Lis Pendens & CC&Rs | A.R.S. §§ 12-1191, 33-420 | 219 Ariz. 391
In this published 2008 decision, Division One held that an association’s action merely to enforce existing CC&Rs does not ‘affect title to real property,’ so its recorded lis pendens was groundless, and it vacated the fee award to limit recovery to the wrongful-recordation counterclaim.
Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Association v. Bartschi; 219 Ariz. 391, 199 P.3d 646.
Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.
The rule in one sentence
A homeowners’ association’s lawsuit to compel a homeowner’s compliance with existing, already-recorded CC&Rs is not an action ‘affecting title to real property’ under A.R.S. § 12-1191(A); any compliance injunction would be personal to the homeowner and would not run with the land, and any lien for future self-help expenses was not yet ripe. The recorded lis pendens was therefore groundless, exposing the association to statutory damages and fees under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). The court affirmed liability and the $5,000 statutory-damages award but vacated the attorneys’-fee award and remanded so that only fees attributable to the wrongful-recordation counterclaim—not the defense of the separate CC&R enforcement complaint—are recovered.
Case Participants
Neutral Parties
- Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Association (Appellant)
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant; an Arizona non-profit corporation that sued to enforce the community’s CC&Rs and recorded the lis pendens later found groundless. - Carla Bartschi (Appellee)
Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Appellee; a Santa Fe Ridge homeowner who counterclaimed for wrongful recordation under A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and prevailed. - Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
Ekmark & Ekmark, L.L.C.
Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant Santa Fe Ridge HOA (Scottsdale). - Penny L. Koepke (Counsel)
Ekmark & Ekmark, L.L.C.
Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant Santa Fe Ridge HOA (Scottsdale). - Quentin T. Phillips (Counsel)
Ekmark & Ekmark, L.L.C.
Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant Santa Fe Ridge HOA (Scottsdale). - John Friedeman (Counsel)
John Friedeman, PC
Counsel for Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Appellee Carla Bartschi (Phoenix). - Ann A. Timmer (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Authored the opinion of the court. - Diane M. Johnsen (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Judge; concurred in the opinion. - Jon W. Thompson (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge; concurred in the opinion.
What happened and why it matters
Carla Bartschi owned a home in the Santa Fe Ridge planned community in Glendale, Arizona, subject to the community’s recorded Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). In November 2006, the Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Association sued her for breach of contract and injunctive relief, alleging she had failed to maintain her landscaping, remove trash and debris from her front yard, and remove a large crate from her lot. Four days after filing, the association recorded a notice of lis pendens against her property under A.R.S. § 12-1191(A). Bartschi counterclaimed for wrongful recordation under A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the lawsuit did not ‘affect title to real property.’ The trial court ultimately agreed, granted her summary judgment, ordered the lis pendens removed, and awarded $5,000 in statutory damages plus $11,110 in attorneys’ fees and $422.20 in costs; it later dismissed the association’s complaint after Bartschi corrected the maintenance issues. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed that the lis pendens was groundless, holding that a suit merely to compel compliance with already-recorded CC&Rs does not affect title, because any injunction would be personal to the owner and would not run with the land. The court vacated the fee award, however, holding fees under § 33-420(A) could be awarded only for the wrongful-recordation counterclaim, not for defending the association’s separate, arguably meritorious enforcement complaint.
Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, the court first addressed timing. It agreed with the association that A.R.S. § 12-1191(A) plainly permits a lis pendens to be recorded when a complaint is filed, and it read the trial court’s remarks not as requiring a prior judgment or lien but as observing that the relief sought would not affect title unless a monetary judgment or lien was later obtained on future events. The dispositive question, therefore, was whether the underlying action was one ‘affecting title to real property.’
Guided by Evergreen West, Inc. v. Boyd, the court explained that a lis pendens is groundless only when the claim that the action affects title has no arguable basis or is unsupported by any credible evidence, and that this inquiry does not turn on the merits of the underlying claim. Applying Tucson Estates, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court accepted that an action affecting rights ‘incident to’ title falls within the statute, but read that principle narrowly: a lawsuit affects a right incident to title only if a judgment would expand, restrict, or burden the owner’s rights as bestowed by that title. In Tucson Estates the plaintiffs sought to establish and enforce an implied covenant that would bind future owners; here, by contrast, the association sought only to enforce existing CC&Rs whose validity Bartschi did not dispute. Any injunction would be personal to Bartschi, would not run with the land, and would not alter rights already burdened by the recorded CC&Rs. The court also found the purposes of § 12-1191 unserved, because future purchasers took subject to the recorded CC&Rs and could not defeat the association’s ability to obtain relief.
The court then rejected the association’s lien theory under Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom Partnership. Merely requesting a lien does not make an action one affecting title; there must be a basis to conclude a lien would actually be imposed. Because the association’s lien depended on future events—Bartschi’s noncompliance with an injunction, the association’s incurring self-help expenses, and her refusal to reimburse them—the claim was anticipatory and not ripe, so the recordation was groundless and premature. The court further held the association waived, and in any event could not show error on, the scienter element of § 33-420(A): the situation was readily distinguishable from Tucson Estates, and because the association’s president signed the notice of lis pendens, counsel’s knowledge that the recording was groundless was imputed to the association. Finally, applying Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc., the court held the CC&R enforcement complaint was separate and distinct from the wrongful-recordation counterclaim, so § 33-420(A) fees were limited to the counterclaim; it vacated the fee award and remanded, denied the association’s request for appellate fees, and awarded Bartschi her reasonable fees on appeal.
This published 2008 decision is a leading Arizona authority on when a homeowners’ association may record a lis pendens against a member’s property during a governing-documents dispute. It draws a clear line: a routine action to enforce existing, already-recorded CC&Rs—demanding that an owner maintain landscaping, clear debris, or remove an object—does not ‘affect title to real property’ and therefore does not authorize a lis pendens. Because the recorded CC&Rs already burden the land and any compliance injunction is personal to the current owner, recording a lis pendens in that setting is groundless and can trigger mandatory statutory damages of at least $5,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, under A.R.S. § 33-420(A).
For associations and their counsel, the decision is a caution against reflexively clouding an owner’s title during a CC&R dispute; a lis pendens generally becomes appropriate only once the association has a ripe basis for a lien or a judgment that actually affects title, not while relief remains anticipatory. For owners, it confirms a powerful remedy against improperly recorded documents. The opinion also refines fee awards under § 33-420(A): even a homeowner who defeats an improper lis pendens cannot recover fees for defending the association’s separate, arguably meritorious enforcement claim, because unrelated claims that could have been litigated separately must be parsed under Schweiger v. China Doll.
Step-by-step litigation record
FAQ
Can an HOA record a lis pendens when it sues to enforce CC&Rs?
Generally no. The Court of Appeals held that a lawsuit merely to compel a homeowner’s compliance with existing, already-recorded CC&Rs is not an action ‘affecting title to real property’ under A.R.S. § 12-1191(A). Because the CC&Rs already burden the land and any compliance injunction is personal to the current owner, recording a lis pendens in that situation is groundless.
What is a lis pendens, and when may it be recorded?
A lis pendens is a recorded notice that gives prospective purchasers and lenders constructive notice of a pending lawsuit that may affect title to real property. It may be recorded when the complaint is filed, but only if the underlying action actually affects title or a right incident to title—meaning a judgment would expand, restrict, or burden the owner’s rights as bestowed by that title.
Why didn’t the association’s request for a lien make the case one ‘affecting title’?
The court, following Coventry Homes v. Scottscom Partnership, explained that merely asking for a lien does not make an action one affecting title; there must be a basis to conclude a lien would actually be imposed. Here the potential lien depended on future events—Bartschi failing to obey an injunction, the association incurring self-help expenses, and her refusing to reimburse them—so the claim was anticipatory and not yet ripe.
What happens if an HOA records a groundless lis pendens?
Under A.R.S. § 33-420(A), a party who records a document claiming an interest, lien, or encumbrance while knowing or having reason to know it is groundless or invalid is liable to the property owner for statutory damages of at least $5,000 plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. The association was ordered to pay Bartschi $5,000 in statutory damages.
Why did the Court of Appeals vacate the attorneys’ fee award?
Applying Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, the court held the association’s CC&R enforcement complaint was separate and distinct from Bartschi’s wrongful-recordation counterclaim. Fees under § 33-420(A) could be awarded only for the counterclaim, not for defending the separate, arguably meritorious enforcement complaint, so the fee award was vacated and remanded for recalculation.
Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?
Yes. This is a published opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, reported at 219 Ariz. 391, 199 P.3d 646 (App. 2008); the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on January 6, 2009. As a published opinion, it is precedential authority.
Case Dossier
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Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 219 Ariz. 391, 199 P.3d 646 |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Court of Appeals |
| Decision / key date | July 29, 2008 |
| Judge / panel | Ann A. Timmer (Judge, author), Diane M. Johnsen (Presiding Judge, concurring), Jon W. Thompson (Judge, concurring) |
| Parties | Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Association (Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant) v. Carla Bartschi (Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Appellee) |
| Governing law | |
| Topics | cc-and-rsliensattorneys-feesprocedure |
| Outcome / holding | A homeowners’ association’s lawsuit to compel a homeowner’s compliance with existing, already-recorded CC&Rs is not an action ‘affecting title to real property’ under A.R.S. § 12-1191(A); any compliance injunction would be personal to the homeowner and would not run with the land, and any lien for future self-help expenses was not yet ripe. The recorded lis pendens was therefore groundless, exposing the association to statutory damages and fees under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). The court affirmed liability and the $5,000 statutory-damages award but vacated the attorneys’-fee award and remanded so that only fees attributable to the wrongful-recordation counterclaim—not the defense of the separate CC&R enforcement complaint—are recovered. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | No raw source-folder files found for this slug |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 10 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 0 download links |
Key Issues & Findings
Carla Bartschi owned a home in the Santa Fe Ridge planned community in Glendale, Arizona, subject to the community’s recorded Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). In November 2006, the Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Association sued her for breach of contract and injunctive relief, alleging she had failed to maintain her landscaping, remove trash and debris from her front yard, and remove a large crate from her lot. Four days after filing, the association recorded a notice of lis pendens against her property under A.R.S. § 12-1191(A). Bartschi counterclaimed for wrongful recordation under A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the lawsuit did not ‘affect title to real property.’ The trial court ultimately agreed, granted her summary judgment, ordered the lis pendens removed, and awarded $5,000 in statutory damages plus $11,110 in attorneys’ fees and $422.20 in costs; it later dismissed the association’s complaint after Bartschi corrected the maintenance issues. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed that the lis pendens was groundless, holding that a suit merely to compel compliance with already-recorded CC&Rs does not affect title, because any injunction would be personal to the owner and would not run with the land. The court vacated the fee award, however, holding fees under § 33-420(A) could be awarded only for the wrongful-recordation counterclaim, not for defending the association’s separate, arguably meritorious enforcement complaint.
Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, the court first addressed timing. It agreed with the association that A.R.S. § 12-1191(A) plainly permits a lis pendens to be recorded when a complaint is filed, and it read the trial court’s remarks not as requiring a prior judgment or lien but as observing that the relief sought would not affect title unless a monetary judgment or lien was later obtained on future events. The dispositive question, therefore, was whether the underlying action was one ‘affecting title to real property.’
Guided by Evergreen West, Inc. v. Boyd, the court explained that a lis pendens is groundless only when the claim that the action affects title has no arguable basis or is unsupported by any credible evidence, and that this inquiry does not turn on the merits of the underlying claim. Applying Tucson Estates, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court accepted that an action affecting rights ‘incident to’ title falls within the statute, but read that principle narrowly: a lawsuit affects a right incident to title only if a judgment would expand, restrict, or burden the owner’s rights as bestowed by that title. In Tucson Estates the plaintiffs sought to establish and enforce an implied covenant that would bind future owners; here, by contrast, the association sought only to enforce existing CC&Rs whose validity Bartschi did not dispute. Any injunction would be personal to Bartschi, would not run with the land, and would not alter rights already burdened by the recorded CC&Rs. The court also found the purposes of § 12-1191 unserved, because future purchasers took subject to the recorded CC&Rs and could not defeat the association’s ability to obtain relief.
The court then rejected the association’s lien theory under Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom Partnership. Merely requesting a lien does not make an action one affecting title; there must be a basis to conclude a lien would actually be imposed. Because the association’s lien depended on future events—Bartschi’s noncompliance with an injunction, the association’s incurring self-help expenses, and her refusal to reimburse them—the claim was anticipatory and not ripe, so the recordation was groundless and premature. The court further held the association waived, and in any event could not show error on, the scienter element of § 33-420(A): the situation was readily distinguishable from Tucson Estates, and because the association’s president signed the notice of lis pendens, counsel’s knowledge that the recording was groundless was imputed to the association. Finally, applying Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc., the court held the CC&R enforcement complaint was separate and distinct from the wrongful-recordation counterclaim, so § 33-420(A) fees were limited to the counterclaim; it vacated the fee award and remanded, denied the association’s request for appellate fees, and awarded Bartschi her reasonable fees on appeal.
This published 2008 decision is a leading Arizona authority on when a homeowners’ association may record a lis pendens against a member’s property during a governing-documents dispute. It draws a clear line: a routine action to enforce existing, already-recorded CC&Rs—demanding that an owner maintain landscaping, clear debris, or remove an object—does not ‘affect title to real property’ and therefore does not authorize a lis pendens. Because the recorded CC&Rs already burden the land and any compliance injunction is personal to the current owner, recording a lis pendens in that setting is groundless and can trigger mandatory statutory damages of at least $5,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, under A.R.S. § 33-420(A).
For associations and their counsel, the decision is a caution against reflexively clouding an owner’s title during a CC&R dispute; a lis pendens generally becomes appropriate only once the association has a ripe basis for a lien or a judgment that actually affects title, not while relief remains anticipatory. For owners, it confirms a powerful remedy against improperly recorded documents. The opinion also refines fee awards under § 33-420(A): even a homeowner who defeats an improper lis pendens cannot recover fees for defending the association’s separate, arguably meritorious enforcement claim, because unrelated claims that could have been litigated separately must be parsed under Schweiger v. China Doll.