Joshua M Waldvogel v. Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121044-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-12-15
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joshua M. Waldvogel Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3); CC&Rs Article VI, Section 6.5

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge, upon rehearing, affirmed the denial of the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA timely denied the Petitioner's architectural application. The timeline for a decision did not start until October 6, 2020, when the application was considered complete, making the November 19, 2020, denial valid.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because the interpretation of the CC&Rs stipulated that the 60-day timeline starts only upon receipt of a complete application, which the ALJ determined was October 6, 2020.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the architectural application for a casita was deemed approved due to the HOA missing the 60-day denial deadline.

Petitioner claimed his architectural application, submitted September 15, 2020, was deemed approved because the Denial Notice (November 19, 2020) occurred after the 60-day deadline (November 14, 2020). The ALJ determined that the 60-day period did not begin until the Application was complete with supporting information (October 6, 2020), making the deadline December 5, 2020, and the denial timely.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Architectural Review, Deemed Approval, HOA Timeline Compliance, CC&R Interpretation, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

Decision Documents

21F-H2121044-REL Decision – 900658.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:19:43 (103.7 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joshua M. Waldvogel (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf in both hearings

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association
  • Carlotta L. Turman (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for both original and rehearing decisions
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the original decision transmission
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the rehearing decision transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for decision transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for decision transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for decision transmission
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for rehearing decision transmission

Joshua M Waldvogel v. Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121044-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-12-15
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joshua M. Waldvogel Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3); CC&Rs Article VI, Section 6.5

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge, upon rehearing, affirmed the denial of the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA timely denied the Petitioner's architectural application. The timeline for a decision did not start until October 6, 2020, when the application was considered complete, making the November 19, 2020, denial valid.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because the interpretation of the CC&Rs stipulated that the 60-day timeline starts only upon receipt of a complete application, which the ALJ determined was October 6, 2020.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the architectural application for a casita was deemed approved due to the HOA missing the 60-day denial deadline.

Petitioner claimed his architectural application, submitted September 15, 2020, was deemed approved because the Denial Notice (November 19, 2020) occurred after the 60-day deadline (November 14, 2020). The ALJ determined that the 60-day period did not begin until the Application was complete with supporting information (October 6, 2020), making the deadline December 5, 2020, and the denial timely.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Architectural Review, Deemed Approval, HOA Timeline Compliance, CC&R Interpretation, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121044-REL-RHG Decision – 933158.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:31 (106.1 KB)

21F-H2121044-REL-RHG Decision – ../21F-H2121044-REL/900658.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:34 (103.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121044-REL-RHG


Briefing on Waldvogel v. Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Joshua M. Waldvogel (Petitioner) and the Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association (Respondent). The core of the conflict was the Petitioner’s application to build a second house, or “casita,” on his property, which was denied by the association’s Architectural Committee (ARC).

The central legal question was procedural: the timing of the association’s denial. The Petitioner argued that the 60-day review period stipulated in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) began when he submitted his initial application on September 15, 2020. By this calculation, the association’s November 19, 2020 denial was late, and his application should have been “deemed approved.”

The Respondent countered that the 60-day clock only began after the Petitioner provided a response to a request for additional information on October 6, 2020, making the application complete on that date. This would make the November 19 denial timely.

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer presided over both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. In both instances, the Judge ruled in favor of the Respondent, finding that the application was not complete until the requested information was provided. The denial was therefore timely and valid. The Petitioner failed to prove that the association violated its governing documents, and his petition was denied in both the initial decision and the final, binding decision on rehearing.

Case Background

Case Numbers: 21F-H2121044-REL & 21F-H2121044-REL-RHG

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petitioner: Joshua M. Waldvogel, owner of Lot 228 at 11208 North 164th Lane, Surprise, Arizona 85388.

Respondent: Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association (Sycamore Estates), a homeowners association in Surprise, Arizona.

Core Issue: Petitioner sought approval from the Sycamore Estates Architectural Committee (ARC) to build a casita on his property. The ARC denied the application. The dispute centers on whether the denial was issued within the 60-day timeframe mandated by the community’s CC&Rs.

Chronology of Key Events

September 15, 2020

Petitioner submits an architectural application to build a casita.

October 5, 2020

Sycamore Estates requests additional information, specifically the required permits for the construction.

October 6, 2020

Petitioner emails a response, stating his architect verified compliance with city “laws” but does not provide permits.

November 13, 2020

The ARC reviews the application and decides to deny it based on CC&Rs Article V, Section 5.2.

November 14, 2020

The date the Petitioner asserts the 60-day deadline for a decision expired.

November 19, 2020

Sycamore Estates issues the official Denial Notice to the Petitioner.

December 5, 2020

The date the Respondent asserts the 60-day deadline for a decision expired.

July 12, 2021

Initial administrative hearing is held.

August 2, 2021

Initial decision is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

November 29, 2021

A rehearing is held at the Petitioner’s request.

December 15, 2021

Final decision on rehearing is issued, again denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Central Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Joshua M. Waldvogel)

• The 60-day timeline for the ARC to approve or deny the application began on the initial submission date of September 15, 2020.

• The deadline for the ARC’s decision was therefore November 14, 2020.

• The association’s request for additional information on October 5, 2020, did not “reset” or pause this timeline.

• Because the Denial Notice was not issued until November 19, 2020, five days after the deadline, the application should be considered “deemed approved” as per the CC&Rs.

• During the rehearing, the Petitioner also argued that Sycamore Estates could only require information listed on the standard submission form.

Respondent’s Position (Sycamore Estates)

• The application was not considered complete until the Petitioner responded to the request for additional information.

• The response, received on October 6, 2020, marked the start of the 60-day review period.

• The deadline for a decision was therefore December 5, 2020.

• The Denial Notice, issued on November 19, 2020, was well within this timeframe and was therefore valid.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

The case revolved around the interpretation of the Sycamore Estates CC&Rs, which function as a binding contract between the homeowner and the association.

Key CC&R Provisions

Article VI, Section 6.5 (Application for Approval): This section contains the critical language that formed the basis of the Judge’s decision. It states that the 60-day review period begins:

Article V, Section 5.2 (Building Type and Size): This section provided the substantive basis for the ARC’s denial of the casita, as it specifies:

Legal Standard

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, as the party asserting the claim, had the burden of proof.

Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Contract Interpretation: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants (like the CC&Rs) are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rulings and Judicial Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge consistently sided with the Respondent’s interpretation of the CC&Rs in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

Initial Hearing and Decision (August 2, 2021)

Finding: The Judge concluded that the application was not complete until the Petitioner provided his response on October 6, 2020.

Rationale: Based on the language in Article VI, Section 6.5, the 60-day clock does not start until the application and all supporting information have been submitted. The association’s request for permits was a reasonable part of gathering this supporting information.

Conclusion: The November 19, 2020 Denial Notice was issued prior to the December 5, 2020 deadline and was therefore valid. The Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

Rehearing and Final Decision (December 15, 2021)

Basis for Rehearing: The Petitioner requested a rehearing, alleging the initial decision was an “abuse of discretion.” His written basis was:

Rehearing Arguments: During the rehearing, the Petitioner acknowledged that the Findings of Fact in the initial decision were not in error and presented the same legal arguments as before.

Final Ruling: The Judge’s conclusion remained unchanged. Upon consideration of all evidence from the rehearing, the Judge again found that the application was not complete until October 6, 2020, and the denial was timely.

Final Order: The Judge concluded that the “Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent failed to comply with its CC&Rs” and again ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition is denied.” This order was designated as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 21F-H2121044-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Waldvogel v. Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between homeowner Joshua M. Waldvogel and the Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association. The materials are derived from the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 2, 2021, and December 15, 2021.

——————————————————————————–

Part I: Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences in length.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what specific project was the petitioner seeking approval for?

2. What was the central procedural dispute regarding the timeline for the respondent’s decision on the application?

3. According to the community’s CC&Rs, what is the consequence if the Architectural Committee fails to approve or disapprove an application within the specified timeframe?

4. On what substantive grounds did the Sycamore Estates Architectural Committee ultimately base its decision to deny Mr. Waldvogel’s application?

5. What key date did the petitioner, Mr. Waldvogel, argue was the start of the 60-day review period, and what was his reasoning?

6. What key date did the respondent, Sycamore Estates, argue was the start of the 60-day review period, and what was its reasoning?

7. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion in the initial hearing decision issued on August 2, 2021?

8. On what basis did the petitioner request a rehearing after the initial decision was rendered against him?

9. During the rehearing, did the petitioner introduce new evidence or arguments, or did he challenge the established Findings of Fact?

10. What legal standard of proof was required in this administrative hearing, and which party held the burden of proof?

——————————————————————————–

Part II: Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Joshua M. Waldvogel, the record owner of Lot 228. The respondent was the Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association. Mr. Waldvogel was seeking approval for a plan to build a second house, or casita, on his property.

2. The central dispute was determining when the 60-day timeline for the Architectural Committee’s decision officially began. The petitioner argued it started upon the initial application submission, while the respondent contended it began only after a request for additional information was answered, thereby making the application “complete.”

3. Article VI, Section 6.5 of the CC&Rs states that if the committee fails to act within sixty days after a complete application and all supporting information have been submitted, “approval will not be required and this Section will be deemed to have been complied with by the Owner.”

4. The committee denied the application based on Article V, Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs. This section explicitly prohibits the construction of more than “one detached Single Family Residence” on any lot.

5. The petitioner argued the 60-day review period began on September 15, 2020, the date he submitted his initial architectural application. This would have set the deadline at November 14, 2020, making the November 19 Denial Notice late and rendering the application “deemed approved.”

6. The respondent argued the 60-day period began on October 6, 2020, the date the petitioner responded to their request for additional information (permits). Sycamore Estates maintained the application was not complete until that response was received, which would set the deadline at December 5, 2020.

7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the application was not complete until the petitioner provided a response to the October 5 request for information. Therefore, the Denial Notice issued on November 19, 2020, was timely and valid, and the petitioner’s petition was denied.

8. The petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” His written statement argued that the CC&Rs do not explicitly state that the review timeline restarts upon a request for more information.

9. No, the petitioner did not introduce new arguments. He presented the same arguments during the rehearing as he had in the initial hearing and acknowledged that the Findings of Fact from the first decision did not contain any errors, choosing only to argue their legal effect.

10. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The petitioner, as the party asserting a claim, had the burden of proof to establish that the respondent violated the governing documents.

——————————————————————————–

Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive essay responses that synthesize facts and legal principles from the source documents.

1. Analyze the significance of Article VI, Section 6.5 of the CC&Rs, specifically the clause “together with all supporting information, plans and specifications required by the Design Guidelines have been submitted to it.” How did the interpretation of this specific language become the central legal issue of the case, and why was it determinative of the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decisions. Explain which party had the burden of proof and evaluate how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the undisputed facts of the case to reach her conclusions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

3. The petitioner’s proposed casita was ultimately denied on the substantive grounds that it violated Article V, Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs. Why did the legal proceedings focus almost entirely on the procedural issue of the decision timeline rather than the substantive prohibition of a second residence on the lot?

4. Examine the petitioner’s basis for requesting a rehearing and the Commissioner’s decision to grant it. Despite the rehearing being granted, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision remained unchanged. Discuss the effectiveness of the petitioner’s arguments during the rehearing process as described in the legal documents.

5. The legal decisions state that CC&Rs are a contract between the parties and that unambiguous restrictive covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ intent. Based on the details provided in this case, explain how the principles of contract law were applied to resolve the dispute between Mr. Waldvogel and the Sycamore Estates association.

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues legally binding decisions. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Application

The comprehensive and detailed written request submitted by a homeowner to the Architectural Committee for approval of construction, alteration, or other improvements that would alter the exterior appearance of the property.

Architectural Committee (ARC)

The committee within the Sycamore Estates Community Association responsible for reviewing and approving or denying modifications to lots to ensure compliance with the CC&Rs and Design Guidelines.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide evidence to prove their claims. In this matter, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Casita

A small, secondary house or guesthouse. This was the type of structure Mr. Waldvogel sought to build on his property.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A legally binding document that governs a planned community or subdivision. The courts treat it as a contract between the homeowners’ association and the property owners.

Denial Notice

The official written communication from the homeowners’ association (Sycamore Estates) informing a homeowner (Mr. Waldvogel) that their architectural application has been formally denied.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, homeowner Joshua M. Waldvogel.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Property

The specific lot owned by the petitioner, identified as Lot 228 of Sycamore Estates, located at 11208 North 164th Lane, Surprise, Arizona 85388.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the claims. In this case, the Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision within the CC&Rs that limits the use of property. Article V, Section 5.2, which prohibits more than one detached residence per lot, is an example of a restrictive covenant.






Blog Post – 21F-H2121044-REL-RHG


He Tried to Use a 60-Day Deadline to Beat His HOA. Here’s What the Judge Decided.

Introduction: The Waiting Game

You’ve done the research, hired the architect, and finally submitted your home improvement plans to the Homeowners Association (HOA). Now, the waiting game begins. The days tick by, and you start wondering: What happens if they miss their own deadline to respond? Can you just start building?

A recent administrative law case in Arizona provides a fascinating and cautionary answer to this very question. It serves as a stark reminder that your community’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—are a legally binding contract, and assumptions about deadlines can lead to a losing battle.

——————————————————————————–

The Core of the Dispute: A Casita and a Calendar

The case involved Joshua M. Waldvogel, a homeowner in the Sycamore Estates community in Surprise, Arizona. His goal was to build a second house, or “casita,” on his property.

The conflict centered on a simple timeline. Waldvogel submitted his application on September 15, 2020. He argued the HOA had 60 days to respond, making the deadline November 14. When the HOA sent its denial on November 19, Waldvogel claimed that because the denial was late, his project was automatically “deemed approved.” This dispute over a five-day difference escalated to an administrative law hearing. Here are the key takeaways from the judge’s decision that every homeowner should understand.

1. The 60-Day Clock Doesn’t Start Until Your Application is “Complete”

The homeowner believed the 60-day review clock started the moment he sent his initial application. The judge, however, disagreed based on the precise wording in the HOA’s CC&Rs—the binding contract governing the community.

The power was in the fine print. Article VI, Section 6.5 of the CC&Rs stated:

In the event that the Architectural Committee fails to approve or disapprove an Application for approval within sixty (60) days after the Application, together with all supporting information, plans and specifications required by the Design Guidelines have been submitted to it, approval will not be required…

This single clause was the linchpin of the entire case. On October 5, the HOA requested additional information—specifically, the appropriate permits for the proposed construction. The next day, the homeowner responded, but according to the case findings, he “did not provide any permits as requested.” Instead, he emailed to confirm that his architect had verified the plans complied with city “laws.”

The judge ruled that the 60-day clock never started on September 15 because the application wasn’t yet “complete.” The HOA’s simple request for more information was the pivotal event. It established that the official start date for the review period was October 6, the day the homeowner provided his response. This made the November 19 denial well within the required timeframe. The crucial lesson here is that an HOA’s request for information can determine the official start date of their review, regardless of when you first submitted paperwork.

2. The Underlying Rules Are Your Biggest Hurdle

The entire legal battle focused on the procedural timeline—when the HOA denied the project. But in a twist of irony, the substance of the project—what was being proposed—was a non-starter from the beginning.

Even if the homeowner had won his argument about the deadline, his project was in direct violation of another core rule. Article V, Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs clearly stated:

No building shall be constructed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached Single Family Residence…

The homeowner fought and lost a battle over how he was denied, when the rules clearly stated his casita project was never going to be approved in the first place. This highlights a critical point: winning a procedural argument is meaningless if your project fundamentally violates the community’s substantive rules.

3. You Can Appeal, But It’s an Uphill Battle

After losing the initial hearing, the homeowner filed for a rehearing, claiming the judge’s decision was an “abuse of discretion.” The appeal, however, only solidified the original outcome and underscored the difficulty of such challenges.

The legal record from the rehearing is particularly telling. The judge noted two critical facts: first, the petitioner “acknowledged that the Findings of Fact set forth in the underlying decision in this matter did not include any errors.” Second, he “presented the same arguments during the rehearing that he provided during the initial hearing.”

In essence, the homeowner appealed without disputing the established facts and by using the same legal argument that had already failed. Unsurprisingly, the judge’s decision remained the same, and the petition was denied again. This serves as a potent reminder that challenging an HOA’s interpretation of its own governing documents can be a difficult, expensive, and often fruitless endeavor.

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Conclusion: Read the Fine Print Before You Dream

This case serves as a powerful lesson for every homeowner living under an HOA. Your community’s CC&Rs are a binding contract, and the specific language within them holds immense power. Assumptions about procedures, deadlines, and what you’re allowed to build can be costly mistakes.

It all boils down to one final, critical question: When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what crucial detail might be waiting in the fine print?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joshua M. Waldvogel (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Carlotta L. Turman (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed during initial decision transmission
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed during rehearing decision transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for case transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for case transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for case transmission
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for case transmission

Susan L Jarzabek v. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-19
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan L Jarzabek Counsel
Respondent Hillcrest Improvement Association #2 Counsel Haidyn DiLorenzo, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 1, Section 10; Enforcement, Fines and Appeals Policy ("Policy")

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's complaint regarding the wrongful assessment of attorney's fees was dismissed because she failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the HOA violated its Policy regarding pre-attorney notification requirements.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof; the ALJ found the Policy does not require the two notices prior to attorney escalation, as Petitioner had alleged.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Policy concerning attorney's fees assessment and required pre-litigation notices.

Petitioner alleged the Association wrongfully assessed attorney's fees, arguing the Policy required providing the owner two warning notices and a certified letter before escalating a matter to attorney involvement.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: attorney fees, HOA policy enforcement, notice requirements, CC&Rs, due process
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221008-REL Decision – 926455.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:40:13 (93.9 KB)





Study Guide – 22F-H2221008-REL


{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”,
“case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek, Petitioner, vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2, Respondent”,
“decision_date”: “November 19, 2021”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Susan L Jarzabek”,
“role”: “petitioner, witness”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Haidyn DiLorenzo”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Counsel for Respondent”
},
{
“name”: “Thomas Shedden”,
“role”: “ALJ”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Robert Cody”,
“role”: “board president, witness”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “John Jarzabek”,
“role”: “spouse”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Petitioner’s husband, named on certified letter sent by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Louis Dettorre”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission”
},
{
“name”: “AHansen”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “djones”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “DGardner”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “vnunez”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “Beth Mulcahy”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Mulcahy Law Firm, PC”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission; firm engaged by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Miranda Alvarez”,
“role”: “OAH staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitter of Decision”
}
]
}

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”, “case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-19”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA send a violation directly to their attorney without sending me warning letters first?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the community’s enforcement policy allows for immediate escalation to legal counsel.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ ruled that the HOA did not violate its policy by involving a lawyer without prior notices, because the policy contained a provision stating that the standard notice procedure ceases to apply once a matter is escalated to an attorney.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy also provides in pertinent part that the Association may escalate a matter to its attorney for further action, if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the notice-procedure will no longer apply”, “legal_basis”: “HOA Enforcement Policy / Contract Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement process”, “attorney referral”, “notice requirements” ] }, { “question”: “If the HOA sends my violation to a lawyer, do I have to pay the attorney’s fees?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, generally, if the CC&Rs and enforcement policy state that the owner is responsible for enforcement costs.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that the governing documents (CC&Rs) specifically allow the Association to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees, from the owner. Additionally, the specific policy noted that upon escalation, the owner becomes responsible for these costs.”, “alj_quote”: “CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1, Enforcement, provides that the Association may recover from an owner its enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “attorney fees”, “fines and penalties”, “collection costs” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove that the HOA did something wrong in a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (petitioner) filing the complaint bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “When a homeowner petitions the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation by the HOA, it is up to the homeowner to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Jarzabek bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “hearing standards” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA’s enforcement policy legally considered a binding contract?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the policy is treated as part of the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge affirmed that community policies are part of the contractual agreement between the parties, meaning both the homeowner and the HOA are legally required to follow the terms written in that policy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy is part of contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law; Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association”, “topic_tags”: [ “contract law”, “governing documents”, “policy enforcement” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge cancel the specific debt or fees I owe the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily; the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be limited to determining if a violation of documents occurred, not the validity of the debt itself.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ explicitly noted in a footnote that while they can determine if the HOA violated its policy, they did not have the jurisdiction to decide if the specific attorney’s fees charged constituted a valid debt.”, “alj_quote”: “it is not within this tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek are a valid debt, and the tribunal offers no opinion on that issue.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “debt validity”, “tribunal limitations” ] }, { “question”: “What standard of evidence is used to make a decision in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show it is more likely than not that the claim is true. It is described as the greater weight of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “evidence”, “administrative hearing” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 22F-H2221008-REL


{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”,
“case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek, Petitioner, vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2, Respondent”,
“decision_date”: “November 19, 2021”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Susan L Jarzabek”,
“role”: “petitioner, witness”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Haidyn DiLorenzo”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Counsel for Respondent”
},
{
“name”: “Thomas Shedden”,
“role”: “ALJ”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Robert Cody”,
“role”: “board president, witness”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “John Jarzabek”,
“role”: “spouse”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Petitioner’s husband, named on certified letter sent by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Louis Dettorre”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission”
},
{
“name”: “AHansen”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “djones”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “DGardner”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “vnunez”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “Beth Mulcahy”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Mulcahy Law Firm, PC”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission; firm engaged by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Miranda Alvarez”,
“role”: “OAH staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitter of Decision”
}
]
}

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”, “case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-19”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA send a violation directly to their attorney without sending me warning letters first?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the community’s enforcement policy allows for immediate escalation to legal counsel.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ ruled that the HOA did not violate its policy by involving a lawyer without prior notices, because the policy contained a provision stating that the standard notice procedure ceases to apply once a matter is escalated to an attorney.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy also provides in pertinent part that the Association may escalate a matter to its attorney for further action, if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the notice-procedure will no longer apply”, “legal_basis”: “HOA Enforcement Policy / Contract Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement process”, “attorney referral”, “notice requirements” ] }, { “question”: “If the HOA sends my violation to a lawyer, do I have to pay the attorney’s fees?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, generally, if the CC&Rs and enforcement policy state that the owner is responsible for enforcement costs.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that the governing documents (CC&Rs) specifically allow the Association to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees, from the owner. Additionally, the specific policy noted that upon escalation, the owner becomes responsible for these costs.”, “alj_quote”: “CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1, Enforcement, provides that the Association may recover from an owner its enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “attorney fees”, “fines and penalties”, “collection costs” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove that the HOA did something wrong in a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (petitioner) filing the complaint bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “When a homeowner petitions the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation by the HOA, it is up to the homeowner to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Jarzabek bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “hearing standards” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA’s enforcement policy legally considered a binding contract?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the policy is treated as part of the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge affirmed that community policies are part of the contractual agreement between the parties, meaning both the homeowner and the HOA are legally required to follow the terms written in that policy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy is part of contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law; Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association”, “topic_tags”: [ “contract law”, “governing documents”, “policy enforcement” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge cancel the specific debt or fees I owe the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily; the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be limited to determining if a violation of documents occurred, not the validity of the debt itself.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ explicitly noted in a footnote that while they can determine if the HOA violated its policy, they did not have the jurisdiction to decide if the specific attorney’s fees charged constituted a valid debt.”, “alj_quote”: “it is not within this tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek are a valid debt, and the tribunal offers no opinion on that issue.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “debt validity”, “tribunal limitations” ] }, { “question”: “What standard of evidence is used to make a decision in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show it is more likely than not that the claim is true. It is described as the greater weight of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “evidence”, “administrative hearing” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan L Jarzabek (petitioner, witness)

Respondent Side

  • Haidyn DiLorenzo (HOA attorney)
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Robert Cody (board president, witness)
    Hillcrest Improvement Association #2
  • Beth Mulcahy (HOA attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Recipient of transmission; firm engaged by Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • Miranda Alvarez (OAH staff)
    Transmitter of Decision

Other Participants

  • John Jarzabek (spouse)
    Petitioner's husband, named on certified letter sent by Association

Richard J. Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-15
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Richard J Jones Counsel
Respondent Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association Counsel Troy Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Design Guidelines; CC&Rs Section 4.1.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner Richard J. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof to show the Association violated its Design Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement. Evidence indicated that the Petitioner was in violation of the existing Guidelines by failing to obtain prior approval for his driveway extension and failing to meet the required setback.

Key Issues & Findings

Petitioner alleged the Association violated Design Guidelines regarding setback requirements for driveway extensions and engaged in selective enforcement.

Petitioner filed a single issue petition asserting that Design Guidelines did not require a twelve-inch setback for driveway extensions from the property line and that the Association was selectively enforcing its rules. The Petitioner had installed a concrete driveway extension without obtaining prior ARC approval, and approval was denied due to the lack of the twelve-inch setback.

Orders: Richard J. Jones’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 173, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Driveway Extension, Architectural Review Committee, Setback Requirements, Design Guidelines, Selective Enforcement, HOA Violation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 173, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924982.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:52 (100.9 KB)

21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924983.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:57 (94.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121038-REL


Briefing Document: Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge in the case of Richard J. Jones versus the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association (Case No. 21F-H2121038-REL). The dispute centered on a concrete driveway extension installed by Mr. Jones without the prior approval of the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC). Mr. Jones contested the Association’s denial of his post-installation application, alleging that the Design Guidelines were misinterpreted and selectively enforced.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed Mr. Jones’s petition. The decision rested on three key determinations:

1. Clear Violation: Mr. Jones was in direct violation of the Design Guidelines by failing to obtain prior approval for the modification and by not adhering to a mandatory 12-inch setback from the common block wall, a fact he acknowledged.

2. Reasonable Interpretation: The Association’s interpretation that the 12-inch setback requirement applied to the entire property line—not just the block wall—was deemed “not unreasonable,” particularly since the common wall is part of the property line.

3. Failure to Prove Selective Enforcement: Mr. Jones did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to prove his claim of selective enforcement. The Association provided credible evidence demonstrating consistent application of the setback rule to other homeowners.

The final order upholds the Association’s enforcement actions and dismisses the petitioner’s claims.

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdictional Details

Name / Entity

Representation

Petitioner

Richard J. Jones

On his own behalf

Respondent

Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Troy Stratman, Esq.

Adjudicator

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge

Case No.

21F-H2121038-REL

Hearing Date

November 2, 2021

Decision Date

November 15, 2021

Core Dispute

The central conflict arose from a concrete driveway extension installed by Richard J. Jones on his property on May 11, 2020. The installation was performed without submitting a request for prior approval to the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC), a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. Following the installation, the ARC denied Mr. Jones’s retroactive application, citing its failure to meet a required 12-inch setback from the property line. This led to a notice of non-compliance and a fine, prompting Mr. Jones to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Chronology of Events

April 2020: Mr. Jones contacted AAM, LLC, the Association’s property management company, to inquire about adding concrete strips. He was informed this was not allowed but that an employee could assist with an approval process for a paver driveway extension.

May 11, 2020: Having not received further guidance from the management company, Mr. Jones proceeded to have the concrete driveway extension installed.

Post-May 11, 2020: Mr. Jones submitted an application to the ARC for retroactive approval of the already-installed extension.

December 2, 2020: The ARC formally denied Mr. Jones’s application. The denial letter stated the extension did not meet the 12-inch setback requirement and advised him to reapply after cutting the driveway back from the property line.

January 12, 2021: The Association issued a Second Notice of Non-compliance/Fine.

February 12, 2021: Mr. Jones filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association was misinterpreting and selectively enforcing its Design Guidelines.

November 2, 2021: The administrative hearing was conducted.

November 15, 2021: The Administrative Law Judge issued a decision dismissing Mr. Jones’s petition.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Richard J. Jones)

Mr. Jones’s case was built on two primary arguments:

Interpretation of Design Guidelines: He contended that the Guidelines in effect at the time of installation required a 12-inch setback from the “common wall” but were silent regarding the “property line.” He argued that since the Guidelines explicitly mandated a property line setback for sidewalks, the absence of such language for driveway extensions meant the requirement did not apply.

Allegation of Selective Enforcement: He asserted that the Association was applying its Guidelines and Rules inconsistently among homeowners.

During testimony, Mr. Jones acknowledged that his driveway extension did not comply with the 12-inch setback from the common wall and expressed a willingness to correct that specific deficiency. He also testified that his neighbors did not object to the extension as installed.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association)

The Association, represented by counsel, presented a multi-faceted defense:

Procedural Failure: A core issue was Mr. Jones’s failure to obtain prior approval from the ARC before installation, as mandated by Section 4.1.1 of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Setback Rule: The Association maintained that the extension violated the required 12-inch setback. The property manager, Paul Favale, testified that this rule is intended to ensure water does not drain onto a neighbor’s property.

Evidence of Consistent Enforcement: To counter the claim of selective enforcement, the Association submitted an “Architectural Status Report” for the period of August 27, 2020, through April 21, 2021. This report demonstrated that other homeowners’ requests for driveway extensions had also been denied for failing to meet the 12-inch property line setback.

It was also noted that the Design Guidelines have since been modified to explicitly require a 12-inch setback from both the common wall and the property line.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Judge’s decision was based on a thorough analysis of the evidence presented and the applicable legal standards.

Key Findings of Fact

• Mr. Jones installed the driveway extension on May 11, 2020, without prior approval from the ARC.

• The extension does not have a 12-inch setback from the common block wall, which is part of the property line.

• The Design Guidelines at the time explicitly required a 12-inch setback from the block wall.

• Mr. Jones acknowledged his non-compliance with the block wall setback requirement.

Conclusions of Law

The Judge concluded that Mr. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof, which required demonstrating a violation by the Association by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

1. Petitioner’s Violation: Mr. Jones was found to be in violation of the Guidelines. His acknowledgment that the driveway did not comply with the 12-inch setback from the common wall was a critical factor.

2. Reasonableness of Association’s Interpretation: The Judge determined that the Association’s interpretation of the Guidelines—requiring a 12-inch setback along the entire property line—was “not unreasonable.” This conclusion was supported by two points: the common wall is physically part of the property line, and Mr. Jones had failed to follow the required prior approval process, where such ambiguities would have been clarified.

3. No Evidence of Selective Enforcement: The Association presented “credible evidence” via its Architectural Status Report showing that other members were subject to the same rule. Consequently, Mr. Jones “did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was selectively enforcing the Guidelines.”

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Judge ordered that Richard J. Jones’s petition be dismissed.

Legal Standing: The decision is binding on both parties.

Appeal Process: The order can only be challenged through a request for rehearing, which must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (November 15, 2021).






Study Guide – 21F-H2121038-REL


Study Guide: Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 21F-H2121038-REL, involving Petitioner Richard J. Jones and Respondent Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final judgment.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their roles?

2. What specific modification did Richard J. Jones make to his property, and on what date did he complete it?

3. What critical step did Mr. Jones fail to take before installing the modification, as required by Section 4.1.1 of the CC&Rs?

4. According to the Design Guidelines in effect at the time of installation, what was the specific rule regarding the placement of driveway extensions that Mr. Jones’s project violated?

5. What was Mr. Jones’s main argument regarding the ambiguity of the Design Guidelines concerning the twelve-inch setback requirement?

6. What justification did the Association’s property manager, Paul Favale, provide for the setback requirement?

7. What were the two primary claims Mr. Jones made against the Association in his petition filed on February 12, 2021?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party carried the burden of meeting that standard?

9. How did the Association counter Mr. Jones’s claim that it was selectively enforcing its rules?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Richard J. Jones, a homeowner who appeared on his own behalf, and the Respondent, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association, which was represented by its counsel, Troy Stratman, Esq.

2. On May 11, 2020, Mr. Jones added a concrete driveway running from the street to a side gate on his property. This modification is referred to in the documents as a “driveway extension.”

3. Mr. Jones did not submit a request for prior approval to the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) before installing his driveway extension. This pre-approval is required for such modifications under the Association’s CC&Rs.

4. The driveway extension violated the rule requiring a twelve-inch setback from the common block wall. Mr. Jones acknowledged that his driveway did not comply with this specific requirement of the Design Guidelines.

5. Mr. Jones argued that since the Design Guidelines explicitly required a twelve-inch setback from the property line for sidewalks but did not explicitly state the same for driveway extensions, the requirement did not apply to his project along the full property line.

6. Mr. Favale testified that the purpose of the setback requirement is functional. It is designed to help ensure that water does not drain from one property onto a neighboring property.

7. Mr. Jones’s petition asserted that the Design Guidelines for driveway extensions did not require a setback from the property line (only the common wall). He also claimed that the Association was selectively enforcing its Guidelines and Rules against him.

8. The standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence. The Petitioner, Mr. Jones, bore the burden of proof to show that the Association had violated its own guidelines.

9. The Association submitted an Architectural Status Report covering August 27, 2020, to April 21, 2021. This report provided credible evidence that other Association members had also been denied requests for driveway extensions due to a failure to meet the twelve-inch setback requirement.

10. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ordered that Richard J. Jones’s petition be dismissed. The judge concluded that Mr. Jones had not met his burden of proof to show the Association had violated its guidelines or enforced them selectively.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as they were applied in this case. Explain specifically how Mr. Jones failed to meet this burden for both of his primary claims.

2. Analyze the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to determine that the Association’s interpretation of its Design Guidelines was “not unreasonable.” Consider the judge’s reference to the common wall being part of the property line and Mr. Jones’s failure to obtain prior approval.

3. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Jones’s initial inquiry to AAM, LLC in April 2020 to the final order in November 2021. Discuss how Mr. Jones’s decision to proceed with construction without explicit approval ultimately weakened his legal position.

4. Evaluate the claim of “selective enforcement.” What kind of evidence would Mr. Jones have needed to present to successfully prove this claim, and why was the Association’s Architectural Status Report considered more compelling evidence by the court?

5. The “Conclusions of Law” section states that the Design Guidelines are part of a contract between the parties. Using the facts of this case, explain the legal and practical implications of this principle for a homeowner living within a master association.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company for the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judge who presides over administrative hearings and renders decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

The committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and granting prior approval for modifications to properties, such as driveway extensions.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on the petitioner, Mr. Jones.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community or homeowners’ association.

Design Guidelines

A set of rules that are part of the contract between homeowners and the association, detailing requirements for property modifications.

Driveway Extension

As defined by the parties, a concrete driveway running from the street to a gate at the side of a house.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Richard J. Jones.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as evidence that has “the most convincing force” and is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association.

Selective Enforcement

The legal claim that an association is not applying its rules and guidelines uniformly, instead penalizing some members while allowing others to violate the same rules.

Setback

A required distance that a structure must be located away from a property line or other feature, such as a common wall. In this case, the requirement was for a twelve-inch setback.






Blog Post – 21F-H2121038-REL


He Fought the HOA Over 12 Inches of Concrete—and Lost. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons from His Case.

Navigating the rules of a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like walking through a minefield of regulations, where a small misstep can lead to notices, fines, and protracted disputes. For one homeowner, Richard J. Jones, a conflict with his HOA, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association, over a new driveway extension escalated all the way to a formal hearing. The official legal decision in his case reveals several counter-intuitive truths about how these disputes are won and lost, offering valuable lessons for any homeowner living under HOA governance.

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1. “Asking for Forgiveness” is a Losing Strategy.

The first major takeaway is that violating rules first and hoping for retroactive approval is an approach doomed to fail, even when the situation feels complex. The story here is more nuanced than simple defiance. In April 2020, before any work began, Mr. Jones contacted the HOA’s management company about his plans. After being told his initial idea for “two concrete strips” was not allowed, he was directed to another employee for help with an application for a different design. According to the case file, Mr. Jones “did not hear back from her and he had the driveway extension installed” on May 11, 2020.

While his frustration is relatable, this impatient miscalculation was his crucial error. Section 4.1.1 of the community’s CC&Rs requires prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). By proceeding without securing this written approval, Mr. Jones was in immediate violation. His subsequent application, submitted only after the work was done, was predictably denied on December 2, 2020. The lesson is stark: a breakdown in communication does not absolve a homeowner of their responsibility to follow procedure. The moment unapproved work begins, you are in breach of the community’s governing documents, and the merits of the project become secondary to the procedural failure.

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2. You Have to Prove the HOA is Wrong—Not the Other Way Around.

Many homeowners assume that in a dispute, the burden is on the HOA to prove the homeowner is wrong. The legal reality is the exact opposite. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision formally stated in Conclusion of Law #2 that Mr. Jones, as the petitioner who brought the case, bore the “burden of proof.”

To win, he had to demonstrate that the Association committed a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision cites the formal definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, which essentially means the evidence presented must be convincing enough to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. The reality for homeowners is surprising and crucial: in a formal dispute, the legal scales are not neutral. You must actively build a case and convincingly prove the HOA has violated its own rules. Mr. Jones failed to meet this standard.

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3. A Small Loophole Isn’t Enough to Win.

Mr. Jones’s central argument rested on a perceived loophole in the governing documents. He claimed the Design Guidelines required a 12-inch setback from the “common wall” but were silent about the “property line” as a whole, and therefore the rule didn’t apply to the entirety of his project. This highlights a key aspect of HOA governance: the purpose behind a rule matters. The property manager testified that the setback requirement exists to “ensure that water does not drain to the neighbor’s property,” transforming the rule from an arbitrary measurement into a practical and defensible standard.

Ultimately, the judge was unpersuaded by the loophole argument, and the reason is a masterclass in how these cases are decided. The judge’s decision, articulated in Conclusion of Law #7, pointed out that the common wall is fundamentally part of the property line. More importantly, the decision explicitly connected this conclusion to Mr. Jones’s prior actions: “…considering that Mr. Jones did not obtain prior approval from ARC before constructing his driveway extension, the Association’s interpretation…is not unreasonable.” This is the crucial insight: his procedural failure (Lesson #1) directly weakened his ability to argue about ambiguous wording. An HOA’s reasonable interpretation of its own rules is far more likely to be upheld when the homeowner has already disregarded clear procedural mandates. Tellingly, the Association later modified the guidelines to explicitly close this perceived loophole.

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4. Proving “Selective Enforcement” is Harder Than You Think.

A common defense from homeowners is that the HOA is engaging in “selective enforcement”—singling them out while letting others get away with similar violations. Mr. Jones made this exact claim, but the Association came prepared with meticulous documentation to defeat it.

As detailed in Finding of Fact #21, the HOA presented an “Architectural Status Report” covering August 27, 2020 through April 21, 2021. This document provided time-stamped evidence that other homeowners’ requests for similar driveway extensions had also been consistently denied for failing to meet the same 12-inch setback requirement. This report systematically dismantled the selective enforcement argument. For homeowners, this underscores a critical point: the feeling of being singled out is not evidence. To win a selective enforcement claim, you must provide clear proof that other members in the exact same situation were treated differently, a high bar that an HOA with good records can easily overcome.

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Conclusion: A Contract is a Contract

The overarching theme from this case is that HOA governing documents are not merely suggestions; they are legally binding. As stated in Conclusion of Law #5, the Design Guidelines are part of a contract between the homeowner and the association. While HOA rules can often feel arbitrary or frustrating, they carry the weight of a contract. The path to successfully challenging them is narrow and requires a clear, well-documented case that proves the HOA, not the homeowner, has breached its duties.

This case serves as a powerful reminder for all community members. How well do you really know the contract you’re living under?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard J Jones (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Paul Favale (property manager)
    Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Angela Pate (property manager employee)
    AAM, LLC
    Contacted by Petitioner regarding installation inquiry

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • Miranda Alvarez (Staff)
    Transmitted decision

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL-RHG Decision – 733509.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-09T17:24:55 (38.6 KB)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:45 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:49 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

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Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

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Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09