Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918029-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nathan Brown Counsel
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition
Additional Citations:

  • 33-1803(E)
  • 32-2199.01
  • 33-1803(C)
  • 33-1803(D)
  • R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:49 (88.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918029-REL


Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

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Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

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Background and Timeline of Events

October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

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Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

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Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

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Final Order and Implications

Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918029-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 19F-H1918029-REL)

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What specific statute did the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, allege that the Respondent violated?

3. What was the initial issue that prompted the Respondent to contact Mr. Brown on October 18, 2018?

4. What was Nathan Brown’s central legal argument concerning the “Notice of Non-Compliance”?

5. How did the Val Vista Lakes Community Association characterize the “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and why was this distinction critical to its defense?

6. According to the Findings of Fact, what procedural step did Mr. Brown fail to take after receiving the initial notice from the association?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

8. What were the Administrative Law Judge’s two primary legal conclusions that led to the dismissal of the petition?

9. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 2019?

10. What recourse was available to the parties following the judge’s Order, and what was the specified time limit for that action?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Nathan Brown, who served as the Petitioner, and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was the Respondent. Mr. Brown brought the complaint against the association, which was defending its actions.

2. Nathan Brown alleged that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). This section concerns an association’s obligation to provide a member with written notice of their option to petition for an administrative hearing.

3. The Respondent contacted Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard, which was considered a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. The “Notice of Non-Compliance” requested that he remedy the situation by November 1, 2018.

4. Mr. Brown’s central argument was that the “Notice of Non-Compliance” was, in fact, a “Notice of Violation.” Therefore, he contended it should have included written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department, as required by statute.

5. The Association characterized the notice as a “courtesy letter,” which is a common practice for providing an initial warning before formal action. This distinction was critical because the Association argued that as a mere courtesy letter and not a formal “Notice of Violation,” it was not subject to the statutory disclosure requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803.

6. Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Respondent via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice. This response is an option provided to members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C).

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, to show that the Respondent had violated the statute.

8. First, the judge concluded that a reasonable reading of the document shows it was not a “Notice of Violation” because it explicitly threatened that one would be issued later. Second, the judge concluded that even if it were a “Notice of Violation,” the statute does not require the hearing disclosure to be in the initial notice, and since Mr. Brown did not follow the response procedure, the Respondent’s obligation to provide that disclosure had not yet been triggered.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition be dismissed. The judge also deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate comprehensive, evidence-based answers using only the information and legal reasoning presented in the case decision.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “Notice of Non-Compliance” (or “courtesy letter”) and a “Notice of Violation” as presented in this case. Discuss why this distinction was the central point of contention and how the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the document’s plain language resolved the issue.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Discuss how Nathan Brown’s failure to meet this standard, as the party with the burden of proof, was fundamental to the dismissal of his petition.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the procedural requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C), (D), and (E). How does the judge’s “sensible reading” of the statute’s timeline and reciprocal obligations undermine the Petitioner’s claim, even setting aside the debate over the notice’s title?

4. Describe the complete procedural timeline of this case, from the initial notice sent by the association to the final order from the Administrative Law Judge. Identify the key dates and actions taken by each party and by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. Discuss the role of statutory interpretation in this legal decision. How did the judge apply established legal principles, such as aiming for a “fair and sensible result” and avoiding “absurd and unreasonable construction,” to support the final ruling against the Petitioner?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at the center of this case is section 33-1803.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The decision implies these are the governing community documents that Mr. Brown was accused of violating due to dead vegetation.

Courtesy Letter

A term used by the Respondent to describe the “Notice of Non-Compliance.” It is characterized as a common industry practice to inform a resident of an issue before issuing a formal Notice of Violation.

Notice of Non-Compliance

The specific document dated October 18, 2018, sent to Mr. Brown. It informed him of dead vegetation, requested a remedy, and warned that a “Notice of Violation” could follow.

Notice of Violation

A formal notification that a violation has occurred. The decision establishes this as a distinct and more serious step than a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and one was issued to Mr. Brown on November 11, 2018.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Nathan Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A legal process to have a case heard again. The parties were notified of their right to request a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918029-REL



📔

19F-H1918029-REL

1 source

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision for a case titled Nathan Brown vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on whether a Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard constitutes a Notice of Violation under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). Mr. Brown argued that the Association violated this statute by failing to include written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing in the initial notice. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the initial document was merely a courtesy letter and not a formal Notice of Violation, and further concluded that the statute does not require the disclosure of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate within the initial violation notice. Ultimately, the judge determined that the Association was not required to provide Mr. Brown with the notice of his right to petition at any relevant time and dismissed Mr. Brown’s petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nathan Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared for the Respondent
  • Simone McGinnis (general manager)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Presented testimony
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission
  • Clint Brown (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission (listed separately from Clint Goodman)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F Del Sol (admin staff)
    Transmitted document

Lawrence Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Nicolas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

Association Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes

Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 683622.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:03 (95.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 694095.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:06 (90.8 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818052-REL/660026.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:10 (91.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818052-REL/720468.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:12 (103.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from an administrative legal case involving Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart and Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute revolves around Mr. Stewart’s unauthorized modifications to a common area, for which the Association’s Board of Directors denied a retroactive variance. Mr. Stewart alleged the Board violated its bylaws by acting in bad faith, that a specific Board member was biased against him, and that he was subjected to unfair treatment compared to other homeowners.

The Administrative Law Judge, in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, consistently ruled against Mr. Stewart. The judge determined that the specific bylaw cited (Section 5.4) was an indemnification clause that shields the Board from liability and does not impose a duty of action. Crucially, Mr. Stewart failed to meet the legal burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Board’s rationale for the denial—to avoid setting a precedent, or “opening a Pandora’s Box”—was deemed a reasonable position for a condominium association. Evidence presented to support claims of bias and unequal treatment was found to be insufficient or not probative. Ultimately, Mr. Stewart’s petition was dismissed in its entirety.

Case Overview

This matter, designated as No. 18F-H1818052-REL, was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings under the authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case centered on a petition filed by Mr. Stewart on May 21, 2018, alleging a violation of the Association’s Bylaws by the Board of Directors.

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation

Petitioner

Lawrence M. Stewart

On his own behalf

Respondent

Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Mark K. Sahl, Esq. & Nichols C. S. Nogami, Esq.

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Case Chronology

November 15, 2017: The Association’s counsel informs Mr. Stewart in a letter that he is in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes to a common/limited common area.

Post-November 15, 2017: Mr. Stewart, then a member of the Board, requests a variance for the changes.

December 27, 2017: The Association’s attorney sends a letter stating an understanding that Mr. Stewart had recused himself and that the other two Board members (Sandra Fernandez and David Larson) had required the area to be restored.

January 4, 2018: Mr. Stewart writes to the other Board members, refuting that he had agreed to recuse himself and requesting a formal meeting to consider his variance request.

February 18, 2018: At a Board meeting, Mr. Stewart resigns from the Board. The remaining two members vote to deny his variance request and require him to restore the area to its original condition.

May 21, 2018: Mr. Stewart files his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 6, 2018: The initial administrative hearing is conducted.

September 14, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues a decision dismissing Mr. Stewart’s petition.

January 2, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

January 17, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision following the rehearing, again dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Central Allegations

Mr. Stewart’s case rested on four primary claims against the Association’s Board.

1. Violation of Bylaws Section 5.4

The formal petition alleged a violation of Association Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability), which states in part:

“So long as he/she has acted in good faith on the basis of information actually possessed, neither the Board nor any member of the Board nor any officer of the ASSOCIATION shall be liable to the ASSOCIATION, any OWNER, or to any other party for any damage, loss, or prejudice suffered or claimed on account of: (i) the approval or disapproval of any plans, drawings, or specifications, whether or not defective…or (v) any act or failure to act by the ASSOCIATION, or Board.”

Mr. Stewart cited this section because it was the only part of the governing documents he could find that included a “good faith” requirement.

2. Lack of Good Faith by the Board

Mr. Stewart asserted that the Board did not act in good faith when it denied his variance request. He based this claim on several points:

• He resigned from the Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting because he “got the sense ‘right away’ that the other Board members’ minds were made up and that they would not approve his request.”

• He presented unrebutted testimony that the Board members were unwilling to physically look at the changes he had made and only gave a “cursory look” at photographs he provided.

• The Board’s decision appeared to have been made prior to the meeting, as evidenced by the attorney’s December 27, 2017 letter which erroneously stated he had recused himself.

3. Bias of Board Member David Larson

A significant portion of Mr. Stewart’s argument was that Board member David Larson was personally biased against him. The evidence presented to support this included:

Initial Hearing Evidence:

◦ A biography of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager. When questioned, Mr. Stewart could not identify specific information showing bias but stated the “entire document coupled with the other statements shows a bias.”

◦ Notes from a November 28, 2017 Board meeting where Mr. Larson informed members that enforcement actions (towing, violation notices) would begin immediately and that he was “too busy to talk to people about Board business in driveways.”

Rehearing Evidence:

◦ A letter dated October 3, 2018, from Mr. Larson to Association members urging them not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

4. Unfair and Unequal Treatment

Mr. Stewart claimed he was treated unfairly because other units in the condominium were also not in conformity with the CC&Rs.

• He presented photos of units he believed were out of compliance.

• He testified that he had verified with the Association that none of these units had received a variance in the last two years.

• However, he acknowledged he did not know if variances had been granted more than two years prior or if the changes had received pre-approval, which would not require a variance.

Respondent’s Position and Legal Arguments

The Canyon Gate Condominium Association, represented by counsel, did not present witnesses but argued on legal grounds.

Inapplicability of Bylaws Section 5.4: The Association’s core argument was that Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s complaint. They contended the section is an indemnification clause designed to act as a “shield” to protect Board members from liability when they act in good faith, not a “sword” that imposes an affirmative duty on them that can be violated.

Reasonableness of Board Decision: The Association maintained that the Board’s decision was reasonable. According to Mr. Stewart’s own testimony, the Board’s basis for denial was the fear that granting his variance would “open a Pandora’s Box where other unit owners would request variances.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ultimately finding in favor of the Respondent.

Legal Framework

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Stewart, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient “to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Board’s Duty: The judge noted that while the Bylaws are a contract, the Association, in exercising its authority, must “act reasonably.”

Analysis of Bylaws Section 5.4

• The judge agreed entirely with the Association’s interpretation, concluding that Section 5.4 “does not impose any duty on the Board members, but rather merely shields them from liability if they act in good faith.”

• In the initial hearing, the judge noted Mr. Stewart “appeared to acknowledge that section 5.4 acts as a ‘shield’ and not a ‘sword.'”

• By the rehearing, this was solidified, with the finding that “Mr. Stewart acknowledges that the Association has not violated Bylaws Section 5.4.”

Assessment of ‘Good Faith’ and Bias Claims

• The ALJ concluded that even if Section 5.4 were applicable, Mr. Stewart “has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board did not act in good faith, that it had a bias against him, or that it treated him unfairly.”

• The judge found the Board’s reasoning for the denial—the “Pandora’s Box” concern—was “not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association.”

• Given this reasoning, the judge stated that “the specifics of the changes Mr. Stewart made would not be germane to the decision,” thereby neutralizing the claim that the Board failed to properly inspect the modifications.

Evaluation of Unfair Treatment Claim

• The evidence of other non-compliant units was deemed “not probative of the issue at hand.”

• The judge reasoned that there was “no evidence to show that they had requested that the Board grant variances,” meaning their situations were not comparable to Mr. Stewart’s, who had made unapproved changes and was subsequently denied a variance.

Final Disposition

Initial Decision (September 14, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. This order was subject to a request for rehearing within 30 days.

Rehearing Decision (January 17, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. This final order was noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

This guide provides a review of the administrative case Lawrence M. Stewart, Petitioner, vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent (No. 18F-H1818052-REL), including the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided case documents.

1. What action by Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart initiated the dispute with the Canyon Gate Condominium Association?

2. What specific provision of the Association Bylaws did Mr. Stewart allege was violated in his petition?

3. Why did Mr. Stewart resign from the Association’s Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting?

4. What was the Board’s stated reason for denying Mr. Stewart’s request for a variance?

5. Explain the legal interpretation of Bylaws Section 5.4 as a “shield” and not a “sword.”

6. List two pieces of evidence Mr. Stewart presented at the initial hearing to support his claim that Board member David Larson was biased against him.

7. What was the legal standard of proof in this case, and which party was required to meet it?

8. How did Mr. Stewart attempt to prove he was being treated unfairly in comparison to other unit owners, and why did the judge find this evidence unconvincing?

9. At the rehearing, what new evidence did Mr. Stewart present regarding Mr. Larson’s alleged bias?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial administrative hearing and the subsequent rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Stewart initiated the dispute by making changes to the common area and/or limited common area around his unit without first receiving permission from the Association. The Association informed him in a letter dated November 15, 2017, that this was a violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs.

2. Mr. Stewart alleged in his petition that the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4. He later acknowledged this section was not technically violated but cited it because it was the only provision in the governing documents he could find that included a “good faith” requirement.

3. Mr. Stewart resigned from the Board because he “got the sense ‘right away’ that the other Board members’ minds were made up” and that they would not approve his request for a variance, regardless of the details.

4. The Board denied Mr. Stewart’s request on the basis that approving it would “open a Pandora’s Box” where other unit owners would then also request variances. The Administrative Law Judge found this was not an unreasonable position for a condominium association board to take.

5. The interpretation of Section 5.4 is that it acts as a “shield” to protect, or indemnify, Board members from liability for damages, loss, or prejudice, provided they have acted in good faith. It is not a “sword” that imposes an affirmative duty on the Board that Mr. Stewart could use to compel a certain action or claim a violation.

6. At the initial hearing, Mr. Stewart presented two of the following: (1) a biography of Mr. Larson; (2) notes from a November 28, 2017 meeting where Mr. Larson stated that enforcement actions would begin immediately; and (3) a letter from the Association’s attorney that erroneously stated Mr. Stewart had recused himself, suggesting the matter was decided without him.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Stewart, to show that the Association had acted improperly.

8. Mr. Stewart presented testimony and photos of other units that he believed were not in conformity with the CC&Rs. The judge found this evidence was not probative because Mr. Stewart provided no evidence that those owners had requested and been denied variances, and he acknowledged he did not know if they had received variances more than two years prior or had received preapproval.

9. At the rehearing, Mr. Stewart entered into evidence an October 3, 2018 letter from Mr. Larson to the Association’s members. In this letter, Mr. Larson urged the members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

10. In both the initial decision (September 14, 2018) and the decision following the rehearing (January 17, 2019), the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stewart’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each prompt, citing specific facts and legal conclusions from the case documents.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Bylaws Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s petition. How did Mr. Stewart’s own testimony during the legal proceedings support this conclusion?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Evaluate the evidence Mr. Stewart presented across both hearings and explain why the judge found it insufficient to meet this standard regarding his claims of bias, bad faith, and unfair treatment.

3. Examine the Canyon Gate Board’s justification for denying the variance request (the “Pandora’s Box” argument). Based on the legal principles cited in the decisions, why was this considered a reasonable position for a condominium association board to take, and why did it render the specifics of Mr. Stewart’s changes non-germane?

4. Trace the procedural timeline of this case from the Association’s initial notice of violation on November 15, 2017, to the final binding order issued on January 17, 2019. Identify the key events, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the administrative process.

5. Mr. Stewart argued that he was treated unfairly because other units were also out of compliance with the CC&Rs. Deconstruct this argument and explain why the judge dismissed this line of reasoning as not being probative to the issue at hand in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

Association

The Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., the entity responsible for enforcing the Bylaws and CC&Rs. In this case, it is the Respondent.

The governing body of the Association, which at the time of the variance request included Lawrence M. Stewart, Sandra Fernandez, and David Larson.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stewart.

Bylaws

A contract between the Association and its members. The parties are required to comply with its terms, and the Association must act reasonably in exercising its authority under them.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Mr. Stewart was found to be in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes.

Common Area / Limited Common Area

The property around a condominium unit that is shared or has restricted use. Mr. Stewart made unauthorized changes to this area.

Good Faith

A standard of conduct mentioned in Bylaws Section 5.4. It protects Board members from liability so long as they act in good faith based on information they possess. Mr. Stewart claimed the Board failed to meet this standard.

Indemnification

The act of compensating for loss or damage. Bylaws Article V, which contains Section 5.4, pertains to indemnification.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was Lawrence M. Stewart.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted in a legal matter. A rehearing was conducted on January 2, 2019, after which the judge issued a final, binding order.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the respondent was Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Variance

An official exception or deviation from a rule. Mr. Stewart requested a variance to allow the unapproved changes he had made, which the Board denied.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


A Homeowner Sued His HOA and Lost—The Surprising Reasons Why Might Save You Thousands

Introduction: The Perennial Battle Between Homeowner and HOA

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant source of friction. From landscaping rules to paint colors, the potential for disputes is endless. But what happens when a homeowner feels so strongly wronged that they take the ultimate step of suing their association? More importantly, what happens when they lose?

This is the story of a homeowner who was also a board member. After making unauthorized changes to his property, he was denied his request for a variance to approve the changes he had already made. Believing the Board had acted in bad faith, he sued the association. His case failed, not on a minor technicality, but due to fundamental misunderstandings of how HOA law and governing documents function.

This outcome highlights a common, and costly, misconception about HOA governance. We will explore the surprising legal realities revealed in the case of Lawrence M. Stewart vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., offering several crucial takeaways for any homeowner before they decide to challenge their HOA.

1. A “Good Faith” Clause Can Be a Shield, Not a Sword

Mr. Stewart based his entire case on the claim that the Board violated Section 5.4 of the bylaws by not acting in “good faith,” as this was the only section in the governing documents he could find that mentioned the phrase.

This is where the case pivots on a crucial legal distinction. The court found that this clause was not intended to impose a duty on the board that a homeowner could sue over (a “sword”). Instead, its function was to protect board members from liability if they acted in good faith (a “shield”). Legally, this is an indemnification clause. Think of it as a form of insurance, designed to protect volunteer board members from being personally sued for making reasonable decisions, not a weapon for homeowners to attack those decisions.

In his testimony, Mr. Stewart even acknowledged this “shield” versus “sword” distinction but proceeded with the argument anyway. The lesson for homeowners is unequivocal: you must understand the precise legal function of a clause within your governing documents, not just its keywords.

2. The “Pandora’s Box” Defense Is a Powerful Argument

The Board’s primary reason for denying Mr. Stewart’s variance request was its fear that approval “would open a Pandora’s Box where other unit owners would request variances.” While a homeowner might hear “Pandora’s Box” and think it’s a lazy excuse, the court viewed it as the board performing its fundamental duty.

The judge stated this reasoning “was not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association.” This validation is incredibly impactful because it shifts the focus from the merits of one homeowner’s request to the Board’s overarching fiduciary duty to uphold the rules consistently for the entire community. It shows that an HOA’s duty to maintain consistent enforcement and avoid setting a messy precedent is a legally sound basis for a decision, making the specific details of one homeowner’s changes irrelevant.

3. Being on the Board Won’t Give You a Pass

In a surprising twist, Mr. Stewart was a member of the HOA Board at the very time he made the unauthorized changes and requested the variance. This created a clear conflict of interest and ultimately did not help his case.

The situation culminated in Mr. Stewart resigning from the Board during the meeting where his request was considered. He stated he resigned because he felt “the other Board members’ minds were made up” and they would not approve his request. This incident serves as a stark reminder: holding a position on the board does not grant special privileges or exceptions to the rules. In fact, it can complicate personal matters and highlight a direct conflict between a board member’s duties to the association and their personal interests.

4. “Whataboutism” Is Not a Legal Strategy

Like many homeowners in a dispute, Mr. Stewart argued that he was being treated unfairly because other units in the community were also out of compliance with the CC&Rs. This is a common defense, but its legal failure in this case is a masterclass in what courts actually require for proof.

Mr. Stewart’s effort was commendable but legally insufficient. He presented photos of other non-conforming units and even “verified with the Association that none of these units had received a variance in the last two years.” However, his evidence collapsed under cross-examination when he “acknowledged… he did not know if any of these units had received variances more than two years ago or whether preapproval for the changes had been granted.”

The judge dismissed his evidence entirely. This transforms the lesson from a simple “don’t point fingers” to a much more sophisticated legal principle: to prove selective enforcement, you must prove others in the identical procedural situation were treated differently, and incomplete evidence is no evidence at all.

5. The Burden of Proof Is Everything

Perhaps the most stunning fact from the case is that the Association “presented no witnesses” at either the initial hearing or the subsequent rehearing. They won the case without putting a single person on the stand to testify.

They could do this because the legal system placed the “burden of proof” squarely on Mr. Stewart. As the petitioner, it was his job to prove his claims of bad faith, bias, and unfair treatment by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Association didn’t have to prove it acted in good faith; Mr. Stewart had to prove it acted in bad faith. He failed to meet this standard. In other words, he had to prove that his claims were more likely to be true than not—even if only by a 51% to 49% margin.

The court document formally defines this legal standard as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In a legal dispute with your HOA, the case is not about who is morally right or wrong. It’s about who can meet their required burden of proof with convincing, relevant evidence.

Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Fight the Rulers

The case of Lawrence M. Stewart is a cautionary tale that every homeowner should internalize. His failed lawsuit, which likely became a five-figure mistake when factoring in legal fees for both sides, underscores that HOA governing documents are a binding contract. Challenging the Board requires more than a sense of unfairness. It demands a precise, evidence-backed legal argument that aligns with the specific terms of that contract and the applicable legal standards.

Before you declare war on your HOA, ask yourself: are you prepared to prove your case with irrefutable evidence, or are you just banking on a feeling of being wronged?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lawrence M. Stewart (petitioner)
    Also served as a Board member for Respondent until resigning during the variance request consideration.

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent in the initial hearing.
  • Nicolas C. S. Nogami (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent in both the initial hearing (listed as 'Nichols C. S. Nogami') and the rehearing.
  • Sandra Fernandez (board member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request.
  • David Larson (board member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request; Petitioner alleged he was biased.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the decision copies.
  • F. Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed the transmission of the decision copies.

Lawrence Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Nicolas C. S. Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by homeowner Lawrence M. Stewart against Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated its Bylaws concerning good faith in denying his request for a variance.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as Bylaws Section 5.4 was determined to be a shield protecting the Board from liability rather than a provision imposing a duty of good faith that could be violated by denying a variance.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the HOA Board to act in good faith when denying a variance request

Petitioner alleged the Board failed to act in good faith when denying his request for a variance to changes he made, and asserted bias and unfair treatment. The ALJ concluded that Section 5.4 acts as a shield from liability for Board members, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, bylaw violation, good faith, variance denial, board liability
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 683622.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:04 (95.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 694095.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:04 (90.8 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818052-REL/660026.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:47:49 (91.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818052-REL/720468.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:47:51 (103.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from an administrative legal case involving Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart and Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute revolves around Mr. Stewart’s unauthorized modifications to a common area, for which the Association’s Board of Directors denied a retroactive variance. Mr. Stewart alleged the Board violated its bylaws by acting in bad faith, that a specific Board member was biased against him, and that he was subjected to unfair treatment compared to other homeowners.

The Administrative Law Judge, in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, consistently ruled against Mr. Stewart. The judge determined that the specific bylaw cited (Section 5.4) was an indemnification clause that shields the Board from liability and does not impose a duty of action. Crucially, Mr. Stewart failed to meet the legal burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Board’s rationale for the denial—to avoid setting a precedent, or “opening a Pandora’s Box”—was deemed a reasonable position for a condominium association. Evidence presented to support claims of bias and unequal treatment was found to be insufficient or not probative. Ultimately, Mr. Stewart’s petition was dismissed in its entirety.

Case Overview

This matter, designated as No. 18F-H1818052-REL, was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings under the authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case centered on a petition filed by Mr. Stewart on May 21, 2018, alleging a violation of the Association’s Bylaws by the Board of Directors.

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation

Petitioner

Lawrence M. Stewart

On his own behalf

Respondent

Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Mark K. Sahl, Esq. & Nichols C. S. Nogami, Esq.

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Case Chronology

November 15, 2017: The Association’s counsel informs Mr. Stewart in a letter that he is in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes to a common/limited common area.

Post-November 15, 2017: Mr. Stewart, then a member of the Board, requests a variance for the changes.

December 27, 2017: The Association’s attorney sends a letter stating an understanding that Mr. Stewart had recused himself and that the other two Board members (Sandra Fernandez and David Larson) had required the area to be restored.

January 4, 2018: Mr. Stewart writes to the other Board members, refuting that he had agreed to recuse himself and requesting a formal meeting to consider his variance request.

February 18, 2018: At a Board meeting, Mr. Stewart resigns from the Board. The remaining two members vote to deny his variance request and require him to restore the area to its original condition.

May 21, 2018: Mr. Stewart files his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 6, 2018: The initial administrative hearing is conducted.

September 14, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues a decision dismissing Mr. Stewart’s petition.

January 2, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

January 17, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision following the rehearing, again dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Central Allegations

Mr. Stewart’s case rested on four primary claims against the Association’s Board.

1. Violation of Bylaws Section 5.4

The formal petition alleged a violation of Association Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability), which states in part:

“So long as he/she has acted in good faith on the basis of information actually possessed, neither the Board nor any member of the Board nor any officer of the ASSOCIATION shall be liable to the ASSOCIATION, any OWNER, or to any other party for any damage, loss, or prejudice suffered or claimed on account of: (i) the approval or disapproval of any plans, drawings, or specifications, whether or not defective…or (v) any act or failure to act by the ASSOCIATION, or Board.”

Mr. Stewart cited this section because it was the only part of the governing documents he could find that included a “good faith” requirement.

2. Lack of Good Faith by the Board

Mr. Stewart asserted that the Board did not act in good faith when it denied his variance request. He based this claim on several points:

• He resigned from the Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting because he “got the sense ‘right away’ that the other Board members’ minds were made up and that they would not approve his request.”

• He presented unrebutted testimony that the Board members were unwilling to physically look at the changes he had made and only gave a “cursory look” at photographs he provided.

• The Board’s decision appeared to have been made prior to the meeting, as evidenced by the attorney’s December 27, 2017 letter which erroneously stated he had recused himself.

3. Bias of Board Member David Larson

A significant portion of Mr. Stewart’s argument was that Board member David Larson was personally biased against him. The evidence presented to support this included:

Initial Hearing Evidence:

◦ A biography of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager. When questioned, Mr. Stewart could not identify specific information showing bias but stated the “entire document coupled with the other statements shows a bias.”

◦ Notes from a November 28, 2017 Board meeting where Mr. Larson informed members that enforcement actions (towing, violation notices) would begin immediately and that he was “too busy to talk to people about Board business in driveways.”

Rehearing Evidence:

◦ A letter dated October 3, 2018, from Mr. Larson to Association members urging them not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

4. Unfair and Unequal Treatment

Mr. Stewart claimed he was treated unfairly because other units in the condominium were also not in conformity with the CC&Rs.

• He presented photos of units he believed were out of compliance.

• He testified that he had verified with the Association that none of these units had received a variance in the last two years.

• However, he acknowledged he did not know if variances had been granted more than two years prior or if the changes had received pre-approval, which would not require a variance.

Respondent’s Position and Legal Arguments

The Canyon Gate Condominium Association, represented by counsel, did not present witnesses but argued on legal grounds.

Inapplicability of Bylaws Section 5.4: The Association’s core argument was that Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s complaint. They contended the section is an indemnification clause designed to act as a “shield” to protect Board members from liability when they act in good faith, not a “sword” that imposes an affirmative duty on them that can be violated.

Reasonableness of Board Decision: The Association maintained that the Board’s decision was reasonable. According to Mr. Stewart’s own testimony, the Board’s basis for denial was the fear that granting his variance would “open a Pandora’s Box where other unit owners would request variances.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ultimately finding in favor of the Respondent.

Legal Framework

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Stewart, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient “to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Board’s Duty: The judge noted that while the Bylaws are a contract, the Association, in exercising its authority, must “act reasonably.”

Analysis of Bylaws Section 5.4

• The judge agreed entirely with the Association’s interpretation, concluding that Section 5.4 “does not impose any duty on the Board members, but rather merely shields them from liability if they act in good faith.”

• In the initial hearing, the judge noted Mr. Stewart “appeared to acknowledge that section 5.4 acts as a ‘shield’ and not a ‘sword.'”

• By the rehearing, this was solidified, with the finding that “Mr. Stewart acknowledges that the Association has not violated Bylaws Section 5.4.”

Assessment of ‘Good Faith’ and Bias Claims

• The ALJ concluded that even if Section 5.4 were applicable, Mr. Stewart “has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board did not act in good faith, that it had a bias against him, or that it treated him unfairly.”

• The judge found the Board’s reasoning for the denial—the “Pandora’s Box” concern—was “not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association.”

• Given this reasoning, the judge stated that “the specifics of the changes Mr. Stewart made would not be germane to the decision,” thereby neutralizing the claim that the Board failed to properly inspect the modifications.

Evaluation of Unfair Treatment Claim

• The evidence of other non-compliant units was deemed “not probative of the issue at hand.”

• The judge reasoned that there was “no evidence to show that they had requested that the Board grant variances,” meaning their situations were not comparable to Mr. Stewart’s, who had made unapproved changes and was subsequently denied a variance.

Final Disposition

Initial Decision (September 14, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. This order was subject to a request for rehearing within 30 days.

Rehearing Decision (January 17, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. This final order was noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

This guide provides a review of the administrative case Lawrence M. Stewart, Petitioner, vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent (No. 18F-H1818052-REL), including the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided case documents.

1. What action by Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart initiated the dispute with the Canyon Gate Condominium Association?

2. What specific provision of the Association Bylaws did Mr. Stewart allege was violated in his petition?

3. Why did Mr. Stewart resign from the Association’s Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting?

4. What was the Board’s stated reason for denying Mr. Stewart’s request for a variance?

5. Explain the legal interpretation of Bylaws Section 5.4 as a “shield” and not a “sword.”

6. List two pieces of evidence Mr. Stewart presented at the initial hearing to support his claim that Board member David Larson was biased against him.

7. What was the legal standard of proof in this case, and which party was required to meet it?

8. How did Mr. Stewart attempt to prove he was being treated unfairly in comparison to other unit owners, and why did the judge find this evidence unconvincing?

9. At the rehearing, what new evidence did Mr. Stewart present regarding Mr. Larson’s alleged bias?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial administrative hearing and the subsequent rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Stewart initiated the dispute by making changes to the common area and/or limited common area around his unit without first receiving permission from the Association. The Association informed him in a letter dated November 15, 2017, that this was a violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs.

2. Mr. Stewart alleged in his petition that the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4. He later acknowledged this section was not technically violated but cited it because it was the only provision in the governing documents he could find that included a “good faith” requirement.

3. Mr. Stewart resigned from the Board because he “got the sense ‘right away’ that the other Board members’ minds were made up” and that they would not approve his request for a variance, regardless of the details.

4. The Board denied Mr. Stewart’s request on the basis that approving it would “open a Pandora’s Box” where other unit owners would then also request variances. The Administrative Law Judge found this was not an unreasonable position for a condominium association board to take.

5. The interpretation of Section 5.4 is that it acts as a “shield” to protect, or indemnify, Board members from liability for damages, loss, or prejudice, provided they have acted in good faith. It is not a “sword” that imposes an affirmative duty on the Board that Mr. Stewart could use to compel a certain action or claim a violation.

6. At the initial hearing, Mr. Stewart presented two of the following: (1) a biography of Mr. Larson; (2) notes from a November 28, 2017 meeting where Mr. Larson stated that enforcement actions would begin immediately; and (3) a letter from the Association’s attorney that erroneously stated Mr. Stewart had recused himself, suggesting the matter was decided without him.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Stewart, to show that the Association had acted improperly.

8. Mr. Stewart presented testimony and photos of other units that he believed were not in conformity with the CC&Rs. The judge found this evidence was not probative because Mr. Stewart provided no evidence that those owners had requested and been denied variances, and he acknowledged he did not know if they had received variances more than two years prior or had received preapproval.

9. At the rehearing, Mr. Stewart entered into evidence an October 3, 2018 letter from Mr. Larson to the Association’s members. In this letter, Mr. Larson urged the members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

10. In both the initial decision (September 14, 2018) and the decision following the rehearing (January 17, 2019), the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stewart’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each prompt, citing specific facts and legal conclusions from the case documents.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Bylaws Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s petition. How did Mr. Stewart’s own testimony during the legal proceedings support this conclusion?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Evaluate the evidence Mr. Stewart presented across both hearings and explain why the judge found it insufficient to meet this standard regarding his claims of bias, bad faith, and unfair treatment.

3. Examine the Canyon Gate Board’s justification for denying the variance request (the “Pandora’s Box” argument). Based on the legal principles cited in the decisions, why was this considered a reasonable position for a condominium association board to take, and why did it render the specifics of Mr. Stewart’s changes non-germane?

4. Trace the procedural timeline of this case from the Association’s initial notice of violation on November 15, 2017, to the final binding order issued on January 17, 2019. Identify the key events, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the administrative process.

5. Mr. Stewart argued that he was treated unfairly because other units were also out of compliance with the CC&Rs. Deconstruct this argument and explain why the judge dismissed this line of reasoning as not being probative to the issue at hand in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

Association

The Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., the entity responsible for enforcing the Bylaws and CC&Rs. In this case, it is the Respondent.

The governing body of the Association, which at the time of the variance request included Lawrence M. Stewart, Sandra Fernandez, and David Larson.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stewart.

Bylaws

A contract between the Association and its members. The parties are required to comply with its terms, and the Association must act reasonably in exercising its authority under them.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Mr. Stewart was found to be in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes.

Common Area / Limited Common Area

The property around a condominium unit that is shared or has restricted use. Mr. Stewart made unauthorized changes to this area.

Good Faith

A standard of conduct mentioned in Bylaws Section 5.4. It protects Board members from liability so long as they act in good faith based on information they possess. Mr. Stewart claimed the Board failed to meet this standard.

Indemnification

The act of compensating for loss or damage. Bylaws Article V, which contains Section 5.4, pertains to indemnification.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was Lawrence M. Stewart.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted in a legal matter. A rehearing was conducted on January 2, 2019, after which the judge issued a final, binding order.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the respondent was Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Variance

An official exception or deviation from a rule. Mr. Stewart requested a variance to allow the unapproved changes he had made, which the Board denied.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


A Homeowner Sued His HOA and Lost—The Surprising Reasons Why Might Save You Thousands

Introduction: The Perennial Battle Between Homeowner and HOA

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant source of friction. From landscaping rules to paint colors, the potential for disputes is endless. But what happens when a homeowner feels so strongly wronged that they take the ultimate step of suing their association? More importantly, what happens when they lose?

This is the story of a homeowner who was also a board member. After making unauthorized changes to his property, he was denied his request for a variance to approve the changes he had already made. Believing the Board had acted in bad faith, he sued the association. His case failed, not on a minor technicality, but due to fundamental misunderstandings of how HOA law and governing documents function.

This outcome highlights a common, and costly, misconception about HOA governance. We will explore the surprising legal realities revealed in the case of Lawrence M. Stewart vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., offering several crucial takeaways for any homeowner before they decide to challenge their HOA.

1. A “Good Faith” Clause Can Be a Shield, Not a Sword

Mr. Stewart based his entire case on the claim that the Board violated Section 5.4 of the bylaws by not acting in “good faith,” as this was the only section in the governing documents he could find that mentioned the phrase.

This is where the case pivots on a crucial legal distinction. The court found that this clause was not intended to impose a duty on the board that a homeowner could sue over (a “sword”). Instead, its function was to protect board members from liability if they acted in good faith (a “shield”). Legally, this is an indemnification clause. Think of it as a form of insurance, designed to protect volunteer board members from being personally sued for making reasonable decisions, not a weapon for homeowners to attack those decisions.

In his testimony, Mr. Stewart even acknowledged this “shield” versus “sword” distinction but proceeded with the argument anyway. The lesson for homeowners is unequivocal: you must understand the precise legal function of a clause within your governing documents, not just its keywords.

2. The “Pandora’s Box” Defense Is a Powerful Argument

The Board’s primary reason for denying Mr. Stewart’s variance request was its fear that approval “would open a Pandora’s Box where other unit owners would request variances.” While a homeowner might hear “Pandora’s Box” and think it’s a lazy excuse, the court viewed it as the board performing its fundamental duty.

The judge stated this reasoning “was not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association.” This validation is incredibly impactful because it shifts the focus from the merits of one homeowner’s request to the Board’s overarching fiduciary duty to uphold the rules consistently for the entire community. It shows that an HOA’s duty to maintain consistent enforcement and avoid setting a messy precedent is a legally sound basis for a decision, making the specific details of one homeowner’s changes irrelevant.

3. Being on the Board Won’t Give You a Pass

In a surprising twist, Mr. Stewart was a member of the HOA Board at the very time he made the unauthorized changes and requested the variance. This created a clear conflict of interest and ultimately did not help his case.

The situation culminated in Mr. Stewart resigning from the Board during the meeting where his request was considered. He stated he resigned because he felt “the other Board members’ minds were made up” and they would not approve his request. This incident serves as a stark reminder: holding a position on the board does not grant special privileges or exceptions to the rules. In fact, it can complicate personal matters and highlight a direct conflict between a board member’s duties to the association and their personal interests.

4. “Whataboutism” Is Not a Legal Strategy

Like many homeowners in a dispute, Mr. Stewart argued that he was being treated unfairly because other units in the community were also out of compliance with the CC&Rs. This is a common defense, but its legal failure in this case is a masterclass in what courts actually require for proof.

Mr. Stewart’s effort was commendable but legally insufficient. He presented photos of other non-conforming units and even “verified with the Association that none of these units had received a variance in the last two years.” However, his evidence collapsed under cross-examination when he “acknowledged… he did not know if any of these units had received variances more than two years ago or whether preapproval for the changes had been granted.”

The judge dismissed his evidence entirely. This transforms the lesson from a simple “don’t point fingers” to a much more sophisticated legal principle: to prove selective enforcement, you must prove others in the identical procedural situation were treated differently, and incomplete evidence is no evidence at all.

5. The Burden of Proof Is Everything

Perhaps the most stunning fact from the case is that the Association “presented no witnesses” at either the initial hearing or the subsequent rehearing. They won the case without putting a single person on the stand to testify.

They could do this because the legal system placed the “burden of proof” squarely on Mr. Stewart. As the petitioner, it was his job to prove his claims of bad faith, bias, and unfair treatment by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Association didn’t have to prove it acted in good faith; Mr. Stewart had to prove it acted in bad faith. He failed to meet this standard. In other words, he had to prove that his claims were more likely to be true than not—even if only by a 51% to 49% margin.

The court document formally defines this legal standard as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In a legal dispute with your HOA, the case is not about who is morally right or wrong. It’s about who can meet their required burden of proof with convincing, relevant evidence.

Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Fight the Rulers

The case of Lawrence M. Stewart is a cautionary tale that every homeowner should internalize. His failed lawsuit, which likely became a five-figure mistake when factoring in legal fees for both sides, underscores that HOA governing documents are a binding contract. Challenging the Board requires more than a sense of unfairness. It demands a precise, evidence-backed legal argument that aligns with the specific terms of that contract and the applicable legal standards.

Before you declare war on your HOA, ask yourself: are you prepared to prove your case with irrefutable evidence, or are you just banking on a feeling of being wronged?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lawrence M. Stewart (petitioner)
    Also served as a Board member for Respondent until resigning during the variance request consideration.

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent in the initial hearing.
  • Nicolas C. S. Nogami (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent in both the initial hearing (listed as 'Nichols C. S. Nogami') and the rehearing.
  • Sandra Fernandez (board member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request.
  • David Larson (board member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request; Petitioner alleged he was biased.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the decision copies.
  • F. Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed the transmission of the decision copies.

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.

The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.

The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)

Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)

Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: December 4, 2018

Decision Date: December 20, 2018

The Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.

The Respondent’s Position

The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

2. Relevant CC&R Provisions

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.

Section

Title / Subject

Description

10.11.4

Inoperable Vehicles

Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”

10.11.2

Street Parking

Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.

Nuisances

Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline

Violation Notices and Fines

Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.

The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:

September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.

October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.

December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.

January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.

April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.

Competing Testimonies

Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.

Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:

◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.

◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.

◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”

4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof

The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Judge’s Rationale

The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.

2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).






Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL


Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?

2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?

3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?

4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?

5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?

6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.

7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?

8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.

2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.

4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.

5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.

6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.

7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.

8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.

9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.

3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?

4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.

5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.

Appearances

A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.

The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.

Community Manager

An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Nuisance

A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.

Operating Condition

A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL



🏛️

19F-H18020-REL

1 source

The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry R. Collis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
  • Lisa Riesland (community manager)
    Laveen Meadows HOA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • f del sol (admin support)
    Signed copy distribution notice

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:31 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.

The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.

The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)

Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)

Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: December 4, 2018

Decision Date: December 20, 2018

The Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.

The Respondent’s Position

The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

2. Relevant CC&R Provisions

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.

Section

Title / Subject

Description

10.11.4

Inoperable Vehicles

Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”

10.11.2

Street Parking

Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.

Nuisances

Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline

Violation Notices and Fines

Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.

The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:

September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.

October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.

December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.

January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.

April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.

Competing Testimonies

Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.

Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:

◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.

◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.

◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”

4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof

The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Judge’s Rationale

The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.

2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).






Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL


Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?

2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?

3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?

4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?

5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?

6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.

7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?

8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.

2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.

4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.

5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.

6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.

7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.

8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.

9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.

3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?

4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.

5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.

Appearances

A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.

The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.

Community Manager

An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Nuisance

A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.

Operating Condition

A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL



🏛️

19F-H18020-REL

1 source

The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry R. Collis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
  • Lisa Riesland (community manager)
    Laveen Meadows HOA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • f del sol (admin support)
    Signed copy distribution notice

Warren R. Brown vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc(ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.

Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:50 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:51 (144.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG


Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.

The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.

Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.

While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.

Case Overview

This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Docket Numbers:

◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Core Issues Contested

The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.

1. The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.

Financial Details:

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825

2018 Total Increase: $325

Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%

Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:

Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)

Special Assessment: $209

Argument on the Assessment Increase

Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)

Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”

Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.

2. Late Payment Charges

Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.

Charges Implemented by Mogollon:

◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.

◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.

Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.

Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.

Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”

Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.

Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”

Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.

ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.

Legal Principles Applied

Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Construction:

1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”

2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.

Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)

Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.

Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.

Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)

Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.

Final Orders

The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.

Docket Number

Petitioner

Primary Issue

Outcome

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

Late Fee Charge

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party. Mogollon ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.


Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Nicolas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

Association Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes

Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 660026.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:02 (91.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 720468.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:02 (103.5 KB)

This is a concise summary of the administrative law proceedings concerning Lawrence M. Stewart's petition against the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., drawing from the original hearing (September 6, 2018) and the subsequent rehearing (January 2, 2019).

Summary of Administrative Law Case: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Key Facts

The Petitioner, Lawrence M. Stewart, an owner and former Board member, made changes to the common or limited common area around his unit without prior permission, violating section 5.1 of the CC&Rs. After being informed of the violation, Mr. Stewart requested a variance from the Association Board while he was still a member. At a Board meeting on February 18, 2018, Mr. Stewart resigned, and the two remaining Board members (Sandra Fernandez and David Larson) voted to deny his variance request, requiring him to restore the areas to their original condition.

Main Issues and Petitioner's Arguments

Mr. Stewart filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Association violated Bylaws section 5.4. His central argument was that the Board did not act in good faith when denying the variance request. He asserted that Board member David Larson was biased against him and that the denial was unfair because other units were also non-conforming with the CC&Rs. Mr. Stewart cited Bylaws Section 5.4 because he testified it was the only section referring to a “good faith” requirement in the governing documents.

Key Legal Points and Analysis

  1. Burden of Proof: Mr. Stewart bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws are considered a contract, and the Respondent (Association) is required to act reasonably in exercising its authority.
  2. Applicability of Section 5.4: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability/Indemnification) does not impose any duty on the Board members; rather, it merely shields them from liability if they act in good faith. Mr. Stewart eventually acknowledged that the Association had not technically violated Section 5.4.
  3. Reasonableness of Board Action: The Board's stated reason for denying the variance was fear of "open[ing] a Pandora’s Box" where other unit owners would request variances. The ALJ found this concern to be a not unreasonable position for a condominium association board.
  4. Lack of Evidence for Bias/Unfairness: The ALJ found that Mr. Stewart did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board lacked good faith, was biased against him, or treated him unfairly. Regarding the assertion of other non-conforming units, there was no evidence that those owners had requested variances, making that testimony not probative of the issue at hand.

Outcome

The Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. Stewart failed to meet his burden of proof. Consequently, Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition was dismissed in both the initial decision (September 14, 2018) and the binding order issued after the rehearing (January 17, 2019). The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party.





Study Guide – 18F-H1818052-REL


Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818052-REL). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing as detailed in the decisions issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be approximately two to three sentences long.

1. What initial action taken by Lawrence M. Stewart prompted the Canyon Gate Condominium Association to contact him with a notice of violation?

2. What specific section of the Association Bylaws did Mr. Stewart allege was violated in his petition to the Department of Real Estate?

3. What was Mr. Stewart’s position within the Association at the time he requested a variance for the changes he had made?

4. According to Mr. Stewart, what was the Board’s primary reason for denying his variance request?

5. Why did Mr. Stewart ultimately resign from the Association’s Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting?

6. In the initial hearing, what three pieces of evidence did Mr. Stewart present to support his allegation that Board member David Larson was biased against him?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bears the burden of meeting that standard?

8. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the function of Bylaws Section 5.4, characterizing it as either a “shield” or a “sword”?

9. During the rehearing, what new piece of evidence did Mr. Stewart introduce to support his claim of bias from Mr. Larson?

10. What was the final ruling in both the initial hearing (September 14, 2018) and the rehearing (January 17, 2019)?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. Mr. Stewart made changes to the common area and/or limited common area around his condominium unit without first getting permission from the Association. This action was a violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, leading the Association’s counsel to send him a letter on November 15, 2017.

2. Mr. Stewart’s petition alleged that the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4. He later clarified that he cited this specific section because it was the only one in the governing documents that included a “good faith” requirement, which he believed the Board had failed to meet.

3. At the time he requested a variance to approve the changes he had made, Mr. Stewart was an active member of the Association’s Board of Directors. The other two members were Sandra Fernandez and David Larson.

4. The Board denied his request because they feared it would “open a Pandora’s Box,” leading other unit owners to request variances for changes to the common area. The judge found this was not an unreasonable position for a condominium association board to take.

5. Mr. Stewart resigned from the Board because he got the sense “right away” that the other two board members, Ms. Fernandez and Mr. Larson, had already made up their minds to deny his request and would not approve it.

6. To support his bias claim, Mr. Stewart relied on: (1) a biography of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager, (2) statements Mr. Larson made in notes from a November 28, 2017 Board meeting, and (3) his belief that the other members had already decided the matter without his input.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof to meet this standard rests entirely on the Petitioner, Mr. Stewart.

8. The judge concluded that Section 5.4 acts as a “shield” to protect Board members from liability when they act in good faith. It does not impose a duty on them and cannot be used as a “sword” by an owner to force a particular action from the Board.

9. At the rehearing, Mr. Stewart entered into evidence an October 3, 2018 letter written by Mr. Larson to the Association’s members. In the letter, Mr. Larson urged the members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

10. In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stewart’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that Bylaws Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s claim. How did Mr. Stewart’s interpretation of the section as a “sword” versus a “shield” contribute to this outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Evaluate the evidence Mr. Stewart presented to prove bias and unfair treatment, and explain why the judge found it insufficient to meet this standard.

3. Examine the Board’s justification for denying the variance request (the “Pandora’s Box” argument). Based on the court’s conclusions, discuss why this was considered a “reasonable position” for a condominium association board, even without a detailed inspection of Mr. Stewart’s specific changes.

4. Trace the evolution of Mr. Stewart’s arguments and evidence from the initial hearing on September 6, 2018, to the rehearing on January 2, 2019. What new evidence was introduced, and did it fundamentally change the core issues or the final outcome of the case?

5. Explore the principle established in the “Conclusions of Law” that Association Bylaws function as a contract between the parties. How does this principle require both homeowners and the Association Board to act, and how did it influence the judge’s final decision in this matter?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in the Context of the Case

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, Thomas Shedden, who presided over the hearings, reviewed the evidence, and issued the final decisions in this matter.

Bylaws

A contract between the Association and its members. The parties are required to comply with its terms, and the Association must act reasonably in exercising its authority under them. Mr. Stewart alleged a violation of Bylaws Section 5.4.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Mr. Stewart was found to be in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes to a common area.

Common Area

An area around a condominium unit that is not privately owned. Mr. Stewart made unauthorized changes to the common and/or limited common area around his unit.

Good Faith

A standard of conduct mentioned in Bylaws Section 5.4, which shields Board members from liability if they act accordingly. Mr. Stewart’s core argument was that the Board did not act in good faith when denying his variance request.

Indemnification

The subject of Article V of the Bylaws. Section 5.4, titled “Liability,” falls under this article and serves to protect, or indemnify, the Board from liability.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Lawrence M. Stewart.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Recuse

To formally withdraw from a decision-making process due to a conflict of interest. The Association’s attorney incorrectly stated in a letter that Mr. Stewart had recused himself from voting on his own variance request.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Variance

A formal request for an exception to the established rules (the CC&Rs). Mr. Stewart requested a variance to gain approval for the changes he had already made to the common area.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818052-REL



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