covenants Archives - Page 2 of 5 - Arizona HOA Transparency Project

Ralph Bianco v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Common Area & Covenants | Terravita | CV2014-053595

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, residents challenged Terravita Country Club and Terravita Community Association over proposed pickleball use of existing courts and asserted rights in Tract G. The court declined to oversee discussion-stage club decisions but allowed the association-related common-area and covenant-enforcement questions to survive summary judgment.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Ralph Bianco v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-053595.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2016-02-25. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Video/audio is held until the source package is rebuilt and the case is reprocessed from the corrected source set.

Scope note: This page covers Ralph Bianco, et al. v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-053595) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, including the March 27, 2015 partial-dismissal ruling, the August 3, 2015 summary-judgment ruling, and the February 25, 2016 settlement/dismissal-calendar entry; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected entry says the court received a notice of settlement, found pending motions moot, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court would not oversee a private club’s discussion-stage decisions about proposed pickleball use of existing multi-use courts, but it also refused to grant the Community Association summary judgment where fact issues remained over whether Tract G was common area, whether the plaintiffs had use or voting rights over that area, and whether the association had covenant-enforcement obligations affecting those property rights.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Ralph Bianco (Plaintiff)
Plaintiff in the Terravita court-use and Tract G dispute.
Wayne Holsinger (Plaintiff)
Plaintiff in the Terravita court-use and Tract G dispute.
Gary Nelson (Plaintiff)
Plaintiff in the Terravita court-use and Tract G dispute.
Erin Selene Iungerich (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for plaintiffs in the 2015 summary-judgment proceedings.
J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for plaintiffs at the January and July 2015 oral arguments.

Respondent Side

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Defendant)
Country Club defendant whose partial motion to dismiss was granted as to several claims in March 2015.
Terravita Community Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Community association defendant whose summary-judgment motion was denied because fact issues remained over Tract G and covenant-enforcement obligations.
Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Terravita Country Club, Inc.
Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Terravita Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

Thomas L. LeClaire (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the March 2015 partial-dismissal ruling.
Susan M. Brnovich (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the August 2015 summary-judgment ruling and later scheduling/settlement entries.

What happened

Terravita residents sued Terravita Country Club, Inc. and Terravita Community Association, Inc. over disputes tied to proposed pickleball use of existing multi-use courts and asserted rights in Tract G. The minute entries show plaintiffs pressing claims against both the Country Club and the Community Association.

The first substantive ruling came after oral argument on Terravita Country Club’s partial motion to dismiss. Judge Thomas L. LeClaire granted the motion as to Counts II, IV, V, and VI of the verified first amended complaint. The court reasoned that the complaint was largely premature: the Country Club had not implemented permanent changes to the courts and had only appointed an ad hoc group to study whether pickleball courts should be incorporated with existing multi-use courts.

The court also drew a line around judicial oversight of private-entity decisions. It said the court does not sit as an overseer of private entities and would not adjudicate discussion-stage matters such as amenity details before a permanent action had been taken.

The Community Association did not get the same result on summary judgment. After July 31, 2015 argument, Judge Susan M. Brnovich denied Terravita Community Association’s motion for summary judgment. The court found genuine fact issues over whether Tract G was common area in Terravita Country Club and whether the plaintiffs had use rights over that area.

The August 2015 ruling also tied those factual disputes to association obligations. If plaintiffs had voting rights over changes in Tract G, the court said there was a legitimate question whether Terravita Community Association had an obligation to enforce covenants, conditions, or restrictions affecting their property rights.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Order granting plaintiffs leave to amend and requiring the amended complaint to be filed by December 30, 2015.

Download source file

2015-12-22_020_minute-entry.pdf

Source 21 2016-02-25

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry finding all pending motions moot after notice of settlement, placing the case on the dismissal calendar, and vacating the pretrial status conference.

Download source file

2016-02-25_021_status-conference.pdf

FAQ

Was this only a country-club case?

No. Terravita Country Club, Inc. was a defendant, but Terravita Community Association, Inc. was also a defendant, and the August 2015 ruling addressed common-area, use-right, voting-right, and covenant-enforcement questions involving the Community Association.

Why were several claims dismissed in March 2015?

The court found those claims largely premature. Terravita Country Club had not made permanent changes to the courts and had only appointed an ad hoc group to study whether pickleball courts should be incorporated with existing multi-use courts.

Why did the Community Association lose summary judgment?

The court found genuine issues of material fact over whether Tract G was common area, whether the plaintiffs had use rights over it, whether they had voting rights over changes to it, and whether the association had an obligation to enforce covenants, conditions, or restrictions affecting those property rights.

Did the court decide who ultimately controlled Tract G?

No. The August 2015 ruling denied summary judgment because fact issues remained. It did not make a final merits determination on Tract G ownership, use rights, voting rights, or covenant-enforcement duties.

How did the case end?

The collected minute entries end with a February 25, 2016 entry stating that the court received a notice of settlement, found all pending motions moot, placed the case on the dismissal calendar, and vacated a pretrial status conference.

Is this ruling precedent?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This case is useful as a factual example of a common-area and covenant-enforcement dispute, but not as a published appellate rule.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2014-053595 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	August 3, 2015
Judge / panel	Hon. Thomas L. LeClaire, Hon. Susan M. Brnovich
Parties	Ralph Bianco, Wayne Holsinger, Gary Nelson, Don Foster, Sally Foster, and John Walker (Plaintiffs) v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. and Terravita Community Association, Inc. (Defendants)
Topics	CC&RsCovenantsMembershipBoard GovernanceProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted Terravita Country Club's partial motion to dismiss counts challenging discussion-stage club decisions, but later denied Terravita Community Association's summary-judgment motion because genuine issues of material fact remained over Tract G, plaintiffs' use and voting rights, and the association's possible obligation to enforce covenants, conditions, or restrictions affecting those rights.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	21 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	9 roadmap entries
Video overview	Temporarily unavailable while the expanded case record is reviewed
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Terravita members and residents sued Terravita Country Club, Inc. and Terravita Community Association, Inc. over proposed pickleball use of existing multi-use courts and alleged rights in Tract G. In March 2015, the court granted the Country Club's partial motion to dismiss several counts, reasoning that the club had taken no permanent action and that courts do not sit as overseers of minor private-entity decisions still in discussion. In August 2015, the court denied Terravita Community Association's summary-judgment motion because fact issues remained over whether Tract G was common area, whether the plaintiffs had use or voting rights over that area, and whether the association had an obligation to enforce covenants, conditions, or restrictions affecting those property rights. Later entries show amended-complaint practice and then a notice of settlement, with pending motions deemed moot and the case placed on the dismissal calendar.

Key Issues & Findings

On the Country Club motion, the court found the complaint largely premature. Terravita Country Club had not implemented permanent changes to the courts and had only appointed an ad hoc group to study whether pickleball courts should be incorporated with existing multi-use courts. The court stated that it does not sit as an overseer of private-entity activities and would not adjudicate discussion-stage decisions about minor club matters.

On the Community Association motion, the court applied the summary-judgment standard and found genuine issues of material fact. The unresolved questions included whether Tract G was common area in Terravita Country Club, whether the plaintiffs had use rights over that area, whether they had voting rights over changes in Tract G, and whether Terravita Community Association had an obligation to enforce covenants, conditions, or restrictions affecting their property rights.

Why It Matters

This case is useful because it separates two recurring HOA-adjacent problems. A private club's tentative discussion of amenity changes may be too premature for court intervention, especially before any permanent action is taken. But where an association's common-area, use-rights, voting-rights, or covenant-enforcement obligations are genuinely disputed, summary judgment may be inappropriate.

The ruling is not a final appellate rule. It is a superior-court case that settled later, and the main association ruling denied summary judgment because fact issues remained. That makes it a standard case rather than a must-read merits decision.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Merlie v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

The court found uncontroverted CC&R debris violations, entered a permanent injunction, and treated the reasonableness of Val Vista Lakes enforcement as a fact question rather than a summary-judgment issue.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Merlie v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-016976.

Download ruling

Current-status note: Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Merlie v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-016976) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the May 10, 2013 CC&R summary-judgment ruling, the June 20, 2013 permanent-injunction entry, the September 26, 2013 contempt ruling, and the January 23, 2014 settlement/final pretrial entry. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court enforced CC&R debris and nuisance restrictions against neighboring owners because the violations were uncontroverted, but it refused to decide on summary judgment whether Val Vista Lakes had acted reasonably in enforcing the deed restrictions. The final settlement preserved the permanent injunction and gave the HOA a right, not an expanded obligation, to enforce it.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Michael Merlie (Plaintiff)
Homeowner plaintiff who sought enforcement of deed restrictions and injunctive relief.
Debra Merlie (Plaintiff)
Homeowner plaintiff who sought enforcement of deed restrictions and injunctive relief.

Respondent Side

Val Vista Lakes Community Association (Defendant)
Homeowners association accused of failing to reasonably enforce the CC&Rs against the neighboring property owners.
Robert A. Follmer (Defendant)
Neighboring owner subject to the permanent injunction and later contempt ruling.
Lois M. Follmer (Defendant)
Neighboring owner subject to the permanent injunction and later contempt ruling.

Neutral Parties

George H. Foster Jr. (Judge)
Superior Court judge who issued the May 2013 summary-judgment ruling and permanent-injunction entry.
Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
Superior Court judge who handled contempt, compliance, settlement, and final pretrial proceedings.

What happened

Michael and Debra Merlie sued Val Vista Lakes Community Association and neighboring owners over alleged violations of subdivision covenants, conditions, and restrictions. The dispute focused on debris, trash, garbage, unsightly or offensive property conditions, and whether the association had reasonably enforced the deed restrictions.

On May 10, 2013, Judge George H. Foster Jr. granted partial summary judgment for the Merlies against the neighboring owners. The court found the subdivision was subject to deed restrictions; those restrictions barred accumulation of debris, trash, and garbage in a way that made property unsanitary, unsightly, or offensive; and they required trash to be kept in approved covered containers and removed rather than allowed to accumulate. The court found the violations uncontroverted and overwhelming.

The court did not grant summary judgment against Val Vista Lakes. The Merlies argued the association failed to enforce the CC&Rs against the neighbors, but the court found factual issues remained. The record showed the association had taken several actions to enforce the deed restrictions, and whether those actions were reasonable was for the factfinder rather than the judge on summary judgment.

The court later entered a permanent injunction against the neighboring owners. When they did not fully comply, the September 26, 2013 evidentiary-hearing entry found them in contempt and imposed a purge remedy: after the compliance deadline, they would owe the Merlies $60 per day and reasonable attorney fees tied to noncompliance.

The case settled at the January 23, 2014 final pretrial conference. The settlement required the HOA to pay the Merlies $43,500, dismissed the case with prejudice except for the existing injunction, kept the injunction permanent, and stated that both the Merlies and the HOA had the right but not the obligation to enforce it. The settlement also stated that the HOA’s right to enforce the injunction did not create a greater CC&R enforcement obligation than it had for any other property owner.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Merlie v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (CV2011-016976 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). CC&R debris injunction granted, but HOA enforcement reasonableness remained a fact question. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Merlie v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Download source

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-04-07_036_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What CC&R provisions did the court enforce?

The May 2013 ruling enforced deed restrictions barring accumulation of debris, trash, or garbage that made property unsanitary, unsightly, or offensive, and requiring trash to be kept in approved covered containers and removed rather than allowed to accumulate.

Did the court find Val Vista Lakes liable on summary judgment?

No. The court denied summary judgment against the association because the record showed it had taken several enforcement actions and the reasonableness of those actions was a fact question.

What happened to the neighbors?

The court granted injunctive relief against them, later entered a permanent injunction, and then found them in contempt for failing to comply fully.

What did the final settlement say about HOA enforcement?

The settlement gave both the Merlies and the HOA the right but not the obligation to enforce the permanent injunction, and it said the HOA’s enforcement right did not create a greater CC&R enforcement obligation than it had for other property owners.

Why is this case marked must-read?

It contains substantive superior-court analysis of CC&R nuisance restrictions, architectural/deed-restriction enforcement, and the fact question of whether an HOA’s enforcement actions were reasonable.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2011-016976 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	May 10, 2013
Judge / panel	Hon. George H. Foster Jr., Hon. Mark F. Aceto
Parties	Michael and Debra Merlie (Plaintiffs, homeowners) v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (Defendant, homeowners association) and Robert A. and Lois M. Follmer (Defendants, neighboring owners)
Governing law	Rule 56, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 80(d), Ariz. R. Civ. P.
Topics	CC&RsCovenantsSelective EnforcementArchitectural ReviewGood Faith & Fair DealingProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The court granted CC&R injunctive relief against neighboring owners for uncontroverted debris and nuisance violations, but denied summary judgment against Val Vista Lakes because whether the association reasonably enforced the deed restrictions was a fact question. The final settlement preserved the injunction and gave the HOA enforcement rights without expanding its enforcement obligation.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	36 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	Merlie v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

The Merlies sued Val Vista Lakes Community Association and neighboring owners over alleged CC&R violations involving debris, trash, garbage, and unsightly conditions. The superior court granted partial summary judgment and later entered a permanent injunction against the neighboring owners, finding the CC&R violations uncontroverted. But it denied summary judgment against Val Vista Lakes because the association had taken several enforcement actions and the reasonableness of those actions was a fact question. The case later settled, with the HOA paying $43,500 and the permanent injunction continuing without creating a greater HOA enforcement obligation.

Key Issues & Findings

The May 10, 2013 under-advisement ruling treated the subdivision deed restrictions as the operative rule. Those restrictions prohibited debris, trash, and garbage from accumulating in a way that made property unsanitary, unsightly, or offensive, required trash to be kept in approved covered containers, and required rubbish, trash, and garbage to be removed rather than allowed to accumulate. The court found the neighboring owners' violations uncontroverted, unsightly, offensive to a reasonable person, and supported by overwhelming evidence.

That same ruling treated the association claim differently. The Merlies wanted summary judgment that Val Vista Lakes had failed to enforce the CC&Rs against the neighbors. The court denied that request because the record showed the association had taken several enforcement actions. Whether those actions were reasonable was a question for the trier of fact, not a summary-judgment ruling.

The later entries show the injunction had real teeth. The court entered a permanent injunction in June 2013, found the neighboring owners in contempt in September 2013, and imposed daily payments plus attorney-fee exposure as a purge remedy if they did not comply.

At the January 2014 final pretrial conference, the parties put a settlement on the record. The HOA agreed to pay the Merlies $43,500, the case would be dismissed with prejudice except for the permanent injunction, and the injunction would remain in force. The settlement also stated that the HOA could enforce the injunction but had no greater duty to enforce it than it had for any other property owner.

Why It Matters

This case is useful because it separates two issues that often blur together in HOA disputes: whether a neighbor is violating recorded restrictions and whether the association acted reasonably in enforcement. The court was willing to enforce clear CC&R debris restrictions against the neighbor, but it would not decide the HOA enforcement claim on summary judgment where the association had taken some action.

The settlement language also matters. It preserved an HOA enforcement right while expressly avoiding an expanded enforcement obligation. That is a practical model for resolving selective-enforcement and covenant-enforcement disputes without converting one injunction into a broader association duty.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Reilly v. Jackson Builders / Orchard House Condominium Association

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court Condo Case

The court refused to dismiss owner-versus-owner contract and implied-covenant claims based on Orchard House condominium bylaws.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Reilly v. Jackson Builders / Orchard House Condominium Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-010115.

Download ruling

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Reilly v. Jackson Builders / Orchard House Condominium Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-010115) as a public Arizona superior-court condominium case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the November 9, 2023 ruling on the neighboring owners’ motion to dismiss and the March 12 and May 9, 2024 inspection rulings. The court observed that these condominium claims arise within a larger construction-defect lawsuit, so this guide focuses on the condominium bylaw-standing and discovery rulings rather than the underlying construction-defect claims. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court allowed condominium owners to pursue breach-of-contract and implied-covenant claims against neighboring owners based on Orchard House bylaws. The ruling found the bylaws made owners responsible for damage to another private unit and did not give the board exclusive authority to sue over those private-unit damages.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Michal Reilly and Jennifer Reilly (Plaintiffs)
Condominium owners who alleged renovation work below them damaged their private unit.

Respondent Side

Ryan Sieker and Katie Rogers (Defendants / counterclaimants)
Neighboring owners who moved to dismiss the bylaw-based contract claims and later opposed Orchard House's inspection position.
Orchard House Condominium Homeowners Association (Defendant)
Condominium association that participated in the construction-defect dispute and obtained inspection and fee relief.
Jackson Builders of Arizona LLC and Stewart Jackson (Defendants)
Contractor defendants against whom default-judgment proceedings were entered.

Neutral Parties

Scott A. Blaney (Judge)
Superior Court judge who issued the bylaw, inspection, reconsideration, and dismissal-calendar rulings.

What happened

The dispute arose after renovation work in one condominium unit allegedly damaged another owner’s unit in the same Orchard House condominium complex. The plaintiffs sued the neighboring owners, a contractor, the association, and others. The neighboring owners moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract and implied-covenant claims.

On November 9, 2023, the court denied dismissal. The ruling considered the bylaws because they were central to the complaint. The court recognized that covenants can operate as contracts among owners, then focused on bylaw language making an owner responsible for damages to another apartment unit caused by failure to perform required work inside that owner’s own apartment.

The court rejected the argument that only the board could sue. It distinguished private-unit damage from common-area damage, found the bylaws did not clearly give the board exclusive enforcement authority over private-unit damages, and noted the uncertainty of a restriction that would deprive an owner of a common-law remedy.

The later inspection entries involved Orchard House’s attempt to inspect repair work. On March 12, 2024, the court found the requested inspection relevant and proportional, found the neighboring owners had violated a stipulation and Rule 34 by covering the area with drywall, and ordered a new inspection with drywall removal at their expense. On May 9, 2024, the court denied reconsideration and awarded Orchard House reasonable fees and costs for the noncompliance.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Reilly v. Jackson Builders / Orchard House Condominium Association (CV2023-010115 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Condo bylaws supported owner contract claims for private-unit damage despite board-enforcement arguments. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Reilly v. Jackson Builders / Orchard House Condominium Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Download source

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2025-03-20_022_dismissal-calendar.pdf

Source 23 2025-04-28

Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment dismissing the remaining case without prejudice after dismissal-calendar deadlines passed without required action.

Download source file

2025-04-28_023_judgment.pdf

FAQ

Did the court let owners sue other owners under the condominium bylaws?

Yes. The court held the plaintiffs adequately pleaded breach-of-contract and implied-covenant claims based on bylaw language making owners responsible for damage to another private unit.

Did the board have exclusive authority to bring the private-unit damage claim?

No, at least at the pleading stage. The court read the bylaws as giving the board authority over common-area damage, but not exclusive authority over another owner’s private-unit damage claim.

What inspection relief did Orchard House obtain?

The court ordered the neighboring owners to provide inspection dates, make the areas accessible by removing drywall at their expense, and reimburse Orchard House for the expert cost incurred at the failed inspection.

Why is this case marked must-read?

The ruling gives substantive trial-court analysis of condominium bylaws as enforceable covenants and addresses who may sue over private-unit damage under those governing documents.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2023-010115 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	November 9, 2023
Judge / panel	Hon. Scott A. Blaney, Hon. Mary C. Cronin, Hon. Danielle J. Viola, Hon. Joan M. Sinclair
Parties	Michal and Jennifer Reilly (Plaintiffs, condominium owners) v. Jackson Builders of Arizona LLC, Stewart Jackson, Orchard House Condominium Homeowners Association, Ryan Sieker, Katie Rogers, and others
Governing law	Rule 12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(b)(1), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 34, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 37(b)(2)(A), Ariz. R. Civ. P.
Topics	CC&RsCovenantsGood Faith & Fair DealingProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The superior court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded contract and implied-covenant claims based on Orchard House condominium bylaws because the bylaws made owners responsible for damage to another owner's private unit and did not give the board exclusive authority to sue for those private-unit damages.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	23 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	Reilly v. Jackson Builders / Orchard House Condominium Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	4 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In a construction-defect dispute at Orchard House Condominiums, the superior court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' breach-of-contract and implied-covenant claims against neighboring owners. The court treated the condominium bylaws as a contract binding the owners, relied on language making an owner responsible for damage to another private unit, and rejected the argument that only the board could sue. Later, the court enforced Orchard House's agreed Rule 34 inspection against the neighboring owners, required drywall removal at their expense, ordered reimbursement of Orchard House's expert cost, and awarded Orchard House fees and costs after noncompliance.

Key Issues & Findings

The November 9, 2023 ruling began with the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and considered the bylaws because they were central to the claims. The court recognized Arizona law treating deed restrictions and planned-community covenants as contractual, then focused on Article V, Section 4 of the Orchard House bylaws. That provision made each owner responsible for maintenance and repair work within the owner's apartment when failure to do that work would affect another owner, and it expressly referenced damage to another apartment unit.

The court distinguished damage to private units from damage to common areas. It read the bylaws as allowing an individual owner to seek damages for injury to that owner's private unit, while recognizing the board's authority over common-area damage. The ruling refused to infer a board-only veto over private-unit damage claims when the bylaws did not clearly say that, and it questioned whether such a limitation on a common-law remedy would be enforceable.

The discovery rulings were narrower but reinforced the association's litigation role. On March 12, 2024, the court found Orchard House's requested inspection relevant and proportional, found the neighboring owners violated their stipulation and Rule 34 by covering the inspection area with drywall, ordered a new inspection window with drywall removal at their expense, and required reimbursement of Orchard House's expert cost. On May 9, 2024, the court denied reconsideration and awarded Orchard House reasonable fees and costs for the noncompliance.

Why It Matters

This case is useful for Arizona condominium disputes because the court let owners use condominium bylaws as the contract source for private-unit damage claims against other owners. The ruling did not force the dispute through the association board when the claimed harm was to another owner's private unit rather than common area.

It also shows how an association can obtain discovery relief when repair work inside a unit affects claims or defenses in a construction dispute. The court compelled access to the relevant areas, shifted expert costs, and later awarded fees and costs after finding the opposing owners had violated the inspection order.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Dynamite Mountain Ranch HOA v. Larson

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

The HOA’s enforcement case settled by permanent injunction, then produced a $35,000 fee award tied to CC&Rs and litigation conduct.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Dynamite Mountain Ranch HOA v. Larson, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-090015.

Download ruling

Media note: Video/audio is held from this page until a fresh media package is generated from the approved source record.

Scope note: This page covers Dynamite Mountain Ranch HOA v. Larson (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-090015) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the October 1, 2012 summary-judgment ruling, the June 24 and August 27, 2013 sanctions rulings, the October 2, 2013 permanent-injunction entry, and the April 14, 2014 fee ruling. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The HOA did not win early summary judgment, but it later obtained a stipulated permanent injunction and a $35,000 attorneys’ fee award. The fee award rested on the CC&Rs and on sanctions for litigation conduct.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Dynamite Mountain Ranch Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association seeking enforcement relief and attorneys' fees.

Respondent Side

Kay E. Larson (Defendant)
Homeowner defendant against whom fees were assessed.
Constance Jean Goetz-Kirchner (Defendant)
Defendant whose statements led to sanctions findings in the June 2013 ruling.

Neutral Parties

Emmet Ronan (Judge)
Superior Court judge who issued the summary-judgment, sanctions, injunction, and fee rulings.

What happened

Dynamite Mountain Ranch HOA brought an enforcement case involving alleged home-business activity and related homeowner counterclaims. The court denied the HOA’s early summary-judgment motion because fact issues remained on all claims.

As the evidentiary hearing progressed, the HOA moved to strike based on alleged false statements. The court found false statements in pleadings, an affidavit, deposition testimony, trial testimony, and pre-suit communications with the HOA. It found violations of Rules 11 and 26.1, but declined to strike the counterclaim because it preferred resolving cases on the merits when possible.

The court still awarded the HOA fees and costs tied to investigating and discovering the inaccurate information and litigating the motion to strike. It later clarified that fees would be assessed against Larson too.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling awarding the HOA $35,000 in reasonable attorneys' fees under the CC&Rs and prior sanctions ruling after all non-fee issues were resolved by agreement.

Download source file

2014-04-14_020_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 21 2020-07-16

Order

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-07-16_021_order.pdf

FAQ

Did the HOA win summary judgment?

No. The court denied summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed on all claims.

Did the case end with a permanent injunction?

Yes. The October 2, 2013 entry approved the parties’ stipulated permanent injunction.

Why did the court award fees?

The court relied on the CC&Rs and on prior sanctions findings based on litigation conduct, including false statements identified in the June 2013 ruling.

How much did the court award?

The court awarded $35,000 in reasonable attorneys’ fees, less than the HOA’s request of at least $141,735.50.

Why is this case marked standard?

The non-fee merits issues were resolved by agreement, and the written rulings focus mainly on sanctions and fees rather than final interpretation of a specific covenant.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2012-090015 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 14, 2014
Judge / panel	Hon. Emmet Ronan, Hon. David K. Udall
Parties	Dynamite Mountain Ranch Homeowners Association (Plaintiff) v. Kay E. Larson and Constance Jean Goetz-Kirchner (Defendants)
Governing law	Rule 11, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 26.1, Ariz. R. Civ. P. CC&Rs
Topics	CovenantsAttorney FeesProcedureBoard Governance
Outcome / holding	The superior court approved the stipulated permanent injunction and later awarded Dynamite Mountain Ranch HOA $35,000 in attorneys' fees, finding fee entitlement under the CC&Rs and additional fee entitlement based on the defendants' litigation conduct.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	21 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Temporarily unavailable while the expanded case record is reviewed
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Dynamite Mountain Ranch Homeowners Association litigated claims involving whether the HOA or property manager had permitted a homeowner to operate a business in the home and whether the association acted reasonably. The court denied the HOA's early summary-judgment motion because fact issues remained, later sanctioned the defense for false statements by awarding the HOA fees and costs tied to its motion to strike, and approved the parties' stipulated permanent injunction. After the parties resolved all non-fee issues, the court awarded the HOA $35,000 in reasonable attorneys' fees under the CC&Rs and as a sanction for litigation conduct.

Key Issues & Findings

The October 1, 2012 under-advisement ruling denied the HOA's motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed on all claims. The case therefore moved into evidentiary hearings rather than summary disposition.

On June 24, 2013, the court found one defendant had made false statements in pleadings, an affidavit, deposition testimony, trial testimony, and communications with the HOA. The court found violations of Rules 11 and 26.1. It declined to strike the counterclaim because cases should be resolved on their merits when possible, but it awarded the HOA reasonable fees and costs incurred investigating and discovering the inaccurate information and litigating the motion to strike. On August 27, 2013, the court clarified that fees would be assessed against Larson as well.

On October 2, 2013, the court granted the parties' motion and stipulation for permanent injunction and set oral argument on fees and costs. In the April 14, 2014 under-advisement ruling, the court stated the parties had resolved all issues except attorneys' fees. It found the HOA entitled to reasonable fees under the CC&Rs and under the earlier sanctions ruling. Although the HOA requested no less than $141,735.50, the court balanced the case history, possible merit to some homeowner reasonableness arguments, hardship, deterrence, and litigation conduct, then awarded $35,000.

Why It Matters

This case is a practical warning about how quickly HOA enforcement litigation can become a fee fight. The court recognized the burden high fees place on both the membership and the homeowner, but still imposed a significant fee award because of litigation conduct and the CC&R fee basis.

The case is marked standard because the merits of the home-business and association-reasonableness dispute were resolved by agreement. The written rulings are important for sanctions and fees, but they do not finally interpret a specific covenant provision in a way that creates a broader must-read HOA rule.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Labadi v. Bellasera Community Association

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

The court reconsidered and vacated an easement-by-necessity summary judgment involving claimed access through Bellasera’s gated subdivision.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Labadi v. Bellasera Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-050858.

Download ruling

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Labadi v. Bellasera Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-050858) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the January 7 and July 10, 2013 under-advisement rulings and the January 22, 2014 stipulation entry. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Bellasera avoided summary judgment on claimed access through its gated subdivision because the court found factual disputes about intent, plat language, and whether other access existed when the property was sold. The case is useful for HOA road-access disputes but is grounded in easement law rather than HOA statutory interpretation.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Labadi Family Limited Partnership and Osuji Family Limited Partnership (Plaintiffs)
Property owners seeking permanent access through Bellasera's gated subdivision and private roads.

Respondent Side

Bellasera Community Association Inc. (Defendant)
Community association defending against claimed access easements through its subdivision.
Daniel Visconti and Ramona Visconti (Putative intervenors)
Putative intervenors whose motion to intervene was denied when the case was dismissed.

Neutral Parties

Michael D. Gordon (Judge)
Superior Court judge who issued the under-advisement rulings and dismissal judgment.

What happened

Plaintiffs sought permanent access to their property from Scottsdale Road or Lone Mountain Road and claimed an easement through Bellasera’s gated subdivision and private roads. Their theories included express easement, implied easement, easement by necessity, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages for interference with the claimed easements.

On January 7, 2013, the court granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment, finding an easement by necessity. Bellasera moved for reconsideration.

The April 8, 2013 entry set up further briefing and amended pleading on the easement theories. The court directed briefing on whether an additional access way would defeat easement by necessity and whether a recorded plat could grant an express easement when the easement was not reflected in the deed.

On July 10, 2013, the court granted Bellasera’s reconsideration motion. It found that the 1979 deed, preliminary plat, and ambiguous plat language could support plaintiffs’ theory, but the parties’ intent and the existence of outside access remained fact questions. The court concluded the earlier summary judgment was improvidently granted.

In January 2014, while the case was heading toward trial, the parties reached a stipulation tied to a possible Verizon contract. Bellasera agreed to give plaintiffs five business days’ notice before entering such a contract and immediate notice of board approval. The case later settled and was dismissed with prejudice.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Labadi v. Bellasera Community Association (CV2012-050858 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Bellasera won reconsideration because disputed facts remained over claimed access through its gated roads. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Labadi v. Bellasera Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Download 2 sources

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment dismissing the case with prejudice under the parties' stipulation and denying the Viscontis' motion to intervene.

Download source file

2014-06-05_020_judgment.pdf

FAQ

Did the court finally decide that plaintiffs had access through Bellasera?

No. The court first granted partial summary judgment, but later granted Bellasera’s reconsideration motion and found fact questions that had to be resolved outside summary judgment.

What fact questions mattered?

The court identified disputes over the parties’ intent, the meaning of recorded plat language, and whether plaintiffs’ property had access outside Bellasera’s subdivision when the property was sold.

What was the Verizon stipulation?

Bellasera agreed to give plaintiffs five business days’ notice before entering a Verizon contract and immediate notice of any board approval to enter that contract.

Why is this case marked standard?

The case involved HOA-controlled roads, but the substantive analysis was easement, deed, and plat law rather than Title 10, Title 33, or CC&R interpretation.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2012-050858 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	July 10, 2013
Judge / panel	Hon. Michael D. Gordon
Parties	Labadi Family Limited Partnership and Osuji Family Limited Partnership (Plaintiffs) v. Bellasera Community Association Inc. (Defendant)
Governing law	Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P.
Topics	CovenantsProcedureBoard Governance
Outcome / holding	The superior court ultimately vacated its earlier easement-by-necessity summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding that material fact questions remained about intent, plat language, and access outside Bellasera's subdivision.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	20 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	Labadi v. Bellasera Community Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	4 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Plaintiffs sought permanent access to land through Bellasera Community Association's gated subdivision and private roads. The court first granted partial summary judgment for plaintiffs on easement-by-necessity theories, then later granted Bellasera's motion for reconsideration after concluding that fact questions remained about the parties' intent, recorded plats, and whether other access existed when the property was sold. The case later included a stipulation requiring Bellasera to give plaintiffs notice before contracting with Verizon, then settled and was dismissed with prejudice.

Key Issues & Findings

The January 7, 2013 under-advisement ruling granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment on Counts 1 and 2, finding no material fact dispute and recognizing an easement by necessity. That gave plaintiffs an early win on claimed access through Bellasera's subdivision.

After Bellasera sought reconsideration, the court required amended pleading and supplemental briefing. The April 8, 2013 entry allowed plaintiffs to separate express-easement and easement-by-necessity theories, to add an interference-with-easement count, and to brief whether another access route would defeat easement by necessity and whether a recorded plat could grant an express easement when the deed did not reflect it.

On July 10, 2013, the court granted Bellasera's reconsideration motion. The ruling explained that the 1979 deed, preliminary plat, and ambiguous plat language could support plaintiffs' theory, but intent remained a material fact question. The court also held that easement by necessity turned on whether plaintiffs' property had access through land outside Bellasera's subdivision when the property was sold in 1979. Because those issues allowed conflicting interpretations, summary judgment had been improvidently granted.

Why It Matters

The case matters for gated communities because it shows how access disputes can reach association roads and gate control even when the legal analysis is ordinary easement law rather than HOA-specific statutes. Bellasera avoided summary judgment by showing factual disputes over deed language, plats, intent, and alternative access.

It is marked standard because the substantive rulings did not interpret Title 10, Title 33, or a CC&R provision. They are useful background for association road-access disputes, but they are not a broad HOA-governance precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Kokoskov v. Harapko and Grayhawk Community Association

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge denied a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against construction approved through Grayhawk’s architectural-review process.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Kokoskov v. Harapko and Grayhawk Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2026-004481.

Download ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2026-03-30. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Kokoskov v. Harapko and Grayhawk Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2026-004481) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the five collected minute entries, especially the March 26, 2026 evidentiary-hearing entry and the March 30, 2026 under-advisement ruling. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry denies only preliminary relief and states that it does not adjudicate the merits. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court denied emergency relief against construction approved through Grayhawk’s architectural-review process. The moving neighbors raised design-guideline objections, but the court found they had not met the Arizona preliminary-injunction standard and refused to stop the project before a final merits decision.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Igor Kokoskov and Patricia Kokoskov (Plaintiffs)
Neighboring owners who sought temporary and preliminary injunctive relief to stop construction they said violated Grayhawk Design Guidelines.
Elizabeth Fine (Counsel)
Counsel for the Kokoskov plaintiffs in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

Sean Harapko and Alicia Harapko (Defendants)
Neighboring owners whose construction project was challenged by the plaintiffs.
Grayhawk Community Association (Defendant)
Community association whose architectural-review process and design-guideline approval were central to the injunction dispute.
Mark Bainbridge (Counsel)
Counsel for Sean and Alicia Harapko in the minute entries.
Tico Glavas (Counsel)
Counsel for Grayhawk Community Association in the later minute entries.

Neutral Parties

Quintin Cushner (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the evidentiary hearing and denied preliminary injunctive relief.

What happened

The Kokoskovs and the Harapkos own neighboring homes in Grayhawk. The Kokoskovs asked the superior court for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop further construction of a structure on the Harapko property. They argued the structure did not comply with Grayhawk Design Guidelines and caused ongoing harm to privacy, use, and enjoyment.

At the February 19, 2026 return hearing, the court set an in-person evidentiary hearing and declined to grant a stop-work order before evidence was heard. The court ordered expedited briefing, discovery, and exhibit deadlines.

At the March 26, 2026 evidentiary hearing, the court received testimony and exhibits. The plaintiffs presented testimony on design-guideline provisions, including setback and parapet issues, and on privacy, enjoyment, and claimed value impact. The defendants argued the project had association approval, had a City of Scottsdale permit, and was already under construction.

On March 30, 2026, the court denied the preliminary injunction and any remaining TRO request. It found the Kokoskovs had not shown either probable success on the merits plus possible irreparable harm, or serious questions with the balance of hardships tipping sharply in their favor. The court also found public policy mixed and noted the Design Guidelines’ discretionary-review language.

The ruling expressly did not adjudicate the merits. That means the court did not finally decide whether the project complied with Grayhawk’s governing documents; it decided only that the plaintiffs had not justified extraordinary preliminary relief on the record presented.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Kokoskov v. Harapko and Grayhawk Community Association (CV2026-004481 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Preliminary injunction denied against Grayhawk-approved construction under disputed design guidelines. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Kokoskov v. Harapko and Grayhawk Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

This index contains 5 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2026-02-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry giving notice that the court signed an order setting an order-to-show-cause return hearing on the requested temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Download source file

2026-02-04_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2026-02-19

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Return-hearing minute entry setting a March 26, 2026 in-person evidentiary hearing, denying a stop-work order before that hearing, and setting expedited discovery and exhibit deadlines.

Download source file

2026-02-19_002_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 3 2026-03-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry granting the plaintiffs' unopposed request for witnesses to appear virtually at the evidentiary hearing.

Download source file

2026-03-25_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2026-03-26

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Evidentiary-hearing minute entry receiving testimony and exhibits on the requested temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, then taking the matter under advisement.

Download source file

2026-03-26_004_oral-argument.pdf

Source 5 2026-03-30

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying preliminary injunctive relief and any remaining TRO request, while expressly leaving the merits of the Grayhawk design-guideline dispute undecided.

Download source file

2026-03-30_005_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

FAQ

Did the court decide whether the construction violated Grayhawk Design Guidelines?

No. The ruling expressly states that it did not adjudicate the merits. The court denied preliminary relief based on the injunction standard and the record presented.

Why was preliminary relief denied?

The court found the plaintiffs had not shown probable success plus possible irreparable harm, or serious questions with hardships tipping sharply in their favor.

How did association approval matter?

The defendants argued the structure was being built consistent with association approval and a city permit. The court considered reliance on the association review process and city permitting as part of the hardship and public-policy analysis.

What harm did the plaintiffs claim?

The plaintiffs claimed harm to privacy, property use and enjoyment, and asserted property value impact. The court found that showing insufficient to establish irreparable injury before final judgment on this record.

Why is this a standard-significance case?

It involves HOA architectural review and design guidelines, but the ruling is preliminary and expressly leaves the merits undecided. Borderline or non-final superior-court rulings are classified as standard.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2026-004481 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	March 30, 2026
Judge / panel	Hon. Quintin Cushner
Parties	Igor Kokoskov and Patricia Kokoskov (Plaintiffs, neighboring owners) v. Sean Harapko, Alicia Harapko, and Grayhawk Community Association (Defendants)
Topics	Architectural ReviewCC&RsCovenantsProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court denied the requested preliminary injunction and any remaining temporary-restraining-order request. It held that the moving owners had not met the Arizona preliminary-injunction standard and expressly stated that the ruling did not adjudicate the merits.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Kokoskov v. Harapko and Grayhawk Community Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Neighboring owners in Grayhawk sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop construction of a structure they said violated Grayhawk Design Guidelines and harmed privacy, property use, and enjoyment. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied preliminary injunctive relief. The court found the moving owners had not shown probable success plus possible irreparable harm, or serious questions with hardships tipping sharply in their favor. The ruling emphasized that the association had approved the project, a city permit existed, construction was underway, and the court was not finally resolving the competing interpretations of the governing documents.

Key Issues & Findings

The court applied the Arizona preliminary-injunction standard from Shoen, Smith, and related cases. The moving owners focused on setback and parapet provisions in Grayhawk Design Guidelines and presented structural-engineer testimony that the structure would not comply if a minimum parapet were added while staying within height or setback limits. The defendants countered that the structure was being built consistent with association approval and a City of Scottsdale permit.

On likelihood of success, the court did not finally resolve the parties' competing interpretations of the governing documents. It held only that the moving owners had not made the showing required for preliminary relief on the record presented. On irreparable harm, the court found testimony about privacy, enjoyment, and asserted value impact insufficient to show harm that could not be addressed through final judgment, particularly because the dispute turned on contested design-guideline interpretations and the project was already underway.

On hardship and public policy, the court found the balance did not tip sharply toward the moving owners because defendants showed substantial cost and disruption from halting construction. It also found public policy mixed: enforcement of community standards and neighbor privacy weighed one way, while reliance on the association's architectural process, city permitting, and the Design Guidelines' discretionary-review language weighed against extraordinary preliminary relief.

Why It Matters

This ruling is useful as a caution about timing and proof in HOA architectural-review disputes. Even where neighbors raise design-guideline objections, a court may deny emergency relief if the project has association approval, construction is underway, harm can potentially be addressed later, and the moving party cannot satisfy the preliminary-injunction standard.

The case is standard rather than must-read because the ruling is procedural and preliminary. The court expressly did not decide the final merits of the design-guideline dispute. It still belongs in the HOA library because it involves association architectural approval, design guidelines, neighbor objections, and reliance on an association review process.

← Back to Superior Court cases

David B. Vanyo v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners Association

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

The superior-court record shows two major HOA access rulings: waiver of CC&R enforcement in the first trial and private condemnation of an interest in the CC&Rs after remand.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: David B. Vanyo v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2006-011927.

Download judgment entry

Scope note: This page covers David B. Vanyo v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2006-011927) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the October 1, 2007 summary-judgment ruling, the November 20, 2007 verdict entry, the January 23, 2012 under-advisement ruling after remand, the February 2, 2012 verdict entry, and the March 15, 2012 modified-judgment entry. Currency caveat: the minute entries refer to a June 16, 2011 Court of Appeals opinion but do not reproduce that opinion; this page summarizes only what the collected superior-court minute entries state. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Carefree Foothills could not rely on the CC&R single-family-use restriction as an automatic bar to access. A first jury found the association waived enforcement of that restriction. After appellate remand, the superior court took implied way of necessity out of the case, ruled that private-condemnation access would include underground utilities, and a second jury found plaintiffs entitled to condemn an interest in the CC&Rs for a private way of necessity.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

David B. Vanyo (Plaintiff)
Plaintiff seeking access across subdivision property to reach adjacent property.
College Book Centers Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan (Plaintiff)
Plaintiff listed in the case-parties data with David B. Vanyo.
Jeffrey D. Gross (Counsel)
Counsel for plaintiffs throughout the minute entries.

Respondent Side

Carefree Foothills Homeowners Association (Defendant)
Homeowners association defending the CC&R restriction and later acting as class representative after remand.
John P. Dwyer and Janet G. Dwyer (Defendants)
Related defendant class members represented with the association in the minute entries.
Kurt M. Zitzer (Counsel)
Counsel for Carefree Foothills and related defendants in the minute entries.

Neutral Parties

John A. Buttrick (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled the 2007 trial and post-trial rulings.
Katherine Cooper (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled the 2012 remand trial and modified judgment.
Colleen L. French (Judge)
Judge pro tem who handled post-remand scheduling and the 2011 fee ruling.

What happened

Vanyo sought access across property within the Carefree Foothills subdivision to reach adjacent property. The October 1, 2007 ruling framed the key question as whether an implied way-of-necessity easement would allow a road across subdivision property even though all parties agreed such a road would violate the subdivision CC&Rs on their face.

The court denied both sides’ summary-judgment motions. It found factual disputes over whether the property was landlocked, what development would be possible with access, whether road access could connect different parts of the property, whether the association waived the relevant CC&R restriction, and whether plaintiffs had enough evidence to prove an implied way of necessity.

The first jury trial ended on November 20, 2007. The jury answered yes to the special-verdict question asking whether the association had waived the right to enforce the single-family-use restriction in the CC&Rs. The court entered judgment in April 2008 and later denied the defendants’ renewed judgment-as-a-matter-of-law, new-trial, and alter-or-amend motions, stating that the judgment comported with the jury verdict.

The record then resumes after appeal. A 2011 reassignment entry says the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On January 23, 2012, Judge Katherine Cooper ruled that implied way of necessity had already been decided by the appellate court and would not be retried as a claim or defense. The court also ruled that, as a matter of law, access resulting from private condemnation of the CC&R restriction included underground utility access.

The second jury trial ended on February 2, 2012. The jury found plaintiffs entitled to condemn an interest in the CC&Rs for a private way of necessity and set just compensation at zero dollars. On March 15, 2012, the court approved and entered a formal written modified judgment.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of David B. Vanyo v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners Association (CV2006-011927 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Juries found HOA waiver of a CC&R use restriction and later allowed private condemnation of CC&R access. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in David B. Vanyo v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Download source

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment-entry minute entry approving and entering the formal written modified judgment after the remand trial.

Download source file

2012-03-15_046_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

What CC&R restriction was disputed?

The minute entries describe a single-family-use restriction in the subdivision CC&Rs. The proposed access road would violate the CC&Rs on their face unless plaintiffs could establish waiver or another legal path to access.

What did the first jury decide?

The first jury found that Carefree Foothills waived the right to enforce the CC&R single-family-use restriction.

What changed after appeal?

The superior-court record says the appeal was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the court ruled that implied way of necessity had already been decided and would not be retried, while private condemnation of the CC&R restriction remained for the jury.

What did the 2012 under-advisement ruling decide about utilities?

The court held that, as a matter of law, access resulting from private condemnation of the CC&R restriction included access for underground utilities.

What did the second jury decide?

The second jury found plaintiffs entitled to condemn an interest in the CC&Rs for a private way of necessity and set just compensation at zero dollars.

Why are the fee rulings included?

The fee entries show post-verdict consequences and the limits of CC&R fee claims in this record. In 2011, the court denied a CC&R-based fee request as untimely and unproven, denied A.R.S. § 12-341.01 fees as premature, and adopted the Court of Appeals fee-and-cost award.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2006-011927 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	March 15, 2012
Judge / panel	Hon. Kenneth L. Fields, Hon. John A. Buttrick, Hon. Colleen L. French, Hon. Katherine Cooper
Parties	David B. Vanyo and College Book Centers Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan (Plaintiffs) v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners Association and related defendants
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	CC&RsCovenantsSelective EnforcementAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior-court record shows two merits outcomes: first, a jury found Carefree Foothills waived its right to enforce the CC&Rs' single-family-use restriction against the proposed access; after remand, the court removed implied way of necessity from trial, ruled that any private-condemnation access included underground utilities, and a jury found Vanyo entitled to condemn an interest in the CC&Rs for a private way of necessity.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	46 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	David B. Vanyo v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

David Vanyo sought access across property within Carefree Foothills, where all sides agreed the proposed road would violate the subdivision's CC&Rs unless the association had waived enforcement or the restriction could be condemned. In the first trial, the court denied cross-motions for summary judgment because disputed facts controlled issues including landlocked status, development access, and whether the association waived the single-family-use restriction. A jury then found the association had waived the right to enforce that CC&R restriction. After an appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, the superior court held that implied way of necessity was no longer an issue, that private condemnation access would include underground utilities as a matter of law, and a second jury found Vanyo entitled to condemn an interest in the CC&Rs for a private way of necessity with zero compensation owed. A modified judgment was entered in March 2012.

Key Issues & Findings

The October 1, 2007 summary-judgment ruling identified the central issue as whether Vanyo had an implied way-of-necessity easement that would allow construction of a road across subdivision property to reach adjacent property. The court noted that all parties agreed the road would violate the subdivision CC&Rs on their face. But the parties disputed whether the property was landlocked, how it could be developed if northern access existed, whether a road could connect different portions of the property, whether the association waived the relevant CC&R provision, and whether Vanyo had enough evidence to prove an implied way of necessity. Because material factual disputes predominated, the court denied both sides' summary-judgment motions.

At the November 2007 jury trial, the jury answered yes to the special verdict asking whether the association waived the right to enforce the single-family-use restriction in the CC&Rs. The court later entered judgment, set a supersedeas bond, and denied the association's renewed judgment-as-a-matter-of-law, new-trial, and alter-or-amend motions, finding the post-trial motions failed under Rules 50 and 59 and that the judgment comported with the jury verdict.

After the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, the January 23, 2012 under-advisement ruling narrowed the retrial. The court stated that the Court of Appeals had already determined the absence of an implied way of necessity as a matter of law based on the record, so implied way of necessity would not be retried as a claim or defense. The court also held that, as a matter of law, access resulting from private condemnation of the CC&R restriction included underground utility access. The second jury then found Vanyo entitled to condemn an interest in the CC&Rs for a private way of necessity and awarded zero dollars in compensation, followed by a March 2012 modified judgment.

Why It Matters

This case is significant because it treats CC&R enforcement and waiver as fact questions capable of defeating an HOA's effort to block access that otherwise violated recorded use restrictions. It also shows how a CC&R restriction can become the target of a private-condemnation theory after appellate remand, with the superior court separating implied way of necessity from private condemnation and ruling that utility access followed the private-condemnation access as a matter of law.

For association boards and owners, the case is a reminder that recorded restrictions are not self-executing in every factual setting. Past conduct, waiver, access history, and the exact remedy sought can matter. As a superior-court record, it binds only the parties, and the minute entries do not reproduce the full appellate opinion or the modified judgment text; the page summarizes only what the collected superior-court minute entries show.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge held that Desert Mountain lacked standing or contract rights to compel an owner to maintain two recorded lots as one assembled parcel.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2006-052755.

Download ruling

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2006-052755) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the December 10, 2007 and May 7, 2008 under-advisement rulings and the March 18, 2010 judgment-entry minute entry; the complete collected minute-entry set is listed in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is dated March 18, 2010 and states that judgment was signed and entered after the court considered Carpediem’s fee-and-cost request. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Desert Mountain could enforce restrictive covenants and reasonably review future construction plans, but it could not force Carpediem to keep two recorded lots assembled as one parcel. The court held the association was not a party or third-party beneficiary to the city hold-as-one-parcel agreement, so the owner’s development options turned on city consent, the final plat, zoning, and recorded restrictions rather than on an independent association right to compel one-lot treatment.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Carpediem Investments LLC (Plaintiff)
Owner that sought declarations and related relief concerning whether two Desert Mountain lots could be developed separately.
Frederick E. Davidson (Counsel)
Counsel for Carpediem in the minute entries.
Chad R. Kaffer (Counsel)
Counsel for Carpediem in later hearings and scheduling entries.

Respondent Side

Desert Mountain Master Association (Defendant)
Homeowners association that opposed Carpediem's position on the lot assemblage and retained architectural-review and covenant-enforcement authority.
Desert Mountain Owners Association for Gambel Quail, Sunrise and Eagle Feather (Defendant)
Association defendant appearing in the case-parties data.
Mario F. Escudero and Grace T. Escudero (Defendants)
Neighboring owner defendants involved in the lot-assemblage dispute and later sanctions-related proceedings.
Ted Kenny, John Folz, and Realty Executives Inc. (Defendants)
Real-estate defendants who received summary judgment in the December 10, 2007 under-advisement ruling and a February 7, 2008 judgment.
Angela L. Potts (Counsel)
Counsel for Desert Mountain in the minute entries.
Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Desert Mountain in the case-parties data and some minute entries.

Neutral Parties

Paul A. Katz (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the December 2007 and May 2008 under-advisement rulings.
Brian R. Hauser (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled later scheduling, sanctions, settlement, and judgment-entry proceedings.

What happened

Carpediem Investments bought Desert Mountain property that had been treated as one assembled parcel even though the final plat showed two lots. The dispute turned on whether Carpediem could undo that arrangement and develop the property as two separate lots, or whether Desert Mountain and neighboring owners could force the property to remain a single unit.

The December 10, 2007 under-advisement ruling narrowed the case. Judge Paul A. Katz granted summary judgment to the real-estate defendants, denied Carpediem’s own summary-judgment request to declare the lot tie invalid, denied Desert Mountain’s summary-judgment request on negligent misrepresentation and part of the declaratory claim because genuine issues remained, and granted Desert Mountain summary judgment on promissory estoppel.

The key HOA ruling came on May 7, 2008. The court granted Carpediem’s summary-judgment motion against Desert Mountain on the enforceability of the lot assemblage. It held that Desert Mountain did not have standing or contractual rights to compel Carpediem to maintain and develop the property as a single unit. The court reasoned that the association was not in privity with the City of Scottsdale or Carpediem’s predecessor on the hold-as-one-parcel agreement and was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement.

The ruling did not strip Desert Mountain of ordinary HOA powers. The court said the association could enforce restrictive covenants for the association’s benefit, and that Carpediem’s future construction plans remained subject to association approval. But that approval could not be unreasonably withheld, and the association’s review power did not create a separate right to require one-home development if city approval, the final plat, zoning, and restrictive covenants allowed two separate lots.

Later entries focused on trial settings, sanctions procedure, a special-action stay, and settlement. In January 2009 the parties reported a settlement between Carpediem and the association defendants, and the court vacated the sanctions hearing, final pretrial conference, and trial. On March 18, 2010, the court entered a judgment signed three days earlier after finding Carpediem entitled to its requested attorneys’ fees and costs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association (CV2006-052755 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Association could review plans but could not force two recorded lots to stay assembled as one parcel. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Download source

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2009-01-15_036_status-conference.pdf

Source 37 2010-03-18

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment-entry minute entry finding Carpediem entitled to requested attorneys' fees and costs after the court balanced the parties' relative hardships.

Download source file

2010-03-18_037_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

What did the court decide about the two lots?

The court held that Desert Mountain could not compel Carpediem to maintain and develop the two recorded lots as one unit. Carpediem could pursue development consistent with city approval, the final plat, zoning, and restrictive covenants.

Did the ruling eliminate HOA architectural review?

No. The court expressly said prospective construction plans remained subject to association approval, but that approval could not be unreasonably withheld.

Why did Desert Mountain lose the lot-assemblage issue?

The court found Desert Mountain was not in privity with the City of Scottsdale or Carpediem’s predecessor on the hold-as-one-parcel agreement and was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. Without standing or contractual rights under that agreement, the association could not force one-parcel treatment.

What role did the restrictive covenants still play?

The ruling preserved Desert Mountain’s ability to enforce restrictive covenants for the association’s benefit. The key point was that covenant enforcement did not equal an automatic right to require the two platted lots to stay assembled.

How did the case end in the collected minute entries?

The January 2009 entries show settlement with the association defendants and withdrawal of remaining claims between Carpediem and another defendant. The March 18, 2010 entry states that judgment was signed and entered after the court found Carpediem entitled to requested fees and costs.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2006-052755 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	May 7, 2008
Judge / panel	Hon. Paul A. Katz, Hon. Brian R. Hauser
Parties	Carpediem Investments LLC (Plaintiff, owner) v. Desert Mountain Master Association and related defendants
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-349
Topics	CC&RsArchitectural ReviewCovenantsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court held that Desert Mountain Master Association could not compel Carpediem to maintain or develop two recorded lots as one assembled parcel. Carpediem could pursue one combined home or two separate homes if consistent with City of Scottsdale approvals, the final plat, and restrictive covenants, subject to the association's reasonable architectural-review authority.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	37 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Carpediem Investments LLC bought property in Desert Mountain made up of two platted lots that prior owners had treated as one parcel. Desert Mountain and neighboring owners disputed whether Carpediem could undo the lot assemblage and develop the property as two separate lots. The superior court granted Carpediem partial summary judgment against Desert Mountain, holding that the association lacked standing or contractual rights to force the property to remain a single unit. The court preserved the association's right to enforce restrictive covenants and review construction plans, but said that approval could not be unreasonably withheld and did not itself make the two lots legally inseparable. The association defendants later settled, and a final judgment awarded Carpediem attorneys' fees and costs.

Key Issues & Findings

The key May 7, 2008 under-advisement ruling separated the association's covenant-enforcement role from the city's parcel-assembly paperwork. The court found that Desert Mountain was not in privity with the City of Scottsdale or Carpediem's predecessor on the covenant and agreement to hold the property as one parcel, and also was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. On that record, the association lacked standing or contractual rights to compel Carpediem to keep the property assembled as a single unit.

The court still recognized that Desert Mountain could enforce recorded restrictive covenants for the association's benefit. The ruling did not let Carpediem ignore the governing documents. Instead, it held that Carpediem's development options depended on city consent to dissolve the one-parcel agreement and on development being consistent with the city zoning, final plat, and restrictive covenants. The court also noted that prospective construction plans remained subject to association approval, but that approval could not be unreasonably withheld.

The earlier December 10, 2007 ruling had already narrowed the case. It rejected Carpediem's attempt to invalidate the lot tie by summary judgment, granted summary judgment to the real-estate defendants, and granted Desert Mountain summary judgment on promissory estoppel, while leaving genuine issues on negligent misrepresentation and declaratory relief. After the May 2008 ruling, later entries dealt mostly with trial scheduling, sanctions procedure, a stay during a special action, settlement with the association defendants, and the March 2010 final judgment awarding Carpediem fees and costs.

Why It Matters

This case is useful for Arizona HOA readers because it draws a practical boundary around architectural review and covenant enforcement. An association may review plans and enforce recorded restrictions, but this ruling did not let the association convert those powers into a free-standing right to force two city-platted lots to remain assembled as one parcel.

The ruling is especially relevant where a property's history includes lot combinations, hold-as-one-parcel agreements, or neighbor expectations about future development. The court focused on privity, third-party-beneficiary status, the final plat, city approval, and the recorded restrictions. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but it is a detailed example of how a trial court treated HOA authority over lot assemblage and architectural approval.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Steven Piper v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Community Documents & Amenity Rules | Community Barn Program | CV2013-014446

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, plaintiffs Steven and Janet Piper litigated against their equestrian-ranch community association over the community barn. The court held — even though the governing document was “inartfully drafted” — that its plain meaning was clear: a person who decides to keep a horse in the community barn agrees to participate in the barn’s program. Summary judgment was granted to the association on all four of the plaintiffs’ counts, the association’s uncontested counterclaim motion was granted, and the case ended in a settlement.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Steven Piper, et al. v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-014446.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2015-05-12. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Steven Piper, et al. v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-014446) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling that granted the association summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. The minute entries do not restate the parties’ pleadings in detail, so the description of the underlying claims here is limited to what the court’s own rulings say. Currency caveat: the last collected entries show a Notice of Settlement received May 12, 2015 and the case placed on the dismissal calendar for June 16, 2015, with a plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration still in briefing — the collected record ends there, and the final stipulated dismissal or judgment does not appear in it. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association summary judgment on all four counts of the Pipers’ complaint. Based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel, the court found that if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn, they agree to participate in the barn’s program — and that while the governing document “may be inartfully drafted, the plain meaning is clear. If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn’s programs.” The Pipers’ own cross-motion for summary judgment had already been denied from the bench. Weeks later, the association’s separate summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim was granted as uncontested after the Pipers filed no response, and the parties then settled.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Steven Piper (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
First-named plaintiff (the caption reads "Steven Piper, et al.") and counterdefendant on the association's counterclaim.
Janet Piper (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
Plaintiff and counterdefendant who filed an affidavit in September 2014 supporting the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment.
J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the Pipers throughout the collected minute entries; appeared for the plaintiffs at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.

Respondent Side

Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
Community association for the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch community. It won summary judgment on all four of the plaintiffs' counts and, separately, an uncontested summary judgment on its counterclaim before the case settled.
Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the association throughout the collected minute entries; appeared at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.
Lydia Linsmeier (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the association at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.

Neutral Parties

James T. Blomo (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided from mid-2014 onward, heard the February 2015 oral argument, and issued the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling and the April 29, 2015 counterclaim ruling.
Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the February 4, 2014 ruling denying the Pipers' motion to dismiss the counterclaim and ordering the association to state its claim more definitely.
James Morrow (Commissioner)
Court commissioner designated to hear Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings after an application for entry of default on the counterclaim was filed in August 2014; the collected minute entries contain no default ruling.

What happened

Steven and Janet Piper sued the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2013, and the association filed a counterclaim. The collected minute entries do not restate the pleadings in detail, but the court’s dispositive ruling shows what the fight was about: the community barn, and whether a person who keeps a horse there is bound to participate in the barn’s program under the community’s governing document.

The first ruling came on the counterclaim. The Pipers moved in January 2014 to dismiss it for failure to state a claim. On February 4, 2014, Judge Michael J. Herrod denied the motion without oral argument but ordered the association to file an amended pleading stating its claim more definitely. In August 2014 an application for entry of default on the counterclaim was filed against the Pipers; the assigned division took no action on it and routed any Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings to Commissioner James Morrow. No default ruling appears in the collected minute entries.

The case then moved to dueling summary-judgment motions before Judge James T. Blomo. The association filed a verified motion for summary judgment on August 6, 2014, followed by a request for summary disposition under Rule 7.1. The Pipers responded on September 14, 2014 and cross-moved for summary judgment, supported by Janet Piper’s affidavit. The association moved to strike the Pipers’ response; the court denied that motion on September 22, 2014. Briefing closed in late October 2014, and oral argument — originally set for January 30, 2015 — was reset to February 20, 2015.

At the February 20, 2015 argument, J. Roger Wood appeared for the Pipers and Augustus H. Shaw IV and Lydia Linsmeier appeared for the association. After hearing argument, the court denied the Pipers’ cross-motion from the bench and took the association’s motion under advisement. On March 2, 2015, Judge Blomo issued the under-advisement ruling granting the association’s verified motion. Applying the Rule 56 standard, the court found — based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel — that “if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn they agree to participate in the barn’s program,” that “[w]hile the document may be inartfully drafted, the plain meaning is clear,” and that there were no material facts in dispute as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The counterclaim was resolved next. The association, as counterclaimant, filed its own motion for summary judgment on March 17, 2015. The Pipers filed no response, and on April 29, 2015 the court granted the motion under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1, finding it “uncontested, supported by the facts and appropriate.”

The endgame was brief. The Pipers filed a motion for reconsideration and a request to extend the summary-judgment briefing schedule, and on May 11, 2015 the court ordered the association to respond within ten days. The next day, May 12, 2015, the court received a Notice of Settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for June 16, 2015 — unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was submitted by that date, all remaining claims and parties would be dismissed. The collected minute entries end there.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Steven Piper v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (CV2013-014446 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court granted the association’s verified motion for summary judgment on all four of the plaintiffs’… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Steven Piper v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

2013

Steven and Janet Piper sue the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2013-014446); the association counterclaims.

2014-02-04

Judge Herrod denies the Pipers' motion to dismiss the counterclaim and orders the association to file an amended pleading stating its claim more definitely.

Download source

Ruling

2014-08-06

The association files its verified motion for summary judgment.

2014-08-11

An application for entry of default on the counterclaim is filed against the Pipers; the division takes no action and refers Rule 55(b) default proceedings to Commissioner Morrow.

Download source

Default Judgment

Download source

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-05-12_010_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What was this case about?

The minute entries do not restate the complaint or counterclaim in detail, but the court’s March 2, 2015 ruling shows the dispute centered on the community barn at Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch. The decisive question was whether a person who keeps a horse in the community barn is bound to participate in the barn’s program under the community’s governing document. The court found the answer was yes: “If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn’s programs.”

Who won?

The association won every dispositive ruling in the collected record. The court denied the Pipers’ cross-motion for summary judgment from the bench on February 20, 2015, granted the association’s verified motion for summary judgment on all four of the Pipers’ counts on March 2, 2015, and granted the association’s uncontested summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim on April 29, 2015. The parties then settled before a final dismissal appears in the collected entries.

Why did the court rule for the association even though it called the document "inartfully drafted"?

Because imperfect drafting is not the same as ambiguity. The court found that, based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel, the document’s plain meaning was clear — choosing to board a horse in the community barn means agreeing to participate in the barn’s program — and that there were no material facts in dispute on Counts 1 through 4. Under Rule 56, that combination entitles the moving party to judgment without a trial.

What happened with the association's counterclaim?

Early on, the Pipers moved to dismiss it for failure to state a claim; the court denied that motion in February 2014 but ordered the association to replead its claim more definitely. In March 2015, after winning summary judgment on the Pipers’ claims, the association moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim. The Pipers filed no response, and under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 the court granted the motion as uncontested, finding it supported by the facts and appropriate. The minute entries do not describe the counterclaim’s substance.

What is an under-advisement ruling?

When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. The March 2, 2015 ruling in this case is one: after the February 20, 2015 oral argument, the court issued a written decision setting out the Rule 56 summary-judgment standard, its findings about the community barn document, and its order granting the association’s motion. These rulings are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent, and this case ended in a settlement rather than an appellate decision. It is still useful reading: it shows a court enforcing the plain meaning of a community document despite drafting flaws, and it illustrates the procedural cost of leaving a summary-judgment motion unanswered — an unopposed motion can be granted as uncontested under Rule 7.1 and Rule 56(e)(4).

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2013-014446 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	March 2, 2015
Judge / panel	Hon. James T. Blomo, Hon. Michael J. Herrod
Parties	Steven Piper and Janet Piper (Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants) v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Defendant/Counterclaimant)
Topics	CC&RsCovenantsProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the association's verified motion for summary judgment on all four of the plaintiffs' counts, finding that a person who decides to keep a horse in the community barn agrees to participate in the barn's program — the governing document, though "inartfully drafted," had a clear plain meaning — and that no material facts were in dispute; the court separately granted the association's unopposed motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim as uncontested under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	10 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	11 roadmap entries
Video overview	Steven Piper v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Steven and Janet Piper sued the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2013, and the association counterclaimed. The minute entries do not restate the pleadings, but the court's rulings show the dispute centered on the community barn and whether a person who keeps a horse there is bound to participate in the barn's program. After the Pipers' motion to dismiss the counterclaim was denied in February 2014 (with the association ordered to replead more definitely), the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Following a February 20, 2015 oral argument at which the Pipers' cross-motion was denied from the bench, the court issued a March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment on all four counts, finding that anyone who chooses to board a horse in the community barn agrees to the barn's programs and that the governing document's plain meaning was clear despite inartful drafting. In April 2015 the court granted the association's uncontested summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim, and in May 2015 — with a plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration in briefing — the parties filed a Notice of Settlement and the case was set on the dismissal calendar.

Key Issues & Findings

In the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling, the court began with the Rule 56(c) standard: summary judgment is available only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the interests of justice are ordinarily best served by a trial on the merits. The court cited United Bank of Arizona v. Allyn, Gold Insurance Company v. Grishom, City of Tucson v. Sanderson, and Comacho v. Gardner for these propositions before turning to the merits.

Applying that standard, the court found — based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel — that if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn, they agree to participate in the barn's program. The court acknowledged the governing document "may be inartfully drafted" but held "the plain meaning is clear. If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn's programs." Because there were no material facts in dispute as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, the association's verified motion for summary judgment was granted; the Pipers' competing cross-motion had already been denied from the bench at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.

The counterclaim was resolved on procedural grounds. The association filed a summary-judgment motion on the counterclaim on March 17, 2015 and the Pipers filed no response. On April 29, 2015 the court found the motion "uncontested, supported by the facts and appropriate" under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 and granted it. The Pipers then moved for reconsideration and to extend the summary-judgment briefing schedule, and the court ordered a response — but the next day, May 12, 2015, a Notice of Settlement arrived and the court set the case for dismissal on June 16, 2015 unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was filed. The collected minute entries end at that point.

Why It Matters

This case is a compact illustration of how Arizona courts treat imperfectly drafted community documents: inartful drafting does not create ambiguity if the plain meaning is clear. The court enforced the community barn document as written — choosing to board a horse in the community barn meant agreeing to the barn's program — and that single interpretive finding disposed of all four of the homeowners' counts at summary judgment.

It also carries two procedural lessons for HOA litigants. First, an unanswered summary-judgment motion is dangerous: the association's counterclaim motion was granted as uncontested under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 when no response was filed. Second, superior-court cases often end without an appellate answer — here the parties settled while a reconsideration motion was in briefing, so the rulings bind only these parties and set no precedent for other Arizona communities.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&R Amendments & Short-Term Rentals | Kalway v. Calabria Ranch | CV2022-004188

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, homeowner Diana Costain challenged the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association’s authority to adopt a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs banning rentals of less than 30 days. Invoking Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, she argued the original declaration — which allows “rent signs” and lets owners delegate common-area rights to tenants — gave no reasonable notice that short-term rentals could later be prohibited. The court denied her motion to dismiss because terms like “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” are undefined in the CC&Rs and required factual development. The parties settled before the question was ever answered on the merits.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2022-004188.

Download motion-to-dismiss ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2022-12-14. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2022-004188) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling on the motion to dismiss; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated December 14, 2022, shows the court accepted a notice of settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The collected entries do not include a final dismissal order, and the terms of the settlement are not part of the court’s minute-entry record. The court never ruled on the merits of the amendment’s validity. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court denied homeowner Diana Costain’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Whether the Association’s 2020 Fifth Amendment to the CC&Rs — which prohibits rentals of less than 30 days — was properly adopted could not be decided on the pleadings, because key terms in the CC&Rs are undefined: “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent.” The court held that further development of those terms was appropriate during the case, and it noted that Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA — the Arizona Supreme Court amendment-notice decision both sides fought over — was initially addressed by the trial court on summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. The court also held that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. The parties settled about four months later, so the validity of the short-term-rental ban was never decided on the merits.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Villa Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association that adopted the Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs in 2020 prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days; the named plaintiff in this action, which filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction on April 4, 2022.
Chandler W. Travis (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Plaintiff Villa Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. throughout the collected minute entries.

Respondent Side

Diana Costain (Defendant)
Homeowner who purchased her Villa Sendero property in 2013 — a 35,000-square-foot lot containing a home, multiple buildings, and parking. She moved to dismiss, challenging the Association's authority to adopt the short-term-rental restriction.
Mark Bainbridge (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Defendant Diana Costain throughout the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

Joseph P. Mikitish (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the case and issued the August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling denying the motion to dismiss.
John D. Lierman (Judge Pro Tempore)
Judge pro tempore appointed through the court's Alternative Dispute Resolution department; conducted the parties' settlement conference and signed the Civil Settlement Conference Report reflected in the December 14, 2022 minute entry.

What happened

Villa Sendero is a homeowners-association community governed by a recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). Diana Costain purchased her property there in 2013 — a 35,000-square-foot lot containing a home, multiple buildings, and parking — and the property has been subject to the CC&Rs since her purchase. In 2020 the Association adopted an amendment to the CC&Rs, the “Fifth Amendment,” prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days.

The dispute reached Maricopa County Superior Court in 2022 with the Association as the named plaintiff and Costain as the defendant; the Association filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction on April 4, 2022. At an April 22, 2022 return hearing before Judge Joseph P. Mikitish, the parties stipulated to a briefing schedule for a motion to dismiss from Costain, and the court held the Association’s preliminary-injunction application in abeyance until that motion could be argued. Costain filed her motion on May 19, 2022, and the court heard oral argument on June 17, 2022 — a virtual hearing that six residents of the Villa Sendero community also attended.

Costain’s motion framed the core question: could the Association validly adopt a new short-term-rental restriction by amendment? She argued that CC&Rs are contracts interpreted as a matter of law, and that under the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), an original declaration must give owners sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. Here, she argued, the original CC&Rs did not restrict rentals at all and in fact contemplated them — Article VIII allows “rent signs,” and Article III, Section 2 lets a homeowner delegate common-area enjoyment rights to tenants — so the general amendment provision gave her no reasonable notice that rentals under 30 days could later be banned. She also argued the restriction decreased her property’s value.

The Association responded on two fronts. Procedurally, it argued Costain’s Kalway theory failed because she had not filed a declaratory relief action, as the Kalway plaintiff had. Substantively, it argued the original CC&Rs already required each lot to be used only for a single-family residence and prohibited use of the premises for “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes” — so residents had notice of use restrictions from the start, and the amendment merely clarified that prohibited commercial operations include short-term, bed-and-breakfast-style leases. Costain replied that no declaratory counterclaim is required to raise the defense, that the Association was not clarifying an existing restriction but adding a new one untethered to the original CC&Rs, and that a short-term rental is no more a business operation than a long-term rental is.

In an under-advisement ruling issued August 9, 2022, Judge Mikitish denied the motion to dismiss. The court agreed with Costain that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. But it found that key terms and provisions in the CC&Rs — “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” — are not defined, and that further development of those terms was appropriate during the action to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. The court could not conclude at the pleading stage that the complaint failed to support the Association’s allegations, and it noted that Kalway itself was initially addressed by the trial court on motions for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss.

The case then moved toward resolution rather than trial. On September 27, 2022 the court adopted the parties’ stipulated scheduling order, referred the case to the court’s Alternative Dispute Resolution department for a mandatory settlement conference to be held by January 5, 2023, and set a trial setting conference for February 24, 2023. The settlement conference worked: after receiving the Civil Settlement Conference Report signed by Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman, the court on December 14, 2022 accepted the notice of settlement, deemed all pending matters moot, vacated the trial setting conference, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The settlement’s terms do not appear in the minute-entry record, and the validity of the short-term-rental amendment was never decided.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain (CV2022-004188 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court denied the homeowner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that a party need not file a… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

2020

The Association adopts the Fifth Amendment to the CC&Rs, prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days.

2022-04-04

The Association files an Application for Preliminary Injunction in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2022-004188).

2022-04-22

Virtual return hearing before Judge Mikitish. By stipulation, the court sets a briefing schedule for Costain's motion to dismiss, sets oral argument, and holds the preliminary-injunction application in abeyance.

Download source

Oral Argument Set

2022-05-19

Costain files her Motion to Dismiss; the Association responds June 3 and Costain replies June 9.

2022-06-17

Virtual oral argument on the motion to dismiss, attended by six Villa Sendero residents; the court takes the motion under advisement.

Download source

Minute Entry

Download source file

2022-06-17_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2022-08-09

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the Motion.

Download source file

2022-08-09_003_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 4 2022-09-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-09-27_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2022-12-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-12-14_005_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What was this case about?

The validity of an HOA CC&R amendment restricting short-term rentals. In 2020 the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association adopted a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days. Homeowner Diana Costain challenged the Association’s authority to adopt that restriction, arguing the original CC&Rs gave owners no notice that such a ban could later be imposed by amendment.

What is Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA and why did it matter here?

As described in the court’s ruling, Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), is an Arizona Supreme Court decision holding that for CC&Rs to be amended, the original declaration must give sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. Costain relied on it to argue the general amendment clause in Villa Sendero’s CC&Rs gave no reasonable notice that a sub-30-day rental ban could be adopted. The court noted that Kalway was initially addressed by the trial court on summary judgment — a stage with a developed factual record — rather than on a motion to dismiss.

Did the court decide whether the short-term-rental ban was valid?

No. The August 9, 2022 ruling decided only that the question could not be answered on the pleadings. Because the CC&Rs do not define key terms — “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” — the court held further development of those terms was appropriate to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. The case settled in December 2022 before any merits ruling.

Does a homeowner have to file a declaratory judgment action to challenge a CC&R amendment?

Not to raise the issue defensively. The Association argued Costain’s challenge failed because, unlike the Kalway plaintiff, she had not filed a declaratory relief action. The court disagreed, holding that under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs.

How did the case end?

By settlement. The court ordered a mandatory settlement conference in September 2022, and after Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman conducted the conference and submitted a Civil Settlement Conference Report, the court on December 14, 2022 accepted the notice of settlement, deemed all pending matters moot, vacated the trial setting conference, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The settlement’s terms are not part of the minute-entry record.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent — and here the court never even reached the merits of the amendment’s validity. The case is still useful reading: it shows how a Kalway notice challenge to a short-term-rental amendment is litigated, that undefined CC&R terms can keep such a dispute alive past the pleading stage, and that these fights often resolve through court-ordered settlement conferences rather than trial.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2022-004188 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	August 9, 2022
Judge / panel	Hon. Joseph P. Mikitish
Parties	Villa Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Diana Costain (Defendant, homeowner)
Topics	CC&RsProcedureAmendmentsCovenantsRental Restrictions
Outcome / holding	The superior court denied the homeowner's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs, but that whether the Fifth Amendment prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days was properly adopted could not be resolved on the pleadings because key CC&R terms — "single-family residence," "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes," and "rent" — are undefined and require further development; the case settled before any merits ruling.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	8 roadmap entries
Video overview	Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In 2020 the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association adopted a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days. The resulting Maricopa County Superior Court case — filed with the Association as plaintiff, which also applied for a preliminary injunction in April 2022 — turned on homeowner Diana Costain's motion to dismiss, in which she challenged the Association's authority to adopt the restriction. Relying on Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), Costain argued the original CC&Rs gave no reasonable notice that short-term rentals could later be banned: the declaration allows "rent signs" and lets owners delegate common-area rights to tenants. The Association countered that the original CC&Rs' single-family-residence requirement and ban on "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes" gave owners notice, and that the amendment merely clarified that prohibited commercial operations include short-term bed-and-breakfast-style leases. In an August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling, the court denied the motion to dismiss because key CC&R terms are undefined and required factual development. The parties then settled at a court-ordered settlement conference, and on December 14, 2022 the court accepted the notice of settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023.

Key Issues & Findings

The court applied the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard: a claim is dismissed only when the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts, the court looks only to the pleading and its well-pled factual allegations, conclusory statements are insufficient, and factual allegations are assumed true in the light most favorable to the pleading party. Against that standard, Costain argued that CC&Rs are contracts interpreted as a matter of law and that under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA an original declaration must give sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. She pointed to features of the original CC&Rs that contemplate renting — Article VIII allows "rent signs" and Article III, Section 2 permits a homeowner to delegate common-area enjoyment rights to tenants — and argued the general amendment provision gave her no reasonable notice that rentals under 30 days could be prohibited, a restriction she said also decreased her property's value.

The Association raised a threshold procedural objection — that Costain's position failed because she had not filed a declaratory relief action, as the Kalway plaintiff had — and a substantive defense: the original CC&Rs required each lot to be used only for a single-family residence and prohibited use of the premises for "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes," so owners had notice of use restrictions and the amendment provisions could be used to clarify that prohibited commercial operations include short-term, bed-and-breakfast-style leases. Costain replied that the Association was not clarifying an existing restriction but adding a new one untethered to the original CC&Rs, that short-term rentals are consistent with single-family-residence use, and that a short-term rental is no more a business operation than a long-term rental.

The court resolved the motion on two grounds. It first rejected the Association's procedural argument, holding that under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. It then found that key terms and provisions in the CC&Rs — "single-family residence," "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes," and "rent" — are not defined, and that further development of those terms was appropriate during the course of the action to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. Because the court could not conclude at the pleading stage that the complaint failed to support the Association's allegations, and because Kalway itself was initially addressed by the trial court on motions for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss, the motion was denied. The case never reached that developed record: after a September 27, 2022 scheduling order requiring a mandatory settlement conference, the parties settled before Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman, and on December 14, 2022 the court accepted the notice of settlement, deemed pending matters moot, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar.

Why It Matters

Short-term-rental amendments are one of the most contested moves an Arizona HOA can make, and this case shows how a Kalway notice challenge to such an amendment actually plays out in superior court. Two practical points emerge from the ruling. First, the procedural holding: a homeowner does not need to file her own declaratory judgment action to attack an amendment's validity — she can raise it as a defense when the association litigates against her. Second, drafting matters: because Villa Sendero's CC&Rs never defined "single-family residence," "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes," or "rent," the court could not resolve the amendment's validity on the pleadings and sent the dispute into discovery.

The case also illustrates a common endgame. Rather than litigate through summary judgment the way Kalway itself was decided, the parties settled at a court-ordered settlement conference roughly four months after the motion to dismiss was denied, and the case went onto the dismissal calendar. That means the ruling offers no merits answer on whether the 30-day rental ban survives Kalway — and as a superior-court decision it binds only these parties in any event.

← Back to Superior Court cases