Tag Archives: board-governance

The takeaway

Case Participants

What happened

Woodmar IV Association, Inc. is a homeowners association; Paul S. Rubin, Inc., doing business as PRM Association Management, is the property-management company that previously managed the community. The Association filed its complaint on July 31, 2017, alleging that while PRM managed the property it stole approximately $244,000 from the association. As the case developed, the Association’s claims included breach of contract, negligence, and conversion, built on allegations that PRM economically damaged the Association by mismanaging its funds, failing to keep accurate financial records, and failing to properly disclose those records to the Association.

The case began on the compulsory-arbitration track. At a January 2018 telephonic status conference, Judge Joshua D. Rogers vacated a scheduled arbitration hearing and extended the arbitration deadline while the Association’s motions to amend the complaint and to vacate arbitration were briefed. In March 2018 the court granted the Association’s motion to amend the complaint after oral argument, and in June 2018 — under the parties’ joint scheduling order — it referred the case to a mandatory settlement conference to be held by the end of November 2018.

Discovery became the center of the case. After PRM failed for roughly a year to allow entry onto its premises and forensic inspection of its computers, the Association moved to compel in June 2018; Judge David J. Palmer granted that motion by an order entered September 25, 2018. PRM moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things that the material was privileged because of a fiduciary duty owed to individual homeowners. In a January 30, 2019 under-advisement ruling the court rejected that argument — finding correct the Association’s position that an association owes no fiduciary duty to individual members, so its agent-manager owes none either — and denied reconsideration. The next day the court ruled on the Association’s motion for discovery sanctions: striking PRM’s answer and entering a default judgment of $244,567.00 was “too extreme” at that point, but the court warned it would seriously reconsider such sanctions if PRM kept delaying, and it awarded the Association additional attorneys’ fees and costs. In June 2019, with no response from PRM, the court set those at $8,000.00 in fees and $54.20 in costs.

The forensic-inspection fight continued into 2019. After an April status conference, the court ruled on April 29, 2019 that the Association could remove imaged copies of data from PRM’s computer servers, laptop and desktop computers, and QuickBooks files from PRM’s premises for off-site examination, rejecting PRM’s insistence that review happen only at its offices with its own expert “looking over their shoulder.” When PRM sought “clarification” in May 2019 to protect attorney-client material — an issue the court noted had never before been raised — the court on August 12, 2019 simply added a clawback protocol: if the Association received a document reasonably deemed privileged, it must stop reading it, make no use of it, and notify opposing counsel. The same day, the court denied PRM’s request to transfer the case to Commercial Court as impermissibly late under either version of Rule 8.1.

PRM’s main merits attack also failed. Its motion for judgment on the pleadings argued the Association had not complied with contractual conditions precedent — notice of the alleged breach, a 30-day opportunity to cure, and an offer to mediate. In an April 3, 2019 under-advisement ruling the court denied the motion, noting the Association’s arguments that the cure provision presupposed an ongoing business relationship that no longer existed, that the parties had actually mediated unsuccessfully, and that the Association had offered to dismiss the litigation to mediate — an offer PRM refused. The same ruling granted the Association leave to file a second amended complaint adding a punitive-damages claim based on information turned up in discovery, applying Rule 15(a)(2) and Owen v. Superior Court and finding no unfair prejudice since no trial date had been set. The court denied PRM’s motions to reconsider that ruling on April 30 and again on August 9, 2019.

The endgame came quickly. On August 14, 2019 the court set oral argument on the Association’s renewed motion to reconsider sanctions, to which PRM had filed no response in sixty days. One week later, on August 21, 2019, a Notice of Settlement was received; the court vacated the argument and placed the case on its dismissal calendar for October 21, 2019, to be dismissed unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was submitted first. The collected minute entries do not disclose the settlement terms.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings

The takeaway

Case Participants

What happened

Darryl J. Roberts, Ann K. Roberts, and the Darryl J. Roberts / Ann K. Roberts Qualified Trust sued in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2016-011505), naming as defendants four homeowners associations — Windy Walk Homeowners Association, Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association, Troon Mountain Community Association, and Skye Top at Troon Homeowners Association — four individuals the court’s ruling refers to collectively as the Individual Committee Member defendants (Michael Kieffer, George Howison, Richard Shenkus, and Richard Fretland), and the Cost-Sharing Committee of the Third Amended and Restated Master Easement and Cost-Sharing Agreement. The operative pleading was a First Amended Verified Complaint that attached the Windy Walk CC&Rs as Exhibit A and the Cost-Sharing Agreement as Exhibit B.

On June 27, 2017, the four associations and the four individual defendants jointly filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs responded on July 14, 2017, and the moving defendants replied on July 26, 2017. Judge Connie Contes set oral argument for September 14, 2017, then reset it to September 18, 2017 because of a calendar conflict. At the September 18 hearing, Mark Bainbridge appeared for the plaintiffs and Daxton R. Watson and Thomas Brent Demmitt appeared for the defendants on behalf of Michael H. Orcutt; after argument, the court took the motion under advisement.

In its November 16, 2017 under-advisement ruling, the court denied the motion. It began with the settled framework: Rule 12(b)(6) motions are not favored under Arizona law, dismissal is permitted only when a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof, and the court must accept the nonmoving party’s material factual allegations as true. The defendants’ motion rested substantially on asserted pleading deficiencies — they highlighted conclusory statements and general accusations in paragraphs 23, 29, 35, 36, and 42 of the First Amended Complaint — but the court found that paragraphs 30-32, 39, and 44-50 complied with Arizona’s notice-pleading standards, which require only that a complaint give the opponent fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim. The court added that even a deficient complaint must ordinarily be given an opportunity to be cured by amendment before dismissal, and that if the defendants did not fully understand the claims, the mandatory disclosure process — followed if necessary by a summary-judgment motion under the Celotex principle adopted in Orme School — was the more effective and efficient tool.

The ruling also sorted out the governing law. The court held that the defendants’ reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3304(B)(2) of the Nonprofit Corporation Act and the Rohde case was misplaced and inapposite; the more applicable statutory sections were A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830, which set the general standards and rebuttable presumption for the acts, omissions, and discharge of duties of committee members, along with A.R.S. §§ 10-11602 and 10-11620. Beyond the statutes, the court stated that the rights and obligations of the plaintiff and the defendants are governed by the terms of the CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement attached to the complaint. The denial was without prejudice but came with conditions: before filing any new or renewed motion to dismiss based on pleading deficiencies, the parties had to meet and confer — through personal, not written, communication — about whether an amendment or disclosure statement could cure the problem, and any renewed motion had to certify that the conference occurred. The plaintiff, for its part, was ordered to serve a detailed, fact-specific disclosure statement within 30 days.

The later collected entries show the case grinding through discovery. On August 9, 2018, pursuant to signed orders regarding a motion to compel and a motion to amend the complaint, the court excused the assigned arbitrator. On September 7, 2018 the plaintiff filed a Motion for Rule 37(b) Sanctions for failure to comply with a court order, which was fully briefed by October 8. In its November 19, 2018 ruling, the court noted this was the second time it had been asked to review the defendants’ failure to provide the same discovery, and rejected as meritless the defendants’ contention that responding fifty days after a court order — without communication, conferring, or ‘some form of professional courtesy’ — was not a failure to obey. For the second time, the court found the plaintiff entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for having to pursue the motion, though it deferred setting the amount until the submission of concluding documents; the other requested relief was denied at that time. The court also warned that if the case proceeded to trial, the trier of fact could be permitted to consider the untimely discovery as bearing on a party’s credibility. That sanctions ruling is the last collected minute entry, so the ultimate outcome of the case does not appear in this record.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Darryl J. Roberts, et al. v. Windy Walk Homeowners Association, et al. (CV2016-011505 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court denied the eight moving defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without prejudice, holding… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Darryl J. Roberts, et al. v. Windy Walk Homeowners Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings

The takeaway

Case Participants

What happened

Bellasera is an Arizona community governed by CC&Rs, with Bellasera Community Association, Inc. responsible for monitoring and supervising the community consistent with those documents. Richard and Darlene Rudner are homeowners in Bellasera, where they have resided since 2005. The Original and Amended CC&Rs authorize the Association’s board to “adopt rules which modify, cancel, limit, create exceptions to, or expand the Use Restrictions” attached to and incorporated in the CC&Rs.

On September 22, 2022, the Bellasera board amended the “Vehicles and Parking” use restriction set forth in subparagraph (g) of Exhibit C to the Amended CC&Rs. As relevant here, the amendment provided: “Except as specifically provided in subsections 3 and 8 below, no more than one (1) passenger vehicle, SUV or pickup truck may be parked on a driveway of a home in Bellasera overnight,” with “overnight” defined as midnight to 6:00 a.m. The Rudners demanded that the Association rescind the change; the Association refused, and this lawsuit followed. The Rudners did not challenge the amendment’s language on overnight street parking — only the prohibition on parking more than one vehicle on a private driveway.

The case’s early procedural steps were brief. The Association filed a motion to dismiss on March 9, 2023, then withdrew it by notice filed March 27, 2023, and the court formally withdrew the motion on March 30, 2023. The parties then moved directly to cross-motions for summary judgment: the Rudners filed their motion on April 17, 2023, the Association filed its response and cross-motion on May 22, 2023, and briefing closed with the Association’s reply on June 26, 2023. Judge Timothy J. Ryan heard oral argument on July 12, 2023 via the Court Connect remote platform and took the matter under advisement.

In an under-advisement ruling dated September 6, 2023, the court granted the Rudners summary judgment. It noted the parties did not dispute the relevant facts and found the case controlled by the principles of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), which the court described as substantially briefed and explained in the Rudners’ motion papers, incorporated by reference. Applying Kalway, the court held the September 22, 2022 change regarding the number of vehicles on a private driveway “was not foreseeable”: the CC&Rs and use restrictions did not give the Rudners sufficient notice, because “[t]he subject and character of the previous parking restrictions pertains to parking locations, not number of vehicles or parking hours.” The mere fact that the board holds a general power to amend, the court explained, does not create foreseeability. The court concluded the new restriction was unreasonable and “an unauthorized restriction on the use of private property.”

The court also rejected a threshold procedural defense, holding A.R.S. § 10-3304 inapplicable: the Rudners had standing to challenge an ultra vires corporate act, making a derivative action unnecessary. The court granted the Rudners’ motion for summary judgment and denied the Association’s cross-motion as moot. In a footnote, the court observed that the Rudners’ counsel had been the prevailing party’s counsel in Kalway itself.

The case then concluded by agreement on the form of relief. The parties submitted a Stipulation for Entry of Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction, and the court signed the formal Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction, which the Clerk entered on September 26, 2023; a September 27, 2023 minute entry approved and settled the judgment. No appeal appears in the collected minute entries.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Richard Rudner v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (CV2023-002424 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Kalway invalidated an unforeseeable CC&R amendment expanding architectural enforcement authority. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Richard Rudner v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings

The takeaway

Case Participants

What happened

Regency House is a community governed by recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) under which the owners share ownership of common elements that include the parking garage and parking areas (Section 1.7). The plat recorded with the CC&Rs was incorporated into them by reference (Section 1.20) and specifically identified the individual parking spaces in the first and second basement plans as they existed in April 1979. Michael Lyon was assigned parking space P-238 when he purchased his apartment in 2009. In September 2019, the parking garage was altered with new parking spaces and loading zones. Lyon sued Regency House Association and a co-defendant in 2020, asserting claims that included breach of contract (Count 1), gross negligence (Count IV), and injunctive relief and/or specific performance (Count 6).

The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss. After a virtual oral argument on December 4, 2020, Commissioner Andrew J. Russell granted the motion as to the gross-negligence count against all defendants and denied it as to every remaining count. The court then referred the parties to a mandatory settlement conference through its Alternative Dispute Resolution office. In June 2021 the defendants sought expedited reconsideration of the motion-to-dismiss ruling; Judge Joan M. Sinclair ordered briefing, noting “the confusion relative to the order in the minute entry filed on December 7, 2020 and the change in judicial officers,” and Commissioner Russell denied the motion on July 23, 2021.

In October 2021 Lyon moved for partial summary judgment on his breach-of-contract and injunctive-relief/specific-performance counts. His theory was that the parking spaces identified on the recorded plat could not be altered without following Section 24 of the CC&Rs, which requires any change, modification, or rescission of the Declaration to be made by a recorded instrument signed by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and by all institutional first mortgagees. After oral argument on March 25, 2022, Judge Sinclair denied the motion in an April 15, 2022 under-advisement ruling. Although the court observed that “[a]t first blush, it appears that the parking spaces cannot be altered without following the Section 24 requirements,” it pointed to the board’s authority over the “use” of parking under Sections 6, 7, and 21.9 of the CC&Rs and its power under the Bylaws to adopt rules and to provide for maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common elements, and concluded a reasonable juror could find no breach — so summary judgment was inappropriate.

Lyon moved for reconsideration on June 7, 2022, supported by exhibits and a declaration of Paul Bakalis. In its September 6, 2022 ruling, the court explained that it had been “unfortunately unaware” of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022), when it decided the original motion. In Kalway, the Arizona Supreme Court held that even a procedurally proper majority-vote amendment fails if the original declaration did not give homeowners sufficient notice of the change, because “allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.” The inquiry turns on the objective, reasonable expectations of homeowners based on the declaration in effect when they purchased.

Applying Kalway, the court found that no vote of 75% of the owners had been taken under Section 24; that the recorded plat — incorporated into the Declaration — specifically identified the parking spaces as they originally existed; and that “[a]dding parking spots within the already cramped parking structure was not contemplated within the CC&Rs.” Lyon’s spot and the other owners’ spots from P-237 to P-246 were disproportionally affected. The board’s general authority under Section 4.2 to “maintain, repair, replace, administer and operate the Property” did not extend to the completed alteration of the parking areas, because those changes were substantial and unforeseen — especially with no homeowners’ vote. The court added that the defendants did not dispute Lyon’s measurements showing the three parking spaces behind P-237 to P-246 were illegal under City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance 702(B)(2)(a), and that “[i]llegal parking spaces are not something that a homeowner could reasonably expect.” It granted reconsideration, vacated the April ruling, granted Lyon’s motion for summary judgment, and directed him to file a proposed order by September 30, 2022.

The case then resolved by agreement. The court received a Notice of Settlement filed October 21, 2022, and on October 25, 2022 it placed the matter on the dismissal calendar for dismissal of all remaining claims and parties on or after January 25, 2023 — unless a judgment, stipulation of dismissal, or extension intervened — and deemed all pending motions moot. The collected minute entries end there; they do not show the final dismissal order or the settlement’s terms.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings

The takeaway

Case Participants

What happened

Sunland Village Community Association formerly allocated its annual assessment among members using a formula based in part on the number of residents in each unit. Rene Bishop was one of the members who benefitted from that formula — her share of the common expenses was less than what some of her neighbors paid. In late 2014 the Association’s board adopted a resolution placing on the annual ballot an amendment to the community’s CC&Rs under which every residential unit would pay the same amount regardless of the number of occupants. A “ballot document” explained the effect: using the 2015 budget, a single residential unit’s assessment would be about $414, meaning a single occupant would pay roughly $86 more per year (about $7 per month) and a two-occupant unit about $59 less. Copies went to every member who requested an early ballot and were placed in each voting booth. The members approved the resolution by majority vote in January 2015.

The reallocated assessment was collected for the first time in January 2016, and Bishop’s payment rose about thirty percent, from $328 to $425. She sued the Association and thirteen individually named defendants in Maricopa County Superior Court, alleging breach of the CC&Rs — Article XI, Section 3, which refers any per-unit regular assessment increase of more than ten percent to a vote of the members — along with breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which bars a regular assessment more than twenty percent greater than the prior year’s without majority member approval. In her view, those rules required the board to determine her specific payment amount before the vote, to put that specific amount on the ballot, and to put the increase into effect immediately upon approval.

The early motion practice split. On May 26, 2016, after oral argument, Judge John R. Hannah Jr. denied the Association’s motion to dismiss, finding that homeowners who are not similarly situated to Bishop were proper parties who could appear and argue their position if they chose, but were not necessary parties. On August 15, 2016, however, the court dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association. The contract claim failed against the directors individually because they are not parties to the contract between the plaintiff and the Association, and the statutory claim failed because A.R.S. § 33-1803 limits the power of the association but creates no cause of action against individual directors. The court acknowledged that an HOA director can be personally liable for dishonest or bad-faith actions on behalf of the association, citing Albers v. Edelson Technology Partners L.P., but found the amended complaint alleged no specific facts supporting an inference of dishonesty or bad faith — a letter from the plaintiff’s lawyer opining that the directors’ actions were illegal was “not enough.”

In January 2017 the court referred the parties to a mandatory settlement conference and set oral argument on the Association’s motion for summary judgment and Bishop’s cross-motion for summary judgment; in March it added Bishop’s motion to certify the case as a class action to the same hearing. On April 14, 2017 the court heard argument on all three motions and took them under advisement.

The June 12, 2017 under-advisement ruling resolved the case. Assuming for the sake of discussion that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and Article XI, Section 3 applied at all — the Association had argued that merely reallocating the existing assessment is not an “increase,” a question the court found unnecessary to decide — the 2015 resolution satisfied both provisions. The statute’s plain language requires only “the approval of the majority of the members of the association,” which the HOA obtained, and it says nothing about the timing of the vote, the ballot language, or board approval of the ballot document; Bishop cited nothing in election law or Title 33 mandating the steps she said were required. The contract and good-faith claims failed for lack of any evidence of a material breach: the reasonable expectation under the CC&Rs was that a substantial assessment increase would be submitted to a fair vote of adequately informed members, which is what happened, and nothing in the ballot document was incorrect or materially misleading. The one-year delay before the new allocation took effect, if anything, benefitted Bishop, and the refund she sought would have forced the Association to disgorge revenues already received and spent — an outcome the court called tantamount to a forfeiture. The court granted the Association summary judgment, denied Bishop’s cross-motion, and denied the class-certification motion as moot.

The endgame was brief. On July 6, 2017 the court noted a joint notice of settlement and a stipulation extending the attorneys’-fees application deadline, placed the case on the dismissal calendar, and vacated all pending hearings. On August 28, 2017 the court approved and entered a formal stipulated judgment against Plaintiff Rene Bishop — the final entry in the collected minute-entry record.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association (CV2016-051857 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Member vote validly approved equalizing annual assessments under A.R.S. § 33-1803 and the CC&Rs. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings

The takeaway

Case Participants

What happened

Safari Drive is a condominium complex containing both residential and commercial units, governed by the Safari Drive Condominium Association, a non-profit corporation run by a board of directors. First Service Residential Arizona, LLC is the complex’s property manager, and Suzanne Hawk is the management company’s general manager. JIMBO, LLC owns a first-floor business condominium in the complex; Oleg Bortman is JIMBO’s managing member and operates a real estate brokerage called The Brokery out of that unit — set up, in part, with the expectation that The Brokery would be in a uniquely favorable position to market units in the complex.

Bortman and JIMBO sued the Association, the management company, Hawk, and five board members (Brenda Vogel, Dirk Claussen, Fritz Beesmeyer, Michael Brady, and Charlie Ray) in Maricopa County Superior Court. Their First Amended Complaint pleaded five counts: defamation (libel and slander), interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and injunctive relief. The defamation and interference counts centered on the Association’s “September 27 Newsletter,” which contained a simple list of recent sales in the complex; plaintiffs alleged the sales were cherry-picked so that the only sale listed for The Brokery was an under-market sale. The interference count also pointed to allegations that units were listed with another broker, that The Brokery was refused electronic promotional monitors near windows and an open-air event in the common area, and that at a November 12, 2024 open session the Board announced Bortman had filed a “frivolous and meritless” lawsuit. The contract counts rested on the Board Members Code of Conduct, which plaintiffs alleged each director signs on joining the board.

The defendants moved to dismiss on January 13, 2025. After full briefing, the court heard oral argument on March 21, 2025 — simultaneously with two Rule 26(D) discovery disputes — and took the motion under advisement, ordering that the clock for responding to the plaintiffs’ discovery would start on the ruling date if the motion were granted, and that the plaintiffs could not serve the defendants by email absent an agreement.

On March 25, 2025, Judge Michael Herrod issued an under-advisement ruling dismissing the complaint without prejudice. On the defamation and interference counts, the court found that even if the allegations were true they applied to The Brokery — a business whose relationship to the plaintiffs the complaint never explained — so Bortman and JIMBO lacked standing to sue on its behalf; that the newsletter’s facts “were true, even if not complete,” and therefore could not be defamatory; and that the statement that the lawsuit was frivolous and meritless was a non-actionable statement of opinion under Takieh v. O’Meara, because it does not imply a false assertion of fact. The Code of Conduct claims failed because association members are not overtly named as third-party beneficiaries, so the Code is not a contract an individual member can sue on. Injunctive relief was denied because “[t]he Court cannot order the Board or the Association ‘not to say that'” — defamation law deters conduct through damages. Finally, the court held the individual directors could not be individually liable where no specific acts by specific directors were identified, and that the management company and Hawk, as agents of the Board and Association, were not appropriate parties. The court ordered the defendants to submit a proposed form of judgment and a fee application.

The fee fight then played out over the spring. The defendants applied for attorneys’ fees and costs on April 8, 2025, invoking A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (actions arising out of contract) and § 12-349 (claims without substantial justification, harassment, delay, or discovery abuse). In an April 30 minute entry the court signaled it would deny § 12-341.01 fees because, although the case was pleaded partly in contract, the matter did not arise out of contract, and it set oral argument on the § 12-349 request. After the June 13, 2025 argument, the court’s June 16, 2025 under-advisement ruling denied the application entirely. Analyzing Mullins, Colberg, and Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., the court explained that a defendant who defeats a contract claim can still recover § 12-341.01 fees, but here the tort of defamation “has nothing to do with the Board Members Code of Conduct” — the tort and contract theories were not intertwined, and the case “sounded primarily in tort.” As for § 12-349 sanctions, even accepting the defendants’ account, sanctions were not appropriate because “the claims were arguable until the parties fully developed the claims in the proceedings on the motion to dismiss.”

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Oleg Bortman v. First Service Residential Arizona, LLC, et al. (CV2024-031553 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court dismissed the First Amended Complaint without prejudice: Bortman and JIMBO, LLC lacked standing… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Oleg Bortman v. First Service Residential Arizona, LLC, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings

The takeaway

Case Participants

What happened

Edward Trenton Albarracin and Gretchen Marie Zamjahn own a home in Scottsdale inside the Troon Fairways Homeowners Association; the complaint alleged the property is also part of Troon Village Association and subject to its CC&Rs. Under the governing CC&Rs, the association is contractually obligated to maintain the common areas, including the gate at the community’s entrance off Happy Valley Road. On February 18, 2023, Douglas J. Cordano went to the residence to administer IV injections to the owners. Security cameras recorded Patrick Gruchala — who in the preceding days had entered a business deal regarding his own home with Mr. Albarracin or Mr. Albarracin’s company — walking southbound past the driveway, then running into the driveway and shooting into Mr. Cordano’s driver’s-side window eight times at point-blank range before fleeing north on foot and, moments later, riding a bicycle south on Alma School Road. It is undisputed that the entrance gate was not functioning that day, had been inoperative for days or weeks, and had been left open at the direction of board president Jeffrey Kinney.

Merrick Avenue Management, LLC, Mr. Albarracin, and Ms. Zamjahn sued Troon Village Association, Cornerstone Properties, Inc., Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association, individual owners and board members, and Amcor Property Professionals, Inc. in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2023-008406), asserting negligence claims that all related to the open gate. Mr. Cordano brought his own case (CV2023-012338), in which Mr. Albarracin and Ms. Zamjahn appeared as defendants. The originally assigned judge, Jay Ryan Adleman, disqualified himself in September 2023, and the case was reassigned to Judge Katherine Cooper. On September 18, 2023, Judge Cooper denied Troon Village Association and Cornerstone’s motion to dismiss, finding the complaint adequately alleged that the TVA CC&Rs are the source of a contractual duty to maintain Common Areas, including the gates. On October 12, 2023, she denied Amcor’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion as well, while noting the ruling did not decide that Amcor actually owed a duty and did not preclude a later summary-judgment motion. In January 2024, all counsel stipulated to consolidating the two cases under CV2023-008406.

Through 2024 the case moved through amended scheduling orders: the trial-setting conference originally set for November 2024 was reset several times, ultimately to August 12, 2025, and Judge Scott Minder assumed the calendar effective June 21, 2024. Meanwhile, default applications against consolidated defendants Patrick Gruchala and Carrie A. Luikens were referred to Commissioner Richard Albrecht, and at a December 2024 order-to-show-cause hearing Ms. Luikens was ordered to appear for a deposition the following January.

On January 29, 2025, Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association and individual defendants Kinney, North, Friedman, Weintraub, Jaffe, and Gold moved for summary judgment on all counts. After oral argument on April 30, 2025, Judge Minder granted the motion the same day in an under-advisement ruling. The court explained that the inoperative gate underlay every claim, so the plaintiffs had to be able to show a jury that Mr. Gruchala entered the community through the Happy Valley Road gate. The undisputed video evidence pointed the other way: he approached the residence from the north, fled north after the shooting, and was recorded moments later on a bicycle on Alma School Road. The plaintiffs admitted they had no evidence he came through the gate and relied on a jury inference, but the court walked through the implausible alternative scenarios such an inference would require and concluded it was not reasonable on the record. A fallback theory — that the long-open gate let the shooter scout the area on an earlier date — was rejected as pure speculation.

The ruling is notable for what the defense did not win. On duty, the court followed Gfeller v. Scottsdale Vista North Townhomes Association and held that the CC&Rs’ allocation of common-area maintenance to the association creates a negligence duty — the association owed the owner plaintiffs, and their invitees, a duty to maintain the gate as part of the common areas. Citing Perez v. Circle K, the court refused the defendants’ invitation to define the duty narrowly as one to prevent an unforeseeable shooting, because that would intertwine duty with breach and causation. It rejected Mr. Cordano’s separate business-invitee theory against the association, since the association had not invited him for business purposes, but still extended the maintenance duty to residents’ invitees. On causation, the court said that if there had been a reasonable basis to conclude the shooter came through the gate, causation would have been for the jury — evidence suggested the association knew of prior security incidents potentially related to the open gate. And among the individual defendants, only Mr. Kinney and Shari Weintraub served on the board on the day of the shooting; the evidence linked only Mr. Kinney to the decision to leave the gate open, so all individual defendants except Mr. Kinney (and Ms. North as his spouse) would have been dismissed in any event. The court also observed that no complaint pleaded a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

The collected minute entries end in mid-2025 with the case still active. The Troon Fairways defendants filed motions for entry of judgment and attorneys’ fees in May 2025 but withdrew them in June. On June 19, 2025, after an evidentiary default hearing at which Mr. Cordano testified, Commissioner Albrecht entered default judgments against Mr. Gruchala and Ms. Luikens. The claims involving Troon Village Association, Cornerstone Properties, and Amcor — whose own summary-judgment motion had been noted at the April 30 argument — were not resolved in the collected minute entries.

Procedural timeline

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