Elections & Open Meetings | A.R.S. §§ 33-1812, 10-3304 | 2 CA-CV 2012-0129
How an Arizona planned community lawfully elected its board entirely by mail-in ballot, and why a homeowner’s after-the-fact challenge to the procedure failed on standing and justiciability grounds.
Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Joan Tober, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc., an Arizona nonprofit corporation; and Rick Hanson, Mark Levine, George Luis, Lee Rayburn, Bob Small, Chris Shipley, and Les Shipley, Defendants/Appellees; 2 CA-CV 2012-0129.
Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.
The rule in one sentence
Under A.R.S. section 33-1812, a planned community association may conduct its board election exclusively by mail-in ballots counted before the annual meeting; the statute does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting, and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804, does not require elections to occur at an open meeting. A member’s suit against the board challenging such procedures is derivative, and, absent a justiciable controversy, it cannot support injunctive relief, so summary judgment and the attorney-fee award for the association were affirmed.
Case Participants
Neutral Parties
- Joan Tober (Plaintiff/Appellant)
Mandatory member of Civano 1 who challenged the 2011 board election conducted exclusively by mail-in ballot. - Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Defendant/Appellee)
Arizona nonprofit corporation managing a Tucson planned community; conducted the challenged mail-in board election. - Rick Hanson (Defendant/Appellee)
Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee. - Mark Levine (Defendant/Appellee)
Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee. - George Luis (Defendant/Appellee)
Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee. - Lee Rayburn (Defendant/Appellee)
Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee. - Bob Small (Defendant/Appellee)
Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee. - Chris Shipley (Defendant/Appellee)
Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee. - Les Shipley (Defendant/Appellee)
Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee. - Elizabeth D. Bushell (Counsel)
Elizabeth D. Bushell, P.L.C.
Tucson attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Joan Tober. - Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (Counsel)
Monroe, McDonough, Goldschmidt & Molla, P.L.L.C.
Tucson attorney for Defendants/Appellees Civano and its board. - Philip G. Espinosa (Judge)
Court of Appeals judge who authored the memorandum decision. - Garye L. Vasquez (Judge)
Presiding Judge on the Court of Appeals panel; concurred. - Virginia C. Kelly (Judge)
Judge on the Court of Appeals panel; concurred.
What happened and why it matters
Joan Tober, a mandatory member of the Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, a Tucson planned community, sued the association and the members of its board of directors after the 2011 board election was conducted exclusively by mail-in ballots that were counted before the association’s annual meeting. She alleged the board breached its statutory obligations under A.R.S. section 33-1812 by not allowing votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot, and she sought injunctive relief under A.R.S. section 10-3304 after withdrawing her breach-of-contract and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and board and awarded them attorney fees and costs, and Tober appealed only the ruling on her breach-of-statutory-duty claim. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative and could not proceed as a direct action because she alleged no injury unique to herself, that neither the CC&Rs nor section 10-3304 authorized her particular statutory claim as pleaded, and that her challenge to the completed 2011 election and to speculative future elections presented no justiciable controversy for injunctive relief. The court added that, in any event, section 33-1812 does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting. It also upheld the attorney-fee award and awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal.
The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo because the material facts were undisputed, and it treated capacity to sue as a question of law. It first held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative rather than direct. An action by an association member is derivative when the gravamen is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of members without any severance among individual holders. A member may sue directly only if she has a relationship with the wrongdoer apart from her membership, the wrongdoer owes her a duty for a reason other than membership, or her injury is unique to her rather than shared by the association. Tober alleged none of these; she asserted only a “personal stake in how her community is run,” and her theory was that Civano members as a whole were disadvantaged by the mail-in procedure. Because she did not follow the demand and standing requirements for a derivative suit under A.R.S. sections 10-3631 and 10-3632, that claim was properly dismissed.
The court next rejected the two authorities Tober said permitted her direct statutory claim. The CC&Rs’ section 16.1 gives owners a right to enforce the community documents, but Tober conceded her statutory claim was independent of the contract, and A.R.S. section 33-1812 could not be read into the CC&Rs because it was enacted after the CC&Rs were executed. A.R.S. section 10-3304 does let a planned community member sue the association to enjoin an ultra vires act, and the court agreed Tober could in theory bring such a claim. But injunctive relief was unavailable: she did not try to enjoin the 2011 election before it was finalized, and a completed election cannot be undone on that ground; her request to control future elections was speculative, unsupported by any showing of likely future harm, and therefore not a justiciable controversy.
Finally, and in any event, the court held the mail-in procedure did not violate section 33-1812. The statute’s phrase “if absentee ballots are used” shows absentee voting is optional, and the statute expressly allows voting by “some other form of delivery” such as mail; it does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections occur at the annual meeting, and section 33-1804 requires only that meetings be open, not that elections happen at them. The court affirmed the attorney-fee award under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and section 16.2 of the CC&Rs, noting that voluntarily dismissing the contract claims did not defeat a contract-based fee award and that the missing hearing transcripts were presumed to support the trial court’s discretion.
For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision illustrates how planned community election procedures are measured against A.R.S. section 33-1812 and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804. The court read section 33-1812 to permit an association to elect directors entirely by mail-in ballot, with ballots counted before the annual meeting, and concluded the statute does not compel in-person voting at every election or require that the election itself take place at the annual meeting. It also underscores a practical timing lesson: a member who believes an election procedure is unlawful generally must seek to enjoin it before the vote is finalized, because courts are reluctant to unwind a completed election or to issue advisory relief about future, speculative elections.
The opinion is an unpublished memorandum decision, so under Rule 28 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure it is not precedent and generally may not be cited as legal authority; it is offered here only as a neutral, educational illustration of how these HOA-governance statutes have been applied. The decision also highlights procedural mechanics that recur in HOA disputes, including the derivative-versus-direct distinction for suits against a board and the risk that a member who loses such a suit may owe the association’s attorney fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and a fee-shifting provision in the CC&Rs. The homeowner was represented by Elizabeth D. Bushell of Elizabeth D. Bushell, P.L.C., and the association and its board by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt of Monroe, McDonough, Goldschmidt & Molla, P.L.L.C.
Step-by-step litigation record
FAQ
What was the dispute in Tober v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association?
Joan Tober, a mandatory member of the Civano 1 planned community in Tucson, challenged the association’s 2011 board election, which was conducted exclusively by mail-in ballots that were counted before the annual meeting. She argued the board violated A.R.S. section 33-1812 by not allowing votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot, and she sought injunctive relief. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and board, and Tober appealed only her breach-of-statutory-duty claim.
Did A.R.S. section 33-1812 require the HOA to hold in-person voting?
No. The Court of Appeals held that section 33-1812 does not require in-person voting at every election. The statute’s phrase ‘if absentee ballots are used’ shows absentee voting is optional, and the statute expressly allows voting by ‘some other form of delivery,’ such as mail-in ballot. The court also held the statute does not require the election to be held at the annual meeting, and that the open-meeting law (A.R.S. section 33-1804) requires only that meetings be open to members, not that elections occur at them.
Why was Tober’s claim against the board members treated as derivative?
The court explained that a member’s suit is derivative when the gravamen is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of members rather than an injury unique to the individual. A member can sue directly only if she has a relationship with the wrongdoer apart from membership, is owed a duty for a reason other than membership, or suffered a unique injury. Tober alleged none of these, asserting only a ‘personal stake in how her community is run,’ so her claim was derivative and, because she did not follow the derivative-suit procedures in A.R.S. sections 10-3631 and 10-3632, it was properly dismissed.
Why did the request for an injunction fail?
Although the court agreed a planned community member may in theory sue the association under A.R.S. section 10-3304 to enjoin an unauthorized act, Tober was not entitled to an injunction. She did not seek to enjoin the 2011 election before it was finalized, and a completed election cannot be undone on that ground. Her attempt to control future elections was speculative, unsupported by any showing of likely future harm, and therefore presented no justiciable controversy; courts do not issue advisory relief about hypothetical future conduct.
Why did the homeowner have to pay the association’s attorney fees?
The trial court awarded the association and board their attorney fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 (fees in a contract action) and section 16.2 of the CC&Rs, which provides that the successful party in litigation to enforce the Declaration is entitled to fees. The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion, noting that voluntarily dismissing the contract claims did not defeat a contract-based fee award and that the missing hearing transcripts were presumed to support the trial court. It also awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal.
Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?
No. This is an unpublished memorandum decision from Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals. Under Rule 28 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, it does not create legal precedent and generally may not be cited as authority except as the rules allow. It is presented here only as a neutral, educational illustration of how these HOA-governance statutes have been applied.
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 2 CA-CV 2012-0129 |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Court of Appeals |
| Decision / key date | March 12, 2013 |
| Judge / panel | Philip G. Espinosa, Garye L. Vasquez, Virginia C. Kelly |
| Parties | Joan Tober (Plaintiff/Appellant) v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc., and its individual board members (Defendants/Appellees) |
| Governing law | |
| Topics | electionsopen-meetingscc-and-rsprocedureattorneys-fees |
| Outcome / holding | Under A.R.S. section 33-1812, a planned community association may conduct its board election exclusively by mail-in ballots counted before the annual meeting; the statute does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting, and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804, does not require elections to occur at an open meeting. A member’s suit against the board challenging such procedures is derivative, and, absent a justiciable controversy, it cannot support injunctive relief, so summary judgment and the attorney-fee award for the association were affirmed. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | No raw source-folder files found for this slug |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 9 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 0 download links |
Key Issues & Findings
Joan Tober, a mandatory member of the Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, a Tucson planned community, sued the association and the members of its board of directors after the 2011 board election was conducted exclusively by mail-in ballots that were counted before the association’s annual meeting. She alleged the board breached its statutory obligations under A.R.S. section 33-1812 by not allowing votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot, and she sought injunctive relief under A.R.S. section 10-3304 after withdrawing her breach-of-contract and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and board and awarded them attorney fees and costs, and Tober appealed only the ruling on her breach-of-statutory-duty claim. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative and could not proceed as a direct action because she alleged no injury unique to herself, that neither the CC&Rs nor section 10-3304 authorized her particular statutory claim as pleaded, and that her challenge to the completed 2011 election and to speculative future elections presented no justiciable controversy for injunctive relief. The court added that, in any event, section 33-1812 does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting. It also upheld the attorney-fee award and awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal.
The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo because the material facts were undisputed, and it treated capacity to sue as a question of law. It first held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative rather than direct. An action by an association member is derivative when the gravamen is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of members without any severance among individual holders. A member may sue directly only if she has a relationship with the wrongdoer apart from her membership, the wrongdoer owes her a duty for a reason other than membership, or her injury is unique to her rather than shared by the association. Tober alleged none of these; she asserted only a “personal stake in how her community is run,” and her theory was that Civano members as a whole were disadvantaged by the mail-in procedure. Because she did not follow the demand and standing requirements for a derivative suit under A.R.S. sections 10-3631 and 10-3632, that claim was properly dismissed.
The court next rejected the two authorities Tober said permitted her direct statutory claim. The CC&Rs’ section 16.1 gives owners a right to enforce the community documents, but Tober conceded her statutory claim was independent of the contract, and A.R.S. section 33-1812 could not be read into the CC&Rs because it was enacted after the CC&Rs were executed. A.R.S. section 10-3304 does let a planned community member sue the association to enjoin an ultra vires act, and the court agreed Tober could in theory bring such a claim. But injunctive relief was unavailable: she did not try to enjoin the 2011 election before it was finalized, and a completed election cannot be undone on that ground; her request to control future elections was speculative, unsupported by any showing of likely future harm, and therefore not a justiciable controversy.
Finally, and in any event, the court held the mail-in procedure did not violate section 33-1812. The statute’s phrase “if absentee ballots are used” shows absentee voting is optional, and the statute expressly allows voting by “some other form of delivery” such as mail; it does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections occur at the annual meeting, and section 33-1804 requires only that meetings be open, not that elections happen at them. The court affirmed the attorney-fee award under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and section 16.2 of the CC&Rs, noting that voluntarily dismissing the contract claims did not defeat a contract-based fee award and that the missing hearing transcripts were presumed to support the trial court’s discretion.
For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision illustrates how planned community election procedures are measured against A.R.S. section 33-1812 and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804. The court read section 33-1812 to permit an association to elect directors entirely by mail-in ballot, with ballots counted before the annual meeting, and concluded the statute does not compel in-person voting at every election or require that the election itself take place at the annual meeting. It also underscores a practical timing lesson: a member who believes an election procedure is unlawful generally must seek to enjoin it before the vote is finalized, because courts are reluctant to unwind a completed election or to issue advisory relief about future, speculative elections.
The opinion is an unpublished memorandum decision, so under Rule 28 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure it is not precedent and generally may not be cited as legal authority; it is offered here only as a neutral, educational illustration of how these HOA-governance statutes have been applied. The decision also highlights procedural mechanics that recur in HOA disputes, including the derivative-versus-direct distinction for suits against a board and the risk that a member who loses such a suit may owe the association’s attorney fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and a fee-shifting provision in the CC&Rs. The homeowner was represented by Elizabeth D. Bushell of Elizabeth D. Bushell, P.L.C., and the association and its board by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt of Monroe, McDonough, Goldschmidt & Molla, P.L.L.C.