Greenberg v. McGowan: HOA Court Case Guide

Arizona Court of Appeals – Division One (Memorandum Decision)

A Yavapai County covenant dispute over whether a neighbor’s structure was a barn or garage, and whether donkeys were allowed, ends with the Court of Appeals affirming summary judgment and a prevailing-party fee award.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Greenberg v. McGowan; 1 CA-CV 19-0061; Yavapai County Superior Court No. P1300CV201600734 (Hon. David L. Mackey).

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Greenberg showed no error in the interpretation and enforcement of the recorded CC&Rs — the covenants did not prohibit donkeys and the structure’s undisputed current use was as a permitted barn — that her contract claim failed for lack of any disclosed, computable damages, and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend or reconsideration or in awarding attorneys’ fees under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Linda H. Greenberg (Party)
    Plaintiff/Appellant; homeowner in Inscription Canyon Ranch who sued over the neighboring structure and donkeys and alleged an open-meetings violation.
  • John McGowan (Party)
    Defendant/Appellee; neighboring homeowner who built the disputed structure and kept donkeys.
  • Eileen McGowan (Party)
    Defendant/Appellee; neighboring homeowner (wife of John McGowan).
  • Inscription Canyon Ranch Architectural Review Committee (ICR ARC) (Party)
    Defendant/Appellee; the community’s architectural review committee that approved the McGowans’ construction.
  • ICR Water Users Association, Inc. (Party)
    Defendant/Appellee; Arizona corporation (association-side entity) named in the suit.
  • William J. O’Leary (Counsel)
    O’Leary Eaton, P.L.L.C.
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Linda Greenberg (Prescott).
  • Michael P. Thieme (Counsel)
    O’Leary Eaton, P.L.L.C.
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Linda Greenberg (Prescott).
  • Andrew J. Becke (Counsel)
    Murphy, Schmitt, Hathaway, Wilson & Becke, P.L.L.C.
    Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellees John and Eileen McGowan (Prescott).
  • Alex B. Vakula (Counsel)
    The Vakula Law Firm, PLC
    Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellees John and Eileen McGowan (Prescott).
  • Douglas J. Suits (Counsel)
    Suits Law Firm, PLC
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee ICR Water Users Association, Inc. (Prescott).
  • Samuel A. Thumma (Judge)
    Presiding Judge; authored the memorandum decision.
  • Jennifer M. Perkins (Judge)
    Judge; joined the decision.
  • Paul J. McMurdie (Judge)
    Judge; joined the decision.

What happened and why it matters

Linda Greenberg and her neighbors, John and Eileen McGowan, own adjoining two-acre parcels in Inscription Canyon Ranch, a residential community in Williamson Valley, Arizona, that is governed by longstanding recorded Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). After the Inscription Canyon Ranch Architectural Review Committee (ICR ARC) approved the McGowans’ construction of a structure, Greenberg sued the McGowans, the ARC, and the ICR Water Users Association, Inc. The dispute centered on whether the structure was a permitted barn or a prohibited garage and whether the McGowans could keep two donkeys and a foal on their parcel. Greenberg’s operative complaint alleged breach of the CC&Rs and a violation of the homeowners’-association open-meetings statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The Yavapai County Superior Court granted summary judgment to all defendants, denied Greenberg’s requests to file a third amended complaint and for reconsideration, and awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. On appeal, Division One reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed, finding no genuine issue of material fact, no abuse of discretion in the procedural rulings, and no error in the fee award. The court also awarded the prevailing defendants their reasonable fees and taxable costs on appeal under the CC&Rs. The decision is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not precedential.

Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, the court treated the interpretation of the CC&Rs as a question of law, giving effect to the parties’ intent as shown by the language of the document read in its entirety and the purpose for which the covenants were created (Powell v. Washburn). On the central animal question, the court rejected Greenberg’s premise that Paragraph 10 (“Livestock and Poultry”) created an exclusive list of permitted animals. Paragraph 10 expressly prohibits poultry, fowl, and swine and expressly permits horses and 4-H animal projects, but it never mentions donkeys and contains no catch-all establishing that the listed animals are the only ones allowed. Because the paragraph does not describe a class of prohibited animals, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius did not apply, and reading the covenant to bar donkeys would improperly render its broad references to “livestock,” “animals,” fences, and corrals superfluous. The court reinforced this reading with other provisions: Paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 contemplate barns and outbuildings for animals of all kinds; Paragraph 6 describes a bridle path expressly for horses, mules, and donkeys; and Paragraphs 8, 13, and 19 show the drafters knew how to write comprehensive, all-encompassing prohibitions when they intended one — something Paragraph 10 conspicuously lacks. The court also noted A.R.S. § 3-1201’s definition of “equine” as including donkeys. On the barn-versus-garage issue, Greenberg conceded the structure had to date been used only as a barn (the approved use), so her theory that it might later be used as a garage presented an unripe, hypothetical dispute on which courts do not issue advisory opinions. Her breach-of-contract claim independently failed because she never disclosed a computation or measure of damages as required by Rule 26.1(a)(7); merely stating she would testify at trial could not create a triable issue under Rule 56(e). The court found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint filed 20 months into the case after discovery closed and summary judgment was entered — the amendment came late, sought to add long-known parties, would have reopened discovery, and was partly futile — and no error in denying reconsideration that merely repackaged rejected CC&R arguments. Finally, because the CC&Rs entitle the prevailing party to reasonable fees and costs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01 also applies, and because the defendants’ fee affidavits complied with Rule 54(g)(4), the fee award (including to the ARC) was proper.

For Arizona homeowners’ associations and their members, the decision illustrates a recurring principle of covenant interpretation: restrictions on the use of land are construed from the text of the recorded document as a whole, and a list of prohibited or permitted items is not treated as exhaustive unless the drafters said so. Because Paragraph 10 barred only certain animals and lacked any catch-all, the court would not read it to prohibit donkeys, and it pointed to the drafters’ use of sweeping language elsewhere in the CC&Rs as proof they knew how to impose a comprehensive ban when they wanted one. Boards, architectural committees, and owners drafting or enforcing covenants should note that ambiguity and omission tend to be resolved in favor of the free use of property, and that courts will avoid readings that render covenant language superfluous.

The case is also a practical reminder about litigation mechanics in HOA disputes. A breach-of-contract claim, even one tied to CC&Rs, still requires the plaintiff to disclose a computation and measure of damages; a promise to testify at trial will not defeat summary judgment. Motions to amend brought late — after discovery has closed and judgment entered — face steep odds, especially when they add previously known parties and would reopen discovery. And most owners bringing or defending covenant suits should anticipate that the CC&Rs’ prevailing-party fee clause, reinforced by A.R.S. § 12-341.01, can shift substantial attorneys’ fees to the losing side both in the trial court and on appeal. As an unpublished memorandum decision, however, the ruling is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2016-05 After ICR ARC approval, the McGowans begin constructing the disputed structure.
Step 2016-10 With the structure nearly complete, Greenberg sues the McGowans, ICR ARC, and ICR WUA to enjoin further construction; the parties stipulate to a preliminary injunction through May 2017.
Step 2017-05 After the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied, the parties stipulate to extend and modify the injunction through November 2017, allowing ‘equine animals’ permitted under the CC&Rs; the McGowans begin keeping two foster donkeys (a foal arrives later).
Step 2017-10 Greenberg files her second amended (operative) complaint alleging breach of the CC&Rs and a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
Step 2018-03 The defendants move for summary judgment; Greenberg moves for partial summary judgment on her contract and injunctive-relief claims.
Step 2018-05 The superior court grants the defendants’ summary-judgment motions and denies Greenberg’s; Greenberg then moves to amend a third time and for reconsideration, which are denied.
Step 2018-06 Greenberg’s late-filed motion for leave to file a third amended complaint is at issue; the case had been pending about 20 months with discovery closed.
Step 2019-01 Greenberg files her appeal (No. 1 CA-CV 19-0061) after entry of final judgment awarding the defendants fees and costs.
Step 2019-12-24 Division One issues a memorandum decision affirming the judgment and awarding the defendants their fees and costs on appeal under the CC&Rs.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/greenberg-v-mcgowan/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2019-12-24

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

FAQ

What was Greenberg v. McGowan about?

It was a dispute between neighbors in Inscription Canyon Ranch, a Yavapai County residential community governed by recorded CC&Rs. Linda Greenberg sued the McGowans, the community’s Architectural Review Committee (ICR ARC), and the ICR Water Users Association, arguing the McGowans’ new structure was a prohibited garage rather than a permitted barn and that the CC&Rs did not allow the McGowans to keep donkeys. She alleged breach of the CC&Rs and a violation of the HOA open-meetings statute and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.

Did the CC&Rs prohibit keeping donkeys?

No. The Court of Appeals held that Paragraph 10 of the CC&Rs did not create an exclusive list of permitted animals. It prohibited poultry, fowl, and swine and expressly allowed horses and 4-H animal projects, but it never mentioned donkeys and contained no catch-all barring unlisted animals. Because the covenant did not describe a class of prohibited animals, the court would not read it to ban donkeys, especially since other provisions referenced barns, livestock, and a bridle path for horses, mules, and donkeys.

Was the structure a barn or a garage?

The court did not have to decide the hypothetical. Greenberg conceded the structure had, to date, been used only as a barn — the use the ARC approved. Her concern that it might later be used as a garage presented an unripe, speculative dispute, and Arizona courts do not issue advisory opinions about actions that may never occur. Summary judgment on that claim was therefore proper.

Why did Greenberg’s breach-of-contract claim fail?

Independent of the merits, her contract claim failed because she never disclosed a computation or measure of her damages, as Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26.1(a)(7) requires. Simply stating that she would testify at trial did not satisfy the disclosure rules and could not create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment under Rule 56(e).

Why were the defendants awarded attorneys’ fees?

The CC&Rs contain a prevailing-party clause entitling the winning side in an enforcement action to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and A.R.S. § 12-341.01 also applies to contract disputes. Because the defendants prevailed and their fee affidavits complied with Rule 54(g)(4), the trial court’s fee award — including to the ARC — was proper, and Division One also awarded the defendants their fees and costs on appeal under the CC&Rs.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

No. Greenberg v. McGowan is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c). It is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule. It is useful as an illustration of how Arizona courts interpret CC&Rs and handle summary judgment, amendment, and fee issues, but it does not establish binding law.

Case Dossier

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Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 19-0061
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateDecember 24, 2019
Judge / panelSamuel A. Thumma (Presiding Judge, author), Jennifer M. Perkins, Paul J. McMurdie
PartiesA homeowner sued her neighbors, the community’s Architectural Review Committee, and its water users association over a structure and donkeys, alleging CC&R breaches and an open-meetings violation; the trial court and Court of Appeals ruled for the defendants.
Governing law
Topics
cc-and-rsarchitectural-reviewattorneys-feesprocedureopen-meetings
Outcome / holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Greenberg showed no error in the interpretation and enforcement of the recorded CC&Rs — the covenants did not prohibit donkeys and the structure’s undisputed current use was as a permitted barn — that her contract claim failed for lack of any disclosed, computable damages, and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend or reconsideration or in awarding attorneys’ fees under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Linda Greenberg and her neighbors, John and Eileen McGowan, own adjoining two-acre parcels in Inscription Canyon Ranch, a residential community in Williamson Valley, Arizona, that is governed by longstanding recorded Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). After the Inscription Canyon Ranch Architectural Review Committee (ICR ARC) approved the McGowans’ construction of a structure, Greenberg sued the McGowans, the ARC, and the ICR Water Users Association, Inc. The dispute centered on whether the structure was a permitted barn or a prohibited garage and whether the McGowans could keep two donkeys and a foal on their parcel. Greenberg’s operative complaint alleged breach of the CC&Rs and a violation of the homeowners’-association open-meetings statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The Yavapai County Superior Court granted summary judgment to all defendants, denied Greenberg’s requests to file a third amended complaint and for reconsideration, and awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. On appeal, Division One reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed, finding no genuine issue of material fact, no abuse of discretion in the procedural rulings, and no error in the fee award. The court also awarded the prevailing defendants their reasonable fees and taxable costs on appeal under the CC&Rs. The decision is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not precedential.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, the court treated the interpretation of the CC&Rs as a question of law, giving effect to the parties’ intent as shown by the language of the document read in its entirety and the purpose for which the covenants were created (Powell v. Washburn). On the central animal question, the court rejected Greenberg’s premise that Paragraph 10 (“Livestock and Poultry”) created an exclusive list of permitted animals. Paragraph 10 expressly prohibits poultry, fowl, and swine and expressly permits horses and 4-H animal projects, but it never mentions donkeys and contains no catch-all establishing that the listed animals are the only ones allowed. Because the paragraph does not describe a class of prohibited animals, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius did not apply, and reading the covenant to bar donkeys would improperly render its broad references to “livestock,” “animals,” fences, and corrals superfluous. The court reinforced this reading with other provisions: Paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 contemplate barns and outbuildings for animals of all kinds; Paragraph 6 describes a bridle path expressly for horses, mules, and donkeys; and Paragraphs 8, 13, and 19 show the drafters knew how to write comprehensive, all-encompassing prohibitions when they intended one — something Paragraph 10 conspicuously lacks. The court also noted A.R.S. § 3-1201’s definition of “equine” as including donkeys. On the barn-versus-garage issue, Greenberg conceded the structure had to date been used only as a barn (the approved use), so her theory that it might later be used as a garage presented an unripe, hypothetical dispute on which courts do not issue advisory opinions. Her breach-of-contract claim independently failed because she never disclosed a computation or measure of damages as required by Rule 26.1(a)(7); merely stating she would testify at trial could not create a triable issue under Rule 56(e). The court found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint filed 20 months into the case after discovery closed and summary judgment was entered — the amendment came late, sought to add long-known parties, would have reopened discovery, and was partly futile — and no error in denying reconsideration that merely repackaged rejected CC&R arguments. Finally, because the CC&Rs entitle the prevailing party to reasonable fees and costs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01 also applies, and because the defendants’ fee affidavits complied with Rule 54(g)(4), the fee award (including to the ARC) was proper.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners’ associations and their members, the decision illustrates a recurring principle of covenant interpretation: restrictions on the use of land are construed from the text of the recorded document as a whole, and a list of prohibited or permitted items is not treated as exhaustive unless the drafters said so. Because Paragraph 10 barred only certain animals and lacked any catch-all, the court would not read it to prohibit donkeys, and it pointed to the drafters’ use of sweeping language elsewhere in the CC&Rs as proof they knew how to impose a comprehensive ban when they wanted one. Boards, architectural committees, and owners drafting or enforcing covenants should note that ambiguity and omission tend to be resolved in favor of the free use of property, and that courts will avoid readings that render covenant language superfluous.

The case is also a practical reminder about litigation mechanics in HOA disputes. A breach-of-contract claim, even one tied to CC&Rs, still requires the plaintiff to disclose a computation and measure of damages; a promise to testify at trial will not defeat summary judgment. Motions to amend brought late — after discovery has closed and judgment entered — face steep odds, especially when they add previously known parties and would reopen discovery. And most owners bringing or defending covenant suits should anticipate that the CC&Rs’ prevailing-party fee clause, reinforced by A.R.S. § 12-341.01, can shift substantial attorneys’ fees to the losing side both in the trial court and on appeal. As an unpublished memorandum decision, however, the ruling is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

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