing proper notice to the membership.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Violation Found
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A. Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Improperly Overturning Election)
• Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs contended that the board was barred from investigating or acting on any concerns about the election after the meeting had concluded. His argument was based on Bylaw 2.4, which states:
• ALJ Finding: The petition on this issue was dismissed. The judge’s finding was affirmed after a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.
• ALJ Rationale:
1. Initiation of Investigation: Testimony established that Board member Patrick Rice expressed concerns “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” Therefore, Mr. Schoeffler’s email the following day did not initiate the board’s investigation.
2. Distinction Between “Member” and “Director”: The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. The waiver in Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member,” and the Petitioner failed to prove that a “Director” was prohibited from raising questions about the validity of an election after a meeting.
B. Issue 2: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (Destruction of Election Materials)
• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law mandates that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… for at least one year after completion of the election.”
• Respondent’s Action: The HOA destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election.
• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.
• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” presented at the hearing that established the destruction of the materials.
C. Issue 3: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Improper Closed Meetings)
• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law requires all HOA board meetings to be open to all members. A meeting can only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must provide notice and cite the legal authority for entering a closed session.
• Respondent’s Action: Certain board members met with an attorney at a private residence on March 29, 2017, to discuss the election. No notice was provided to the membership regarding this meeting.
• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.
• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” that the meeting occurred and that the board “did not provide any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or provide notice that the meeting would be closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.”
IV. Final Order and Disposition
The final decision, issued on August 23, 2018, and upheld after a rehearing decision on December 26, 2018, ordered the following:
• Dismissal: The petition regarding Issue 1 (violation of Bylaw 2.4) was dismissed.
• Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Tom Barrs, was deemed the prevailing party as to Issue 2 and Issue 3.
• Monetary Award: The Respondent, Desert Ranch HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00.
• Civil Penalty: The judge determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”
• Finality: The decision after rehearing was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Study Guide:Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 23, 2018, and December 26, 2018.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What were the initially announced results of the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors election on March 18, 2017?
3. What were the two primary procedural violations that the Desert Ranch HOA Board committed following the March 18, 2017 election?
4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the violation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4?
5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismiss the Petitioner’s claim regarding Bylaw 2.4?
6. Explain the violation related to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1812(A)(7) that the ALJ found the Respondent had committed.
7. Describe the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 concerning open meetings.
8. What was the final order from the initial hearing on August 23, 2018?
9. What was the specific focus of the rehearing held on December 6, 2018?
10. What was the ultimate outcome of the rehearing, and what legal recourse was available to the parties afterward?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Tom Barrs, who filed the dispute, and Respondent Desert Ranch HOA. The HOA was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. At the Annual Board Meeting on March 18, 2017, the ballots were counted and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates for the two vacant seats on the Board of Directors. No members present raised an objection before the meeting was adjourned.
3. The HOA Board committed two primary procedural violations. First, they destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election, and second, certain Board members met with an attorney without providing notice to the association members that a meeting was being held or that it would be a closed session.
4. The Petitioner argued that candidate Brian Schoeffler’s challenge to the election was invalid because it was raised the day after the meeting adjourned. According to Bylaw 2.4, any “Member” who fails to object to an irregularity at the meeting waives their claim, and the Petitioner argued this rule should also apply to Board members.
5. The ALJ dismissed the claim because the investigation was initiated by Board member Patrick Rice, who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting, not by Mr. Schoeffler’s later email. The judge also determined that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific, non-interchangeable meanings, and the Petitioner failed to show that a Director was barred from raising concerns after a meeting.
6. The ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) based on uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing. This statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related election materials be retained for at least one year after an election, but the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.
7. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when certain Board members met with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s house on March 29, 2017. The HOA failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the members and did not announce that the meeting would be closed to discuss legal advice, as required by the statute.
8. In the initial order, the ALJ dismissed the petition as to Issue 1 (the Bylaw 2.4 violation) but found the Petitioner to be the prevailing party on Issues 2 and 3 (the statutory violations). The judge ordered the Respondent HOA to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00 but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.
9. The rehearing focused exclusively on the first issue from the initial hearing: whether the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on objections to the election results after the Annual Meeting had adjourned. The Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the lack of penalties for the other two violations.
10. The rehearing upheld the original decision, dismissing the petition as to Issue 1. The decision from the rehearing was final and binding, and any party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing upon specific facts and legal arguments presented in the source documents.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4, specifically the distinction between a “Member” and a “Director.” Discuss the strength of the Petitioner’s counter-argument and why the judge’s reasoning ultimately prevailed.
2. Examine the series of actions taken by the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors following the March 18, 2017 election announcement. Evaluate whether their actions to investigate irregularities, consult an attorney, and hold a run-off election were ultimately justified, despite the procedural violations they committed.
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as the burden of proof in this case. For each of the three issues presented, explain how the Petitioner either met or failed to meet this standard, citing specific evidence mentioned in the decisions.
4. Based on the events described, from the initial election to the final administrative ruling, critique the effectiveness of the HOA’s internal governance and dispute resolution processes. What systemic failures are evident, and how did they lead to a formal administrative hearing?
5. Although the Petitioner was the “prevailing party” on two of the three issues, the remedy was limited to a refund of his filing fee, with no civil penalty imposed. Argue for or against the appropriateness of this remedy, considering the nature of the HOA’s violations and their impact on the integrity of the election process.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Statute
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on evidence and law. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all meetings of a homeowners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. A meeting may only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must state the statutory reason for closing the meeting.
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
An Arizona Revised Statute that mandates the retention of election materials, including ballots and envelopes, in either electronic or paper format for at least one year after the completion of an election for member inspection.
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
An Arizona statute that permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
A provision in the HOA’s bylaws stating, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”
Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal proceeding against their HOA for alleged violations.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Tom Barrs.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to consider a decision that has already been made, typically granted if there are perceived errors of law, misconduct, or if the decision was not supported by the evidence.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch HOA.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Botched Election—Here Are 3 Lessons Every Board Should Learn
Friction between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) board is a common feature of community living, and nowhere is that friction more apparent than in disputes over elections and rule enforcement. But what happens when a board, trying to correct an error, makes the situation exponentially worse?
This article is a deep dive into the real administrative law case of Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, a seemingly straightforward dispute that reveals surprising and practical lessons for anyone living in or governing a planned community. It’s a story of a cascade of errors, where initial election confusion led to a panicked and procedurally flawed response, compounded by a pre-existing failure in record-keeping. As we’ll see, the outcome wasn’t what anyone expected, and the board’s biggest mistakes weren’t the ones they thought they were fighting.
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1. You Can Lose the Main Argument But Still Win the Case
The dispute began at the Desert Ranch HOA’s annual meeting, where election results were announced. The trouble started immediately after the meeting adjourned when a board Director, Patrick Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed concerns about irregularities. A day later, a losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, echoed those concerns via email. Citing the Director’s objection, the board overturned the initial results, prompting homeowner Tom Barrs to file a petition arguing this was a violation of the HOA’s own rules.
Barrs’ case hinged on Bylaw 2.4, which stated that any “Member” must object to irregularities during the meeting itself, or else they waive their right to complain. Barrs argued that since no one objected before adjournment, the results should stand. However, the judge disagreed, pointing to two critical distinctions in the evidence. First, the investigation was triggered by the concerns of a “Director,” not the losing candidate’s later email. Second, a close reading of the bylaws showed that the terms “Member” and “Director” were used as distinct categories and were not interchangeable. Since the bylaw only restricted “Members,” it did not prevent a Director from raising concerns after the meeting. Barrs lost his primary argument.
Despite this, in a counter-intuitive twist, the judge declared Barrs the “prevailing party” in the overall case and ordered the HOA to repay his $1,000 filing fee. Why? Because while investigating the petitioner’s main claim, the judge found the board had committed other clear violations of state law while trying to “fix” the election. This outcome underscores a critical principle for all boards: procedural integrity is paramount. The HOA won the battle over its right to review the election but lost the war because of its flawed process.
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2. Your Records (or Lack Thereof) Will Be Your Downfall
One of the board’s most significant errors was a simple but critical failure of administrative duty: they destroyed election materials in direct violation of state law. The HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), which is unambiguous about an HOA’s responsibility.
According to A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), “Ballots, envelopes and related materials…shall be retained…for at least one year after completion of the election.”
The legal decision states the evidence was “uncontroverted” that the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. Because the HOA could not dispute this fact, it was an easy violation for the petitioner to prove.
This wasn’t just a minor administrative oversight; it was a catastrophic error. By destroying the envelopes, the board not only violated the law but also eliminated any possibility of independently verifying the vote count after their own director discovered irregularities. This single failure trapped them in a procedural corner of their own making. It made a definitive resolution of the election challenge impossible, leading to the messy and expensive situation of declaring a tie and holding a run-off, all of which could have been avoided if the primary evidence had been preserved as required by law.
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3. “Private” Board Business Can Be an Illegal Secret Meeting
In an attempt to resolve the election dispute correctly, the board took what it likely considered a responsible step: seeking legal advice. After the election was contested, certain board members met with an attorney at a board member’s house to figure out how to proceed. However, the way they did it constituted another clear violation of state law.
This private meeting violated Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804. While the statute does allow a board to enter a closed session to receive legal advice, it has strict procedural requirements. The board must first provide notice of the meeting to all members and then, at that public meeting, officially vote to enter the closed session for that specific, legally permissible reason. The evidence was “uncontroverted” that the board failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the association members.
The board’s desire for confidential legal advice was understandable, but their method created an unforced legal error. The correct procedure—notifying members of a meeting and then voting to enter a closed session—protects the board by demonstrating procedural propriety. The shortcut they took exposed them to a clear-cut violation that was impossible to defend. For an HOA board, transparency is the default, and secrecy is a narrow, legally defined exception. The process of going private matters as much as the reason for doing so.
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Conclusion: It’s Not Just What You Do, It’s How You Do It
The Desert Ranch HOA board, in its attempt to correct a perceived election error, committed two clear statutory violations. In their haste, they held an illegal secret meeting and were hamstrung by their prior failure to properly retain election records—the very evidence needed for a clean resolution. These procedural missteps ultimately cost them the case.
The ultimate lesson from Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA is that for any governing body, procedural correctness is just as important as substantive correctness. This case serves as a stark reminder that good intentions are no defense against procedural law. When a crisis hits, does your board have the discipline to follow procedure, or will the rush to find a solution lead you to commit unforced errors that are far worse than the original problem?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Tom Barrs(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Stephen Barrs(witness) Testified for Petitioner
Respondent Side
Catherine Overby(board president, witness) Desert Ranch HOA Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Brian Schoeffler(board vice president, witness) Desert Ranch HOA Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Patrick Rice(board member) Desert Ranch HOA Board member who expressed concerns with election results
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Jerome Klinger(board member) Desert Ranch HOA Director elected in disputed election
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the HOA (Respondent) did not violate CC&R Section 3.10. The CC&Rs imposed the duty of keeping the drainage area clear primarily on the Unit Owners, and the HOA only retained the right to enforce this requirement, not an explicit obligation.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the CC&Rs because the HOA did not have an obligation to enforce clearance requirements against unit owners under the cited covenant provisions.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to require unit owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel behind their homes.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to compel unit owners to clear vegetation and debris (including chicken wire) from the stormwater drainage channel, asserting this failure created a flood risk to unit 12. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs placed the primary maintenance responsibility on Unit Owners, and the HOA only had the right, but not the obligation, to enforce clearance requirements.
Orders: The petition was denied and dismissed. No action was required of Respondent because Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated the CC&Rs regarding maintenance of the drainage easement.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
Title 33, Chapter 9
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
Vazanno v. Superior Court
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
Powell v. Washburn
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 667122.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:27 (50.0 KB)
19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 678371.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:27 (129.5 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918010-REL
Briefing Document: Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case John A Sellers, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association, Respondent (Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a claim by Petitioner John Sellers that his homeowner’s association (HOA) violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to compel other homeowners to remove vegetation and fencing from a common stormwater drainage channel, which he alleged created a flood risk to his property, Unit 12.
The petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful. It was denied first in an initial evidentiary hearing and again in a subsequent rehearing. The central finding of the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in both decisions was a critical distinction between an HOA’s right to enforce rules and an obligation to do so. The ALJs determined that the CC&Rs placed the primary responsibility for maintaining the drainage easement on the individual unit owners. The HOA’s mandatory duty to intervene was found to be triggered only by actual damage resulting from an owner’s negligence, not by the mere potential for future damage. As no flooding or damage had ever occurred, the HOA was found to have acted within its authority and had not violated the CC&Rs. The petitioner’s personal circumstances, including a contentious divorce and court-ordered sale of the property, were noted but deemed legally irrelevant to the determination of a CC&R violation.
Case Chronology and Procedural History
The case progressed through an initial petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final decision on rehearing. A notable procedural anomaly occurred when a hearing scheduled for November 5, 2018, was officially vacated due to a withdrawal notice from the petitioner, yet the hearing proceeded on that date as originally planned.
Details
Aug 23, 2018
Petition Filed
John A. Sellers filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated CC&R § 3.10.
Oct 23, 2018
Hearing Vacated
An order was issued by ALJ Diane Mihalsky vacating the November 5 hearing because the petitioner had notified the Department of his wish to withdraw the petition.
Nov 5 & Dec 12, 2018
Initial Hearing
Despite the prior vacating order, an evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ Mihalsky.
Dec 26, 2018
Initial Decision
ALJ Mihalsky issued a decision finding that the petitioner failed to prove his case. The petition was denied.
Feb 1, 2019
Rehearing Requested
The petitioner filed a request for a rehearing, alleging procedural irregularities and errors in the initial decision.
Feb 22, 2019
Rehearing Granted
The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
Apr 15, 2019
Rehearing Held
A rehearing was held before a new judge, ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer.
May 7, 2019
Post-Hearing Filing Stricken
The petitioner submitted an unauthorized supplemental argument after the rehearing. ALJ Eigenheer issued an order striking the filing from the record and closing the record.
May 10, 2019
Final Decision on Rehearing
ALJ Eigenheer issued a final decision, again finding for the respondent and dismissing the petition.
Core Dispute Analysis
Petitioner’s Position and Allegations
• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent) violated CC&R § 3.10 by failing to enforce its rules. Specifically, the Association did not require owners of “Drainage Easement Units” to remove obstructions—such as large succulents, cacti, shrubs, and chicken wire fencing—from a 3′ x 3′ stormwater drainage canal located behind their homes.
• Perceived Risk: The petitioner testified that these items could catch storm debris, clog the channel, and cause flooding that would damage his property, Unit 12. He submitted videos of heavy rains to support his concern.
• Evolving Legal Argument: In the rehearing, the petitioner’s argument shifted. He acknowledged that the CC&Rs gave the Association the right to enforce maintenance standards but argued that “at a certain point exercising a right becomes an obligation,” particularly when matters of safety and property values are implicated.
• Claimed Financial Damages: The petitioner testified he was undergoing a contentious divorce and his condominium was being sold by order of the Maricopa County Superior Court. He asserted that due to the unresolved flood risk, which he was obligated to disclose, the sale price of Unit 12 was “$40,000 less than it would have been.”
Respondent’s Position and Actions
• Denial of Violation: The Association denied it had violated any CC&Rs by its handling of the drainage channel.
• Evidence and Testimony: The Association, represented by its President, Jeffrey Kaplan, presented several key points:
◦ No History of Flooding: Mr. Kaplan testified that Unit 12 had never sustained any flood damage since the development was built in 2012, including during a “100-year storm” in 2014. After a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he personally inspected the easement and saw no water in it.
◦ Origin of Plants: Mr. Kaplan stated that the builder had originally planted the vegetation in the drainage easement that the petitioner was concerned about.
◦ No Other Complaints: No other members of the 46-unit Association had expressed any concerns about drainage.
◦ Proactive Communication: To assuage the petitioner’s concerns, the Association’s management company sent letters to the relevant homeowners on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminding them of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions.
◦ Due Diligence: Mr. Kaplan contacted officials at the Maricopa County Flood Control District and the Town of Cave Creek, who confirmed the drainage area was not on any official floodplain maps and that the Association was solely responsible for its maintenance.
Key CC&R Provisions and Legal Interpretation
The ALJs’ decisions hinged on a close reading of the Rancho Madera CC&Rs. The analysis consistently differentiated between the duties of individual owners and the duties of the Association.
• CC&R § 3.10.2 — Unit Owner Responsibility: This section places the primary maintenance burden directly on the homeowners of the Drainage Easement Units.
◦ Interpretation: The legal conclusion was that this provision unambiguously makes individual owners responsible for keeping their portion of the easement clear.
• CC&R § 3.10.4 — Association Responsibility: This section defines the specific circumstance under which the Association is required to act.
◦ Interpretation: Both ALJs found that this clause creates a reactionary, not a proactive, duty for the Association. Its obligation to repair is triggered by actual damage occurring, not by a perceived risk of future damage.
• CC&R § 13.1.1 — Association Enforcement Power: This section, highlighted in the rehearing, grants the Association authority to act.
◦ Interpretation: The ALJ in the rehearing ruled that this language grants a discretionary right, not a mandatory obligation. The CC&Rs contain no provision that converts this right into a duty under the circumstances presented by the petitioner.
Judicial Findings and Rulings
Initial Decision (ALJ Diane Mihalsky, Dec 26, 2018)
• Burden of Proof: The petitioner failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Findings of Fact: The petitioner successfully established that plants and chicken wire existed in the stormwater canal. However, he failed to establish that these items actually impeded the flow of water.
• Conclusion: The respondent proved that the drainage canal had functioned as intended since 2012 and that Unit 12 had never flooded. The petitioner’s divorce was noted to have “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint” but was irrelevant to the legal issue. The petition was denied.
Rehearing Decision (ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer, May 10, 2019)
• Central Legal Finding: The CC&Rs clearly intend for unit owners to bear the primary responsibility for keeping the drainage area clear. The Association’s only specified obligation is to repair damage after it has occurred and bill the responsible owner.
• Right vs. Obligation: The decision explicitly states, “While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”
• Final Order: The petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Section 3.10 of the CC&Rs. The petition was dismissed.
Notable Evidence
A key piece of evidence submitted by the respondent was a June 22, 2018, email from the petitioner’s wife, Debborah Sellers, which directly refuted the petitioner’s claims. In the email, she stated:
“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”
Study Guide – 19F-H1918010-REL
Study Guide for Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. What was the specific allegation John A. Sellers made against the Rancho Madera Condominium Association in his petition filed on August 23, 2018?
2. Identify the key responsibilities assigned to individual unit owners of Drainage Easement Units according to Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs.
3. Who is Jeffrey Kaplan, and what key testimony did he provide on behalf of the Respondent?
4. What specific actions did the Respondent’s management company take in April and July of 2018 to address the Petitioner’s concerns?
5. According to the decision by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, what did the Petitioner fail to establish regarding the plants and chicken wire in the drainage canal?
6. On what grounds did John A. Sellers file his Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request on February 1, 2019?
7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument regarding the Association’s “right to enforce” the CC&Rs versus an “obligation to enforce” them?
8. What was the final conclusion of Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer regarding the Association’s responsibilities under the CC&Rs?
9. What occurred after the April 15, 2019 rehearing when the Petitioner attempted to submit supplemental information to the Office of Administrative Hearings?
10. Describe the evidence presented in an email from Debborah Sellers and its relevance to the case.
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Answer Key
1. John A. Sellers alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated Section 3.10 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He claimed the Association failed to require condominium owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel, creating a flood risk for his unit.
2. Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs requires each Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit to keep their respective Drainage Easement Area free of weeds and other debris. The purpose is to ensure that stormwater can flow freely and that no improvement, including plant materials, impedes this flow.
3. Jeffrey Kaplan is the President of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association. He testified that the drainage easement had never failed, even during a 100-year storm in 2014, that the original builder had planted the vegetation in question, and that he had consulted with county and town officials about the drainage area.
4. To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent’s management company sent letters to the owners of the Drainage Easement Units. Letters sent on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminded owners of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions, weeds, and debris.
5. Judge Mihalsky’s decision on December 26, 2018, concluded that the Petitioner established the presence of plants and chicken wire but failed to establish that these items actually impede the flow of water. The judge found that the drainage system functions as intended and there was no unreasonable risk of flooding.
6. The Petitioner filed for a rehearing based on several alleged issues with the original proceeding. These included an irregularity in the proceedings, the existence of newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, and a belief that the findings of fact or decision were arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence.
7. The Petitioner argued that while the CC&Rs grant the Association the “right to enforce” maintenance requirements, this right becomes an “obligation” when issues of property values and safety are at stake. He maintained that the potential for flooding created such an obligation for the Association to act.
8. Judge Eigenheer concluded that the CC&Rs intend for unit owners to bear the responsibility of keeping the Drainage Easement Area clear. She determined that while the Association has the right to enforce this, nothing in the CC&Rs creates an obligation for it to do so, and its only specified responsibility is to repair damage after it occurs, billing the responsible unit owner.
9. After the rehearing, the Petitioner submitted supplemental authority and argument without having requested leave to do so. The Respondent’s counsel argued this filing was untimely and introduced new arguments, requesting it be struck. On May 7, 2019, Judge Eigenheer ordered the filing struck from the record and closed the record.
10. The Respondent submitted a June 22, 2018 email from Debborah Sellers, the Petitioner’s wife. In the email, she stated there had never been an issue with the storm drain, called his concerns “nonsense,” and noted that the developer had done a good job, undermining the Petitioner’s claim of a significant and obvious flood risk.
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Suggested Essay Questions
1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer to dismiss the petition after the rehearing. Contrast her interpretation of the Association’s duties under the CC&Rs with the findings presented by Judge Diane Mihalsky in the initial decision.
2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal documents. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explaining why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet this burden of proof in both hearings.
3. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 19F-H1918010-REL. Identify and explain the significance of key events, including the initial petition, the vacated hearing, the first Administrative Law Judge Decision, the request for rehearing, and the final order dismissing the case.
4. Examine the role and responsibilities of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association versus the individual unit owners as defined by Sections 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4, and 13.1.1 of the CC&Rs. How did the interpretation of these sections form the basis of the final legal decision?
5. Evaluate the different types of evidence presented in the hearings, including witness testimony (Sellers, Kaplan), documentary evidence (CC&Rs, letters, emails), and physical evidence (photographs, videos). How did each type of evidence contribute to the final outcome of the case?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Tammy L. Eigenheer served as ALJs.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium association. In this case, the CC&Rs for Rancho Madera were the central document in the dispute.
Drainage Easement
A perpetual, non-exclusive legal right created over a specific portion of property (the eastern five feet of Units 9-18) for constructing and maintaining a stormwater drainage channel.
Drainage Easement Area
The specific portion of land encumbered by the Drainage Easement, defined as the eastern five feet of the designated units.
Drainage Improvements
The physical components of the drainage system, such as the channel, decomposed granite, rip rap (large stones), or concrete, as originally constructed by the developer.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, John A. Sellers.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, making a contention more probably true than not.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted by the Commissioner in this instance, to re-examine the issues based on claims such as procedural irregularities, newly discovered evidence, or errors in the original decision.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.
The Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium unit owners’ associations.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918010-REL
I Read an Entire HOA Lawsuit. Here Are 4 Shocking Lessons About Power, Rules, and Reality.
The Anatomy of a Neighborhood War
Living under a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex world of rules, regulations, and neighborhood politics. For most, disagreements are minor annoyances. But sometimes, a seemingly small issue can escalate into a full-blown legal war.
This is the story of one homeowner’s single-minded crusade against his HOA over a stormwater drainage channel he believed was a serious flooding risk. After filing a formal petition, the dispute escalated into a multi-stage legal battle that spanned nearly a year. The official court documents reveal that even after a judge ruled decisively against him, the homeowner doubled down, demanding a rare rehearing.
A deep dive into this protracted case reveals a fascinating and cautionary tale. The legal reasoning that ultimately settled the matter highlights several surprising lessons that apply to anyone living in a planned community.
1. Proving a Rule Was Broken Isn’t the Same as Proving Harm
The initial hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky in late 2018, centered on a seemingly straightforward argument from the petitioner, John Sellers. He pointed out that his neighbors had placed plants—including large succulents, shrubs, and cacti—as well as chicken wire in a stormwater drainage channel. This, he argued, was a clear violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which stated that no improvement “shall be constructed, installed or allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water.”
But in her December 26, 2018 decision, the judge ruled against him. While Sellers successfully proved the obstructions existed, he failed to meet the legal burden of proof that they actually “impede the flow of water.” His claim was defeated by testimony from the HOA President, Jeffrey Kaplan, who stated that the unit had never sustained any flood damage, not even during a “100-year storm in 2014.”
The lesson from this first round is stark: in this legal context, simply pointing out a technical rule break was not enough. The petitioner had to prove that the violation was causing a tangible, negative impact. Without evidence of actual harm or impeded water flow, the theoretical risk was insufficient to win the case.
2. An HOA’s “Right” to Enforce Is Not an “Obligation”
After losing the first round on a question of evidence, Sellers’ argument evolved. He requested a rehearing, which was granted, and the case landed before a new judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, in the spring of 2019. This shifted the legal focus from physical proof of impeded water flow to a more fundamental question of the HOA’s duties.
Sellers argued that because safety and property values were at stake, the association had a duty to enforce the CC&Rs and compel his neighbors to clear the drainage channel. He contended that at a certain point, an organization’s “right” to act becomes an “obligation.”
The judge’s final decision on May 10, 2019, was clear, absolute, and is where the most powerful lesson of the entire case lies.
“While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”
This distinction is critical for any homeowner. An HOA can possess the legal power to act but may not be legally compelled to use it. According to the judge’s interpretation, the governing documents placed the responsibility for keeping the channel clear on the individual unit owners. The association’s only stated obligation was to repair damage after it happened, with the cost being billed back to the responsible party.
3. Outside Conflicts Can Cast a Long Shadow
Legal disputes are rarely just about the facts of the case. During the initial hearing, it was revealed that the petitioner was going through a “contentious divorce” and that the condo unit at the center of the dispute was a community asset being sold by the court.
The most dramatic evidence, however, came from an email written by the petitioner’s own wife, Debborah Sellers. The email, submitted as evidence by the HOA, directly undermined his claims about the severity of the drainage issue.
“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”
In her decision, Judge Mihalsky officially stated that the divorce was “not relevant” to the technical question of whether the HOA violated the CC&Rs. However, she immediately added that the situation “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint,” suggesting that the personal context, and especially the damaging email, severely harmed the petitioner’s credibility.
4. Writing Letters Isn’t the Same as Being Heard
Throughout the dispute, the petitioner made his concerns known by writing “many letters” to the HOA president. He was persistent in his written communications, attempting to force the issue onto the association’s radar.
Yet, this effort was contrasted with a notable lack of direct participation. According to the testimony of HOA President Kaplan during the first hearing, Sellers “never attended any of Respondent’s noticed Board meetings” where his concerns could have been discussed among the board members.
The HOA’s response to his letters was limited; it sent two general reminder letters to all residents in the affected area but did not take direct enforcement action against any specific homeowner. The practical takeaway is that to effect change or be taken seriously in an HOA dispute, visibility and participation are critical. Writing letters is a start, but attending official meetings to present a case in person can be a more effective strategy for ensuring an issue is formally addressed.
A Cautionary Tale for Any Homeowner
What began as a seemingly straightforward complaint about drainage and rule enforcement devolved into a legal battle that consumed nearly a year, involving two multi-day hearings before two different administrative law judges. The petitioner lost his case on the evidence, then lost it again on the law.
It serves as a potent cautionary tale, demonstrating that in the world of HOA disputes, the obvious path is not always the winning one. It leaves every homeowner with a final, thought-provoking question to ponder: When you see a problem in your community, how do you decide if a fight is worth the cost—not just in money, but in time, credibility, and peace?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John A Sellers(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Edward D. O’Brien(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP Represented Respondent
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the HOA (Respondent) did not violate CC&R Section 3.10. The CC&Rs imposed the duty of keeping the drainage area clear primarily on the Unit Owners, and the HOA only retained the right to enforce this requirement, not an explicit obligation.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the CC&Rs because the HOA did not have an obligation to enforce clearance requirements against unit owners under the cited covenant provisions.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to require unit owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel behind their homes.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to compel unit owners to clear vegetation and debris (including chicken wire) from the stormwater drainage channel, asserting this failure created a flood risk to unit 12. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs placed the primary maintenance responsibility on Unit Owners, and the HOA only had the right, but not the obligation, to enforce clearance requirements.
Orders: The petition was denied and dismissed. No action was required of Respondent because Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated the CC&Rs regarding maintenance of the drainage easement.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
Title 33, Chapter 9
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
Vazanno v. Superior Court
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
Powell v. Washburn
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 667122.pdf
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19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 678371.pdf
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Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918010-REL
Briefing Document: Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case John A Sellers, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association, Respondent (Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a claim by Petitioner John Sellers that his homeowner’s association (HOA) violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to compel other homeowners to remove vegetation and fencing from a common stormwater drainage channel, which he alleged created a flood risk to his property, Unit 12.
The petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful. It was denied first in an initial evidentiary hearing and again in a subsequent rehearing. The central finding of the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in both decisions was a critical distinction between an HOA’s right to enforce rules and an obligation to do so. The ALJs determined that the CC&Rs placed the primary responsibility for maintaining the drainage easement on the individual unit owners. The HOA’s mandatory duty to intervene was found to be triggered only by actual damage resulting from an owner’s negligence, not by the mere potential for future damage. As no flooding or damage had ever occurred, the HOA was found to have acted within its authority and had not violated the CC&Rs. The petitioner’s personal circumstances, including a contentious divorce and court-ordered sale of the property, were noted but deemed legally irrelevant to the determination of a CC&R violation.
Case Chronology and Procedural History
The case progressed through an initial petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final decision on rehearing. A notable procedural anomaly occurred when a hearing scheduled for November 5, 2018, was officially vacated due to a withdrawal notice from the petitioner, yet the hearing proceeded on that date as originally planned.
Details
Aug 23, 2018
Petition Filed
John A. Sellers filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated CC&R § 3.10.
Oct 23, 2018
Hearing Vacated
An order was issued by ALJ Diane Mihalsky vacating the November 5 hearing because the petitioner had notified the Department of his wish to withdraw the petition.
Nov 5 & Dec 12, 2018
Initial Hearing
Despite the prior vacating order, an evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ Mihalsky.
Dec 26, 2018
Initial Decision
ALJ Mihalsky issued a decision finding that the petitioner failed to prove his case. The petition was denied.
Feb 1, 2019
Rehearing Requested
The petitioner filed a request for a rehearing, alleging procedural irregularities and errors in the initial decision.
Feb 22, 2019
Rehearing Granted
The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
Apr 15, 2019
Rehearing Held
A rehearing was held before a new judge, ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer.
May 7, 2019
Post-Hearing Filing Stricken
The petitioner submitted an unauthorized supplemental argument after the rehearing. ALJ Eigenheer issued an order striking the filing from the record and closing the record.
May 10, 2019
Final Decision on Rehearing
ALJ Eigenheer issued a final decision, again finding for the respondent and dismissing the petition.
Core Dispute Analysis
Petitioner’s Position and Allegations
• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent) violated CC&R § 3.10 by failing to enforce its rules. Specifically, the Association did not require owners of “Drainage Easement Units” to remove obstructions—such as large succulents, cacti, shrubs, and chicken wire fencing—from a 3′ x 3′ stormwater drainage canal located behind their homes.
• Perceived Risk: The petitioner testified that these items could catch storm debris, clog the channel, and cause flooding that would damage his property, Unit 12. He submitted videos of heavy rains to support his concern.
• Evolving Legal Argument: In the rehearing, the petitioner’s argument shifted. He acknowledged that the CC&Rs gave the Association the right to enforce maintenance standards but argued that “at a certain point exercising a right becomes an obligation,” particularly when matters of safety and property values are implicated.
• Claimed Financial Damages: The petitioner testified he was undergoing a contentious divorce and his condominium was being sold by order of the Maricopa County Superior Court. He asserted that due to the unresolved flood risk, which he was obligated to disclose, the sale price of Unit 12 was “$40,000 less than it would have been.”
Respondent’s Position and Actions
• Denial of Violation: The Association denied it had violated any CC&Rs by its handling of the drainage channel.
• Evidence and Testimony: The Association, represented by its President, Jeffrey Kaplan, presented several key points:
◦ No History of Flooding: Mr. Kaplan testified that Unit 12 had never sustained any flood damage since the development was built in 2012, including during a “100-year storm” in 2014. After a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he personally inspected the easement and saw no water in it.
◦ Origin of Plants: Mr. Kaplan stated that the builder had originally planted the vegetation in the drainage easement that the petitioner was concerned about.
◦ No Other Complaints: No other members of the 46-unit Association had expressed any concerns about drainage.
◦ Proactive Communication: To assuage the petitioner’s concerns, the Association’s management company sent letters to the relevant homeowners on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminding them of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions.
◦ Due Diligence: Mr. Kaplan contacted officials at the Maricopa County Flood Control District and the Town of Cave Creek, who confirmed the drainage area was not on any official floodplain maps and that the Association was solely responsible for its maintenance.
Key CC&R Provisions and Legal Interpretation
The ALJs’ decisions hinged on a close reading of the Rancho Madera CC&Rs. The analysis consistently differentiated between the duties of individual owners and the duties of the Association.
• CC&R § 3.10.2 — Unit Owner Responsibility: This section places the primary maintenance burden directly on the homeowners of the Drainage Easement Units.
◦ Interpretation: The legal conclusion was that this provision unambiguously makes individual owners responsible for keeping their portion of the easement clear.
• CC&R § 3.10.4 — Association Responsibility: This section defines the specific circumstance under which the Association is required to act.
◦ Interpretation: Both ALJs found that this clause creates a reactionary, not a proactive, duty for the Association. Its obligation to repair is triggered by actual damage occurring, not by a perceived risk of future damage.
• CC&R § 13.1.1 — Association Enforcement Power: This section, highlighted in the rehearing, grants the Association authority to act.
◦ Interpretation: The ALJ in the rehearing ruled that this language grants a discretionary right, not a mandatory obligation. The CC&Rs contain no provision that converts this right into a duty under the circumstances presented by the petitioner.
Judicial Findings and Rulings
Initial Decision (ALJ Diane Mihalsky, Dec 26, 2018)
• Burden of Proof: The petitioner failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Findings of Fact: The petitioner successfully established that plants and chicken wire existed in the stormwater canal. However, he failed to establish that these items actually impeded the flow of water.
• Conclusion: The respondent proved that the drainage canal had functioned as intended since 2012 and that Unit 12 had never flooded. The petitioner’s divorce was noted to have “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint” but was irrelevant to the legal issue. The petition was denied.
Rehearing Decision (ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer, May 10, 2019)
• Central Legal Finding: The CC&Rs clearly intend for unit owners to bear the primary responsibility for keeping the drainage area clear. The Association’s only specified obligation is to repair damage after it has occurred and bill the responsible owner.
• Right vs. Obligation: The decision explicitly states, “While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”
• Final Order: The petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Section 3.10 of the CC&Rs. The petition was dismissed.
Notable Evidence
A key piece of evidence submitted by the respondent was a June 22, 2018, email from the petitioner’s wife, Debborah Sellers, which directly refuted the petitioner’s claims. In the email, she stated:
“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”
Study Guide – 19F-H1918010-REL
Study Guide for Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. What was the specific allegation John A. Sellers made against the Rancho Madera Condominium Association in his petition filed on August 23, 2018?
2. Identify the key responsibilities assigned to individual unit owners of Drainage Easement Units according to Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs.
3. Who is Jeffrey Kaplan, and what key testimony did he provide on behalf of the Respondent?
4. What specific actions did the Respondent’s management company take in April and July of 2018 to address the Petitioner’s concerns?
5. According to the decision by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, what did the Petitioner fail to establish regarding the plants and chicken wire in the drainage canal?
6. On what grounds did John A. Sellers file his Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request on February 1, 2019?
7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument regarding the Association’s “right to enforce” the CC&Rs versus an “obligation to enforce” them?
8. What was the final conclusion of Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer regarding the Association’s responsibilities under the CC&Rs?
9. What occurred after the April 15, 2019 rehearing when the Petitioner attempted to submit supplemental information to the Office of Administrative Hearings?
10. Describe the evidence presented in an email from Debborah Sellers and its relevance to the case.
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Answer Key
1. John A. Sellers alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated Section 3.10 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He claimed the Association failed to require condominium owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel, creating a flood risk for his unit.
2. Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs requires each Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit to keep their respective Drainage Easement Area free of weeds and other debris. The purpose is to ensure that stormwater can flow freely and that no improvement, including plant materials, impedes this flow.
3. Jeffrey Kaplan is the President of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association. He testified that the drainage easement had never failed, even during a 100-year storm in 2014, that the original builder had planted the vegetation in question, and that he had consulted with county and town officials about the drainage area.
4. To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent’s management company sent letters to the owners of the Drainage Easement Units. Letters sent on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminded owners of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions, weeds, and debris.
5. Judge Mihalsky’s decision on December 26, 2018, concluded that the Petitioner established the presence of plants and chicken wire but failed to establish that these items actually impede the flow of water. The judge found that the drainage system functions as intended and there was no unreasonable risk of flooding.
6. The Petitioner filed for a rehearing based on several alleged issues with the original proceeding. These included an irregularity in the proceedings, the existence of newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, and a belief that the findings of fact or decision were arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence.
7. The Petitioner argued that while the CC&Rs grant the Association the “right to enforce” maintenance requirements, this right becomes an “obligation” when issues of property values and safety are at stake. He maintained that the potential for flooding created such an obligation for the Association to act.
8. Judge Eigenheer concluded that the CC&Rs intend for unit owners to bear the responsibility of keeping the Drainage Easement Area clear. She determined that while the Association has the right to enforce this, nothing in the CC&Rs creates an obligation for it to do so, and its only specified responsibility is to repair damage after it occurs, billing the responsible unit owner.
9. After the rehearing, the Petitioner submitted supplemental authority and argument without having requested leave to do so. The Respondent’s counsel argued this filing was untimely and introduced new arguments, requesting it be struck. On May 7, 2019, Judge Eigenheer ordered the filing struck from the record and closed the record.
10. The Respondent submitted a June 22, 2018 email from Debborah Sellers, the Petitioner’s wife. In the email, she stated there had never been an issue with the storm drain, called his concerns “nonsense,” and noted that the developer had done a good job, undermining the Petitioner’s claim of a significant and obvious flood risk.
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Suggested Essay Questions
1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer to dismiss the petition after the rehearing. Contrast her interpretation of the Association’s duties under the CC&Rs with the findings presented by Judge Diane Mihalsky in the initial decision.
2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal documents. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explaining why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet this burden of proof in both hearings.
3. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 19F-H1918010-REL. Identify and explain the significance of key events, including the initial petition, the vacated hearing, the first Administrative Law Judge Decision, the request for rehearing, and the final order dismissing the case.
4. Examine the role and responsibilities of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association versus the individual unit owners as defined by Sections 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4, and 13.1.1 of the CC&Rs. How did the interpretation of these sections form the basis of the final legal decision?
5. Evaluate the different types of evidence presented in the hearings, including witness testimony (Sellers, Kaplan), documentary evidence (CC&Rs, letters, emails), and physical evidence (photographs, videos). How did each type of evidence contribute to the final outcome of the case?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Tammy L. Eigenheer served as ALJs.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium association. In this case, the CC&Rs for Rancho Madera were the central document in the dispute.
Drainage Easement
A perpetual, non-exclusive legal right created over a specific portion of property (the eastern five feet of Units 9-18) for constructing and maintaining a stormwater drainage channel.
Drainage Easement Area
The specific portion of land encumbered by the Drainage Easement, defined as the eastern five feet of the designated units.
Drainage Improvements
The physical components of the drainage system, such as the channel, decomposed granite, rip rap (large stones), or concrete, as originally constructed by the developer.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, John A. Sellers.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, making a contention more probably true than not.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted by the Commissioner in this instance, to re-examine the issues based on claims such as procedural irregularities, newly discovered evidence, or errors in the original decision.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.
The Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium unit owners’ associations.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918010-REL
I Read an Entire HOA Lawsuit. Here Are 4 Shocking Lessons About Power, Rules, and Reality.
The Anatomy of a Neighborhood War
Living under a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex world of rules, regulations, and neighborhood politics. For most, disagreements are minor annoyances. But sometimes, a seemingly small issue can escalate into a full-blown legal war.
This is the story of one homeowner’s single-minded crusade against his HOA over a stormwater drainage channel he believed was a serious flooding risk. After filing a formal petition, the dispute escalated into a multi-stage legal battle that spanned nearly a year. The official court documents reveal that even after a judge ruled decisively against him, the homeowner doubled down, demanding a rare rehearing.
A deep dive into this protracted case reveals a fascinating and cautionary tale. The legal reasoning that ultimately settled the matter highlights several surprising lessons that apply to anyone living in a planned community.
1. Proving a Rule Was Broken Isn’t the Same as Proving Harm
The initial hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky in late 2018, centered on a seemingly straightforward argument from the petitioner, John Sellers. He pointed out that his neighbors had placed plants—including large succulents, shrubs, and cacti—as well as chicken wire in a stormwater drainage channel. This, he argued, was a clear violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which stated that no improvement “shall be constructed, installed or allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water.”
But in her December 26, 2018 decision, the judge ruled against him. While Sellers successfully proved the obstructions existed, he failed to meet the legal burden of proof that they actually “impede the flow of water.” His claim was defeated by testimony from the HOA President, Jeffrey Kaplan, who stated that the unit had never sustained any flood damage, not even during a “100-year storm in 2014.”
The lesson from this first round is stark: in this legal context, simply pointing out a technical rule break was not enough. The petitioner had to prove that the violation was causing a tangible, negative impact. Without evidence of actual harm or impeded water flow, the theoretical risk was insufficient to win the case.
2. An HOA’s “Right” to Enforce Is Not an “Obligation”
After losing the first round on a question of evidence, Sellers’ argument evolved. He requested a rehearing, which was granted, and the case landed before a new judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, in the spring of 2019. This shifted the legal focus from physical proof of impeded water flow to a more fundamental question of the HOA’s duties.
Sellers argued that because safety and property values were at stake, the association had a duty to enforce the CC&Rs and compel his neighbors to clear the drainage channel. He contended that at a certain point, an organization’s “right” to act becomes an “obligation.”
The judge’s final decision on May 10, 2019, was clear, absolute, and is where the most powerful lesson of the entire case lies.
“While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”
This distinction is critical for any homeowner. An HOA can possess the legal power to act but may not be legally compelled to use it. According to the judge’s interpretation, the governing documents placed the responsibility for keeping the channel clear on the individual unit owners. The association’s only stated obligation was to repair damage after it happened, with the cost being billed back to the responsible party.
3. Outside Conflicts Can Cast a Long Shadow
Legal disputes are rarely just about the facts of the case. During the initial hearing, it was revealed that the petitioner was going through a “contentious divorce” and that the condo unit at the center of the dispute was a community asset being sold by the court.
The most dramatic evidence, however, came from an email written by the petitioner’s own wife, Debborah Sellers. The email, submitted as evidence by the HOA, directly undermined his claims about the severity of the drainage issue.
“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”
In her decision, Judge Mihalsky officially stated that the divorce was “not relevant” to the technical question of whether the HOA violated the CC&Rs. However, she immediately added that the situation “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint,” suggesting that the personal context, and especially the damaging email, severely harmed the petitioner’s credibility.
4. Writing Letters Isn’t the Same as Being Heard
Throughout the dispute, the petitioner made his concerns known by writing “many letters” to the HOA president. He was persistent in his written communications, attempting to force the issue onto the association’s radar.
Yet, this effort was contrasted with a notable lack of direct participation. According to the testimony of HOA President Kaplan during the first hearing, Sellers “never attended any of Respondent’s noticed Board meetings” where his concerns could have been discussed among the board members.
The HOA’s response to his letters was limited; it sent two general reminder letters to all residents in the affected area but did not take direct enforcement action against any specific homeowner. The practical takeaway is that to effect change or be taken seriously in an HOA dispute, visibility and participation are critical. Writing letters is a start, but attending official meetings to present a case in person can be a more effective strategy for ensuring an issue is formally addressed.
A Cautionary Tale for Any Homeowner
What began as a seemingly straightforward complaint about drainage and rule enforcement devolved into a legal battle that consumed nearly a year, involving two multi-day hearings before two different administrative law judges. The petitioner lost his case on the evidence, then lost it again on the law.
It serves as a potent cautionary tale, demonstrating that in the world of HOA disputes, the obvious path is not always the winning one. It leaves every homeowner with a final, thought-provoking question to ponder: When you see a problem in your community, how do you decide if a fight is worth the cost—not just in money, but in time, credibility, and peace?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John A Sellers(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Edward D. O’Brien(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP Represented Respondent
The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.
Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.
The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
• Parties Involved:
◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.
◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.
• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.
• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.
Background and Timeline of the Dispute
The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).
• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):
◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.
◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.
◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.
◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.
• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:
◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.
◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.
◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.
• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.
• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.
• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.
• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.
• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.
Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)
The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”
• Specific Violations Alleged:
◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.
◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.
◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.
• Evidence Presented at Hearing:
◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.
◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).
◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.
◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.
Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)
The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.
• Core Arguments:
◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.
◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.
◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.
• Actions Taken by MCIII:
◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.
◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.
◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.
◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.
◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.
Governing Rules and CC&Rs
The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.
Document
Article/Rule
Provision
Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)
Rule 3
Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.12
Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.13
States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.14
Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.
• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.
• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.
◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.
◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”
◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.
◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.
• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL
Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?
3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?
4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.
5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?
6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?
7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?
9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.
2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.
3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.
4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.
5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.
6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.
7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.
9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.
4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.
Common Elements
Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.
Community Manager
An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.
Inoperable Vehicle
A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.
A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.
A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL
He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.
Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking
For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.
This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.
The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.
1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work
The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.
The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.
The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:
MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.
2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon
John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:
• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.
• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.
• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.
The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.
3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures
In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.
The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.
This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.
4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis
Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.
Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.
The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:
Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.
The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.
5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient
Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:
• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.
• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.
The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.
For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.
Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One
The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John W. Gray(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Austin Baillio(attorney) Maxwell & Morgan PC Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe(community manager) Curtiss Management Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.
Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.
The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
• Parties Involved:
◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.
◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.
• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.
• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.
Background and Timeline of the Dispute
The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).
• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):
◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.
◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.
◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.
◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.
• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:
◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.
◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.
◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.
• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.
• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.
• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.
• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.
• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.
Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)
The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”
• Specific Violations Alleged:
◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.
◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.
◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.
• Evidence Presented at Hearing:
◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.
◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).
◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.
◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.
Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)
The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.
• Core Arguments:
◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.
◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.
◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.
• Actions Taken by MCIII:
◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.
◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.
◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.
◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.
◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.
Governing Rules and CC&Rs
The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.
Document
Article/Rule
Provision
Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)
Rule 3
Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.12
Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.13
States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.14
Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.
• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.
• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.
◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.
◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”
◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.
◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.
• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL
Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?
3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?
4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.
5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?
6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?
7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?
9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.
2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.
3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.
4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.
5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.
6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.
7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.
9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.
4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.
Common Elements
Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.
Community Manager
An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.
Inoperable Vehicle
A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.
A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.
A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL
He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.
Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking
For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.
This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.
The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.
1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work
The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.
The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.
The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:
MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.
2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon
John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:
• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.
• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.
• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.
The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.
3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures
In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.
The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.
This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.
4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis
Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.
Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.
The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:
Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.
The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.
5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient
Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:
• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.
• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.
The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.
For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.
Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One
The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John W. Gray(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Austin Baillio(attorney) Maxwell & Morgan PC Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe(community manager) Curtiss Management Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).
Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:56 (112.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818050-REL
Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.
The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.
1. Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1818050-REL
Petitioner
Brent J. Mathews
Respondent
American Ranch Community Association
Hearing Date
September 21, 2018
Decision Date
October 11, 2018
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.
2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation
After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:
“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”
The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.
3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events
The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.
A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.
June 2011
The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.
November 23, 2013
Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.
July 30, 2016
Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.
August 2016
Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.
August 9, 2016
The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.
4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning
The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.
A. Burden of Proof
The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.
B. Variance vs. Amendment
The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.
• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.
• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”
The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.
C. The Board’s Delegated Authority
The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:
1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.
2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”
3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.
5. Final Order
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:
• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.
• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”
The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818050-REL
Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?
3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?
4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?
5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?
6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?
7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?
8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?
9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.
2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.
3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.
4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.
5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.
6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.
7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.
8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.
9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.
10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.
2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”
3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?
4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.
5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.
Architectural Review Committee
A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.
Bylaws
The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.
Petition
The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.
Variance
An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.
Well Agreement 1
A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.
Well Agreement 2
An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818050-REL
Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown
1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome
It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.
That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.
The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.
2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone
Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.
However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.
3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees
This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.
This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.
According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.
“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”
This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.
4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution
While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.
The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.
When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”
The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.
5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them
The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.
This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brent J. Mathews(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).
Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:00 (112.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818050-REL
Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.
The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.
1. Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1818050-REL
Petitioner
Brent J. Mathews
Respondent
American Ranch Community Association
Hearing Date
September 21, 2018
Decision Date
October 11, 2018
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.
2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation
After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:
“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”
The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.
3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events
The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.
A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.
June 2011
The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.
November 23, 2013
Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.
July 30, 2016
Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.
August 2016
Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.
August 9, 2016
The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.
4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning
The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.
A. Burden of Proof
The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.
B. Variance vs. Amendment
The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.
• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.
• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”
The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.
C. The Board’s Delegated Authority
The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:
1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.
2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”
3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.
5. Final Order
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:
• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.
• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”
The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818050-REL
Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?
3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?
4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?
5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?
6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?
7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?
8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?
9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.
2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.
3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.
4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.
5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.
6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.
7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.
8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.
9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.
10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.
2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”
3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?
4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.
5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.
Architectural Review Committee
A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.
Bylaws
The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.
Petition
The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.
Variance
An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.
Well Agreement 1
A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.
Well Agreement 2
An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818050-REL
Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown
1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome
It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.
That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.
The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.
2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone
Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.
However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.
3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees
This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.
This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.
According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.
“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”
This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.
4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution
While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.
The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.
When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”
The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.
5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them
The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.
This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brent J. Mathews(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.
Key Issues & Findings
Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:06 (107.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL
Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”
The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”
The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.
Case Overview
This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
18F-H1818053-REL
Petitioner
Travis Prall
Respondent
Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Initial Hearing
September 4, 2018
Initial Decision
September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)
Rehearing
January 11, 2019
Final Decision
January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)
Timeline of Key Events
• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.
• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.
• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.
• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.
• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.
Central Allegation and Dispute
The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.
Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)
The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.
• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.
• Inferences about Original Landscaping:
◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.
◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.
◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.
Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)
The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.
• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.
• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.
• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.
◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.
◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.
◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”
Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections
The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.
Section
Provision
Significance in the Case
The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“
This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”
“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…
This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.
“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…
This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.
Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.
Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)
• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”
• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”
• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.
Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)
• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”
• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”
• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”
• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818053-REL
Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal decisions. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition?
3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing.
4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request?
5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent.
6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion?
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision?
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?
9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019?
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Answer Key
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles? The Petitioner was Travis Prall, the homeowner who filed the dispute. The Respondent was the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (HOA), which was defending against the Petitioner’s claims. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition? The Petitioner alleged a violation of Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). His central claim was that the HOA violated this section by neglecting its duty to perform yard maintenance in his backyard, which he argued was a “visible public yard.”
3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing. The exterior homes feature six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing their backyards. In contrast, the interior homes, including the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall consisting of a two-foot block wall topped with a two-foot aluminum fence, making the total height approximately four feet and more visible from a common walkway.
4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request? In 2018, the HOA had a “pony wall” in the Petitioner’s backyard repaired and was informed by the repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, that the wall had buckled due to tree roots. Consequently, the HOA issued a Courtesy Letter on May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent. The Respondent argued that a yard is considered a “Private Yard” if it is enclosed or shielded from view, meaning any enclosed yard qualified. The Petitioner argued that the definition should be read to mean a yard is private only if it is enclosed so that it is not generally visible from neighboring property, implying visibility was the key factor.
6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion? The Petitioner testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA had provided landscaping maintenance for his backyard. The Respondent denied this claim, stating that it had never provided any landscaping maintenance to any backyards in the community and raised liability concerns about entering residents’ enclosed yards.
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision? The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case? The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to present evidence proving that the tree in his backyard was “originally installed by the Declarant” (the developer). According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, the HOA’s maintenance responsibility only applied to landscaping and improvements installed by the original community developer.
9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter? Maureen Karpinski testified that none of the homes in the community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt” at the time of purchase. Her testimony was considered credible because she was a real estate agent involved in the initial sales, had walked the community with many buyers during construction, and was herself an original buyer.
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019? In both the initial decision issued on September 24, 2018, and the final decision issued after the rehearing on January 31, 2019, the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated the CC&Rs.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style answers. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found it unnecessary to rule on this specific issue to reach a decision.
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard shape the proceedings, and what specific types of evidence (or lack thereof) were most influential in the judge’s final decision?
3. Trace the timeline of the dispute over the tree in Travis Prall’s backyard, from the 2014 storm to the final legal decision in 2019. How did each key event contribute to the escalation of the conflict and the arguments presented at the hearings?
4. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA at the rehearing. Why did the judge characterize Prall’s evidence as “suppositions and inferences” while deeming the HOA’s evidence “credible”?
5. Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs contains the phrase “as originally installed by Declarant.” Explain the critical importance of this phrase to the outcome of the case and how it became the dispositive legal issue, overshadowing all other arguments.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community.
Common Area
Areas within the community maintained by the HOA for the benefit of all residents. The HOA provides landscaping for these areas.
Courtesy Letter
A formal notice sent by the HOA to a homeowner regarding a potential violation or required action. In this case, it requested the removal of a tree causing damage.
Declarant
The original developer of the planned community who installed the initial infrastructure and landscaping.
HOA Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal hearing regarding an alleged violation by their HOA.
Improvements
A term used in the CC&Rs referring to any additions to a lot other than the main residential dwelling, including landscaping.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the homeowner Travis Prall.
Pony Wall
A term used to describe the short, two-foot-tall block wall in the backyards of the interior homes, which was buckling due to tree roots.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention “more probably true than not.”
Private Yard
As defined in the CC&Rs, a portion of a yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a point of contention.
Public Yard
As defined in the CC&Rs, the portion of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property,” regardless of its location on the lot. The HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping originally installed by the Declarant in Public Yards.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the claims. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.
Visible from Neighboring Property
A term defined in the CC&Rs to mean an object that would be visible to a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property. It includes a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.
As defined in the CC&Rs, “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”
Blog Post – 18F-H1818053-REL
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18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
2 sources
These documents are two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Travis Prall, the Petitioner, and the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, the Respondent. The first document outlines the initial decision, dated September 24, 2018, which dismissed Mr. Prall’s petition arguing the HOA violated their Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements (CC&Rs) by neglecting yard maintenance. The second document is the decision following a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, dated January 31, 2019, which reaffirmed the initial dismissal, concluding that Mr. Prall failed to prove that the landscaping in question was originally installed by the Declarant, a prerequisite for the HOA’s maintenance responsibility under the CC&Rs. Both decisions rely heavily on interpreting sections of the CC&Rs, particularly the definitions of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard,” to determine the HOA’s obligation. Ultimately, both rulings found that the Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Travis Prall(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Lydia Pierce Linsmeier(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Nicole Payne(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Maureen Karpinski(board member) Villas at Tierra Buena HOA President of the Board; testified
Frank Peake(property manager) Pride Community Management Owner of Pride Community Management; testified
Rebecca Stowers(community manager) Community Manager; testified at initial hearing
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
