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Dreamland Villa is a large retirement subdivision near Mesa, Arizona. For decades after it was first developed, the Dreamland Villa Community Club (DVCC) operated as a voluntary club with voluntary membership. Homeowners had no right, appurtenant to owning a lot, to club membership or to the recreational facilities; there were no common areas and no mandatory assessments, only voluntary dues paid by those who chose to use the facilities. Many owners chose not to join or participate.

DVCC later recorded amendments known as the “Second Amended Declarations” that purported to make membership and assessments mandatory for owners in six sections of the subdivision – sections 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 (the “Six Sections”). When some owners did not pay, DVCC filed collection actions in Maricopa County Superior Court (consolidated under Cause Nos. CC2006-211780 and related numbers), obtaining judgments against homeowners for unpaid assessments, late charges, and interest.

In the first appeal, Dreamland Villa Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010), DVCC appealed the denial of its attorneys’ fees and the homeowners cross-appealed, arguing the Second Amended Declarations were invalid because the original declarations never alerted owners that they could be subjected to assessments. The Court of Appeals agreed with the homeowners, holding the Second Amended Declarations invalid and unenforceable and awarding the homeowners their appellate fees. The mandate directed the trial court to comply with the decision.

On remand, the parties disputed the scope of that ruling. DVCC argued the decision bound only the homeowners who had actually cross-appealed, while the homeowners argued the declarations were invalid as to everyone in the Six Sections. The trial court (the Honorable John Ditsworth) sided with DVCC, entering a judgment on mandate that invalidated the declarations only as to the cross-appellants and declined to address the homeowners’ requests for restitution and for their trial-court attorneys’ fees. The homeowners then filed this petition for special action.

The Court of Appeals first explained why it had jurisdiction: a special action, not an appeal, is the appropriate way to review a trial court’s judgment entered on remand under an appellate mandate, because such a judgment is based on the appellate court’s specific directions and is not itself appealable. Reviewing the trial court’s compliance with the Raimey mandate presented a pure question of law.

On the merits, the court held the trial court had erred. Deed restrictions are a contract among all lot owners and, absent contrary language, must apply uniformly to every lot; a covenant cannot be invalid as to some owners yet enforceable against others without creating a “patchwork quilt” of restrictions. Because Raimey conclusively held the declarations invalid, DVCC was collaterally estopped from enforcing them against anyone in the Six Sections – the court compared this to a facial invalidation of a statute, which bars all enforcement, not just enforcement against the challenger. The court rejected DVCC’s “voidable” theory and its reliance on the dicta in Armstrong v. Ledges about later purchasers with notice, holding the declarations invalid as to all owners regardless of purchase date, and correcting the trial court’s omission of section 18.

Finally, the court addressed remedies. It held that owners who had paid the vacated judgments were entitled to restitution with interest (subject to equitable reduction if DVCC could show a particular owner used the facilities); that petitioners could record a notice of invalidity so the public record would reflect the ruling; and that petitioners’ broadly worded appellate fee request preserved their right to seek the attorneys’ fees they had incurred in the superior court, warranting reconsideration of pre- and post-appellate fees on remand. The court awarded petitioners their fees for the special action and denied DVCC’s request for sanctions.

Raimey is one of the leading Arizona decisions – frequently paired with Kalway v. Calabria Ranch – limiting a community association’s power to use a generic amendment provision to impose new affirmative burdens, such as mandatory assessments, that owners were never alerted to when they bought. It confirms that once a court holds such an amendment invalid, the invalidity runs to the whole affected community: the association cannot enforce the covenant against later purchasers or against neighbors who sat out the litigation, because deed restrictions must be applied uniformly and an invalid restriction is not cured by the timing of a lot purchase. The decision is also a practical roadmap for what happens after a homeowner wins. It confirms that a special action – not an appeal – is the proper vehicle to police a trial court that misreads an appellate mandate on remand; that owners who already paid assessments under the invalidated declarations are entitled to restitution with interest; that owners may record a notice of invalidity so the title record reflects the ruling; and that a broadly worded appellate fee request can preserve the right to recover trial-court fees, even where the specific pre-appellate fees were not itemized. For associations and owners alike, it underscores that CC&R amendments creating new financial obligations are vulnerable, and that the consequences of losing extend community-wide.

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