Tag Archives: Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:27 (149.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918037-REL


Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The central issue was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to adequately fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner on November 1, 2018.

The initial hearing on March 21, 2019, resulted in an April 10, 2019, decision in favor of the Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board, and thus the Association’s partial response (a summary table) did not constitute a statutory violation.

Following a successful appeal by the Petitioner, a rehearing was held on August 27, 2019. New evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner had followed prior express instructions from the Association regarding who to contact for records requests. Consequently, the ALJ issued a new decision on September 12, 2019, reversing the original order. The final ruling found the Association in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and was assessed a civil penalty of $500.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)
No. 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

Petitioner

Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, Scottsdale, Arizona.

Central Issue

Whether the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request for Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions, requests, and approvals.

Initial Petition

Filed by Tom Barrs on December 17, 2018.

Initial Hearing

March 21, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Rehearing

August 27, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Final Outcome

Petition granted in favor of Tom Barrs. The Association was found in violation of state law, ordered to reimburse the filing fee, and fined.

Key Individuals and Entities

Role / Affiliation

Tom Barrs

Petitioner; homeowner in the Desert Ranch subdivision.

Desert Ranch HOA

Respondent; homeowners’ association.

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Brian Schoeffler

Chairman of the Association’s Environmental Design Committee (EDC); appeared on behalf of the Association.

Catherine Overby

President of the Association’s Board of Directors.

Lori Loch-Lee

Vice President of Client Services at Associated Asset Management (AAM), the Association’s accounting/management company.

Jonathan Dessaules, Esq.

Attorney who appeared on behalf of the Petitioner at the rehearing.

The Records Request and Subsequent Dispute

The Initial Request

On November 1, 2018, at 9:40 p.m., Petitioner submitted an electronic records request to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee. The text of the request was as follows:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

The Association’s Response and Petitioner’s Follow-Up

• November 2, 2018: Lori Loch-Lee from AAM notified the Petitioner she would forward his request to all Board members, noting that AAM was only the Association’s accounting firm.

• November 18, 2018: The Petitioner received a summary table listing some EDC actions, not the complete set of communications and documents requested. At this time, he was advised by Brian Schoeffler that he “needed to copy all Board members on records requests.”

• March 6, 2019: The Petitioner sent a follow-up email, accusing the Association of willful failure and clarifying the specific records he sought beyond the summary table, including “copies of the communications (letters, emails, and application forms) relating to Environmental Design Review (EDC) submissions, requests, complaints and approvals (or denials).”

• March 11, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler replied, arguing that the request had been complied with on November 18, 2018, and directed the Petitioner to “submit a new request” for the additional information.

• March 17, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler reiterated that the original request was only sent to two of four Board members and stated that providing additional documents could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

As of the rehearing date (August 27, 2019), the Petitioner had still not received all the documentation requested on November 1, 2018.

Legal Proceedings and Rulings

Initial Hearing and Decision (April 10, 2019)

In the first hearing, the dispute centered on the validity of the request submission and the adequacy of the Association’s response.

Arguments:

• Petitioner (Barrs): Argued the Association acted in bad faith and willfully failed to fulfill the request, noting a similar dispute had been previously adjudicated. He was concerned with the completeness of the response, not its timeliness.

• Respondent (HOA): Argued it had complied with the request by providing a summary table, consistent with its handling of a previous dispute with the Petitioner. Mr. Schoeffler testified that the response was untimely (provided on the 11th business day) but asserted it was otherwise sufficient.

ALJ Conclusion: The Judge ruled in favor of the Association, denying the Petitioner’s petition. The key finding was that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request.

“Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 for providing him with a summary table on November 18, 2018.”

The decision also noted that the statute does not legally obligate an HOA to email copies of records.

Rehearing and Final Decision (September 12, 2019)

After the Petitioner’s appeal was granted, a rehearing introduced new evidence that fundamentally changed the outcome.

New Evidence and Concessions:

• July 19, 2017 Instruction: Evidence showed Association President Catherine Overby had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s “primary records request contact.”

• July 18, 2018 Instruction: Evidence showed Ms. Overby had also instructed the Petitioner to direct requests to the management company, AAM.

• Association Concessions: The Respondent conceded that its governing documents do not require all Board members to be copied on records requests and that its own bylaws regarding submission forms are not adhered to or enforced.

ALJ’s Reversed Conclusion: The Judge reversed the prior decision and granted the Petitioner’s petition. The new evidence proved the Petitioner had followed express instructions from the Association.

“Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

The Judge concluded that the partial response was a clear violation of the law.

“Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order and Penalties

The Administrative Law Judge’s Final Order on September 12, 2019, which is binding on the parties, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent (Desert Ranch HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.


Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel —
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.

The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.

The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

• Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)

◦ Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)

• Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: December 4, 2018

• Decision Date: December 20, 2018

The Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.

The Respondent’s Position

The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

2. Relevant CC&R Provisions

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.

Section

Title / Subject

Description

10.11.4

Inoperable Vehicles

Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”

10.11.2

Street Parking

Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.

Nuisances

Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline

Violation Notices and Fines

Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.

The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:

• September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.

• October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.

• December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.

• January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.

• April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.

Competing Testimonies

• Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.

• Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:

◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.

◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.

◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”

4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof

The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Judge’s Rationale

The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.

2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).






Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL


Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?

2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?

3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?

4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?

5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?

6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.

7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?

8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.

2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.

4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.

5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.

6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.

7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.

8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.

9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.

3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?

4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.

5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.

Appearances

A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.

The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.

Community Manager

An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Nuisance

A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.

Operating Condition

A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL



🏛️

19F-H18020-REL

1 source

The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry R. Collis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
  • Lisa Riesland (community manager)
    Laveen Meadows HOA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • f del sol (admin support)
    Signed copy distribution notice

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel —
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:31 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.

The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.

The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.

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1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

• Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)

◦ Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)

• Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: December 4, 2018

• Decision Date: December 20, 2018

The Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.

The Respondent’s Position

The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

2. Relevant CC&R Provisions

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.

Section

Title / Subject

Description

10.11.4

Inoperable Vehicles

Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”

10.11.2

Street Parking

Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.

Nuisances

Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline

Violation Notices and Fines

Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.

The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:

• September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.

• October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.

• December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.

• January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.

• April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.

Competing Testimonies

• Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.

• Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:

◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.

◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.

◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”

4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof

The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Judge’s Rationale

The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.

2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).






Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL


Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?

2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?

3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?

4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?

5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?

6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.

7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?

8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.

2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.

4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.

5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.

6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.

7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.

8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.

9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.

3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?

4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.

5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.

Appearances

A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.

The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.

Community Manager

An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Nuisance

A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.

Operating Condition

A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL



🏛️

19F-H18020-REL

1 source

The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry R. Collis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
  • Lisa Riesland (community manager)
    Laveen Meadows HOA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • f del sol (admin support)
    Signed copy distribution notice

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome total
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:50 (142.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818042-REL


Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

• Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

• Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

• Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

• Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

• Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

• Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818042-REL


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818042-REL, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action by the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA) prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. What were the allegations made against candidates Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell prior to the March 20, 2018 election?

4. State the vote counts for the top three candidates who were elected to the Board of Directors on March 20, 2018.

5. What was the reason given by the Board’s president, Lance Van Horne, for calling a special recall election for April 24, 2018?

6. What were the specific outcomes for each of the three board members facing recall in the April 24, 2018 election?

7. Which two Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) were at the center of the legal dispute, and what general topics do they cover?

8. What was the HOA’s primary legal argument for why its president was permitted to call the special recall meeting?

9. What legal principle of statutory construction did the Administrative Law Judge use to resolve the conflict between the two statutes?

10. What two things was the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, ordered to do in the final ruling?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, the Petitioner, who is a homeowner and member of the association, and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner initiated the legal action against the HOA.

2. The Petitioner filed the complaint because the HOA’s president called a special meeting to hold a vote on recalling three recently elected members of the Board of Directors. The Petitioner alleged this action violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition signed by homeowners.

3. Prior to the March election, reports were made that Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell were going door-to-door disseminating allegedly false information about the HOA’s finances. They were also accused of “harvesting ballots” from members based on this information.

4. The top three candidates elected on March 20, 2018, were Roxanne Gould with 30 votes, Steve Brownell with 26 votes, and Trish Brownell with 25 votes.

5. Board president Lance Van Horne called the special recall election because he felt the election’s outcome was compromised. He believed the dissemination of allegedly false information and the harvesting of votes by the Brownells and Ms. Gould had tainted the results.

6. In the April 24 recall election, Roxanne Gould survived the recall with 27 votes against to 25 for. Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell were both removed from the board, with 27 votes for their recall and 25 against.

7. The statutes at the center of the dispute were A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically covers the “Removal of board member; special meeting,” while A.R.S. § 33-1804 is a more general statute concerning “Open meetings.”

8. The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the only procedure for calling a recall meeting. It contended that the procedures in the more general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which allows the president to call a special meeting, could also be used.

9. The judge applied the well-established common law principle that when a general statute and a specific statute on the same subject are in conflict, the specific statute controls. Therefore, the specific procedures for recall in A.R.S. § 33-1813 took precedence over the general meeting rules in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the removed board members, Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell. The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

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Essay Questions

1. Trace the complete timeline of events described in the decision, beginning with the failed meeting on February 20, 2018, and concluding with the judge’s final order. For each key date, describe the event that occurred, the people involved, and the outcome of the event.

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of Arizona state law presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Explain which specific clauses of A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 each party relied upon to justify their position regarding the legality of the April 24, 2018 recall meeting.

3. The decision states that the case presents a “pure legal issue of statutory interpretation.” Explain what this means and how it affects the burden of proof. Describe in detail the canons of statutory construction cited by the judge and how she applied them to rule in favor of the Petitioner.

4. Discuss the role of the allegations of misconduct (disseminating false information and harvesting ballots) against the newly elected board members. How did these allegations act as a catalyst for the recall election, and what was their ultimate relevance (or lack thereof) to the final legal conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge?

5. Based on the judge’s “Conclusions of Law,” explain the definitive legal procedure for an HOA in Arizona, with 1,000 or fewer members, to initiate the removal of a board member. Detail the petition requirements, signature thresholds, and meeting notice timelines as established by the controlling statute, A.R.S. § 33-1813.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the homeowners’ association, elected by the members.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation.

De Novo Review

A type of review where a court or judge decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the previous party in the case. This was applied because the issue was a pure matter of statutory interpretation.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Standard

The level of proof required to convince the trier of fact. In this case, the standard was a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that governs the Carter Ranch development, of which all lot owners are members.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, it was homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is more probably true than not.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at a meeting for the proceedings of that meeting to be valid. In the March 20 election, the quorum was 47 homeowners.

Recall Election

A special vote held to determine whether to remove an elected official (in this case, board members) from office before the end of their term.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of an association’s members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled annual meetings. The April 24 recall vote was a special meeting.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used common-law canons of statutory construction to resolve the conflict between the two A.R.S. sections.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818042-REL


Majority Rules? Not in This HOA: How One Homeowner Overturned a Recall Election on a Technicality

The Unruly World of Neighborhood Politics

In the world of Homeowners Associations, a majority vote is typically the final word. But for the Carter Ranch HOA, a 27-to-25 recall vote meant to oust two board members became the start of a legal battle, not the end. This case reveals a crucial lesson in community governance: when a board president’s unilateral action clashes with statutory procedure, the will of the majority can be rendered completely irrelevant.

A Democratic Vote Can Be Completely Ignored

On April 24, 2018, the Carter Ranch HOA held a special recall election targeting three recently elected board members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell. A quorum of 52 homeowners participated, and the vote was a split decision. Roxanne Gould survived the recall attempt, with 27 votes against her removal and 25 for it. However, Steve and Trish Brownell were successfully voted off the board by a clear majority of 27 to 25.

The twist came later, in a judge’s chambers. Despite the democratic outcome, an Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reinstate the Brownells. This counter-intuitive decision wasn’t the result of voter fraud or a miscount. The entire election was nullified because of a critical procedural error made by the HOA president before a single ballot was cast.

An HOA President Can’t Unilaterally Oust Board Members

The conflict began after a heated board election on March 20, 2018. The board president at the time, Lance Van Horne, felt the election’s outcome was “compromised.” He believed three newly elected members had won their seats by disseminating “allegedly false information” and “harvesting of votes.”

In response, Mr. Van Horne took decisive action. Believing he was correcting a wrong, he personally called for a special meeting to hold a recall election. This unilateral action became the sole basis for the legal challenge that followed. While the president’s concerns about election integrity were the catalyst for the drama, the court’s subsequent decision would demonstrate that his motives were entirely irrelevant. The only thing that mattered was the procedure he followed—or in this case, failed to follow.

The “Specific Beats General” Rule Is King

The HOA’s legal defense rested on a general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which grants an association’s president the power to call special meetings for various purposes. They argued this general power included the authority to call a recall meeting.

However, the homeowner who challenged the recall pointed to a different, more specific law. A.R.S. § 33-1813 is a statute written exclusively for the purpose of removing board members. This specific law dictates that a recall process can only be initiated upon receipt of a petition signed by a required number of homeowners. The president cannot simply decide to do it alone.

The judge’s decision hinged on a foundational principle of legal interpretation. As cited in the final order:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Because the HOA president initiated the recall without first receiving the required petition from the homeowners, he failed to follow the specific procedure mandated by law. As a result, the entire recall election was declared invalid from the start.

One Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge an Entire HOA

This entire case was set in motion not by a group of disgruntled residents, but by a single individual. Homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a “single-issue petition” with the state, challenging the validity of the president’s action. His understanding of the specific rules governing board member removal proved to be the key that unraveled the HOA’s actions.

The final court order was a complete victory for the petitioner:

• His petition was granted.

• The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members, Steve and Trish Brownell.

• The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the petitioner for his $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome serves as an empowering example of how a single member, armed with knowledge of the governing documents and statutes, can hold an association’s leadership accountable and ensure that proper procedures are followed.

Conclusion: Rules, Not Rulers

The Carter Ranch case is a powerful illustration that in community governance, established process is not a technicality—it is the bedrock of legitimacy. The board’s failure to adhere to the specific statute for recalls (A.R.S. § 33-1813) created a fatal procedural flaw that no amount of good intention or majority support could cure. This serves as a stark reminder for all HOA boards: power is derived from the meticulous application of rules, not the perceived authority of rulers. Ignoring this principle doesn’t just invalidate an action; it exposes the association to legal challenges, financial penalties, and a loss of credibility with the community it governs. Do you know the specific rules that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Chad M. Gallacher (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Represented Respondent
  • Mary Chaira (Community Manager)
    Witness for Respondent
  • Lance Van Horne (Board President)
    Called the special recall election which led to the petition,,

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received decision
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Roxanne Gould (board member)
    Elected board member; subject of recall attempt,,
  • Steve Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Trish Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Steve F. (candidate)
    Candidate in board election
  • Dave (candidate)
    Candidate in board election

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome total
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:07 (142.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818042-REL


Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

• Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

• Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

• Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

• Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

• Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

• Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818042-REL


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818042-REL, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action by the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA) prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. What were the allegations made against candidates Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell prior to the March 20, 2018 election?

4. State the vote counts for the top three candidates who were elected to the Board of Directors on March 20, 2018.

5. What was the reason given by the Board’s president, Lance Van Horne, for calling a special recall election for April 24, 2018?

6. What were the specific outcomes for each of the three board members facing recall in the April 24, 2018 election?

7. Which two Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) were at the center of the legal dispute, and what general topics do they cover?

8. What was the HOA’s primary legal argument for why its president was permitted to call the special recall meeting?

9. What legal principle of statutory construction did the Administrative Law Judge use to resolve the conflict between the two statutes?

10. What two things was the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, ordered to do in the final ruling?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, the Petitioner, who is a homeowner and member of the association, and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner initiated the legal action against the HOA.

2. The Petitioner filed the complaint because the HOA’s president called a special meeting to hold a vote on recalling three recently elected members of the Board of Directors. The Petitioner alleged this action violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition signed by homeowners.

3. Prior to the March election, reports were made that Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell were going door-to-door disseminating allegedly false information about the HOA’s finances. They were also accused of “harvesting ballots” from members based on this information.

4. The top three candidates elected on March 20, 2018, were Roxanne Gould with 30 votes, Steve Brownell with 26 votes, and Trish Brownell with 25 votes.

5. Board president Lance Van Horne called the special recall election because he felt the election’s outcome was compromised. He believed the dissemination of allegedly false information and the harvesting of votes by the Brownells and Ms. Gould had tainted the results.

6. In the April 24 recall election, Roxanne Gould survived the recall with 27 votes against to 25 for. Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell were both removed from the board, with 27 votes for their recall and 25 against.

7. The statutes at the center of the dispute were A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically covers the “Removal of board member; special meeting,” while A.R.S. § 33-1804 is a more general statute concerning “Open meetings.”

8. The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the only procedure for calling a recall meeting. It contended that the procedures in the more general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which allows the president to call a special meeting, could also be used.

9. The judge applied the well-established common law principle that when a general statute and a specific statute on the same subject are in conflict, the specific statute controls. Therefore, the specific procedures for recall in A.R.S. § 33-1813 took precedence over the general meeting rules in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the removed board members, Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell. The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Trace the complete timeline of events described in the decision, beginning with the failed meeting on February 20, 2018, and concluding with the judge’s final order. For each key date, describe the event that occurred, the people involved, and the outcome of the event.

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of Arizona state law presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Explain which specific clauses of A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 each party relied upon to justify their position regarding the legality of the April 24, 2018 recall meeting.

3. The decision states that the case presents a “pure legal issue of statutory interpretation.” Explain what this means and how it affects the burden of proof. Describe in detail the canons of statutory construction cited by the judge and how she applied them to rule in favor of the Petitioner.

4. Discuss the role of the allegations of misconduct (disseminating false information and harvesting ballots) against the newly elected board members. How did these allegations act as a catalyst for the recall election, and what was their ultimate relevance (or lack thereof) to the final legal conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge?

5. Based on the judge’s “Conclusions of Law,” explain the definitive legal procedure for an HOA in Arizona, with 1,000 or fewer members, to initiate the removal of a board member. Detail the petition requirements, signature thresholds, and meeting notice timelines as established by the controlling statute, A.R.S. § 33-1813.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the homeowners’ association, elected by the members.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation.

De Novo Review

A type of review where a court or judge decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the previous party in the case. This was applied because the issue was a pure matter of statutory interpretation.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Standard

The level of proof required to convince the trier of fact. In this case, the standard was a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that governs the Carter Ranch development, of which all lot owners are members.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, it was homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is more probably true than not.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at a meeting for the proceedings of that meeting to be valid. In the March 20 election, the quorum was 47 homeowners.

Recall Election

A special vote held to determine whether to remove an elected official (in this case, board members) from office before the end of their term.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of an association’s members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled annual meetings. The April 24 recall vote was a special meeting.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used common-law canons of statutory construction to resolve the conflict between the two A.R.S. sections.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818042-REL


Majority Rules? Not in This HOA: How One Homeowner Overturned a Recall Election on a Technicality

The Unruly World of Neighborhood Politics

In the world of Homeowners Associations, a majority vote is typically the final word. But for the Carter Ranch HOA, a 27-to-25 recall vote meant to oust two board members became the start of a legal battle, not the end. This case reveals a crucial lesson in community governance: when a board president’s unilateral action clashes with statutory procedure, the will of the majority can be rendered completely irrelevant.

A Democratic Vote Can Be Completely Ignored

On April 24, 2018, the Carter Ranch HOA held a special recall election targeting three recently elected board members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell. A quorum of 52 homeowners participated, and the vote was a split decision. Roxanne Gould survived the recall attempt, with 27 votes against her removal and 25 for it. However, Steve and Trish Brownell were successfully voted off the board by a clear majority of 27 to 25.

The twist came later, in a judge’s chambers. Despite the democratic outcome, an Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reinstate the Brownells. This counter-intuitive decision wasn’t the result of voter fraud or a miscount. The entire election was nullified because of a critical procedural error made by the HOA president before a single ballot was cast.

An HOA President Can’t Unilaterally Oust Board Members

The conflict began after a heated board election on March 20, 2018. The board president at the time, Lance Van Horne, felt the election’s outcome was “compromised.” He believed three newly elected members had won their seats by disseminating “allegedly false information” and “harvesting of votes.”

In response, Mr. Van Horne took decisive action. Believing he was correcting a wrong, he personally called for a special meeting to hold a recall election. This unilateral action became the sole basis for the legal challenge that followed. While the president’s concerns about election integrity were the catalyst for the drama, the court’s subsequent decision would demonstrate that his motives were entirely irrelevant. The only thing that mattered was the procedure he followed—or in this case, failed to follow.

The “Specific Beats General” Rule Is King

The HOA’s legal defense rested on a general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which grants an association’s president the power to call special meetings for various purposes. They argued this general power included the authority to call a recall meeting.

However, the homeowner who challenged the recall pointed to a different, more specific law. A.R.S. § 33-1813 is a statute written exclusively for the purpose of removing board members. This specific law dictates that a recall process can only be initiated upon receipt of a petition signed by a required number of homeowners. The president cannot simply decide to do it alone.

The judge’s decision hinged on a foundational principle of legal interpretation. As cited in the final order:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Because the HOA president initiated the recall without first receiving the required petition from the homeowners, he failed to follow the specific procedure mandated by law. As a result, the entire recall election was declared invalid from the start.

One Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge an Entire HOA

This entire case was set in motion not by a group of disgruntled residents, but by a single individual. Homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a “single-issue petition” with the state, challenging the validity of the president’s action. His understanding of the specific rules governing board member removal proved to be the key that unraveled the HOA’s actions.

The final court order was a complete victory for the petitioner:

• His petition was granted.

• The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members, Steve and Trish Brownell.

• The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the petitioner for his $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome serves as an empowering example of how a single member, armed with knowledge of the governing documents and statutes, can hold an association’s leadership accountable and ensure that proper procedures are followed.

Conclusion: Rules, Not Rulers

The Carter Ranch case is a powerful illustration that in community governance, established process is not a technicality—it is the bedrock of legitimacy. The board’s failure to adhere to the specific statute for recalls (A.R.S. § 33-1813) created a fatal procedural flaw that no amount of good intention or majority support could cure. This serves as a stark reminder for all HOA boards: power is derived from the meticulous application of rules, not the perceived authority of rulers. Ignoring this principle doesn’t just invalidate an action; it exposes the association to legal challenges, financial penalties, and a loss of credibility with the community it governs. Do you know the specific rules that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Chad M. Gallacher (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Represented Respondent
  • Mary Chaira (Community Manager)
    Witness for Respondent
  • Lance Van Horne (Board President)
    Called the special recall election which led to the petition,,

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received decision
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Roxanne Gould (board member)
    Elected board member; subject of recall attempt,,
  • Steve Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Trish Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Steve F. (candidate)
    Candidate in board election
  • Dave (candidate)
    Candidate in board election

Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel —
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:26 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:26 (959.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717026-REL


Briefing Document: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between homeowner Tom Pyron (“Petitioner”) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board of Directors position was open for election in 2017, whereas the Petitioner contended two positions should have been open.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the association’s bylaws, specifically Article III, § 3.02, which governs the staggered terms of office for the three-member board. The ALJ found that a board member’s personal understanding of their term length could not amend the plain language of the bylaws. Based on the bylaw’s schedule for staggered terms, the judge concluded that a pivotal 2015 election could only have filled a one-year and a three-year term, which sequentially led to only one position being open in 2017. The Petitioner’s petition was denied, and this decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Tom Pyron, a condominium owner and member of the Respondent association.

◦ Respondent: Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc., represented by B. Austin Baillio, Esq., of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

• Case Numbers: 17F-H1717026-REL; HO 17-17/026

• Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Final Order By: Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: June 12, 2017.

• Final Order Date: July 12, 2017.

The case was initiated when Tom Pyron filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 16, 2017, alleging a violation of the homeowners’ association’s bylaws concerning the 2017 Board of Directors election.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner’s claim centered on the belief that the Respondent improperly noticed the number of available Board positions for the 2017 election.

• Core Allegation: The Respondent violated its Bylaws (Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06) by informing members that only one Board position for a one-year term was available for the 2017 election.

• Petitioner’s Contention: Two positions—one for a one-year term and one for a two-year term—should have been up for election in 2017.

• Basis of Argument: The Petitioner’s argument was built upon the 2015 election of Barbara Ahlstrand. He contended, supported by Ahlstrand’s testimony, that she was elected to a two-year term. Following this logic:

1. Ahlstrand’s term would run from 2015 to 2017.

2. When she resigned in August 2015, her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was appointed to serve the remainder of that two-year term, which would expire in 2017.

3. Therefore, Jeff Oursland should not have been on the ballot for the 2016 election, and his two-year position should have been one of the two seats open for election in 2017.

III. Respondent’s Position and Pre-Hearing Actions

The Respondent denied any violation of its bylaws and maintained that its actions were consistent with the governing documents.

• Pre-Hearing Resolution Attempts: In response to the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued election ballots. The Respondent also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution, an offer the Petitioner did not accept.

• Core Defense: The Respondent’s position was based on a direct interpretation of Bylaw § 3.02, which dictates the schedule of staggered terms.

• Basis of Argument: The Respondent argued that according to the bylaw’s prescribed cycle, only the one-year and three-year positions were up for election in 2015.

1. As it was agreed that Sandra Singer received the most votes and was elected to the three-year term, Barbara Ahlstrand must have been elected to the available one-year term.

2. Therefore, Ahlstrand’s term was set to expire in 2016.

3. Her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was correctly appointed to serve only until the 2016 election.

4. Consequently, Oursland was properly elected to a new two-year term in 2016 (expiring in 2018), and the only seat open in 2017 was the one-year term completed by Steve Molever.

IV. Chronology of Board Elections and Appointments

The dispute originated from differing interpretations of election outcomes from 2014 onward. The Board of Directors has consistently been comprised of three members.

Election Year

Agreed Facts & Election Results

Petitioner’s Interpretation/Contention

Respondent’s Interpretation/Position

Anne Fugate elected to a 3-year term.
John Haunschild elected to a 2-year term.
Ron Cadaret elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Ron Cadaret re-elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Minutes state “the election of Sandra Singer was unanimously passed by acclamation.”

Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term. No other officers were elected.

Based on bylaw § 3.02 and the 2015 Board composition, John Haunschild must have been re-elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2016), and Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term (expiring 2015).

Sandra Singer and Barbara Ahlstrand were elected. Singer received the most votes and was elected to a 3-year term. Ahlstrand resigned 8/3/2015.

Ahlstrand believed she was elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2017).

Per bylaw § 3.02, only the 1-year and 3-year terms were open. Since Singer got the 3-year term, Ahlstrand must have been elected to the 1-year term (expiring 2016).

Appointment

The Board appointed Jeff Oursland to serve the remainder of Ahlstrand’s term.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2017.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2016.

Jeff Oursland was elected to a 2-year term.
Steve Molever was elected to a 1-year term.

Oursland should not have been on the ballot, as his term was not set to expire until 2017.

Oursland’s appointed term expired, so he was properly elected to a new 2-year term (expiring 2018).

No election had been held due to the pending petition.

Two positions should be open for election: the 2-year term (Ahlstrand/Oursland’s) and the 1-year term (Molever’s).

Only one position is open for election: the 1-year term completed by Molever.

V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the legal standard of “a preponderance of the evidence” and a strict textual interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation.

• Primacy of Bylaw Language: The judge’s central legal conclusion was that the bylaws must be interpreted based on their plain meaning. Key quotes from the decision include:

• Key Legal Finding: The pivotal determination concerned the 2015 election. The ALJ found that under the “plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015.”

◦ Because the parties agreed that Ms. Singer was elected to the three-year term, the judge concluded that “Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term.”

◦ This finding invalidated the Petitioner’s core premise that Ahlstrand had begun a two-year term.

• Consequential Logic: This central finding created a direct logical chain that affirmed the Respondent’s actions:

1. Ms. Ahlstrand’s term was for one year, expiring in 2016.

2. When she resigned, the Board appointed Mr. Oursland to serve the remainder of her term, which correctly ended at the 2016 election.

3. Mr. Oursland was therefore “properly elected to a two-year term at that time [2016], which will expire in 2018.”

VI. Final Disposition

Based on the analysis of the bylaws and the sequence of elections, the ALJ ruled against the Petitioner.

• Recommended Order (June 19, 2017): The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Final Order (July 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Final Order states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. The document outlines eight potential causes for which a rehearing or review may be granted, including procedural irregularities, misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, or a finding of fact that is arbitrary or contrary to law.






Study Guide – 17F-H1717026-REL


Study Guide: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1717026-REL between Tom Pyron (Petitioner) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (Respondent). It covers the central arguments, key evidence, relevant bylaws, and the final legal decision.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the single issue at the heart of Tom Pyron’s petition filed on March 16, 2017?

2. According to the Association’s bylaws, how are Board of Director terms structured when the board consists of three members?

3. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding Jeff Oursland’s term on the Board of Directors?

4. What was the Respondent’s counter-argument regarding Barbara Ahlstrand’s 2015 election and, subsequently, Jeff Oursland’s term?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in an attempt to resolve the dispute with the Petitioner before the hearing?

6. Who was the key witness for the Respondent, and what was their role?

7. Explain the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined in the case documents.

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s core legal reasoning for concluding that only one board position was open in 2017?

9. What was the final outcome of the case as stated in the Recommended Order and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. Following the Final Order issued on July 12, 2017, what legal recourse was available to a party dissatisfied with the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Tom Pyron’s petition alleged that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board position was open for a one-year term in the 2017 election. Pyron contended that two positions—one for a one-year term and another for a two-year term—should have been up for election.

2. Bylaw Article III, § 3.02 specifies that for a three-person board, the directors hold staggered terms of one year, two years, and three years. The bylaw further dictates which terms end at which annual meetings (e.g., the two-year term ends at the second, fourth, sixth, etc., annual meetings).

3. The Petitioner argued that Barbara Ahlstrand was elected to a two-year term in 2015. Therefore, when Jeff Oursland was appointed to fill her vacancy, his term should have expired in 2017, meaning his two-year position should have been on the 2017 ballot.

4. The Respondent argued that under the plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since Sandra Singer received the most votes and secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, meaning Mr. Oursland’s appointed term expired in 2016.

5. In response to the petition, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued ballots to include all candidates who had submitted an application. The Association also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with this resolution.

6. The key witness for the Respondent was Cynthia Quillen. She served as the Community Manager for the Association’s management company, Associated Property Management, and testified about the Board’s composition and her interpretation of the bylaws.

7. “A preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence, which is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The Judge’s decision was based on the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02. This bylaw dictated that only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since the parties agreed Ms. Singer won the three-year term, the Judge concluded Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, making the Respondent’s subsequent actions and election notices correct.

9. The Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate in a Final Order, making it binding on the parties.

10. According to the Final Order, a dissatisfied party could request a rehearing within thirty days by filing a petition setting forth the reasons. The document lists eight specific causes for a rehearing. A party could also appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the 2015 election presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02 to resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the interpretation of governing documents in legal disputes?

2. Trace the chain of events from the 2012 election to the 2017 dispute. Explain how the board composition, terms of office, and specific actions (like Ms. Ahlstrand’s resignation) compounded to create the disagreement at the heart of this case.

3. Discuss the burden of proof in this administrative hearing. Define “preponderance of the evidence” and explain why the Petitioner, Tom Pyron, failed to meet this standard in the view of the Administrative Law Judge.

4. Examine the roles and authorities of the different entities involved: the homeowners’ association Board, the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Administrative Law Judge. How do these bodies interact to resolve disputes within a planned community?

5. Based on the Final Order, outline the legal recourse available to Tom Pyron following the denial of his petition. What specific grounds for a rehearing are mentioned, and what is the process for further appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Acclamation

A form of election where a candidate is declared elected without opposition, as when Sandra Singer’s election was “unanimously passed by acclamation” in 2014.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, draws conclusions of law, and issues a recommended decision. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations. The Commissioner of the Department, Judy Lowe, issued the Final Order in this case.

Bylaws

The governing documents of the homeowners’ association that outline its rules and procedures, including the number of directors, terms of office, and process for filling vacancies.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which accepts and adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order becomes effective and can only be changed by a successful rehearing or judicial appeal.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Pyron, a homeowner in the association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing, defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The Petitioner bore this burden to prove the Respondent violated its bylaws.

Recommended Order

The decision and order issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. In this case, it recommended that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Rehearing

A formal request to have a case heard again. The Final Order specifies that a petition for rehearing must be filed within thirty days and may be granted for specific causes, such as newly discovered evidence or an arbitrary decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Staggered Terms

A system where not all board members are elected at the same time. As defined in Bylaw § 3.02, the three-person board had terms of one, two, and three years to ensure continuity.

Unexpired Portion of the Prior Director’s Term

The remainder of a board member’s term that an appointee serves after the original member resigns or is removed, as specified in Bylaw § 3.6.






Blog Post – 17F-H1717026-REL


We Read an HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To: 3 Shocking Lessons Hidden in the Bylaws

1. Introduction: The Hidden Drama in Your Community’s Fine Print

If you live in a condominium association or a planned community, you’re familiar with the thick packet of governing documents you received at closing—the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Bylaws. For many, these documents are filed away and forgotten, seen as a collection of mundane rules about trash cans and paint colors. But hidden within that legalese is the complete operating manual for your community, and a simple misunderstanding of its contents can have significant consequences.

What happens when a homeowner’s interpretation of the rules clashes with the association’s? In a case from Arizona involving homeowner Tom Pyron and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, the dispute escalated into a formal administrative hearing. The central question was simple: how many board seats were open for election in 2017? But this wasn’t just a procedural disagreement. Court documents reveal that before the hearing, the association offered to re-issue ballots to include all candidates and even “offered to pay Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution.” The homeowner refused.

This decision transforms the case from a simple rules dispute into a cautionary tale about how a deeply held belief can override a pragmatic, no-cost compromise. The official court documents offer a fascinating look at how community governance can go awry, revealing powerful, practical lessons for any homeowner or board member who believes they know what the rules should say.

2. Takeaway 1: Your Beliefs Don’t Overrule the Bylaws

What You Think the Rules Say Doesn’t Matter—Only What They Actually Say

The core of the dispute rested on a belief held by a former board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, who was elected in 2015. She testified that she believed she had been elected to a two-year term. Based on this belief, the petitioner argued that the director appointed to replace her after her resignation should have served until 2017, meaning a two-year position was open for election that year.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, looked not at what anyone believed, but at the “plain language” of the community’s governing documents. The judge’s conclusion was a matter of inescapable logic derived directly from the bylaws:

1. First, Bylaw § 3.02 clearly states that in an election with multiple open seats, “the person receiving the most votes will become the Director with the longest term.”

2. Next, the court record shows that “the parties agreed that… because she got the most votes, Ms. Singer was elected to a three-year term” in the 2015 election.

3. Finally, the judge determined that according to the same bylaw, only the one-year and three-year terms were available in 2015. Since Ms. Singer secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand, by definition, must have been elected to the only other available position: the one-year term.

The lesson is stark and unambiguous: an individual’s interpretation or assumption, however sincere, cannot change the written rules. The bylaws are the ultimate authority. As the judge stated in the final decision, the documents speak for themselves.

The Bylaws do not allow their plain language to be modified or amended by a member’s understanding.

3. Takeaway 2: The Domino Effect of a Single Resignation

A Single Resignation Can Create Years of Confusion

This entire legal conflict was set in motion by a single, routine event: a board member’s resignation. The timeline of events shows how one small action, when combined with a misunderstanding of the rules, can create a ripple effect with long-lasting consequences.

1. On August 3, 2015, the newly elected board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, resigned.

2. The Board then appointed another member, Jeff Oursland, to serve the remainder of her term, as permitted by the bylaws.

3. The critical point of contention became the length of that “remainder.” Was it the rest of a one-year term ending in 2016, or a two-year term ending in 2017?

4. The judge’s determination that Ahlstrand’s original term was only one year (as explained above) meant that Mr. Oursland’s appointed term correctly expired in 2016. He was then properly elected to a new two-year term at the 2016 meeting.

5. This sequence confirmed that the association was correct all along: only one board position (a one-year term) was actually open for election in 2017.

A single resignation created two years of confusion that ultimately required an administrative hearing to resolve. It’s a powerful reminder of how crucial it is for boards to precisely follow their own procedures, especially when handling vacancies and appointments, as one small error can cascade into years of conflict.

4. Takeaway 3: The Hidden Complexity of “Staggered Terms”

“Staggered Terms” Are Designed for Stability, But Can Cause Chaos

Many associations use staggered terms for their board of directors. The concept, outlined in Bylaw § 3.02 for the Cliffs at North Mountain, is simple: instead of all directors being elected at once, they serve terms of varying lengths (in this case, one, two, and three years). This is a common and effective practice designed to ensure leadership continuity and prevent the entire board from turning over in a single election.

However, this case reveals the hidden downside of that system: complexity. The staggered terms created an election cycle where the available term lengths changed every single year. The court documents show that in 2014, the one-year and two-year positions were on the ballot. In 2015, the one-year and three-year terms were available. This rotating schedule was difficult for members—and apparently even some board members—to track accurately.

This built-in complexity was the root cause of the entire disagreement. The system’s lack of intuitive clarity created the exact conditions necessary for a personal belief, like Ms. Ahlstrand’s, to seem plausible even when it was contrary to the bylaws. The very governance structure intended to create stability inadvertently created the fertile ground for confusion, allowing a misunderstanding to grow into a lawsuit.

5. Conclusion: The Power Is in the Paperwork

The overarching theme from this case is that in the world of community associations, the governing documents are the ultimate source of truth. They are not merely suggestions; they are the binding legal framework that dictates how the community must operate. A board’s actions and a homeowner’s rights are all defined within that paperwork.

In the end, the homeowner’s petition was denied, and the judge’s order affirmed the association’s position. The written rules, as found in the bylaws, prevailed over individual beliefs and interpretations. The case stands as a powerful testament to the importance of reading, understanding, and strictly adhering to your community’s foundational documents.

This entire conflict stemmed from a few lines in a legal document—when was the last time you read yours?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Pyron (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Cynthia Quillen (property manager)
    Associated Property Management
    Community Manager

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (coordinator)
    HOA Coordinator/Admin Official listed for rehearing requests and transmission

Other Participants

  • Anne Fugate (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Barbara Ahlstrand (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2015
  • Kevin Downey (witness)
    Candidate for 2017 election
  • John Haunschild (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Ron Cadaret (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012, re-elected 2013
  • Sandra Singer (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2014 and 2015
  • Jeff Oursland (board member)
    Appointed to the Board in 2015, elected 2016
  • Steve Molever (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2016

Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel —
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:38 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:41 (959.2 KB)

  • 2016




Study Guide – 17F-H1717026-REL


Study Guide: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1717026-REL between Tom Pyron (Petitioner) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (Respondent). It covers the central arguments, key evidence, relevant bylaws, and the final legal decision.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the single issue at the heart of Tom Pyron’s petition filed on March 16, 2017?

2. According to the Association’s bylaws, how are Board of Director terms structured when the board consists of three members?

3. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding Jeff Oursland’s term on the Board of Directors?

4. What was the Respondent’s counter-argument regarding Barbara Ahlstrand’s 2015 election and, subsequently, Jeff Oursland’s term?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in an attempt to resolve the dispute with the Petitioner before the hearing?

6. Who was the key witness for the Respondent, and what was their role?

7. Explain the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined in the case documents.

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s core legal reasoning for concluding that only one board position was open in 2017?

9. What was the final outcome of the case as stated in the Recommended Order and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. Following the Final Order issued on July 12, 2017, what legal recourse was available to a party dissatisfied with the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Tom Pyron’s petition alleged that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board position was open for a one-year term in the 2017 election. Pyron contended that two positions—one for a one-year term and another for a two-year term—should have been up for election.

2. Bylaw Article III, § 3.02 specifies that for a three-person board, the directors hold staggered terms of one year, two years, and three years. The bylaw further dictates which terms end at which annual meetings (e.g., the two-year term ends at the second, fourth, sixth, etc., annual meetings).

3. The Petitioner argued that Barbara Ahlstrand was elected to a two-year term in 2015. Therefore, when Jeff Oursland was appointed to fill her vacancy, his term should have expired in 2017, meaning his two-year position should have been on the 2017 ballot.

4. The Respondent argued that under the plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since Sandra Singer received the most votes and secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, meaning Mr. Oursland’s appointed term expired in 2016.

5. In response to the petition, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued ballots to include all candidates who had submitted an application. The Association also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with this resolution.

6. The key witness for the Respondent was Cynthia Quillen. She served as the Community Manager for the Association’s management company, Associated Property Management, and testified about the Board’s composition and her interpretation of the bylaws.

7. “A preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence, which is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The Judge’s decision was based on the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02. This bylaw dictated that only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since the parties agreed Ms. Singer won the three-year term, the Judge concluded Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, making the Respondent’s subsequent actions and election notices correct.

9. The Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate in a Final Order, making it binding on the parties.

10. According to the Final Order, a dissatisfied party could request a rehearing within thirty days by filing a petition setting forth the reasons. The document lists eight specific causes for a rehearing. A party could also appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the 2015 election presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02 to resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the interpretation of governing documents in legal disputes?

2. Trace the chain of events from the 2012 election to the 2017 dispute. Explain how the board composition, terms of office, and specific actions (like Ms. Ahlstrand’s resignation) compounded to create the disagreement at the heart of this case.

3. Discuss the burden of proof in this administrative hearing. Define “preponderance of the evidence” and explain why the Petitioner, Tom Pyron, failed to meet this standard in the view of the Administrative Law Judge.

4. Examine the roles and authorities of the different entities involved: the homeowners’ association Board, the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Administrative Law Judge. How do these bodies interact to resolve disputes within a planned community?

5. Based on the Final Order, outline the legal recourse available to Tom Pyron following the denial of his petition. What specific grounds for a rehearing are mentioned, and what is the process for further appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Acclamation

A form of election where a candidate is declared elected without opposition, as when Sandra Singer’s election was “unanimously passed by acclamation” in 2014.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, draws conclusions of law, and issues a recommended decision. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations. The Commissioner of the Department, Judy Lowe, issued the Final Order in this case.

Bylaws

The governing documents of the homeowners’ association that outline its rules and procedures, including the number of directors, terms of office, and process for filling vacancies.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which accepts and adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order becomes effective and can only be changed by a successful rehearing or judicial appeal.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Pyron, a homeowner in the association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing, defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The Petitioner bore this burden to prove the Respondent violated its bylaws.

Recommended Order

The decision and order issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. In this case, it recommended that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Rehearing

A formal request to have a case heard again. The Final Order specifies that a petition for rehearing must be filed within thirty days and may be granted for specific causes, such as newly discovered evidence or an arbitrary decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Staggered Terms

A system where not all board members are elected at the same time. As defined in Bylaw § 3.02, the three-person board had terms of one, two, and three years to ensure continuity.

Unexpired Portion of the Prior Director’s Term

The remainder of a board member’s term that an appointee serves after the original member resigns or is removed, as specified in Bylaw § 3.6.






Blog Post – 17F-H1717026-REL


We Read an HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To: 3 Shocking Lessons Hidden in the Bylaws

1. Introduction: The Hidden Drama in Your Community’s Fine Print

If you live in a condominium association or a planned community, you’re familiar with the thick packet of governing documents you received at closing—the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Bylaws. For many, these documents are filed away and forgotten, seen as a collection of mundane rules about trash cans and paint colors. But hidden within that legalese is the complete operating manual for your community, and a simple misunderstanding of its contents can have significant consequences.

What happens when a homeowner’s interpretation of the rules clashes with the association’s? In a case from Arizona involving homeowner Tom Pyron and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, the dispute escalated into a formal administrative hearing. The central question was simple: how many board seats were open for election in 2017? But this wasn’t just a procedural disagreement. Court documents reveal that before the hearing, the association offered to re-issue ballots to include all candidates and even “offered to pay Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution.” The homeowner refused.

This decision transforms the case from a simple rules dispute into a cautionary tale about how a deeply held belief can override a pragmatic, no-cost compromise. The official court documents offer a fascinating look at how community governance can go awry, revealing powerful, practical lessons for any homeowner or board member who believes they know what the rules should say.

2. Takeaway 1: Your Beliefs Don’t Overrule the Bylaws

What You Think the Rules Say Doesn’t Matter—Only What They Actually Say

The core of the dispute rested on a belief held by a former board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, who was elected in 2015. She testified that she believed she had been elected to a two-year term. Based on this belief, the petitioner argued that the director appointed to replace her after her resignation should have served until 2017, meaning a two-year position was open for election that year.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, looked not at what anyone believed, but at the “plain language” of the community’s governing documents. The judge’s conclusion was a matter of inescapable logic derived directly from the bylaws:

1. First, Bylaw § 3.02 clearly states that in an election with multiple open seats, “the person receiving the most votes will become the Director with the longest term.”

2. Next, the court record shows that “the parties agreed that… because she got the most votes, Ms. Singer was elected to a three-year term” in the 2015 election.

3. Finally, the judge determined that according to the same bylaw, only the one-year and three-year terms were available in 2015. Since Ms. Singer secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand, by definition, must have been elected to the only other available position: the one-year term.

The lesson is stark and unambiguous: an individual’s interpretation or assumption, however sincere, cannot change the written rules. The bylaws are the ultimate authority. As the judge stated in the final decision, the documents speak for themselves.

The Bylaws do not allow their plain language to be modified or amended by a member’s understanding.

3. Takeaway 2: The Domino Effect of a Single Resignation

A Single Resignation Can Create Years of Confusion

This entire legal conflict was set in motion by a single, routine event: a board member’s resignation. The timeline of events shows how one small action, when combined with a misunderstanding of the rules, can create a ripple effect with long-lasting consequences.

1. On August 3, 2015, the newly elected board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, resigned.

2. The Board then appointed another member, Jeff Oursland, to serve the remainder of her term, as permitted by the bylaws.

3. The critical point of contention became the length of that “remainder.” Was it the rest of a one-year term ending in 2016, or a two-year term ending in 2017?

4. The judge’s determination that Ahlstrand’s original term was only one year (as explained above) meant that Mr. Oursland’s appointed term correctly expired in 2016. He was then properly elected to a new two-year term at the 2016 meeting.

5. This sequence confirmed that the association was correct all along: only one board position (a one-year term) was actually open for election in 2017.

A single resignation created two years of confusion that ultimately required an administrative hearing to resolve. It’s a powerful reminder of how crucial it is for boards to precisely follow their own procedures, especially when handling vacancies and appointments, as one small error can cascade into years of conflict.

4. Takeaway 3: The Hidden Complexity of “Staggered Terms”

“Staggered Terms” Are Designed for Stability, But Can Cause Chaos

Many associations use staggered terms for their board of directors. The concept, outlined in Bylaw § 3.02 for the Cliffs at North Mountain, is simple: instead of all directors being elected at once, they serve terms of varying lengths (in this case, one, two, and three years). This is a common and effective practice designed to ensure leadership continuity and prevent the entire board from turning over in a single election.

However, this case reveals the hidden downside of that system: complexity. The staggered terms created an election cycle where the available term lengths changed every single year. The court documents show that in 2014, the one-year and two-year positions were on the ballot. In 2015, the one-year and three-year terms were available. This rotating schedule was difficult for members—and apparently even some board members—to track accurately.

This built-in complexity was the root cause of the entire disagreement. The system’s lack of intuitive clarity created the exact conditions necessary for a personal belief, like Ms. Ahlstrand’s, to seem plausible even when it was contrary to the bylaws. The very governance structure intended to create stability inadvertently created the fertile ground for confusion, allowing a misunderstanding to grow into a lawsuit.

5. Conclusion: The Power Is in the Paperwork

The overarching theme from this case is that in the world of community associations, the governing documents are the ultimate source of truth. They are not merely suggestions; they are the binding legal framework that dictates how the community must operate. A board’s actions and a homeowner’s rights are all defined within that paperwork.

In the end, the homeowner’s petition was denied, and the judge’s order affirmed the association’s position. The written rules, as found in the bylaws, prevailed over individual beliefs and interpretations. The case stands as a powerful testament to the importance of reading, understanding, and strictly adhering to your community’s foundational documents.

This entire conflict stemmed from a few lines in a legal document—when was the last time you read yours?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Pyron (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Cynthia Quillen (property manager)
    Associated Property Management
    Community Manager

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (coordinator)
    HOA Coordinator/Admin Official listed for rehearing requests and transmission

Other Participants

  • Anne Fugate (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Barbara Ahlstrand (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2015
  • Kevin Downey (witness)
    Candidate for 2017 election
  • John Haunschild (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Ron Cadaret (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012, re-elected 2013
  • Sandra Singer (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2014 and 2015
  • Jeff Oursland (board member)
    Appointed to the Board in 2015, elected 2016
  • Steve Molever (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2016

Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel —
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:37 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:38 (959.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717026-REL


Briefing Document: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between homeowner Tom Pyron (“Petitioner”) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board of Directors position was open for election in 2017, whereas the Petitioner contended two positions should have been open.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the association’s bylaws, specifically Article III, § 3.02, which governs the staggered terms of office for the three-member board. The ALJ found that a board member’s personal understanding of their term length could not amend the plain language of the bylaws. Based on the bylaw’s schedule for staggered terms, the judge concluded that a pivotal 2015 election could only have filled a one-year and a three-year term, which sequentially led to only one position being open in 2017. The Petitioner’s petition was denied, and this decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Tom Pyron, a condominium owner and member of the Respondent association.

◦ Respondent: Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc., represented by B. Austin Baillio, Esq., of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

• Case Numbers: 17F-H1717026-REL; HO 17-17/026

• Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Final Order By: Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: June 12, 2017.

• Final Order Date: July 12, 2017.

The case was initiated when Tom Pyron filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 16, 2017, alleging a violation of the homeowners’ association’s bylaws concerning the 2017 Board of Directors election.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner’s claim centered on the belief that the Respondent improperly noticed the number of available Board positions for the 2017 election.

• Core Allegation: The Respondent violated its Bylaws (Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06) by informing members that only one Board position for a one-year term was available for the 2017 election.

• Petitioner’s Contention: Two positions—one for a one-year term and one for a two-year term—should have been up for election in 2017.

• Basis of Argument: The Petitioner’s argument was built upon the 2015 election of Barbara Ahlstrand. He contended, supported by Ahlstrand’s testimony, that she was elected to a two-year term. Following this logic:

1. Ahlstrand’s term would run from 2015 to 2017.

2. When she resigned in August 2015, her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was appointed to serve the remainder of that two-year term, which would expire in 2017.

3. Therefore, Jeff Oursland should not have been on the ballot for the 2016 election, and his two-year position should have been one of the two seats open for election in 2017.

III. Respondent’s Position and Pre-Hearing Actions

The Respondent denied any violation of its bylaws and maintained that its actions were consistent with the governing documents.

• Pre-Hearing Resolution Attempts: In response to the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued election ballots. The Respondent also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution, an offer the Petitioner did not accept.

• Core Defense: The Respondent’s position was based on a direct interpretation of Bylaw § 3.02, which dictates the schedule of staggered terms.

• Basis of Argument: The Respondent argued that according to the bylaw’s prescribed cycle, only the one-year and three-year positions were up for election in 2015.

1. As it was agreed that Sandra Singer received the most votes and was elected to the three-year term, Barbara Ahlstrand must have been elected to the available one-year term.

2. Therefore, Ahlstrand’s term was set to expire in 2016.

3. Her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was correctly appointed to serve only until the 2016 election.

4. Consequently, Oursland was properly elected to a new two-year term in 2016 (expiring in 2018), and the only seat open in 2017 was the one-year term completed by Steve Molever.

IV. Chronology of Board Elections and Appointments

The dispute originated from differing interpretations of election outcomes from 2014 onward. The Board of Directors has consistently been comprised of three members.

Election Year

Agreed Facts & Election Results

Petitioner’s Interpretation/Contention

Respondent’s Interpretation/Position

Anne Fugate elected to a 3-year term.
John Haunschild elected to a 2-year term.
Ron Cadaret elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Ron Cadaret re-elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Minutes state “the election of Sandra Singer was unanimously passed by acclamation.”

Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term. No other officers were elected.

Based on bylaw § 3.02 and the 2015 Board composition, John Haunschild must have been re-elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2016), and Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term (expiring 2015).

Sandra Singer and Barbara Ahlstrand were elected. Singer received the most votes and was elected to a 3-year term. Ahlstrand resigned 8/3/2015.

Ahlstrand believed she was elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2017).

Per bylaw § 3.02, only the 1-year and 3-year terms were open. Since Singer got the 3-year term, Ahlstrand must have been elected to the 1-year term (expiring 2016).

Appointment

The Board appointed Jeff Oursland to serve the remainder of Ahlstrand’s term.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2017.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2016.

Jeff Oursland was elected to a 2-year term.
Steve Molever was elected to a 1-year term.

Oursland should not have been on the ballot, as his term was not set to expire until 2017.

Oursland’s appointed term expired, so he was properly elected to a new 2-year term (expiring 2018).

No election had been held due to the pending petition.

Two positions should be open for election: the 2-year term (Ahlstrand/Oursland’s) and the 1-year term (Molever’s).

Only one position is open for election: the 1-year term completed by Molever.

V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the legal standard of “a preponderance of the evidence” and a strict textual interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation.

• Primacy of Bylaw Language: The judge’s central legal conclusion was that the bylaws must be interpreted based on their plain meaning. Key quotes from the decision include:

• Key Legal Finding: The pivotal determination concerned the 2015 election. The ALJ found that under the “plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015.”

◦ Because the parties agreed that Ms. Singer was elected to the three-year term, the judge concluded that “Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term.”

◦ This finding invalidated the Petitioner’s core premise that Ahlstrand had begun a two-year term.

• Consequential Logic: This central finding created a direct logical chain that affirmed the Respondent’s actions:

1. Ms. Ahlstrand’s term was for one year, expiring in 2016.

2. When she resigned, the Board appointed Mr. Oursland to serve the remainder of her term, which correctly ended at the 2016 election.

3. Mr. Oursland was therefore “properly elected to a two-year term at that time [2016], which will expire in 2018.”

VI. Final Disposition

Based on the analysis of the bylaws and the sequence of elections, the ALJ ruled against the Petitioner.

• Recommended Order (June 19, 2017): The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Final Order (July 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Final Order states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. The document outlines eight potential causes for which a rehearing or review may be granted, including procedural irregularities, misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, or a finding of fact that is arbitrary or contrary to law.


Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel —
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:49 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:50 (959.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717026-REL


Briefing Document: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between homeowner Tom Pyron (“Petitioner”) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board of Directors position was open for election in 2017, whereas the Petitioner contended two positions should have been open.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the association’s bylaws, specifically Article III, § 3.02, which governs the staggered terms of office for the three-member board. The ALJ found that a board member’s personal understanding of their term length could not amend the plain language of the bylaws. Based on the bylaw’s schedule for staggered terms, the judge concluded that a pivotal 2015 election could only have filled a one-year and a three-year term, which sequentially led to only one position being open in 2017. The Petitioner’s petition was denied, and this decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Tom Pyron, a condominium owner and member of the Respondent association.

◦ Respondent: Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc., represented by B. Austin Baillio, Esq., of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

• Case Numbers: 17F-H1717026-REL; HO 17-17/026

• Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Final Order By: Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: June 12, 2017.

• Final Order Date: July 12, 2017.

The case was initiated when Tom Pyron filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 16, 2017, alleging a violation of the homeowners’ association’s bylaws concerning the 2017 Board of Directors election.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner’s claim centered on the belief that the Respondent improperly noticed the number of available Board positions for the 2017 election.

• Core Allegation: The Respondent violated its Bylaws (Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06) by informing members that only one Board position for a one-year term was available for the 2017 election.

• Petitioner’s Contention: Two positions—one for a one-year term and one for a two-year term—should have been up for election in 2017.

• Basis of Argument: The Petitioner’s argument was built upon the 2015 election of Barbara Ahlstrand. He contended, supported by Ahlstrand’s testimony, that she was elected to a two-year term. Following this logic:

1. Ahlstrand’s term would run from 2015 to 2017.

2. When she resigned in August 2015, her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was appointed to serve the remainder of that two-year term, which would expire in 2017.

3. Therefore, Jeff Oursland should not have been on the ballot for the 2016 election, and his two-year position should have been one of the two seats open for election in 2017.

III. Respondent’s Position and Pre-Hearing Actions

The Respondent denied any violation of its bylaws and maintained that its actions were consistent with the governing documents.

• Pre-Hearing Resolution Attempts: In response to the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued election ballots. The Respondent also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution, an offer the Petitioner did not accept.

• Core Defense: The Respondent’s position was based on a direct interpretation of Bylaw § 3.02, which dictates the schedule of staggered terms.

• Basis of Argument: The Respondent argued that according to the bylaw’s prescribed cycle, only the one-year and three-year positions were up for election in 2015.

1. As it was agreed that Sandra Singer received the most votes and was elected to the three-year term, Barbara Ahlstrand must have been elected to the available one-year term.

2. Therefore, Ahlstrand’s term was set to expire in 2016.

3. Her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was correctly appointed to serve only until the 2016 election.

4. Consequently, Oursland was properly elected to a new two-year term in 2016 (expiring in 2018), and the only seat open in 2017 was the one-year term completed by Steve Molever.

IV. Chronology of Board Elections and Appointments

The dispute originated from differing interpretations of election outcomes from 2014 onward. The Board of Directors has consistently been comprised of three members.

Election Year

Agreed Facts & Election Results

Petitioner’s Interpretation/Contention

Respondent’s Interpretation/Position

Anne Fugate elected to a 3-year term.
John Haunschild elected to a 2-year term.
Ron Cadaret elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Ron Cadaret re-elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Minutes state “the election of Sandra Singer was unanimously passed by acclamation.”

Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term. No other officers were elected.

Based on bylaw § 3.02 and the 2015 Board composition, John Haunschild must have been re-elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2016), and Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term (expiring 2015).

Sandra Singer and Barbara Ahlstrand were elected. Singer received the most votes and was elected to a 3-year term. Ahlstrand resigned 8/3/2015.

Ahlstrand believed she was elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2017).

Per bylaw § 3.02, only the 1-year and 3-year terms were open. Since Singer got the 3-year term, Ahlstrand must have been elected to the 1-year term (expiring 2016).

Appointment

The Board appointed Jeff Oursland to serve the remainder of Ahlstrand’s term.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2017.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2016.

Jeff Oursland was elected to a 2-year term.
Steve Molever was elected to a 1-year term.

Oursland should not have been on the ballot, as his term was not set to expire until 2017.

Oursland’s appointed term expired, so he was properly elected to a new 2-year term (expiring 2018).

No election had been held due to the pending petition.

Two positions should be open for election: the 2-year term (Ahlstrand/Oursland’s) and the 1-year term (Molever’s).

Only one position is open for election: the 1-year term completed by Molever.

V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the legal standard of “a preponderance of the evidence” and a strict textual interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation.

• Primacy of Bylaw Language: The judge’s central legal conclusion was that the bylaws must be interpreted based on their plain meaning. Key quotes from the decision include:

• Key Legal Finding: The pivotal determination concerned the 2015 election. The ALJ found that under the “plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015.”

◦ Because the parties agreed that Ms. Singer was elected to the three-year term, the judge concluded that “Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term.”

◦ This finding invalidated the Petitioner’s core premise that Ahlstrand had begun a two-year term.

• Consequential Logic: This central finding created a direct logical chain that affirmed the Respondent’s actions:

1. Ms. Ahlstrand’s term was for one year, expiring in 2016.

2. When she resigned, the Board appointed Mr. Oursland to serve the remainder of her term, which correctly ended at the 2016 election.

3. Mr. Oursland was therefore “properly elected to a two-year term at that time [2016], which will expire in 2018.”

VI. Final Disposition

Based on the analysis of the bylaws and the sequence of elections, the ALJ ruled against the Petitioner.

• Recommended Order (June 19, 2017): The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Final Order (July 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Final Order states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. The document outlines eight potential causes for which a rehearing or review may be granted, including procedural irregularities, misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, or a finding of fact that is arbitrary or contrary to law.


Saxton, Nancy vs. The Lakes Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 13F-H1314007-BFS
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2014-06-02
Administrative Law Judge M. Douglas
Outcome false
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nancy Saxton Counsel Steven W. Cheifetz
Respondent The Lakes Community Association Counsel Charles E. Maxwell

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the case. The Judge found that the Petitioner was contractually obligated to arbitrate disputes under the Association's bylaws, that the petition was filed after the one-year statute of limitations had expired, and that the Respondent had lawfully complied with A.R.S. § 33-1805 by offering inspection of unredacted records.

Why this result: Jurisdictional bar due to mandatory arbitration clause; statute of limitations expiration; finding of compliance by Respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

Request to Review Association Records

Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated statutes by providing heavily redacted financial records and failing to provide unredacted copies for review upon demand.

Orders: The matter was dismissed. The Tribunal found the Petitioner was required to arbitrate, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and the Respondent had complied with the statute by making records reasonably available.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 5
  • 37
  • 38
  • 41

Decision Documents

13F-H1314007-BFS Decision – 396509.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:29:41 (158.0 KB)

13F-H1314007-BFS Decision – 401319.pdf

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13F-H1314007-BFS Decision – 404479.pdf

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13F-H1314007-BFS Decision – 404483.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:29:42 (53.4 KB)

**Case Title:** *Nancy Saxton v. The Lakes Community Association*
**Case Number:** 13F-H1314007-BFS
**Forum:** Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

**Proceedings and Background**
The hearing was held on April 29, 2014, before Administrative Law Judge M. Douglas,. Petitioner Nancy Saxton, a homeowner, filed a petition alleging The Lakes Community Association (HOA) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the inspection of financial records,. The HOA filed motions to dismiss based on jurisdiction, the statute of limitations, and prior compliance.

**Key Facts**
* **Records Request:** Saxton submitted demands to inspect the HOA's financial records in November 2012,.
* **Production:** The HOA provided approximately 3,700 pages of documents,.
* **Redactions:** The documents contained numerous redactions. The HOA claimed these were necessary to protect personal and payroll information as permitted by statute,. Saxton argued the redactions precluded a proper evaluation of the HOA’s expenditures,.
* **Offer to Inspect:** Upon receiving complaints about the redactions, the HOA offered to allow Saxton to review un-redacted documents at the HOA attorney's office. Saxton declined this offer, feeling it would be "futile" or intimidating,.

**Key Legal Arguments and Issues**
1. **Arbitration:** The HOA argued that an "Alternative Dispute Resolution" amendment to its Bylaws required binding arbitration for governance disputes, precluding administrative action,.
2. **Statute of Limitations:** The HOA contended the claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under A.R.S. § 12-541(5) for liabilities created by statute,.
3. **Compliance:** The HOA argued it satisfied its statutory obligation to make records "reasonably available" by providing copies and offering an in-person review of un-redacted files,.

**Administrative Law Judge Decision**
The ALJ ruled in favor of the Respondent (the HOA) on all three major points:

1. **Arbitration Clause Enforced:** The ALJ concluded that under the HOA's Bylaws and Arizona common law, Saxton was required to submit her claims to arbitration. The arbitration clause was deemed valid and enforceable.
2. **Statute of Limitations Expired:** The ALJ determined the cause of action accrued ten business days after Saxton’s November 5, 2012 demand. Because the petition was filed on November 25, 2013, it fell outside the one-year limitation period prescribed by A.R.S. § 12-541(5).
3. **Substantive Compliance:** The ALJ found that the HOA had complied with A.R.S. § 33-1805. By providing redacted copies and subsequently making un-redacted versions available for review at their attorney's office, the HOA satisfied the requirement to make records "reasonably available".

**Outcome**
The matter was dismissed, and The Lakes Community Association was deemed the prevailing party. The decision was certified as the final administrative decision on July 10

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nancy Saxton (petitioner)
    The Lakes Community Association (Member)
    Homeowner
  • Steven W. Cheifetz (attorney)
    Cheifetz, Iannitelli Marcolini, P.C.
    Listed as 'Heifetz' in mailing list

Respondent Side

  • Charles E. Maxwell (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Christine Green Baldanza (community manager)
    The Lakes Community Association
    Community Manager in 2012 and early 2013

Neutral Parties

  • M. Douglas (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Cliff J. Vanell (director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed Certification of Decision
  • Gene Palma (director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Agency Director
  • Joni Cage (agency staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    c/o for Gene Palma
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Mailed/transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Marsha Hill (witness)
    The Lakes Community Association
    CPA; Former chairman of budget and finance committee
  • Maureen Harrison (witness)
    The Lakes Community Association
    Former Board Member (1993-2000, 2011-2012)