Tag Archives: BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)

Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

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Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL-RHG Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:48 (69.0 KB)

19F-H1919071-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1919071-REL/741807.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:51 (78.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Brief: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict arose from Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s display of a “Trump 2020” flag, which the HOA deemed a violation of its “Flag Display Rule.” Mr. Van Dan Elzen petitioned the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA’s rule was invalid and violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1808.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, both in the initial hearing and upon a subsequent rehearing. The central findings were that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA’s rule was inconsistent with its governing documents (CC&Rs) or that the HOA had violated the state statute. The HOA’s authority to create rules restricting the use of lots, granted by its CC&Rs, was upheld. The final decision affirmed the HOA as the prevailing party, concluding a legal challenge that centered on the distinction between statutorily protected flags and political displays.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Background and Chronology

The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings, with Velva Moses-Thompson serving as the Administrative Law Judge. The case involved a petition filed by a homeowner against his HOA regarding flag display regulations.

Parties Involved:

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (appeared on his own behalf)

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (represented by Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.)

Key Events:

Date (2019-2020)

May 21, 2019

Carter Ranch HOA notifies Mr. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates association rules.

June 14, 2019

Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808.

July 16, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

Sept. 9, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

Sept. 30, 2019

The ALJ issues a decision dismissing the petitioner’s case.

Nov. 18, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Jan. 10, 2020

A rehearing is held.

Jan. 30, 2020

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, again dismissing the petition.

II. The Core Dispute and Competing Arguments

The central issue was the legality of the Carter Ranch HOA’s rule prohibiting Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s “Trump 2020” flag and the scope of the HOA’s authority to regulate such displays.

A. The Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s challenge was based on the premise that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because it was not explicitly supported by the language of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

• Primary Argument: He asserted that because the CC&Rs do not specifically contain the word “flag,” any rule created by the HOA Board regulating flags is inconsistent with the CC&Rs and therefore unenforceable.

• Petition Allegation: In his formal petition, Mr. Van Dan Elzen stated the violation was “based on 33-1808 Flags and Sings [sic].” He further argued that the HOA’s rule referenced section 3.14 of the CC&Rs, which he claimed “ONLY defines SIGNS and has no reference to Flags whatsoever.”

B. The Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was a valid exercise of the authority granted to its Board by the community’s governing documents.

• Basis of Authority: The HOA contended that it was authorized to adopt the rule under Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs.

• Defense of the Rule: The HOA argued that the Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs and was properly adopted.

• Argument for Dismissal: Carter Ranch asserted that the petition should be dismissed because the petitioner had not successfully alleged a violation of any statute or provision within the governing documents.

III. Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The case was decided based on an interpretation of both state law and the HOA’s internal governing documents.

A. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Rules

• The “Flag Display Rule”: The association’s rules and regulations explicitly prohibit the flying of any flag other than the following:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official or replica flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ An Arizona Indian Nations flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

• CC&Rs, Article V, Section 5.3: This section grants the HOA Board broad rule-making authority. The text states, in relevant part:

B. Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1808

This state statute places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to prohibit certain flags and political signs.

• Section A – Protected Flags: The statute mandates that an HOA “shall not prohibit the outdoor display” of the exact list of flags enumerated in the Carter Ranch “Flag Display Rule” (American, military, POW/MIA, state, etc.). A “Trump 2020” flag is not included in this list of protected flags.

• Section C – Political Signs: The statute addresses political signs separately from flags.

◦ Definition: A “political sign” is defined as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

◦ Regulation: An HOA may prohibit political signs “earlier than seventy-one days before the day of an election and later than three days after an election day.”

◦ Size/Number: An HOA may regulate the size and number of signs, provided the rules are no more restrictive than local ordinances. If no local ordinance exists, an HOA cannot limit the number of signs but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

Across both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the ALJ’s conclusions of law consistently favored the respondent HOA. The petitioner failed to meet the required legal standard to prove his case.

A. Burden of Proof

The ALJ established that the petitioner, Mr. Van Dan Elzen, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated A.R.S. § 33-1808. A preponderance of the evidence means showing the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

B. Key Conclusions of Law

• Validity of the “Flag Display Rule”: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner “had not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.” In the rehearing, this was stated as the petitioner having “not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

• No Statutory Violation: A critical conclusion in both decisions was that the petitioner “has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.”

• Final Judgment: Based on these conclusions, the ALJ determined that Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and that the Carter Ranch HOA should be deemed the prevailing party.

C. Final Order

• Initial Decision (September 30, 2019): “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

• Rehearing Decision (January 30, 2020): The order to dismiss was reaffirmed. The final notice specified that this order was binding on the parties and that any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case involving Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, based on the legal decisions from September 2019 and January 2020. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was the official case number?

2. What specific action by the Petitioner prompted the initial notice of violation from the homeowners association?

3. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument against the validity of the Association’s “Flag Display Rule”?

4. According to the Carter Ranch CC&Rs, what authority does the Board have to create rules and regulations?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence,” and which party had the burden of meeting this standard?

6. List at least five of the flags that are explicitly permitted for display under the Carter Ranch “Flag Display Rule.”

7. Summarize the key provisions of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808(C) regarding “political signs.”

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule?

9. What was the final outcome of the petition after both the initial hearing on September 9, 2019, and the rehearing on January 10, 2020?

10. Who was the Administrative Law Judge that presided over both hearings?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, and the Respondent was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. The case number was 19F-H1919071-REL, with the rehearing designated as 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG.

2. The case was prompted by Mr. Van Dan Elzen displaying a “Trump 2020” flag on a flagpole in his front yard. On or about May 21, 2019, Carter Ranch notified him that this action violated the Association’s rules.

3. The Petitioner argued that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) do not specifically mention the word “flag.” He asserted that the Association’s rules and regulations can only be based on topics explicitly mentioned in the CC&Rs.

4. Article V, Section 5.3 of the CC&Rs grants the Board the authority to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to the management of common areas, minimum maintenance standards for lots, the health, safety, or welfare of residents, and restrictions on the use of lots.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. The Petitioner, Mr. Van Dan Elzen, bore the burden of proving his case by this standard.

6. The Carter Ranch Flag Display Rule permits the display of the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) states that an association cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but it can prohibit them earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election. An association may also regulate the size and number of signs to be no more restrictive than local ordinances, or to a maximum aggregate of nine square feet if no such ordinances exist.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner had not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs. The judge found that the rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

9. In both instances, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

10. The Administrative Law Judge for both the initial hearing and the rehearing was Velva Moses-Thompson.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy. Why did his argument that the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag” ultimately fail to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard?

2. Explain the relationship between the Carter Ranch CC&Rs, the Association’s Rules and Regulations, and Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808. How do these documents interact to govern what a resident can display on their property?

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard apply to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition, and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude he did not meet it?

4. Could the “Trump 2020” flag have been considered a “political sign” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1808(C)? Based on the text, evaluate the potential arguments for and against this classification and how the statute’s time restrictions on display might have been relevant.

5. Examine the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and how did the Administrative Law Judge evaluate this justification?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 33-1808

The Arizona Revised Statute that, notwithstanding community documents, protects the right of homeowners to display certain flags (American, military, POW/MIA, state, etc.) and regulates how an association may restrict political signs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to provide evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or homeowners association. In this case, Article V, Section 5.3 of the CC&Rs gave the Board authority to create rules.

Flag Display Rule

The specific Carter Ranch Association rule prohibiting any flag other than the American Flag, specific military flags, POW/MIA flag, Arizona Indian National flag, Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the petitioner was Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

As defined in A.R.S. § 33-1808(C), “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. Defined in the decision as “[e]vidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case. In this matter, a rehearing was held on January 10, 2020, after the initial decision was made on September 30, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case involving Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, based on the legal decisions from September 2019 and January 2020. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was the official case number?

2. What specific action by the Petitioner prompted the initial notice of violation from the homeowners association?

3. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument against the validity of the Association’s “Flag Display Rule”?

4. According to the Carter Ranch CC&Rs, what authority does the Board have to create rules and regulations?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence,” and which party had the burden of meeting this standard?

6. List at least five of the flags that are explicitly permitted for display under the Carter Ranch “Flag Display Rule.”

7. Summarize the key provisions of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808(C) regarding “political signs.”

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule?

9. What was the final outcome of the petition after both the initial hearing on September 9, 2019, and the rehearing on January 10, 2020?

10. Who was the Administrative Law Judge that presided over both hearings?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, and the Respondent was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. The case number was 19F-H1919071-REL, with the rehearing designated as 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG.

2. The case was prompted by Mr. Van Dan Elzen displaying a “Trump 2020” flag on a flagpole in his front yard. On or about May 21, 2019, Carter Ranch notified him that this action violated the Association’s rules.

3. The Petitioner argued that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) do not specifically mention the word “flag.” He asserted that the Association’s rules and regulations can only be based on topics explicitly mentioned in the CC&Rs.

4. Article V, Section 5.3 of the CC&Rs grants the Board the authority to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to the management of common areas, minimum maintenance standards for lots, the health, safety, or welfare of residents, and restrictions on the use of lots.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. The Petitioner, Mr. Van Dan Elzen, bore the burden of proving his case by this standard.

6. The Carter Ranch Flag Display Rule permits the display of the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) states that an association cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but it can prohibit them earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election. An association may also regulate the size and number of signs to be no more restrictive than local ordinances, or to a maximum aggregate of nine square feet if no such ordinances exist.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner had not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs. The judge found that the rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

9. In both instances, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

10. The Administrative Law Judge for both the initial hearing and the rehearing was Velva Moses-Thompson.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy. Why did his argument that the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag” ultimately fail to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard?

2. Explain the relationship between the Carter Ranch CC&Rs, the Association’s Rules and Regulations, and Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808. How do these documents interact to govern what a resident can display on their property?

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard apply to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition, and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude he did not meet it?

4. Could the “Trump 2020” flag have been considered a “political sign” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1808(C)? Based on the text, evaluate the potential arguments for and against this classification and how the statute’s time restrictions on display might have been relevant.

5. Examine the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and how did the Administrative Law Judge evaluate this justification?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 33-1808

The Arizona Revised Statute that, notwithstanding community documents, protects the right of homeowners to display certain flags (American, military, POW/MIA, state, etc.) and regulates how an association may restrict political signs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to provide evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or homeowners association. In this case, Article V, Section 5.3 of the CC&Rs gave the Board authority to create rules.

Flag Display Rule

The specific Carter Ranch Association rule prohibiting any flag other than the American Flag, specific military flags, POW/MIA flag, Arizona Indian National flag, Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the petitioner was Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

As defined in A.R.S. § 33-1808(C), “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. Defined in the decision as “[e]vidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case. In this matter, a rehearing was held on January 10, 2020, after the initial decision was made on September 30, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (HOA attorney)
    Shaw & Lines LLC
  • Dustin Snow (property manager)
    SNOW PROPERTY SERVICES

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:09:41 (69.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

• Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

• Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

• Decision Date: January 30, 2020

• Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

• May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

• June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

• January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

• Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

• Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

• Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

• The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

• Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

• Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
• Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
• Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

• Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

• Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

• Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

• Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.


Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 741807.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:05:18 (78.9 KB)

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:23 (69.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

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I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

• Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

• Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

• Decision Date: January 30, 2020

• Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

• May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

• June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

• January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

• Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

• Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

• Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

• The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

• Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

• Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
• Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
• Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

• Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

• Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

• Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

• Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919071-REL


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG). The guide includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information in the provided source text.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action taken by Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen initiated the dispute with the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association?

3. What was Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument for why the HOA’s Flag Display Rule was invalid?

4. On what authority did the Carter Ranch HOA claim it had the right to create and enforce its Flag Display Rule?

5. According to the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule,” which specific flags are homeowners permitted to fly?

6. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this hearing, and how is it defined in the decision?

7. What protection does Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1808(C) provide for “political signs”?

8. What were the two key failures of the petitioner’s case, as identified in the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law?

9. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

10. What are the next steps for a party wishing to challenge the Administrative Law Judge’s order?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Van Dan Elzen represented himself, while the HOA was represented by its attorney, Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

2. The dispute began on or about May 21, 2019, when the Carter Ranch HOA notified Mr. Van Dan Elzen that he had violated its rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag in his front yard. This notice of violation prompted Mr. Van Dan Elzen to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument was that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the community’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He contended that because CC&R section 3.14 only defines “SIGNS” and makes no reference to “Flags,” the HOA had no basis in the CC&Rs to regulate his flag.

4. The Carter Ranch HOA asserted its authority based on Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the HOA Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to the health, safety, or welfare of the owners and restrictions on the use of Lots.

5. The HOA’s Flag Display Rule prohibits flying any flag other than the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian National flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

6. The petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) prevents an HOA from prohibiting the display of political signs on a member’s property, although it allows for regulation. An HOA cannot prohibit political signs earlier than 71 days before an election or later than three days after, and its rules on size and number can be no more restrictive than applicable city or county ordinances.

8. The Judge concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the Flag Display Rule was improperly adopted or inconsistent with the CC&Rs. Furthermore, the Judge concluded that the petitioner had not actually alleged that Carter Ranch violated the specific statute he cited, A.R.S. § 33-1808.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by state statutes.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are designed to encourage a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the word “flag” does not appear in the CC&Rs. Why was this argument ultimately unconvincing to the Administrative Law Judge?

2. Explain the legal distinction between a “flag” and a “political sign” as presented in A.R.S. § 33-1808. How might the petitioner’s case have differed if he had argued his “Trump 2020” flag was a “political sign” instead of a flag?

3. Discuss the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and why was this justification accepted by the court?

4. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the petitioner “has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” How can this be true when the petitioner’s initial filing explicitly cited this statute?

5. Based on the provided text of A.R.S. § 33-1808, under what specific circumstances could a homeowner in Carter Ranch successfully challenge the HOA’s rules on outdoor displays?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ in the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. The case centered on an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or subdivision. The Carter Ranch CC&Rs grant the HOA Board the authority to adopt rules and regulations.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.

Flag Display Rule

The specific rule created by the Carter Ranch HOA that prohibits flying any flag other than the American, military, POW/MIA, Arizona Indian National, Arizona State, and Gadsden flags.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Carter Ranch Homeowners Association is the Respondent in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, the petitioner is Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

Defined by A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.” HOAs are restricted in their ability to prohibit the display of such signs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it,” meaning the fact is more probable than not.

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent (Carter Ranch HOA) to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues. This case was decided as a result of a rehearing held on January 10, 2020.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the complaint. In this case, the respondent is the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919071-REL


He Fought the HOA Over a Political Flag—And Lost. Here Are 3 Surprising Reasons Why.

Introduction: The Pride and the Problem

Imagine this: You want to display a flag on your own property to support a political candidate. It feels like a fundamental right, an expression of free speech on your home turf. But then, a letter arrives from your Homeowners Association (HOA) citing you for a violation. This exact scenario happened to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who displayed a “Trump 2020” flag and promptly received a violation notice from the Carter Ranch HOA in Arizona.

Believing the HOA was overstepping its authority, Mr. Van Dan Elzen took them to court. He lost. The outcome might seem counter-intuitive, but the court’s decision reveals crucial lessons for any homeowner living under an HOA. Here are the three surprising legal reasons why the HOA won.

1. The Power of the Fine Print: Why a “Loophole” Wasn’t Enough

Mr. Van Dan Elzen built his case on a clever textual argument. He alleged that the HOA’s rule against his flag was invalid because the section of the master community documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—he believed it was based on only regulated “SIGNS” and made no mention of “FLAGS.” He argued that since the document didn’t explicitly prohibit flags, the rule against his was unenforceable.

This seemingly logical “loophole” argument failed. The HOA countered by pointing to a different, much broader clause in their CC&Rs. Article V, Section 5.3, gave the HOA board expansive power to create new rules.

The Board may, from time to time, adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to: … (iii) the health, safety or welfare of the owners, Lessees and Residence, or (iv) restrictions on the use of Lots…

This general power to create rules for the “welfare of the owners” was enough to give the HOA the legal authority to regulate flags, even if the word “flag” wasn’t in the specific section the homeowner cited. The broad power to govern trumped the narrow, semantic argument.

2. A Flag Is Not a Sign (At Least, Not According to the Law)

While the homeowner’s flag was political in nature, it did not receive the legal protections granted to “political signs” under Arizona law. This distinction proved fatal to his case.

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808, is highly specific about which flags an HOA is forbidden from prohibiting. The protected list includes: the American flag, official military branch flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, Arizona Indian nations flags, and the Gadsden flag. Critically, the Carter Ranch HOA’s own Flag Display Rule mirrored this state-approved list exactly, demonstrating they had aligned their regulations with the law. A political campaign flag, like “Trump 2020,” is not on this protected list.

The same law does protect political signs, but it defines them very precisely:

“political sign” means a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.

The key takeaway is that the law treats a political flag differently from a political sign. Because the “Trump 2020” item was a flag and not on the state’s protected flag list, the HOA was well within its rights to restrict its display based on its own community rules.

3. A Critical Misstep: Arguing the Wrong Point

The most decisive reason for the loss was not a procedural error, but a substantive legal failure. Mr. Van Dan Elzen filed his petition with the state on the grounds that the HOA had violated a specific state law, A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and political signs.

However, his entire case was built on arguing that the HOA’s internal rules were inconsistent with its own CC&Rs—the “sign” versus “flag” argument. This was the wrong legal target. To win, he had to prove that the HOA had violated the state statute. But the statute explicitly allows an HOA to regulate any flag not on the protected list. By regulating his “Trump 2020” flag, the HOA was doing exactly what the state law permitted. His argument about internal documents, even if correct, did not add up to a violation of the state law he sued under.

The Administrative Law Judge recognized this fundamental flaw, concluding that the homeowner hadn’t actually made a case for a statutory violation at all.

Moreover, Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

This is a crucial lesson: it’s not enough to feel wronged. Your argument must directly prove that the specific law you cite in your complaint has actually been broken. The homeowner’s claim was dismissed because his central argument was irrelevant to the law he needed to prove was violated.

Conclusion: Know Your Rights, and Your Rules

The case of the “Trump 2020” flag is a powerful illustration for homeowners everywhere. It highlights three critical realities of living in an HOA: the broad rule-making power granted by community documents can override perceived loopholes; state laws make very specific and narrow distinctions between protected items like signs and flags; and a sound legal strategy is paramount.

This case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, your property rights are defined not by what you feel is right, but by what is written down. Before you make a stand, are you certain you’re fighting the right battle on the right legal ground?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines LLC
    Appeared for Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Dustin Snow (property manager)
    SNOW PROPERTY SERVICES
    Recipient of order transmission

Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel —
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, ruling that the DMMA Communication Committee was not subject to the open meetings law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because it did not hold 'regularly scheduled meetings',,,.

Why this result: The committee met too infrequently and without regular intervals to be deemed 'regularly scheduled' for the purposes of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether a Communications Committee meeting must be open to members under the open meetings law.

Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated the open meetings statute by closing the September 6, 2017 meeting of the Communications Committee. The issue was whether this committee constituted a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,,,.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the DMMA Communication committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings, meaning it was not subject to the open meetings law under A.R.S. § 33-1804,,,.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:03 (106.4 KB)

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1817005-REL/605190.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:45:58 (77.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing on the Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association Case

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions regarding a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA or Respondent). The core of the case, No. 18F-H1817005-REL, is the legal interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as it appears in Arizona’s open meeting statute for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The conflict arose when the DMMA Communications Committee held a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, which Mr. Moselle was barred from attending. He contended this violated the statute’s open meeting requirements. The DMMA argued the committee was exempt because its meetings were infrequent and not held at fixed intervals.

In two separate decisions—an initial ruling on December 7, 2017, and a second after a rehearing on May 10, 2018—Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer consistently ruled in favor of the DMMA. The judge concluded that “regularly scheduled” applies to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly). Since the Communications Committee met only four times in two years without a set schedule, it was not subject to the open meeting law. The judge determined that the statute’s general policy favoring openness does not override its more specific provisions. Ultimately, the petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute proceeded through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, culminating in a definitive ruling after a granted rehearing.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging DMMA violated open meeting laws.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Mr. Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

An initial hearing is conducted before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer.

December 7, 2017

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

January 4, 2018

Mr. Moselle files a request for rehearing, citing “newly discovered material evidence” and arguing the decision was contrary to law.

January 26, 2018

The Department of Real Estate grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted before the ALJ.

May 10, 2018

The ALJ issues a final decision after rehearing, again denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

Core Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The central legal question was whether the DMMA Communications Committee was subject to the open meeting requirements mandated by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. The resolution of the case hinged on the interpretation of specific language within the statute.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): “It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.”

Arguments Presented by the Parties

The petitioner and respondent presented starkly different interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled.”

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Mr. Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting scheduled in a “normal manner” or “ordinary fashion,” not necessarily one that recurs at fixed intervals.

• Primacy of Openness Policy: He emphasized the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), asserting that the statute’s clear preference for open meetings should guide the interpretation of any ambiguous terms.

• Arguments for Rehearing: In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Moselle cited newly discovered evidence (an email sent by the DMMA after the first hearing) and suggested the ALJ should evaluate whether the DMMA had misled the court regarding the Board’s actions on the committee’s recommendation.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA contended that the phrase “regularly scheduled” plainly refers to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals, “such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: As evidence, the DMMA testified that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed pattern, holding only four meetings in 2016 and 2017 (twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and the contested meeting of September 6, 2017).

• Lack of Board Action: The DMMA further argued that a recommendation from the committee to the Board of Directors was not acted upon, which it presented as evidence that the committee was not “conducting any actual business of the Board.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Rulings

Across both decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided a consistent legal analysis that ultimately favored the respondent’s interpretation of the statute.

Initial Decision (December 7, 2017)

• The ALJ concluded that the DMMA Communications Committee does not hold “regularly scheduled meetings.”

• Based on this finding, the committee was deemed not subject to the open meetings law.

• The decision to hold a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, was therefore ruled not to be a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

• The petitioner’s petition was denied.

Decision After Rehearing (May 10, 2018)

• Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ reaffirmed the conclusion that the “plain language” of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) applies to meetings that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the ALJ settled on this interpretation.

• Policy vs. Specifics: The decision explicitly states that the general policy favoring open meetings in subsection (F) “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

• Petitioner’s Testimony: The ALJ noted that during the rehearing, Mr. Moselle’s own testimony on cross-examination appeared to support the court’s interpretation. When questioned about other DMMA committees, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

• Final Ruling: The ALJ again concluded that the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings at the time of the incident and was therefore not in violation of the statute. The petition was denied for a final time.

Final Disposition

The petition filed by Gary W. Moselle against the Desert Mountain Master Association was denied. The Administrative Law Judge’s order of May 10, 2018, issued after the rehearing, was declared binding on the parties. As per the final notice, any further appeal would require a party to seek judicial review in superior court within thirty-five days of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (Respondent) concerning Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific event on September 6, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file his complaint?

3. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for why its Communications Committee was not subject to the open meetings law?

5. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the key statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

6. What evidence did the Respondent present regarding the frequency of the Communications Committee’s meetings in 2016 and 2017?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party had the responsibility to meet it?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the meaning of “regularly scheduled” in the context of the statute?

9. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued on December 7, 2017?

10. How did the judge weigh the general policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) against the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Gary W. Moselle, the Petitioner, and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), the Respondent. Mr. Moselle was a homeowner who filed a petition against the DMMA, which is the homeowners association for the community.

2. The Petitioner filed his complaint after he was not allowed to attend a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee that was held on September 6, 2017. He alleged this violated Arizona’s open meeting statute.

3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804. This statute governs open meetings for planned communities, such as homeowners associations.

4. The Respondent argued that the Communications Committee did not meet at regular, established intervals and therefore its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” as required by the statute to be open. They also asserted that the committee’s recommendation was not acted upon by the Board, suggesting it was not conducting official business.

5. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting that was scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He asserted this interpretation was supported by the statute’s general policy favoring open meetings.

6. The Respondent provided testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set interval, having held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017. These meetings occurred twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and on September 6, 2017.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring evidence to show that a fact is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, bore the burden of proving the Respondent’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plain language of the statute meant “regularly scheduled” referred to meetings that occur at regular intervals, such as monthly, quarterly, or annually. The judge rejected the Petitioner’s alternate interpretation.

9. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing by citing newly discovered material evidence (an email sent after the first hearing) and arguing the need to evaluate whether the Respondent had misled the judge. He also contended that the initial decision was contrary to law.

10. The judge acknowledged the state’s policy favoring open meetings as stated in subsection (F). However, the judge ruled that this general policy statement did not override the specific provision in subsection (A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing upon the facts, arguments, and legal reasoning presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the principles of statutory construction used by the Administrative Law Judge to resolve this dispute and explain why one interpretation was favored over the other.

2. Examine the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to the final order issued after the rehearing. What were the key legal steps, decisions, and turning points in the process?

3. Discuss the evidence presented by the Desert Mountain Master Association to support its case. How did testimony regarding meeting frequency and the Board’s actions on committee recommendations contribute to the final outcome?

4. Explain the legal relationship between A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Based on the judge’s decision, what is the hierarchy between a statute’s specific provisions and its general policy declarations?

5. During the rehearing, the Petitioner’s own testimony about other committees was noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Explain this apparent contradiction in the Petitioner’s argument and discuss its potential impact on the case.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions on behalf of a government agency.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the dispute, which governs open meetings for planned communities and their boards of directors and committees.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.

Conclusions of Law

The judge’s application of legal principles to the facts of the case to reach a decision.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and homeowners associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA)

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners association located in Scottsdale, Arizona, classified as a Planned Unit Development.

Findings of Fact

The determination of factual events made by a judge from the evidence presented in a trial or hearing.

Gary W. Moselle

The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner within the DMMA who filed the complaint.

Jurisdiction

The official power of a court or agency to hear a case and make legal decisions and judgments.

Open Meetings Law

A law, in this case A.R.S. § 33-1804, that requires meetings of certain entities to be open to all members or the public.

Petition

The formal written request filed with an administrative body or court to initiate a case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition and initiates a legal action.

Planned Unit Development (PUD)

A type of real estate development and community governed by specific state laws, such as those in A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows a fact is more probable than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the previous decision, typically granted due to new evidence or an argument of legal error.

Regularly Scheduled

The key statutory phrase in dispute. The judge interpreted it to mean meetings that occur at regular, established intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party defending against the complaint.

Statutory Construction

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, starting with the plain text of the statute.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Your HOA Committee Might Be Meeting in Secret—And It Could Be Perfectly Legal

As a homeowner in a planned community, you likely know you have the right to attend your HOA’s board of directors meetings. But what about the committee meetings? The finance, architectural, or communications committees often lay the critical groundwork for decisions that ultimately affect your property and fees. Do you have a right to observe their deliberations?

A recent legal case in Scottsdale, Arizona, hinged on the interpretation of a single, seemingly straightforward phrase and exposed a surprising rule about HOA transparency. The case, Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association, reveals critical lessons for any homeowner about the letter of the law and how it can sometimes create legal loopholes that allow committee meetings to happen behind closed doors.

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1. The Crucial Loophole: “Regularly Scheduled” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The entire dispute rested on how to interpret the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as written in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.

The Homeowner’s Argument The petitioner, homeowner Gary Moselle, argued that when the Communications Committee of the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA) scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2017, it should be open to all members. His logic was simple: a meeting that is formally scheduled and placed on the calendar is, by any common-sense definition, a “regularly scheduled” meeting.

The HOA’s Counter-Argument The DMMA countered with a different interpretation. They argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” implies a recurring, predictable pattern, such as meetings held monthly, quarterly, or on the third Thursday of every month. The association presented evidence that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set pattern, having convened only four times in 2016 and 2017. Because the meetings were sporadic, the HOA contended they were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore not subject to the open meeting law.

To bolster its case, the HOA added a second point: the committee’s work wasn’t essential to board business anyway. They noted that a recommendation from the committee was never acted upon by the board, suggesting the committee was not conducting “any actual business of the Board” and thus did not require the same level of transparency.

The Surprising Verdict Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer sided with the HOA. The final decision concluded that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings that occur at regular intervals. This created a legal distinction: HOA committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule must be open, but those that meet on an as-needed basis may not be.

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2. A Law’s “Spirit” Can Be Trumped by Its “Letter”

Adding another layer to the case was the law’s own powerful statement about its intent. The petitioner pointed to a specific section of the statute designed to ensure transparency.

The Policy Statement The Arizona law contains a strong policy statement declaring that all HOA meetings should be conducted openly. It explicitly directs anyone interpreting the law to favor open meetings.

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

The Legal Reasoning Despite this clear declaration, Judge Eigenheer ruled that a general policy statement does not override the specific and explicit language of the law. The statute does not say all committee meetings must be open; it says “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open. The judge concluded that this specific wording created a clear exception, and the broad policy in favor of transparency could not erase it.

The Impact This is a critical takeaway for understanding how laws are interpreted. This outcome reflects a fundamental principle of statutory construction: while the “spirit” or stated policy of a law provides guidance, it cannot override the plain meaning of the specific words—the “letter”—that the legislature chose to write.

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3. A Cautionary Tale: How a Petitioner Undermined His Own Case

The petitioner was granted a rehearing, giving him another chance to argue his case. However, a statement he made during his own testimony dramatically weakened his position.

The Key Testimony During the rehearing on April 20, 2018, the petitioner was asked about other committees within the DMMA. In explaining how they operated, he unintentionally adopted the very definition of “regularly scheduled” that the HOA was using against him. The judge recorded his exact words in the final decision:

…five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

The Consequence The judge seized on this admission in the final ruling. The decision notes that while “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the petitioner himself used the phrase to differentiate between committees that meet at fixed intervals and those that do not. By describing committees that “meet at the request of the chair” as being “not regularly scheduled,” he validated the very interpretation the court was now adopting.

The Lesson This moment serves as a dramatic lesson in the power and precision of language in legal proceedings. In an attempt to describe the function of other committees, the petitioner inadvertently validated his opponent’s core legal argument.

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Conclusion: A Question of Transparency

The ruling in Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association clarifies a significant point in HOA governance. Under this legal interpretation, committees that meet on an ad-hoc basis or “at the call of the chair” may not be subject to open meeting laws. Only those committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule are explicitly required to be open to homeowners.

This ruling draws a bright line between standing committees with fixed schedules and ad-hoc committees that meet “at the call of the chair.” Homeowners should now ask: Which of our committees fall into this second category, and are we comfortable with decisions being shaped behind closed doors?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary W. Moselle (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Desert Mountain Master Association (respondent)
    Organizational party (HOA)
  • Curtis Ekmark (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Charles Markle (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • AHansen (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • djones (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • DGardner (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • ncano (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
    Transmitting staff/clerk