The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes
Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.
Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes
Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.
Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 660026.pdf
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18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 720468.pdf
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This is a concise summary of the administrative law proceedings concerning Lawrence M. Stewart's petition against the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., drawing from the original hearing (September 6, 2018) and the subsequent rehearing (January 2, 2019).
Summary of Administrative Law Case: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
Key Facts
The Petitioner, Lawrence M. Stewart, an owner and former Board member, made changes to the common or limited common area around his unit without prior permission, violating section 5.1 of the CC&Rs. After being informed of the violation, Mr. Stewart requested a variance from the Association Board while he was still a member. At a Board meeting on February 18, 2018, Mr. Stewart resigned, and the two remaining Board members (Sandra Fernandez and David Larson) voted to deny his variance request, requiring him to restore the areas to their original condition.
Main Issues and Petitioner's Arguments
Mr. Stewart filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Association violated Bylaws section 5.4. His central argument was that the Board did not act in good faith when denying the variance request. He asserted that Board member David Larson was biased against him and that the denial was unfair because other units were also non-conforming with the CC&Rs. Mr. Stewart cited Bylaws Section 5.4 because he testified it was the only section referring to a “good faith” requirement in the governing documents.
Key Legal Points and Analysis
Burden of Proof: Mr. Stewart bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws are considered a contract, and the Respondent (Association) is required to act reasonably in exercising its authority.
Applicability of Section 5.4: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability/Indemnification) does not impose any duty on the Board members; rather, it merely shields them from liability if they act in good faith. Mr. Stewart eventually acknowledged that the Association had not technically violated Section 5.4.
Reasonableness of Board Action: The Board's stated reason for denying the variance was fear of "open[ing] a Pandora’s Box" where other unit owners would request variances. The ALJ found this concern to be a not unreasonable position for a condominium association board.
Lack of Evidence for Bias/Unfairness: The ALJ found that Mr. Stewart did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board lacked good faith, was biased against him, or treated him unfairly. Regarding the assertion of other non-conforming units, there was no evidence that those owners had requested variances, making that testimony not probative of the issue at hand.
Outcome
The Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. Stewart failed to meet his burden of proof. Consequently, Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition was dismissed in both the initial decision (September 14, 2018) and the binding order issued after the rehearing (January 17, 2019). The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818052-REL
Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818052-REL). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing as detailed in the decisions issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be approximately two to three sentences long.
1. What initial action taken by Lawrence M. Stewart prompted the Canyon Gate Condominium Association to contact him with a notice of violation?
2. What specific section of the Association Bylaws did Mr. Stewart allege was violated in his petition to the Department of Real Estate?
3. What was Mr. Stewart’s position within the Association at the time he requested a variance for the changes he had made?
4. According to Mr. Stewart, what was the Board’s primary reason for denying his variance request?
5. Why did Mr. Stewart ultimately resign from the Association’s Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting?
6. In the initial hearing, what three pieces of evidence did Mr. Stewart present to support his allegation that Board member David Larson was biased against him?
7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bears the burden of meeting that standard?
8. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the function of Bylaws Section 5.4, characterizing it as either a “shield” or a “sword”?
9. During the rehearing, what new piece of evidence did Mr. Stewart introduce to support his claim of bias from Mr. Larson?
10. What was the final ruling in both the initial hearing (September 14, 2018) and the rehearing (January 17, 2019)?
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Quiz Answer Key
1. Mr. Stewart made changes to the common area and/or limited common area around his condominium unit without first getting permission from the Association. This action was a violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, leading the Association’s counsel to send him a letter on November 15, 2017.
2. Mr. Stewart’s petition alleged that the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4. He later clarified that he cited this specific section because it was the only one in the governing documents that included a “good faith” requirement, which he believed the Board had failed to meet.
3. At the time he requested a variance to approve the changes he had made, Mr. Stewart was an active member of the Association’s Board of Directors. The other two members were Sandra Fernandez and David Larson.
4. The Board denied his request because they feared it would “open a Pandora’s Box,” leading other unit owners to request variances for changes to the common area. The judge found this was not an unreasonable position for a condominium association board to take.
5. Mr. Stewart resigned from the Board because he got the sense “right away” that the other two board members, Ms. Fernandez and Mr. Larson, had already made up their minds to deny his request and would not approve it.
6. To support his bias claim, Mr. Stewart relied on: (1) a biography of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager, (2) statements Mr. Larson made in notes from a November 28, 2017 Board meeting, and (3) his belief that the other members had already decided the matter without his input.
7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof to meet this standard rests entirely on the Petitioner, Mr. Stewart.
8. The judge concluded that Section 5.4 acts as a “shield” to protect Board members from liability when they act in good faith. It does not impose a duty on them and cannot be used as a “sword” by an owner to force a particular action from the Board.
9. At the rehearing, Mr. Stewart entered into evidence an October 3, 2018 letter written by Mr. Larson to the Association’s members. In the letter, Mr. Larson urged the members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.
10. In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stewart’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that Bylaws Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s claim. How did Mr. Stewart’s interpretation of the section as a “sword” versus a “shield” contribute to this outcome?
2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Evaluate the evidence Mr. Stewart presented to prove bias and unfair treatment, and explain why the judge found it insufficient to meet this standard.
3. Examine the Board’s justification for denying the variance request (the “Pandora’s Box” argument). Based on the court’s conclusions, discuss why this was considered a “reasonable position” for a condominium association board, even without a detailed inspection of Mr. Stewart’s specific changes.
4. Trace the evolution of Mr. Stewart’s arguments and evidence from the initial hearing on September 6, 2018, to the rehearing on January 2, 2019. What new evidence was introduced, and did it fundamentally change the core issues or the final outcome of the case?
5. Explore the principle established in the “Conclusions of Law” that Association Bylaws function as a contract between the parties. How does this principle require both homeowners and the Association Board to act, and how did it influence the judge’s final decision in this matter?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition in the Context of the Case
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, Thomas Shedden, who presided over the hearings, reviewed the evidence, and issued the final decisions in this matter.
Bylaws
A contract between the Association and its members. The parties are required to comply with its terms, and the Association must act reasonably in exercising its authority under them. Mr. Stewart alleged a violation of Bylaws Section 5.4.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Mr. Stewart was found to be in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes to a common area.
Common Area
An area around a condominium unit that is not privately owned. Mr. Stewart made unauthorized changes to the common and/or limited common area around his unit.
Good Faith
A standard of conduct mentioned in Bylaws Section 5.4, which shields Board members from liability if they act accordingly. Mr. Stewart’s core argument was that the Board did not act in good faith when denying his variance request.
Indemnification
The subject of Article V of the Bylaws. Section 5.4, titled “Liability,” falls under this article and serves to protect, or indemnify, the Board from liability.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Lawrence M. Stewart.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Recuse
To formally withdraw from a decision-making process due to a conflict of interest. The Association’s attorney incorrectly stated in a letter that Mr. Stewart had recused himself from voting on his own variance request.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
Variance
A formal request for an exception to the established rules (the CC&Rs). Mr. Stewart requested a variance to gain approval for the changes he had already made to the common area.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818052-REL
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18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
4 sources
These documents consist of Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, detailing a dispute between Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart and the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. The core issue revolves around Mr. Stewart making unauthorized changes to the common area of his unit and his subsequent failed attempt to obtain a variance from the Association’s Board. The sources include an initial decision (dated September 14, 2018) and two decisions stemming from a rehearing (both dated January 17, 2019, though one is more detailed), all concluding that Mr. Stewart’s petition must be dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. Stewart failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association acted in bad faith or was biased against him when it denied his request, despite his reliance on a Bylaws section regarding indemnity which the court found acted as a “shield” for the Board rather than a source of duty.
Based on 4 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Lawrence M. Stewart(petitioner) Was also a board member during the variance request period, but resigned prior to the vote to deny his request
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(Respondent Attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Nicolas C. S. Nogami(Respondent Attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Also appears as 'Nichols C. S. Nogami'
Sandra Fernandez(board member) Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request
David Larson(board member) Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request; Petitioner alleged bias against him
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
F. Del Sol(Administrative Staff) Transmitted copies of the decision
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Gary W. Moselle
Counsel
—
Respondent
Desert Mountain Master Association
Counsel
Curtis Ekmark
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
Outcome Summary
The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.
Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Briefing on the Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association Case
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions regarding a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA or Respondent). The core of the case, No. 18F-H1817005-REL, is the legal interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as it appears in Arizona’s open meeting statute for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.
The conflict arose when the DMMA Communications Committee held a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, which Mr. Moselle was barred from attending. He contended this violated the statute’s open meeting requirements. The DMMA argued the committee was exempt because its meetings were infrequent and not held at fixed intervals.
In two separate decisions—an initial ruling on December 7, 2017, and a second after a rehearing on May 10, 2018—Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer consistently ruled in favor of the DMMA. The judge concluded that “regularly scheduled” applies to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly). Since the Communications Committee met only four times in two years without a set schedule, it was not subject to the open meeting law. The judge determined that the statute’s general policy favoring openness does not override its more specific provisions. Ultimately, the petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Background and Timeline
The dispute proceeded through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, culminating in a definitive ruling after a granted rehearing.
September 1, 2017
Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging DMMA violated open meeting laws.
September 6, 2017
The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Mr. Moselle is not permitted to attend.
September 18, 2017
DMMA files an answer denying all allegations.
November 17, 2017
An initial hearing is conducted before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer.
December 7, 2017
The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.
January 4, 2018
Mr. Moselle files a request for rehearing, citing “newly discovered material evidence” and arguing the decision was contrary to law.
January 26, 2018
The Department of Real Estate grants the request for a rehearing.
April 20, 2018
A rehearing is conducted before the ALJ.
May 10, 2018
The ALJ issues a final decision after rehearing, again denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.
Core Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804
The central legal question was whether the DMMA Communications Committee was subject to the open meeting requirements mandated by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. The resolution of the case hinged on the interpretation of specific language within the statute.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): “It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.”
Arguments Presented by the Parties
The petitioner and respondent presented starkly different interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled.”
Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Mr. Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting scheduled in a “normal manner” or “ordinary fashion,” not necessarily one that recurs at fixed intervals.
• Primacy of Openness Policy: He emphasized the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), asserting that the statute’s clear preference for open meetings should guide the interpretation of any ambiguous terms.
• Arguments for Rehearing: In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Moselle cited newly discovered evidence (an email sent by the DMMA after the first hearing) and suggested the ALJ should evaluate whether the DMMA had misled the court regarding the Board’s actions on the committee’s recommendation.
Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA contended that the phrase “regularly scheduled” plainly refers to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals, “such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”
• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: As evidence, the DMMA testified that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed pattern, holding only four meetings in 2016 and 2017 (twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and the contested meeting of September 6, 2017).
• Lack of Board Action: The DMMA further argued that a recommendation from the committee to the Board of Directors was not acted upon, which it presented as evidence that the committee was not “conducting any actual business of the Board.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Rulings
Across both decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided a consistent legal analysis that ultimately favored the respondent’s interpretation of the statute.
Initial Decision (December 7, 2017)
• The ALJ concluded that the DMMA Communications Committee does not hold “regularly scheduled meetings.”
• Based on this finding, the committee was deemed not subject to the open meetings law.
• The decision to hold a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, was therefore ruled not to be a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• The petitioner’s petition was denied.
Decision After Rehearing (May 10, 2018)
• Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ reaffirmed the conclusion that the “plain language” of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) applies to meetings that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the ALJ settled on this interpretation.
• Policy vs. Specifics: The decision explicitly states that the general policy favoring open meetings in subsection (F) “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
• Petitioner’s Testimony: The ALJ noted that during the rehearing, Mr. Moselle’s own testimony on cross-examination appeared to support the court’s interpretation. When questioned about other DMMA committees, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”
• Final Ruling: The ALJ again concluded that the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings at the time of the incident and was therefore not in violation of the statute. The petition was denied for a final time.
Final Disposition
The petition filed by Gary W. Moselle against the Desert Mountain Master Association was denied. The Administrative Law Judge’s order of May 10, 2018, issued after the rehearing, was declared binding on the parties. As per the final notice, any further appeal would require a party to seek judicial review in superior court within thirty-five days of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (Respondent) concerning Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific event on September 6, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file his complaint?
3. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?
4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for why its Communications Committee was not subject to the open meetings law?
5. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the key statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?
6. What evidence did the Respondent present regarding the frequency of the Communications Committee’s meetings in 2016 and 2017?
7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party had the responsibility to meet it?
8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the meaning of “regularly scheduled” in the context of the statute?
9. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued on December 7, 2017?
10. How did the judge weigh the general policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) against the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Gary W. Moselle, the Petitioner, and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), the Respondent. Mr. Moselle was a homeowner who filed a petition against the DMMA, which is the homeowners association for the community.
2. The Petitioner filed his complaint after he was not allowed to attend a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee that was held on September 6, 2017. He alleged this violated Arizona’s open meeting statute.
3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804. This statute governs open meetings for planned communities, such as homeowners associations.
4. The Respondent argued that the Communications Committee did not meet at regular, established intervals and therefore its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” as required by the statute to be open. They also asserted that the committee’s recommendation was not acted upon by the Board, suggesting it was not conducting official business.
5. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting that was scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He asserted this interpretation was supported by the statute’s general policy favoring open meetings.
6. The Respondent provided testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set interval, having held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017. These meetings occurred twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and on September 6, 2017.
7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring evidence to show that a fact is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, bore the burden of proving the Respondent’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plain language of the statute meant “regularly scheduled” referred to meetings that occur at regular intervals, such as monthly, quarterly, or annually. The judge rejected the Petitioner’s alternate interpretation.
9. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing by citing newly discovered material evidence (an email sent after the first hearing) and arguing the need to evaluate whether the Respondent had misled the judge. He also contended that the initial decision was contrary to law.
10. The judge acknowledged the state’s policy favoring open meetings as stated in subsection (F). However, the judge ruled that this general policy statement did not override the specific provision in subsection (A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing upon the facts, arguments, and legal reasoning presented in the case documents.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the principles of statutory construction used by the Administrative Law Judge to resolve this dispute and explain why one interpretation was favored over the other.
2. Examine the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to the final order issued after the rehearing. What were the key legal steps, decisions, and turning points in the process?
3. Discuss the evidence presented by the Desert Mountain Master Association to support its case. How did testimony regarding meeting frequency and the Board’s actions on committee recommendations contribute to the final outcome?
4. Explain the legal relationship between A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Based on the judge’s decision, what is the hierarchy between a statute’s specific provisions and its general policy declarations?
5. During the rehearing, the Petitioner’s own testimony about other committees was noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Explain this apparent contradiction in the Petitioner’s argument and discuss its potential impact on the case.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions on behalf of a government agency.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the dispute, which governs open meetings for planned communities and their boards of directors and committees.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.
Conclusions of Law
The judge’s application of legal principles to the facts of the case to reach a decision.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and homeowners associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA)
The Respondent in the case; a homeowners association located in Scottsdale, Arizona, classified as a Planned Unit Development.
Findings of Fact
The determination of factual events made by a judge from the evidence presented in a trial or hearing.
Gary W. Moselle
The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner within the DMMA who filed the complaint.
Jurisdiction
The official power of a court or agency to hear a case and make legal decisions and judgments.
Open Meetings Law
A law, in this case A.R.S. § 33-1804, that requires meetings of certain entities to be open to all members or the public.
Petition
The formal written request filed with an administrative body or court to initiate a case.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition and initiates a legal action.
Planned Unit Development (PUD)
A type of real estate development and community governed by specific state laws, such as those in A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows a fact is more probable than not.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to reconsider the previous decision, typically granted due to new evidence or an argument of legal error.
Regularly Scheduled
The key statutory phrase in dispute. The judge interpreted it to mean meetings that occur at regular, established intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly).
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party defending against the complaint.
Statutory Construction
The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, starting with the plain text of the statute.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Your HOA Committee Might Be Meeting in Secret—And It Could Be Perfectly Legal
As a homeowner in a planned community, you likely know you have the right to attend your HOA’s board of directors meetings. But what about the committee meetings? The finance, architectural, or communications committees often lay the critical groundwork for decisions that ultimately affect your property and fees. Do you have a right to observe their deliberations?
A recent legal case in Scottsdale, Arizona, hinged on the interpretation of a single, seemingly straightforward phrase and exposed a surprising rule about HOA transparency. The case, Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association, reveals critical lessons for any homeowner about the letter of the law and how it can sometimes create legal loopholes that allow committee meetings to happen behind closed doors.
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1. The Crucial Loophole: “Regularly Scheduled” Doesn’t Mean What You Think
The entire dispute rested on how to interpret the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as written in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.
The Homeowner’s Argument The petitioner, homeowner Gary Moselle, argued that when the Communications Committee of the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA) scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2017, it should be open to all members. His logic was simple: a meeting that is formally scheduled and placed on the calendar is, by any common-sense definition, a “regularly scheduled” meeting.
The HOA’s Counter-Argument The DMMA countered with a different interpretation. They argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” implies a recurring, predictable pattern, such as meetings held monthly, quarterly, or on the third Thursday of every month. The association presented evidence that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set pattern, having convened only four times in 2016 and 2017. Because the meetings were sporadic, the HOA contended they were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore not subject to the open meeting law.
To bolster its case, the HOA added a second point: the committee’s work wasn’t essential to board business anyway. They noted that a recommendation from the committee was never acted upon by the board, suggesting the committee was not conducting “any actual business of the Board” and thus did not require the same level of transparency.
The Surprising Verdict Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer sided with the HOA. The final decision concluded that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings that occur at regular intervals. This created a legal distinction: HOA committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule must be open, but those that meet on an as-needed basis may not be.
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2. A Law’s “Spirit” Can Be Trumped by Its “Letter”
Adding another layer to the case was the law’s own powerful statement about its intent. The petitioner pointed to a specific section of the statute designed to ensure transparency.
The Policy Statement The Arizona law contains a strong policy statement declaring that all HOA meetings should be conducted openly. It explicitly directs anyone interpreting the law to favor open meetings.
It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.
The Legal Reasoning Despite this clear declaration, Judge Eigenheer ruled that a general policy statement does not override the specific and explicit language of the law. The statute does not say all committee meetings must be open; it says “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open. The judge concluded that this specific wording created a clear exception, and the broad policy in favor of transparency could not erase it.
The Impact This is a critical takeaway for understanding how laws are interpreted. This outcome reflects a fundamental principle of statutory construction: while the “spirit” or stated policy of a law provides guidance, it cannot override the plain meaning of the specific words—the “letter”—that the legislature chose to write.
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3. A Cautionary Tale: How a Petitioner Undermined His Own Case
The petitioner was granted a rehearing, giving him another chance to argue his case. However, a statement he made during his own testimony dramatically weakened his position.
The Key Testimony During the rehearing on April 20, 2018, the petitioner was asked about other committees within the DMMA. In explaining how they operated, he unintentionally adopted the very definition of “regularly scheduled” that the HOA was using against him. The judge recorded his exact words in the final decision:
…five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”
The Consequence The judge seized on this admission in the final ruling. The decision notes that while “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the petitioner himself used the phrase to differentiate between committees that meet at fixed intervals and those that do not. By describing committees that “meet at the request of the chair” as being “not regularly scheduled,” he validated the very interpretation the court was now adopting.
The Lesson This moment serves as a dramatic lesson in the power and precision of language in legal proceedings. In an attempt to describe the function of other committees, the petitioner inadvertently validated his opponent’s core legal argument.
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Conclusion: A Question of Transparency
The ruling in Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association clarifies a significant point in HOA governance. Under this legal interpretation, committees that meet on an ad-hoc basis or “at the call of the chair” may not be subject to open meeting laws. Only those committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule are explicitly required to be open to homeowners.
This ruling draws a bright line between standing committees with fixed schedules and ad-hoc committees that meet “at the call of the chair.” Homeowners should now ask: Which of our committees fall into this second category, and are we comfortable with decisions being shaped behind closed doors?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Gary W. Moselle(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Desert Mountain Master Association(respondent) Organizational party (HOA)
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Gary W. Moselle
Counsel
—
Respondent
Desert Mountain Master Association
Counsel
Curtis Ekmark
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, ruling that the DMMA Communication Committee was not subject to the open meetings law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because it did not hold 'regularly scheduled meetings',,,.
Why this result: The committee met too infrequently and without regular intervals to be deemed 'regularly scheduled' for the purposes of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether a Communications Committee meeting must be open to members under the open meetings law.
Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated the open meetings statute by closing the September 6, 2017 meeting of the Communications Committee. The issue was whether this committee constituted a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,,,.
Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the DMMA Communication committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings, meaning it was not subject to the open meetings law under A.R.S. § 33-1804,,,.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Planned Community
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Briefing on the Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association Case
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions regarding a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA or Respondent). The core of the case, No. 18F-H1817005-REL, is the legal interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as it appears in Arizona’s open meeting statute for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.
The conflict arose when the DMMA Communications Committee held a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, which Mr. Moselle was barred from attending. He contended this violated the statute’s open meeting requirements. The DMMA argued the committee was exempt because its meetings were infrequent and not held at fixed intervals.
In two separate decisions—an initial ruling on December 7, 2017, and a second after a rehearing on May 10, 2018—Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer consistently ruled in favor of the DMMA. The judge concluded that “regularly scheduled” applies to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly). Since the Communications Committee met only four times in two years without a set schedule, it was not subject to the open meeting law. The judge determined that the statute’s general policy favoring openness does not override its more specific provisions. Ultimately, the petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Background and Timeline
The dispute proceeded through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, culminating in a definitive ruling after a granted rehearing.
September 1, 2017
Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging DMMA violated open meeting laws.
September 6, 2017
The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Mr. Moselle is not permitted to attend.
September 18, 2017
DMMA files an answer denying all allegations.
November 17, 2017
An initial hearing is conducted before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer.
December 7, 2017
The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.
January 4, 2018
Mr. Moselle files a request for rehearing, citing “newly discovered material evidence” and arguing the decision was contrary to law.
January 26, 2018
The Department of Real Estate grants the request for a rehearing.
April 20, 2018
A rehearing is conducted before the ALJ.
May 10, 2018
The ALJ issues a final decision after rehearing, again denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.
Core Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804
The central legal question was whether the DMMA Communications Committee was subject to the open meeting requirements mandated by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. The resolution of the case hinged on the interpretation of specific language within the statute.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): “It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.”
Arguments Presented by the Parties
The petitioner and respondent presented starkly different interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled.”
Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Mr. Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting scheduled in a “normal manner” or “ordinary fashion,” not necessarily one that recurs at fixed intervals.
• Primacy of Openness Policy: He emphasized the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), asserting that the statute’s clear preference for open meetings should guide the interpretation of any ambiguous terms.
• Arguments for Rehearing: In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Moselle cited newly discovered evidence (an email sent by the DMMA after the first hearing) and suggested the ALJ should evaluate whether the DMMA had misled the court regarding the Board’s actions on the committee’s recommendation.
Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA contended that the phrase “regularly scheduled” plainly refers to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals, “such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”
• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: As evidence, the DMMA testified that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed pattern, holding only four meetings in 2016 and 2017 (twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and the contested meeting of September 6, 2017).
• Lack of Board Action: The DMMA further argued that a recommendation from the committee to the Board of Directors was not acted upon, which it presented as evidence that the committee was not “conducting any actual business of the Board.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Rulings
Across both decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided a consistent legal analysis that ultimately favored the respondent’s interpretation of the statute.
Initial Decision (December 7, 2017)
• The ALJ concluded that the DMMA Communications Committee does not hold “regularly scheduled meetings.”
• Based on this finding, the committee was deemed not subject to the open meetings law.
• The decision to hold a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, was therefore ruled not to be a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• The petitioner’s petition was denied.
Decision After Rehearing (May 10, 2018)
• Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ reaffirmed the conclusion that the “plain language” of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) applies to meetings that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the ALJ settled on this interpretation.
• Policy vs. Specifics: The decision explicitly states that the general policy favoring open meetings in subsection (F) “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
• Petitioner’s Testimony: The ALJ noted that during the rehearing, Mr. Moselle’s own testimony on cross-examination appeared to support the court’s interpretation. When questioned about other DMMA committees, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”
• Final Ruling: The ALJ again concluded that the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings at the time of the incident and was therefore not in violation of the statute. The petition was denied for a final time.
Final Disposition
The petition filed by Gary W. Moselle against the Desert Mountain Master Association was denied. The Administrative Law Judge’s order of May 10, 2018, issued after the rehearing, was declared binding on the parties. As per the final notice, any further appeal would require a party to seek judicial review in superior court within thirty-five days of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (Respondent) concerning Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific event on September 6, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file his complaint?
3. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?
4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for why its Communications Committee was not subject to the open meetings law?
5. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the key statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?
6. What evidence did the Respondent present regarding the frequency of the Communications Committee’s meetings in 2016 and 2017?
7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party had the responsibility to meet it?
8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the meaning of “regularly scheduled” in the context of the statute?
9. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued on December 7, 2017?
10. How did the judge weigh the general policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) against the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Gary W. Moselle, the Petitioner, and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), the Respondent. Mr. Moselle was a homeowner who filed a petition against the DMMA, which is the homeowners association for the community.
2. The Petitioner filed his complaint after he was not allowed to attend a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee that was held on September 6, 2017. He alleged this violated Arizona’s open meeting statute.
3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804. This statute governs open meetings for planned communities, such as homeowners associations.
4. The Respondent argued that the Communications Committee did not meet at regular, established intervals and therefore its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” as required by the statute to be open. They also asserted that the committee’s recommendation was not acted upon by the Board, suggesting it was not conducting official business.
5. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting that was scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He asserted this interpretation was supported by the statute’s general policy favoring open meetings.
6. The Respondent provided testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set interval, having held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017. These meetings occurred twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and on September 6, 2017.
7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring evidence to show that a fact is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, bore the burden of proving the Respondent’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plain language of the statute meant “regularly scheduled” referred to meetings that occur at regular intervals, such as monthly, quarterly, or annually. The judge rejected the Petitioner’s alternate interpretation.
9. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing by citing newly discovered material evidence (an email sent after the first hearing) and arguing the need to evaluate whether the Respondent had misled the judge. He also contended that the initial decision was contrary to law.
10. The judge acknowledged the state’s policy favoring open meetings as stated in subsection (F). However, the judge ruled that this general policy statement did not override the specific provision in subsection (A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing upon the facts, arguments, and legal reasoning presented in the case documents.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the principles of statutory construction used by the Administrative Law Judge to resolve this dispute and explain why one interpretation was favored over the other.
2. Examine the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to the final order issued after the rehearing. What were the key legal steps, decisions, and turning points in the process?
3. Discuss the evidence presented by the Desert Mountain Master Association to support its case. How did testimony regarding meeting frequency and the Board’s actions on committee recommendations contribute to the final outcome?
4. Explain the legal relationship between A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Based on the judge’s decision, what is the hierarchy between a statute’s specific provisions and its general policy declarations?
5. During the rehearing, the Petitioner’s own testimony about other committees was noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Explain this apparent contradiction in the Petitioner’s argument and discuss its potential impact on the case.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions on behalf of a government agency.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the dispute, which governs open meetings for planned communities and their boards of directors and committees.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.
Conclusions of Law
The judge’s application of legal principles to the facts of the case to reach a decision.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and homeowners associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA)
The Respondent in the case; a homeowners association located in Scottsdale, Arizona, classified as a Planned Unit Development.
Findings of Fact
The determination of factual events made by a judge from the evidence presented in a trial or hearing.
Gary W. Moselle
The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner within the DMMA who filed the complaint.
Jurisdiction
The official power of a court or agency to hear a case and make legal decisions and judgments.
Open Meetings Law
A law, in this case A.R.S. § 33-1804, that requires meetings of certain entities to be open to all members or the public.
Petition
The formal written request filed with an administrative body or court to initiate a case.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition and initiates a legal action.
Planned Unit Development (PUD)
A type of real estate development and community governed by specific state laws, such as those in A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows a fact is more probable than not.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to reconsider the previous decision, typically granted due to new evidence or an argument of legal error.
Regularly Scheduled
The key statutory phrase in dispute. The judge interpreted it to mean meetings that occur at regular, established intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly).
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party defending against the complaint.
Statutory Construction
The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, starting with the plain text of the statute.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Your HOA Committee Might Be Meeting in Secret—And It Could Be Perfectly Legal
As a homeowner in a planned community, you likely know you have the right to attend your HOA’s board of directors meetings. But what about the committee meetings? The finance, architectural, or communications committees often lay the critical groundwork for decisions that ultimately affect your property and fees. Do you have a right to observe their deliberations?
A recent legal case in Scottsdale, Arizona, hinged on the interpretation of a single, seemingly straightforward phrase and exposed a surprising rule about HOA transparency. The case, Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association, reveals critical lessons for any homeowner about the letter of the law and how it can sometimes create legal loopholes that allow committee meetings to happen behind closed doors.
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1. The Crucial Loophole: “Regularly Scheduled” Doesn’t Mean What You Think
The entire dispute rested on how to interpret the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as written in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.
The Homeowner’s Argument The petitioner, homeowner Gary Moselle, argued that when the Communications Committee of the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA) scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2017, it should be open to all members. His logic was simple: a meeting that is formally scheduled and placed on the calendar is, by any common-sense definition, a “regularly scheduled” meeting.
The HOA’s Counter-Argument The DMMA countered with a different interpretation. They argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” implies a recurring, predictable pattern, such as meetings held monthly, quarterly, or on the third Thursday of every month. The association presented evidence that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set pattern, having convened only four times in 2016 and 2017. Because the meetings were sporadic, the HOA contended they were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore not subject to the open meeting law.
To bolster its case, the HOA added a second point: the committee’s work wasn’t essential to board business anyway. They noted that a recommendation from the committee was never acted upon by the board, suggesting the committee was not conducting “any actual business of the Board” and thus did not require the same level of transparency.
The Surprising Verdict Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer sided with the HOA. The final decision concluded that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings that occur at regular intervals. This created a legal distinction: HOA committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule must be open, but those that meet on an as-needed basis may not be.
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2. A Law’s “Spirit” Can Be Trumped by Its “Letter”
Adding another layer to the case was the law’s own powerful statement about its intent. The petitioner pointed to a specific section of the statute designed to ensure transparency.
The Policy Statement The Arizona law contains a strong policy statement declaring that all HOA meetings should be conducted openly. It explicitly directs anyone interpreting the law to favor open meetings.
It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.
The Legal Reasoning Despite this clear declaration, Judge Eigenheer ruled that a general policy statement does not override the specific and explicit language of the law. The statute does not say all committee meetings must be open; it says “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open. The judge concluded that this specific wording created a clear exception, and the broad policy in favor of transparency could not erase it.
The Impact This is a critical takeaway for understanding how laws are interpreted. This outcome reflects a fundamental principle of statutory construction: while the “spirit” or stated policy of a law provides guidance, it cannot override the plain meaning of the specific words—the “letter”—that the legislature chose to write.
——————————————————————————–
3. A Cautionary Tale: How a Petitioner Undermined His Own Case
The petitioner was granted a rehearing, giving him another chance to argue his case. However, a statement he made during his own testimony dramatically weakened his position.
The Key Testimony During the rehearing on April 20, 2018, the petitioner was asked about other committees within the DMMA. In explaining how they operated, he unintentionally adopted the very definition of “regularly scheduled” that the HOA was using against him. The judge recorded his exact words in the final decision:
…five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”
The Consequence The judge seized on this admission in the final ruling. The decision notes that while “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the petitioner himself used the phrase to differentiate between committees that meet at fixed intervals and those that do not. By describing committees that “meet at the request of the chair” as being “not regularly scheduled,” he validated the very interpretation the court was now adopting.
The Lesson This moment serves as a dramatic lesson in the power and precision of language in legal proceedings. In an attempt to describe the function of other committees, the petitioner inadvertently validated his opponent’s core legal argument.
——————————————————————————–
Conclusion: A Question of Transparency
The ruling in Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association clarifies a significant point in HOA governance. Under this legal interpretation, committees that meet on an ad-hoc basis or “at the call of the chair” may not be subject to open meeting laws. Only those committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule are explicitly required to be open to homeowners.
This ruling draws a bright line between standing committees with fixed schedules and ad-hoc committees that meet “at the call of the chair.” Homeowners should now ask: Which of our committees fall into this second category, and are we comfortable with decisions being shaped behind closed doors?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Gary W. Moselle(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Desert Mountain Master Association(respondent) Organizational party (HOA)
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5, and the petition was filed after the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550) expired.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Community Governing Document regarding pipe installation
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R section 2.5 by installing pipes for a well. Respondent argued that CC&R section 2.5 was inapplicable as it governs additional easements conveyed to a third party, and that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550).
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Statute of Limitations, Easement, CC&R Violation, Well Installation
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:08 (77.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818023-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the HOA violated community governing documents (CC&Rs) by installing pipes related to a well through his lot.
The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, dismissed the petitioner’s case in its entirety. The decision was based on two independent and definitive grounds. First, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to meet his burden of proof on the merits of the case; the evidence demonstrated that the pipes were installed within a pre-existing easement and not improperly on his lot, and the specific CC&R section cited was inapplicable. Second, the petition was procedurally barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitations, as the installation occurred in the summer of 2013, and the action was filed after this period had expired. Consequently, the Rancho Del Oro HOA was deemed the prevailing party.
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I. Case Overview
This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Michael J. Stoltenberg against his HOA.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Michael J. Stoltenberg, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Respondent
Case Number
18F-H1818023-REL
Hearing Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Hearing Date
March 28, 2018
Decision Date
April 17, 2018
II. Core Dispute and Allegations
A. Petitioner’s Claim
The central allegation from the petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, was that the Rancho Del Oro HOA violated the Community Governing Document CC&Rs.
• Specific Allegation: The HOA improperly installed pipes through his lot as part of a well installation project.
• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition focused on violations of CC&R sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5. The decision notes that sections 1.13 and 1.19 are definition sections, making section 2.5 the substantive focus of the dispute.
B. Respondent’s Defense Strategy
The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a multi-faceted defense against the petitioner’s claims, combining a procedural dismissal argument with a substantive rebuttal.
1. Statute of Limitations: The HOA contended the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations established in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550. They asserted that since the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, the time frame for filing a petition had expired.
2. Inapplicability of CC&R Section 2.5: The HOA argued that this section was not relevant to the situation. They maintained that CC&R section 2.5 pertains specifically to instances where the HOA grants or conveys an additional easement to a third party, which had not occurred.
3. Factual Rebuttal: The HOA asserted that the pipes were installed within an easement that already existed at the time of installation, not on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot outside of an easement.
III. Adjudicated Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge made several key findings of fact and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the final order. The petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
A. Findings of Fact
The ALJ’s decision was based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. The key findings were:
• Witnesses: The court heard testimony from petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, HOA community manager Diana Crites, and HOA Board Chairman James Van Sickle.
• Location of Installation: Evidence showed the pipes were installed in an easement that was already in existence at the time of the 2013 installation.
• Failure of Evidentiary Support: The judge explicitly noted, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.”
B. Conclusions of Law
Based on the evidence and statutes, the ALJ reached the following legal conclusions:
• Statute of Limitations is Applicable: The judge affirmed that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. The installation occurred in 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, rendering the claim time-barred.
• Interpretation of CC&R 2.5: The judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation, concluding that CC&R section 2.5 applies to easements granted to a third party by the HOA.
• No Violation Occurred: The “weight of the evidence” demonstrated that the pipes were in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party. Therefore, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Due to the lack of evidence and the inapplicability of the cited CC&R section, the petitioner failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
IV. Final Order and Implications
Based on the dual findings that the claim was both time-barred and without merit, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decisive order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order’s service, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818023-REL
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818023-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Michael J. Stoltenberg versus the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, against the Respondent?
3. What two primary legal arguments did the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association present in its defense?
4. According to the judge’s findings, what crucial piece of evidence was not presented at the hearing regarding the location of the well and pipes?
5. What is the statute of limitations cited in this case, and why was it a critical factor in the judge’s decision?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret Community Governing Document CC&R section 2.5 in relation to the Respondent’s actions?
7. Who has the burden of proof in this type of hearing, and what is the specific standard of proof required to win the case?
8. What was the ultimate Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and who was named the prevailing party?
9. Aside from the statute of limitations, what was the other fundamental reason the Petitioner failed to prove his case?
10. After the judge’s Order was issued on April 17, 2018, what recourse was available to the parties involved?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, who brought the complaint, and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, who was defending against the complaint. Mr. Stoltenberg represented himself, while the Homeowners Association was represented by its attorney, Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.
2. Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the Homeowners Association violated sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5 of the Community Governing Document (CC&Rs). The basis of his petition was that the HOA had improperly installed pipes through his lot in connection with a new well.
3. The HOA argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, as the installation occurred in 2013, more than four years prior. The HOA also contended that CC&R section 2.5 did not apply because it refers to granting additional easements to a third party, which the HOA did not do.
4. The judge’s “Findings of Fact” state that “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.” This lack of evidence was a key failure in the Petitioner’s case.
5. The statute of limitations cited is ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, which requires actions to be brought within four years. This was critical because the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, making his claim untimely.
6. The judge concluded that CC&R section 2.5 specifically applies to easements that are granted or conveyed to a third party by the Respondent. Since the evidence showed the pipes were installed in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant a new one to a third party, the judge found that this section was not violated.
7. The Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition be dismissed. As a result of the dismissal, the Respondent (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
9. The Petitioner failed to prove his case because the weight of the evidence showed the HOA did not violate CC&R section 2.5. The evidence indicated the pipes were installed in a pre-existing easement, and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party as described in that section.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. This request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, particularly regarding the location of the pipes, contribute to the dismissal of his petition?
2. Discuss the significance of the statute of limitations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550) in the judge’s decision. Why are such statutes important in legal proceedings, and how did it provide a separate and independent basis for dismissing the case?
3. Explain the legal reasoning behind the judge’s interpretation of CC&R section 2.5. Why was the distinction between an “existing easement” and granting a “new easement to a third party” a critical factor in the outcome?
4. Imagine you were legal counsel for the Petitioner. Based on the information in the decision, what kind of evidence would have been necessary to successfully prove a violation of the Community Governing Documents and overcome the Respondent’s defenses?
5. Examine the roles of the different entities involved in this dispute: the Petitioner, the Homeowners Association, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate. How does the structure of this administrative hearing process provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between homeowners and HOAs?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Several statutes are cited, including those governing real estate, HOA disputes, and the statute of limitations.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.
An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules set forth in a Community Governing Document that property owners in a planned community or condominium must follow.
Easement
A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific, limited purpose. In this case, it refers to the area where pipes were installed, which the judge found was an “existing easement.”
Findings of Fact
The section of a legal decision that details the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing.
Homeowners Association (HOA)
An organization in a planned community (like Rancho Del Oro) that creates and enforces rules for the properties and residents within its jurisdiction.
Notice of Hearing
A formal document issued to inform the parties of the date, time, location, and subject matter of a scheduled legal hearing.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition, seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Michael J. Stoltenberg.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. Defined in the document as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Statute of Limitations
A law that sets the maximum amount of time that parties involved in a dispute have to initiate legal proceedings. In this case, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550 established a four-year limit.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5, and the petition was filed after the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550) expired.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Community Governing Document regarding pipe installation
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R section 2.5 by installing pipes for a well. Respondent argued that CC&R section 2.5 was inapplicable as it governs additional easements conveyed to a third party, and that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550).
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Statute of Limitations, Easement, CC&R Violation, Well Installation
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:26 (77.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818023-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the HOA violated community governing documents (CC&Rs) by installing pipes related to a well through his lot.
The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, dismissed the petitioner’s case in its entirety. The decision was based on two independent and definitive grounds. First, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to meet his burden of proof on the merits of the case; the evidence demonstrated that the pipes were installed within a pre-existing easement and not improperly on his lot, and the specific CC&R section cited was inapplicable. Second, the petition was procedurally barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitations, as the installation occurred in the summer of 2013, and the action was filed after this period had expired. Consequently, the Rancho Del Oro HOA was deemed the prevailing party.
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I. Case Overview
This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Michael J. Stoltenberg against his HOA.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Michael J. Stoltenberg, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Respondent
Case Number
18F-H1818023-REL
Hearing Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Hearing Date
March 28, 2018
Decision Date
April 17, 2018
II. Core Dispute and Allegations
A. Petitioner’s Claim
The central allegation from the petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, was that the Rancho Del Oro HOA violated the Community Governing Document CC&Rs.
• Specific Allegation: The HOA improperly installed pipes through his lot as part of a well installation project.
• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition focused on violations of CC&R sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5. The decision notes that sections 1.13 and 1.19 are definition sections, making section 2.5 the substantive focus of the dispute.
B. Respondent’s Defense Strategy
The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a multi-faceted defense against the petitioner’s claims, combining a procedural dismissal argument with a substantive rebuttal.
1. Statute of Limitations: The HOA contended the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations established in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550. They asserted that since the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, the time frame for filing a petition had expired.
2. Inapplicability of CC&R Section 2.5: The HOA argued that this section was not relevant to the situation. They maintained that CC&R section 2.5 pertains specifically to instances where the HOA grants or conveys an additional easement to a third party, which had not occurred.
3. Factual Rebuttal: The HOA asserted that the pipes were installed within an easement that already existed at the time of installation, not on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot outside of an easement.
III. Adjudicated Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge made several key findings of fact and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the final order. The petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
A. Findings of Fact
The ALJ’s decision was based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. The key findings were:
• Witnesses: The court heard testimony from petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, HOA community manager Diana Crites, and HOA Board Chairman James Van Sickle.
• Location of Installation: Evidence showed the pipes were installed in an easement that was already in existence at the time of the 2013 installation.
• Failure of Evidentiary Support: The judge explicitly noted, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.”
B. Conclusions of Law
Based on the evidence and statutes, the ALJ reached the following legal conclusions:
• Statute of Limitations is Applicable: The judge affirmed that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. The installation occurred in 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, rendering the claim time-barred.
• Interpretation of CC&R 2.5: The judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation, concluding that CC&R section 2.5 applies to easements granted to a third party by the HOA.
• No Violation Occurred: The “weight of the evidence” demonstrated that the pipes were in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party. Therefore, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Due to the lack of evidence and the inapplicability of the cited CC&R section, the petitioner failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
IV. Final Order and Implications
Based on the dual findings that the claim was both time-barred and without merit, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decisive order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order’s service, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818023-REL
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818023-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Michael J. Stoltenberg versus the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, against the Respondent?
3. What two primary legal arguments did the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association present in its defense?
4. According to the judge’s findings, what crucial piece of evidence was not presented at the hearing regarding the location of the well and pipes?
5. What is the statute of limitations cited in this case, and why was it a critical factor in the judge’s decision?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret Community Governing Document CC&R section 2.5 in relation to the Respondent’s actions?
7. Who has the burden of proof in this type of hearing, and what is the specific standard of proof required to win the case?
8. What was the ultimate Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and who was named the prevailing party?
9. Aside from the statute of limitations, what was the other fundamental reason the Petitioner failed to prove his case?
10. After the judge’s Order was issued on April 17, 2018, what recourse was available to the parties involved?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, who brought the complaint, and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, who was defending against the complaint. Mr. Stoltenberg represented himself, while the Homeowners Association was represented by its attorney, Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.
2. Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the Homeowners Association violated sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5 of the Community Governing Document (CC&Rs). The basis of his petition was that the HOA had improperly installed pipes through his lot in connection with a new well.
3. The HOA argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, as the installation occurred in 2013, more than four years prior. The HOA also contended that CC&R section 2.5 did not apply because it refers to granting additional easements to a third party, which the HOA did not do.
4. The judge’s “Findings of Fact” state that “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.” This lack of evidence was a key failure in the Petitioner’s case.
5. The statute of limitations cited is ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, which requires actions to be brought within four years. This was critical because the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, making his claim untimely.
6. The judge concluded that CC&R section 2.5 specifically applies to easements that are granted or conveyed to a third party by the Respondent. Since the evidence showed the pipes were installed in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant a new one to a third party, the judge found that this section was not violated.
7. The Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition be dismissed. As a result of the dismissal, the Respondent (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
9. The Petitioner failed to prove his case because the weight of the evidence showed the HOA did not violate CC&R section 2.5. The evidence indicated the pipes were installed in a pre-existing easement, and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party as described in that section.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. This request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, particularly regarding the location of the pipes, contribute to the dismissal of his petition?
2. Discuss the significance of the statute of limitations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550) in the judge’s decision. Why are such statutes important in legal proceedings, and how did it provide a separate and independent basis for dismissing the case?
3. Explain the legal reasoning behind the judge’s interpretation of CC&R section 2.5. Why was the distinction between an “existing easement” and granting a “new easement to a third party” a critical factor in the outcome?
4. Imagine you were legal counsel for the Petitioner. Based on the information in the decision, what kind of evidence would have been necessary to successfully prove a violation of the Community Governing Documents and overcome the Respondent’s defenses?
5. Examine the roles of the different entities involved in this dispute: the Petitioner, the Homeowners Association, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate. How does the structure of this administrative hearing process provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between homeowners and HOAs?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Several statutes are cited, including those governing real estate, HOA disputes, and the statute of limitations.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.
An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules set forth in a Community Governing Document that property owners in a planned community or condominium must follow.
Easement
A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific, limited purpose. In this case, it refers to the area where pipes were installed, which the judge found was an “existing easement.”
Findings of Fact
The section of a legal decision that details the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing.
Homeowners Association (HOA)
An organization in a planned community (like Rancho Del Oro) that creates and enforces rules for the properties and residents within its jurisdiction.
Notice of Hearing
A formal document issued to inform the parties of the date, time, location, and subject matter of a scheduled legal hearing.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition, seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Michael J. Stoltenberg.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. Defined in the document as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Statute of Limitations
A law that sets the maximum amount of time that parties involved in a dispute have to initiate legal proceedings. In this case, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550 established a four-year limit.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818023-REL
4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against Their HOA
For many homeowners, a dispute with their Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like a classic David vs. Goliath story. We’re drawn to tales of the little guy winning against a powerful board, but the reality is that these battles are governed by unforgiving rules, and victory is never guaranteed. While stories of homeowner triumphs are inspiring, it is just as crucial—if not more so—to understand the anatomy of a failure.
This article serves as a cautionary tale, exploring the surprising and impactful lessons from a legal case where a homeowner’s petition against their HOA was decisively dismissed. By understanding the series of avoidable missteps that led to this loss, every homeowner can be better prepared to protect their rights and their property.
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1. Time is Not on Your Side: The Statute of Limitations
In the legal world, a “statute of limitations” is a strict deadline for filing a lawsuit. Think of it as a countdown clock that starts the moment a potential legal issue occurs. If you let that clock run out, you forfeit your right to take legal action, no matter how valid your complaint might be.
The first domino to fall in this case was the calendar. The homeowner’s complaint centered on pipes installed in the summer of 2013. The petition, however, wasn’t filed until early 2018, just a few months after the four-year deadline had expired. This wasn’t a case of extreme neglect; it was a critical error of a few months that proved instantly fatal. The lesson here is harsh and urgent: if you believe your HOA has wronged you, you must act promptly. Waiting too long can render your claim legally void before it ever gets a fair hearing.
The specific rule that was applied is a stark reminder of this unforgiving principle:
Actions other than for recovery of real property for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward.
2. You Have to Prove It: The Burden of Proof
In any legal dispute, the person bringing the complaint—the petitioner—has the “burden of proof.” This means it is entirely your responsibility to present convincing evidence to support your claims. Simply believing something to be true is not enough; you must prove it with cold, hard facts. Here’s where every homeowner should pay close attention.
The case’s foundation crumbled under the simple question: “Where is the proof?” The core of the homeowner’s case was the allegation that the HOA had installed pipes through his lot. This was the central pillar of the entire petition. But when the time came to present evidence, the pillar collapsed. The judge’s decision contained this stunning finding:
There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on […] lot.
An entire lawsuit can be dismissed if a fundamental claim, no matter how strongly you believe it, cannot be factually proven. Your conviction that you are right means nothing in a hearing without evidence to back it up.
3. Read the Fine Print: The Rules Might Not Mean What You Think They Mean
The homeowner built his argument on a specific part of the Community Governing Documents (CC&Rs), section 2.5, believing it proved the HOA had acted improperly. But the devil is always in the details, and a misinterpretation of those details can be fatal to a case.
The HOA successfully argued that the rule the homeowner cited only applied to situations where the HOA granted a new easement to a third party. In reality, the HOA had simply used an existing easement and had not granted anything to an outside entity. This is a critical distinction. Think of it this way: the homeowner argued the HOA violated the rules for building a new road, but the HOA proved they were simply driving a car on a road that already existed. The homeowner’s argument, while possibly correct about new roads, was irrelevant to the actual situation.
Compounding the error, the homeowner’s initial petition also cited sections of the CC&Rs that were simply definitions, not enforceable rules—a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal documents at the heart of the case.
4. A Double Dismissal: Why the Case Failed on Two Fronts
This case didn’t just lose once; the court effectively ruled the homeowner would have lost twice, on two completely different grounds. This reveals a devastating legal reality: winning requires clearing multiple hurdles, while losing only requires failing at one.
The petition was dismissed for two independent and powerful reasons:
1. The Procedural Knockout: The case was filed too late, violating the four-year statute of limitations. This is a procedural bar, meaning the court couldn’t even consider the facts of the case. It was dead on arrival.
2. The Substantive Failure: The judge made it clear that even if the case had been filed on time, it would have failed on its merits. The homeowner failed to prove his central claim (the pipe location) and fundamentally misinterpreted the CC&Rs.
This “double loss” demonstrates that a successful case against an HOA must be both timely and legally sound. One without the other is a recipe for failure.
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Conclusion: Are You Ready for a Fight?
Being frustrated with your HOA is understandable, but that feeling is not enough to win a legal battle. As this case demonstrates, a successful challenge demands timely action, solid evidence, and a precise interpretation of your community’s governing documents. And a loss isn’t just a disappointment; it means your filing fees are lost, and you’ve spent significant time and energy for nothing, with the HOA’s position only becoming more entrenched. This is a financial and emotional trap you must avoid.
Before you decide to take on your HOA, ask yourself: Have you checked the calendar, your property survey, and the fine print?
The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.
Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:03:08 (106.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL
Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.
The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Background and Timeline
The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.
September 1, 2017
Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
September 5, 2017
The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.
September 6, 2017
The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.
September 18, 2017
DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.
November 17, 2017
The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
December 7, 2017
The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.
January 4, 2018
Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.
January 26, 2017
The Department grants the request for a rehearing.
April 20, 2018
A rehearing is conducted.
May 10, 2018
The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.
The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804
The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:
“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”
The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.
Arguments Presented
Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)
The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).
• Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.
• Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.
Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)
The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”
• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.
• Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.
Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.
1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language
The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.
2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony
A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:
“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)
The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.
3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy
The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:
“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.
Final Order and Implications
Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.
The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.
Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 605190.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:04:02 (77.0 KB)
18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:01 (106.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL
Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.
The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Background and Timeline
The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.
September 1, 2017
Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
September 5, 2017
The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.
September 6, 2017
The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.
September 18, 2017
DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.
November 17, 2017
The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
December 7, 2017
The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.
January 4, 2018
Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.
January 26, 2017
The Department grants the request for a rehearing.
April 20, 2018
A rehearing is conducted.
May 10, 2018
The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.
The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804
The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:
“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”
The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.
Arguments Presented
Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)
The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).
• Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.
• Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.
Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)
The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”
• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.
• Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.
Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.
1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language
The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.
2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony
A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:
“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)
The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.
3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy
The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:
“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.
Final Order and Implications
Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL
Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association (No. 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG)
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Gary W. Moselle and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What specific event and action by the Respondent prompted the Petitioner to file his initial petition?
3. What was the Respondent’s primary argument at the November 17, 2017, hearing for why the Communications committee was not subject to the open meetings law?
4. What was the initial outcome of the case following the first hearing, as decided on December 7, 2017?
5. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully file for a rehearing of the case?
6. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?
7. How did the Respondent, DMMA, interpret the same phrase, “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?
8. According to the document, what is the primary goal when construing a statute, and what is the first step in that process?
9. What was the significance of the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) regarding open meetings, and how did the judge rule on its applicability?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on May 10, 2018, and what was its legal effect on the parties?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Gary W. Moselle, a homeowner, and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), an association of homeowners in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Moselle filed a petition against the DMMA.
2. The Petitioner filed his petition after the Chair of the DMMA’s Communications Committee alleged that a scheduled meeting was “closed” and not subject to Arizona’s open meeting statute. The Petitioner was subsequently not allowed to attend the closed committee meeting held on September 6, 2017.
3. The Respondent argued that the Communications committee did not meet regularly and was therefore not subject to the open meetings law. To support this, they presented testimony that the committee had only met four times in 2016 and 2017.
4. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision on December 7, 2017, in which the Petitioner’s petition was denied.
5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing based on what he cited as newly discovered material evidence, specifically an email sent by the Respondent after the first hearing concluded. He also argued the initial decision was contrary to law and that the Respondent may have misled the judge.
6. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He contended that because the September 6, 2017, meeting was scheduled in this manner, it should have been open.
7. The Respondent argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” meant meetings that occurred at regular intervals, such as on a specific day each month, quarterly, or annually. They contended that since the Communications committee met infrequently and without an established interval, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
8. The primary goal when construing a statute is to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The first step is to look at the text of the statute itself and ascribe its plain meaning if the language is clear.
9. The policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) declares that it is the state’s policy for all meetings of a planned community to be conducted openly. The judge ruled that this general policy statement does not override the specific provision in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings must be open.
10. The final order, issued on May 10, 2018, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. As this order was the result of a rehearing, it was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and Respondent. Discuss which argument the Administrative Law Judge found more compelling and explain the legal reasoning provided in the decision.
2. Discuss the role and significance of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(F) in this case. Explain how the Petitioner used this section to support his argument and why the Administrative Law Judge concluded it did not override the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).
3. Trace the procedural history of the case from the initial petition filing on September 1, 2017, to the final order on May 10, 2018. Include key dates, events (hearings, decisions, requests), and the outcomes at each stage.
4. Evaluate the evidence presented by the Respondent regarding the meeting frequency of the DMMA Communication committee. How did this evidence support the Respondent’s legal argument and influence the final decision?
5. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the standard of proof required in this proceeding (preponderance of the evidence) and the principles of statutory construction the judge applied to interpret the relevant statute.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision on the matter.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the legal dispute. It mandates that meetings of a members’ association, its board of directors, and any “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open to all members of the association.
Cross-examination
A phase during the hearing where a party or their representative questions a witness from the opposing side. Petitioner Moselle underwent cross-examination during the April 20, 2018, rehearing.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Petitioner filed his initial petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between homeowners and condominium owners associations.
An abbreviation for Desert Mountain Master Association, the Respondent in the case and the homeowners association for a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona.
Open Meetings Law
The legal requirement, as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804, that certain meetings of a homeowners association must be open to all members, who must be permitted to attend and speak.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the petitioner was homeowner Gary W. Moselle.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA).
Statutory Construction
The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain legislative intent, first by looking at the plain language of the statute’s text.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL
Your HOA Can Legally Hold Secret Committee Meetings. Here’s How.
Most homeowners operate under a reasonable assumption: meetings that concern their community association should be open for them to attend. Transparency is a cornerstone of trust between residents and their HOA board. But what if some of those meetings, like committee meetings, could be held in private, entirely legally? The answer, revealed in a contentious Arizona case, lies in a two-word loophole that every homeowner should understand.
A legal case from Scottsdale, Arizona, Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association, hinged on this very issue. It revealed a surprising and important nuance in the law, showing how specific wording can create exceptions to the general rule of open governance.
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1. The “Regularly Scheduled” Loophole That Allows for Closed Meetings
The central conflict of the case began when a homeowner, Gary Moselle, was barred from attending a Communications Committee meeting for his HOA, the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA). He filed a petition, arguing this action violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities.
But the homeowner’s argument ran into a wall: the precise text of the law. The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling hinged on the wording of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which mandates openness for “any regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The judge found that the Communications Committee meeting was legally closed because it was not “regularly scheduled.”
Everything came down to the court’s interpretation of two words: “regularly scheduled.”
• The Homeowner’s Argument: Mr. Moselle contended that “regularly scheduled” simply meant “scheduled in a normal fashion.”
• The Court’s Conclusion: The HOA and the judge determined that the phrase means meetings that “occur at regular intervals,” such as monthly, quarterly, or annually.
The evidence supported the court’s conclusion. The DMMA Communications committee had only met four times in 2016 and 2017. This ad-hoc pattern was crucial evidence that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled” in the way the law required.
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2. Why a Law’s General Policy Doesn’t Always Overrule Its Specific Text
The petitioner argued that the law’s explicit policy statement, which strongly favors open meetings, should have been the guiding principle. He pointed to the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F):
It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.
The judge’s conclusion illustrates a fundamental principle of legal interpretation: the specific almost always trumps the general. Despite the clear declaration of policy, the judge found that it did not override the more precise provision in the law. The general policy favoring open meetings could not change the fact that A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) explicitly limits the open meeting requirement to only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings.
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3. A Petitioner’s Own Words Undercut His Argument
The case took a surprising turn, however, when the petitioner himself handed the association its strongest piece of evidence. While trying to make a point about other committees within the DMMA, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”
This statement was a moment of legal irony that proved devastating to his case. The judge noted in the final decision that the petitioner’s own language aligned perfectly with the court’s ultimate interpretation. In a formal hearing, Mr. Moselle inadvertently defined the key term against his own interest, drawing a clear distinction between meetings called on an as-needed basis (“at the request of the chair”) and those that are “regularly scheduled.” This admission provided the exact plain-language interpretation the judge needed to resolve the ambiguity in the case at hand, significantly weakening the petitioner’s entire position.
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Conclusion: A Lesson in Legal Precision
The ultimate lesson from this case is that while homeowner transparency laws are powerful, their protections are defined by precise legal wording. Seemingly small details can have significant consequences. In this Arizona case, the distinction between ad-hoc meetings called as needed and those that occur at regular, predictable intervals was the deciding factor that allowed a committee meeting to be held behind closed doors.
This raises a critical question for homeowners and boards alike: Does this legal distinction provide necessary flexibility for informal committee work, or is it a loophole that ultimately undermines the spirit of open governance in our communities?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Gary W. Moselle(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf; Chair of the Communications Committee
