Briefing on the Administrative Law Judge Decision Document
Executive Summary
The source material provides a standardized template for an “Administrative Law Judge Decision” issued by the Office of Administrative Hearings located in Phoenix, Arizona. The document is structured to formalize the outcome of an administrative hearing, delineating key procedural and case-specific information. Its core components include sections for case identification, hearing details, participant appearances, and the presiding judge’s official signature. A notable feature is the explicit protocol for electronic transmission of the final decision to a designated client contact, indicating a formalized digital workflow. The template utilizes a series of placeholders to be populated with specific details for each case.
Document Origin and Jurisdiction
The document template originates from a specific governmental body, establishing its context and authority within an administrative legal framework.
• Issuing Authority: Office of Administrative Hearings
This information firmly places the document within the purview of this Arizona-based administrative office.
Core Components of the Decision Template
The template is systematically organized to ensure all critical information for a legal decision is captured and presented clearly.
1. Case Identification
The header section is designed to uniquely identify the matter being adjudicated.
• Case Number: The document includes a field for a unique identifier, denoted as No. «Matter Matter ID».
• Matter Notes: A placeholder, «Matter Notes», is provided at the top, likely for a case title, subject matter, or other essential preliminary information.
2. Hearing and Participant Details
The template formalizes the record of the hearing and its attendees.
• Hearing Information: A dedicated HEARING: section is included to record the specifics of the hearing itself, such as the date and nature of the proceedings.
• Appearances: A section labeled APPEARANCES: is designated for listing the parties and representatives who were present.
• Presiding Judge: The decision is attributed to a specific judge, identified by the placeholder ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: «Professional Full Name».
3. Decision and Execution
The concluding section of the template is structured for the formal issuance and authentication of the judge’s decision.
• Date of Decision: The document is dated with the line: Done this day, «Today: July 4, 1996».
• Judge’s Signature: A formal signature line is provided for the judge: /s/ «Professional Full Name» Administrative Law Judge.
4. Transmission Protocol
The template includes explicit instructions for the document’s dissemination after being finalized.
• Method of Delivery: The document specifies it is “Transmitted electronically to:”.
• Recipient Information: It contains placeholders to detail the recipient, including their full name («Client Contact Full Name»), title («Client Contact Title»), and organization («Client Contact Company»).
Analysis of Placeholder Fields
The template’s functionality relies on a series of placeholder fields, which reveal the specific data points required to complete a formal decision document.
Placeholder Field
Inferred Purpose
«Matter Notes»
To be replaced with the case title, subject, or other key contextual notes.
«Matter Matter ID»
The unique docket or case number assigned to the administrative matter.
«Professional Full Name»
The full name of the presiding Administrative Law Judge; used in two locations.
«Today: July 4, 1996»
The specific date on which the judge finalizes and issues the decision.
«Client Contact Full Name»
The full name of the primary contact person receiving the decision.
«Client Contact Title»
The professional title of the recipient.
«Client Contact Company»
The company or organization to which the recipient belongs.
Study Guide – 18F-H1717040-REL
Study Guide: Administrative Law Judge Decision Document
This guide provides a detailed review of the structure, components, and terminology found within the provided document template from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Quiz: Short Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based solely on the information provided in the source document.
1. What is the official name and full address of the government body that issues this document?
2. What is the formal title of the document, and what is the title of the official who signs it?
3. How is the document delivered to its intended recipient after being finalized?
4. Identify two placeholders in the document that are used to specify the unique details of a particular case.
5. What two distinct sections are designated in the body of the document’s template, apart from the header and signature blocks?
6. Who is the specific audience for the electronic transmission of this document, as indicated by the placeholders?
7. What information is located in the header of the document?
8. Describe the function of the placeholder «Professional Full Name» in the context of this document.
9. What action is indicated as being completed on the date specified by the «Today: July 4, 1996» placeholder?
10. Where is the Office of Administrative Hearings located within its building?
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Answer Key
1. The issuing body is the Office of Administrative Hearings. Its full address is 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, Phoenix, Arizona 85007.
2. The formal title of the document is “ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION.” The official who signs the document holds the title of “Administrative Law Judge.”
3. After being finalized and signed, the document is “Transmitted electronically” to the designated client contact.
4. The placeholders «Matter Notes» and No. «Matter Matter ID» are used to specify the unique details of a case. These likely correspond to a short description or title of the matter and its official case number.
5. The two distinct sections designated in the body of the template are “HEARING” and “APPEARANCES.” These sections are intended to contain details about the proceeding and the parties involved.
6. The audience for the electronic transmission is a specific individual identified by placeholders for their full name («Client Contact Full Name»), professional title («Client Contact Title»), and company («Client Contact Company»).
7. The header contains the name of the issuing body, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and its physical address. It also includes the case identifier («Matter Matter ID») and a space for case notes («Matter Notes»).
8. The placeholder «Professional Full Name» appears twice. It is used for the name of the presiding Administrative Law Judge in the main body and again above the signature line to indicate which judge authored and signed the decision.
9. The date placeholder signifies when the decision was officially completed and signed by the Administrative Law Judge. The document states, “Done this day,” followed by the date.
10. The Office of Administrative Hearings is located on the “Lower Level” of the building at 1740 West Adams Street.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper, more analytical understanding of the document. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt.
1. Describe the structure and key components of the “ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION” document as presented in the source. What does this structure suggest about the formal legal process it represents?
2. Analyze the role of placeholders (e.g., «Matter Matter ID», «Professional Full Name», «Client Contact Company») in this document. Discuss their function in transforming a generic template into a case-specific official record.
3. Based on the information provided, explain the complete procedural flow of this document, from its creation and signing by an Administrative Law Judge to its final delivery.
4. Discuss the significance of the “Office of Administrative Hearings” and the “Administrative Law Judge” in the context of the legal system, as implied by the details in this document template.
5. Evaluate the methods of communication and record-keeping indicated in the source text (e.g., electronic transmission, formal titling, unique case identifiers). How do these elements contribute to the document’s authority and administrative efficiency?
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Glossary of Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
The title of the presiding official within the Office of Administrative Hearings who signs and issues the formal decision.
Administrative Law Judge Decision
The formal title of the document, indicating it is the official ruling resulting from a hearing conducted by an Administrative Law Judge.
Appearances
A designated section in the document template, intended to formally list the parties and/or legal counsel who participated in the hearing.
Hearing
A designated section in the document template, referring to the formal proceeding where arguments and evidence were presented before the Administrative Law Judge.
Matter Matter ID
A placeholder for the unique numerical or alphanumerical identifier assigned to a specific legal case or matter.
Matter Notes
A placeholder at the top of the document, likely used for a brief title or summary description of the legal case.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The governmental body, located in Phoenix, Arizona, that is responsible for conducting hearings and issuing administrative law decisions.
Transmitted electronically
The official method specified for the delivery of the finalized and signed decision document to the designated recipient.
Blog Post – 18F-H1717040-REL
What a Blank Legal Form Reveals About the Systems We Live In
Introduction: The Stories Hidden in Plain Sight
We tend to see legal documents as the epitome of boring: dense, intimidating, and irrelevant until we’re forced to deal with them. They are the paperwork we ignore, the fine print we scroll past. But what if even the most mundane administrative form held surprising insights into the systems that shape our society? A closer look at a template for an “ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION” from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona, reveals just that. This single page exposes the inherent tension in modern justice: the system’s need for standardized, machine-like efficiency clashing with the unique, messy human stories it is built to process. Let’s explore the lessons hidden within its structure.
The Unexpected Takeaways
The first thing one notices is not a dramatic narrative but a series of placeholders: «Matter Matter ID», «Matter Notes», and «Professional Full Name». Running down the left margin are line numbers, 1 through 30, a tool for absolute precision, allowing legal professionals to reference exact parts of the document in future arguments. This is not a unique script for a high-stakes battle; it is a template, a fill-in-the-blanks form.
This reality stands in stark contrast to the dramatic courtroom scenes portrayed in media. The day-to-day process of justice is less about impassioned speeches and more about systematic procedure. From a systems analyst’s perspective, this banality is a cornerstone of fairness. Templates, line numbers, and standardization are mechanisms designed to reduce variance and ensure predictable outputs. They ensure each case is processed through the same structural lens, making justice a repeatable, and therefore equitable, procedure. But within this rigid template, the system must still make space for the very thing it seeks to control: people.
While the format is rigid, it is ultimately a vessel for human conflict. The fields for APPEARANCES and the ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE are waiting for human names. But the analysis deepens when we see the recipient information: «Client Contact Full Name», «Client Contact Title», and «Client Contact Company». The system needs to know not just who you are, but what you do and who you represent.
This form acts as an input protocol, designed to convert a complex human narrative into structured, machine-readable data for the legal system. Each filled-out template signifies a human story—a dispute, a claim, a need—being processed. It reveals that the system sees people not just as individuals, but as actors within a larger organizational and economic context. It’s a framework built to contain the messiness of human affairs, reminding us that even our most personal problems must be assigned a title and a case number to be resolved. And this system, designed to process human data, is itself grounded in a very real place.
The law can feel like an abstract, untouchable force. Yet, printed at the top of the form is a concrete, physical location: Office of Administrative Hearings 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level Phoenix, Arizona 85007.
This small detail grounds the entire process in reality. The law isn’t just an idea; it’s an institution run by people working in a specific building. Decisions that impact lives are made not in some ethereal cloud of authority, but in a lower-level office on West Adams Street. This detail demystifies the system, making it more tangible and, perhaps, more accountable. And it is in this physical building, steeped in procedural tradition, that we find the most telling signs of adaptation to a new world.
The document announces its formal gravity with an almost archaic header: IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS. This language evokes a sense of place, history, and tradition. Yet, this tradition is forced to confront modernity in a few subtle keystrokes. Below the formal signature line for the judge, we find /s/ «Professional Full Name».
That /s/ is a ghost in the machine. It is a modern typographic convention signifying a digital signature, a symbol that represents the authority of a handwritten signature in an electronic context. This quiet nod to the digital age is confirmed by the final line on the page: Transmitted electronically. The juxtaposition is powerful. A document that begins with the formal weight of a physical office ends with the frictionless speed of digital transmission. This, combined with a legacy placeholder date of «Today: July 4, 1996», paints a perfect picture of an institution in transition, holding onto its analog legacy while operating with the tools of the present.
Conclusion: Finding Meaning in the Margins
Insightful truths about our society are not always found in grand pronouncements. Sometimes, they are quietly embedded in the structure of administrative paperwork, revealing the constant negotiation between systematic order and human reality. By looking closely at the mundane, we uncover the logic, values, and contradictions of the complex world we have built—a world of templates designed to process unique lives, and of digital signatures that carry the weight of centuries of law.
What other everyday documents do we overlook, and what stories might they tell if we looked closer?
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5, and the petition was filed after the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550) expired.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Community Governing Document regarding pipe installation
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R section 2.5 by installing pipes for a well. Respondent argued that CC&R section 2.5 was inapplicable as it governs additional easements conveyed to a third party, and that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550).
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Statute of Limitations, Easement, CC&R Violation, Well Installation
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:26 (77.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818023-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the HOA violated community governing documents (CC&Rs) by installing pipes related to a well through his lot.
The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, dismissed the petitioner’s case in its entirety. The decision was based on two independent and definitive grounds. First, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to meet his burden of proof on the merits of the case; the evidence demonstrated that the pipes were installed within a pre-existing easement and not improperly on his lot, and the specific CC&R section cited was inapplicable. Second, the petition was procedurally barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitations, as the installation occurred in the summer of 2013, and the action was filed after this period had expired. Consequently, the Rancho Del Oro HOA was deemed the prevailing party.
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I. Case Overview
This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Michael J. Stoltenberg against his HOA.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Michael J. Stoltenberg, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Respondent
Case Number
18F-H1818023-REL
Hearing Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Hearing Date
March 28, 2018
Decision Date
April 17, 2018
II. Core Dispute and Allegations
A. Petitioner’s Claim
The central allegation from the petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, was that the Rancho Del Oro HOA violated the Community Governing Document CC&Rs.
• Specific Allegation: The HOA improperly installed pipes through his lot as part of a well installation project.
• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition focused on violations of CC&R sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5. The decision notes that sections 1.13 and 1.19 are definition sections, making section 2.5 the substantive focus of the dispute.
B. Respondent’s Defense Strategy
The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a multi-faceted defense against the petitioner’s claims, combining a procedural dismissal argument with a substantive rebuttal.
1. Statute of Limitations: The HOA contended the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations established in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550. They asserted that since the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, the time frame for filing a petition had expired.
2. Inapplicability of CC&R Section 2.5: The HOA argued that this section was not relevant to the situation. They maintained that CC&R section 2.5 pertains specifically to instances where the HOA grants or conveys an additional easement to a third party, which had not occurred.
3. Factual Rebuttal: The HOA asserted that the pipes were installed within an easement that already existed at the time of installation, not on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot outside of an easement.
III. Adjudicated Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge made several key findings of fact and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the final order. The petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
A. Findings of Fact
The ALJ’s decision was based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. The key findings were:
• Witnesses: The court heard testimony from petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, HOA community manager Diana Crites, and HOA Board Chairman James Van Sickle.
• Location of Installation: Evidence showed the pipes were installed in an easement that was already in existence at the time of the 2013 installation.
• Failure of Evidentiary Support: The judge explicitly noted, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.”
B. Conclusions of Law
Based on the evidence and statutes, the ALJ reached the following legal conclusions:
• Statute of Limitations is Applicable: The judge affirmed that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. The installation occurred in 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, rendering the claim time-barred.
• Interpretation of CC&R 2.5: The judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation, concluding that CC&R section 2.5 applies to easements granted to a third party by the HOA.
• No Violation Occurred: The “weight of the evidence” demonstrated that the pipes were in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party. Therefore, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Due to the lack of evidence and the inapplicability of the cited CC&R section, the petitioner failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
IV. Final Order and Implications
Based on the dual findings that the claim was both time-barred and without merit, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decisive order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order’s service, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818023-REL
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818023-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Michael J. Stoltenberg versus the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, against the Respondent?
3. What two primary legal arguments did the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association present in its defense?
4. According to the judge’s findings, what crucial piece of evidence was not presented at the hearing regarding the location of the well and pipes?
5. What is the statute of limitations cited in this case, and why was it a critical factor in the judge’s decision?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret Community Governing Document CC&R section 2.5 in relation to the Respondent’s actions?
7. Who has the burden of proof in this type of hearing, and what is the specific standard of proof required to win the case?
8. What was the ultimate Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and who was named the prevailing party?
9. Aside from the statute of limitations, what was the other fundamental reason the Petitioner failed to prove his case?
10. After the judge’s Order was issued on April 17, 2018, what recourse was available to the parties involved?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, who brought the complaint, and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, who was defending against the complaint. Mr. Stoltenberg represented himself, while the Homeowners Association was represented by its attorney, Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.
2. Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the Homeowners Association violated sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5 of the Community Governing Document (CC&Rs). The basis of his petition was that the HOA had improperly installed pipes through his lot in connection with a new well.
3. The HOA argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, as the installation occurred in 2013, more than four years prior. The HOA also contended that CC&R section 2.5 did not apply because it refers to granting additional easements to a third party, which the HOA did not do.
4. The judge’s “Findings of Fact” state that “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.” This lack of evidence was a key failure in the Petitioner’s case.
5. The statute of limitations cited is ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, which requires actions to be brought within four years. This was critical because the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, making his claim untimely.
6. The judge concluded that CC&R section 2.5 specifically applies to easements that are granted or conveyed to a third party by the Respondent. Since the evidence showed the pipes were installed in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant a new one to a third party, the judge found that this section was not violated.
7. The Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition be dismissed. As a result of the dismissal, the Respondent (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
9. The Petitioner failed to prove his case because the weight of the evidence showed the HOA did not violate CC&R section 2.5. The evidence indicated the pipes were installed in a pre-existing easement, and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party as described in that section.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. This request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, particularly regarding the location of the pipes, contribute to the dismissal of his petition?
2. Discuss the significance of the statute of limitations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550) in the judge’s decision. Why are such statutes important in legal proceedings, and how did it provide a separate and independent basis for dismissing the case?
3. Explain the legal reasoning behind the judge’s interpretation of CC&R section 2.5. Why was the distinction between an “existing easement” and granting a “new easement to a third party” a critical factor in the outcome?
4. Imagine you were legal counsel for the Petitioner. Based on the information in the decision, what kind of evidence would have been necessary to successfully prove a violation of the Community Governing Documents and overcome the Respondent’s defenses?
5. Examine the roles of the different entities involved in this dispute: the Petitioner, the Homeowners Association, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate. How does the structure of this administrative hearing process provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between homeowners and HOAs?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Several statutes are cited, including those governing real estate, HOA disputes, and the statute of limitations.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.
An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules set forth in a Community Governing Document that property owners in a planned community or condominium must follow.
Easement
A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific, limited purpose. In this case, it refers to the area where pipes were installed, which the judge found was an “existing easement.”
Findings of Fact
The section of a legal decision that details the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing.
Homeowners Association (HOA)
An organization in a planned community (like Rancho Del Oro) that creates and enforces rules for the properties and residents within its jurisdiction.
Notice of Hearing
A formal document issued to inform the parties of the date, time, location, and subject matter of a scheduled legal hearing.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition, seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Michael J. Stoltenberg.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. Defined in the document as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Statute of Limitations
A law that sets the maximum amount of time that parties involved in a dispute have to initiate legal proceedings. In this case, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550 established a four-year limit.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818023-REL
4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against Their HOA
For many homeowners, a dispute with their Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like a classic David vs. Goliath story. We’re drawn to tales of the little guy winning against a powerful board, but the reality is that these battles are governed by unforgiving rules, and victory is never guaranteed. While stories of homeowner triumphs are inspiring, it is just as crucial—if not more so—to understand the anatomy of a failure.
This article serves as a cautionary tale, exploring the surprising and impactful lessons from a legal case where a homeowner’s petition against their HOA was decisively dismissed. By understanding the series of avoidable missteps that led to this loss, every homeowner can be better prepared to protect their rights and their property.
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1. Time is Not on Your Side: The Statute of Limitations
In the legal world, a “statute of limitations” is a strict deadline for filing a lawsuit. Think of it as a countdown clock that starts the moment a potential legal issue occurs. If you let that clock run out, you forfeit your right to take legal action, no matter how valid your complaint might be.
The first domino to fall in this case was the calendar. The homeowner’s complaint centered on pipes installed in the summer of 2013. The petition, however, wasn’t filed until early 2018, just a few months after the four-year deadline had expired. This wasn’t a case of extreme neglect; it was a critical error of a few months that proved instantly fatal. The lesson here is harsh and urgent: if you believe your HOA has wronged you, you must act promptly. Waiting too long can render your claim legally void before it ever gets a fair hearing.
The specific rule that was applied is a stark reminder of this unforgiving principle:
Actions other than for recovery of real property for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward.
2. You Have to Prove It: The Burden of Proof
In any legal dispute, the person bringing the complaint—the petitioner—has the “burden of proof.” This means it is entirely your responsibility to present convincing evidence to support your claims. Simply believing something to be true is not enough; you must prove it with cold, hard facts. Here’s where every homeowner should pay close attention.
The case’s foundation crumbled under the simple question: “Where is the proof?” The core of the homeowner’s case was the allegation that the HOA had installed pipes through his lot. This was the central pillar of the entire petition. But when the time came to present evidence, the pillar collapsed. The judge’s decision contained this stunning finding:
There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on […] lot.
An entire lawsuit can be dismissed if a fundamental claim, no matter how strongly you believe it, cannot be factually proven. Your conviction that you are right means nothing in a hearing without evidence to back it up.
3. Read the Fine Print: The Rules Might Not Mean What You Think They Mean
The homeowner built his argument on a specific part of the Community Governing Documents (CC&Rs), section 2.5, believing it proved the HOA had acted improperly. But the devil is always in the details, and a misinterpretation of those details can be fatal to a case.
The HOA successfully argued that the rule the homeowner cited only applied to situations where the HOA granted a new easement to a third party. In reality, the HOA had simply used an existing easement and had not granted anything to an outside entity. This is a critical distinction. Think of it this way: the homeowner argued the HOA violated the rules for building a new road, but the HOA proved they were simply driving a car on a road that already existed. The homeowner’s argument, while possibly correct about new roads, was irrelevant to the actual situation.
Compounding the error, the homeowner’s initial petition also cited sections of the CC&Rs that were simply definitions, not enforceable rules—a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal documents at the heart of the case.
4. A Double Dismissal: Why the Case Failed on Two Fronts
This case didn’t just lose once; the court effectively ruled the homeowner would have lost twice, on two completely different grounds. This reveals a devastating legal reality: winning requires clearing multiple hurdles, while losing only requires failing at one.
The petition was dismissed for two independent and powerful reasons:
1. The Procedural Knockout: The case was filed too late, violating the four-year statute of limitations. This is a procedural bar, meaning the court couldn’t even consider the facts of the case. It was dead on arrival.
2. The Substantive Failure: The judge made it clear that even if the case had been filed on time, it would have failed on its merits. The homeowner failed to prove his central claim (the pipe location) and fundamentally misinterpreted the CC&Rs.
This “double loss” demonstrates that a successful case against an HOA must be both timely and legally sound. One without the other is a recipe for failure.
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Conclusion: Are You Ready for a Fight?
Being frustrated with your HOA is understandable, but that feeling is not enough to win a legal battle. As this case demonstrates, a successful challenge demands timely action, solid evidence, and a precise interpretation of your community’s governing documents. And a loss isn’t just a disappointment; it means your filing fees are lost, and you’ve spent significant time and energy for nothing, with the HOA’s position only becoming more entrenched. This is a financial and emotional trap you must avoid.
Before you decide to take on your HOA, ask yourself: Have you checked the calendar, your property survey, and the fine print?
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5, and the petition was filed after the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550) expired.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Community Governing Document regarding pipe installation
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R section 2.5 by installing pipes for a well. Respondent argued that CC&R section 2.5 was inapplicable as it governs additional easements conveyed to a third party, and that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550).
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Statute of Limitations, Easement, CC&R Violation, Well Installation
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:08 (77.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818023-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the HOA violated community governing documents (CC&Rs) by installing pipes related to a well through his lot.
The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, dismissed the petitioner’s case in its entirety. The decision was based on two independent and definitive grounds. First, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to meet his burden of proof on the merits of the case; the evidence demonstrated that the pipes were installed within a pre-existing easement and not improperly on his lot, and the specific CC&R section cited was inapplicable. Second, the petition was procedurally barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitations, as the installation occurred in the summer of 2013, and the action was filed after this period had expired. Consequently, the Rancho Del Oro HOA was deemed the prevailing party.
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I. Case Overview
This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Michael J. Stoltenberg against his HOA.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Michael J. Stoltenberg, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Respondent
Case Number
18F-H1818023-REL
Hearing Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Hearing Date
March 28, 2018
Decision Date
April 17, 2018
II. Core Dispute and Allegations
A. Petitioner’s Claim
The central allegation from the petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, was that the Rancho Del Oro HOA violated the Community Governing Document CC&Rs.
• Specific Allegation: The HOA improperly installed pipes through his lot as part of a well installation project.
• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition focused on violations of CC&R sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5. The decision notes that sections 1.13 and 1.19 are definition sections, making section 2.5 the substantive focus of the dispute.
B. Respondent’s Defense Strategy
The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a multi-faceted defense against the petitioner’s claims, combining a procedural dismissal argument with a substantive rebuttal.
1. Statute of Limitations: The HOA contended the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations established in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550. They asserted that since the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, the time frame for filing a petition had expired.
2. Inapplicability of CC&R Section 2.5: The HOA argued that this section was not relevant to the situation. They maintained that CC&R section 2.5 pertains specifically to instances where the HOA grants or conveys an additional easement to a third party, which had not occurred.
3. Factual Rebuttal: The HOA asserted that the pipes were installed within an easement that already existed at the time of installation, not on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot outside of an easement.
III. Adjudicated Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge made several key findings of fact and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the final order. The petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
A. Findings of Fact
The ALJ’s decision was based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. The key findings were:
• Witnesses: The court heard testimony from petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, HOA community manager Diana Crites, and HOA Board Chairman James Van Sickle.
• Location of Installation: Evidence showed the pipes were installed in an easement that was already in existence at the time of the 2013 installation.
• Failure of Evidentiary Support: The judge explicitly noted, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.”
B. Conclusions of Law
Based on the evidence and statutes, the ALJ reached the following legal conclusions:
• Statute of Limitations is Applicable: The judge affirmed that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. The installation occurred in 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, rendering the claim time-barred.
• Interpretation of CC&R 2.5: The judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation, concluding that CC&R section 2.5 applies to easements granted to a third party by the HOA.
• No Violation Occurred: The “weight of the evidence” demonstrated that the pipes were in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party. Therefore, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Due to the lack of evidence and the inapplicability of the cited CC&R section, the petitioner failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
IV. Final Order and Implications
Based on the dual findings that the claim was both time-barred and without merit, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decisive order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order’s service, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818023-REL
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818023-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Michael J. Stoltenberg versus the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, against the Respondent?
3. What two primary legal arguments did the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association present in its defense?
4. According to the judge’s findings, what crucial piece of evidence was not presented at the hearing regarding the location of the well and pipes?
5. What is the statute of limitations cited in this case, and why was it a critical factor in the judge’s decision?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret Community Governing Document CC&R section 2.5 in relation to the Respondent’s actions?
7. Who has the burden of proof in this type of hearing, and what is the specific standard of proof required to win the case?
8. What was the ultimate Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and who was named the prevailing party?
9. Aside from the statute of limitations, what was the other fundamental reason the Petitioner failed to prove his case?
10. After the judge’s Order was issued on April 17, 2018, what recourse was available to the parties involved?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, who brought the complaint, and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, who was defending against the complaint. Mr. Stoltenberg represented himself, while the Homeowners Association was represented by its attorney, Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.
2. Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the Homeowners Association violated sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5 of the Community Governing Document (CC&Rs). The basis of his petition was that the HOA had improperly installed pipes through his lot in connection with a new well.
3. The HOA argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, as the installation occurred in 2013, more than four years prior. The HOA also contended that CC&R section 2.5 did not apply because it refers to granting additional easements to a third party, which the HOA did not do.
4. The judge’s “Findings of Fact” state that “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.” This lack of evidence was a key failure in the Petitioner’s case.
5. The statute of limitations cited is ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, which requires actions to be brought within four years. This was critical because the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, making his claim untimely.
6. The judge concluded that CC&R section 2.5 specifically applies to easements that are granted or conveyed to a third party by the Respondent. Since the evidence showed the pipes were installed in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant a new one to a third party, the judge found that this section was not violated.
7. The Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition be dismissed. As a result of the dismissal, the Respondent (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
9. The Petitioner failed to prove his case because the weight of the evidence showed the HOA did not violate CC&R section 2.5. The evidence indicated the pipes were installed in a pre-existing easement, and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party as described in that section.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. This request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, particularly regarding the location of the pipes, contribute to the dismissal of his petition?
2. Discuss the significance of the statute of limitations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550) in the judge’s decision. Why are such statutes important in legal proceedings, and how did it provide a separate and independent basis for dismissing the case?
3. Explain the legal reasoning behind the judge’s interpretation of CC&R section 2.5. Why was the distinction between an “existing easement” and granting a “new easement to a third party” a critical factor in the outcome?
4. Imagine you were legal counsel for the Petitioner. Based on the information in the decision, what kind of evidence would have been necessary to successfully prove a violation of the Community Governing Documents and overcome the Respondent’s defenses?
5. Examine the roles of the different entities involved in this dispute: the Petitioner, the Homeowners Association, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate. How does the structure of this administrative hearing process provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between homeowners and HOAs?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Several statutes are cited, including those governing real estate, HOA disputes, and the statute of limitations.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.
An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules set forth in a Community Governing Document that property owners in a planned community or condominium must follow.
Easement
A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific, limited purpose. In this case, it refers to the area where pipes were installed, which the judge found was an “existing easement.”
Findings of Fact
The section of a legal decision that details the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing.
Homeowners Association (HOA)
An organization in a planned community (like Rancho Del Oro) that creates and enforces rules for the properties and residents within its jurisdiction.
Notice of Hearing
A formal document issued to inform the parties of the date, time, location, and subject matter of a scheduled legal hearing.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition, seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Michael J. Stoltenberg.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. Defined in the document as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Statute of Limitations
A law that sets the maximum amount of time that parties involved in a dispute have to initiate legal proceedings. In this case, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550 established a four-year limit.
The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs Article 10.8, because that provision applies only to recorded notices, and the notices issued to the Petitioner were not recorded.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R notice requirements regarding clarity and completeness of violation notices.
The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 because the violation notices sent to him failed to include five mandatory pieces of information required by that section of the CC&Rs. The Petitioner also sought the refund of $175 in fines.
Orders: Petitioners' petition in this matter is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, CC&R, Notice of Violation, Recording
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:41 (78.5 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817019-REL
Case Briefing: Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817019-REL, wherein Petitioner Jerry L. Webster’s complaint against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association was dismissed. The central issue revolved around Mr. Webster’s claim that the HOA engaged in a pattern of harassment by issuing vague and improper violation notices that failed to comply with Article 10.8 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
The case was decided on a critical legal interpretation of the CC&Rs. The presiding judge determined that the specific requirements of Article 10.8, which Mr. Webster cited as being violated, apply exclusively to violation notices that are formally “Recorded” with the Maricopa County Recorder’s office. The petitioner failed to provide any evidence, or even make the claim, that the notices he received had been recorded. Consequently, Mr. Webster did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA had violated the cited article. The dismissal of the petition was based entirely on this procedural and definitional distinction, without a ruling on the petitioner’s underlying allegations of harassment or selective enforcement.
Case Background
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.
◦ Respondent: Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (“Mountain Rose”), located in Scottsdale, Arizona.
• Adjudicating Body:
◦ The Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona.
◦ Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson.
• Key Dates:
◦ 2016–2017: Mountain Rose issues a series of violation notices to Mr. Webster regarding tree trimming and debris cleanup.
◦ December 6, 2017: Mr. Webster files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
◦ February 9, 2018: A hearing is held.
◦ February 9, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issues the decision dismissing the petition.
Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments
Mr. Webster’s petition centered on the claim that the HOA’s actions constituted harassment and violated specific provisions of the governing documents.
Core Claim: Violation of CC&Rs Article 10.8
Mr. Webster contended that the violation notices he received from Mountain Rose were invalid because they failed to contain information mandated by Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”) of the CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged the notices omitted the following required elements:
• (ii) The legal description of the lot against which the notice is being Recorded.
• (iii) A brief description of the nature of the violation.
• (iv) A statement that the notice is being Recorded by the Association pursuant to the Declaration.
• (v) A statement of the specific steps which must be taken by the Owner or occupant to cure the violation.
Allegations of Harassment and Prejudicial Treatment
In his petition, Mr. Webster framed the HOA’s actions as a targeted and unfair campaign against him.
• Stated Intent: “The intent of this action is to stop the HOA from violating our civil rights by prejudicially harassing us with unclear and unwarranted violation notices.”
• History of Conflict: He alleged that “The HOA has harassed us for over 10 years with vague violation notices.”
• Lack of Communication: He claimed that his “Numerous requests were made for clarification…which were ignored.”
• Financial Penalties: Mr. Webster stated he was recently fined three times for a total of $175, which he sought to have refunded.
• Alleged Bias: To demonstrate selective enforcement, Mr. Webster noted that a review of the neighborhood revealed “22 trees touching dwellings, including ours,” and stated, “It is very doubtful any other member received notices or fines for identical circumstances.”
• Supporting Evidence: Mr. Webster submitted an aerial photo from 2012 showing the tree in a similar condition, a 2017 photo of another home with a tree touching the dwelling, and a 2017 photo of HOA-maintained trees.
Respondent’s Position
The Mountain Rose HOA, represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., presented a focused defense based on the specific language of the CC&Rs.
• Central Argument: The HOA contended that the violation notices issued to Mr. Webster were not recorded with the Maricopa County Recorder.
• Legal Position: Because the notices were not recorded, the stringent requirements outlined in Article 10.8 did not apply to them.
• Additional Detail: The HOA also argued that it had previously communicated the necessary corrective action to Mr. Webster, stating that “his tree needed to be trimmed 8 feet above the ground.”
The Decisive Legal Interpretation and Ruling
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the precise definition and application of “Recording” as established within the Mountain Rose CC&Rs.
The Definition of “Recording”
Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs provides the controlling definition:
“Recording” means placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona, and “Recorded” means having been so placed of public record.
Application of Law to Facts
The Judge concluded that Mr. Webster’s entire case rested on a misapplication of Article 10.8.
• Limited Scope of Article 10.8: The ruling states, “Mountain Rose CC&Rs Article 10.8. applies to the recording of notices and recorded notices.”
• Burden of Proof: Under Arizona law (A.A.C. R2-19-119), the burden of proof fell to the petitioner, Mr. Webster, to demonstrate his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Crucial Factual Finding: The decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.“
• Petitioner’s Failure to Allege: The Judge further noted, “Mr. Webster did not even contend that Mountain Rose recorded the notices issued to him.”
Conclusion of Law
Based on the evidence and the plain language of the CC&Rs, the Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to make his case.
“Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs as described above.”
Final Order and Disposition
The petition was summarily dismissed based on the failure to prove that the relevant CC&R article was applicable to the facts presented.
Order:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition in this matter is dismissed.”
The order was dated February 9, 2018, and transmitted to the parties on February 28, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817019-REL
Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817019-REL
This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, heard on February 9, 2018. It includes a quiz to test comprehension, suggested essay topics for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the source document.
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source text.
1. Identify the primary parties involved in this case and describe their respective roles.
2. What was the central accusation that Petitioner Jerry L. Webster made against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association?
3. Which specific article of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) did Mr. Webster claim the HOA violated, and what key information did he allege was missing from the notices he received?
4. Beyond the content of the violation notices, what other complaints did Mr. Webster include in his petition regarding the HOA’s conduct?
5. According to the Mountain Rose CC&Rs, what is the specific definition of “Recording”?
6. What was the key piece of evidence that was absent from the hearing, which proved critical to the final decision?
7. What was the Mountain Rose HOA’s primary defense against Mr. Webster’s allegation that it had violated Article 10.8 of the CC&Rs?
8. In this type of administrative hearing, who holds the burden of proof, and what is the standard of proof required to win the case?
9. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson in this matter?
10. What recourse did the parties have after the judge issued the Order on February 9, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the association, and Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Webster filed a petition alleging violations by the HOA, making him the accuser, while the HOA was the party responding to the allegations.
2. Mr. Webster’s central accusation was that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its own CC&Rs. He contended that the HOA engaged in prejudicial harassment by sending him a series of vague, unclear, and unwarranted violation notices over a period of more than 10 years.
3. Mr. Webster claimed the HOA violated Article 10.8, titled “Notice of Violation.” He alleged the notices he received failed to include several required subsections, including the legal description of the lot (ii), a brief description of the violation (iii), a statement that the notice was being Recorded (iv), and a statement of the specific steps needed to cure the violation (v).
4. Mr. Webster also complained that his numerous requests for clarification were ignored and that the HOA’s intent was harassment. He claimed he was fined $175 based on invalid notices and that the HOA was engaging in selective enforcement, noting 22 other homes had trees touching dwellings without receiving similar notices or fines.
5. According to Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs, “Recording” is defined as placing an instrument of public record in the office of the County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona. “Recorded” means that the instrument has been placed on public record in that office.
6. The key piece of evidence absent from the hearing was any proof that the violation notices sent to Mr. Webster were ever recorded with the County Recorder of Maricopa County. The judge’s decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.”
7. The HOA’s primary defense was that the requirements of Article 10.8 only apply to recorded notices. Since the notices issued to Mr. Webster were never recorded, the HOA argued that the article’s specific formatting requirements were not applicable to their correspondence with him.
8. The burden of proof falls to the party asserting the claim, which in this case was the Petitioner, Mr. Webster. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.
9. The final Order issued by the judge was that the Petitioner’s petition in the matter be dismissed. This means Mr. Webster’s case was unsuccessful.
10. After the Order was issued, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer-form, analytical answers. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument as presented in the petition. What was the critical legal misinterpretation regarding Article 10.8 that ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?
2. Explain the direct relationship between Article 1.33 (“Recording”) and Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”). How did the specific definition in the former article completely undermine the petitioner’s entire claim, which was based on the latter?
3. Discuss the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Citing specific findings from the decision, explain exactly how the petitioner failed to meet this standard.
4. Mr. Webster raised several secondary issues in his petition, including allegations of long-term harassment, selective enforcement (“22 trees touch dwellings”), and ignored requests for clarification. Why were these claims ultimately not addressed or validated in the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?
5. Based on the text of Article 10.8, what is the specific function and legal purpose of a recorded Notice of Violation? Why might an HOA choose to go through the formal process of recording a notice rather than just sending an unrecorded letter to a homeowner?
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Glossary
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
An Arizona Revised Statute that permits a homeowner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Burden of Proof
The responsibility of the party asserting a claim or right to prove their case. In this matter, the burden of proof fell to the Petitioner.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Mountain Rose, which are the governing documents for the homeowners association.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which Mr. Webster filed his petition.
Notice of Violation (Article 10.8)
A written notice that the Association has the right to record. This article specifies that such a recorded notice must contain five key pieces of information, including the legal description of the lot and the specific steps to cure the violation. Its provisions apply specifically to notices that are formally recorded.
Petitioner
The party who filed the petition. In this case, it was Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose HOA.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “the greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that…is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Recording (Article 1.33)
The act of “placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona.” “Recorded” means having been so placed on public record.
Respondent
The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, it was the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817019-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, addressing a dispute between Petitioner Jerry L. Webster and the Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Webster alleged that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its CC&Rs by issuing unclear and unwarranted violation notices, specifically regarding the trimming of his tree and cleaning debris, and he sought the refund of recent fines. The HOA contended that the notices were not recorded, making the specific requirements of Article 10.8—which applies to recorded notices—inapplicable to the general violation notices Mr. Webster received. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the CC&Rs because the notices in question were never officially recorded, leading to the dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.
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Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jerry L. Webster(petitioner)
Pamela Webster(witness)
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(HOA attorney)
Frank Puma(manager) Mountain Rose
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs Article 10.8, because that provision applies only to recorded notices, and the notices issued to the Petitioner were not recorded.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R notice requirements regarding clarity and completeness of violation notices.
The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 because the violation notices sent to him failed to include five mandatory pieces of information required by that section of the CC&Rs. The Petitioner also sought the refund of $175 in fines.
Orders: Petitioners' petition in this matter is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, CC&R, Notice of Violation, Recording
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:17 (78.5 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817019-REL
Case Briefing: Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817019-REL, wherein Petitioner Jerry L. Webster’s complaint against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association was dismissed. The central issue revolved around Mr. Webster’s claim that the HOA engaged in a pattern of harassment by issuing vague and improper violation notices that failed to comply with Article 10.8 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
The case was decided on a critical legal interpretation of the CC&Rs. The presiding judge determined that the specific requirements of Article 10.8, which Mr. Webster cited as being violated, apply exclusively to violation notices that are formally “Recorded” with the Maricopa County Recorder’s office. The petitioner failed to provide any evidence, or even make the claim, that the notices he received had been recorded. Consequently, Mr. Webster did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA had violated the cited article. The dismissal of the petition was based entirely on this procedural and definitional distinction, without a ruling on the petitioner’s underlying allegations of harassment or selective enforcement.
Case Background
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.
◦ Respondent: Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (“Mountain Rose”), located in Scottsdale, Arizona.
• Adjudicating Body:
◦ The Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona.
◦ Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson.
• Key Dates:
◦ 2016–2017: Mountain Rose issues a series of violation notices to Mr. Webster regarding tree trimming and debris cleanup.
◦ December 6, 2017: Mr. Webster files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
◦ February 9, 2018: A hearing is held.
◦ February 9, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issues the decision dismissing the petition.
Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments
Mr. Webster’s petition centered on the claim that the HOA’s actions constituted harassment and violated specific provisions of the governing documents.
Core Claim: Violation of CC&Rs Article 10.8
Mr. Webster contended that the violation notices he received from Mountain Rose were invalid because they failed to contain information mandated by Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”) of the CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged the notices omitted the following required elements:
• (ii) The legal description of the lot against which the notice is being Recorded.
• (iii) A brief description of the nature of the violation.
• (iv) A statement that the notice is being Recorded by the Association pursuant to the Declaration.
• (v) A statement of the specific steps which must be taken by the Owner or occupant to cure the violation.
Allegations of Harassment and Prejudicial Treatment
In his petition, Mr. Webster framed the HOA’s actions as a targeted and unfair campaign against him.
• Stated Intent: “The intent of this action is to stop the HOA from violating our civil rights by prejudicially harassing us with unclear and unwarranted violation notices.”
• History of Conflict: He alleged that “The HOA has harassed us for over 10 years with vague violation notices.”
• Lack of Communication: He claimed that his “Numerous requests were made for clarification…which were ignored.”
• Financial Penalties: Mr. Webster stated he was recently fined three times for a total of $175, which he sought to have refunded.
• Alleged Bias: To demonstrate selective enforcement, Mr. Webster noted that a review of the neighborhood revealed “22 trees touching dwellings, including ours,” and stated, “It is very doubtful any other member received notices or fines for identical circumstances.”
• Supporting Evidence: Mr. Webster submitted an aerial photo from 2012 showing the tree in a similar condition, a 2017 photo of another home with a tree touching the dwelling, and a 2017 photo of HOA-maintained trees.
Respondent’s Position
The Mountain Rose HOA, represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., presented a focused defense based on the specific language of the CC&Rs.
• Central Argument: The HOA contended that the violation notices issued to Mr. Webster were not recorded with the Maricopa County Recorder.
• Legal Position: Because the notices were not recorded, the stringent requirements outlined in Article 10.8 did not apply to them.
• Additional Detail: The HOA also argued that it had previously communicated the necessary corrective action to Mr. Webster, stating that “his tree needed to be trimmed 8 feet above the ground.”
The Decisive Legal Interpretation and Ruling
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the precise definition and application of “Recording” as established within the Mountain Rose CC&Rs.
The Definition of “Recording”
Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs provides the controlling definition:
“Recording” means placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona, and “Recorded” means having been so placed of public record.
Application of Law to Facts
The Judge concluded that Mr. Webster’s entire case rested on a misapplication of Article 10.8.
• Limited Scope of Article 10.8: The ruling states, “Mountain Rose CC&Rs Article 10.8. applies to the recording of notices and recorded notices.”
• Burden of Proof: Under Arizona law (A.A.C. R2-19-119), the burden of proof fell to the petitioner, Mr. Webster, to demonstrate his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Crucial Factual Finding: The decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.“
• Petitioner’s Failure to Allege: The Judge further noted, “Mr. Webster did not even contend that Mountain Rose recorded the notices issued to him.”
Conclusion of Law
Based on the evidence and the plain language of the CC&Rs, the Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to make his case.
“Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs as described above.”
Final Order and Disposition
The petition was summarily dismissed based on the failure to prove that the relevant CC&R article was applicable to the facts presented.
Order:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition in this matter is dismissed.”
The order was dated February 9, 2018, and transmitted to the parties on February 28, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817019-REL
Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817019-REL
This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, heard on February 9, 2018. It includes a quiz to test comprehension, suggested essay topics for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the source document.
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source text.
1. Identify the primary parties involved in this case and describe their respective roles.
2. What was the central accusation that Petitioner Jerry L. Webster made against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association?
3. Which specific article of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) did Mr. Webster claim the HOA violated, and what key information did he allege was missing from the notices he received?
4. Beyond the content of the violation notices, what other complaints did Mr. Webster include in his petition regarding the HOA’s conduct?
5. According to the Mountain Rose CC&Rs, what is the specific definition of “Recording”?
6. What was the key piece of evidence that was absent from the hearing, which proved critical to the final decision?
7. What was the Mountain Rose HOA’s primary defense against Mr. Webster’s allegation that it had violated Article 10.8 of the CC&Rs?
8. In this type of administrative hearing, who holds the burden of proof, and what is the standard of proof required to win the case?
9. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson in this matter?
10. What recourse did the parties have after the judge issued the Order on February 9, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the association, and Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Webster filed a petition alleging violations by the HOA, making him the accuser, while the HOA was the party responding to the allegations.
2. Mr. Webster’s central accusation was that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its own CC&Rs. He contended that the HOA engaged in prejudicial harassment by sending him a series of vague, unclear, and unwarranted violation notices over a period of more than 10 years.
3. Mr. Webster claimed the HOA violated Article 10.8, titled “Notice of Violation.” He alleged the notices he received failed to include several required subsections, including the legal description of the lot (ii), a brief description of the violation (iii), a statement that the notice was being Recorded (iv), and a statement of the specific steps needed to cure the violation (v).
4. Mr. Webster also complained that his numerous requests for clarification were ignored and that the HOA’s intent was harassment. He claimed he was fined $175 based on invalid notices and that the HOA was engaging in selective enforcement, noting 22 other homes had trees touching dwellings without receiving similar notices or fines.
5. According to Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs, “Recording” is defined as placing an instrument of public record in the office of the County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona. “Recorded” means that the instrument has been placed on public record in that office.
6. The key piece of evidence absent from the hearing was any proof that the violation notices sent to Mr. Webster were ever recorded with the County Recorder of Maricopa County. The judge’s decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.”
7. The HOA’s primary defense was that the requirements of Article 10.8 only apply to recorded notices. Since the notices issued to Mr. Webster were never recorded, the HOA argued that the article’s specific formatting requirements were not applicable to their correspondence with him.
8. The burden of proof falls to the party asserting the claim, which in this case was the Petitioner, Mr. Webster. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.
9. The final Order issued by the judge was that the Petitioner’s petition in the matter be dismissed. This means Mr. Webster’s case was unsuccessful.
10. After the Order was issued, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer-form, analytical answers. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument as presented in the petition. What was the critical legal misinterpretation regarding Article 10.8 that ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?
2. Explain the direct relationship between Article 1.33 (“Recording”) and Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”). How did the specific definition in the former article completely undermine the petitioner’s entire claim, which was based on the latter?
3. Discuss the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Citing specific findings from the decision, explain exactly how the petitioner failed to meet this standard.
4. Mr. Webster raised several secondary issues in his petition, including allegations of long-term harassment, selective enforcement (“22 trees touch dwellings”), and ignored requests for clarification. Why were these claims ultimately not addressed or validated in the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?
5. Based on the text of Article 10.8, what is the specific function and legal purpose of a recorded Notice of Violation? Why might an HOA choose to go through the formal process of recording a notice rather than just sending an unrecorded letter to a homeowner?
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Glossary
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
An Arizona Revised Statute that permits a homeowner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Burden of Proof
The responsibility of the party asserting a claim or right to prove their case. In this matter, the burden of proof fell to the Petitioner.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Mountain Rose, which are the governing documents for the homeowners association.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which Mr. Webster filed his petition.
Notice of Violation (Article 10.8)
A written notice that the Association has the right to record. This article specifies that such a recorded notice must contain five key pieces of information, including the legal description of the lot and the specific steps to cure the violation. Its provisions apply specifically to notices that are formally recorded.
Petitioner
The party who filed the petition. In this case, it was Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose HOA.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “the greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that…is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Recording (Article 1.33)
The act of “placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona.” “Recorded” means having been so placed on public record.
Respondent
The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, it was the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817019-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, addressing a dispute between Petitioner Jerry L. Webster and the Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Webster alleged that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its CC&Rs by issuing unclear and unwarranted violation notices, specifically regarding the trimming of his tree and cleaning debris, and he sought the refund of recent fines. The HOA contended that the notices were not recorded, making the specific requirements of Article 10.8—which applies to recorded notices—inapplicable to the general violation notices Mr. Webster received. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the CC&Rs because the notices in question were never officially recorded, leading to the dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.
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Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jerry L. Webster(petitioner)
Pamela Webster(witness)
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(HOA attorney)
Frank Puma(manager) Mountain Rose
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248 Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248 Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws
Outcome Summary
Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party only regarding the Respondent's violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248 (failure to provide notice for hiring Mulcahy and Kinney). Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. All other claims, including the alleged Bylaws violation and the violation related to hiring Osselaer, were dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the Bylaws violation. The HOA successfully argued that the hiring of Osselaer was conducted during a valid emergency board meeting, exempting it from open meeting notice requirements.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Open Meeting Law (Hiring Kinney and Mulcahy)
Sunset Plaza decided to hire Kinney Management and Mulcahy Law Firm at board meetings without informing its members of those meetings.
Orders: Respondent Sunset Plaza must pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
Violation of Open Meeting Law (Hiring Osselaer)
Petitioner alleged violation regarding the hiring of Osselaer Management Company, but the ALJ found the association was exempt because the decision was made at a valid emergency board meeting.
Orders: Petition dismissed in this respect.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
Failure to keep correct and complete books and records of account
Petitioner alleged Sunset Plaza failed to keep accurate financial records, pointing out discrepancies and an unexplained reserve deficit between 2015 and 2016 balance sheets.
Orders: Petition dismissed in all other respects.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws
Analytics Highlights
Topics: open meeting violation, emergency meeting, governing documents, financial records, condominium association
Additional Citations:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 41-2198.01
Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817003-REL Decision – 605735.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:29 (112.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817003-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Carr v. Sunset Plaza Condo Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in the case of David B. Carr versus the Sunset Plaza Condo Association (Case No. 18F-H1817003-REL). The central conflict involved a petition filed by Mr. Carr, a condominium owner, alleging that the Association’s Board of Management violated Arizona’s open meeting law and engaged in financial mismanagement.
The final ruling was a partial victory for the petitioner. The judge found that Sunset Plaza violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 by failing to provide members with proper notice of board meetings where decisions were made to hire Kinney Management Services and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The Association admitted to this failure, citing a misunderstanding of the law, and pledged future compliance. As the prevailing party on this specific issue, Mr. Carr was awarded reimbursement for his $500 filing fee.
However, the judge dismissed all of Mr. Carr’s other allegations. The claim that a meeting to hire Osselaer Management Company violated the open meeting law was rejected, as the judge deemed it a valid emergency meeting exempt from notice requirements. Furthermore, Mr. Carr’s claims of financial mismanagement and inaccurate record-keeping in violation of the Association’s bylaws were not substantiated. The judge accepted the Association’s defense that alleged financial discrepancies stemmed from a change in accounting practices by a new management company, not from an actual deficit. No civil penalty was imposed on the Association.
I. Case Overview
• Case Number: 18F-H1817003-REL
• Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona
• Petitioner: David B. Carr
• Respondent: Sunset Plaza Condo Association
• Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson
• Hearing Date: November 21, 2017
• Decision Date: November 22, 2017
• Core Dispute: A petition filed by a condo owner alleging the association’s board violated state statutes and its own bylaws concerning open meetings, financial record-keeping, and the execution of contracts.
II. Petitioner’s Allegations (David B. Carr)
On August 14, 2017, Mr. Carr filed a petition outlining two primary grievances against the Sunset Plaza Condo Association.
A. Violation of Open Meeting Law (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248)
Mr. Carr alleged that the Association’s Board of Management took official action without holding properly authorized and noticed board meetings. This resulted in unapproved contracts and expenditures.
Direct Quotation from Petition:
“SUNSET PLAZA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION BOARD OF MANAGEMENT TAKES ACTION WITHOUT HOLDING AUTHORIZED BOARD MEETING IN VIOLATION OF AZ STATUTE 33-1248. THESE UNAUTHORIZED MEETINGS HAVE RESULTED IN CONTRACTS WITH MANAGEMENT FIRMS AND ATTORNEYS. THESE CONTRACTS HAVE RESULTED IN EXPENSES NOT APPROVED OR REVIEWED BY CONDO OWNERS.”
• Specific Contracts Cited:
◦ Kinney Management (October 2016)
◦ Osselaer Real Estate (September 2016)
◦ Mulcahy Law Firm (May 2016)
• Requested Remedy: Cancellation of all contracts entered into without a properly called board meeting and personal repayment of all related expenditures by the signatory.
B. Violation of Bylaws and Financial Mismanagement (Article XI)
Mr. Carr contended that the Association violated Article XI of its bylaws, which requires it to “keep correct and complete books and records of account.” He identified specific financial discrepancies based on his analysis of the Association’s financial statements.
• Alleged Reserve Fund Discrepancy: Mr. Carr claimed an “unexplained reserve deficit of $10,295.09” based on the following figures, noting there were no reported reserve expenses in 2016.
Financial Statement Item
Amount
2015 Year-End Reserve Equity
$10,295.09
2016 Income Statement Reserve Deposit
$9,180.00
2016 Year-End Balance Sheet Reserve Total
$2,295.44
• Additional Discrepancies:
◦ The 2016 year-end balance sheet failed to identify prior and current year operating equity.
◦ An “expanded 2016 balance sheet” calculation revealed a discrepancy of $2,808.42.
• Requested Remedy: A formal audit of the 2016 and 2017 financial statements and improved future reporting to identify reserve balances and homeowner equity.
III. Respondent’s Defense (Sunset Plaza Condo Association)
The Association, represented by Paige Marks, Esq., and through the testimony of board member Marilyn Gelroth, presented a defense against both allegations.
A. Response to Open Meeting Allegations
• Admission: The Association conceded that it “did not provide notice of its board meetings when it decided to hire Kinney and the Mulcahy firm.”
• Justification: This failure was attributed to the board’s misunderstanding of the open meeting law. The Association represented to the judge that it would abide by the law in the future.
• Emergency Meeting Exemption: The Association argued that the decision to hire Osselaer Management was made at a valid emergency board meeting on September 21, 2016.
◦ Timeline of Events: Kinney Management Services retracted its offer to manage the property on September 15, 2016, after receiving notice of a complaint Mr. Carr had filed against them with the Attorney General’s Office.
◦ Urgency: This retraction created an urgent need for a new management company. Ms. Gelroth testified that the board “needed to move quickly because members needed to know where to send payments.” This situation, they argued, constituted an emergency under the law.
B. Response to Financial Allegations
• Flawed Comparison: The Association contended that Mr. Carr’s financial analysis was fundamentally flawed because he “erroneously compared Sunset Plaza’s 2015 year end balance statement to its 2016 income statement,” which are two different types of financial records.
• Change in Accounting Methods: The primary reason for the apparent discrepancies was a change in how financial data was categorized.
◦ The previous management company, Kolby, separated reserve amounts in its financial statements.
◦ The new management company, Osselaer, “does not separate reserve amounts” and is not required by law to do so. This difference in reporting style accounted for the changes Mr. Carr identified as a deficit.
IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, found Ms. Gelroth’s testimony credible and issued a split decision, upholding one of Mr. Carr’s claims while dismissing the other.
A. Finding on Financial Mismanagement Allegation
Conclusion: Petition Dismissed The judge ruled that Mr. Carr “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Sunset Plaza violated Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws.” The Association’s explanation regarding the different accounting methods used by Kolby and Osselaer, and the flawed comparison of financial documents, was accepted as a valid defense.
B. Finding on Open Meeting Law Allegations
Conclusion: Partial Violation Confirmed
• Hiring of Osselaer Management (No Violation): The judge concluded that Sunset Plaza did not violate Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 in this instance. The decision was made at a legitimate emergency board meeting, which exempts the board from the 48-hour notice requirement. The minutes of the meeting stated the reason for the emergency.
• Hiring of Kinney Management and Mulcahy Law Firm (Violation Confirmed): The judge found that Mr. Carr “established by preponderance of the evidence that Sunset Plaza violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-1248” when it decided to hire these two firms. The Association did not dispute that it failed to inform members of these board meetings, which was a key factor in the ruling.
C. Final Order
Based on the findings and conclusions of law, the judge issued the following order:
1. Prevailing Party: Petitioner David B. Carr is deemed the prevailing party solely with regard to the violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248.
2. Reimbursement: Sunset Plaza is ordered to pay Mr. Carr his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
3. Dismissal: All other aspects of Mr. Carr’s petition are dismissed.
4. Penalty: No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in the matter.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817003-REL
Study Guide: Carr v. Sunset Plaza Condo Association (No. 18F-H1817003-REL)
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of David B. Carr versus the Sunset Plaza Condo Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final judgment.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the source document.
1. What were the two primary allegations David B. Carr made against the Sunset Plaza Condo Association in his petition?
2. Identify the three specific contracts Mr. Carr claimed resulted from unauthorized board meetings.
3. Why did Kinney Management Services retract its offer to manage Sunset Plaza in September 2016?
4. What justification did Sunset Plaza provide for holding an emergency board meeting to hire Osselaer Management Company?
5. According to Sunset Plaza, why did Mr. Carr mistakenly believe there was a financial discrepancy in the association’s records?
6. Did the Sunset Plaza board admit to violating the open meeting law? If so, what was their explanation?
7. What authority do the association’s Declaration and Bylaws grant the Board of Management regarding contracts?
8. How does Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 define the requirements for an “emergency meeting” of a board of directors?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding Sunset Plaza’s hiring of the Osselaer Management Company?
10. What specific orders were issued against Sunset Plaza as a result of the judge’s decision?
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Answer Key
1. David B. Carr alleged that the Sunset Plaza Condo Association violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 by holding unauthorized board meetings to enter into contracts. He also alleged the association violated Article XI of its bylaws by failing to keep correct and complete books and records, citing an unexplained deficit in reserve accounts.
2. Mr. Carr’s petition identified contracts with Kinney Management (October 2016), Osselaer Real Estate (September 2016), and the Mulcahy Law Firm (May 2016). He argued these contracts were entered into without a properly called board meeting and resulted in unapproved expenses.
3. Kinney Management Services retracted its acceptance of Sunset Plaza’s offer after receiving a complaint that Mr. Carr had filed against Kinney with the Attorney General’s Office. This information was stated in a letter from Kinney to Sunset Plaza on September 15, 2016.
4. The board held an emergency meeting because after Kinney retracted its offer, they needed to move quickly to hire a new management company. Board member Marilyn Gelroth testified it was important to have a single company handle all affairs and that members needed to know where to send payments without delay.
5. Sunset Plaza contended that Mr. Carr erroneously compared two different types of financial records: the 2015 year-end balance sheet and the 2016 income statement. Furthermore, the association argued that the new management company, Osselaer, categorized financials differently than the previous company, Kolby, and did not separate out reserve amounts.
6. Yes, Sunset Plaza conceded that it did not provide notice to its members of the board meetings when it decided to hire Kinney Management and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The association contended that it did not understand the open meeting law at the time and represented to the Tribunal that it would abide by the law in the future.
7. The Declaration grants the Board the power to “enter into contracts” and generally have the powers of an apartment house manager. Article VII, section 11 of the Bylaws states the Board of Management “shall enter into contracts on behalf of the association.”
8. The statute allows an emergency meeting to be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the required forty-eight hours’ notice. At such a meeting, the board may only act on emergency matters, and the minutes must state the reason necessitating the emergency.
9. The judge concluded that Sunset Plaza did not violate Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 when it hired Osselaer. The decision was made at a legitimate emergency board meeting, which exempted the board from the standard open meeting notification requirements.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner, David Carr, be deemed the prevailing party regarding the violation of the open meeting law. It was further ordered that Sunset Plaza pay Mr. Carr his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days, and his petition was dismissed in all other respects.
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Suggested Essay Questions
1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it was applied in this case. How did David B. Carr meet this burden for his claim about the open meeting law but fail to meet it for his claim about financial mismanagement?
2. Discuss the legal requirements and exceptions for board meetings under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248. Use the board’s decisions to hire Kinney Management, the Mulcahy Law Firm, and Osselaer Management Company as distinct examples to illustrate the application of this law.
3. Evaluate Sunset Plaza’s defense regarding the financial discrepancies alleged by Mr. Carr. Why was this defense successful, and what does it reveal about the potential for confusion when an association changes management companies and accounting methods?
4. Examine the powers and duties of the Sunset Plaza Board of Management as outlined in its Declaration and Bylaws. How do these documents support the board’s authority to enter into contracts, and how does that authority intersect with the procedural requirements of state law?
5. Based on the judge’s decision, critique the actions and governance of the Sunset Plaza board. What were their key procedural mistakes, what was their stated reason for these errors, and what were the ultimate consequences of their violation of the open meeting law?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Velva Moses-Thompson, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a decision based on evidence and law.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248
An Arizona statute, also known as the open meeting law, which requires that meetings of a unit owners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. It outlines requirements for meeting notices, member participation, and exceptions for emergency meetings.
Bylaws
The rules and regulations adopted by an association to govern its internal management. In this case, Article XI requires the association to keep correct and complete books, records, and minutes.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the decision where the judge applies the relevant statutes and legal principles to the established facts of the case to reach a legal judgment.
Declaration
The legal document that creates a condominium or planned community. The Sunset Plaza Declaration grants the Board of Management the power to enter into contracts and manage the association’s affairs.
Emergency Meeting
A type of board meeting that can be called without the standard 48-hour notice to discuss business that cannot be delayed. Action at such a meeting is limited to emergency matters only.
Findings of Facts
The section of the decision that outlines the factual history of the dispute as determined by the judge based on testimony and evidence presented at the hearing.
The final, binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order declared Mr. Carr the prevailing party, required Sunset Plaza to refund his filing fee, and dismissed the other parts of his petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Petitioner was David B. Carr.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required in this civil administrative hearing. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
Prevailing Party
The party who wins the legal case or a significant issue within it. The judge declared Mr. Carr the prevailing party regarding the violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sunset Plaza Condo Association.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817003-REL
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18F-H1817003-REL
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This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision resulting from a hearing held on November 21, 2017, between Petitioner David B. Carr and the Respondent Sunset Plaza Condo Association. Mr. Carr brought a petition alleging that the Condo Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248) and its own bylaws by taking action without authorized board meetings and exhibiting financial discrepancies, specifically concerning reserve funds. The decision found that the Condo Association did violate the open meeting law when hiring Kinney and the Mulcahy law firms but was exempt from the open meeting requirement for the emergency meeting that resulted in hiring Osselaer Management Company. Ultimately, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the statutory violation and was awarded a filing fee of $500.00, though all other aspects of the petition were dismissed.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
David B. Carr(petitioner) Sunset Plaza Condo Association (member)
Respondent Side
Paige Marks(attorney) Sunset Plaza Condo Association Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Marilyn Gelroth(board member) Sunset Plaza Condo Association Testified at hearing
Beth Mulcahy(HOA attorney) Mulcahy Law Firm, PC Decision transmitted to her firm; firm hired by Respondent
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) ADRE
LDettorre(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
djones(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
ncano(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248 Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248 Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws
Outcome Summary
Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party only regarding the Respondent's violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248 (failure to provide notice for hiring Mulcahy and Kinney). Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. All other claims, including the alleged Bylaws violation and the violation related to hiring Osselaer, were dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the Bylaws violation. The HOA successfully argued that the hiring of Osselaer was conducted during a valid emergency board meeting, exempting it from open meeting notice requirements.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Open Meeting Law (Hiring Kinney and Mulcahy)
Sunset Plaza decided to hire Kinney Management and Mulcahy Law Firm at board meetings without informing its members of those meetings.
Orders: Respondent Sunset Plaza must pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
Violation of Open Meeting Law (Hiring Osselaer)
Petitioner alleged violation regarding the hiring of Osselaer Management Company, but the ALJ found the association was exempt because the decision was made at a valid emergency board meeting.
Orders: Petition dismissed in this respect.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
Failure to keep correct and complete books and records of account
Petitioner alleged Sunset Plaza failed to keep accurate financial records, pointing out discrepancies and an unexplained reserve deficit between 2015 and 2016 balance sheets.
Orders: Petition dismissed in all other respects.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws
Analytics Highlights
Topics: open meeting violation, emergency meeting, governing documents, financial records, condominium association
Additional Citations:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 41-2198.01
Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817003-REL Decision – 605735.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:59 (112.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817003-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Carr v. Sunset Plaza Condo Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in the case of David B. Carr versus the Sunset Plaza Condo Association (Case No. 18F-H1817003-REL). The central conflict involved a petition filed by Mr. Carr, a condominium owner, alleging that the Association’s Board of Management violated Arizona’s open meeting law and engaged in financial mismanagement.
The final ruling was a partial victory for the petitioner. The judge found that Sunset Plaza violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 by failing to provide members with proper notice of board meetings where decisions were made to hire Kinney Management Services and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The Association admitted to this failure, citing a misunderstanding of the law, and pledged future compliance. As the prevailing party on this specific issue, Mr. Carr was awarded reimbursement for his $500 filing fee.
However, the judge dismissed all of Mr. Carr’s other allegations. The claim that a meeting to hire Osselaer Management Company violated the open meeting law was rejected, as the judge deemed it a valid emergency meeting exempt from notice requirements. Furthermore, Mr. Carr’s claims of financial mismanagement and inaccurate record-keeping in violation of the Association’s bylaws were not substantiated. The judge accepted the Association’s defense that alleged financial discrepancies stemmed from a change in accounting practices by a new management company, not from an actual deficit. No civil penalty was imposed on the Association.
I. Case Overview
• Case Number: 18F-H1817003-REL
• Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona
• Petitioner: David B. Carr
• Respondent: Sunset Plaza Condo Association
• Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson
• Hearing Date: November 21, 2017
• Decision Date: November 22, 2017
• Core Dispute: A petition filed by a condo owner alleging the association’s board violated state statutes and its own bylaws concerning open meetings, financial record-keeping, and the execution of contracts.
II. Petitioner’s Allegations (David B. Carr)
On August 14, 2017, Mr. Carr filed a petition outlining two primary grievances against the Sunset Plaza Condo Association.
A. Violation of Open Meeting Law (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248)
Mr. Carr alleged that the Association’s Board of Management took official action without holding properly authorized and noticed board meetings. This resulted in unapproved contracts and expenditures.
Direct Quotation from Petition:
“SUNSET PLAZA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION BOARD OF MANAGEMENT TAKES ACTION WITHOUT HOLDING AUTHORIZED BOARD MEETING IN VIOLATION OF AZ STATUTE 33-1248. THESE UNAUTHORIZED MEETINGS HAVE RESULTED IN CONTRACTS WITH MANAGEMENT FIRMS AND ATTORNEYS. THESE CONTRACTS HAVE RESULTED IN EXPENSES NOT APPROVED OR REVIEWED BY CONDO OWNERS.”
• Specific Contracts Cited:
◦ Kinney Management (October 2016)
◦ Osselaer Real Estate (September 2016)
◦ Mulcahy Law Firm (May 2016)
• Requested Remedy: Cancellation of all contracts entered into without a properly called board meeting and personal repayment of all related expenditures by the signatory.
B. Violation of Bylaws and Financial Mismanagement (Article XI)
Mr. Carr contended that the Association violated Article XI of its bylaws, which requires it to “keep correct and complete books and records of account.” He identified specific financial discrepancies based on his analysis of the Association’s financial statements.
• Alleged Reserve Fund Discrepancy: Mr. Carr claimed an “unexplained reserve deficit of $10,295.09” based on the following figures, noting there were no reported reserve expenses in 2016.
Financial Statement Item
Amount
2015 Year-End Reserve Equity
$10,295.09
2016 Income Statement Reserve Deposit
$9,180.00
2016 Year-End Balance Sheet Reserve Total
$2,295.44
• Additional Discrepancies:
◦ The 2016 year-end balance sheet failed to identify prior and current year operating equity.
◦ An “expanded 2016 balance sheet” calculation revealed a discrepancy of $2,808.42.
• Requested Remedy: A formal audit of the 2016 and 2017 financial statements and improved future reporting to identify reserve balances and homeowner equity.
III. Respondent’s Defense (Sunset Plaza Condo Association)
The Association, represented by Paige Marks, Esq., and through the testimony of board member Marilyn Gelroth, presented a defense against both allegations.
A. Response to Open Meeting Allegations
• Admission: The Association conceded that it “did not provide notice of its board meetings when it decided to hire Kinney and the Mulcahy firm.”
• Justification: This failure was attributed to the board’s misunderstanding of the open meeting law. The Association represented to the judge that it would abide by the law in the future.
• Emergency Meeting Exemption: The Association argued that the decision to hire Osselaer Management was made at a valid emergency board meeting on September 21, 2016.
◦ Timeline of Events: Kinney Management Services retracted its offer to manage the property on September 15, 2016, after receiving notice of a complaint Mr. Carr had filed against them with the Attorney General’s Office.
◦ Urgency: This retraction created an urgent need for a new management company. Ms. Gelroth testified that the board “needed to move quickly because members needed to know where to send payments.” This situation, they argued, constituted an emergency under the law.
B. Response to Financial Allegations
• Flawed Comparison: The Association contended that Mr. Carr’s financial analysis was fundamentally flawed because he “erroneously compared Sunset Plaza’s 2015 year end balance statement to its 2016 income statement,” which are two different types of financial records.
• Change in Accounting Methods: The primary reason for the apparent discrepancies was a change in how financial data was categorized.
◦ The previous management company, Kolby, separated reserve amounts in its financial statements.
◦ The new management company, Osselaer, “does not separate reserve amounts” and is not required by law to do so. This difference in reporting style accounted for the changes Mr. Carr identified as a deficit.
IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, found Ms. Gelroth’s testimony credible and issued a split decision, upholding one of Mr. Carr’s claims while dismissing the other.
A. Finding on Financial Mismanagement Allegation
Conclusion: Petition Dismissed The judge ruled that Mr. Carr “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Sunset Plaza violated Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws.” The Association’s explanation regarding the different accounting methods used by Kolby and Osselaer, and the flawed comparison of financial documents, was accepted as a valid defense.
B. Finding on Open Meeting Law Allegations
Conclusion: Partial Violation Confirmed
• Hiring of Osselaer Management (No Violation): The judge concluded that Sunset Plaza did not violate Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 in this instance. The decision was made at a legitimate emergency board meeting, which exempts the board from the 48-hour notice requirement. The minutes of the meeting stated the reason for the emergency.
• Hiring of Kinney Management and Mulcahy Law Firm (Violation Confirmed): The judge found that Mr. Carr “established by preponderance of the evidence that Sunset Plaza violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-1248” when it decided to hire these two firms. The Association did not dispute that it failed to inform members of these board meetings, which was a key factor in the ruling.
C. Final Order
Based on the findings and conclusions of law, the judge issued the following order:
1. Prevailing Party: Petitioner David B. Carr is deemed the prevailing party solely with regard to the violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248.
2. Reimbursement: Sunset Plaza is ordered to pay Mr. Carr his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
3. Dismissal: All other aspects of Mr. Carr’s petition are dismissed.
4. Penalty: No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in the matter.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817003-REL
Study Guide: Carr v. Sunset Plaza Condo Association (No. 18F-H1817003-REL)
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of David B. Carr versus the Sunset Plaza Condo Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final judgment.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the source document.
1. What were the two primary allegations David B. Carr made against the Sunset Plaza Condo Association in his petition?
2. Identify the three specific contracts Mr. Carr claimed resulted from unauthorized board meetings.
3. Why did Kinney Management Services retract its offer to manage Sunset Plaza in September 2016?
4. What justification did Sunset Plaza provide for holding an emergency board meeting to hire Osselaer Management Company?
5. According to Sunset Plaza, why did Mr. Carr mistakenly believe there was a financial discrepancy in the association’s records?
6. Did the Sunset Plaza board admit to violating the open meeting law? If so, what was their explanation?
7. What authority do the association’s Declaration and Bylaws grant the Board of Management regarding contracts?
8. How does Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 define the requirements for an “emergency meeting” of a board of directors?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding Sunset Plaza’s hiring of the Osselaer Management Company?
10. What specific orders were issued against Sunset Plaza as a result of the judge’s decision?
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Answer Key
1. David B. Carr alleged that the Sunset Plaza Condo Association violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 by holding unauthorized board meetings to enter into contracts. He also alleged the association violated Article XI of its bylaws by failing to keep correct and complete books and records, citing an unexplained deficit in reserve accounts.
2. Mr. Carr’s petition identified contracts with Kinney Management (October 2016), Osselaer Real Estate (September 2016), and the Mulcahy Law Firm (May 2016). He argued these contracts were entered into without a properly called board meeting and resulted in unapproved expenses.
3. Kinney Management Services retracted its acceptance of Sunset Plaza’s offer after receiving a complaint that Mr. Carr had filed against Kinney with the Attorney General’s Office. This information was stated in a letter from Kinney to Sunset Plaza on September 15, 2016.
4. The board held an emergency meeting because after Kinney retracted its offer, they needed to move quickly to hire a new management company. Board member Marilyn Gelroth testified it was important to have a single company handle all affairs and that members needed to know where to send payments without delay.
5. Sunset Plaza contended that Mr. Carr erroneously compared two different types of financial records: the 2015 year-end balance sheet and the 2016 income statement. Furthermore, the association argued that the new management company, Osselaer, categorized financials differently than the previous company, Kolby, and did not separate out reserve amounts.
6. Yes, Sunset Plaza conceded that it did not provide notice to its members of the board meetings when it decided to hire Kinney Management and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The association contended that it did not understand the open meeting law at the time and represented to the Tribunal that it would abide by the law in the future.
7. The Declaration grants the Board the power to “enter into contracts” and generally have the powers of an apartment house manager. Article VII, section 11 of the Bylaws states the Board of Management “shall enter into contracts on behalf of the association.”
8. The statute allows an emergency meeting to be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the required forty-eight hours’ notice. At such a meeting, the board may only act on emergency matters, and the minutes must state the reason necessitating the emergency.
9. The judge concluded that Sunset Plaza did not violate Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 when it hired Osselaer. The decision was made at a legitimate emergency board meeting, which exempted the board from the standard open meeting notification requirements.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner, David Carr, be deemed the prevailing party regarding the violation of the open meeting law. It was further ordered that Sunset Plaza pay Mr. Carr his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days, and his petition was dismissed in all other respects.
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Suggested Essay Questions
1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it was applied in this case. How did David B. Carr meet this burden for his claim about the open meeting law but fail to meet it for his claim about financial mismanagement?
2. Discuss the legal requirements and exceptions for board meetings under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248. Use the board’s decisions to hire Kinney Management, the Mulcahy Law Firm, and Osselaer Management Company as distinct examples to illustrate the application of this law.
3. Evaluate Sunset Plaza’s defense regarding the financial discrepancies alleged by Mr. Carr. Why was this defense successful, and what does it reveal about the potential for confusion when an association changes management companies and accounting methods?
4. Examine the powers and duties of the Sunset Plaza Board of Management as outlined in its Declaration and Bylaws. How do these documents support the board’s authority to enter into contracts, and how does that authority intersect with the procedural requirements of state law?
5. Based on the judge’s decision, critique the actions and governance of the Sunset Plaza board. What were their key procedural mistakes, what was their stated reason for these errors, and what were the ultimate consequences of their violation of the open meeting law?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Velva Moses-Thompson, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a decision based on evidence and law.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248
An Arizona statute, also known as the open meeting law, which requires that meetings of a unit owners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. It outlines requirements for meeting notices, member participation, and exceptions for emergency meetings.
Bylaws
The rules and regulations adopted by an association to govern its internal management. In this case, Article XI requires the association to keep correct and complete books, records, and minutes.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the decision where the judge applies the relevant statutes and legal principles to the established facts of the case to reach a legal judgment.
Declaration
The legal document that creates a condominium or planned community. The Sunset Plaza Declaration grants the Board of Management the power to enter into contracts and manage the association’s affairs.
Emergency Meeting
A type of board meeting that can be called without the standard 48-hour notice to discuss business that cannot be delayed. Action at such a meeting is limited to emergency matters only.
Findings of Facts
The section of the decision that outlines the factual history of the dispute as determined by the judge based on testimony and evidence presented at the hearing.
The final, binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order declared Mr. Carr the prevailing party, required Sunset Plaza to refund his filing fee, and dismissed the other parts of his petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Petitioner was David B. Carr.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required in this civil administrative hearing. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
Prevailing Party
The party who wins the legal case or a significant issue within it. The judge declared Mr. Carr the prevailing party regarding the violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sunset Plaza Condo Association.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817003-REL
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18F-H1817003-REL
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This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision resulting from a hearing held on November 21, 2017, between Petitioner David B. Carr and the Respondent Sunset Plaza Condo Association. Mr. Carr brought a petition alleging that the Condo Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248) and its own bylaws by taking action without authorized board meetings and exhibiting financial discrepancies, specifically concerning reserve funds. The decision found that the Condo Association did violate the open meeting law when hiring Kinney and the Mulcahy law firms but was exempt from the open meeting requirement for the emergency meeting that resulted in hiring Osselaer Management Company. Ultimately, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the statutory violation and was awarded a filing fee of $500.00, though all other aspects of the petition were dismissed.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
David B. Carr(petitioner) Sunset Plaza Condo Association (member)
Respondent Side
Paige Marks(attorney) Sunset Plaza Condo Association Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Marilyn Gelroth(board member) Sunset Plaza Condo Association Testified at hearing
Beth Mulcahy(HOA attorney) Mulcahy Law Firm, PC Decision transmitted to her firm; firm hired by Respondent
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) ADRE
LDettorre(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
djones(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
ncano(ADRE staff) ADRE Received electronic transmission
The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to timely provide access to association records
The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.
Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:09 (79.9 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:12 (726.4 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:15 (95.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL
Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.
Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.
The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.
Case Timeline and Factual Background
The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.
February 6, 2017
William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.
February 14, 2017
Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.
Post-Feb. 6, 2017
Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
April 13, 2017
The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.
May 2, 2017
Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
May 3, 2017
The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
June 26, 2017
The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.
July 14, 2017
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.
July 24, 2017
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.
Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805
The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”
Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)
Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.
• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.
• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.
• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.
Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)
Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.
• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.
• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine
The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:
“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”
Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.
The Correct Interpretation of the Law
The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:
“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”
Final Conclusion
The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:
1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.
2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.
3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.
Final Order and Mandates
The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.
The key directives of the order were:
• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.
• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.
• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.
• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.
Study Guide – 17F-H1717032-REL
Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (No. 17F-H1717032-REL), heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the central conflict, the legal arguments, the statutory interpretations, and the final resolution of the dispute.
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Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.
1. What was the initial action taken by William M. Brown on February 6, 2017, and what was Terravita Country Club’s response?
2. On what legal grounds did Terravita justify its refusal to provide the requested records?
3. What was William M. Brown’s primary legal argument against Terravita’s position during the hearing?
4. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Terravita’s argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2), and why was it rejected?
5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?
6. What key fact regarding the “pending litigation” was central to the Judge’s final decision?
7. What was the final conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Terravita’s actions?
8. Identify the three specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Recommended Order.”
9. What state department adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a “Final Order”?
10. Besides complying with the records request and paying the filing fee, what specific penalty was explicitly not levied against Terravita?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown requested records from Terravita Country Club. On February 14, 2017, Terravita responded via email, refusing to disclose the records because they were allegedly part of pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
2. Terravita justified its refusal by citing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(B)(2). The club argued that this statute allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”
3. Mr. Brown’s primary argument was that Terravita had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide records within 10 business days. He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” in § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only when the association itself is a party to that litigation, which Terravita was not in his criminal case.
4. The Judge interpreted Terravita’s argument to mean that an association could deny any records request if the documents related to pending litigation between any two parties anywhere. This interpretation was rejected because it would lead to the “absurd result” of broadly denying access to records, which was not the statute’s intent.
5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard where the trier of fact must be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that Terravita violated the statute, while the Respondent (Terravita) bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses.
6. The central fact was that Terravita Country Club was not a party to the criminal case brought against Mr. Brown by the City of Scottsdale. Because the association was not a party, the judge ruled that the statutory exemption for withholding records related to pending litigation did not apply.
7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Brown had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his records request within the required 10 business days. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.
8. The Judge ordered that: (1) the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) be deemed the prevailing party; (2) Terravita must comply with the records request within 10 days of the Order; and (3) Terravita must pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within 30 days of the Order.
9. The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This action, dated July 24, 2017, made the decision a binding Final Order.
10. The Recommended Order, which was adopted as the Final Order, explicitly states that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal principles, and arguments presented in the source documents.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) presented by William M. Brown and Terravita Country Club. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to resolve this dispute, including the principle of avoiding “absurd results.”
2. Describe the complete timeline of the case, from the initial records request to the issuance of the Final Order. For each key date, explain the event’s significance to the progression and outcome of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how this standard was applied to both the Petitioner’s claim and the Respondent’s affirmative defense and why the Judge ultimately found that the Petitioner had met this burden.
4. Examine the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in resolving disputes within planned communities, as demonstrated by this case. How does the process flow from an initial petition to a binding order?
5. Based on the Judge’s decision, formulate an argument about the balance between a homeowner’s right to access association records and an association’s right to protect its interests in legal matters. How does A.R.S. § 33-1805 attempt to strike this balance, and how did the ruling in this case clarify its limits?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ.
Affirmative Defense
A set of facts or legal arguments raised by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. Terravita’s claim that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) exempted them was their affirmative defense.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that requires a planned community association to make financial and other records available for member examination within 10 business days.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that allows an association to withhold books and records from disclosure if the portion withheld relates to “pending litigation.”
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
The Arizona statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of statutes or community documents.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. The Petitioner bore the burden to prove the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden to establish its defense.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that received the Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown and ultimately adopted the ALJ’s decision, making it final.
Final Order
The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which adopted the ALJ’s Recommended Order. This order is an administrative action and is effective immediately upon service.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct hearings on disputes, such as the one between Mr. Brown and Terravita.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or hearing by filing a petition. In this case, William M. Brown was the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Prevailing Party
The party who is successful in a legal case. The Final Order deemed William M. Brown the prevailing party.
Recommended Order
The initial decision and orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. This decision is then sent to the relevant state agency (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for adoption.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc. was the Respondent.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717032-REL
Your HOA Can’t Use “Pending Litigation” to Hide Records. This Homeowner Proved It.
Introduction: The Wall of Secrecy
For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like confronting an organization that operates with total authority and little transparency. Board decisions can seem arbitrary, and getting straight answers or access to official documents can be a frustrating, uphill battle. But what happens when an HOA flatly denies a simple request for records, citing a vague legal reason?
One homeowner decided to find out. The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a fascinating look at how a single individual challenged his HOA’s interpretation of state law. In doing so, he not only won access to the records he sought but also revealed a crucial limit on an HOA’s power to operate in secret.
The Takeaways: Four Lessons from a Landmark HOA Dispute
This case offers several powerful and practical lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt stonewalled by their association’s board.
Takeaway 1: “Pending Litigation” Isn’t a Blank Check to Deny Records
At the heart of the dispute was a simple request. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown asked his HOA, Terravita, for access to association records. The HOA denied the request, citing an exemption in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)) that allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”
Terravita’s argument was that this exemption applied because of a pending criminal case against Mr. Brown. Crucially, they argued this was not just any unrelated case; the criminal charges stemmed from allegations that Mr. Brown had threatened the HOA’s board members and property. From their perspective, the records request was directly linked to a hostile legal situation involving the association’s leadership. However, the critical fact remained that the HOA itself was not a formal party to the criminal case.
The judge’s ruling was definitive and clear: the “pending litigation” exemption can only be used to withhold records if the litigation is between the association and the member. Because Terravita was not a party to Mr. Brown’s criminal case, it had no legal grounds to use that case as an excuse to withhold its records from him. This ruling draws a bright line: The “pending litigation” shield cannot be borrowed from a separate case, even one that feels highly relevant to the HOA.
Takeaway 2: Legal Interpretations Must Be Sensible, Not Absurd
The HOA argued for a literal interpretation of the law, claiming the statute didn’t explicitly state that the association had to be a party to the litigation. Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson rejected this line of reasoning, stating that it would lead to an “absurd result.”
This is a critical lesson for homeowners. Judges are tasked with ensuring laws are applied sensibly. When an HOA’s interpretation of a rule would create an illogical or unfair outcome, it is vulnerable to legal challenge. The judge highlighted the flaw in the HOA’s logic with a powerful statement in her decision:
Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.
Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge Their HOA
Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who argued it. The court documents show that while the HOA was represented by legal counsel (“Joshua Bolen, Esq. appeared on behalf of Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.”), Mr. Brown represented himself (“Petitioner William M. Brown appeared on behalf of himself”).
Despite being outmatched on paper, Mr. Brown successfully researched the law, presented a logical argument, and held his ground. His victory demonstrates that the legal process is not just for lawyers. A well-researched, logical argument from a homeowner can be more powerful than a law firm’s flawed interpretation of a statute. The judge ultimately found that “Mr. Brown established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within 10 business days.”
Takeaway 4: Misapplying the Law Can Have Financial Consequences
This wasn’t just a moral victory. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017, came with tangible consequences for the HOA. For its failure to correctly apply the law, Terravita faced direct and tangible consequences.
• The HOA was ordered to provide the requested records within 10 days.
• The homeowner, Mr. Brown, was deemed the “prevailing party.”
• The HOA, Terravita, was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.
This outcome underscores a critical point: when an HOA oversteps its authority or misinterprets the law, it can be held financially responsible for the costs incurred by the homeowner forced to challenge its actions.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power
The story of William M. Brown’s dispute with his HOA serves as a powerful reminder that HOAs do not have unlimited power. They are governed by specific state laws, and understanding those laws is the most effective tool a homeowner possesses.
The central lesson is that an HOA’s authority is not absolute, and its interpretation of its own rules—and, more importantly, state law—must be reasonable and sensible. This case affirms the right of members to transparency and proves that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully stand up for those rights.
After seeing how one homeowner held his board accountable, will you take the time to learn your rights before you need them?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William M. Brown(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of himself
The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to timely provide access to association records
The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.
Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:52 (79.9 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (726.4 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (95.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL
Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.
Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.
The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.
Case Timeline and Factual Background
The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.
February 6, 2017
William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.
February 14, 2017
Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.
Post-Feb. 6, 2017
Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
April 13, 2017
The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.
May 2, 2017
Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
May 3, 2017
The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
June 26, 2017
The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.
July 14, 2017
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.
July 24, 2017
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.
Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805
The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”
Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)
Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.
• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.
• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.
• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.
Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)
Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.
• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.
• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine
The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:
“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”
Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.
The Correct Interpretation of the Law
The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:
“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”
Final Conclusion
The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:
1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.
2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.
3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.
Final Order and Mandates
The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.
The key directives of the order were:
• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.
• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.
• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.
• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.
The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to timely provide access to association records
The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.
Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:05 (79.9 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:05 (726.4 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:06 (95.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL
Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.
Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.
The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.
Case Timeline and Factual Background
The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.
February 6, 2017
William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.
February 14, 2017
Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.
Post-Feb. 6, 2017
Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
April 13, 2017
The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.
May 2, 2017
Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
May 3, 2017
The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
June 26, 2017
The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.
July 14, 2017
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.
July 24, 2017
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.
Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805
The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”
Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)
Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.
• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.
• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.
• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.
Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)
Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.
• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.
• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine
The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:
“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”
Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.
The Correct Interpretation of the Law
The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:
“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”
Final Conclusion
The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:
1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.
2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.
3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.
Final Order and Mandates
The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.
The key directives of the order were:
• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.
• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.
• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.
• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.
