ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803; Bylaws Article IV, Section 6
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the HOA's action to uniformly assess all CR-1 Lots (including Petitioner's two uncombined lots) adhered to the Association Bylaws, which require uniform rates, and did not violate ARS § 33-1803. The governing documents took precedence over any prior reduced assessment granted by a previous Board Order.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association’s interpretation of the Bylaws requiring uniform assessment for all CR-1 lots was incorrect or unlawful, as her lots remained separate parcels according to the county map.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements.
Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% (full rate for two lots) based on the Association's interpretation that the Bylaws require uniform assessment rates for all CR-1 lots, arguing the new rate violated a long-standing prior Board Order (2003) granting her a reduced rate.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Bylaws Article IV, Covenant For Maintenance Assessments, Section 6
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918017-REL Decision – 698354.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:53 (137.2 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918017-REL
Briefing Document: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918017-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Loraine Brokaw versus the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (POA). The central conflict concerned the POA Board’s decision to increase Ms. Brokaw’s annual assessment from 150% to 200% for a single residence constructed across two separate lots.
The Petitioner, Ms. Brokaw, argued that this increase was unlawful and capricious, violating a nearly thirty-year practice that had been formalized by a 2003 Board decision granting her a reduced assessment. The POA contended that its action, taken on the advice of counsel, was necessary to comply with the Association’s governing documents, which mandate uniform assessments for all lots.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the homeowner’s petition. The decision established a critical legal precedent for the Association: the unambiguous language of the governing Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) takes precedence over any past Board decisions, informal agreements, or long-standing practices, regardless of their duration. Because the Petitioner owns two distinct, legally unconsolidated lots, the ALJ found that the Board’s action to assess each lot at the full, uniform rate was not a violation, but rather a correct and required application of the community’s Bylaws.
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I. Case Overview
• Parties: Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) vs. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent).
• Jurisdiction: Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), State of Arizona.
• Case Number: 19F-H1918017-REL.
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark.
• Hearing Date: March 25, 2019.
• Decision Date: April 01, 2019.
II. Central Issue of the Dispute
The hearing was convened to address the following issue, as stated in the NOTICE OF HEARING:
“Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements based on utterly flawed legal theory, which, in fact, changed from attorney to attorney.”
The core of the dispute was the Association Board’s decision in 2017 to increase the annual assessment for the Petitioner’s property—a single home built across two adjacent lots—from 150% to 200% of the standard single-lot assessment rate. The Petitioner sought to compel the Board to revert to the 150% assessment schedule and reimburse her for costs associated with the petition.
III. Petitioner’s Position and Key Testimony
• Property History: The Petitioner testified that her husband first bought property in Sin Vacas in 1979. In 2003, the couple purchased an adjacent lot and constructed a new home that spanned across both properties (Lots 156 and 157).
• Claim of Lot Combination: The Petitioner claimed to have legally combined the two lots but presented no supporting documentation to the tribunal.
• Historical Assessment Practice: The Petitioner testified that as of 2003, the Association’s practice was to assess properties as follows:
◦ 100%: For a home on a single lot.
◦ 25%: For an undeveloped vacant lot.
◦ 150%: For a residence situated on two lots.
• 2003 Board Decision: On March 24, 2003, the Petitioner received written confirmation from the Board that it had voted to grant her a reduced assessment of 150%, formalizing the existing practice for her property.
• 2017 Assessment Change: On or about December 4, 2017, the Petitioner received a letter from the Association’s management company advising that the Board had decided to raise her assessment to 200%, citing “advice of counsel.”
• Rationale for Increase: The Petitioner stated she was given varying reasons for the change but was ultimately informed that the Board determined all plats needed to be assessed uniformly according to the Association’s governing documents. She was also told that to be assessed as a single lot, she would need to formally combine the lots on the county plat map, a process estimated to cost between $3,000 and $10,000 and require the permission of every other homeowner in the community.
IV. Respondent’s Position
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association declined to present witnesses or exhibits. Its position at the hearing was that the dispute arose from differing interpretations of the language within the governing Bylaws. The Association’s counsel stated that the matter would be resolved based on the tribunal’s interpretation of the relevant governing texts.
V. Analysis of Governing Documents
The decision rested heavily on the interpretation of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), recorded on April 13, 1978.
Document Section
Key Provision
Relevance to the Case
Bylaws Article I, Section 5
Defines a “Lot” as “any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map of the Sin Vacas Properties.”
This established that the Petitioner’s two properties, being separately numbered on the subdivision map, constitute two distinct lots for assessment purposes.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 6
“Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”
This clause was central to the Judge’s decision. It establishes a clear mandate for uniformity in assessments across all lots of the same type (CR-1), which the 150% rate violated by treating two CR-1 lots differently from others.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 7
States the Board of Directors shall “fix the amount of the annual assessment against each Lot.”
This empowers the Board to set assessments but reinforces that they must do so on a per-lot basis, consistent with the uniformity requirement.
VI. Judge’s Findings and Conclusions of Law
The Administrative Law Judge made the following key determinations, leading to the denial of the petition:
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated community documents or Arizona statutes.
• Undisputed Material Facts: The Judge found it undisputed that:
1. The Petitioner owns two distinct CR-1 lots (Lot 156 and Lot 157).
2. The lots have never been legally combined or consolidated on the Pima County Assessor’s plat map.
3. The Petitioner’s residence is constructed across both lots.
• Primacy of Governing Documents: The central conclusion of the decision was that the Association’s governing documents supersede any past Board decisions or long-standing informal agreements. The Judge stated:
• Uniformity is Mandatory: The Bylaws require that the Association assess all developed CR-1 lots at a uniform rate. By assessing both of the Petitioner’s lots at the same full rate as every other developed CR-1 lot, the Association was found to be complying with the Declaration.
• Board’s Action as Corrective: The 2017 Board’s action was not a breach of contract or an unlawful act. Instead, it was an appropriate correction of the previous Board’s 2003 order, which was inconsistent with the Bylaws’ uniformity mandate. The Petitioner’s argument that the 2003 order should supersede the 2017 order was deemed inaccurate.
VII. Final Order
Based on the findings and legal conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
The decision affirmed that the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association Board’s action to uniformly assess all CR-1 lots did not violate Arizona state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803) or the Association’s Bylaws.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918017-REL
Study Guide: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
This guide reviews the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling in the administrative hearing case No. 19F-H1918017-REL, Loraine Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in the hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific relief did the Petitioner request from the Office of Administrative Hearings?
3. What specific action taken by the Respondent prompted the Petitioner to file her petition?
4. Describe the assessment practice that the Sin Vacas Board had in place for the Petitioner’s property from 2003 until the change in 2017.
5. What was the Association’s stated reason for increasing the Petitioner’s assessment from 150% to 200%?
6. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what is the rule for how special assessments must be fixed and apportioned?
7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge determine that the Petitioner owned two separate lots?
8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and did the Petitioner successfully meet it?
9. Why did the Judge rule that the 2003 Board Order reducing the Petitioner’s assessment was not a binding contract?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Loraine Brokaw, the Petitioner, who brought the action, and the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
2. The Petitioner requested that the Association’s Board be compelled to honor the 30-year assessment schedule and charge her the 150% assessment rate. She also requested that the Board reimburse her for the costs of bringing the petition.
3. The Petitioner filed her petition after receiving a letter on or about December 4, 2017, from the Association’s management company. This letter advised her that the Board had decided to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% based on “advice of counsel.”
4. Beginning in 2003, the Association assessed a home on a single lot at 100%, an undeveloped vacant lot at 25%, and a residence spanning two lots, like the Petitioner’s, at 150%. The Petitioner received written confirmation of her reduced 150% assessment from the Board on March 24, 2003.
5. The Association’s Board increased the assessment after determining that all plats needed to be assessed uniformly, per the Association’s Restatement. The increase was meant to bring her two lots into compliance with the governing documents.
6. Bylaws Article IV, Section 6 states that “Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”
7. The Judge’s conclusion was based on the undisputed fact that the Petitioner’s two properties, Lots 156 and 157, have never been officially combined or consolidated into a single numbered lot on the Pima County Assessor’s Office plat map.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means proving a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof.
9. The Judge ruled that the 2003 Board Order was not a binding contract because the Petitioner provided no proof of consideration tendered to the Association. Therefore, the Association’s governing documents took precedence over the informal agreement.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge concluded that the Board’s action to uniformly assess all CR-1 lots did not violate state statutes or the Association’s Bylaws.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Discuss the hierarchy of authority between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs) and a Board Order, as interpreted in this case.
2. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” in the context of this hearing. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard lead to the denial of her petition?
3. The Petitioner’s case relied heavily on past practice and a 2003 Board decision to grant her a reduced assessment. Discuss why this argument was ultimately insufficient to overcome the explicit language of the Association’s governing documents.
4. Examine the contractual nature of a homeowners’ association’s CC&Rs as described in the Findings of Fact. How does this contractual relationship between the Association and each property owner shape the obligations and rights of both parties?
5. The Respondent (Sin Vacas POA) declined to present witnesses or exhibits, taking a passive stance at the hearing. Discuss the potential legal strategy behind this approach and how the undisputed material facts of the case made this a viable option.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders.
Association
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, a homeowners’ association for the Sin Vacas subdivision in Tucson, Arizona, responsible for managing, maintaining, and improving the property.
Assessment
A fee levied by the Association on property owners to promote the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of residents and for the improvement and maintenance of common areas and private streets.
Bylaws
The specific articles and sections within the CC&Rs that govern the Association’s operations, including definitions, assessment rules, and voting procedures.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing documents for the Association, recorded with Pima County on April 13, 1978. They form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, which is authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
Any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map of the Sin Vacas Properties, with the exception of the Common Area. This case deals specifically with CR-1 lots.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency to which the Department refers matters for evidentiary hearings. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret contracts between parties.
Petitioner
Loraine Brokaw, a property owner in the Sin Vacas subdivision and member of the Association who filed the petition against the Association.
Planned Community
A real estate development where owners of separately owned lots are mandatory members of a nonprofit association and are required to pay assessments for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win her case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents the greater weight of evidence.
Respondent
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, the entity against whom the petition was filed.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918017-REL
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19F-H1918017-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) and the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner challenged the Association’s decision to raise her annual assessment, arguing that the increase was arbitrary and contravened a decades-long practice of assessing her two lots at a combined 150% rate, rather than the new 200% rate. The decision outlines the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, confirming that the Association is governed by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Bylaws, which require uniform assessment rates for all developed lots. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated any community documents or statutes, reasoning that the governing documents take precedence over any prior informal agreement, and denied the Petitioner’s request.
What was the core legal basis for rejecting the petitioner’s assessment challenge?
How did the Association’s governing documents dictate uniform assessment requirements?
What legal implications arose from the Board’s decision to change long-standing practice?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Loraine Brokaw(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Jason Smith(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Counsel for Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
Sean Moynihan(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Counsel for Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Rogelio A. Garcia
Counsel
—
Respondent
Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
Counsel
Nathan Tennyson
Alleged Violations
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”). The core of the dispute was Mr. Garcia’s allegation that Villagio violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 in its handling of violation notices related to an alleged breach of short-term rental policies.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that he failed to meet the burden of proof. The decisions consistently hinged on a critical point: Mr. Garcia did not respond to Villagio’s violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period prescribed by the statute. This failure meant that the HOA’s subsequent obligations under the statute—specifically, to provide the name of the violation’s observer and to give notice of the right to a state administrative hearing—were never triggered. Villagio successfully argued that by including its own internal appeal process in the violation notices, it had fulfilled its legal requirements under the circumstances. The final ruling deemed Villagio the prevailing party, with the decision after rehearing being binding on both parties.
Background of the Dispute
The case, No. 19F-H1918009-REL, was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, following a petition filed by Mr. Garcia with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Timeline of Notices and Fines
Villagio issued a series of notices to Mr. Garcia alleging that his unit was being rented in violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) regarding short-term leases.
Date of Notice
Allegation / Action Taken
Instructions Provided to Homeowner
March 8, 2018
Alleged violation of short-term lease provisions.
“If you wish to contest this notice… file an appeal with the Board of Directors… Requests for an appeal must be received within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”
March 22, 2018
A fine of $1,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.
Same instructions to appeal within 10 days. The notice also included the phrase, “Please bring this issue into compliance within 10 days of this notice.”
April 5, 2018
A fine of $2,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.
Same instructions to appeal within 10 days.
Procedural History
1. Violation Notices: Villagio sent the three notices in March and April 2018.
2. Homeowner Inaction (Statutory): Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the notices by sending a certified letter within the 21-day period allowed by A.R.S. § 33-1242(B).
3. Homeowner Action (Internal): Mr. Garcia did eventually file an appeal with Villagio regarding the violation and fines, but the HOA did not change its position.
4. Petition Filed: On or about August 17, 2018, Mr. Garcia filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Villagio violated state statutes.
5. Initial Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on October 30, 2018.
6. First Decision: On November 19, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.
7. Rehearing Granted: Mr. Garcia requested a rehearing, which was granted and scheduled.
8. Rehearing: The rehearing was held on February 12, 2019, with testimony from Mr. Garcia and Tom Gordon, Villagio’s Community Manager.
9. Final Decision: On March 4, 2019, the ALJ issued a final decision again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition. This order was declared binding and appealable only to the superior court.
Core Legal Arguments and Statutory Interpretation
The case centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs the process for notifying and responding to violations of condominium documents.
Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1242
• Section (B): A unit owner receiving a violation notice may provide the association with a written response via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice date.
• Section (C):If the owner sends a response as described in Section (B), the association must then respond within 10 business days with specific information, including the name of the person who observed the violation and the process to contest the notice.
• Section (D): An association must give a unit owner written notice of their option to petition for a state administrative hearing unless the information regarding the contest process (required in Section C, paragraph 4) is already provided in the initial violation notice.
Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)
Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 on several grounds:
• The violation letters did not allow him to respond by certified mail within 21 days.
• The notices failed to include the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.
• The notices failed to inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.
• During the rehearing, he contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from using the 21-day statutory response period. He claimed the rapid succession of notices (14 days apart) and the language demanding compliance “within 10 days” led him to believe he “would only be 10 days before he would acquire another violation.”
Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)
Villagio disputed all of Mr. Garcia’s allegations, arguing that its actions were fully compliant with the statute:
• The obligation to provide the observer’s name under Section (C) is only triggered after the homeowner first submits a timely certified mail response, which Mr. Garcia failed to do.
• The obligation to provide notice of the right to a state administrative hearing under Section (D) was not applicable because Villagio did provide its internal process for contesting the notice in every letter sent.
• They did not prevent Mr. Garcia from responding. At the rehearing, Mr. Garcia admitted under cross-examination that he was not prohibited by any court order from sending a response.
• Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified that while the HOA’s policy gives homeowners 10 days to contest internally, the association does not restrict them from also using the 21-day statutory response period.
• As a further defense in the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 was not applicable at all, asserting the statute addresses violations concerning the “condition of the property,” whereas Mr. Garcia’s violation concerned the “use of his property.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ruling decisively in favor of the Respondent, Villagio.
Burden of Proof
In both decisions, the Judge established that Mr. Garcia, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof to show that a violation occurred. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the “most convincing force.”
Key Conclusions of Law
1. Homeowner’s Failure to Respond Was Decisive: The Judge found it was “undisputed” that Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-day period via certified mail. This failure was the central reason his petition was dismissed.
2. HOA Obligations Were Not Triggered: Because Mr. Garcia did not initiate the process described in A.R.S. § 33-1242(B), Villagio’s corresponding obligation under Section (C) to provide the observer’s name was never activated.
3. Internal Appeal Process Satisfied Statutory Requirement: The Judge concluded that because Villagio included instructions on how to contest the notice (i.e., appeal to the Board of Directors) in its letters, it was not required under Section (D) to provide separate notice of the right to a state administrative hearing.
4. No Evidence of Prevention: The Judge found that Mr. Garcia “provided no evidence to establish that Villagio prevented him from responding.” The issuance of subsequent notices and fines before the 21-day period had lapsed was not found to constitute a legal barrier that prevented Mr. Garcia from exercising his statutory right to respond.
5. Final Order: Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. His petition was ordered to be dismissed, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party. The order issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties and can only be appealed by seeking judicial review in the superior court within 35 days of service.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source documents.
1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia?
2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C?
3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?
4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?
5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices?
6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property?
7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent?
8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department?
9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019?
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Answer Key
1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia? The initial violation alleged by Villagio was that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of the short-term lease provisions located in Villagio’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The first notice of this violation was mailed to Mr. Garcia on March 8, 2018.
2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C? To trigger the association’s obligations, a unit owner who receives a written notice of violation must provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.
3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required? The petitioner, Mr. Garcia, bears the burden of proof to show that the respondent committed the alleged violation. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with the most convincing force that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.
4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation? The judge ruled that Villagio was not required to provide the observer’s name because that obligation is only triggered after a unit owner responds to the violation notice in writing by certified mail within 21 days. It is undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the notices within the 21-day period, so Villagio’s obligation was never activated.
5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices? Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio prevented him from responding by certified mail within 21 days because it failed to wait 21 days before issuing additional notices and imposing fines. He stated that the notices’ language requiring compliance within 10 days made him believe he would acquire another violation before the 21-day statutory response period had passed.
6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property? Villagio contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 does not apply to this case at all because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition” of the property. Villagio argued that it notified Mr. Garcia that the “use” of his property violated its short-term rental policy, not that a physical condition of the property was in violation.
7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent? A fine of $1,000 was posted to Mr. Garcia’s account, with the notice being sent on March 22, 2018. Subsequently, a $2,000 fine was posted to his account for the same violation, and that notice was sent on April 5, 2018.
8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department? The Judge concluded that Villagio was not obligated to provide this information because A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) only requires it if the association fails to provide the unit owner with the process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s notices all contained instructions on how to contest the violation, specifically by filing an appeal with the Board of Directors via a provided website.
9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice? Tom Gordon testified that homeowners are provided with 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio, pursuant to Villagio’s short-term rental policy. When asked if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” (A.R.S. § 33-1242) if Mr. Garcia had responded in twenty-one days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.”
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019? In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party.
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Essay Questions
Develop detailed essay-format answers to the following prompts, drawing evidence and examples exclusively from the provided source documents.
1. Analyze the central arguments presented by both Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association regarding the application of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statute in relation to these arguments in the final decision?
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
3. Trace the timeline of events from the first notice sent by Villagio on March 8, 2018, to the final order on March 4, 2019. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s actions, or lack thereof, at key moments influenced the legal obligations of the association and the ultimate outcome of the case.
4. Evaluate Villagio’s argument that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge’s decision did not ultimately hinge on this point, discuss the potential implications of this distinction in homeowner association disputes.
5. Explain the two distinct procedural paths available to a unit owner after receiving a violation notice as outlined in this case: the association’s internal appeal process and the statutory process under A.R.S. § 33-1242. Why did the path Mr. Garcia chose fail to trigger the statutory protections he sought?
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Glossary
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the administrative hearing and rehearing, evaluates evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)
The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona that regulate condominiums and planned communities.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency that has authority over homeowner association disputes and with which homeowners may petition for a hearing.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The governing documents of the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, which contain the short-term lease provisions Mr. Garcia was alleged to have violated.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The venue where the evidentiary hearing and rehearing for this matter were held.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Rehearing
A second hearing on a matter, granted in this case at Mr. Garcia’s request after the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
He Fought His HOA and Followed Their Rules. Here’s Why He Still Lost.
1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded Letter
For many homeowners, it’s a familiar and unwelcome sight: a crisp envelope from the Homeowners Association (HOA) containing a formal, intimidating violation notice. Your first instinct is to act, to follow the instructions, and to fight back against what feels like an unfair accusation. You read the letter, see a process for an appeal, and dutifully follow it, believing you are protecting your rights. But what if the process outlined in the letter isn’t the one that truly matters under the law?
This isn’t a theoretical warning. It’s the hard lesson learned by a real homeowner in Arizona, Rogelio A. Garcia, who took on his HOA, Villagio at Tempe. He believed the association had violated his rights, and unlike many homeowners, he didn’t ignore the notices—he took action. He filed an appeal with the HOA, just as their letter instructed. Yet, he lost his case, not because he was wrong on the facts, but because he fell into a subtle procedural trap, following the HOA’s internal process while missing a separate, more powerful one defined by state law.
This article breaks down the top three legal takeaways from that court decision. It reveals how taking the wrong action can be just as costly as taking no action at all, offering crucial strategic insights for any homeowner facing a dispute with their association.
2.0 Takeaway 1: Your Rights Often Have an ‘On’ Switch You Must Flip First
Mr. Garcia’s primary complaint was that the HOA failed to provide him with the name of the person who reported his alleged violation—a requirement under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1242. On the surface, this seems like a clear-cut right afforded to homeowners.
However, the court revealed a counter-intuitive legal reality. The HOA’s legal obligation to provide the reporter’s name was not automatic. That right only became active—the obligation was only triggered—if the homeowner first took a specific, formal step: sending a written response to the violation notice via certified mail within 21 calendar days. The record was clear that Mr. Garcia did not send such a response to the March 8, March 22, or April 5 notices. This single procedural failure was fatal to his claim.
The judge’s finding on this point was direct and unambiguous:
“Because Mr. Garcia did not respond in the 21 day period, Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the first and last name of the person or persons who observed the violation.”
This illustrates a critical principle: your most important legal rights may exist in state law, but they often lie dormant. To activate them, you must flip the “on” switch by taking the precise action required by statute, which may be entirely different from the process described in the HOA’s notice.
3.0 Takeaway 2: An Internal Process Can Legally Replace—and Distract From—a State-Level One
So why would an engaged homeowner like Mr. Garcia, who went so far as to file an appeal, neglect to send the critical 21-day certified letter? The answer lies in the second key takeaway: the HOA’s violation notice offered its own, separate appeal process with a much shorter deadline, creating a critical and costly distraction.
Mr. Garcia’s second major argument was that Villagio violated the law by not informing him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department. Again, the law contained a crucial nuance. Under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), an HOA is only required to notify a homeowner of the state hearing option if it fails to provide its own process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s letters did include a process: the homeowner could “file an appeal with the Board of Directors… within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”
Court records show Mr. Garcia followed this path and “filed an appeal with Villagio.” By doing so, he engaged with the HOA on their terms, likely focusing all his energy on meeting that urgent 10-day deadline. Because Villagio provided this internal process, the judge concluded it had met its legal obligation and was not required to inform Mr. Garcia about the alternative state-level hearing. This created a procedural trap: the HOA satisfied its legal requirement by offering an internal process that simultaneously diverted the homeowner’s attention from the more powerful, but less obvious, 21-day statutory deadline that would have unlocked his other rights.
4.0 Takeaway 3: Conflicting Deadlines Can Create a Legal Minefield
During a rehearing, Mr. Garcia argued that the HOA’s communication style effectively “prevented” him from using his full 21-day statutory response window. The notices demanded compliance within 10 days and were sent every 14 days with escalating fines. He felt the rapid succession of notices created a pressure cooker, making it impossible to properly exercise his rights.
The court flatly rejected this argument, highlighting a harsh legal truth. The judge found no evidence that Villagio had explicitly told Mr. Garcia he could not respond or had physically prevented him from sending a certified letter. The issuance of a second notice with a demanding 10-day timeline did not legally nullify the 21-day window he had to respond to the first. When asked directly if he was prohibited by a court order from sending a response, Mr. Garcia answered, “No.”
This reveals a common tactic, whether intentional or not, in HOA disputes. The violation notices contained two conflicting timelines: a prominent, urgent “10 days to comply” demand and the less obvious, but legally superior, 21-day statutory right to respond. This conflict creates confusion and pressure, causing homeowners to focus on the immediate threat (the 10-day deadline) while missing the most important legal one. The court, however, places the burden squarely on the homeowner to navigate this minefield, as feeling pressured is not a legal defense for failing to meet a statutory deadline.
5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Play the Game
The case of Mr. Garcia versus the Villagio at Tempe HOA is a powerful reminder that successfully challenging an HOA is not about being “right,” or even about taking action. It is about taking the correct, procedurally perfect action defined by law.
Mr. Garcia was not passive; he engaged and appealed the violation. His case was lost because he followed the path laid out for him by the HOA, not the one laid out for him by state statute. This crucial distinction—between an association’s internal process and the homeowner’s statutory rights—can mean the difference between victory and defeat. Before you act on any violation notice, you must first understand the precise rules of engagement, which may not be written in the notice itself.
If you received a violation notice today, would you know whether the appeal process in the letter is your only option, or a potential distraction from the legal first step required to truly protect your rights?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Rogelio A. Garcia(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of himself
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(HOA attorney) Brown Olcott, PLLC
Tom Gordon(community manager) Villagio / AAMAZ Testified as witness for Villagio
Amanda Shaw(property manager/agent) AAM LLC Listed as agent for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).
Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:23 (85.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL
Briefing Document: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the case is Mr. Garcia’s allegation that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 by failing to follow specific procedures after issuing notices for a violation of its short-term rental policy.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The central finding was that Mr. Garcia failed to meet a critical prerequisite outlined in the statute: he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period. This failure meant that the HOA’s corresponding statutory obligations—such as providing the name of the person who observed the violation—were never triggered.
Furthermore, the judge determined that the HOA was not required to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to an administrative hearing because the violation notices themselves included instructions on the HOA’s internal process for contesting the matter. Mr. Garcia’s argument that the HOA’s rapid issuance of fines and subsequent notices prevented him from responding was found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The decisions underscore a strict interpretation of the statute, placing the initial burden of response on the unit owner.
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I. Case Overview
This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings after a petition was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involved an initial hearing and a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
Rogelio A. Garcia
Respondent
Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”)
Respondent’s Counsel
Nathan Tennyson, Esq.
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Case Number (Initial)
19F-H1918009-REL
Case Number (Rehearing)
19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Core Allegation
Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 by the Respondent.
II. Chronology of Events
• March 8, 2018: Villagio mails the first letter to Mr. Garcia, alleging a violation of short-term lease provisions in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The letter instructs him to file an appeal with the Board of Directors within 10 days of receipt.
• March 22, 2018: Villagio mails a second notice for the same violation, informing Mr. Garcia that a $1,000 fine has been posted to his account. This notice also contains instructions for contesting the violation.
• April 5, 2018: Villagio mails a third notice, informing Mr. Garcia that a $2,000 fine has been posted to his account for the continuing violation.
• Response from Garcia: Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-calendar-day period specified by statute. He did, at some point, file an appeal directly with Villagio, which held a hearing but did not change its position.
• August 17, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Garcia files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally initiating the administrative hearing process.
• October 30, 2018: The first evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.
• November 19, 2018: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.
• January 3, 2019 (approx.): The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an order setting a rehearing for the matter, following a request from Mr. Garcia.
• February 12, 2019: The rehearing is held. Mr. Garcia testifies on his own behalf, and Villagio presents testimony from Community Manager Tom Gordon.
• March 4, 2019: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.
III. Central Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242
The entire dispute centered on the procedural requirements laid out in A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs how an HOA must handle notices of violation to a unit owner. The key provisions are:
• Unit Owner’s Responsibility (Subsection B): A unit owner who receives a written notice of violation may provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.
• Association’s Obligations upon Response (Subsection C):Within ten business days after receiving the certified mail response, the association must provide a written explanation that includes:
1. The specific provision of the condominium documents allegedly violated.
2. The date the violation occurred or was observed.
3. The first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.
4. The process the unit owner must follow to contest the notice.
• Association’s Obligation Regarding Administrative Hearings (Subsection D): An association must provide written notice of the owner’s option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department unless the information required in Subsection C, paragraph 4 (the contest process) is provided in the initial notice of violation.
IV. Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)
Mr. Garcia’s arguments, presented across both hearings, focused on three primary claims of statutory violation by Villagio:
1. Failure to Provide Required Information: Villagio violated the statute by not providing him with the first and last name of the person who observed the violation.
2. Failure to Notify of Hearing Rights: Villagio did not inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.
3. Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from responding via certified mail within the 21-day statutory period. He argued that the notices’ demand for compliance within 10 days, combined with the issuance of a second notice and a fine just 14 days after the first, led him to believe he only had 10 days to act before incurring another violation.
Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)
Villagio presented a defense based on a direct reading of the statute and Mr. Garcia’s inaction:
1. Statutory Obligations Not Triggered: Villagio’s central argument was that its obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C)—including the duty to name the observer—are only triggered after a unit owner submits a written response by certified mail within 21 days. Since Mr. Garcia never sent such a response, these obligations never came into effect.
2. Internal Contest Process Satisfied Statute: Per A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), the duty to notify an owner of their right to an administrative hearing only applies if the HOA fails to provide its own contest process. Villagio argued that because all three notices explicitly stated the process for appealing to the Board of Directors, it had fulfilled its statutory duty.
3. No Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia was never legally or physically prevented from sending a certified letter. During cross-examination, he admitted he was not under any court order prohibiting him from responding.
4. Statute Inapplicability (Argument from Rehearing): Villagio further contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies specifically to violations concerning the “condition of the property,” not the “use” of the property. Since short-term renting is a use, Villagio argued the statute did not apply to this situation at all.
Key Testimony from Rehearing
During the February 12, 2019 rehearing, Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified.
• On direct examination, Mr. Gordon stated that Villagio does not restrict homeowners from responding to violation notices within the 21-day period.
• On cross-examination, when asked by Mr. Garcia if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” had he responded in 21 days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.” He explained this by stating that homeowners are given 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio pursuant to its own short-term rental policy.
V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions and Rationale
The judge’s findings were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, leading to the same conclusion in each instance.
Initial Decision (November 19, 2018)
• Finding of Fact: It was undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the March 8, March 22, or April 5, 2018 notices within 21 calendar days.
• Conclusion 1: Because Mr. Garcia did not respond within the 21-day period, Villagio was not required to provide him with the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.
• Conclusion 2: Because Villagio notified Mr. Garcia of the process for contesting the notice, it was not required under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) to provide him with notice of the right to petition for an administrative hearing.
• Outcome: Mr. Garcia failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The petition was dismissed.
Rehearing Decision (March 4, 2019)
The judge reaffirmed the initial findings and addressed Mr. Garcia’s argument that he was prevented from responding.
• Finding on “Prevention”: The judge found no evidence that Villagio informed Mr. Garcia he could not respond within 21 days or otherwise prevented him from doing so. The issuance of a second notice 14 days after the first was not deemed a preventative act that nullified Mr. Garcia’s statutory window to respond to the first notice.
• Statutory Construction: The decision invoked the legal principle that “what the Legislature means, it will say,” indicating a strict, literal interpretation of the statute’s requirements.
• Reaffirmed Conclusions: The judge again concluded that because Mr. Garcia failed to submit a written response by certified mail, Villagio’s obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) were not triggered, and its inclusion of an internal appeal process satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).
• Outcome: Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed for a second time, with Villagio deemed the prevailing party.
VI. Final Disposition
The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Garcia’s petition be dismissed. The decision issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL
Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case between Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, as detailed in case number 19F-H1918009-REL.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source context.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific violation did the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association initially accuse Mr. Garcia of committing?
3. What was the core of Mr. Garcia’s legal complaint against the Homeowners Association?
4. According to the court’s findings, what crucial step did Mr. Garcia fail to take after receiving the violation notices?
5. What was Villagio’s main argument for why it was not obligated to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?
6. Under what circumstance did Villagio argue it was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with notice of his right to petition for an administrative hearing?
7. What new fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia in the notices dated March 22, 2018, and April 5, 2018?
8. At the rehearing, what was Mr. Garcia’s explanation for why he was unable to respond to the notices within the statutory 21-day period?
9. What argument did Villagio introduce at the rehearing concerning the distinction between a property’s “condition” and its “use”?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Rogelio A. Garcia, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, the Respondent defending against the complaint. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.
2. Villagio accused Mr. Garcia of violating the short-term lease provisions located in the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The association alleged that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of its short-term rental policy.
3. Mr. Garcia alleged that Villagio violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. He claimed Villagio failed to provide him the opportunity to respond by certified mail within 21 days, did not inform him of his right to an administrative hearing, and did not provide the name of the person who observed the violation.
4. The court found that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the violation notices sent on March 8, March 22, and April 5, 2018. Specifically, he failed to provide the association with a written response by sending it via certified mail within 21 calendar days after the date of the notices.
5. Villagio argued that its obligation to provide the observer’s name under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) is only triggered if the unit owner first submits a written response by certified mail within the 21-day period. Because Mr. Garcia did not do so, Villagio was not required to provide that information.
6. Villagio argued it was not required to provide notice of the right to petition for a hearing because it had already fulfilled its legal obligation under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D). The violation notices it sent to Mr. Garcia contained instructions on the process for contesting the notice with the Board of Directors.
7. The notice dated March 22, 2018, informed Mr. Garcia that a fine of $1,000 had been posted to his account. The subsequent notice on April 5, 2018, stated that an additional $2,000 fine had been posted for the same violation.
8. Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio prevented him from responding because it did not wait 21 days before issuing subsequent notices and fines. He believed he only had 10 days to comply based on language in the notices, which created confusion and pressure.
9. At the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition of the property.” Villagio asserted its notices concerned the “use” of Mr. Garcia’s property (short-term renting), not its physical condition.
10. In both the initial hearing decision issued on November 19, 2018, and the rehearing decision issued on March 4, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove Villagio had violated the statute. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to provoke deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing evidence and reasoning exclusively from the case documents.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson to dismiss Mr. Garcia’s petition. How did the judge interpret and apply the specific subsections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242 to the facts presented in the initial hearing and the rehearing?
2. Trace the progression of arguments made by both Rogelio A. Garcia and Villagio from the initial petition through the rehearing. How did their claims and defenses evolve, and what new evidence or legal theories were introduced in the second hearing?
3. Discuss the significance of the “burden of proof” in this case, which rested upon Mr. Garcia. Explain the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decision and detail why the judge concluded Mr. Garcia failed to meet this standard.
4. Evaluate the strength and potential implications of Villagio’s argument, introduced at the rehearing, that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge did not base the final decision on this point, discuss how this interpretation could affect future disputes between homeowners and associations.
5. Based on the dates and actions described in the two decisions, construct a detailed procedural timeline of this case. Begin with the first violation letter from Villagio and conclude with the notice of the right to appeal the rehearing decision, including all key notices, filings, hearings, and fines.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The central statute in this case was A.R.S. § 33-1242.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this matter, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof to show that Villagio committed the alleged violation.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing documents that dictate how a condominium or planned community must be operated and maintained, and which contain the rules that unit owners must follow. Mr. Garcia was accused of violating the short-term lease provisions of Villagio’s CC&Rs.
Certified Mail
A type of mail service that provides the sender with a mailing receipt and electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made. A.R.S. § 33-1242(B) specifies this method for a unit owner’s written response to a violation notice.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal proceeding, similar to a trial, where parties present evidence (such as testimony and documents) to a neutral decision-maker. Hearings were held in this case on October 30, 2018, and February 12, 2019.
Office of Administrative Hearings
A state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies, boards, and commissions. This office was responsible for conducting the hearings in this case.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia was the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to reconsider the original decision, often granted to review the evidence or arguments. Mr. Garcia requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association was the Respondent.
Unit Owner
A person who owns a unit within a condominium or planned community and is subject to the association’s governing documents. Mr. Garcia is a unit owner in the Villagio at Tempe community.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL
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19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
2 sources
These sources consist of two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The first document records the initial decision from October 2018, which dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition alleging the HOA violated Arizona statute § 33-1242 by not providing required information following a notice of violation for short-term leasing. The second document details the rehearing decision from February 2019, which again found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove the HOA violated the statute because he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the mandatory 21-day period to trigger the HOA’s legal obligations. Both rulings concluded that since the HOA provided him with the process for contesting the notices, they were not required to provide written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing. Consequently, both decisions dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition and designated the HOA as the prevailing party.
What are the legal requirements concerning notice and response for HOA violations?
How did the unit owner’s failure to respond impact their statutory rights?
What legal interpretation was key to dismissing the homeowner’s administrative petition?
Based on 2 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Rogelio A. Garcia(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of himself,
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(HOA attorney) Brown Olcott, PLLC Appeared on behalf of Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association,
Tom Gordon(Community Manager/witness) AAM LLC Community Manager for Villagio; testified on behalf of Villagio
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) Administrative Law Judge,
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of the decision,
Other Participants
Amanda Shaw(Representative/Contact) AAM LLC Listed as c/o for service of process for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5, and the petition was filed after the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550) expired.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Community Governing Document regarding pipe installation
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R section 2.5 by installing pipes for a well. Respondent argued that CC&R section 2.5 was inapplicable as it governs additional easements conveyed to a third party, and that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550).
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Statute of Limitations, Easement, CC&R Violation, Well Installation
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:08 (77.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818023-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the HOA violated community governing documents (CC&Rs) by installing pipes related to a well through his lot.
The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, dismissed the petitioner’s case in its entirety. The decision was based on two independent and definitive grounds. First, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to meet his burden of proof on the merits of the case; the evidence demonstrated that the pipes were installed within a pre-existing easement and not improperly on his lot, and the specific CC&R section cited was inapplicable. Second, the petition was procedurally barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitations, as the installation occurred in the summer of 2013, and the action was filed after this period had expired. Consequently, the Rancho Del Oro HOA was deemed the prevailing party.
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I. Case Overview
This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Michael J. Stoltenberg against his HOA.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Michael J. Stoltenberg, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Respondent
Case Number
18F-H1818023-REL
Hearing Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Hearing Date
March 28, 2018
Decision Date
April 17, 2018
II. Core Dispute and Allegations
A. Petitioner’s Claim
The central allegation from the petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, was that the Rancho Del Oro HOA violated the Community Governing Document CC&Rs.
• Specific Allegation: The HOA improperly installed pipes through his lot as part of a well installation project.
• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition focused on violations of CC&R sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5. The decision notes that sections 1.13 and 1.19 are definition sections, making section 2.5 the substantive focus of the dispute.
B. Respondent’s Defense Strategy
The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a multi-faceted defense against the petitioner’s claims, combining a procedural dismissal argument with a substantive rebuttal.
1. Statute of Limitations: The HOA contended the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations established in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550. They asserted that since the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, the time frame for filing a petition had expired.
2. Inapplicability of CC&R Section 2.5: The HOA argued that this section was not relevant to the situation. They maintained that CC&R section 2.5 pertains specifically to instances where the HOA grants or conveys an additional easement to a third party, which had not occurred.
3. Factual Rebuttal: The HOA asserted that the pipes were installed within an easement that already existed at the time of installation, not on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot outside of an easement.
III. Adjudicated Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge made several key findings of fact and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the final order. The petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
A. Findings of Fact
The ALJ’s decision was based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. The key findings were:
• Witnesses: The court heard testimony from petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, HOA community manager Diana Crites, and HOA Board Chairman James Van Sickle.
• Location of Installation: Evidence showed the pipes were installed in an easement that was already in existence at the time of the 2013 installation.
• Failure of Evidentiary Support: The judge explicitly noted, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.”
B. Conclusions of Law
Based on the evidence and statutes, the ALJ reached the following legal conclusions:
• Statute of Limitations is Applicable: The judge affirmed that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. The installation occurred in 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, rendering the claim time-barred.
• Interpretation of CC&R 2.5: The judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation, concluding that CC&R section 2.5 applies to easements granted to a third party by the HOA.
• No Violation Occurred: The “weight of the evidence” demonstrated that the pipes were in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party. Therefore, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Due to the lack of evidence and the inapplicability of the cited CC&R section, the petitioner failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
IV. Final Order and Implications
Based on the dual findings that the claim was both time-barred and without merit, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decisive order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order’s service, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818023-REL
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818023-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Michael J. Stoltenberg versus the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, against the Respondent?
3. What two primary legal arguments did the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association present in its defense?
4. According to the judge’s findings, what crucial piece of evidence was not presented at the hearing regarding the location of the well and pipes?
5. What is the statute of limitations cited in this case, and why was it a critical factor in the judge’s decision?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret Community Governing Document CC&R section 2.5 in relation to the Respondent’s actions?
7. Who has the burden of proof in this type of hearing, and what is the specific standard of proof required to win the case?
8. What was the ultimate Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and who was named the prevailing party?
9. Aside from the statute of limitations, what was the other fundamental reason the Petitioner failed to prove his case?
10. After the judge’s Order was issued on April 17, 2018, what recourse was available to the parties involved?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, who brought the complaint, and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, who was defending against the complaint. Mr. Stoltenberg represented himself, while the Homeowners Association was represented by its attorney, Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.
2. Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the Homeowners Association violated sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5 of the Community Governing Document (CC&Rs). The basis of his petition was that the HOA had improperly installed pipes through his lot in connection with a new well.
3. The HOA argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, as the installation occurred in 2013, more than four years prior. The HOA also contended that CC&R section 2.5 did not apply because it refers to granting additional easements to a third party, which the HOA did not do.
4. The judge’s “Findings of Fact” state that “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.” This lack of evidence was a key failure in the Petitioner’s case.
5. The statute of limitations cited is ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, which requires actions to be brought within four years. This was critical because the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, making his claim untimely.
6. The judge concluded that CC&R section 2.5 specifically applies to easements that are granted or conveyed to a third party by the Respondent. Since the evidence showed the pipes were installed in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant a new one to a third party, the judge found that this section was not violated.
7. The Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition be dismissed. As a result of the dismissal, the Respondent (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
9. The Petitioner failed to prove his case because the weight of the evidence showed the HOA did not violate CC&R section 2.5. The evidence indicated the pipes were installed in a pre-existing easement, and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party as described in that section.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. This request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, particularly regarding the location of the pipes, contribute to the dismissal of his petition?
2. Discuss the significance of the statute of limitations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550) in the judge’s decision. Why are such statutes important in legal proceedings, and how did it provide a separate and independent basis for dismissing the case?
3. Explain the legal reasoning behind the judge’s interpretation of CC&R section 2.5. Why was the distinction between an “existing easement” and granting a “new easement to a third party” a critical factor in the outcome?
4. Imagine you were legal counsel for the Petitioner. Based on the information in the decision, what kind of evidence would have been necessary to successfully prove a violation of the Community Governing Documents and overcome the Respondent’s defenses?
5. Examine the roles of the different entities involved in this dispute: the Petitioner, the Homeowners Association, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate. How does the structure of this administrative hearing process provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between homeowners and HOAs?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Several statutes are cited, including those governing real estate, HOA disputes, and the statute of limitations.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.
An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules set forth in a Community Governing Document that property owners in a planned community or condominium must follow.
Easement
A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific, limited purpose. In this case, it refers to the area where pipes were installed, which the judge found was an “existing easement.”
Findings of Fact
The section of a legal decision that details the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing.
Homeowners Association (HOA)
An organization in a planned community (like Rancho Del Oro) that creates and enforces rules for the properties and residents within its jurisdiction.
Notice of Hearing
A formal document issued to inform the parties of the date, time, location, and subject matter of a scheduled legal hearing.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition, seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Michael J. Stoltenberg.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. Defined in the document as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Statute of Limitations
A law that sets the maximum amount of time that parties involved in a dispute have to initiate legal proceedings. In this case, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550 established a four-year limit.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5, and the petition was filed after the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550) expired.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Community Governing Document regarding pipe installation
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R section 2.5 by installing pipes for a well. Respondent argued that CC&R section 2.5 was inapplicable as it governs additional easements conveyed to a third party, and that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550).
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Statute of Limitations, Easement, CC&R Violation, Well Installation
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
CC&R section 2.5
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:26 (77.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818023-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the HOA violated community governing documents (CC&Rs) by installing pipes related to a well through his lot.
The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, dismissed the petitioner’s case in its entirety. The decision was based on two independent and definitive grounds. First, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to meet his burden of proof on the merits of the case; the evidence demonstrated that the pipes were installed within a pre-existing easement and not improperly on his lot, and the specific CC&R section cited was inapplicable. Second, the petition was procedurally barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitations, as the installation occurred in the summer of 2013, and the action was filed after this period had expired. Consequently, the Rancho Del Oro HOA was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
I. Case Overview
This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Michael J. Stoltenberg against his HOA.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Michael J. Stoltenberg, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Respondent
Case Number
18F-H1818023-REL
Hearing Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Hearing Date
March 28, 2018
Decision Date
April 17, 2018
II. Core Dispute and Allegations
A. Petitioner’s Claim
The central allegation from the petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, was that the Rancho Del Oro HOA violated the Community Governing Document CC&Rs.
• Specific Allegation: The HOA improperly installed pipes through his lot as part of a well installation project.
• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition focused on violations of CC&R sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5. The decision notes that sections 1.13 and 1.19 are definition sections, making section 2.5 the substantive focus of the dispute.
B. Respondent’s Defense Strategy
The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a multi-faceted defense against the petitioner’s claims, combining a procedural dismissal argument with a substantive rebuttal.
1. Statute of Limitations: The HOA contended the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations established in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550. They asserted that since the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, the time frame for filing a petition had expired.
2. Inapplicability of CC&R Section 2.5: The HOA argued that this section was not relevant to the situation. They maintained that CC&R section 2.5 pertains specifically to instances where the HOA grants or conveys an additional easement to a third party, which had not occurred.
3. Factual Rebuttal: The HOA asserted that the pipes were installed within an easement that already existed at the time of installation, not on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot outside of an easement.
III. Adjudicated Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge made several key findings of fact and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the final order. The petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
A. Findings of Fact
The ALJ’s decision was based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. The key findings were:
• Witnesses: The court heard testimony from petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, HOA community manager Diana Crites, and HOA Board Chairman James Van Sickle.
• Location of Installation: Evidence showed the pipes were installed in an easement that was already in existence at the time of the 2013 installation.
• Failure of Evidentiary Support: The judge explicitly noted, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.”
B. Conclusions of Law
Based on the evidence and statutes, the ALJ reached the following legal conclusions:
• Statute of Limitations is Applicable: The judge affirmed that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. The installation occurred in 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, rendering the claim time-barred.
• Interpretation of CC&R 2.5: The judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation, concluding that CC&R section 2.5 applies to easements granted to a third party by the HOA.
• No Violation Occurred: The “weight of the evidence” demonstrated that the pipes were in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party. Therefore, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Due to the lack of evidence and the inapplicability of the cited CC&R section, the petitioner failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
IV. Final Order and Implications
Based on the dual findings that the claim was both time-barred and without merit, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decisive order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order’s service, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818023-REL
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818023-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Michael J. Stoltenberg versus the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, against the Respondent?
3. What two primary legal arguments did the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association present in its defense?
4. According to the judge’s findings, what crucial piece of evidence was not presented at the hearing regarding the location of the well and pipes?
5. What is the statute of limitations cited in this case, and why was it a critical factor in the judge’s decision?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret Community Governing Document CC&R section 2.5 in relation to the Respondent’s actions?
7. Who has the burden of proof in this type of hearing, and what is the specific standard of proof required to win the case?
8. What was the ultimate Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and who was named the prevailing party?
9. Aside from the statute of limitations, what was the other fundamental reason the Petitioner failed to prove his case?
10. After the judge’s Order was issued on April 17, 2018, what recourse was available to the parties involved?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, who brought the complaint, and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, who was defending against the complaint. Mr. Stoltenberg represented himself, while the Homeowners Association was represented by its attorney, Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.
2. Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the Homeowners Association violated sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5 of the Community Governing Document (CC&Rs). The basis of his petition was that the HOA had improperly installed pipes through his lot in connection with a new well.
3. The HOA argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, as the installation occurred in 2013, more than four years prior. The HOA also contended that CC&R section 2.5 did not apply because it refers to granting additional easements to a third party, which the HOA did not do.
4. The judge’s “Findings of Fact” state that “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.” This lack of evidence was a key failure in the Petitioner’s case.
5. The statute of limitations cited is ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, which requires actions to be brought within four years. This was critical because the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, making his claim untimely.
6. The judge concluded that CC&R section 2.5 specifically applies to easements that are granted or conveyed to a third party by the Respondent. Since the evidence showed the pipes were installed in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant a new one to a third party, the judge found that this section was not violated.
7. The Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition be dismissed. As a result of the dismissal, the Respondent (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
9. The Petitioner failed to prove his case because the weight of the evidence showed the HOA did not violate CC&R section 2.5. The evidence indicated the pipes were installed in a pre-existing easement, and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party as described in that section.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. This request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, particularly regarding the location of the pipes, contribute to the dismissal of his petition?
2. Discuss the significance of the statute of limitations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550) in the judge’s decision. Why are such statutes important in legal proceedings, and how did it provide a separate and independent basis for dismissing the case?
3. Explain the legal reasoning behind the judge’s interpretation of CC&R section 2.5. Why was the distinction between an “existing easement” and granting a “new easement to a third party” a critical factor in the outcome?
4. Imagine you were legal counsel for the Petitioner. Based on the information in the decision, what kind of evidence would have been necessary to successfully prove a violation of the Community Governing Documents and overcome the Respondent’s defenses?
5. Examine the roles of the different entities involved in this dispute: the Petitioner, the Homeowners Association, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate. How does the structure of this administrative hearing process provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between homeowners and HOAs?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Several statutes are cited, including those governing real estate, HOA disputes, and the statute of limitations.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.
An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules set forth in a Community Governing Document that property owners in a planned community or condominium must follow.
Easement
A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific, limited purpose. In this case, it refers to the area where pipes were installed, which the judge found was an “existing easement.”
Findings of Fact
The section of a legal decision that details the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing.
Homeowners Association (HOA)
An organization in a planned community (like Rancho Del Oro) that creates and enforces rules for the properties and residents within its jurisdiction.
Notice of Hearing
A formal document issued to inform the parties of the date, time, location, and subject matter of a scheduled legal hearing.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition, seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Michael J. Stoltenberg.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. Defined in the document as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Statute of Limitations
A law that sets the maximum amount of time that parties involved in a dispute have to initiate legal proceedings. In this case, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550 established a four-year limit.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818023-REL
4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against Their HOA
For many homeowners, a dispute with their Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like a classic David vs. Goliath story. We’re drawn to tales of the little guy winning against a powerful board, but the reality is that these battles are governed by unforgiving rules, and victory is never guaranteed. While stories of homeowner triumphs are inspiring, it is just as crucial—if not more so—to understand the anatomy of a failure.
This article serves as a cautionary tale, exploring the surprising and impactful lessons from a legal case where a homeowner’s petition against their HOA was decisively dismissed. By understanding the series of avoidable missteps that led to this loss, every homeowner can be better prepared to protect their rights and their property.
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1. Time is Not on Your Side: The Statute of Limitations
In the legal world, a “statute of limitations” is a strict deadline for filing a lawsuit. Think of it as a countdown clock that starts the moment a potential legal issue occurs. If you let that clock run out, you forfeit your right to take legal action, no matter how valid your complaint might be.
The first domino to fall in this case was the calendar. The homeowner’s complaint centered on pipes installed in the summer of 2013. The petition, however, wasn’t filed until early 2018, just a few months after the four-year deadline had expired. This wasn’t a case of extreme neglect; it was a critical error of a few months that proved instantly fatal. The lesson here is harsh and urgent: if you believe your HOA has wronged you, you must act promptly. Waiting too long can render your claim legally void before it ever gets a fair hearing.
The specific rule that was applied is a stark reminder of this unforgiving principle:
Actions other than for recovery of real property for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward.
2. You Have to Prove It: The Burden of Proof
In any legal dispute, the person bringing the complaint—the petitioner—has the “burden of proof.” This means it is entirely your responsibility to present convincing evidence to support your claims. Simply believing something to be true is not enough; you must prove it with cold, hard facts. Here’s where every homeowner should pay close attention.
The case’s foundation crumbled under the simple question: “Where is the proof?” The core of the homeowner’s case was the allegation that the HOA had installed pipes through his lot. This was the central pillar of the entire petition. But when the time came to present evidence, the pillar collapsed. The judge’s decision contained this stunning finding:
There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on […] lot.
An entire lawsuit can be dismissed if a fundamental claim, no matter how strongly you believe it, cannot be factually proven. Your conviction that you are right means nothing in a hearing without evidence to back it up.
3. Read the Fine Print: The Rules Might Not Mean What You Think They Mean
The homeowner built his argument on a specific part of the Community Governing Documents (CC&Rs), section 2.5, believing it proved the HOA had acted improperly. But the devil is always in the details, and a misinterpretation of those details can be fatal to a case.
The HOA successfully argued that the rule the homeowner cited only applied to situations where the HOA granted a new easement to a third party. In reality, the HOA had simply used an existing easement and had not granted anything to an outside entity. This is a critical distinction. Think of it this way: the homeowner argued the HOA violated the rules for building a new road, but the HOA proved they were simply driving a car on a road that already existed. The homeowner’s argument, while possibly correct about new roads, was irrelevant to the actual situation.
Compounding the error, the homeowner’s initial petition also cited sections of the CC&Rs that were simply definitions, not enforceable rules—a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal documents at the heart of the case.
4. A Double Dismissal: Why the Case Failed on Two Fronts
This case didn’t just lose once; the court effectively ruled the homeowner would have lost twice, on two completely different grounds. This reveals a devastating legal reality: winning requires clearing multiple hurdles, while losing only requires failing at one.
The petition was dismissed for two independent and powerful reasons:
1. The Procedural Knockout: The case was filed too late, violating the four-year statute of limitations. This is a procedural bar, meaning the court couldn’t even consider the facts of the case. It was dead on arrival.
2. The Substantive Failure: The judge made it clear that even if the case had been filed on time, it would have failed on its merits. The homeowner failed to prove his central claim (the pipe location) and fundamentally misinterpreted the CC&Rs.
This “double loss” demonstrates that a successful case against an HOA must be both timely and legally sound. One without the other is a recipe for failure.
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Conclusion: Are You Ready for a Fight?
Being frustrated with your HOA is understandable, but that feeling is not enough to win a legal battle. As this case demonstrates, a successful challenge demands timely action, solid evidence, and a precise interpretation of your community’s governing documents. And a loss isn’t just a disappointment; it means your filing fees are lost, and you’ve spent significant time and energy for nothing, with the HOA’s position only becoming more entrenched. This is a financial and emotional trap you must avoid.
Before you decide to take on your HOA, ask yourself: Have you checked the calendar, your property survey, and the fine print?
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
Counsel
Nathan Andrews
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
Counsel
Bradley R. Jardine
Alleged Violations
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
Outcome Summary
The ALJ decision, certified as the final administrative decision, dismissed the Petitioner's claim after rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The challenged $660 fee was determined to be a permissible working capital contribution under the CC&Rs, not a fee restricted by the statutory cap on resale disclosure services.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in question was determined to be a working capital fee/assessment governed by the CC&Rs and ARS § 33-1242(A)(2), and not subject to the limitation set forth in ARS § 33-1260.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged excessive fee collection for resale disclosure/transfer services
Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 fee, which he argued exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure/transfer services. The Association argued the $660 fee was a working capital contribution mandated by CC&R section 8.13 and was mislabeled, and therefore not subject to the statutory limitations of § 33-1260.
Orders: Brian D. Sopatyk’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA fee dispute, Working capital fee, Transfer fee, Resale disclosure, Statutory interpretation
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 531040.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:41 (67.9 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 540004.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:44 (154.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Briefing: Sopatyk v. Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and outcomes of an administrative legal case brought by petitioner Brian Sopatyk against The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute was Mr. Sopatyk’s allegation that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660 upon the sale of a condominium unit, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at an aggregate of $400.
Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition on both occasions. The central finding was that the petitioner failed to prove a statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 charge was not a resale disclosure fee governed by A.R.S. § 33-1260, but rather a “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association admitted that this fee had been historically mislabeled as a “transfer fee,” an error it had since identified and corrected. The actual fee charged for resale disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “statement fee.” The ALJ’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision in the matter on August 10, 2017.
State of Arizona, Office of Administrative Hearings
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Core Allegation
Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits fees for resale disclosure services to a maximum of $400.
Final Outcome
Petition Dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
March 2, 2015
The Association issues a disclosure statement for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, showing a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”
May 18, 2016
Prompted by Mr. Sopatyk, the Association’s Board discusses the fee structure. It concludes the $660 fee is a mislabeled “working capital fee” and not a statutory violation.
August 9, 2016
Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the violation.
November 14, 2016
The initial administrative hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
November 29, 2016
ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
December 13, 2016
The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopts the ALJ’s recommendation, issuing a Final Order to dismiss the petition.
Post-Dec. 2016
Mr. Sopatyk requests a rehearing of the matter.
June 9, 2017
The rehearing is conducted, again before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
June 26, 2017
ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, once again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
August 10, 2017
With no modifying action from the Department of Real Estate, the ALJ’s June 26 decision is certified as the final administrative decision.
Core Dispute Analysis
The case centered on the interpretation and classification of two fees charged by the Association during the sale of Mr. Sopatyk’s condominium unit.
Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)
• Allegation of Violation: Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660, which directly contravened the $400 statutory maximum established by A.R.S. § 33-1260 for services related to resale disclosure.
• Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted a March 2, 2015 disclosure form from the Association listing both a “660transferfee”anda”30 statement fee.” A HUD-1 disclosure statement for the purchase was also entered, showing the $660 “Transfer Fee” was split, with $330 paid from the buyer’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the seller’s funds.
• Contradictory Testimony: The ALJ noted a discrepancy in the petitioner’s statements. The sworn petition stated the $660 fee was split between him and the seller, while his testimony at the rehearing claimed he “had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price.” The ALJ decision stated, “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”
• Requested Remedies: Mr. Sopatyk requested that the Association be ordered to comply with the statute, that refunds be paid to those who paid fees in excess of the statutory maximum, and that a civil penalty be imposed against the Association.
Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc.)
• Distinction Between Fees: The Association’s central argument was that two separate and legally distinct fees were assessed:
1. A $30 Resale Statement Fee: This was the charge for preparing documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260 and was well within the $400 limit.
2. A $660 Working Capital Fee: This fee was authorized under a separate provision, Section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, which mandates an assessment from each new owner equal to two monthly installments to fund the Association’s working capital (reserve) fund.
• “Mislabeled” Fee: The Association acknowledged that the $660 working capital fee was incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee.” Association Manager Amy Telnes testified that she received erroneous information from the prior manager and had been using the wrong label.
• Board Action and Corrective Measures: The minutes from the May 18, 2016 Board meeting show that the Board, after reviewing a legal opinion, concluded the issue was one of “labeling, not violating the statute.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected into the Reserve Account. To prevent future confusion, the Board also voted to assess a single $400 transfer fee on all future transactions, with no other fees.
• Fund Allocation: Ms. Telnes testified that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, consistent with its purpose as a working capital contribution, while the $30 fee was the charge pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260(C).
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
ALJ Thomas Shedden presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing, reaching the same conclusion in both instances.
Key Rulings and Legal Reasoning
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
• Core Finding: The evidence demonstrated that the Association charged two distinct fees. The $30 fee was for document preparation under A.R.S. § 33-1260, while the $660 fee was a working capital assessment authorized by CC&R Section 8.13. The ALJ concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1260 was not applicable to the $660 fee.
• Conclusion on Violation: Based on the evidence, including the testimony of the Association manager and the board meeting minutes, the ALJ found that the $660 fee was mislabeled but was not collected for services related to resale disclosure. Therefore, Mr. Sopatyk did not meet his burden to show that the Association violated the statute.
• Rejection of Harm-Based Argument: The ALJ did not accept the Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Mr. Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400. The judge clarified that A.R.S. § 33-2199.01 “does not require this type of particularized harm, but rather applies to all statutory violations.”
• Dismissal of Petition: In both the November 29, 2016 decision and the June 26, 2017 decision, the order was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition and deem the Association the prevailing party.
Final Disposition and Legal Status
The decision issued by ALJ Shedden on June 26, 2017, was transmitted to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The Department had until August 1, 2017, to accept, reject, or modify the decision. As no action was taken by the deadline, the Office of Administrative Hearings issued a Certification of Decision of Administrative Law Judge on August 10, 2017. This certification established the ALJ’s decision as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate in the matter.
Key Legal Citations and Definitions
• A.R.S. § 33-1260 (Resale of Units; Information Required): This Arizona statute governs the information a condominium association must provide to a prospective purchaser. It explicitly limits the fees an association can charge for these services:
• CC&R Section 8.13 (Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund): This section of The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association’s governing documents provides the authority to collect a fee from new owners for a different purpose:
• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required for the petitioner to prevail, defined in the legal decisions as:
Study Guide – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Identify the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and state the core legal violation the petitioner alleged.
2. What specific fees were charged during the petitioner’s condominium purchase that became the central point of the dispute?
3. According to the Association, what was the true nature of the $660 fee, and how did it explain the “transfer fee” label on the disclosure documents?
4. What role did Amy Telnes, the Association manager, play in explaining the history of the disputed fee?
5. What actions did the Association’s Board take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, to address the petitioner’s concerns and correct its internal procedures?
6. Who held the burden of proof in this matter, and what was the legal standard required to meet that burden?
7. What was the official outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?
8. Why was a re-hearing conducted, and what was the final outcome of that hearing on June 9, 2017?
9. According to the re-hearing decision, there was a significant contradiction between the petitioner’s sworn petition and his later testimony. What was this contradiction?
10. What was the legal basis, according to the Association’s CC&Rs, for collecting the $660 working capital fee?
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Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Brian Sopatyk, and the respondent was The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 by charging a transfer fee in excess of the statutory maximum of $400.
2. The disputed fees were a $660 “transfer fee,” which was split between the buyer (Mr. Sopatyk) and the seller, and a separate $30 “statement fee” or “Resale Statement Fee.” The petitioner’s claim focused on the $660 fee being above the legal limit for resale disclosure services.
3. The Association argued the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was a “working capital fee” authorized by its CC&Rs. It explained that the fee had been mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to an error passed down from a previous property manager.
4. Amy Telnes testified that when she became the Association manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She further testified that the $660 was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, and the actual fee charged for disclosure under the statute was the separate $30 statement fee.
5. At the May 18, 2016, meeting, the Board concluded it was not in violation of the law but that its fee labeling was confusing. The Board directed Amy Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all mislabeled fees into the Reserve Account and voted to assess a single, correctly labeled $400 transfer fee on all future transactions.
6. The petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
7. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The judge ordered that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition be dismissed.
8. A re-hearing was conducted after Mr. Sopatyk requested one following the initial decision. The final outcome of the June 9, 2017, re-hearing was the same as the first: the Administrative Law Judge found the petitioner did not meet his burden of proof and ordered the petition to be dismissed.
9. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 transfer fee was split between him and the seller. However, during his testimony at the re-hearing, he stated that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.
10. The legal basis was Section 8.13 of the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section, titled “Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund,” called for an assessment from each new owner of two monthly installments of the annual fee to be deposited into the working capital fund.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific facts, legal arguments, and procedural details from the source documents.
1. Trace the complete timeline of the case, beginning with the filing of the petition. Include key dates of filings, hearings, decisions, and final certifications, and describe the significance of each event in the legal process.
2. Analyze the central legal argument of the Respondent, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association. Explain how the distinction between a “transfer fee” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 and a “working capital fee” under the Association’s CC&Rs was crucial to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain why the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the re-hearing, citing specific evidence presented by the Association.
4. Evaluate the importance of the Association’s Board Meeting Minutes from May 18, 2016, as a piece of evidence. Detail the specific findings and resolutions from that meeting and explain how they were used to build the Association’s defense.
5. Examine the roles of the key individuals and entities in this administrative action. Describe the functions and contributions of Brian Sopatyk (Petitioner), Amy Telnes (Association Manager), Michael Cibellis (Association President), Thomas Shedden (Administrative Law Judge), and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to provide certain disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser. It also limits the fee an association can charge for the preparation of these documents to an aggregate of four hundred dollars.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. In this case, section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs authorized the collection of a fee from new owners for a working capital fund.
Final Administrative Decision
The ultimate, legally binding decision in the administrative matter. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision became the final administrative decision after the Department of Real Estate did not act to accept, reject, or modify it within the statutory time limit.
HUD-1 Disclosure Statement
A document used in the petitioner’s property purchase that itemized all charges imposed upon a borrower and seller for a real estate transaction. It was used as evidence to show how the $660 “Transfer Fee” and $30 “Resale Statement Fee” were assessed and paid.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Brian Sopatyk was the petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Reserve Fund
An account maintained by the Condominium Association. The Association referred to its “working capital fund” as the Reserve Fund, into which the disputed $660 fees were deposited.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. was the respondent.
Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee
A $30 fee charged by the Association for the preparation of disclosure documents. The Association argued this was the fee governed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260, which was compliant with the $400 statutory cap.
Transfer Fee
In the context of the petitioner’s allegation, a fee charged for resale disclosure services, limited to $400 by statute. In the context of the Association’s defense, this was the erroneous label applied to the working capital fee.
Working Capital Fee
A fee authorized by section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, assessed to each new owner to be deposited into the working capital fund (or Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 fee was this type of fee, not one for resale disclosure.
Blog Post – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute
We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?
For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.
1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm
A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.
The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.
Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.
The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.
2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form
Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.
The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.
3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War
How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.
Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.
In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”
As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.
4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase
What it really means to have to prove your case.
In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:
The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.
5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility
When every word you say (and write) is on the record.
A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.
There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”
The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.
Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details
This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.
The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brian Sopatyk(petitioner) Represented himself at the initial hearing; sought rehearing
Nathan Andrews(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Jill M. Kennedy(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Judy Sopatyk(petitioner's wife) Co-purchaser of the condominium unit,
Chance Peterson(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Respondent Side
Bradley R. Jardine(HOA attorney) Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
Amy Telnes(property manager/witness) The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Association manager who testified,
Michael Cibellis(Association president/witness) The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Testified at the rehearing
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Abby Hansen(HOA Coordinator) Contact for requests for rehearing
Greg Hanchett(Interim Director) OAH Signed the Certification of Decision,
Other Participants
Rosella J. Rodriguez(administrative staff) Administrative staff for transmission/mailing,
The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee
Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.
Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:43 (96.8 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:43 (61.2 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:44 (100.9 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:44 (59.2 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.
The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.
After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
Parties and Jurisdiction
Representation
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ
Core Allegation and Governing Statute
• Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.
• Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.
——————————————————————————–
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
March 2, 2015
The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.
May 18, 2016
The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.
August 9, 2016
Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
November 14, 2016
The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
November 29, 2016
ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
December 13, 2016
The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.
February 7, 2017
A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.
June 9, 2017
A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
June 26, 2017
ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
August 1, 2017
The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.
August 10, 2017
The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)
• Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Evidence Presented:
◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”
◦ HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.
• Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”
Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)
• Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.
◦ Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.
◦ May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.
——————————————————————————–
Judicial Findings and Final Disposition
Standard and Burden of Proof
Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.
Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)
• Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.
• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.
Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)
• Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.
• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.
Final Administrative Disposition
The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.
The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee
Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.
Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:50 (96.8 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:51 (61.2 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:51 (100.9 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:52 (59.2 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.
The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.
After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
Parties and Jurisdiction
Representation
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ
Core Allegation and Governing Statute
• Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.
• Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.
——————————————————————————–
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
March 2, 2015
The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.
May 18, 2016
The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.
August 9, 2016
Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
November 14, 2016
The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
November 29, 2016
ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
December 13, 2016
The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.
February 7, 2017
A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.
June 9, 2017
A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
June 26, 2017
ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
August 1, 2017
The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.
August 10, 2017
The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)
• Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Evidence Presented:
◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”
◦ HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.
• Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”
Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)
• Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.
◦ Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.
◦ May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.
——————————————————————————–
Judicial Findings and Final Disposition
Standard and Burden of Proof
Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.
Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)
• Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.
• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.
• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.
Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)
• Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.
• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.
Final Administrative Disposition
The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
Counsel
Nathan Andrews
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
Counsel
Bradley R. Jardine
Alleged Violations
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
Outcome Summary
The ALJ decision, certified as the final administrative decision, dismissed the Petitioner's claim after rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The challenged $660 fee was determined to be a permissible working capital contribution under the CC&Rs, not a fee restricted by the statutory cap on resale disclosure services.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in question was determined to be a working capital fee/assessment governed by the CC&Rs and ARS § 33-1242(A)(2), and not subject to the limitation set forth in ARS § 33-1260.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged excessive fee collection for resale disclosure/transfer services
Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 fee, which he argued exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure/transfer services. The Association argued the $660 fee was a working capital contribution mandated by CC&R section 8.13 and was mislabeled, and therefore not subject to the statutory limitations of § 33-1260.
Orders: Brian D. Sopatyk’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA fee dispute, Working capital fee, Transfer fee, Resale disclosure, Statutory interpretation
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 531040.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:41:29 (67.9 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 540004.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:41:30 (154.0 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (96.8 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (61.2 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (100.9 KB)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:00 (59.2 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Briefing: Sopatyk v. Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and outcomes of an administrative legal case brought by petitioner Brian Sopatyk against The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute was Mr. Sopatyk’s allegation that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660 upon the sale of a condominium unit, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at an aggregate of $400.
Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition on both occasions. The central finding was that the petitioner failed to prove a statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 charge was not a resale disclosure fee governed by A.R.S. § 33-1260, but rather a “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association admitted that this fee had been historically mislabeled as a “transfer fee,” an error it had since identified and corrected. The actual fee charged for resale disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “statement fee.” The ALJ’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision in the matter on August 10, 2017.
State of Arizona, Office of Administrative Hearings
Petitioner
Brian Sopatyk
Respondent
The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.
Core Allegation
Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits fees for resale disclosure services to a maximum of $400.
Final Outcome
Petition Dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
March 2, 2015
The Association issues a disclosure statement for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, showing a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”
May 18, 2016
Prompted by Mr. Sopatyk, the Association’s Board discusses the fee structure. It concludes the $660 fee is a mislabeled “working capital fee” and not a statutory violation.
August 9, 2016
Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the violation.
November 14, 2016
The initial administrative hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
November 29, 2016
ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
December 13, 2016
The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopts the ALJ’s recommendation, issuing a Final Order to dismiss the petition.
Post-Dec. 2016
Mr. Sopatyk requests a rehearing of the matter.
June 9, 2017
The rehearing is conducted, again before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
June 26, 2017
ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, once again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.
August 10, 2017
With no modifying action from the Department of Real Estate, the ALJ’s June 26 decision is certified as the final administrative decision.
Core Dispute Analysis
The case centered on the interpretation and classification of two fees charged by the Association during the sale of Mr. Sopatyk’s condominium unit.
Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)
• Allegation of Violation: Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660, which directly contravened the $400 statutory maximum established by A.R.S. § 33-1260 for services related to resale disclosure.
• Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted a March 2, 2015 disclosure form from the Association listing both a “660transferfee”anda”30 statement fee.” A HUD-1 disclosure statement for the purchase was also entered, showing the $660 “Transfer Fee” was split, with $330 paid from the buyer’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the seller’s funds.
• Contradictory Testimony: The ALJ noted a discrepancy in the petitioner’s statements. The sworn petition stated the $660 fee was split between him and the seller, while his testimony at the rehearing claimed he “had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price.” The ALJ decision stated, “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”
• Requested Remedies: Mr. Sopatyk requested that the Association be ordered to comply with the statute, that refunds be paid to those who paid fees in excess of the statutory maximum, and that a civil penalty be imposed against the Association.
Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc.)
• Distinction Between Fees: The Association’s central argument was that two separate and legally distinct fees were assessed:
1. A $30 Resale Statement Fee: This was the charge for preparing documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260 and was well within the $400 limit.
2. A $660 Working Capital Fee: This fee was authorized under a separate provision, Section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, which mandates an assessment from each new owner equal to two monthly installments to fund the Association’s working capital (reserve) fund.
• “Mislabeled” Fee: The Association acknowledged that the $660 working capital fee was incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee.” Association Manager Amy Telnes testified that she received erroneous information from the prior manager and had been using the wrong label.
• Board Action and Corrective Measures: The minutes from the May 18, 2016 Board meeting show that the Board, after reviewing a legal opinion, concluded the issue was one of “labeling, not violating the statute.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected into the Reserve Account. To prevent future confusion, the Board also voted to assess a single $400 transfer fee on all future transactions, with no other fees.
• Fund Allocation: Ms. Telnes testified that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, consistent with its purpose as a working capital contribution, while the $30 fee was the charge pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260(C).
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
ALJ Thomas Shedden presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing, reaching the same conclusion in both instances.
Key Rulings and Legal Reasoning
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
• Core Finding: The evidence demonstrated that the Association charged two distinct fees. The $30 fee was for document preparation under A.R.S. § 33-1260, while the $660 fee was a working capital assessment authorized by CC&R Section 8.13. The ALJ concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1260 was not applicable to the $660 fee.
• Conclusion on Violation: Based on the evidence, including the testimony of the Association manager and the board meeting minutes, the ALJ found that the $660 fee was mislabeled but was not collected for services related to resale disclosure. Therefore, Mr. Sopatyk did not meet his burden to show that the Association violated the statute.
• Rejection of Harm-Based Argument: The ALJ did not accept the Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Mr. Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400. The judge clarified that A.R.S. § 33-2199.01 “does not require this type of particularized harm, but rather applies to all statutory violations.”
• Dismissal of Petition: In both the November 29, 2016 decision and the June 26, 2017 decision, the order was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition and deem the Association the prevailing party.
Final Disposition and Legal Status
The decision issued by ALJ Shedden on June 26, 2017, was transmitted to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The Department had until August 1, 2017, to accept, reject, or modify the decision. As no action was taken by the deadline, the Office of Administrative Hearings issued a Certification of Decision of Administrative Law Judge on August 10, 2017. This certification established the ALJ’s decision as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate in the matter.
Key Legal Citations and Definitions
• A.R.S. § 33-1260 (Resale of Units; Information Required): This Arizona statute governs the information a condominium association must provide to a prospective purchaser. It explicitly limits the fees an association can charge for these services:
• CC&R Section 8.13 (Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund): This section of The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association’s governing documents provides the authority to collect a fee from new owners for a different purpose:
• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required for the petitioner to prevail, defined in the legal decisions as:
Study Guide – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Identify the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and state the core legal violation the petitioner alleged.
2. What specific fees were charged during the petitioner’s condominium purchase that became the central point of the dispute?
3. According to the Association, what was the true nature of the $660 fee, and how did it explain the “transfer fee” label on the disclosure documents?
4. What role did Amy Telnes, the Association manager, play in explaining the history of the disputed fee?
5. What actions did the Association’s Board take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, to address the petitioner’s concerns and correct its internal procedures?
6. Who held the burden of proof in this matter, and what was the legal standard required to meet that burden?
7. What was the official outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?
8. Why was a re-hearing conducted, and what was the final outcome of that hearing on June 9, 2017?
9. According to the re-hearing decision, there was a significant contradiction between the petitioner’s sworn petition and his later testimony. What was this contradiction?
10. What was the legal basis, according to the Association’s CC&Rs, for collecting the $660 working capital fee?
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Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Brian Sopatyk, and the respondent was The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 by charging a transfer fee in excess of the statutory maximum of $400.
2. The disputed fees were a $660 “transfer fee,” which was split between the buyer (Mr. Sopatyk) and the seller, and a separate $30 “statement fee” or “Resale Statement Fee.” The petitioner’s claim focused on the $660 fee being above the legal limit for resale disclosure services.
3. The Association argued the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was a “working capital fee” authorized by its CC&Rs. It explained that the fee had been mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to an error passed down from a previous property manager.
4. Amy Telnes testified that when she became the Association manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She further testified that the $660 was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, and the actual fee charged for disclosure under the statute was the separate $30 statement fee.
5. At the May 18, 2016, meeting, the Board concluded it was not in violation of the law but that its fee labeling was confusing. The Board directed Amy Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all mislabeled fees into the Reserve Account and voted to assess a single, correctly labeled $400 transfer fee on all future transactions.
6. The petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
7. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The judge ordered that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition be dismissed.
8. A re-hearing was conducted after Mr. Sopatyk requested one following the initial decision. The final outcome of the June 9, 2017, re-hearing was the same as the first: the Administrative Law Judge found the petitioner did not meet his burden of proof and ordered the petition to be dismissed.
9. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 transfer fee was split between him and the seller. However, during his testimony at the re-hearing, he stated that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.
10. The legal basis was Section 8.13 of the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section, titled “Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund,” called for an assessment from each new owner of two monthly installments of the annual fee to be deposited into the working capital fund.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific facts, legal arguments, and procedural details from the source documents.
1. Trace the complete timeline of the case, beginning with the filing of the petition. Include key dates of filings, hearings, decisions, and final certifications, and describe the significance of each event in the legal process.
2. Analyze the central legal argument of the Respondent, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association. Explain how the distinction between a “transfer fee” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 and a “working capital fee” under the Association’s CC&Rs was crucial to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain why the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the re-hearing, citing specific evidence presented by the Association.
4. Evaluate the importance of the Association’s Board Meeting Minutes from May 18, 2016, as a piece of evidence. Detail the specific findings and resolutions from that meeting and explain how they were used to build the Association’s defense.
5. Examine the roles of the key individuals and entities in this administrative action. Describe the functions and contributions of Brian Sopatyk (Petitioner), Amy Telnes (Association Manager), Michael Cibellis (Association President), Thomas Shedden (Administrative Law Judge), and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to provide certain disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser. It also limits the fee an association can charge for the preparation of these documents to an aggregate of four hundred dollars.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. In this case, section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs authorized the collection of a fee from new owners for a working capital fund.
Final Administrative Decision
The ultimate, legally binding decision in the administrative matter. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision became the final administrative decision after the Department of Real Estate did not act to accept, reject, or modify it within the statutory time limit.
HUD-1 Disclosure Statement
A document used in the petitioner’s property purchase that itemized all charges imposed upon a borrower and seller for a real estate transaction. It was used as evidence to show how the $660 “Transfer Fee” and $30 “Resale Statement Fee” were assessed and paid.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Brian Sopatyk was the petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Reserve Fund
An account maintained by the Condominium Association. The Association referred to its “working capital fund” as the Reserve Fund, into which the disputed $660 fees were deposited.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. was the respondent.
Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee
A $30 fee charged by the Association for the preparation of disclosure documents. The Association argued this was the fee governed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260, which was compliant with the $400 statutory cap.
Transfer Fee
In the context of the petitioner’s allegation, a fee charged for resale disclosure services, limited to $400 by statute. In the context of the Association’s defense, this was the erroneous label applied to the working capital fee.
Working Capital Fee
A fee authorized by section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, assessed to each new owner to be deposited into the working capital fund (or Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 fee was this type of fee, not one for resale disclosure.
Blog Post – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute
We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?
For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.
1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm
A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.
The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.
Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.
The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.
2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form
Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.
The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.
3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War
How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.
Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.
In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”
As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.
4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase
What it really means to have to prove your case.
In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:
The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.
5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility
When every word you say (and write) is on the record.
A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.
There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”
The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.
Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details
This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.
The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brian Sopatyk(petitioner) Represented himself at the initial hearing; sought rehearing
Nathan Andrews(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Jill M. Kennedy(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Judy Sopatyk(petitioner's wife) Co-purchaser of the condominium unit,
Chance Peterson(petitioner attorney) ASU Alumni Law Group
Respondent Side
Bradley R. Jardine(HOA attorney) Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
Amy Telnes(property manager/witness) The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Association manager who testified,
Michael Cibellis(Association president/witness) The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Testified at the rehearing
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Abby Hansen(HOA Coordinator) Contact for requests for rehearing
Greg Hanchett(Interim Director) OAH Signed the Certification of Decision,
Other Participants
Rosella J. Rodriguez(administrative staff) Administrative staff for transmission/mailing,
