Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowner’s Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners' Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

Bylaw 2.4

Outcome Summary

In the initial decision, Petitioner established violations of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (election materials disposal) and A.R.S. § 33-1804 (closed/improperly noticed meetings), but failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Issue 1). The rehearing only addressed Issue 1, which was ultimately dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 violation) because the ALJ found that while the Bylaw applied to Members, Petitioner failed to show it prohibited a Director from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned, and the investigation was initiated by a Board member immediately following the meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Election Objection Waiver)

Whether Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on an objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting, given that the Bylaw requires members to object to irregularities 'at the meeting' to avoid waiver.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed as to Issue 1.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Election Challenge, Bylaw Violation, Meeting Notice, Record Retention, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Bylaw 3.3
  • Bylaw 2.4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – 678304.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:44 (117.5 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – 678305.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:47 (38.8 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818035-REL/655766.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:50 (113.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Tom Barrs vs. Desert Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative legal dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning the HOA’s board election of March 18, 2017. The core of the dispute involved the HOA board’s decision to investigate and ultimately overturn the initially announced election results, leading to a run-off election.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) overseeing the case and a subsequent rehearing issued a mixed final decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, successfully proved that the Desert Ranch HOA committed two statutory violations:

1. Destruction of Election Materials: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by destroying ballot envelopes shortly after the election, materials which are required to be retained for at least one year.

2. Improper Closed Meeting: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding a board meeting with its attorney at a private residence without providing the required notice to its members.

However, the Petitioner’s primary challenge—that the board violated its own Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned—was dismissed. The ALJ ruled that the bylaw’s waiver of claims applied to general “Members” but not to “Directors” acting in their official capacity. This ruling effectively upheld the board’s authority to investigate the election, which led to the discovery of invalid ballots and the eventual run-off election won by Brian Schoeffler.

As the prevailing party on two of the three issues, Mr. Barrs was awarded a reimbursement of his $1,000.00 filing fee. The judge, however, found that no civil penalty against the HOA was appropriate.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Tom Barrs

Respondent: Desert Ranch HOA, represented by Catherine Overby (President) and Brian Schoeffler (Vice President)

Case Number: 18F-H1818035-REL

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Subject of Dispute: Alleged violations of Arizona statutes and HOA bylaws related to the handling and outcome of the March 18, 2017, annual board election.

II. Chronology of the Contested Election

The dispute originated from the following sequence of events surrounding the 2017 election for two vacant seats on the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors.

1. Pre-Election: Absentee ballots were distributed to members, listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates and providing a space for a write-in candidate.

2. March 18, 2017 (Annual Meeting): Ballots were submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger (a write-in) were announced as the winning candidates. No members present objected to the results before the meeting was adjourned.

3. Immediately Following the Meeting: Board member Patrick Rice gathered the ballots and “expressed his concerns with the election results.”

4. Circa March 18, 2017: All ballot envelopes from the election were destroyed.

5. March 19, 2017: Candidate Brian Schoeffler sent an email regarding the election, stating, “I’m asking you to review the situation and make a decision if there is enough concern that there should be a revote.”

6. March 20, 2017: Board President Catherine Overby emailed the members, announcing that the election had been “contested.” In the email, she asserted that the bylaws did not permit write-in candidates and declared that she and Mr. Schoeffler were the new directors.

7. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Ms. Overby and Mr. Rice, held an unannounced meeting with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s home. During this meeting, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot” had been improperly counted.

8. Post-March 29, 2017: After consulting the attorney, the board determined that the valid vote count resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board decided to hold a run-off election.

9. April 29, 2017: The run-off election was held, and Brian Schoeffler was announced as the winner.

10. May 10, 2017: The newly constituted Board of Directors held its organizational meeting.

III. Adjudicated Issues and Rulings

The petition, originally filed as a single issue, was converted to a multiple-issue case. At the hearing, the dispute was clarified into three distinct issues, each with a specific ruling from the ALJ.

Petitioner’s Allegation

Legal Basis

Final Ruling

The HOA improperly overturned the election results based on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned.

Bylaw 2.4

Dismissed

The HOA unlawfully discarded ballot envelopes and related election materials.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)

Violation Found

The HOA held closed board meetings without providing proper notice to the membership.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Violation Found

——————————————————————————–

A. Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Improperly Overturning Election)

Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs contended that the board was barred from investigating or acting on any concerns about the election after the meeting had concluded. His argument was based on Bylaw 2.4, which states:

ALJ Finding: The petition on this issue was dismissed. The judge’s finding was affirmed after a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.

ALJ Rationale:

1. Initiation of Investigation: Testimony established that Board member Patrick Rice expressed concerns “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” Therefore, Mr. Schoeffler’s email the following day did not initiate the board’s investigation.

2. Distinction Between “Member” and “Director”: The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. The waiver in Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member,” and the Petitioner failed to prove that a “Director” was prohibited from raising questions about the validity of an election after a meeting.

B. Issue 2: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (Destruction of Election Materials)

Statutory Requirement: Arizona law mandates that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… for at least one year after completion of the election.”

Respondent’s Action: The HOA destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election.

ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.

ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” presented at the hearing that established the destruction of the materials.

C. Issue 3: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Improper Closed Meetings)

Statutory Requirement: Arizona law requires all HOA board meetings to be open to all members. A meeting can only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must provide notice and cite the legal authority for entering a closed session.

Respondent’s Action: Certain board members met with an attorney at a private residence on March 29, 2017, to discuss the election. No notice was provided to the membership regarding this meeting.

ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.

ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” that the meeting occurred and that the board “did not provide any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or provide notice that the meeting would be closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.”

IV. Final Order and Disposition

The final decision, issued on August 23, 2018, and upheld after a rehearing decision on December 26, 2018, ordered the following:

Dismissal: The petition regarding Issue 1 (violation of Bylaw 2.4) was dismissed.

Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Tom Barrs, was deemed the prevailing party as to Issue 2 and Issue 3.

Monetary Award: The Respondent, Desert Ranch HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00.

Civil Penalty: The judge determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Finality: The decision after rehearing was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


Study Guide:Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 23, 2018, and December 26, 2018.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the initially announced results of the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors election on March 18, 2017?

3. What were the two primary procedural violations that the Desert Ranch HOA Board committed following the March 18, 2017 election?

4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the violation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismiss the Petitioner’s claim regarding Bylaw 2.4?

6. Explain the violation related to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1812(A)(7) that the ALJ found the Respondent had committed.

7. Describe the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 concerning open meetings.

8. What was the final order from the initial hearing on August 23, 2018?

9. What was the specific focus of the rehearing held on December 6, 2018?

10. What was the ultimate outcome of the rehearing, and what legal recourse was available to the parties afterward?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Tom Barrs, who filed the dispute, and Respondent Desert Ranch HOA. The HOA was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. At the Annual Board Meeting on March 18, 2017, the ballots were counted and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates for the two vacant seats on the Board of Directors. No members present raised an objection before the meeting was adjourned.

3. The HOA Board committed two primary procedural violations. First, they destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election, and second, certain Board members met with an attorney without providing notice to the association members that a meeting was being held or that it would be a closed session.

4. The Petitioner argued that candidate Brian Schoeffler’s challenge to the election was invalid because it was raised the day after the meeting adjourned. According to Bylaw 2.4, any “Member” who fails to object to an irregularity at the meeting waives their claim, and the Petitioner argued this rule should also apply to Board members.

5. The ALJ dismissed the claim because the investigation was initiated by Board member Patrick Rice, who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting, not by Mr. Schoeffler’s later email. The judge also determined that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific, non-interchangeable meanings, and the Petitioner failed to show that a Director was barred from raising concerns after a meeting.

6. The ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) based on uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing. This statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related election materials be retained for at least one year after an election, but the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.

7. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when certain Board members met with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s house on March 29, 2017. The HOA failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the members and did not announce that the meeting would be closed to discuss legal advice, as required by the statute.

8. In the initial order, the ALJ dismissed the petition as to Issue 1 (the Bylaw 2.4 violation) but found the Petitioner to be the prevailing party on Issues 2 and 3 (the statutory violations). The judge ordered the Respondent HOA to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00 but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

9. The rehearing focused exclusively on the first issue from the initial hearing: whether the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on objections to the election results after the Annual Meeting had adjourned. The Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the lack of penalties for the other two violations.

10. The rehearing upheld the original decision, dismissing the petition as to Issue 1. The decision from the rehearing was final and binding, and any party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing upon specific facts and legal arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4, specifically the distinction between a “Member” and a “Director.” Discuss the strength of the Petitioner’s counter-argument and why the judge’s reasoning ultimately prevailed.

2. Examine the series of actions taken by the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors following the March 18, 2017 election announcement. Evaluate whether their actions to investigate irregularities, consult an attorney, and hold a run-off election were ultimately justified, despite the procedural violations they committed.

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as the burden of proof in this case. For each of the three issues presented, explain how the Petitioner either met or failed to meet this standard, citing specific evidence mentioned in the decisions.

4. Based on the events described, from the initial election to the final administrative ruling, critique the effectiveness of the HOA’s internal governance and dispute resolution processes. What systemic failures are evident, and how did they lead to a formal administrative hearing?

5. Although the Petitioner was the “prevailing party” on two of the three issues, the remedy was limited to a refund of his filing fee, with no civil penalty imposed. Argue for or against the appropriateness of this remedy, considering the nature of the HOA’s violations and their impact on the integrity of the election process.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on evidence and law. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all meetings of a homeowners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. A meeting may only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must state the statutory reason for closing the meeting.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)

An Arizona Revised Statute that mandates the retention of election materials, including ballots and envelopes, in either electronic or paper format for at least one year after the completion of an election for member inspection.

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

An Arizona statute that permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4

A provision in the HOA’s bylaws stating, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal proceeding against their HOA for alleged violations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Tom Barrs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to consider a decision that has already been made, typically granted if there are perceived errors of law, misconduct, or if the decision was not supported by the evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch HOA.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Botched Election—Here Are 3 Lessons Every Board Should Learn

Friction between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) board is a common feature of community living, and nowhere is that friction more apparent than in disputes over elections and rule enforcement. But what happens when a board, trying to correct an error, makes the situation exponentially worse?

This article is a deep dive into the real administrative law case of Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, a seemingly straightforward dispute that reveals surprising and practical lessons for anyone living in or governing a planned community. It’s a story of a cascade of errors, where initial election confusion led to a panicked and procedurally flawed response, compounded by a pre-existing failure in record-keeping. As we’ll see, the outcome wasn’t what anyone expected, and the board’s biggest mistakes weren’t the ones they thought they were fighting.

——————————————————————————–

1. You Can Lose the Main Argument But Still Win the Case

The dispute began at the Desert Ranch HOA’s annual meeting, where election results were announced. The trouble started immediately after the meeting adjourned when a board Director, Patrick Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed concerns about irregularities. A day later, a losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, echoed those concerns via email. Citing the Director’s objection, the board overturned the initial results, prompting homeowner Tom Barrs to file a petition arguing this was a violation of the HOA’s own rules.

Barrs’ case hinged on Bylaw 2.4, which stated that any “Member” must object to irregularities during the meeting itself, or else they waive their right to complain. Barrs argued that since no one objected before adjournment, the results should stand. However, the judge disagreed, pointing to two critical distinctions in the evidence. First, the investigation was triggered by the concerns of a “Director,” not the losing candidate’s later email. Second, a close reading of the bylaws showed that the terms “Member” and “Director” were used as distinct categories and were not interchangeable. Since the bylaw only restricted “Members,” it did not prevent a Director from raising concerns after the meeting. Barrs lost his primary argument.

Despite this, in a counter-intuitive twist, the judge declared Barrs the “prevailing party” in the overall case and ordered the HOA to repay his $1,000 filing fee. Why? Because while investigating the petitioner’s main claim, the judge found the board had committed other clear violations of state law while trying to “fix” the election. This outcome underscores a critical principle for all boards: procedural integrity is paramount. The HOA won the battle over its right to review the election but lost the war because of its flawed process.

——————————————————————————–

2. Your Records (or Lack Thereof) Will Be Your Downfall

One of the board’s most significant errors was a simple but critical failure of administrative duty: they destroyed election materials in direct violation of state law. The HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), which is unambiguous about an HOA’s responsibility.

According to A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), “Ballots, envelopes and related materials…shall be retained…for at least one year after completion of the election.”

The legal decision states the evidence was “uncontroverted” that the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. Because the HOA could not dispute this fact, it was an easy violation for the petitioner to prove.

This wasn’t just a minor administrative oversight; it was a catastrophic error. By destroying the envelopes, the board not only violated the law but also eliminated any possibility of independently verifying the vote count after their own director discovered irregularities. This single failure trapped them in a procedural corner of their own making. It made a definitive resolution of the election challenge impossible, leading to the messy and expensive situation of declaring a tie and holding a run-off, all of which could have been avoided if the primary evidence had been preserved as required by law.

——————————————————————————–

3. “Private” Board Business Can Be an Illegal Secret Meeting

In an attempt to resolve the election dispute correctly, the board took what it likely considered a responsible step: seeking legal advice. After the election was contested, certain board members met with an attorney at a board member’s house to figure out how to proceed. However, the way they did it constituted another clear violation of state law.

This private meeting violated Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804. While the statute does allow a board to enter a closed session to receive legal advice, it has strict procedural requirements. The board must first provide notice of the meeting to all members and then, at that public meeting, officially vote to enter the closed session for that specific, legally permissible reason. The evidence was “uncontroverted” that the board failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the association members.

The board’s desire for confidential legal advice was understandable, but their method created an unforced legal error. The correct procedure—notifying members of a meeting and then voting to enter a closed session—protects the board by demonstrating procedural propriety. The shortcut they took exposed them to a clear-cut violation that was impossible to defend. For an HOA board, transparency is the default, and secrecy is a narrow, legally defined exception. The process of going private matters as much as the reason for doing so.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: It’s Not Just What You Do, It’s How You Do It

The Desert Ranch HOA board, in its attempt to correct a perceived election error, committed two clear statutory violations. In their haste, they held an illegal secret meeting and were hamstrung by their prior failure to properly retain election records—the very evidence needed for a clean resolution. These procedural missteps ultimately cost them the case.

The ultimate lesson from Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA is that for any governing body, procedural correctness is just as important as substantive correctness. This case serves as a stark reminder that good intentions are no defense against procedural law. When a crisis hits, does your board have the discipline to follow procedure, or will the rush to find a solution lead you to commit unforced errors that are far worse than the original problem?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Stephen Barrs (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Catherine Overby (board president, witness)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Brian Schoeffler (board vice president, witness)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Patrick Rice (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Board member who expressed concerns with election results

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Jerome Klinger (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Director elected in disputed election

George E Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918013-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner George E Lord Counsel
Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association Counsel Maria Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, and CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any statute or covenant alleged. The core findings supported the HOA's position that the lessee was engaging in prohibited business activity and subletting, and that the charged attorney fees were permissible.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations concerning notice procedures, leasing restrictions, prohibited business use, and excessive fees.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to include proper citations in violation notices, violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 and CC&Rs by imposing illegal restrictions on occupancy dates and prohibiting tenant guests, and violated fee limits under A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) by charging $250 in attorney fees.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, HOA dispute, leasing restrictions, short-term rental, business use, notice procedure, attorney fees
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:32 (115.9 KB)

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:32 (47.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918013-REL


Briefing Document: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918013-REL, involving Petitioner George E. Lord and Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association. The judge ultimately dismissed all claims brought by the Petitioner, ruling that the Association acted within the bounds of Arizona statutes and its governing documents.

The core of the dispute centered on Mr. Lord’s leasing of three condominium units to an individual, Barrie Shepley, who used the properties to house participants for his commercial fitness training camps. The Association contended this arrangement constituted a prohibited short-term sublease and an improper business use of the units, leading them to suspend amenity access for the occupants.

The judge’s decision affirmed the Association’s position on all counts. Key takeaways include:

Substance Over Form: The judge concluded that despite the absence of a formal sublease agreement, the nature of the arrangement—specifically a camp pricing structure that varied based on the number of occupants per condo—was effectively a sublet designed to house an “itinerant population,” contrary to the “spirit and purpose” of the community’s rules.

Business Use Violation: The operation was found to be a business activity that violated the CC&Rs by requiring persons (camp participants) to come to the residential units.

Procedural Compliance: The Association’s violation notices were deemed compliant with Arizona law. The judge noted that the statute only requires a detailed citation of the violated rule after the owner responds to the initial notice, which the Petitioner failed to do.

Legality of Fees: A $250 charge levied by the Association’s counsel was determined to be a permissible charge for attorney’s fees related to potential collection, not an illegal penalty for leasing information as the Petitioner alleged.

As a result of these findings, the Petitioner’s request for relief was denied, and the petition was dismissed in its entirety.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: George E. Lord (unit owner)

Respondent: The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Number: 19F-H1918013-REL

Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: November 26, 2018

Decision Date: December 17, 2018

Final Disposition: The petition filed by George E. Lord was dismissed.

II. Factual Background and Timeline of Events

1. Lease Agreements: On or about December 4, 2017, Petitioner George Lord, through his management company, leased two units at The Boulders to Barrie Shepley for a term from March 7, 2018, to April 30, 2018. A third unit was subsequently leased to Mr. Shepley on or about January 15, 2018.

2. Commercial Use: Mr. Shepley operated a Canadian fitness business, “Personal Best,” which offered training camps in Tucson. Accommodations at The Boulders were included in the camp packages. The price for a camp varied based on occupancy:

◦ $950.00 each for four campers in a condo

◦ $1075.00 each for three campers in a condo

◦ $1299.00 each for two campers in a condo

3. Occupancy Begins: On March 7, 2018, guests of Mr. Shepley (camp participants) began arriving to occupy the three leased units.

4. Association Intervention: On March 9, 2018, Community Manager Danielle Morris emailed Mr. Lord, stating the Association’s belief that he was in violation of the CC&Rs by allowing subleasing for periods less than the 30-day minimum. Ms. Morris informed him that amenity access cards for the three units were deactivated.

5. Dispute Escalation: Mr. Lord contended that the occupants were merely “guests” of Mr. Shepley, not subletters. Ms. Morris countered that the Association required the names of all occupants and the duration of their stays, and that each occupant must stay for a minimum of 30 days.

6. Information Provided: On March 13, 2018, Mr. Lord provided the names of the occupants and their dates of occupancy, requesting that amenities be restored.

7. Violation Reiterated: On March 16, 2018, Ms. Morris stated the violation was ongoing, as occupants staying from March 7 to March 31 did not meet the 30-day minimum stay requirement.

8. Formal Notice of Violation: On March 18, 2018, Mr. Lord received formal Notices of Violations for the three units. The notices stated that amenity access was suspended because the HOA was not provided with the names of adult occupants and their timeframes. The notice warned that a $300 fine could be applied. Mr. Lord did not respond to these notices.

9. Attorney Involvement: On March 22, 2018, Mr. Lord received a letter from the Association’s legal counsel outlining its legal position and noting an amount due of $250 for attorney’s fees already incurred.

10. Lease Cancellation & Financial Loss: On April 2, 2018, Mr. Shepley cancelled the remainder of the leases due to the lack of amenities for his guests. Mr. Lord asserted a resulting financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018.

11. Petition Filing: On August 31, 2018, Mr. Lord filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association violated state statutes and its own CC&Rs.

III. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Lord’s petition was based on three primary allegations against the Association:

Allegation 1: Defective Violation Notice (A.R.S. § 33-1242): The Petitioner argued that the Notices of Violations were legally deficient because they failed to cite the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

Allegation 2: Unlawful Occupancy Requirements (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 & CC&Rs): The Petitioner asserted that the Association overstepped its authority by demanding that each occupant, whom he characterized as a “guest” of the primary lessee, must stay for a minimum of 30 days. He argued the 30-day minimum lease term applied only to the primary lease with Mr. Shepley, not to the occupants.

Allegation 3: Improper Fees (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)): The Petitioner claimed that the $250 charge from the Association’s attorney constituted an illegal fee, penalty, or charge related to providing leasing information, which he argued was prohibited by statute.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for any of his allegations and dismissed the petition. The judge’s reasoning is detailed below.

Finding 1: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Violation Notice)

The judge determined that the Association’s initial Notices of Violations were legally sufficient.

Legal Reasoning: A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) requires an association to cite the specific provision of the condominium documents that has been violated. However, this obligation is only triggered after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail.

Factual Basis: The Petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the formal Notices of Violations he received.

Conclusion: Because the Petitioner did not take the legally required step to trigger the Association’s duty to provide a specific citation, the Association did not violate the statute.

Finding 2: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 or CC&Rs (Leasing Rules)

The judge concluded that the Association was justified in its actions regarding the occupancy of the units.

The Arrangement was a “Form” of Subletting: The judge ruled against the Petitioner’s argument that the occupants were merely “guests.” The fact that the price of the fitness camp changed based on how many people shared a unit was seen as evidence that Mr. Shepley was, in effect, subletting the units for his business.

Prohibited Business Activity: The judge found that Mr. Shepley was operating a business from the units in a manner prohibited by Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs, which disallows business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.”

Spirit of the Law: The decision acknowledged that the specific facts of the case “falls between the cracks of the specific language of the statutes and the regulations.” However, the judge emphasized that the Association’s actions were consistent with the broader intent of its rules, stating, “given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.”

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated leasing statutes or its own CC&Rs.

Finding 3: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) (Fees)

The judge found that the $250 charge was not an illegal penalty.

Nature of the Charge: The evidence showed that no fines for the lease policy violation had actually been assessed. The $250 charge was explicitly for attorney’s fees related to the potential collection of assessments.

Legal Reasoning: The judge stated, “Nothing in the cited statute or the CC&Rs prohibits such a charge being implemented.” The fee was not a penalty for “incomplete or late information” as covered by the statute, but a charge for legal costs incurred by the Association.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish a violation regarding the assessed fees.

V. Referenced Statutes and Governing Documents

Reference

Provision Summary

Relevance to Case

A.R.S. § 33-1242(B)&(C)

Outlines the process for a unit owner to respond to a violation notice and the association’s subsequent duty to provide specific details of the violation.

The judge found no violation because the Petitioner did not follow the procedure to trigger the association’s duty.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(C)

Limits the information an association can require about a tenant to names, contact info for adults, lease period, and vehicle information.

The Petitioner’s case rested on interpreting this statute; the judge found the Association’s inquiries justified by the unique circumstances.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)

Prohibits an association from imposing fees greater than $15 for incomplete or late leasing information.

The Petitioner argued the $250 attorney fee violated this, but the judge found it was a permissible charge for legal costs, not a penalty.

CC&R Section 7.21

Requires leases to be in writing, for a term of not less than 30 days, and requires owners to provide lessee names and lease dates.

The Association argued the arrangement violated the 30-day minimum stay rule for occupants, which the judge upheld in spirit.

CC&R Section 7.3

Prohibits business activities within a unit that involve persons coming to the unit.

The judge found Mr. Shepley’s fitness camp, which housed participants in the units, was a clear violation of this provision.

Leasing Policy

States a $300 fine may be imposed for violations of the 30-day minimum lease policy.

The Notice of Violation referenced this potential fine, though it was never actually assessed.

VI. Final Order and Procedural Notes

Order: Based on the above findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed.

Binding Nature: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Related Filings: On the same day the decision was issued, December 17, 2018, the court also issued a separate “Order Vacating Hearing,” likely a procedural filing to cancel a future hearing that was rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of the case.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918013-REL


Study Guide: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918013-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The case involves a dispute between a condominium unit owner, George E. Lord, and his condominium association, The Boulders at La Reserve, concerning leasing policies, occupant regulations, and alleged statutory violations.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. Describe the business arrangement that Barrie Shepley, the petitioner’s lessee, was operating from the leased condominium units.

3. What was the first official action the Condominium Association’s management took in response to the arrival of Barrie Shepley’s guests, and what was their stated reason?

4. According to the Association, what two specific provisions of the governing documents were being violated by the petitioner and his lessee?

5. What was the petitioner’s central argument for why the occupants of the units were not in violation of the Association’s 30-day minimum stay requirement?

6. On what procedural grounds did the petitioner, George Lord, claim that the Association’s “Notice of Violations” was itself a violation of Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242)?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1242?

8. How did the judge interpret the fact that the price for Barrie Shepley’s fitness camps varied based on the number of people sharing a condo?

9. What financial loss did the petitioner claim to have suffered, and what was the direct cause of this loss?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were George E. Lord, the petitioner and owner of multiple condominium units, and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association, the respondent and governing body for the community. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. Barrie Shepley operated a fitness business called “Personal Best” that offered training camps in the Tucson area. The price for these camps included accommodations at The Boulders, with the cost per person varying based on how many campers shared a condominium unit.

3. The Association’s first action was to deactivate the amenity access cards for the three units leased by Shepley. Danielle Morris, the Community Manager, stated this was due to a belief that the petitioner’s lessee was subleasing the units for periods of less than the 30-day minimum in violation of the CC&Rs.

4. The Association alleged violations of the CC&Rs related to subleasing for less than the 30-day minimum timeframe. The formal Notices of Violations also cited the failure to provide the names of all adult occupants and the timeframes of their stays to the HOA.

5. The petitioner argued that because his lessee, Mr. Shepley, was not charging a specific rental fee to the occupants, they were merely “guests” and not sub-lessees. Therefore, the 30-day minimum stay requirement applicable to leases did not apply to them.

6. The petitioner alleged that the Association’s failure to include a citation to the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated in the initial Notice of Violations was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242.

7. The judge ruled against the petitioner because A.R.S. § 33-1242 only requires an association to provide the specific provision violated after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail. The petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the Notices of Violations.

8. The judge found that the tiered pricing structure supported the conclusion that Mr. Shepley was, “in a form, subletting the units.” The fact that the camp price decreased as more people shared a unit indicated that the occupants were paying for their accommodations, not simply staying as guests.

9. The petitioner asserted a financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018. This loss was directly caused by Barrie Shepley canceling the remainder of his leases due to the lack of amenities for his occupants.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s final order was that the Petition filed by George E. Lord be dismissed. This decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts, arguments, and legal interpretations from the case file.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Barrie Shepley was “in a form, subletting” the units. Discuss the evidence cited and the concept of the “spirit and purpose” of the rules versus their literal interpretation.

2. Examine the procedural misstep made by the petitioner, George Lord, after receiving the Notices of Violations. How did this action directly impact the judge’s ruling on his claim regarding A.R.S. § 33-1242?

3. Discuss the conflict between a unit owner’s right to lease their property and a condominium association’s right to enforce its governing documents, using the specific provisions of the CC&Rs (Sections 7.21 and 7.3) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01) as examples from the case.

4. Explain the distinction the judge made between the $300 potential fine mentioned in the Notice of Violations and the $250 attorney’s fee charged to the petitioner. How did this distinction relate to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E), and why was the Association’s action deemed permissible?

5. Evaluate the concept of an “itinerant population” as mentioned by the judge. How did Barrie Shepley’s business model contribute to this concern for the Association, and how did it ultimately weigh into the judge’s decision to dismiss the petition?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Name

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings on disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified body of laws for the state of Arizona. The petitioner alleged violations of specific statutes within this code, namely A.R.S. § 33-1242 and § 33-1260.01.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

A state law governing the process for notifying a unit owner of a violation of condominium documents and the procedures for the owner to respond and contest the notice.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01

A state law that places limitations on what information an association can require from a unit owner regarding a tenant and caps certain fees or penalties for incomplete information at $15.

Amenity

A feature or facility of a property that provides comfort, convenience, or pleasure. In this case, access to amenities was controlled by key cards, which the Association deactivated.

Barrie Shepley

The individual who leased three condominium units from the petitioner. He operated a fitness business, “Personal Best,” and used the units to house clients attending his training camps.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Association alleged Shepley’s use of the units violated Sections 7.21 (leasing limitations) and 7.3 (business use limitations).

George E. Lord

The Petitioner in the case. He was the owner of multiple condominium units at The Boulders at La Reserve and filed the petition against the Association.

Itinerant population

A term used by the judge to describe a population of short-term, transient occupants. The judge concluded that the purpose of the Association’s rules was, in part, to prevent this type of occupancy.

Notice of Violations

A formal written document sent by the Association to the petitioner informing him of alleged violations of the governing documents and outlining potential consequences, such as fines.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, George E. Lord.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the petitioner had the burden of showing that the facts they sought to prove were “more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association.

Subletting

The practice of a tenant leasing a rented property to a third party. The Association contended Shepley was subletting the units to his campers, while the petitioner argued they were merely guests.

The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case. The homeowners’ association (HOA) responsible for governing the condominium community in Oro Valley, Arizona.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918013-REL


The $6,900 ‘Guest’ Mistake: 3 Hard Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit

A $6,900 loss in rental income and a losing legal battle with his HOA—all because of a dispute over the definition of a “guest.” This case between owner George Lord and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association is a masterclass in how quickly and completely an owner can lose when they misinterpret the rules and underestimate an association’s power.

For any homeowner or landlord, this dispute provides three crucial lessons distilled from the administrative court’s decision. Understanding these precedents is essential before you ever find yourself at odds with your own HOA.

Lesson 1: The “Spirit of the Rule” Can Outweigh Your Clever Workaround

The dispute began when the property owner, Mr. Lord, leased three condos to Barrie Shepley, who ran fitness training camps. Mr. Shepley then used the condos to house his camp attendees, often for periods shorter than the HOA’s 30-day minimum lease term.

The owner argued his arrangement complied with the rules. He claimed his tenant, Mr. Shepley, was not subleasing the units; the attendees were merely “guests,” and therefore not subject to the 30-day minimum. It was a clever workaround, but it fell apart under scrutiny for two distinct reasons.

First, the judge looked past the “guest” label to the financial substance of the arrangement. A key piece of evidence was the camp’s pricing: the cost changed based on how many campers shared a condo ($950 each for four campers vs. $1299 each for two). The judge saw this as clear proof that housing was being paid for, making it a form of subletting.

Second, the judge found that the arrangement constituted a prohibited business activity. The association’s CC&Rs (Section 7.3) explicitly forbade any business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.” Since the fitness camp required attendees to come to the condos for lodging, it was a direct violation. The judge’s decision was therefore not just based on a subjective interpretation, but was also grounded in a concrete rule violation.

The court looked at the “totality of the circumstances” to make its ruling, a point powerfully summarized in the final decision:

However, given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.

Pro Tip: Before implementing a workaround, ask yourself: “Does this honor the community’s stated goal?” If the answer is no, you’re on thin ice, even if you think you’ve found a loophole.

Lesson 2: You Must Follow Procedure to the Letter, Or You Forfeit Your Rights

Confident in his “guest” interpretation, the homeowner made his next critical error by underestimating the importance of legal procedure. He argued that the HOA’s initial “Notice of Violations” was invalid because it failed to cite the specific CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

This argument was swiftly dismissed due to a simple but fatal mistake: the owner never sent a formal written response to the notice by certified mail.

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242), an owner’s formal written response via certified mail triggers the HOA’s obligation to provide the specific provision that was violated. Without that trigger, the HOA’s duty to explain further is never activated. The homeowner failed to pull the trigger. Because he did not follow this exact procedure, his claim was thrown out, and the HOA had no further legal obligation to detail its case.

Analyst’s Takeaway: In a legal dispute, communication that isn’t sent via the officially mandated channel (like certified mail) is legally equivalent to communication that never happened.

Lesson 3: The HOA’s Legal Fees Can Hit Your Wallet Sooner Than You Think

Early in the dispute, the owner received a letter from the HOA’s legal counsel. The letter outlined the association’s position and included a charge for $250.00. This was not a fine for the violation. It was a fee for the lawyer’s time, as explained in the letter:

“As you know, the Association is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees from you, including $250.00 already incurred for the preparation of this letter.”

Many governing documents contain clauses that allow an HOA to recover its “costs of enforcement.” This letter was an enforcement action, and the legal fee was the cost. The judge found that nothing in the law or CC&Rs prohibited the HOA from immediately passing this expense to the owner.

This initial charge was a precursor to a much larger financial blow. As an enforcement tool for the violations discussed in Lesson 1, the HOA suspended the tenants’ access to community amenities. This pressure tactic worked perfectly. The tenant, Mr. Shepley, cancelled his leases due to the lack of amenity access, leading to the owner’s stated loss of $6,900 in rental fees.

Pro Tip: Assume your HOA’s first legal letter starts a running tab. Budget for legal costs from day one of a formal dispute, not just for potential fines.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

The case of Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve establishes three clear precedents for owners: a rule’s intent can supersede its literal interpretation, procedural shortcuts void your rights, and the financial clock starts ticking the moment an HOA retains counsel.

This case is a firm reminder of an HOA’s power to enforce its rules, but it also highlights the owner’s responsibility to understand them. It begs the question: In our own communities, are we fully aware of the rules we’ve agreed to live by?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • George E. Lord (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Maria Kupillas (respondent attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
  • Danielle Morris (community manager)
    The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barrie Shepley (renter/key individual)

George E Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918013-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner George E Lord Counsel
Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association Counsel Maria Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, and CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any statute or covenant alleged. The core findings supported the HOA's position that the lessee was engaging in prohibited business activity and subletting, and that the charged attorney fees were permissible.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations concerning notice procedures, leasing restrictions, prohibited business use, and excessive fees.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to include proper citations in violation notices, violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 and CC&Rs by imposing illegal restrictions on occupancy dates and prohibiting tenant guests, and violated fee limits under A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) by charging $250 in attorney fees.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, HOA dispute, leasing restrictions, short-term rental, business use, notice procedure, attorney fees
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:46 (115.9 KB)

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:49 (47.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918013-REL


Briefing Document: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918013-REL, involving Petitioner George E. Lord and Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association. The judge ultimately dismissed all claims brought by the Petitioner, ruling that the Association acted within the bounds of Arizona statutes and its governing documents.

The core of the dispute centered on Mr. Lord’s leasing of three condominium units to an individual, Barrie Shepley, who used the properties to house participants for his commercial fitness training camps. The Association contended this arrangement constituted a prohibited short-term sublease and an improper business use of the units, leading them to suspend amenity access for the occupants.

The judge’s decision affirmed the Association’s position on all counts. Key takeaways include:

Substance Over Form: The judge concluded that despite the absence of a formal sublease agreement, the nature of the arrangement—specifically a camp pricing structure that varied based on the number of occupants per condo—was effectively a sublet designed to house an “itinerant population,” contrary to the “spirit and purpose” of the community’s rules.

Business Use Violation: The operation was found to be a business activity that violated the CC&Rs by requiring persons (camp participants) to come to the residential units.

Procedural Compliance: The Association’s violation notices were deemed compliant with Arizona law. The judge noted that the statute only requires a detailed citation of the violated rule after the owner responds to the initial notice, which the Petitioner failed to do.

Legality of Fees: A $250 charge levied by the Association’s counsel was determined to be a permissible charge for attorney’s fees related to potential collection, not an illegal penalty for leasing information as the Petitioner alleged.

As a result of these findings, the Petitioner’s request for relief was denied, and the petition was dismissed in its entirety.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: George E. Lord (unit owner)

Respondent: The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Number: 19F-H1918013-REL

Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: November 26, 2018

Decision Date: December 17, 2018

Final Disposition: The petition filed by George E. Lord was dismissed.

II. Factual Background and Timeline of Events

1. Lease Agreements: On or about December 4, 2017, Petitioner George Lord, through his management company, leased two units at The Boulders to Barrie Shepley for a term from March 7, 2018, to April 30, 2018. A third unit was subsequently leased to Mr. Shepley on or about January 15, 2018.

2. Commercial Use: Mr. Shepley operated a Canadian fitness business, “Personal Best,” which offered training camps in Tucson. Accommodations at The Boulders were included in the camp packages. The price for a camp varied based on occupancy:

◦ $950.00 each for four campers in a condo

◦ $1075.00 each for three campers in a condo

◦ $1299.00 each for two campers in a condo

3. Occupancy Begins: On March 7, 2018, guests of Mr. Shepley (camp participants) began arriving to occupy the three leased units.

4. Association Intervention: On March 9, 2018, Community Manager Danielle Morris emailed Mr. Lord, stating the Association’s belief that he was in violation of the CC&Rs by allowing subleasing for periods less than the 30-day minimum. Ms. Morris informed him that amenity access cards for the three units were deactivated.

5. Dispute Escalation: Mr. Lord contended that the occupants were merely “guests” of Mr. Shepley, not subletters. Ms. Morris countered that the Association required the names of all occupants and the duration of their stays, and that each occupant must stay for a minimum of 30 days.

6. Information Provided: On March 13, 2018, Mr. Lord provided the names of the occupants and their dates of occupancy, requesting that amenities be restored.

7. Violation Reiterated: On March 16, 2018, Ms. Morris stated the violation was ongoing, as occupants staying from March 7 to March 31 did not meet the 30-day minimum stay requirement.

8. Formal Notice of Violation: On March 18, 2018, Mr. Lord received formal Notices of Violations for the three units. The notices stated that amenity access was suspended because the HOA was not provided with the names of adult occupants and their timeframes. The notice warned that a $300 fine could be applied. Mr. Lord did not respond to these notices.

9. Attorney Involvement: On March 22, 2018, Mr. Lord received a letter from the Association’s legal counsel outlining its legal position and noting an amount due of $250 for attorney’s fees already incurred.

10. Lease Cancellation & Financial Loss: On April 2, 2018, Mr. Shepley cancelled the remainder of the leases due to the lack of amenities for his guests. Mr. Lord asserted a resulting financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018.

11. Petition Filing: On August 31, 2018, Mr. Lord filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association violated state statutes and its own CC&Rs.

III. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Lord’s petition was based on three primary allegations against the Association:

Allegation 1: Defective Violation Notice (A.R.S. § 33-1242): The Petitioner argued that the Notices of Violations were legally deficient because they failed to cite the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

Allegation 2: Unlawful Occupancy Requirements (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 & CC&Rs): The Petitioner asserted that the Association overstepped its authority by demanding that each occupant, whom he characterized as a “guest” of the primary lessee, must stay for a minimum of 30 days. He argued the 30-day minimum lease term applied only to the primary lease with Mr. Shepley, not to the occupants.

Allegation 3: Improper Fees (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)): The Petitioner claimed that the $250 charge from the Association’s attorney constituted an illegal fee, penalty, or charge related to providing leasing information, which he argued was prohibited by statute.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for any of his allegations and dismissed the petition. The judge’s reasoning is detailed below.

Finding 1: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Violation Notice)

The judge determined that the Association’s initial Notices of Violations were legally sufficient.

Legal Reasoning: A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) requires an association to cite the specific provision of the condominium documents that has been violated. However, this obligation is only triggered after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail.

Factual Basis: The Petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the formal Notices of Violations he received.

Conclusion: Because the Petitioner did not take the legally required step to trigger the Association’s duty to provide a specific citation, the Association did not violate the statute.

Finding 2: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 or CC&Rs (Leasing Rules)

The judge concluded that the Association was justified in its actions regarding the occupancy of the units.

The Arrangement was a “Form” of Subletting: The judge ruled against the Petitioner’s argument that the occupants were merely “guests.” The fact that the price of the fitness camp changed based on how many people shared a unit was seen as evidence that Mr. Shepley was, in effect, subletting the units for his business.

Prohibited Business Activity: The judge found that Mr. Shepley was operating a business from the units in a manner prohibited by Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs, which disallows business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.”

Spirit of the Law: The decision acknowledged that the specific facts of the case “falls between the cracks of the specific language of the statutes and the regulations.” However, the judge emphasized that the Association’s actions were consistent with the broader intent of its rules, stating, “given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.”

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated leasing statutes or its own CC&Rs.

Finding 3: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) (Fees)

The judge found that the $250 charge was not an illegal penalty.

Nature of the Charge: The evidence showed that no fines for the lease policy violation had actually been assessed. The $250 charge was explicitly for attorney’s fees related to the potential collection of assessments.

Legal Reasoning: The judge stated, “Nothing in the cited statute or the CC&Rs prohibits such a charge being implemented.” The fee was not a penalty for “incomplete or late information” as covered by the statute, but a charge for legal costs incurred by the Association.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish a violation regarding the assessed fees.

V. Referenced Statutes and Governing Documents

Reference

Provision Summary

Relevance to Case

A.R.S. § 33-1242(B)&(C)

Outlines the process for a unit owner to respond to a violation notice and the association’s subsequent duty to provide specific details of the violation.

The judge found no violation because the Petitioner did not follow the procedure to trigger the association’s duty.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(C)

Limits the information an association can require about a tenant to names, contact info for adults, lease period, and vehicle information.

The Petitioner’s case rested on interpreting this statute; the judge found the Association’s inquiries justified by the unique circumstances.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)

Prohibits an association from imposing fees greater than $15 for incomplete or late leasing information.

The Petitioner argued the $250 attorney fee violated this, but the judge found it was a permissible charge for legal costs, not a penalty.

CC&R Section 7.21

Requires leases to be in writing, for a term of not less than 30 days, and requires owners to provide lessee names and lease dates.

The Association argued the arrangement violated the 30-day minimum stay rule for occupants, which the judge upheld in spirit.

CC&R Section 7.3

Prohibits business activities within a unit that involve persons coming to the unit.

The judge found Mr. Shepley’s fitness camp, which housed participants in the units, was a clear violation of this provision.

Leasing Policy

States a $300 fine may be imposed for violations of the 30-day minimum lease policy.

The Notice of Violation referenced this potential fine, though it was never actually assessed.

VI. Final Order and Procedural Notes

Order: Based on the above findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed.

Binding Nature: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Related Filings: On the same day the decision was issued, December 17, 2018, the court also issued a separate “Order Vacating Hearing,” likely a procedural filing to cancel a future hearing that was rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of the case.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918013-REL


Study Guide: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918013-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The case involves a dispute between a condominium unit owner, George E. Lord, and his condominium association, The Boulders at La Reserve, concerning leasing policies, occupant regulations, and alleged statutory violations.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. Describe the business arrangement that Barrie Shepley, the petitioner’s lessee, was operating from the leased condominium units.

3. What was the first official action the Condominium Association’s management took in response to the arrival of Barrie Shepley’s guests, and what was their stated reason?

4. According to the Association, what two specific provisions of the governing documents were being violated by the petitioner and his lessee?

5. What was the petitioner’s central argument for why the occupants of the units were not in violation of the Association’s 30-day minimum stay requirement?

6. On what procedural grounds did the petitioner, George Lord, claim that the Association’s “Notice of Violations” was itself a violation of Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242)?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1242?

8. How did the judge interpret the fact that the price for Barrie Shepley’s fitness camps varied based on the number of people sharing a condo?

9. What financial loss did the petitioner claim to have suffered, and what was the direct cause of this loss?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were George E. Lord, the petitioner and owner of multiple condominium units, and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association, the respondent and governing body for the community. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. Barrie Shepley operated a fitness business called “Personal Best” that offered training camps in the Tucson area. The price for these camps included accommodations at The Boulders, with the cost per person varying based on how many campers shared a condominium unit.

3. The Association’s first action was to deactivate the amenity access cards for the three units leased by Shepley. Danielle Morris, the Community Manager, stated this was due to a belief that the petitioner’s lessee was subleasing the units for periods of less than the 30-day minimum in violation of the CC&Rs.

4. The Association alleged violations of the CC&Rs related to subleasing for less than the 30-day minimum timeframe. The formal Notices of Violations also cited the failure to provide the names of all adult occupants and the timeframes of their stays to the HOA.

5. The petitioner argued that because his lessee, Mr. Shepley, was not charging a specific rental fee to the occupants, they were merely “guests” and not sub-lessees. Therefore, the 30-day minimum stay requirement applicable to leases did not apply to them.

6. The petitioner alleged that the Association’s failure to include a citation to the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated in the initial Notice of Violations was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242.

7. The judge ruled against the petitioner because A.R.S. § 33-1242 only requires an association to provide the specific provision violated after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail. The petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the Notices of Violations.

8. The judge found that the tiered pricing structure supported the conclusion that Mr. Shepley was, “in a form, subletting the units.” The fact that the camp price decreased as more people shared a unit indicated that the occupants were paying for their accommodations, not simply staying as guests.

9. The petitioner asserted a financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018. This loss was directly caused by Barrie Shepley canceling the remainder of his leases due to the lack of amenities for his occupants.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s final order was that the Petition filed by George E. Lord be dismissed. This decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts, arguments, and legal interpretations from the case file.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Barrie Shepley was “in a form, subletting” the units. Discuss the evidence cited and the concept of the “spirit and purpose” of the rules versus their literal interpretation.

2. Examine the procedural misstep made by the petitioner, George Lord, after receiving the Notices of Violations. How did this action directly impact the judge’s ruling on his claim regarding A.R.S. § 33-1242?

3. Discuss the conflict between a unit owner’s right to lease their property and a condominium association’s right to enforce its governing documents, using the specific provisions of the CC&Rs (Sections 7.21 and 7.3) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01) as examples from the case.

4. Explain the distinction the judge made between the $300 potential fine mentioned in the Notice of Violations and the $250 attorney’s fee charged to the petitioner. How did this distinction relate to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E), and why was the Association’s action deemed permissible?

5. Evaluate the concept of an “itinerant population” as mentioned by the judge. How did Barrie Shepley’s business model contribute to this concern for the Association, and how did it ultimately weigh into the judge’s decision to dismiss the petition?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Name

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings on disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified body of laws for the state of Arizona. The petitioner alleged violations of specific statutes within this code, namely A.R.S. § 33-1242 and § 33-1260.01.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

A state law governing the process for notifying a unit owner of a violation of condominium documents and the procedures for the owner to respond and contest the notice.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01

A state law that places limitations on what information an association can require from a unit owner regarding a tenant and caps certain fees or penalties for incomplete information at $15.

Amenity

A feature or facility of a property that provides comfort, convenience, or pleasure. In this case, access to amenities was controlled by key cards, which the Association deactivated.

Barrie Shepley

The individual who leased three condominium units from the petitioner. He operated a fitness business, “Personal Best,” and used the units to house clients attending his training camps.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Association alleged Shepley’s use of the units violated Sections 7.21 (leasing limitations) and 7.3 (business use limitations).

George E. Lord

The Petitioner in the case. He was the owner of multiple condominium units at The Boulders at La Reserve and filed the petition against the Association.

Itinerant population

A term used by the judge to describe a population of short-term, transient occupants. The judge concluded that the purpose of the Association’s rules was, in part, to prevent this type of occupancy.

Notice of Violations

A formal written document sent by the Association to the petitioner informing him of alleged violations of the governing documents and outlining potential consequences, such as fines.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, George E. Lord.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the petitioner had the burden of showing that the facts they sought to prove were “more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association.

Subletting

The practice of a tenant leasing a rented property to a third party. The Association contended Shepley was subletting the units to his campers, while the petitioner argued they were merely guests.

The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case. The homeowners’ association (HOA) responsible for governing the condominium community in Oro Valley, Arizona.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918013-REL


The $6,900 ‘Guest’ Mistake: 3 Hard Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit

A $6,900 loss in rental income and a losing legal battle with his HOA—all because of a dispute over the definition of a “guest.” This case between owner George Lord and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association is a masterclass in how quickly and completely an owner can lose when they misinterpret the rules and underestimate an association’s power.

For any homeowner or landlord, this dispute provides three crucial lessons distilled from the administrative court’s decision. Understanding these precedents is essential before you ever find yourself at odds with your own HOA.

Lesson 1: The “Spirit of the Rule” Can Outweigh Your Clever Workaround

The dispute began when the property owner, Mr. Lord, leased three condos to Barrie Shepley, who ran fitness training camps. Mr. Shepley then used the condos to house his camp attendees, often for periods shorter than the HOA’s 30-day minimum lease term.

The owner argued his arrangement complied with the rules. He claimed his tenant, Mr. Shepley, was not subleasing the units; the attendees were merely “guests,” and therefore not subject to the 30-day minimum. It was a clever workaround, but it fell apart under scrutiny for two distinct reasons.

First, the judge looked past the “guest” label to the financial substance of the arrangement. A key piece of evidence was the camp’s pricing: the cost changed based on how many campers shared a condo ($950 each for four campers vs. $1299 each for two). The judge saw this as clear proof that housing was being paid for, making it a form of subletting.

Second, the judge found that the arrangement constituted a prohibited business activity. The association’s CC&Rs (Section 7.3) explicitly forbade any business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.” Since the fitness camp required attendees to come to the condos for lodging, it was a direct violation. The judge’s decision was therefore not just based on a subjective interpretation, but was also grounded in a concrete rule violation.

The court looked at the “totality of the circumstances” to make its ruling, a point powerfully summarized in the final decision:

However, given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.

Pro Tip: Before implementing a workaround, ask yourself: “Does this honor the community’s stated goal?” If the answer is no, you’re on thin ice, even if you think you’ve found a loophole.

Lesson 2: You Must Follow Procedure to the Letter, Or You Forfeit Your Rights

Confident in his “guest” interpretation, the homeowner made his next critical error by underestimating the importance of legal procedure. He argued that the HOA’s initial “Notice of Violations” was invalid because it failed to cite the specific CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

This argument was swiftly dismissed due to a simple but fatal mistake: the owner never sent a formal written response to the notice by certified mail.

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242), an owner’s formal written response via certified mail triggers the HOA’s obligation to provide the specific provision that was violated. Without that trigger, the HOA’s duty to explain further is never activated. The homeowner failed to pull the trigger. Because he did not follow this exact procedure, his claim was thrown out, and the HOA had no further legal obligation to detail its case.

Analyst’s Takeaway: In a legal dispute, communication that isn’t sent via the officially mandated channel (like certified mail) is legally equivalent to communication that never happened.

Lesson 3: The HOA’s Legal Fees Can Hit Your Wallet Sooner Than You Think

Early in the dispute, the owner received a letter from the HOA’s legal counsel. The letter outlined the association’s position and included a charge for $250.00. This was not a fine for the violation. It was a fee for the lawyer’s time, as explained in the letter:

“As you know, the Association is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees from you, including $250.00 already incurred for the preparation of this letter.”

Many governing documents contain clauses that allow an HOA to recover its “costs of enforcement.” This letter was an enforcement action, and the legal fee was the cost. The judge found that nothing in the law or CC&Rs prohibited the HOA from immediately passing this expense to the owner.

This initial charge was a precursor to a much larger financial blow. As an enforcement tool for the violations discussed in Lesson 1, the HOA suspended the tenants’ access to community amenities. This pressure tactic worked perfectly. The tenant, Mr. Shepley, cancelled his leases due to the lack of amenity access, leading to the owner’s stated loss of $6,900 in rental fees.

Pro Tip: Assume your HOA’s first legal letter starts a running tab. Budget for legal costs from day one of a formal dispute, not just for potential fines.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

The case of Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve establishes three clear precedents for owners: a rule’s intent can supersede its literal interpretation, procedural shortcuts void your rights, and the financial clock starts ticking the moment an HOA retains counsel.

This case is a firm reminder of an HOA’s power to enforce its rules, but it also highlights the owner’s responsibility to understand them. It begs the question: In our own communities, are we fully aware of the rules we’ve agreed to live by?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • George E. Lord (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Maria Kupillas (respondent attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
  • Danielle Morris (community manager)
    The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barrie Shepley (renter/key individual)

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Respondent Property Owner's Association was not found to be a 'planned community' under the applicable Arizona statute.

Why this result: The ALJ determined that the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' because its maintenance of landscaping did not constitute maintaining 'roadways' as required by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing it was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because it did not maintain 'roadways'. Petitioner argued that maintaining landscaping around the entrance sign satisfied the 'covenant to maintain roadways' requirement by defining 'roadway' as the entire 'right-of-way'. The ALJ found that 'roadway' means the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, HOA Dispute
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:22 (130.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

“Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


This Homeowner’s Case Collapsed Over One Word — Here’s Why It Matters

Dealing with a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) can sometimes feel like navigating a maze of rules and regulations. But what happens when a dispute isn’t about a rule, but about the definition of a single, common word? In the Arizona case of Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association, a major legal conflict hinged on one seemingly simple question: What, exactly, is a “roadway”?

The answer would determine whether a state agency had the power to hear the case at all. The judge’s decision provides a masterclass in how the law interprets language, revealing practical lessons about why a single word can make or break an entire legal argument.

1. A Legal Battle Can Hinge on a Dictionary Definition

The core issue of the case was jurisdiction—whether the Arizona Department of Real Estate had the authority to hear the dispute. For the department to have jurisdiction, the HOA had to qualify as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). A key part of that definition required the HOA to have a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

This is where the entire case pivoted.

The Homeowner’s Argument: The petitioner, Mr. Satterlee, argued that the HOA’s responsibility to maintain the walls, sign, and surrounding landscaping at the community entrance fulfilled this requirement. He contended that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly as a “roadway system,” which would include the entire right-of-way, landscaping and all.

The HOA’s Argument: The respondent HOA argued for a much narrower definition. They stated that a “roadway” is only the part of the road used for vehicle traffic. Since maintaining walls and landscaping is not maintaining a roadway, they argued they were not a “planned community” under the law, and therefore the state had no jurisdiction.

The entire legal question of whether the case could even proceed came down to the plain meaning of this one word.

2. Judges Don’t Guess — They Have a Method for Meaning

When a legal dispute depends on the meaning of a word in a law, judges don’t simply pick the definition they prefer. Legal interpretation follows a clear principle: start with the “plain meaning” of the words the legislature chose to use. This wasn’t just a casual search; it was a methodical application of the “plain meaning rule,” a cornerstone of statutory interpretation where judges prioritize the common, ordinary meaning of words over specialized or re-imagined definitions.

To determine the plain meaning of “roadway,” the Administrative Law Judge in this case conducted a thorough review of its common definition by consulting numerous dictionaries:

• English Oxford Living Dictionaries

• Merriam-Webster

• Dictionary.com

• Cambridge Dictionary

• American Heritage Dictionary

• Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

The collective conclusion was overwhelming. The dictionaries consistently defined a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicles, explicitly contrasting it with sidewalks, shoulders, or adjacent landscaping. This methodical approach demonstrated that the common, established meaning of the word supported the HOA’s narrow interpretation, not the homeowner’s broad one.

3. Your Own Evidence Can Be Used Against You

In a classic case of legal irony, the very evidence the homeowner presented to support his case became the primary tool the judge used to dismantle it. The homeowner submitted several official documents from Pima County, but these exhibits ended up undermining his own argument.

The judge pointed to several instances where the homeowner’s own evidence made a clear distinction between a “roadway” and the surrounding area:

• A Pima County ordinance referred to the “right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway,” treating the two as separate things. The judge noted that the petitioner tried to argue that the “shoulder of an existing roadway” referred not to the paved edge for vehicles, but to the landscaped areas beyond it—an interpretation that defies common understanding and the county’s own official language.

• County planning documents used different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’), showing they are considered distinct components.

• Another county rule stated that the “installation of landscaping” must begin after the formal completion of the “roadway project.”

The judge concluded that these documents demonstrated that in official use, “roadway” and “right-of-way” are treated as different concepts. The very evidence intended to support the homeowner’s case ended up directly contradicting it.

4. Modern Concepts Don’t Automatically Change Old Laws

The homeowner’s central supporting idea was the “Complete Streets” approach—a modern civil engineering concept that views streets as integrated systems for all users, including cars, bicyclists, and pedestrians. He argued this modern understanding should apply to the word “roadway.”

The judge rejected this argument based on a crucial point of legal reasoning: legislative intent.

The judge noted that the “Complete Streets” concept was already well-known in 2014 when the Arizona legislature amended the statute in question. The legislature could have used broader terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets” but deliberately chose not to. Instead, they specifically chose the narrower, more traditional term “roadway.” The judge inferred that this was a deliberate choice, and the court’s job was to interpret the word the legislature actually used, not one it could have used.

The judge even noted that the sheer volume of evidence the homeowner presented to redefine “roadway” was itself proof that his interpretation was not the “plain meaning”—if it were, such extensive explanation wouldn’t be necessary.

To illustrate the point with a simple, real-world example of plain meaning, the judge wrote:

One would be hard pressed to interpret that phrase [“don’t play in the street”] as a warning not to play on the sidewalk or landscaping area bordering a paved thoroughfare.

Conclusion: In Law, Precision Is Everything

The overarching lesson from this case is that in legal interpretation, every word matters. Whether it’s the dictionary definition of “roadway,” the precise language in county ordinances, or the specific terms chosen by lawmakers, the plain, established meaning of words carries immense weight.

Ultimately, the homeowner’s petition was dismissed. Because the HOA’s duty to maintain landscaping did not qualify as a “covenant to maintain roadways,” it was not a “planned community” under the statute. As a result, the state agency lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.

This case shows how the specific words chosen by lawmakers years ago can have major consequences today. What common words might we be using every day that have a completely different and critical meaning in a legal context?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff)
    Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:16:14 (130.3 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (HOA attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff/clerk)
    Staff responsible for decision distribution

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Authored May 18, 2018 letter presented as documentation by Petitioner

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

“Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.


  • don't play in the street

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff)
    Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Tom Barrs vs Desert Ranch HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners' Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

Bylaw 2.4

Outcome Summary

In the initial decision, Petitioner established violations of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (election materials disposal) and A.R.S. § 33-1804 (closed/improperly noticed meetings), but failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Issue 1). The rehearing only addressed Issue 1, which was ultimately dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 violation) because the ALJ found that while the Bylaw applied to Members, Petitioner failed to show it prohibited a Director from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned, and the investigation was initiated by a Board member immediately following the meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Election Objection Waiver)

Whether Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on an objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting, given that the Bylaw requires members to object to irregularities 'at the meeting' to avoid waiver.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed as to Issue 1.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Election Challenge, Bylaw Violation, Meeting Notice, Record Retention, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Bylaw 3.3
  • Bylaw 2.4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 655766.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:04:26 (113.2 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678304.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:44 (117.5 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678305.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:44 (38.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818035-REL


Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the legal dispute between Petitioner Tom Barrs and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (HOA) concerning the HOA’s March 18, 2017, Board of Directors election. The petitioner alleged that the HOA improperly overturned the initial election results, mishandled election materials, and held meetings in violation of state law and its own bylaws.

An initial ruling by an Administrative Law Judge found the HOA in violation of state statutes regarding the retention of election materials (A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)) and open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804). However, the judge ruled against the petitioner on the central claim that the HOA violated Bylaw 2.4 by investigating the election after the annual meeting had concluded.

The petitioner requested and was granted a rehearing, which focused exclusively on the alleged violation of Bylaw 2.4. The final decision on rehearing, issued December 26, 2018, reaffirmed the initial ruling. The judge concluded that the investigation was properly initiated by a board member, not a general member, and that the bylaw restricting post-meeting objections did not apply to the Board of Directors itself. Consequently, the petition regarding the overturning of the election was dismissed.

Case Overview

This document details the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the administrative case No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG, heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Tom Barrs

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association

Presiding Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Initial Hearing

Not specified in document

Rehearing Date

December 6, 2018

Decision Date

December 26, 2018

Key Individuals:

Tom Barrs: Petitioner.

Catherine Overby: HOA President, appeared for Respondent.

Brian Schoeffler: HOA Vice President, appeared for Respondent; candidate in the disputed election.

Jerome Klinger: Candidate initially announced as a winner of the election.

Patrick Rice: Board member at the time of the election.

Chronology of the 2017 Election Dispute

1. Pre-March 18, 2017: Absentee ballots are sent to HOA members listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates, with a space for a write-in.

2. March 18, 2017: At the Annual Meeting, ballots are submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and write-in candidate Jerome Klinger are announced as the winners. No members object before the meeting is adjourned. Immediately following, board member Patrick Rice gathers the ballots and expresses concerns about the results.

3. March 19, 2017: Brian Schoeffler sends an email to board members asking for a review and a decision on whether a “revote” is necessary.

4. March 20, 2017: Catherine Overby emails the HOA membership, stating the election has been “contested” and that the board must investigate. She also asserts that bylaws do not allow write-in candidates, meaning she and Schoeffler were the new directors based on the vote count.

5. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Overby and Rice, meet with an attorney at Overby’s house. They discover that duplicate and proxy ballots were improperly counted.

6. Post-March 29, 2017: The board determines the valid votes resulted in a tie between Schoeffler and Klinger. A run-off election is scheduled.

7. April 29, 2017: The run-off election is held. Brian Schoeffler is announced as the winner.

8. May 10, 2017: The Board of Directors holds an organizational meeting.

Procedural History and Allegations

Initial Petition and Hearing

March 19, 2018: Tom Barrs files a single-issue HOA Dispute Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, paying a $500 fee but including a four-page narrative alleging multiple violations.

April 13, 2018: Barrs files an amended petition, adding an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812.

July 30, 2018: Barrs pays to convert the petition to a multiple-issue dispute and submits a “Clarification of Three Issues alleged in Petition.”

The three core issues alleged by the petitioner were:

1. Improper Overturning of Election: The Board of Directors improperly removed Jerome Klinger by overturning the March 18, 2017 election results. The petitioner argued the challenge by the third candidate was barred by Bylaw 2.4, and the methods used violated recall protocols under A.R.S. § 33-1813 and Bylaw 3.3.

2. Improper Handling of Election Materials: The board violated A.R.S. § 33-1812 by disposing of election materials (ballot envelopes) required to be kept for one year and by selectively invalidating votes cast on invalid ballots.

3. Improperly Held Meetings: Meetings related to the 2017 election were held as closed sessions or without proper notice in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Initial Decision

Following the initial hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision with the following conclusions:

Violation Found: The Respondent (HOA) violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by discarding the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.

Violation Found: The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding meetings that were closed and/or without proper notice.

No Violation Found: The Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4.

Rehearing and Final Order

October 1, 2018: Barrs files a request for rehearing, citing misconduct, insufficient penalties, errors of law, and a decision not supported by evidence.

November 2, 2018: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

December 6, 2018: At the rehearing, the petitioner states he is only seeking reconsideration of Issue 1 (the improper overturning of the election) and not the lack of penalties for Issues 2 and 3.

Judicial Analysis and Final Rulings

The final decision focused solely on whether the HOA’s actions violated its own bylaws regarding election challenges.

Key Bylaw and Legal Standard

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4: The central bylaw in dispute states:

Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden of proving the violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Analysis of Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4

Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs argued that because candidate Brian Schoeffler did not object to the election results before the March 18, 2017 meeting adjourned, Bylaw 2.4 barred the board from investigating his concerns raised the following day via email. The petitioner contended that board members are also “Members” and thus are bound by this rule.

Evidence Presented: Testimony established that Patrick Rice, acting as a Board member, expressed concerns with the vote count immediately after the meeting adjourned. This, not Mr. Schoeffler’s subsequent email, initiated the board’s investigation. At the rehearing, the petitioner presented selected audio clips he had recorded to support his arguments but did not provide the entire recording.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ made a critical distinction between the terms used in the HOA’s bylaws.

◦ The terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were found to have specific, non-interchangeable meanings throughout the bylaws.

◦ Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member.”

◦ The petitioner made no showing that a “Director” or the “Board of Directors” could not raise questions about the validity of election results after a meeting had adjourned.

◦ Since the investigation was initiated by a board member (Rice) and not exclusively by a member’s untimely objection (Schoeffler), the board’s actions did not violate Bylaw 2.4.

Final Order

Based on the analysis from the rehearing, the judge issued the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed as to Issue 1.

This order, resulting from a rehearing, is legally binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of the order’s service date.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL


Study Guide: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Tom Barrs and Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG, and what were their roles?

2. What specific event on March 18, 2017, served as the catalyst for the entire legal dispute?

3. What were the initial, announced results of the election held at the March 18, 2017, Annual Meeting?

4. According to the Petitioner, how did the HOA Board violate Bylaw 2.4 following the election?

5. In the initial hearing, which two of the Petitioner’s allegations were found to be valid violations committed by the Respondent?

6. Why did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

7. During the rehearing on December 6, 2018, what was the single issue that the Petitioner chose to focus on for reconsideration?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what action initiated the Board’s investigation into the election results, separate from Brian Schoeffler’s email?

9. How did the Judge’s interpretation of the terms “Member” and “Director” in the bylaws defeat the Petitioner’s primary argument on rehearing?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Issue 1 after the conclusion of the rehearing?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Tom Barrs, who served as the Petitioner, and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, appeared on his own behalf, while the Respondent was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler.

2. The dispute was triggered by the election for two vacant seats on the HOA Board of Directors held during the Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017. The subsequent actions by the Board to investigate and ultimately overturn the initial results of this election led the Petitioner to file a dispute.

3. The initially announced results of the March 18, 2017, election declared that Ms. Catherine Overby and Mr. Jerome Klinger were the winning candidates. No members present at the meeting raised an objection to these announced results before the meeting was adjourned.

4. The Petitioner argued that the Board violated Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection to the election results raised by Brian Schoeffler the day after the meeting. The bylaw states that any member who fails to object to an irregularity during a meeting “forever waives that claim,” and the Petitioner argued Mr. Schoeffler, as a member, had waived his right to object.

5. In the initial hearing, the Judge found that the Petitioner successfully established two violations by the Respondent. These were a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) for discarding ballot envelopes and a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for holding closed meetings without proper notice.

6. The Commissioner granted the rehearing “for the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s Rehearing Request.” The Petitioner’s request cited multiple grounds, including misconduct by the prevailing party, errors of law, and that the initial findings of fact were not supported by the evidence or were contrary to law.

7. At the rehearing, the Petitioner stated he was only seeking reconsideration of the initial decision as it related to Issue 1. This issue was the allegation that the Board improperly overturned the election results in violation of Bylaw 2.4.

8. The Judge found that the Board’s investigation was initiated by Mr. Patrick Rice, a Board member at the time, who expressed his concerns with the vote “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” This occurred prior to and independent of the email sent by Brian Schoeffler the following day.

9. The Judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. Because the Petitioner made no showing that a “Director” (like Mr. Rice) could not raise questions after a meeting, the restriction on “Members” in Bylaw 2.4 did not apply to the Board’s actions.

10. The final order stated that the Petition was to be dismissed as to Issue 1. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish that the Respondent had violated Bylaw 2.4.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the timeline of events from the Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017, to the run-off election on April 29, 2017. Discuss the key actions taken by the HOA Board—including the meeting with an attorney and the discovery of invalid ballots—and explain how these actions led to the legal dispute.

2. Detail the three distinct issues the Petitioner alleged in his “Clarification of Three Issues alleged in Petition.” Based on the outcome of the initial hearing, evaluate the success of these claims and explain why the Petitioner prevailed on some issues but not others.

3. The Petitioner’s case on rehearing hinged on the interpretation of Bylaw 2.4. Construct the Petitioner’s argument regarding this bylaw and then fully explain the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning for ultimately rejecting it, focusing on the distinction between “Members” and “Directors.”

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and analyze how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this standard led to the dismissal of Issue 1 on rehearing.

5. Examine the procedural history of the case, from the initial single-issue petition to the final binding order after rehearing. What were the key procedural steps, such as amending the petition and filing for a rehearing, and how did these steps shape the final scope and outcome of the case?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the State of Arizona. The Petitioner alleged violations of several statutes, including A.R.S. § 33-1813, § 33-1811, § 33-1812, and § 33-1804.

Bylaw 2.4

The specific bylaw of the Desert Ranch HOA that was the central focus of the rehearing. It states, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Director

An elected member of the HOA’s Board of Directors. The ALJ’s decision distinguished this role from that of a general “Member.”

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The governing organization for the planned community of Desert Ranch, responsible for enforcing community documents and statutes.

Member

A homeowner within the planned community. The ALJ’s decision emphasized that in the bylaws, this term has a specific meaning that is not interchangeable with “Director.”

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Barrs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this instance by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, to reconsider the initial decision based on alleged errors.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL


5 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Election Gone Wrong

Introduction: When “The Rules” Aren’t What You Think

Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs) run on rules. From lawn maintenance to paint colors, the governing documents are the ultimate authority. But what happens when the rules themselves become the center of a dispute? Imagine this scenario: your HOA holds its annual board election. The results are announced, the winners are declared, and everyone goes home. Then, the next day, the board decides to overturn the result.

This isn’t a hypothetical. It’s the core of a real-life legal case that reveals surprising truths about community governance, the power of a single word, and what can happen when an election goes off the rails.

——————————————————————————–

1. An Election Isn’t Over Until the Board Says It’s Over

The dispute began at the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017. The ballots for two open board seats were counted, and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates. Crucially, no members present raised an objection before the meeting adjourned. By all appearances, the election was over.

But it wasn’t. Immediately after the meeting, a board member, Mr. Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed his concerns with the election results. The next day, the losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, sent an email asking the board to “review the situation” and consider a “revote.” The board then formally announced that the election had been contested and that it was obligated to investigate.

After consulting an attorney, the board discovered several ballot irregularities, including duplicate ballots and an improperly counted proxy ballot. This new tally resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board then forced a run-off election, which Mr. Schoeffler ultimately won. While the losing candidate’s email drew attention, the true turning point had already occurred moments after the meeting ended, when a board member himself questioned the results—an act that would prove legally decisive.

2. A Single Word in the Bylaws Can Change Everything

The homeowner who filed the legal petition, Tom Barrs, built his case on a seemingly straightforward rule in the HOA’s bylaws. He argued that any challenge to the election was invalid because it wasn’t raised before the Annual Meeting adjourned. The bylaw in question, Section 2.4, reads:

Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting (whether procedural, parliamentary, substantive or technical) forever waives that claim.

The petitioner’s argument was simple: the challenge was raised after the meeting by a “Member,” so the claim was waived. The case seemed open-and-shut.

However, the Administrative Law Judge made a critical distinction that decided the case. The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific meanings and were not interchangeable. While a Member had to object during the meeting, the judge found no rule preventing a Director from raising questions later.

Because a board member, Mr. Rice, had expressed concerns immediately following the meeting, the board’s subsequent investigation was deemed permissible. This razor-thin interpretation of a single word highlights the immense power that definitions and precise language hold in governing documents.

3. The Board Broke the Law, But Still Won on the Main Issue

In a surprising twist, the judge determined that the HOA had, in fact, violated Arizona state law on two separate counts during the election controversy. The petitioner successfully proved that the board failed to follow established statutes.

The two violations established in the initial hearing were:

Improper Destruction of Ballots: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) when it destroyed all of the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. This act made a true, verifiable recount impossible, directly undermining the integrity of the very election the board was claiming to investigate.

Improper Meetings: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding closed meetings without providing proper notice to the members, particularly a meeting at the home of a board member, Ms. Overby, where the decision to hold a run-off was made. By making these critical decisions behind closed doors, the board created an appearance of secrecy that fueled the dispute and eroded member trust.

Despite proving these clear legal violations, the petitioner still lost on his primary complaint—overturning the run-off and reinstating the original election results. This outcome serves as a stark example of a pyrrhic victory. You can successfully prove that an organization broke the rules without achieving your ultimate goal in the dispute.

4. An Investigation Can Uncover a Cascade of Deeper Problems

The board’s decision to contest its own election results was controversial, but the subsequent investigation brought a cascade of other procedural failures to light. The initial challenge acted like a pulled thread that unraveled a series of previously unknown mistakes.

During the board’s meeting with its attorney, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot that were improperly counted” had skewed the original vote. This alone was enough to call the first result into question.

Furthermore, the board itself asserted that its own bylaws “did not allow for a write-in candidate.” This was a significant admission, as one of the original winners, Jerome Klinger, had been a write-in. If true, his victory would have been invalid from the start, regardless of any other challenges. The board’s investigation, initiated to resolve one perceived error, ended up exposing its own systemic incompetence—from improperly counting ballots to being unaware of its own rules regarding write-in candidates. The effort to fix the election proved the election was fundamentally broken from the start.

5. An HOA Board Can Investigate Itself

The petitioner’s case rested on the idea that board members are also “Members” of the association and are therefore bound by the same rules. If a regular member had to object during the meeting, a director should have to as well.

The judge rejected this argument, implicitly affirming the board’s higher-level fiduciary duty to ensure a fair and legal election. The final decision made it clear that the bylaws used “Member” and “Director” with distinct meanings and responsibilities. The bylaw requiring members to object during the meeting was the mechanism for an individual’s challenge; it did not override the board’s inherent duty to govern properly.

The key takeaway from the judge’s decision was unambiguous: The petitioner “made no showing that a Director could not raise questions as to the validity of the election results after the meeting adjourned.” This legally affirms a board’s power to investigate its own processes, a responsibility separate from the rules that govern challenges from the general membership.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Have You Read Your Bylaws Lately?

This case serves as a powerful reminder that the dense, legalistic language of HOA governing documents is not just boilerplate. These documents have immense real-world power, dictating the outcomes of contentious disputes and shaping the governance of a community. The intricate details and specific wording can mean the difference between a final result and one that is just the beginning of a long and costly fight.

This entire, year-long legal battle hinged on the definition of a single word. When was the last time you read the fine print governing your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf,.
  • Stephen Barrs (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner,.

Respondent Side

  • Catherine Overby (board member/president)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent,; Board President,; testified at hearing,.
  • Brian Schoeffler (board member/vice president)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent,; Board Vice President,; testified at hearing,.
  • Patrick Rice (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Board member who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting,,,; involved in meeting with attorney,.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner (ADRE))
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Issued Order Granting Rehearing; recipient of decision copy,.
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.

Other Participants

  • Jerome Klinger (board director)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Initially announced as a winning candidate for director,; later removed after contest; involved in run-off,.
  • Paula Barrs (listed resident)
    Listed with Tom Barrs on mailing address.

Dina R. Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condo Owners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3

Dina R. Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condo Owners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3

Dina R. Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condo Owners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3