Tag Archives: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02

John H. Kelly v. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-13
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John H. Kelly Counsel —
Respondent Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243

Outcome Summary

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the required threshold of 21 valid signatures from eligible voters needed to compel the Association to call a special meeting under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243. The petition was consequently denied.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to provide the minimum required 21 valid signatures from eligible unit owners (only 13 were valid) as required by the Association's Bylaws and state statute.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of failure to call a special meeting to remove a board member.

Petitioner filed a petition alleging the Association failed to call a special meeting to remove a board member after collecting what Petitioner believed were sufficient signatures (36 collected, 21 required). The Association countered that only 13 of those signatures were valid (excluding non-owners, duplicates, and delinquent members ineligible to vote).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Condominium, Special Meeting, Board Member Removal, Petition Signature Validity, Voting Rights, Delinquency
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919060-REL Decision – 737890.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:30 (142.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919060-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Kelly vs. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919060-REL, a dispute between Petitioner John H. Kelly and the Respondent, Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (“the Association”). The core issue was whether the Association violated Arizona state law by refusing to call a special meeting to remove a board member, as demanded by a petition initiated by Mr. Kelly.

The Association’s bylaws require a petition signed by at least 25% of eligible voting members—in this case, 21 of the 84 unit owners—to compel such a meeting. Mr. Kelly submitted a petition with 36 signatures. However, upon review, the Association invalidated 23 signatures for specific reasons: 11 were from non-owner renters, 6 were duplicate signatures from units that had already signed, and 6 were from owners whose voting rights were suspended due to being over 15 days delinquent on payments.

This left only 13 valid signatures, well short of the 21 required. The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The evidence clearly demonstrated that the number of valid signatures was insufficient to legally compel the Association to call a special meeting. Consequently, the judge ruled that the Association did not violate Arizona statute § 33-1243 and denied Mr. Kelly’s petition.

Case Overview

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Details

Petitioner

John H. Kelly

A condominium owner and member of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. Appeared on his own behalf.

Respondent

Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association

The homeowners’ association for the Cortez Canyon condominium development in Phoenix, AZ. Represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq.

Witness

Saundra Garcia

President of the Association’s Board of Directors.

Adjudicator

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge, Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Core Dispute

The central issue adjudicated was whether the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member after receiving a petition from unit owners. The Petitioner alleged that the required number of signatures had been collected, while the Respondent denied this claim, asserting that the petition lacked the requisite number of valid signatures from eligible voters.

Legal and Governance Framework

The dispute was governed by Arizona state law and the Association’s own internal documents.

• Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243(H)(4): This statute mandates that an association with 1,000 or fewer members must call a special meeting to remove a board member upon receipt of a petition signed by at least 25% of the eligible voters in the association.

• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 2: Mirrors the state statute, stipulating that a special meeting may be called by unit owners holding at least 25% of the votes in the Association.

• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 7: Critically, this section states that a unit owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if they are in arrears on payments (assessments, penalties, etc.) for a period of 15 days. This suspension remains until all payments are brought current.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (John H. Kelly)

Mr. Kelly initiated the petition to recall an Association board member. His position and the evidence he presented are summarized as follows:

• Petition Submission: Mr. Kelly, with assistance from others, collected 36 signatures and submitted them to the Association’s then-property management group, Golden Valley.

• Initial Confirmation: He testified that Golden Valley initially informed him that he had secured enough signatures to compel the special meeting.

• Reversal by New Management: A short time later, after the Association’s contract with Golden Valley expired on June 1, 2019, a new property management company informed him that the petition did not meet the signature threshold.

• Key Admission: Mr. Kelly testified that neither he nor his assistants verified whether the signatories were unit owners eligible to vote prior to submitting the petition.

• Argument at Hearing: Mr. Kelly argued that he had submitted a minimum of 23 valid signatures. This included the signature of Jeffery Law, an owner of six units, which Mr. Kelly contended should be counted six times. However, it was established that Mr. Law’s signature was secured after the initial submission and was never provided to the management company.

• Formal Allegation: In his April 29, 2019, filing with the Department, Mr. Kelly stated: “Cortez Canyon has 84 units and 25% is 21 units. Homeowners have collected more than the required 21 home-owner’s signatures. The Cortez Canyon HOA board has stated that they will not schedule the required special meeting.”

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Cortez Canyon Association)

The Association, represented by its Board President Saundra Garcia, presented a detailed rebuttal based on a thorough review of the submitted petition.

• Receipt of Petition: The Association received the petition with 36 purported unit owner signatures on or about April 19, 2019.

• Signature Verification Process: Upon review, the Association determined that a significant number of signatures were invalid based on the community’s governing documents.

• Disqualification of Signatures: The Association provided a specific breakdown of the 23 signatures it disqualified:

◦ 11 signatures were removed because they were from non-owner renters or occupants.

◦ 6 signatures were removed because they were from units for which another owner’s signature had already been collected (only one vote is permitted per unit).

◦ 6 signatures were removed because the unit owner was ineligible to vote, being more than 15 days delinquent on fines, fees, or dues owed to the Association, as stipulated in the Bylaws.

• Final Tally: After removing the 23 invalid signatures from the 36 submitted, the Association concluded that the petition contained only 13 valid signatures.

• Conclusion: Since 13 signatures is below the required threshold of 21, the Association determined it was not obligated by law or its bylaws to call the special meeting. The signature from the multi-unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not part of the petition received by the Association and was therefore not considered in its count.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling

The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, reviewed the evidence and testimony from both parties and issued a decision decisively in favor of the Respondent.

Conclusions of Law

• Burden of Proof: The Judge established that the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association had violated the statute. A preponderance of evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

• Undisputed Facts: The material facts of the case were not at issue. Both parties agreed that 21 valid signatures were required to compel the special meeting.

• Evidence of Record: The Judge found that the evidence presented demonstrated the Petitioner’s failure to meet the required threshold. The decision states, “While Petitioner is correct that he submitted more than twenty-one signatures to the Association, he is incorrect that all of signatures provided were valid.”

• Final Determination on Signatures: The ruling affirmed the Association’s count, concluding, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner only provided thirteen valid signatures along with his petition to the Association, which was not enough to compel the Association to call a special meeting.”

Final Order

Based on the failure of the Petitioner to sustain his burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on September 13, 2019:

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919060-REL


Study Guide: Kelly v. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919060-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Petitioner John H. Kelly and Respondent Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. It is designed to test and reinforce understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, governing documents, and final outcome.

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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences, based solely on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the specific violation of Arizona law alleged by the Petitioner in his initial petition to the Department of Real Estate?

3. How many condominium units are in the Cortez Canyon development, and what number of valid signatures was consequently required to compel a special meeting?

4. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what circumstances would cause a Unit Owner to have their voting rights suspended?

5. List the three categories of invalid signatures that the Association identified in its review of the Petitioner’s submission.

6. Who was Jeffery Law, and why was his signature ultimately not counted by the Association?

7. What was the initial assessment given to the Petitioner by the property management group, Golden Valley, and how did it differ from the Association’s final determination?

8. In this type of legal proceeding, who bears the “burden of proof,” and what standard of proof must be met?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim?

10. What was the final ORDER issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Part II: Answer Key

1. The primary parties were John H. Kelly, the “Petitioner,” who appeared on his own behalf, and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the “Respondent,” which was represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq. Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark presided over the hearing. Saundra Garcia, the Association’s Board President, appeared as a witness for the Respondent.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member. He claimed to have collected the required number of signatures from homeowners to compel such a meeting.

3. The Cortez Canyon development has 84 units. Based on the requirement for signatures from 25% of the votes in the Association, a total of 21 valid Unit Owner signatures were required to compel a special meeting.

4. According to Bylaws Article II, Section 7, a Unit Owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if the owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties, or other fees for a period of fifteen days. This suspension remains in effect until all payments are brought current.

5. The Association determined that of the 36 submitted signatures, 23 were invalid. The categories for invalidation were: eleven signatures from non-owner renters or occupants, six signatures from units where another signature had already been collected, and six signatures from Unit Owners who were ineligible to vote due to being delinquent on payments.

6. Jeffery Law was an Association member and owner of six condominium units. His signature was not counted because the Petitioner secured it after submitting the petition to the management company and never provided it to the Association as part of the formal submission.

7. The former property management group, Golden Valley, initially informed the Petitioner that he had secured enough valid signatures to compel a special meeting. However, after the Association directly reviewed the petition, it determined that only 13 of the signatures were valid, far short of the required 21.

8. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means providing evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight than the evidence presented by the opposing side.

9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof. The credible evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner submitted only thirteen valid signatures, which was insufficient to compel the Association to call a special meeting under its Bylaws and state law.

10. The final ORDER, based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

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Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. They require a deeper analysis of the case’s themes, legal principles, and procedural elements. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means in this context, who held the burden, and how the failure to meet this standard was the central reason for the judge’s final decision.

2. Discuss the critical importance of an association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) in resolving internal disputes. Use specific articles and sections from the Cortez Canyon Bylaws to illustrate how they definitively established the rules for calling a special meeting and determining voter eligibility, leaving little room for interpretation.

3. Evaluate the Petitioner’s strategy and execution in collecting signatures for his petition. Identify the critical errors he and his assistants made in the process, and outline the specific steps he could have taken to verify signatures and ensure his petition was valid before its submission.

4. Explain the legal and practical distinctions between a Unit Owner, an occupant/renter, and an “eligible voter” within the context of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. How did the Petitioner’s failure to understand these distinctions become the central point of failure for his petition?

5. Imagine you are advising the Cortez Canyon Board of Directors following this hearing. Based on the evidence and outcome of the case, what recommendations would you make regarding their procedures for validating petitions and their communication with Unit Owners about voting rights, petition requirements, and the consequences of financial delinquency?

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Jenna Clark) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, reviews evidence, and makes legal findings and conclusions.

Answer

The formal written response filed by the Respondent (the Association) on May 28, 2019, denying the Petitioner’s allegations.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at issue was § 33-1243.

Association

The Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the governing body for the condominium development, comprised of all unit owners.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The group of individuals that oversees the Association, as empowered by the CC&Rs. The petition sought to remove a member of this board.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation on one party in a dispute (in this case, the Petitioner) to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim.

Bylaws

The set of rules adopted by the Association on June 14, 2000, that govern its internal operations, including meetings and voting rights.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing documents for the development, recorded on May 9, 2000, which form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.

Eligible Votes

A term defined in the Bylaws as the total number of votes that can be lawfully cast, excluding those from members whose voting rights are suspended.

Findings of Fact

The section of the legal decision that outlines the established, undisputed facts of the case based on the hearing evidence.

OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)

An independent state agency where evidentiary hearings are conducted by Administrative Law Judges.

The final, legally binding command issued by the judge at the conclusion of the decision. In this case, the Order was to deny the petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John H. Kelly.

Petition

The formal document filed by the Petitioner on April 29, 2019, with the Department to initiate the hearing process against the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, meaning that the evidence must be sufficient to convince the judge that the contention is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of Association members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled meetings. The petition sought to compel a special meeting to remove a board member.

Unit Owner

An individual who holds legal title to a condominium within the Cortez Canyon development and is a member of the Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919060-REL


He Gathered 36 Signatures to Oust His HOA Board. Here’s Why Only 13 Counted.

Introduction: The Power and Pitfalls of Community Action

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of trying to enact change within their community, especially when it involves challenging the decisions of a Homeowners Association (HOA) board. It can feel like an uphill battle, but the right to petition and call for special meetings is a cornerstone of community governance.

However, a real-world case involving homeowner John H. Kelly and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association serves as a critical cautionary tale. Mr. Kelly gathered what he believed were more than enough signatures to force a special meeting to remove a board member. Despite his significant effort, his petition failed spectacularly. This article breaks down the key legal and procedural reasons why, offering essential lessons for every homeowner.

1. Not All Signatures Are Created Equal: The Validity Gauntlet

The core of the issue began with a simple numbers game. The Cortez Canyon HOA has 84 units, meaning a petition required signatures from 25%, or 21, of the unit owners to compel a special meeting. Mr. Kelly successfully collected 36 signatures—a number that seemed to guarantee his success.

In a moment of false victory, the association’s property management company at the time, Golden Valley, informed Mr. Kelly that he had indeed secured enough signatures. But this assurance was short-lived. A new management company took over, and after a formal review, the association delivered devastating news: only 13 of the 36 signatures were valid. The petition was dead on arrival.

The association disqualified 23 signatures for specific, documented reasons:

• Non-Owners: Eleven signatures were from renters or other residential occupants who were not the legal owners of the unit.

• Duplicate Units: Six signatures were removed because another signature had already been collected from the same unit, upholding the “one vote per unit” principle.

• Ineligible Owners: Six signatures were from homeowners who were technically owners but were found to be ineligible to vote at the time they signed.

This reveals the petitioner’s first critical, and ultimately fatal, assumption: that the HOA would do the work of verifying his supporters. In reality, the burden of proof was his alone. The legal findings state it plainly: “Neither Petitioner nor his assistants verified if the signatures that were collected belonged to Unit Owners eligible to vote.” From a governance perspective, this initial culling of signatures is where most grassroots community efforts fail.

2. The Fine Print That Disenfranchises: “Good Standing” and Your Right to Vote

Here, we find the kind of boilerplate legal language that is often ignored by homeowners but wielded with immense power by boards. The ineligibility of six homeowners stemmed from a specific clause in the association’s bylaws related to financial standing.

The bylaw states:

“In the event any Unit Owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties or other fees and charges due under the terms of the Condominium Documents for a period of fifteen (15) days, the Unit Owner’s right to vote as a member of the Association shall be automatically suspended…”

This single provision had a profound impact. Six of the signatures Mr. Kelly collected were from homeowners who were more than 15 days late on their dues or fines. Their voting rights were suspended, and their signatures were rendered invalid. This highlights a crucial preparatory step for any petitioner: confidentially requesting a list of members in good standing from the association before collecting signatures, if the governing documents allow, or at minimum, reminding potential signatories to ensure their accounts are current.

3. Process is Paramount: The Signature That Never Was

Facing a losing battle at the administrative hearing, the petitioner made a final argument to salvage his petition. He contended that he had also secured the signature of a member named Jeffrey Law, who owned six separate units. Mr. Kelly argued this single signature should count as six votes, which would have put him over the required threshold.

However, this argument failed due to a simple but fatal procedural error. According to the court’s findings, the signature from Mr. Law was never actually submitted with the petition to the association.

The Administrative Law Judge’s finding was unambiguous: “The signature Petitioner collected from the multiple unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not a part of the petition received by the Association and therefore was not counted.” This procedural error, while seemingly minor, is an absolute bar to success in administrative law. Unlike a casual disagreement, there is no room for “I meant to” or “I thought I had.”

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA

Because the petitioner could only provide 13 valid signatures instead of the required 21, the Administrative Law Judge denied his petition. The HOA was not required to call the special meeting, and the board member remained in place. Mr. Kelly’s story is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort are not enough to navigate the complexities of community governance. The case provides three clear takeaways for any homeowner:

1. Quality Over Quantity: A short, verified list of eligible voters is infinitely more powerful than a long list of unverified names.

2. Bylaws are Your Battlefield: The governing documents contain the rules of engagement. Ignoring them—especially clauses on voter eligibility—is a unilateral surrender.

3. Documentation is Everything: If it wasn’t formally submitted to the correct party, it legally never happened. Your ability to prove submission is as important as the submission itself.

This case is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort aren’t enough. The real question every homeowner should ask is: Do you truly know the rules that govern your rights in your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John H. Kelly (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (attorney)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Saundra Garcia (board member)
    Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
    Called as a witness and testified as Board President
  • Jacob A. Kubert (attorney)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Counsel receiving notice of decision

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to Commissioner

Other Participants

  • Jeffery Law (owner)
    Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
    Unit owner whose signature Petitioner secured but was not submitted to the Association

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL-RHG Decision – 737525.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:11 (176.7 KB)

19F-H1918037-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918037-REL/700566.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:13 (149.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG


Briefing on Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of case number 19F-H1918037-REL, a dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (“Petitioner”) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was the Association’s alleged violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 for failing to completely fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner on November 1, 2018.

An initial hearing on March 21, 2019, resulted in a decision in favor of the Association. Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark found that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board, and therefore the Association’s provision of a summary table did not constitute a statutory violation.

Following an appeal by the Petitioner, a rehearing was held on August 27, 2019. New evidence was introduced demonstrating that the Petitioner had previously been expressly instructed by the Association’s President to direct records requests specifically to the Environmental Design Committee (EDC) Chairman, Brian Schoeffler, a directive the Petitioner followed. Consequently, Judge Clark reversed the initial decision, concluding that the request was properly submitted and the Association’s failure to provide the full records—offering only a summary table—was a clear violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The final order granted the Petitioner’s petition, ordered the reimbursement of his $500 filing fee, and levied a $500 civil penalty against the Association.

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Case Overview

Parties Involved

Name/Entity

Key Individuals

Tom Barrs

Petitioner, Homeowner

Represented himself initially; later by Jonathan Dessaules, Esq.

Desert Ranch Homeowners Assoc.

Respondent, HOA

Governed by CC&Rs and a Board of Directors.

Brian Schoeffler

Witness for Respondent

Chairman of the Environmental Design Committee (EDC).

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge

Presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

Catherine Overby

Association President

Appointed Schoeffler as Petitioner’s primary records contact.

Lori Loch-Lee

VP, Associated Asset Management (AAM)

Recipient of records request; AAM acted as the Association’s accounting firm.

Core Legal Issue

The central question adjudicated was whether the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request. This statute requires that an association’s records be made “reasonably available for examination” and that a request for copies be fulfilled within ten business days.

Timeline of Key Events

July 19, 2017

Association President Catherine Overby appoints EDC Director Brian Schoeffler as Petitioner’s primary records contact.

November 1, 2018

Petitioner emails a records request to Schoeffler, Overby, and Lori Loch-Lee.

November 18, 2018

The Association provides a summary table of EDC actions, not the full records requested.

December 17, 2018

Petitioner files a formal petition against the Association with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

March 6, 2019

Petitioner follows up via email, specifying the exact communications and documents he is seeking.

March 11, 2019

Schoeffler responds, asserting the request was fulfilled and directing Petitioner to submit a new one.

March 21, 2019

The first evidentiary hearing is held at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

April 10, 2019

The initial ALJ Decision is issued, denying the petition.

June 10, 2019

Petitioner submits a successful appeal to the Department.

August 27, 2019

A rehearing is held at the OAH.

September 12, 2019

The final ALJ Decision is issued, reversing the prior decision and ruling in favor of the Petitioner.

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Initial Hearing and Decision (No. 19F-H1918037-REL)

Petitioner’s Position (Tom Barrs)

• On November 1, 2018, Barrs requested “a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018.”

• The Association’s response on November 18, 2018, was a “summary table listing of some, not all, EDC actions,” which did not include the totality of communications requested.

• Barrs argued the Association willfully failed to comply, citing a similar previous dispute that required OAH adjudication.

• The dispute was clarified to be about the completeness of the response, not its timeliness.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Ranch HOA)

• Represented by Brian Schoeffler, the HOA argued it had fully, though untimelily, complied with the request.

• The core of the defense was that the request was improperly submitted because Barrs only sent it to two of the four Board members.

• Schoeffler reasoned that the Association’s response was guided by a prior OAH decision in a similar case that had been returned in the Association’s favor.

• Schoeffler also stated that fulfilling the more detailed request from March 6, 2019, could be interpreted as an “admission of guilt,” which is why he asked for a new request.

Initial Findings and Order (April 10, 2019)

• Key Finding: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to all members of the Association’s Board.

• Legal Conclusion: “Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 for providing him with a summary table on November 18, 2018.”

• Order: The Petitioner’s petition was denied. His request for a civil penalty and reimbursement of his filing fee was also denied.

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Rehearing and Final Decision (No. 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG)

Basis for Rehearing

The Petitioner successfully appealed the initial decision, leading the Department of Real Estate to refer the matter back to the OAH for a new evidentiary hearing on the same issue.

New Evidence and Revised Testimony

• Petitioner’s New Evidence: Crucially, the Petitioner introduced evidence (Petitioner Exhibit 11) showing that on July 19, 2017, Association President Catherine Overby had appointed Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s primary records request contact.

• Respondent’s Concession: The Association conceded that its governing documents do not require all Board members to be copied on records requests. It also conceded that its own bylaws regarding the submission of forms for records requests were not adhered to or enforced.

• Persistent Failure to Comply: It was established that as of the date of the rehearing (August 27, 2019), the Petitioner had still not received all of the documentation requested on November 1, 2018.

Final Findings and Order (September 12, 2019)

• Revised Key Finding: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s request was not required to be sent to all Board members. Instead, the Petitioner had “expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

• Final Legal Conclusion: “Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

• Final Order:

1. The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

3. A civil penalty of $500.00 was levied against the Respondent, payable to the Department of Real Estate.

Key Judicial Quotes

On the Improper Submission Argument (First Decision): “Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805…”

On the Proper Submission Argument (Final Decision): “Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

On the Violation (Final Decision): “Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”






Study Guide – 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal case Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, Docket No. 19F-H1918037-REL. It covers the initial hearing, the subsequent rehearing, the key arguments, the relevant statutes, and the final outcome of the dispute. The case centers on a homeowner’s records request and the association’s legal obligations under Arizona state law.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing all information from the provided case documents.

1. Who are the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What was the central legal issue presented for adjudication at the Office of Administrative Hearings?

3. What specific records did the Petitioner, Tom Barrs, request from the Association on November 1, 2018?

4. What was the Association’s initial response to the Petitioner’s records request, and when was it provided?

5. What was the outcome of the first hearing on March 21, 2019, as detailed in the decision issued on April 10, 2019?

6. Why did the Administrative Law Judge initially rule in favor of the Respondent?

7. What new evidence presented at the rehearing on August 27, 2019, proved critical to reversing the initial decision?

8. According to Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, what is the time frame for an association to fulfill a request for examination or copies of records?

9. What was the final outcome of the case after the rehearing, as ordered on September 12, 2019?

10. What specific penalties and reimbursements were levied against the Respondent in the final order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Tom Barrs, a property owner in the Desert Ranch subdivision and a member of its homeowners’ association. The Respondent is the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (“the Association”), the governing body for the subdivision.

2. The central issue was whether the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to properly and completely fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner.

3. The Petitioner requested a copy of all Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. He later clarified this included communications like letters, emails, and application forms related to specific EDC decisions.

4. On November 18, 2018, the Association provided the Petitioner with a summary table listing some EDC actions. This response did not include the full scope of communications and underlying documents that the Petitioner had requested.

5. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The judge ruled that the Association’s conduct did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1805, denied the request for a civil penalty, and ordered that the Association did not have to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

6. The judge initially ruled for the Respondent because the evidence suggested the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board. This procedural error was seen as the reason the Association’s response (the summary table) was not a violation of the statute.

7. At the rehearing, evidence was introduced showing that on July 19, 2017, the Association’s President had explicitly appointed Brian Schoeffler, the EDC Chairman, as the Petitioner’s primary records request contact. This demonstrated that the Petitioner was not required to send his request to all Board members and had followed prior instructions correctly.

8. A.R.S. § 33-1805 states that an association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination of records. It also specifies that the association has ten business days to provide copies of requested records upon request.

9. After the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Association’s conduct did violate A.R.S. § 33-1805 by providing only a summary table instead of the full records requested.

10. In the final order, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee. Additionally, a civil penalty of $500.00 was levied against the Respondent, payable to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed response for each, synthesizing facts and arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Compare and contrast the findings of fact and conclusions of law from the first hearing (April 10, 2019 decision) with those from the rehearing (September 12, 2019 decision). What specific evidence or legal reasoning led to the reversal of the initial order?

2. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner, Tom Barrs, and the Respondent’s representative, Brian Schoeffler. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s position across both hearings.

3. Explain the role and significance of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805 in this case. How did the interpretation of the Association’s obligations under this statute differ between the initial ruling and the final ruling?

4. Trace the timeline of events from the initial records request on November 1, 2018, to the final order on September 12, 2019. Highlight the key communications and procedural steps that influenced the case’s progression and ultimate outcome.

5. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined in the case documents. How did the Petitioner successfully meet this burden of proof in the rehearing after failing to do so in the initial hearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues orders. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The section of the Arizona Revised Statutes that governs the rights of homeowners’ association members to access association records. It mandates that records be made “reasonably available for examination” and establishes a ten-business-day deadline for associations to fulfill such requests.

Associated Asset Management (AAM)

The management company that served as the Association’s accounting firm. Petitioner was at one point instructed to direct requests to an AAM representative.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The group that oversees the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association. The dispute involved questions about whether a records request needed to be sent to all members of the Board.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents for the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association.

Environmental Design Committee (EDC)

A committee within the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, chaired by Brian Schoeffler. The records requested by the Petitioner pertained to the actions and decisions of this committee.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for disputes referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Tom Barrs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof in this case. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG


He Fought His HOA Over Public Records and Lost. Then One Old Email Changed Everything.

1.0 Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of Fighting the System

Almost everyone has a story about the maddening frustration of dealing with a bureaucratic organization. The rules can seem arbitrary, the answers vague, and the entire process engineered to make you give up. For homeowners, that organization is often their Homeowners Association (HOA). This was precisely the situation for Tom Barrs, a homeowner in Scottsdale, Arizona, when he made what seemed like a simple request for records from his HOA, the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association. His straightforward request ignited a surprising legal battle, where an initial, demoralizing defeat in court was ultimately overturned by a single, crucial piece of evidence exhumed from the past.

2.0 Takeaway 1: The First Verdict Isn’t Always the Final Word

The dispute began with a formal records request. In November 2018, Tom Barrs asked to see documents related to the HOA’s Environmental Design Committee (EDC). His request was clear, specific, and cited the relevant state law:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

The HOA refused to provide the records, and the case went before Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark on March 21, 2019. The judge denied Mr. Barrs’s petition. The ruling was based on what seemed to be a fatal procedural error: the judge concluded that Mr. Barrs had failed to properly submit his request because he did not email it to all members of the Association’s Board.

Adding a potent dose of irony, the HOA’s representative at the hearing—Brian Schoeffler, the very EDC Chairman to whom Barrs had sent the request—successfully argued that a prior case meant Barrs “knew or should have known the requirements.” For many people, this initial loss, buttressed by the HOA weaponizing their past behavior against them, would have been the end of the road. But for Mr. Barrs, it was only the first chapter.

3.0 Takeaway 2: The Paper Trail is Your Most Powerful Weapon

Unwilling to accept the verdict, Mr. Barrs appealed and was granted a rehearing. The case was heard again before the very same judge, Jenna Clark. This time, however, Mr. Barrs had a new piece of evidence—a single, forgotten email that would force the judge to re-evaluate her own initial conclusion.

The case hinged on a communication from sixteen months prior. In July 2017, the Association’s President, Catherine Overby, had sent an email specifically appointing EDC Chairman Brian Schoeffler as Mr. Barrs’s “primary records request contact.”

This single document completely dismantled the HOA’s central argument. It proved that a specific, documented protocol existed that superseded any unwritten procedure the HOA later tried to enforce. Based on this prior instruction, Judge Clark’s new conclusion was decisive: Mr. Barrs was not required to send his request to the entire board. He had, in fact, followed the HOA’s own explicit directive perfectly. The HOA’s argument, built on chastising Mr. Barrs for not knowing the rules, crumbled under the weight of a rule they themselves had established and forgotten.

4.0 Takeaway 3: A “Summary” Isn’t the Same as “The Records”

Another key issue was the HOA’s attempt to control the information it released. Instead of providing the actual letters, emails, and applications Mr. Barrs had asked for, the HOA sent him a “summary table” of the EDC’s actions.

This defense initially worked. In the first ruling, Judge Clark concluded that because the request itself was improperly submitted, the summary table was not a violation of the statute. The HOA’s failure to provide the actual records was excused on a technicality.

But once the old email proved the request was valid, that technicality vanished and the summary table argument collapsed. In her final ruling, Judge Clark determined that providing a summary was a clear violation of Arizona law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805). The statute is unambiguous: records must be made “reasonably available for examination,” and copies must be provided upon request. The HOA’s attempt to substitute its interpretation of the records for the records themselves was not just unhelpful—it was illegal.

5.0 Takeaway 4: Resistance Can Be More Costly Than Compliance

The final, reversed decision was issued on September 12, 2019. Mr. Barrs’s petition was granted, and the HOA faced direct financial consequences for its stonewalling. The Desert Ranch HOA was ordered to:

• Reimburse Mr. Barrs’s $500.00 filing fee.

• Pay a separate $500.00 civil penalty to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

For the price of a few photocopies, the HOA chose instead to pay for a protracted legal battle, a public loss, and $1,000 in fees and penalties—a steep cost for refusing transparency. The outcome is a stark reminder that an organization’s attempt to obstruct access to information can be far more damaging to its finances and reputation than simple compliance.

6.0 Conclusion: The Power of a Single Fact

The story of Tom Barrs’s dispute offers powerful, practical lessons for anyone facing a similar challenge. It highlights the importance of persistence, the legal weight of true transparency, and, above all, the critical power of documentation. One old email—one documented fact—was enough to level the playing field, force a judge to reverse her own decision, and ensure the rules were applied fairly. It leaves us with a compelling question to consider.

How might meticulous record-keeping change the outcome of a dispute in your own life?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner/witness)
    Appeared on his own behalf initially; appeared as witness at rehearing
  • Jonathan Dessaules (attorney)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Appeared on behalf of Petitioner at rehearing

Respondent Side

  • Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (respondent)
  • Brian Schoeffler (EDC chairman/witness)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent; Chairman of the Association’s EDC
  • Catherine Overby (HOA president)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
    Association President; records request recipient
  • Lori Loch-Lee (VP Client Services)
    Associated Asset Management (AAM)
    Management company contact; records request recipient
  • Amanda Shaw (property manager rep)
    AAM LLC
    Contact for Respondent c/o AAM LLC
  • B. Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • Dan Gardner (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Other Participants

  • G. Mangiero (observer)
    Observed initial hearing
  • Peter Ashkin (observer)
  • Stephen Banks (observer)
  • Noah Banks (observer)
  • Gerard Manieri (observer)
    Observed rehearing
  • Stephen Barrs (observer)
    Observed rehearing
  • Abraham Barrs (observer)
    Observed rehearing

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:49 (89.7 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of decision transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal

Other Participants

  • JS (Clerk)
    Transmittal initials

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

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Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

• Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

• Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

• History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

• Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

• Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

• Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

• Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

• Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

• Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

• Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

• Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

• Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

• Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

• CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

• Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

• Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

• Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

• Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

• Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

• August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

• January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

• April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

• May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

• The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

• The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

• The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

• CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

• Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

• Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

• Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

• Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

• Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:45 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:49 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

——————————————————————————–

Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

——————————————————————————–

Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

• Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

• Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

• History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

• Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

• Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

• Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

• Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

• Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

• Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

• Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

• Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

• Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Analysis and Conclusions

• Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

• CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

• Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

• Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

• Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

• Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

• Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

• August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

• January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

• April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

• May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

• The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

• The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

• The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

• CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

• Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

• Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

• Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

• Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

• Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL-RHG Decision – 733509.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-09T17:24:55 (38.6 KB)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09