The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.
The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.
Orders: Don France's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: CC&R, RV storage, Estoppel, Fines
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 823714.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:50 (96.1 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020056-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a detailed analysis of the administrative hearing decision in case number 20F-H2020056-REL, involving petitioner Don France and respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association (the “Association”). The core of the dispute was the Association’s enforcement of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), specifically section 2.7, which requires a six-foot-high gate for Recreational Vehicles (RVs) stored on a property.
The petitioner, Mr. France, was fined by the Association in 2019 for not having the required gate on an RV structure that the Association itself had approved in 2014. Mr. France initially filed a petition alleging the Association was in violation of its own CC&Rs. However, at the September 1, 2020 hearing, he conceded this was not the case and instead argued the Association was “estopped”—or legally prevented—from enforcing the rule due to its prior approval.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. France’s petition on procedural grounds. The judge determined that since Mr. France acknowledged his petition’s central claim was incorrect, he had failed to meet his burden of proof. The new arguments concerning estoppel and the legality of the fines were deemed not properly before the tribunal because they were not included in the original petition. The decision underscores the critical importance of aligning claims made in a formal petition with the arguments presented at a hearing.
Case Overview
Case Number
No. 20F-H2020056-REL
In the Office of Administrative Hearings
Petitioner
Don France
Respondent
Mesa East Property Owners Association
Respondent’s Counsel
B. Austin Bailio, Esq.
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Hearing Date
September 1, 2020
Decision Date
September 21, 2020
The central issue of the case revolves around the enforcement of CC&R section 2.7, which mandates that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a six-foot-high gate. This requirement is mirrored by a City of Mesa municipal code.
Chronology of Key Events
• 2014: Mr. France applies for and receives approval from the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) to build an RV port. In his application, he acknowledges he will abide by deed restrictions and City of Mesa codes.
• October 21, 2014: The Association issues its final approval for the structure, which is built without a gate.
• Circa 2018: Following threats of litigation from other residents over non-enforcement of the CC&Rs, the Association begins a new enforcement campaign for the six-foot gate rule. The City of Mesa denies the Association’s request to “grandfather in” non-compliant homes.
• 2019: The deadline for residents to come into compliance passes.
• March 11, 2019: The Association issues a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Mr. France for lacking the required gate.
• April 5, 2019: Through an attorney, Mr. France asserts that the Association is estopped from enforcing the rule due to its 2014 approval.
• May 15, 2019: The Association’s attorney rejects the estoppel claim and informs Mr. France’s attorney that fines of $500 per week will be assessed.
• May 31, 2019: The Association assesses a $500 fine against Mr. France, with additional fines assessed later.
• July 24, 2019: The City of Mesa issues its own NOV to Mr. France, citing a violation of city code 11-34-5(B), which also requires a six-foot screening fence for RVs.
• April 16, 2020: Mr. France files a petition alleging the Association is in violation of CC&R section 2.7.
• Prior to Hearing: To comply with the City of Mesa’s NOV, Mr. France installs a temporary gate at a cost of approximately $800.
• September 1, 2020: The administrative hearing is conducted.
Analysis of Arguments and Testimonies
Petitioner’s Position (Don France)
• Initial Petition: The formal petition, filed on April 16, 2020, was based on the single issue that the Mesa East Property Owners Association had violated its own CC&R section 2.7.
• Revised Argument at Hearing: During the hearing, Mr. France acknowledged that the Association was not, in fact, violating section 2.7. His argument shifted to a claim of estoppel, asserting that the Association could not enforce the rule against him because its own ARC had approved his gateless structure in 2014.
• Requested Relief: Mr. France asked the judge to rule that the Association could not require him to install a gate and to invalidate any outstanding fines levied against him.
• Supporting Testimony: Joann Van Kirk, the chairperson of the ARC in 2014, testified on Mr. France’s behalf. She stated that she had been informed by a past chair that no gate was required for structures like Mr. France’s, citing other properties that had RV shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa at the time and was told a gate was not required if the structure was attached to the house.
Respondent’s Position (Mesa East POA)
• Basis for Enforcement: The Association began strictly enforcing the gate requirement around 2018 after being threatened with lawsuits by other members for failing to enforce the CC&Rs.
• Enforcement Actions: After an unsuccessful attempt to have the City of Mesa grandfather in non-compliant properties, the Association notified members of the requirement via its newsletter and online, setting a compliance deadline of 2019. When Mr. France did not comply, the Association issued an NOV and subsequently began assessing fines.
• Legal Stance: The Association’s counsel formally rejected Mr. France’s estoppel argument in May 2019.
• Supporting Testimony: Donald Smith testified that at the time the NOV was issued to Mr. France, eleven other residents were also non-compliant. By the hearing date, six remained in violation, five of whom had agreed to comply. This testimony was intended to show that the enforcement was not targeted solely at Mr. France.
Independent Municipal Action
The City of Mesa’s regulations played a significant and independent role in the matter.
• City Code: The City of Mesa has its own ordinance, Code section 11-34-5(B), which requires RVs taller than six feet to be screened by a six-foot-tall fence.
• Notice of Violation: On July 24, 2019, the City issued its own NOV to Mr. France for violating this code.
• Consequence: This municipal enforcement action compelled Mr. France to install a temporary gate to avoid penalties from the City, regardless of the outcome of his dispute with the Property Owners Association.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
Final Order: IT IS ORDERED that Don France’s petition is dismissed.
The judge’s decision to dismiss the case was based on a precise legal and procedural rationale, rather than the merits of the estoppel argument.
• Failure of the Core Claim: The judge noted that Mr. France’s petition was limited to the single claim that the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Mr. France himself admitted this was not the case. As the petitioner, Mr. France bore the burden of proof, and his own testimony demonstrated that the “preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation.”
• Jurisdictional Limitation: The new issues raised by Mr. France at the hearing—namely the estoppel argument and the legality of the fines—were declared “not properly before the tribunal.” The judge reasoned that these claims were not included in the original petition, a separate filing fee was not paid for a second issue, and the claims were not listed in the official Notice of Hearing. This procedural failure prevented the judge from ruling on the substance of these arguments.
Conclusion and Post-Decision Protocol
The dismissal of Mr. France’s petition represents a conclusive finding in favor of the respondent based on the specific claims filed. The decision illustrates that the scope of an administrative hearing is strictly defined by the issues raised in the initial petition.
According to the decision document, the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020056-REL
Study Guide: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association (No. 20F-H2020056-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision in the case between Don France (Petitioner) and the Mesa East Property Owners Association (Respondent), as decided by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.
1. Who are the primary parties in this case, and what was the single issue alleged in the Petitioner’s original petition filed on April 16, 2020?
2. According to CC&R section 2.7 and the City of Mesa’s code, what is the specific requirement for storing a recreational vehicle (RV) on a property?
3. What enforcement actions did the Mesa East Property Owners Association take against Don France in the spring of 2019?
4. What was Don France’s primary legal argument against the Association’s enforcement, which he revealed at the September 1, 2020 hearing?
5. What was the state of compliance on Mr. France’s property regarding the RV gate as of the hearing date, and what prompted this action?
6. According to the testimony of Donald Smith, what prompted the Association to begin enforcing the six-foot gate requirement around 2018?
7. What key information did Joann Van Kirk, the 2014 chairperson of the Architectural Review Committee, provide in her testimony?
8. How did the Petitioner’s argument at the hearing differ from the allegation in his initial petition, and why was this difference critical to the case’s outcome?
9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decline to rule on the legality of the fines the Association had levied against Mr. France?
10. What was the ultimate order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal reasoning behind this decision?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key for Short-Answer Questions
1. The primary parties are Don France, the Petitioner, and the Mesa East Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The single issue alleged in Mr. France’s petition was that the Association was in violation of its own CC&R section 2.7.
2. Both CC&R section 2.7 (the 1994 version) and the City of Mesa’s code (section 11-34-5(B)) require that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a gate that is at least six feet high. The CC&Rs also specified the fence and gate must be tall enough to prevent a person from seeing the RV.
3. On March 11, 2019, the Association issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. France because his RV structure lacked a six-foot gate. Subsequently, on May 31, 2019, the Association fined him $500 for the same violation.
4. At the hearing, Mr. France’s primary argument was that the Association was “estopped” from finding him in violation of section 2.7. He argued this because the Association’s Architectural Review Committee had approved his RV structure in 2014 without the gate.
5. As of the hearing date, Mr. France had installed a temporary six-foot gate at a cost of about $800. This action was taken to comply with a Notice of Violation issued to him by the City of Mesa on July 24, 2019.
6. Donald Smith testified that around 2018, people were threatening to sue the Association if it did not enforce the CC&Rs. After meeting with the City of Mesa, which would not allow non-compliant homes to be grandfathered in, the Association began enforcing the gate requirement.
7. Joann Van Kirk testified that in 2014, she had learned from the past ARC chair that no gate was required because other owners had shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa and was told no gate was required if the structure was attached to the house.
8. While his petition alleged the Association had violated section 2.7, at the hearing Mr. France acknowledged this was not the case and argued instead that the Association was estopped from enforcing that section against him. This was critical because the judge could only rule on the single issue raised in the petition, which Mr. France conceded had no merit.
9. The judge declined to rule on the legality of the fines because the issue was not raised in Mr. France’s original petition. Therefore, it was not properly before the tribunal as a filing fee had not been paid for a second issue and it was not included in the Notice of Hearing.
10. The judge ordered that Don France’s petition be dismissed. The reasoning was that the petition was limited to the single issue of whether the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7, and Mr. France himself acknowledged at the hearing that no such violation by the Association had occurred.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-format response for each, citing specific facts from the case decision to support your arguments.
1. Analyze the concept of estoppel as it applies to this case. Explain why Don France believed the Association was estopped from enforcing the gate requirement, referencing the 2014 approvals, and discuss why the Association disagreed and proceeded with enforcement actions.
2. Discuss the procedural limitations that shaped the outcome of this hearing. How did the specific wording of Mr. France’s initial petition and the rules governing administrative hearings ultimately prevent the judge from considering the central issues of estoppel and the validity of the fines?
3. Examine the conflict between a property owner’s reliance on past approvals and a Property Owners Association’s duty to enforce its CC&Rs. Use the testimony of Joann Van Kirk and Donald Smith to illustrate the differing perspectives and pressures that led to this dispute.
4. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. France’s 2014 application to the 2020 hearing. Detail the key actions taken by Mr. France, the Association’s Architectural Review Committee, the Association’s Board, and the City of Mesa, and explain how their interactions created the legal conflict.
5. Evaluate the standard of proof required in this case, the “preponderance of the evidence.” Although the case was dismissed on a procedural issue, discuss which party presented a more convincing case regarding the underlying dispute over the RV gate, and why.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders.
Architectural Review Committee (ARC)
A committee within the Property Owners Association responsible for reviewing and approving applications for property improvements, such as Mr. France’s RV port in 2014.
Burden of Proof
The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, Mr. France bore the burden of proof to show the Association violated its CC&Rs.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing community documents that set rules for property use, such as section 2.7 which requires a six-foot gate for RV storage.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the judge’s decision that applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a final ruling.
Estoppel
A legal principle asserted by Mr. France arguing that the Association should be prevented from enforcing a rule (the gate requirement) against him because of its prior action (approving his structure without a gate in 2014).
Findings of Fact
A formal, numbered list of facts in the judge’s decision that are established by the evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.
Notice of Violation (NOV)
A formal notice issued by the Association or the City of Mesa to a property owner informing them that they are in violation of a specific rule or code.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Don France is the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient to incline an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Mesa East Property Owners Association is the Respondent.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020056-REL
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20F-H2020056-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning the case of Don France versus the Mesa East Property Owners Association. The document details a dispute where Petitioner Don France alleged that the Respondent Association violated a community covenant regarding the storage of recreational vehicles (RVs), specifically CC&R section 2.7, which requires RVs to be stored behind a six-foot gate. Although Mr. France initially brought the petition alleging the Association violated the rule, he ultimately argued that the Association was estopped from enforcing the rule against him due to past approval of his RV structure without a gate. The decision includes a summary of the Findings of Fact related to Mr. France’s structure, the Association’s attempts to enforce the gate requirement against him and other residents, and the resulting fines he incurred before installing a gate to comply with a separate City of Mesa Notice of Violation. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. France failed to meet the burden of proof to show the Association violated the CC&Rs, and his petition was dismissed because he acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7.
What were the legal and factual grounds for the case’s dismissal?
How did the Association’s past actions relate to the estoppel claim?
What was the core conflict between the homeowner, HOA, and city codes?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Don France(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf and testified
Joann Van Kirk(witness) Testified for Petitioner; was chairperson of Architectural Review Committee ('ARC') in 2014
Respondent Side
B. Austin Bailio(HOA attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. Attorney for Respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association
Michael Estey(witness) Testified for Respondent
Donald Smith(witness) Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.
Orders: Don France's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: CC&R, RV storage, Estoppel, Fines
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 823714.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:18 (96.1 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020056-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a detailed analysis of the administrative hearing decision in case number 20F-H2020056-REL, involving petitioner Don France and respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association (the “Association”). The core of the dispute was the Association’s enforcement of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), specifically section 2.7, which requires a six-foot-high gate for Recreational Vehicles (RVs) stored on a property.
The petitioner, Mr. France, was fined by the Association in 2019 for not having the required gate on an RV structure that the Association itself had approved in 2014. Mr. France initially filed a petition alleging the Association was in violation of its own CC&Rs. However, at the September 1, 2020 hearing, he conceded this was not the case and instead argued the Association was “estopped”—or legally prevented—from enforcing the rule due to its prior approval.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. France’s petition on procedural grounds. The judge determined that since Mr. France acknowledged his petition’s central claim was incorrect, he had failed to meet his burden of proof. The new arguments concerning estoppel and the legality of the fines were deemed not properly before the tribunal because they were not included in the original petition. The decision underscores the critical importance of aligning claims made in a formal petition with the arguments presented at a hearing.
Case Overview
Case Number
No. 20F-H2020056-REL
In the Office of Administrative Hearings
Petitioner
Don France
Respondent
Mesa East Property Owners Association
Respondent’s Counsel
B. Austin Bailio, Esq.
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Hearing Date
September 1, 2020
Decision Date
September 21, 2020
The central issue of the case revolves around the enforcement of CC&R section 2.7, which mandates that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a six-foot-high gate. This requirement is mirrored by a City of Mesa municipal code.
Chronology of Key Events
• 2014: Mr. France applies for and receives approval from the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) to build an RV port. In his application, he acknowledges he will abide by deed restrictions and City of Mesa codes.
• October 21, 2014: The Association issues its final approval for the structure, which is built without a gate.
• Circa 2018: Following threats of litigation from other residents over non-enforcement of the CC&Rs, the Association begins a new enforcement campaign for the six-foot gate rule. The City of Mesa denies the Association’s request to “grandfather in” non-compliant homes.
• 2019: The deadline for residents to come into compliance passes.
• March 11, 2019: The Association issues a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Mr. France for lacking the required gate.
• April 5, 2019: Through an attorney, Mr. France asserts that the Association is estopped from enforcing the rule due to its 2014 approval.
• May 15, 2019: The Association’s attorney rejects the estoppel claim and informs Mr. France’s attorney that fines of $500 per week will be assessed.
• May 31, 2019: The Association assesses a $500 fine against Mr. France, with additional fines assessed later.
• July 24, 2019: The City of Mesa issues its own NOV to Mr. France, citing a violation of city code 11-34-5(B), which also requires a six-foot screening fence for RVs.
• April 16, 2020: Mr. France files a petition alleging the Association is in violation of CC&R section 2.7.
• Prior to Hearing: To comply with the City of Mesa’s NOV, Mr. France installs a temporary gate at a cost of approximately $800.
• September 1, 2020: The administrative hearing is conducted.
Analysis of Arguments and Testimonies
Petitioner’s Position (Don France)
• Initial Petition: The formal petition, filed on April 16, 2020, was based on the single issue that the Mesa East Property Owners Association had violated its own CC&R section 2.7.
• Revised Argument at Hearing: During the hearing, Mr. France acknowledged that the Association was not, in fact, violating section 2.7. His argument shifted to a claim of estoppel, asserting that the Association could not enforce the rule against him because its own ARC had approved his gateless structure in 2014.
• Requested Relief: Mr. France asked the judge to rule that the Association could not require him to install a gate and to invalidate any outstanding fines levied against him.
• Supporting Testimony: Joann Van Kirk, the chairperson of the ARC in 2014, testified on Mr. France’s behalf. She stated that she had been informed by a past chair that no gate was required for structures like Mr. France’s, citing other properties that had RV shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa at the time and was told a gate was not required if the structure was attached to the house.
Respondent’s Position (Mesa East POA)
• Basis for Enforcement: The Association began strictly enforcing the gate requirement around 2018 after being threatened with lawsuits by other members for failing to enforce the CC&Rs.
• Enforcement Actions: After an unsuccessful attempt to have the City of Mesa grandfather in non-compliant properties, the Association notified members of the requirement via its newsletter and online, setting a compliance deadline of 2019. When Mr. France did not comply, the Association issued an NOV and subsequently began assessing fines.
• Legal Stance: The Association’s counsel formally rejected Mr. France’s estoppel argument in May 2019.
• Supporting Testimony: Donald Smith testified that at the time the NOV was issued to Mr. France, eleven other residents were also non-compliant. By the hearing date, six remained in violation, five of whom had agreed to comply. This testimony was intended to show that the enforcement was not targeted solely at Mr. France.
Independent Municipal Action
The City of Mesa’s regulations played a significant and independent role in the matter.
• City Code: The City of Mesa has its own ordinance, Code section 11-34-5(B), which requires RVs taller than six feet to be screened by a six-foot-tall fence.
• Notice of Violation: On July 24, 2019, the City issued its own NOV to Mr. France for violating this code.
• Consequence: This municipal enforcement action compelled Mr. France to install a temporary gate to avoid penalties from the City, regardless of the outcome of his dispute with the Property Owners Association.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
Final Order: IT IS ORDERED that Don France’s petition is dismissed.
The judge’s decision to dismiss the case was based on a precise legal and procedural rationale, rather than the merits of the estoppel argument.
• Failure of the Core Claim: The judge noted that Mr. France’s petition was limited to the single claim that the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Mr. France himself admitted this was not the case. As the petitioner, Mr. France bore the burden of proof, and his own testimony demonstrated that the “preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation.”
• Jurisdictional Limitation: The new issues raised by Mr. France at the hearing—namely the estoppel argument and the legality of the fines—were declared “not properly before the tribunal.” The judge reasoned that these claims were not included in the original petition, a separate filing fee was not paid for a second issue, and the claims were not listed in the official Notice of Hearing. This procedural failure prevented the judge from ruling on the substance of these arguments.
Conclusion and Post-Decision Protocol
The dismissal of Mr. France’s petition represents a conclusive finding in favor of the respondent based on the specific claims filed. The decision illustrates that the scope of an administrative hearing is strictly defined by the issues raised in the initial petition.
According to the decision document, the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020056-REL
Study Guide: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association (No. 20F-H2020056-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision in the case between Don France (Petitioner) and the Mesa East Property Owners Association (Respondent), as decided by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.
1. Who are the primary parties in this case, and what was the single issue alleged in the Petitioner’s original petition filed on April 16, 2020?
2. According to CC&R section 2.7 and the City of Mesa’s code, what is the specific requirement for storing a recreational vehicle (RV) on a property?
3. What enforcement actions did the Mesa East Property Owners Association take against Don France in the spring of 2019?
4. What was Don France’s primary legal argument against the Association’s enforcement, which he revealed at the September 1, 2020 hearing?
5. What was the state of compliance on Mr. France’s property regarding the RV gate as of the hearing date, and what prompted this action?
6. According to the testimony of Donald Smith, what prompted the Association to begin enforcing the six-foot gate requirement around 2018?
7. What key information did Joann Van Kirk, the 2014 chairperson of the Architectural Review Committee, provide in her testimony?
8. How did the Petitioner’s argument at the hearing differ from the allegation in his initial petition, and why was this difference critical to the case’s outcome?
9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decline to rule on the legality of the fines the Association had levied against Mr. France?
10. What was the ultimate order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal reasoning behind this decision?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key for Short-Answer Questions
1. The primary parties are Don France, the Petitioner, and the Mesa East Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The single issue alleged in Mr. France’s petition was that the Association was in violation of its own CC&R section 2.7.
2. Both CC&R section 2.7 (the 1994 version) and the City of Mesa’s code (section 11-34-5(B)) require that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a gate that is at least six feet high. The CC&Rs also specified the fence and gate must be tall enough to prevent a person from seeing the RV.
3. On March 11, 2019, the Association issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. France because his RV structure lacked a six-foot gate. Subsequently, on May 31, 2019, the Association fined him $500 for the same violation.
4. At the hearing, Mr. France’s primary argument was that the Association was “estopped” from finding him in violation of section 2.7. He argued this because the Association’s Architectural Review Committee had approved his RV structure in 2014 without the gate.
5. As of the hearing date, Mr. France had installed a temporary six-foot gate at a cost of about $800. This action was taken to comply with a Notice of Violation issued to him by the City of Mesa on July 24, 2019.
6. Donald Smith testified that around 2018, people were threatening to sue the Association if it did not enforce the CC&Rs. After meeting with the City of Mesa, which would not allow non-compliant homes to be grandfathered in, the Association began enforcing the gate requirement.
7. Joann Van Kirk testified that in 2014, she had learned from the past ARC chair that no gate was required because other owners had shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa and was told no gate was required if the structure was attached to the house.
8. While his petition alleged the Association had violated section 2.7, at the hearing Mr. France acknowledged this was not the case and argued instead that the Association was estopped from enforcing that section against him. This was critical because the judge could only rule on the single issue raised in the petition, which Mr. France conceded had no merit.
9. The judge declined to rule on the legality of the fines because the issue was not raised in Mr. France’s original petition. Therefore, it was not properly before the tribunal as a filing fee had not been paid for a second issue and it was not included in the Notice of Hearing.
10. The judge ordered that Don France’s petition be dismissed. The reasoning was that the petition was limited to the single issue of whether the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7, and Mr. France himself acknowledged at the hearing that no such violation by the Association had occurred.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-format response for each, citing specific facts from the case decision to support your arguments.
1. Analyze the concept of estoppel as it applies to this case. Explain why Don France believed the Association was estopped from enforcing the gate requirement, referencing the 2014 approvals, and discuss why the Association disagreed and proceeded with enforcement actions.
2. Discuss the procedural limitations that shaped the outcome of this hearing. How did the specific wording of Mr. France’s initial petition and the rules governing administrative hearings ultimately prevent the judge from considering the central issues of estoppel and the validity of the fines?
3. Examine the conflict between a property owner’s reliance on past approvals and a Property Owners Association’s duty to enforce its CC&Rs. Use the testimony of Joann Van Kirk and Donald Smith to illustrate the differing perspectives and pressures that led to this dispute.
4. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. France’s 2014 application to the 2020 hearing. Detail the key actions taken by Mr. France, the Association’s Architectural Review Committee, the Association’s Board, and the City of Mesa, and explain how their interactions created the legal conflict.
5. Evaluate the standard of proof required in this case, the “preponderance of the evidence.” Although the case was dismissed on a procedural issue, discuss which party presented a more convincing case regarding the underlying dispute over the RV gate, and why.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders.
Architectural Review Committee (ARC)
A committee within the Property Owners Association responsible for reviewing and approving applications for property improvements, such as Mr. France’s RV port in 2014.
Burden of Proof
The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, Mr. France bore the burden of proof to show the Association violated its CC&Rs.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing community documents that set rules for property use, such as section 2.7 which requires a six-foot gate for RV storage.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the judge’s decision that applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a final ruling.
Estoppel
A legal principle asserted by Mr. France arguing that the Association should be prevented from enforcing a rule (the gate requirement) against him because of its prior action (approving his structure without a gate in 2014).
Findings of Fact
A formal, numbered list of facts in the judge’s decision that are established by the evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.
Notice of Violation (NOV)
A formal notice issued by the Association or the City of Mesa to a property owner informing them that they are in violation of a specific rule or code.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Don France is the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient to incline an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Mesa East Property Owners Association is the Respondent.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020056-REL
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20F-H2020056-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning the case of Don France versus the Mesa East Property Owners Association. The document details a dispute where Petitioner Don France alleged that the Respondent Association violated a community covenant regarding the storage of recreational vehicles (RVs), specifically CC&R section 2.7, which requires RVs to be stored behind a six-foot gate. Although Mr. France initially brought the petition alleging the Association violated the rule, he ultimately argued that the Association was estopped from enforcing the rule against him due to past approval of his RV structure without a gate. The decision includes a summary of the Findings of Fact related to Mr. France’s structure, the Association’s attempts to enforce the gate requirement against him and other residents, and the resulting fines he incurred before installing a gate to comply with a separate City of Mesa Notice of Violation. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. France failed to meet the burden of proof to show the Association violated the CC&Rs, and his petition was dismissed because he acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7.
What were the legal and factual grounds for the case’s dismissal?
How did the Association’s past actions relate to the estoppel claim?
What was the core conflict between the homeowner, HOA, and city codes?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Don France(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf and testified
Joann Van Kirk(witness) Testified for Petitioner; was chairperson of Architectural Review Committee ('ARC') in 2014
Respondent Side
B. Austin Bailio(HOA attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. Attorney for Respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association
Michael Estey(witness) Testified for Respondent
Donald Smith(witness) Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.
The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.
The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John R Ashley
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Counsel
Wendy Erlich
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article III, Section 4
Outcome Summary
The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.
The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
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Case Background and Procedural History
Parties Involved
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
John R. Ashley
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Attorney for Respondent
Wendy Erlich, Esq.
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Oversight Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Core Allegation
The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.
Procedural Timeline
• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.
• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.
• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.
• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.
• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.
• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.
• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.
Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation
The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.
Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)
• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.
• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.
• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.
Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)
• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.
• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.
Controlling Bylaw Provisions
Article
Pertinent Text / Description
Article III, Section 4
Meetings of Members; Quorum
“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”
Article VI, Section 3
Meetings of Directors; Quorum
Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.
Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)
In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:
• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.
• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”
• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.
Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)
The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:
• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.
• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.
• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:
◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.
◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”
• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?
2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?
3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?
4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?
5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?
6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?
7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?
8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?
9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?
10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.
3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.
4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.
5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.
6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.
7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.
8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.
9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.
10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.
1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.
2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?
3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?
4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?
5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.
Bylaws
A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).
Motion to Dismiss
A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.
Quorum
The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association
Introduction: The Rules We All Live By
If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.
But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.
A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.
The Takeaways
Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.
The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:
and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.
A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.
Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”
A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.
In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.
However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.
Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.
During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.
The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.
Conclusion: Read the Fine Print
The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.
When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John R Ashley(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Wendy Erlich(respondent attorney) Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
djones(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
ncano(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
Other Participants
A. Leverette(clerical staff) Signed document transmission in initial order
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John R Ashley
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Counsel
Wendy Erlich
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article III, Section 4
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because the provision does not require a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof, as Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws was found to be unambiguous in not requiring a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.
The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
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Case Background and Procedural History
Parties Involved
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
John R. Ashley
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Attorney for Respondent
Wendy Erlich, Esq.
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Oversight Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Core Allegation
The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.
Procedural Timeline
• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.
• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.
• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.
• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.
• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.
• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.
• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.
Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation
The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.
Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)
• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.
• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.
• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.
Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)
• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.
• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.
Controlling Bylaw Provisions
Article
Pertinent Text / Description
Article III, Section 4
Meetings of Members; Quorum
“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”
Article VI, Section 3
Meetings of Directors; Quorum
Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.
Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)
In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:
• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.
• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”
• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.
Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)
The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:
• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.
• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.
• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:
◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.
◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”
• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?
2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?
3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?
4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?
5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?
6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?
7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?
8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?
9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?
10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.
3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.
4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.
5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.
6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.
7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.
8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.
9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.
10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.
1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.
2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?
3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?
4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?
5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.
Bylaws
A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).
Motion to Dismiss
A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.
Quorum
The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association
Introduction: The Rules We All Live By
If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.
But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.
A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.
The Takeaways
Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.
The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:
and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.
A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.
Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”
A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.
In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.
However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.
Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.
During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.
The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.
Conclusion: Read the Fine Print
The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.
When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John R Ashley(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Wendy Erlich(respondent attorney) Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
djones(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
ncano(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
Other Participants
A. Leverette(clerical staff) Signed document transmission in initial order
The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Mary J Bartle
Counsel
—
Respondent
Saguaro West Owner's Association
Counsel
Nicole Payne, Esq.
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions
The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.
Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG Decision – 767041.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:24 (94.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association (Case No. 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG)
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Mary J. Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association. The final order, issued on January 30, 2020, dismissed the petition brought by Ms. Bartle. The core of the case revolved around a financial transaction where $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018, and redeposited on November 30, 2018.
The petitioner, Ms. Bartle, alleged this transaction violated a specific provision of the Association’s bylaws—Article VIII, section 8(d)—which outlines the duties of the Treasurer. Despite two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently concluded that Ms. Bartle failed to meet her burden of proof. The central finding was that while evidence suggested the transaction “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper,” the petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, how this transaction specifically violated any of the enumerated duties of the Treasurer as set forth in the cited bylaw. The decision underscores a critical legal distinction between a potentially improper act and a proven violation of the specific bylaw under which the complaint was filed.
Case Overview
Case Name
Mary J. Bartle, Petitioner, vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association, Respondent
Case Number
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Petitioner
Mary J. Bartle (representing herself)
Respondent
Saguaro West Owner’s Association (represented by Nicole Payne, Esq.)
Rehearing Date
January 14, 2020
Final Decision Date
January 30, 2020
Procedural History and Core Allegation
The case proceeded through an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, following a specific timeline of events:
• April 22, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed the initial petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• August 29, 2019: The first hearing was held. At the outset, a discussion was held to narrow the scope of the hearing. Ms. Bartle agreed to limit her petition to a single issue.
• The Single Issue: Whether the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) through a withdrawal of $49,000.50 on October 22, 2018, and a redeposit of the same amount on November 30, 2018.
• September 18, 2019: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing Ms. Bartle’s petition.
• October 23, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed a request for a rehearing, asserting an error in the admission of evidence.
• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
• January 14, 2020: The rehearing was convened. Ms. Bartle testified, while the Respondent presented no witnesses.
• January 30, 2020: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, reaffirming the dismissal of the petition.
At the rehearing, Ms. Bartle testified “to the effect that laws must have been violated by the withdrawal and redepositing of the $49,000.50 without the Association’s members being provided any notice of these transactions.”
Analysis of Bylaw and Judicial Findings
Bylaw Article VIII, Section 8(d): The Treasurer’s Duties
The entirety of the petitioner’s case rested on proving a violation of the specific duties outlined for the Treasurer in the Association’s bylaws. The text of the bylaw is as follows:
The Treasurer shall receive and deposit in the Association’s bank accounts all monies received by the Association and shall disburse such funds as directed by resolution [of] the Board of Directors; shall properly prepare and sign all checks before presenting them to be co-signed; keep proper books of account; cause an annual audit of the Association’s books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year; and shall prepare an annual budget to be presented to the membership at the annual meeting; to cause all Federal and State reports to be prepared; and shall prepare all monthly statements of finance for the Board of Directors.
Key Judicial Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the petitioner’s failure to connect the disputed financial transaction to a specific violation of the duties listed above. The judge made a clear distinction between the potential impropriety of the transaction and the narrow scope of the legal claim.
• Initial Hearing Conclusion: The decision from the first hearing, which the judge took notice of in the rehearing, established the core finding:
• Rehearing Conclusion: The final decision after the rehearing reinforced this exact point, stating:
Ultimately, the case was dismissed because Ms. Bartle did not meet the legal standard required to prove her specific claim.
Legal Framework and Final Order
Applicable Legal Standards
The decision was grounded in several key legal principles cited by the Administrative Law Judge:
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate possesses authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
• Burden of Proof: Ms. Bartle, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof on all issues.
• Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
• Contractual Nature of Bylaws: Citing McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., the decision notes that “The Bylaws are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”
Final Order and Implications
Based on the failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with the following key points:
1. Dismissal: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed.
2. Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, is deemed the prevailing party.
3. Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served, as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 12-904(A) and Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Bartle v. Saguaro West Owner’s Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the legal matter.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific financial transaction was the central subject of the petitioner’s complaint?
3. Which specific article and section of the Association’s Bylaws did the petitioner claim was violated?
4. What was the legal standard of proof that the petitioner was required to meet, and who had the burden of proof?
5. On what grounds did Ms. Bartle file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision?
6. According to the judge’s decision, what was the key failure in the petitioner’s argument regarding the financial transaction?
7. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on January 30, 2020?
8. Although the judge dismissed the petition, what did the decision state about the nature of the financial transactions?
9. Which government department granted the request for a rehearing and has authority over this type of matter?
10. What options does a party have if they wish to appeal the final administrative law judge order?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Mary J. Bartle, and the Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association. Ms. Bartle brought the petition against the Association, alleging a violation of its bylaws.
2. The central subject was the withdrawal of $49,000.50 from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018. The same amount was subsequently redeposited into the account on November 30, 2018.
3. The petitioner claimed the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). This section outlines the specific duties and responsibilities of the Association’s Treasurer.
4. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioner, Ms. Bartle, to demonstrate that the Association had violated the bylaw.
5. Ms. Bartle filed her Rehearing Request on the grounds that there was an error in the admission of evidence. She specifically referenced documents dated July 5, August 6, and September 13, 2019, in her request.
6. The key failure was that Ms. Bartle did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the withdrawal and redeposit specifically violated any of the treasurer’s duties as explicitly listed in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Her claim was too narrow for the evidence she presented.
7. The final order was that Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, was deemed to be the prevailing party in the matter.
8. The decision stated that there was evidence to suggest that the withdrawal and redeposit of the $49,000.50 “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper.” However, this was not sufficient to prove a violation of the specific bylaw in question.
9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing on November 18, 2019. This department has authority over the matter as established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information provided in the source document.
1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain why Mary J. Bartle failed to meet this standard, despite the judge’s acknowledgment that the transaction may have been “improper” or in “violation of the law.”
2. Discuss the procedural significance of limiting the hearing to the single issue of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). How might the case’s outcome have differed if the scope of the hearing had been broader?
3. Trace the complete timeline of the case from the initial petition filing in April 2019 to the final order in January 2020. What do the key events and dates reveal about the process of administrative hearings and rehearings?
4. Based on the full text of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d), what specific types of evidence would the petitioner have needed to present to successfully prove that the treasurer’s duties were violated by the $49,000.50 transaction?
5. Evaluate the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between a transaction that is potentially illegal or improper and a transaction that specifically violates the duties enumerated in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Why is this distinction critical to the final order of dismissal?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions on matters under the jurisdiction of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona’s state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited to establish jurisdiction and the appeals process.
Bylaws
A set of rules established by an organization, such as a homeowners’ association, to regulate itself. In this case, the bylaws are treated as a binding contract between the parties.
Conclusion of Law
The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case.
Finding of Fact
The section of a legal decision that lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a court of law reviews the decision of a lower court or an administrative agency to determine if the decision was legally sound.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
A state agency that provides a neutral forum for conducting administrative hearings for other state agencies. The hearings in this matter were held at the OAH.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the petitioner was Mary J. Bartle.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is met when the evidence presented has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Prevailing Party
The party in a legal dispute who is successful and in whose favor the judgment is rendered. In this case, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to consider new evidence or to argue against the original decision on the basis of an error. Ms. Bartle’s request for a rehearing was granted.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Saguaro West Owner’s Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Found a Mysterious $49,000 Transaction in Her HOA’s Books. The Reason She Lost in Court Is a Lesson for Everyone.
Introduction: The David-vs-Goliath Fight That Didn’t Go as Planned
For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant battle for transparency and fairness. It’s a common story: a resident raises concerns about financial decisions made behind closed doors, only to be met with resistance or silence. But what happens when a homeowner pushes back and takes that fight to an administrative hearing?
After an initial hearing and a persistent request for a rehearing, the final decision in Mary J. Bartle’s case against the Saguaro West Owner’s Association seemed, on the surface, like a clear-cut quest for accountability. The dispute centered on a single, alarming event: the withdrawal and subsequent redeposit of $49,000.50 from the association’s operating account without any notice to the members. It appeared to be a straightforward case of a concerned resident demanding answers.
However, the ruling from the administrative hearing offers a surprising and crucial lesson in how the legal system operates. The outcome reveals that suspicion, no matter how justified, is not enough to win. This article breaks down the top counter-intuitive takeaways from the judge’s decision and what they mean for any homeowner considering a legal challenge against their HOA.
Takeaway 1: A “Suspicious” Act Isn’t a Guaranteed Win
Feeling Something Is Wrong Isn’t the Same as Proving It.
The core facts of the case were not in dispute. On October 22, 2018, $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Saguaro West Owner’s Association’s operating account. On November 30, 2018, the exact same amount was redeposited. Members were not notified of these transactions. To any reasonable observer, this activity raises immediate questions.
Even the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case acknowledged the questionable nature of the transaction. In his final decision, he validated Ms. Bartle’s initial concerns with a striking statement:
The evidence shows that $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s account in October 2018 and the same amount was deposited in November 2018, and there is evidence to suggest that the transactions may have been in violation of the law.
This is the most stunning part of the case: the judge agreed that the transaction looked suspicious and might have broken the law, yet Ms. Bartle still lost. This reveals a critical distinction in legal proceedings. A judge is not an arbiter of general fairness but an interpreter of specific laws and rules. The judge’s comment shows he understood the spirit of Ms. Bartle’s complaint, but his hands were tied by the letter of her petition. The legal system requires more than a gut feeling; it demands specific proof that a specific rule was violated, which leads directly to the next critical lesson.
Takeaway 2: You Must Prove theExactRule Was Broken
Specificity Is Your Only Weapon.
Ms. Bartle’s case was ultimately narrowed to a single, highly specific issue: whether the $49,000.50 transaction violated Article VIII, section 8(d) of the association’s bylaws. This is a crucial detail because courts and administrative bodies require this rigid specificity to ensure fairness, prevent “moving goalposts,” and keep proceedings focused on the actual claims filed, not a general feeling of grievance.
Her entire case hinged on proving a violation of that specific section and no other. The rule in question outlines the treasurer’s duties, which include the power to: “receive and deposit…all monies,” “disburse such funds as directed,” “sign all checks,” and “keep proper books of account.”
The judge’s conclusion was brutally precise. He found that Ms. Bartle had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence” that the transaction violated any of those specific, listed duties. She couldn’t prove the treasurer failed to deposit money or keep proper books; she could only prove a strange transaction occurred that wasn’t explicitly forbidden by the rule she cited. This is a critical lesson: it doesn’t matter if an HOA’s action feels wrong; what matters is whether you can prove it violated the precise rule you cited in your petition.
Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on the Accuser
It’s Your Job to Build the Case, Not Theirs to Disprove It.
In a civil administrative hearing like this, the petitioner—Ms. Bartle—carries the “burden of proof.” The standard she had to meet was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition for this is:
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
In simple terms, she had to present enough convincing evidence to make the judge believe that her version of events was more likely true than not. The judge’s decision explicitly states that Ms. Bartle bore this burden and ultimately failed to meet it.
One of the most powerful details from the case file illustrates this point perfectly: the Saguaro West Owner’s Association, though represented by legal counsel, “presented no witnesses.” They didn’t have to. They didn’t need to explain the transaction or justify their actions because Ms. Bartle failed to build a strong enough case to prove her specific claim. The onus was completely on her to prove her argument, and when it fell short, the case was dismissed.
Conclusion: A Sobering Reminder for Homeowners
The case of Mary Bartle is a sobering reminder that winning a legal fight against a well-resourced entity like an HOA is less about moral rightness and more about meticulous legal strategy and precision.
While the judge acknowledged that Ms. Bartle’s concerns about the $49,000.50 transaction were potentially valid, her petition was dismissed not on a simple technicality, but because of a core principle of law: the failure to prove that the specific rule cited had actually been broken. Her case highlights the immense challenge for individual homeowners seeking transparency. It leaves us asking, if the legal bar is this specific, what practical recourse do residents have when they feel something is fundamentally wrong?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Mary J Bartle(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf and testified
Respondent Side
Nicole Payne(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
Edith Rudder(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
