Tag Archives: A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16

John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120009-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John D Klemmer Counsel —
Respondent Caribbean Gardens Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne, Esq., Lydia A. Pierce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 1, Sections 1.5 and 1.8; Article 3, Section 3.4; Article 4, Section 4.1; Article 8, Section 8.1; and, Article 12, Section 12.4

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent Association violated the cited CC&R provisions by refusing to manage the disputed area, which the ALJ determined was a limited common element.

Why this result: The Petitioner lost because the area in dispute was determined to be a 'limited common element' (a balcony serving Unit 207) under Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1212(A)), not a 'common area' the Association was required to manage under the referenced CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusal to manage, operate, maintain and administer common area

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated multiple CC&Rs by refusing to maintain an area between Unit 206 and Unit 207, which he claimed was a common area. The HOA argued the area was a limited common element. The ALJ concluded, relying on A.R.S. § 33-1212(A), that the disputed area was a limited common element (a balcony) allocated exclusively to Unit 207, thus Petitioner failed to establish a CC&R violation.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is dismissed. Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(A)
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Section 1.5
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Section 1.6
  • CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4
  • CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1
  • CC&Rs Article 8, Section 8.1
  • CC&Rs Article 12, Section 12.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, common elements, limited common elements, balcony dispute, CC&R violation, A.R.S. 33-1212
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212
  • A.R.S. § 33-1218
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Sections 1.5, 1.8
  • CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4
  • CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1
  • CC&Rs Article 8, Section 8.1
  • CC&Rs Article 12, Section 12.4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120009-REL Decision – 843358.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:00 (129.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120009-REL


Briefing Document: Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative case of John D. Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association (No. 21F-H2120009-REL). The core of the dispute was the legal classification of an outdoor space located between two condominium units. The Petitioner, a unit owner, argued the space was a “common area” that the Association was legally obligated to manage under its governing documents (CC&Rs). The Respondent Association countered that the space was a “balcony” or “limited common element” for the exclusive use of the adjacent unit owner.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition. While the Association’s 1973 CC&Rs and the official Plat document were ambiguous regarding the space, the decision hinged on the application of a later state statute, Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1212. This statute defines balconies designed to serve a single unit as “limited common elements” allocated exclusively to that unit. Because the disputed area was only accessible from a single unit (Unit 207), the ALJ concluded it met this statutory definition. Consequently, the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association had violated its CC&Rs by not treating the space as a general common area.

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Case Overview

Case Name

John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

Case Number

21F-H2120009-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn

Hearing Date

November 6, 2020

Decision Date

December 17, 2020

Petitioner

John D. Klemmer (Unit 101 Owner), representing himself

Respondent

Caribbean Gardens Association, represented by Nicole D. Payne, Esq.

Fundamental Dispute: The case centered on whether the Caribbean Gardens Association violated its Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by refusing to manage, operate, and maintain an outdoor area located on the second level between Units 206 and 207, which the Petitioner claimed was a common area belonging to all 40 unit owners.

Petitioner’s Position (John D. Klemmer)

The Petitioner’s case rested on the argument that the disputed area was a “common area” or “common element” as defined by the Association’s governing documents.

• Core Allegation: On April 15, 2020, the Caribbean Board violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs by refusing to administer a common area.

• Basis of Claim: The Petitioner argued that all space not explicitly delineated on the official Plat document as an “Apartment,” “patio,” or “balcony” must be considered a common area. The area in question is blank on the Plat.

• Ownership Argument: Each of the 40 unit owners possesses an “undivided ownership interest in the common areas and [common] elements.” He contended that if the Board did not acknowledge ownership, this common area would be lost to its rightful owners.

• Evidence of Misuse: The Petitioner presented photographic evidence showing that the owners of Unit 207 were exclusively occupying the space as if it were another room, adding furniture, walls, and making improvements to the exterior walls of Unit 206.

• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition alleged violations of the following articles:

◦ Article 1, Sections 1.5 and 1.8: Definitions of “Apartment” and “Plat.”

◦ Article 3, Section 3.4: Requirement for the Association to manage Common Elements.

◦ Article 4, Section 4.1: Vests title of Common Elements in the owners.

◦ Article 8, Section 8.1: Pertains to encroachments.

◦ Article 12, Section 12.4: Binds all owners to the Declaration.

Respondent’s Position (Caribbean Gardens Association)

The Association denied the allegations, arguing that the space was not a common area under its purview.

• Core Defense: The disputed area is not a common area but is instead a “balcony” attached to Unit 207, or alternatively, a “limited common element” for the exclusive use of the Unit 207 owners.

• Testimony: Board Member Alex Gomez testified that the Board’s position is that the area is a balcony. He further stated that the Association has never maintained any balconies within the community, including the one in question.

• Procedural Motions: The Association initially filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the Petitioner was seeking relief that couldn’t be granted (declaratory and injunctive), and that other procedural and constitutional issues existed. These motions were denied by the tribunal.

Findings of Fact and Evidence

The ALJ established the following key facts based on the hearing record:

• Description of Disputed Area: The space is a concrete slab on the second level, located between the exterior walls of Unit 206 and Unit 207. It includes outside iron railings that fence it off.

• Exclusive Access: The area is not a staircase landing and can only be accessed through a door from a room within Unit 207. This access is an original feature of the building’s construction.

• Status on the Plat: The official Plat document, which defines the boundaries of apartments and their associated balconies and patios, is blank in the location of the disputed area. It is not specifically delineated in any way.

• Current Use: Photographic evidence confirmed the space contains furniture and other decorative items, indicating exclusive use by the occupants of Unit 207.

Legal Analysis and Conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge

The ALJ’s decision was based on an interpretation of both the community’s CC&Rs and overriding state law.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, Mr. Klemmer, bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association had violated the specified CC&R provisions.

• Ambiguity in Governing Documents: The judge acknowledged a conflict in the 1973 CC&Rs.

◦ Article 1.5 defines an “Apartment” by its depiction on the Plat, which does not include the disputed area.

◦ Article 1.6 defines “Common Elements” as “all other portions of the Property except the Apartments.” This definition would logically include the undelineated disputed area.

• Application of State Statute: The decisive factor was the application of A.R.S. § 33-1212, a statute enacted in 1985, after the CC&Rs were recorded. The judge focused on subsection 4:

• Final Conclusion: The ALJ concluded that the disputed area fits the statutory description of a balcony “designed to serve a single unit,” as it is only accessible from Unit 207. Therefore, under Arizona law, it is classified as a “limited common element” allocated exclusively to that unit. Because it is not a general common area, the Association had no obligation to manage it as such. The Petitioner thus failed to establish a violation of the CC&Rs.

Final Order

Based on the analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders on December 17, 2020:

1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.






Study Guide – 21F-H2120009-REL


Study Guide: Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John D. Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association, No. 21F-H2120009-REL. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key legal and case-specific terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner, John D. Klemmer, in his petition filed on August 21, 2020?

3. Describe the specific physical location and characteristics of the disputed area at the heart of this case.

4. On what grounds did the Petitioner argue that the disputed area should be considered a “common area”?

5. What was the initial position of the Caribbean Gardens Association Board regarding the status of the disputed area, as testified by Board Member Alex Gomez?

6. Before the hearing, what arguments did the Respondent make in its Motion for Summary Judgment?

7. How do the CC&Rs define an “Apartment” versus “Common Elements”?

8. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rely upon to classify the disputed area?

9. What was the final conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge regarding the nature of the disputed area?

10. What was the final recommended order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are John D. Klemmer, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Caribbean Gardens Association, the Respondent and condominium community association. Mr. Klemmer represented himself, while the Association was represented by counsel, Nicole D. Payne, Esq.

2. The Petitioner alleged that on April 15, 2020, the Caribbean Board violated its CC&Rs by refusing to manage, operate, maintain, and administer a specific “common area.” He claimed this refusal would lead to the loss of the area to its rightful owners, the 40 unit owners of Caribbean Gardens.

3. The disputed area is located on the second level of the building, between the exterior walls of Unit 206 and Unit 207. It consists of a concrete slab with attached iron railings and can only be accessed through a door from Unit 207.

4. The Petitioner argued the area was a “common area” because it was not specifically delineated on the Plat document as part of an apartment, patio, or balcony. He contended that any space not explicitly designated as part of a unit on the Plat must therefore be a common element belonging to all 40 unit owners.

5. Board Member Alex Gomez testified that the Board’s position was that the disputed area is not a common area but is a “balcony” attached to Unit 207. He stated that the Association has never maintained any balconies, including the one in question.

6. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Respondent argued that the Petitioner was seeking relief that the Tribunal could not grant, that he should have filed a derivative action, and that he had not paid sufficient filing fees for multiple issues. The Respondent also challenged the constitutionality of the Enabling Statutes and the jurisdiction of the Department and the Tribunal.

7. Article 1, Section 1.5 of the CC&Rs defines an “Apartment” as the space enclosed by the planes shown on the Plat, including any patio or balcony areas identified on said Plat. In contrast, Article 1, Section 1.6 defines “Common Elements” as all other portions of the Property except the Apartments, including specific items like pools and landscaping.

8. The Judge relied on A.R.S. § 33-1212, which states that balconies and other fixtures designed to serve a single unit but located outside its boundaries are “limited common elements allocated exclusively to that unit.”

9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the disputed area must be a balcony “designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit’s boundaries.” Therefore, it is considered a limited common element, and the Petitioner did not establish that the Caribbean Gardens Association had violated any CC&R provisions.

10. The recommended order was that the Petitioner’s Petition be dismissed. It was further ordered that the Petitioner bear his own $500.00 filing fee.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the disputed area presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. How did their respective readings of the CC&Rs and the Plat document lead to their opposing conclusions?

2. Discuss the critical role of the Plat document in this dispute. Explain how the blank space on the Plat between Units 206 and 207 created an ambiguity that was central to the arguments of both parties.

3. Trace the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn. Detail her process of weighing the definitions in the 1973 CC&Rs against the provisions of the 1985 Arizona Revised Statutes to reach a final decision.

4. Evaluate the arguments raised by the Caribbean Gardens Association in its Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the motion was not granted, what significant legal and jurisdictional challenges did it present against the Petitioner’s case and the hearing body’s authority?

5. This case highlights a tension between a condominium’s original governing documents (the 1973 Declaration) and subsequent state law (the 1985 Condominium statutes). Discuss how this dynamic influenced the outcome and what it reveals about the hierarchy of legal authority in condominium governance.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over an administrative hearing and issues a written decision. In this case, the ALJ was Kay A. Abramsohn.

Apartment

As defined by Article 1, Section 1.5 of the CC&Rs, it is a part of the Property intended for independent use as a dwelling unit, consisting of the space enclosed by the planes shown on the Plat, including any patio and balcony areas identified on that Plat.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, the governing legal documents for the Caribbean Gardens community. These were originally recorded in 1973.

Common Elements

As defined by Article 1, Section 1.6 of the CC&Rs, this term includes “general common elements” as defined in the former A.R.S. § 33-551, along with specific areas like parking, yards, the swimming pool, and “all other portions of the Property except the Apartments.”

Horizontal Property Regime

The legal framework governing the property, established under A.R.S. § 33-551 through § 33-561 at the time of the 1973 Declaration. These statutes were later repealed and replaced by the current Condominium laws.

Limited Common Elements

A legal classification defined in A.R.S. § 33-1212. It refers to fixtures like porches, balconies, patios, and entryways that are designed to serve a single unit but are located outside that unit’s boundaries, and are therefore allocated exclusively to that unit.

Petition

The formal, single-issue legal document filed by John D. Klemmer with the Department to initiate the dispute, alleging that the Caribbean Board violated its CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party initiating a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John D. Klemmer, a resident of Unit 101.

The official two-page survey map of the Property and all Apartments, attached to the Declaration as Exhibit “B.” It delineates the boundaries of individual units and other areas within the community.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet. It means the evidence presented must be more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact in question is more probable than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Caribbean Gardens Association.

Tribunal

A term used in the decision to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the state agency authorized to hear and decide the contested matter.


Questions

Question

If a balcony or patio serves only my unit but isn't explicitly drawn on the community Plat map, is it considered general common area?

Short Answer

Likely not. Under Arizona law, fixtures designed to serve a single unit located outside its boundaries are considered 'limited common elements' allocated exclusively to that unit, even if the Plat is ambiguous.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the ALJ determined that an area not drawn on the Plat was a limited common element because it was physically accessible only from one unit. The judge cited A.R.S. § 33-1212(4), which defines features like balconies and patios designed to serve a single unit as limited common elements.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that the disputed area must be a balcony 'designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit’s boundaries.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)

Topic Tags

  • Common Elements
  • Plat Maps
  • Property Boundaries

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a petition against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must demonstrate that their claims are more probable than not. It is not the HOA's job to disprove the allegations; the homeowner must provide evidence of greater weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that, as alleged, Caribbean has violated CC&Rs…

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear disputes about CC&R violations and maintenance issues?

Short Answer

Yes, the Department has jurisdiction to receive petitions and hear disputes regarding property owners and condominium associations.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that the Tribunal has the authority to hear contested matters between owners and associations regarding alleged violations of the CC&Rs and statutes.

Alj Quote

The Department has jurisdiction to receive petitions, hear disputes between a property owner and a condominium community association, and take other actions pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.), Title 33, Chapter 16.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • ADRE Authority
  • Dispute Resolution

Question

Who is responsible for paying the filing fee if the homeowner loses the hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) typically bears the cost of the filing fee if the petition is dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, after dismissing the homeowner's petition, the judge ordered the homeowner to bear the cost of the $500 filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • Fees
  • Penalties
  • Hearing Costs

Question

What specifically counts as a 'limited common element' under Arizona law?

Short Answer

Fixtures like shutters, awnings, balconies, and patios that are outside a unit's boundaries but designed to serve that single unit.

Detailed Answer

State statute specifically lists items such as doorsteps, stoops, porches, balconies, and exterior doors as limited common elements if they are designed for the exclusive use of one unit.

Alj Quote

Any shutters, awnings, window boxes, doorsteps, stoops, porches, balconies, entryways or patios, and all exterior doors and windows or other fixtures designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit's boundaries, are limited common elements allocated exclusively to that unit.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1212

Topic Tags

  • Definitions
  • Limited Common Elements
  • Statutes

Question

Can the HOA Board make rules regarding the use of common elements without a vote of the owners?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the exclusive right to manage and regulate common elements.

Detailed Answer

The CC&Rs in this case provided the Board with the exclusive power to establish rules governing the use and maintenance of common elements.

Alj Quote

The Board shall have the exclusive right and power to establish and impose rules and regulations governing the use, maintenance and development of all and any part of the Common Elements…

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4

Topic Tags

  • Board Authority
  • Rules and Regulations
  • Common Elements

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120009-REL
Case Title
John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association
Decision Date
2020-12-17
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John D. Klemmer (petitioner)
    represented himself

Respondent Side

  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Alex Gomez (board member)
    Caribbean Board
    testified at hearing
  • Lydia A. Pierce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120012-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-12-13
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Anthony & Karen Negrete Counsel —
Respondent Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Quinten Cupps, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was granted because the statute cited by Petitioners (A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)) regarding mandatory design approval meetings applies only to the construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure,' not to a shed.

Why this result: The key statute relied upon by Petitioners was deemed inapplicable to the construction of a shed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide opportunity to participate in design approval meeting for replacement shed

Petitioners alleged they were not given the opportunity to participate in a final design approval meeting for building a replacement shed on their property, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Orders: Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Design Review, Shed, Architectural Approval, Motion to Dismiss, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120012-REL Decision – 842597.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:17 (131.7 KB)

Questions

Question

Do I need HOA approval to replace an old structure (like a shed) that was approved years ago?

Short Answer

Yes. Prior approval of an original structure does not automatically apply to a replacement, especially if the location or condition changes.

Detailed Answer

Even if a structure was approved in the past, building a replacement is considered a new improvement or alteration. The ALJ found that despite having a shed approved in 2005, the homeowners were required to seek approval for the new shed, particularly because the governing documents stated that no improvements or alterations could be made without prior written approval.

Alj Quote

All subsequent additions to or changes or alterations in any building, fence, wall or other structure … shall be subject to the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1(a)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Improvements
  • Grandfathering

Question

Is the HOA required to hold a 'final design approval meeting' for backyard projects like sheds?

Short Answer

No. The legal requirement for a design approval meeting applies only to the main residential structure.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates a design approval meeting, is specific to the new construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure.' It does not apply to ancillary structures like sheds.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) contains a mandate for a “design approval” meeting in the circumstance of construction of a “main residential structure.” That was not the circumstance in this case.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Topic Tags

  • Meetings
  • Statutory Interpretation
  • Homeowner Rights

Question

Can I move an approved structure to a different location on my lot without new approval?

Short Answer

No. Moving a structure is considered a change that must adhere to current guidelines and receive approval.

Detailed Answer

The HOA successfully argued that an approval from 2005 was for a specific location and condition. Moving the structure constitutes a change that requires adherence to current guidelines.

Alj Quote

Again, the shed that was approved in 2005 cannot move or change- it is not denied, it simply cannot be moved or change. Any changes must adhere to the guidelines and be approved.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • modifications
  • Architectural Review
  • Compliance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof when a homeowner challenges an HOA in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proving the HOA violated the law.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, it is up to the homeowner to provide evidence that carries more weight than the evidence offered by the HOA to prove a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Legal Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Can the HOA restrict the height and placement of backyard sheds?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA can enforce specific design guidelines regarding dimensions and location relative to neighbors and the street.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld the validity of Design Guidelines that mandated maximum heights and specific lot placements to ensure conformity with city codes and minimize visibility.

Alj Quote

Sundance Design Guidelines regarding “sheds” mandates: (a) a maximum height, including the roof pitch, of no more than eight (8) feet, … [and] (c) lot placement has to conform to City codes and have approval from the Design Committee “based on neighboring properties and visibility from the street,”

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Guidelines
  • Restrictions
  • Property Use

Question

What happens if I start construction without approval?

Short Answer

The HOA may issue violation notices, impose fines, and require the structure be returned to its original state.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the HOA acted within its rights to issue violation notices and fines when it discovered unapproved construction. They also warned the homeowner to return the property to its original state.

Alj Quote

If the work has been started or completed, you will have 30 days from the date of this letter to have the submitted items returned to the original state. Or fines will be imposed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

  • Violations
  • Fines
  • Enforcement

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120012-REL
Case Title
Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-12-13
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Do I need HOA approval to replace an old structure (like a shed) that was approved years ago?

Short Answer

Yes. Prior approval of an original structure does not automatically apply to a replacement, especially if the location or condition changes.

Detailed Answer

Even if a structure was approved in the past, building a replacement is considered a new improvement or alteration. The ALJ found that despite having a shed approved in 2005, the homeowners were required to seek approval for the new shed, particularly because the governing documents stated that no improvements or alterations could be made without prior written approval.

Alj Quote

All subsequent additions to or changes or alterations in any building, fence, wall or other structure … shall be subject to the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1(a)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Improvements
  • Grandfathering

Question

Is the HOA required to hold a 'final design approval meeting' for backyard projects like sheds?

Short Answer

No. The legal requirement for a design approval meeting applies only to the main residential structure.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates a design approval meeting, is specific to the new construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure.' It does not apply to ancillary structures like sheds.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) contains a mandate for a “design approval” meeting in the circumstance of construction of a “main residential structure.” That was not the circumstance in this case.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Topic Tags

  • Meetings
  • Statutory Interpretation
  • Homeowner Rights

Question

Can I move an approved structure to a different location on my lot without new approval?

Short Answer

No. Moving a structure is considered a change that must adhere to current guidelines and receive approval.

Detailed Answer

The HOA successfully argued that an approval from 2005 was for a specific location and condition. Moving the structure constitutes a change that requires adherence to current guidelines.

Alj Quote

Again, the shed that was approved in 2005 cannot move or change- it is not denied, it simply cannot be moved or change. Any changes must adhere to the guidelines and be approved.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • modifications
  • Architectural Review
  • Compliance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof when a homeowner challenges an HOA in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proving the HOA violated the law.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, it is up to the homeowner to provide evidence that carries more weight than the evidence offered by the HOA to prove a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Legal Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Can the HOA restrict the height and placement of backyard sheds?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA can enforce specific design guidelines regarding dimensions and location relative to neighbors and the street.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld the validity of Design Guidelines that mandated maximum heights and specific lot placements to ensure conformity with city codes and minimize visibility.

Alj Quote

Sundance Design Guidelines regarding “sheds” mandates: (a) a maximum height, including the roof pitch, of no more than eight (8) feet, … [and] (c) lot placement has to conform to City codes and have approval from the Design Committee “based on neighboring properties and visibility from the street,”

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Guidelines
  • Restrictions
  • Property Use

Question

What happens if I start construction without approval?

Short Answer

The HOA may issue violation notices, impose fines, and require the structure be returned to its original state.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the HOA acted within its rights to issue violation notices and fines when it discovered unapproved construction. They also warned the homeowner to return the property to its original state.

Alj Quote

If the work has been started or completed, you will have 30 days from the date of this letter to have the submitted items returned to the original state. Or fines will be imposed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

  • Violations
  • Fines
  • Enforcement

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120012-REL
Case Title
Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-12-13
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Anthony Negrete (petitioner)
  • Karen Negrete (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Quinten Cupps (HOA attorney)
    Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel —
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, ruling that the DMMA Communication Committee was not subject to the open meetings law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because it did not hold 'regularly scheduled meetings',,,.

Why this result: The committee met too infrequently and without regular intervals to be deemed 'regularly scheduled' for the purposes of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether a Communications Committee meeting must be open to members under the open meetings law.

Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated the open meetings statute by closing the September 6, 2017 meeting of the Communications Committee. The issue was whether this committee constituted a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,,,.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the DMMA Communication committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings, meaning it was not subject to the open meetings law under A.R.S. § 33-1804,,,.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:03 (106.4 KB)

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1817005-REL/605190.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:45:58 (77.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing on the Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association Case

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions regarding a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA or Respondent). The core of the case, No. 18F-H1817005-REL, is the legal interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as it appears in Arizona’s open meeting statute for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The conflict arose when the DMMA Communications Committee held a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, which Mr. Moselle was barred from attending. He contended this violated the statute’s open meeting requirements. The DMMA argued the committee was exempt because its meetings were infrequent and not held at fixed intervals.

In two separate decisions—an initial ruling on December 7, 2017, and a second after a rehearing on May 10, 2018—Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer consistently ruled in favor of the DMMA. The judge concluded that “regularly scheduled” applies to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly). Since the Communications Committee met only four times in two years without a set schedule, it was not subject to the open meeting law. The judge determined that the statute’s general policy favoring openness does not override its more specific provisions. Ultimately, the petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute proceeded through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, culminating in a definitive ruling after a granted rehearing.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging DMMA violated open meeting laws.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Mr. Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

An initial hearing is conducted before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer.

December 7, 2017

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

January 4, 2018

Mr. Moselle files a request for rehearing, citing “newly discovered material evidence” and arguing the decision was contrary to law.

January 26, 2018

The Department of Real Estate grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted before the ALJ.

May 10, 2018

The ALJ issues a final decision after rehearing, again denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

Core Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The central legal question was whether the DMMA Communications Committee was subject to the open meeting requirements mandated by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. The resolution of the case hinged on the interpretation of specific language within the statute.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): “It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.”

Arguments Presented by the Parties

The petitioner and respondent presented starkly different interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled.”

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Mr. Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting scheduled in a “normal manner” or “ordinary fashion,” not necessarily one that recurs at fixed intervals.

• Primacy of Openness Policy: He emphasized the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), asserting that the statute’s clear preference for open meetings should guide the interpretation of any ambiguous terms.

• Arguments for Rehearing: In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Moselle cited newly discovered evidence (an email sent by the DMMA after the first hearing) and suggested the ALJ should evaluate whether the DMMA had misled the court regarding the Board’s actions on the committee’s recommendation.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA contended that the phrase “regularly scheduled” plainly refers to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals, “such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: As evidence, the DMMA testified that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed pattern, holding only four meetings in 2016 and 2017 (twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and the contested meeting of September 6, 2017).

• Lack of Board Action: The DMMA further argued that a recommendation from the committee to the Board of Directors was not acted upon, which it presented as evidence that the committee was not “conducting any actual business of the Board.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Rulings

Across both decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided a consistent legal analysis that ultimately favored the respondent’s interpretation of the statute.

Initial Decision (December 7, 2017)

• The ALJ concluded that the DMMA Communications Committee does not hold “regularly scheduled meetings.”

• Based on this finding, the committee was deemed not subject to the open meetings law.

• The decision to hold a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, was therefore ruled not to be a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

• The petitioner’s petition was denied.

Decision After Rehearing (May 10, 2018)

• Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ reaffirmed the conclusion that the “plain language” of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) applies to meetings that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the ALJ settled on this interpretation.

• Policy vs. Specifics: The decision explicitly states that the general policy favoring open meetings in subsection (F) “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

• Petitioner’s Testimony: The ALJ noted that during the rehearing, Mr. Moselle’s own testimony on cross-examination appeared to support the court’s interpretation. When questioned about other DMMA committees, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

• Final Ruling: The ALJ again concluded that the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings at the time of the incident and was therefore not in violation of the statute. The petition was denied for a final time.

Final Disposition

The petition filed by Gary W. Moselle against the Desert Mountain Master Association was denied. The Administrative Law Judge’s order of May 10, 2018, issued after the rehearing, was declared binding on the parties. As per the final notice, any further appeal would require a party to seek judicial review in superior court within thirty-five days of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (Respondent) concerning Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific event on September 6, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file his complaint?

3. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for why its Communications Committee was not subject to the open meetings law?

5. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the key statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

6. What evidence did the Respondent present regarding the frequency of the Communications Committee’s meetings in 2016 and 2017?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party had the responsibility to meet it?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the meaning of “regularly scheduled” in the context of the statute?

9. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued on December 7, 2017?

10. How did the judge weigh the general policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) against the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Gary W. Moselle, the Petitioner, and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), the Respondent. Mr. Moselle was a homeowner who filed a petition against the DMMA, which is the homeowners association for the community.

2. The Petitioner filed his complaint after he was not allowed to attend a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee that was held on September 6, 2017. He alleged this violated Arizona’s open meeting statute.

3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804. This statute governs open meetings for planned communities, such as homeowners associations.

4. The Respondent argued that the Communications Committee did not meet at regular, established intervals and therefore its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” as required by the statute to be open. They also asserted that the committee’s recommendation was not acted upon by the Board, suggesting it was not conducting official business.

5. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting that was scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He asserted this interpretation was supported by the statute’s general policy favoring open meetings.

6. The Respondent provided testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set interval, having held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017. These meetings occurred twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and on September 6, 2017.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring evidence to show that a fact is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, bore the burden of proving the Respondent’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plain language of the statute meant “regularly scheduled” referred to meetings that occur at regular intervals, such as monthly, quarterly, or annually. The judge rejected the Petitioner’s alternate interpretation.

9. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing by citing newly discovered material evidence (an email sent after the first hearing) and arguing the need to evaluate whether the Respondent had misled the judge. He also contended that the initial decision was contrary to law.

10. The judge acknowledged the state’s policy favoring open meetings as stated in subsection (F). However, the judge ruled that this general policy statement did not override the specific provision in subsection (A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing upon the facts, arguments, and legal reasoning presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the principles of statutory construction used by the Administrative Law Judge to resolve this dispute and explain why one interpretation was favored over the other.

2. Examine the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to the final order issued after the rehearing. What were the key legal steps, decisions, and turning points in the process?

3. Discuss the evidence presented by the Desert Mountain Master Association to support its case. How did testimony regarding meeting frequency and the Board’s actions on committee recommendations contribute to the final outcome?

4. Explain the legal relationship between A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Based on the judge’s decision, what is the hierarchy between a statute’s specific provisions and its general policy declarations?

5. During the rehearing, the Petitioner’s own testimony about other committees was noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Explain this apparent contradiction in the Petitioner’s argument and discuss its potential impact on the case.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions on behalf of a government agency.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the dispute, which governs open meetings for planned communities and their boards of directors and committees.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.

Conclusions of Law

The judge’s application of legal principles to the facts of the case to reach a decision.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and homeowners associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA)

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners association located in Scottsdale, Arizona, classified as a Planned Unit Development.

Findings of Fact

The determination of factual events made by a judge from the evidence presented in a trial or hearing.

Gary W. Moselle

The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner within the DMMA who filed the complaint.

Jurisdiction

The official power of a court or agency to hear a case and make legal decisions and judgments.

Open Meetings Law

A law, in this case A.R.S. § 33-1804, that requires meetings of certain entities to be open to all members or the public.

Petition

The formal written request filed with an administrative body or court to initiate a case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition and initiates a legal action.

Planned Unit Development (PUD)

A type of real estate development and community governed by specific state laws, such as those in A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows a fact is more probable than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the previous decision, typically granted due to new evidence or an argument of legal error.

Regularly Scheduled

The key statutory phrase in dispute. The judge interpreted it to mean meetings that occur at regular, established intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party defending against the complaint.

Statutory Construction

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, starting with the plain text of the statute.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Your HOA Committee Might Be Meeting in Secret—And It Could Be Perfectly Legal

As a homeowner in a planned community, you likely know you have the right to attend your HOA’s board of directors meetings. But what about the committee meetings? The finance, architectural, or communications committees often lay the critical groundwork for decisions that ultimately affect your property and fees. Do you have a right to observe their deliberations?

A recent legal case in Scottsdale, Arizona, hinged on the interpretation of a single, seemingly straightforward phrase and exposed a surprising rule about HOA transparency. The case, Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association, reveals critical lessons for any homeowner about the letter of the law and how it can sometimes create legal loopholes that allow committee meetings to happen behind closed doors.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Crucial Loophole: “Regularly Scheduled” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The entire dispute rested on how to interpret the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as written in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.

The Homeowner’s Argument The petitioner, homeowner Gary Moselle, argued that when the Communications Committee of the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA) scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2017, it should be open to all members. His logic was simple: a meeting that is formally scheduled and placed on the calendar is, by any common-sense definition, a “regularly scheduled” meeting.

The HOA’s Counter-Argument The DMMA countered with a different interpretation. They argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” implies a recurring, predictable pattern, such as meetings held monthly, quarterly, or on the third Thursday of every month. The association presented evidence that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set pattern, having convened only four times in 2016 and 2017. Because the meetings were sporadic, the HOA contended they were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore not subject to the open meeting law.

To bolster its case, the HOA added a second point: the committee’s work wasn’t essential to board business anyway. They noted that a recommendation from the committee was never acted upon by the board, suggesting the committee was not conducting “any actual business of the Board” and thus did not require the same level of transparency.

The Surprising Verdict Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer sided with the HOA. The final decision concluded that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings that occur at regular intervals. This created a legal distinction: HOA committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule must be open, but those that meet on an as-needed basis may not be.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Law’s “Spirit” Can Be Trumped by Its “Letter”

Adding another layer to the case was the law’s own powerful statement about its intent. The petitioner pointed to a specific section of the statute designed to ensure transparency.

The Policy Statement The Arizona law contains a strong policy statement declaring that all HOA meetings should be conducted openly. It explicitly directs anyone interpreting the law to favor open meetings.

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

The Legal Reasoning Despite this clear declaration, Judge Eigenheer ruled that a general policy statement does not override the specific and explicit language of the law. The statute does not say all committee meetings must be open; it says “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open. The judge concluded that this specific wording created a clear exception, and the broad policy in favor of transparency could not erase it.

The Impact This is a critical takeaway for understanding how laws are interpreted. This outcome reflects a fundamental principle of statutory construction: while the “spirit” or stated policy of a law provides guidance, it cannot override the plain meaning of the specific words—the “letter”—that the legislature chose to write.

——————————————————————————–

3. A Cautionary Tale: How a Petitioner Undermined His Own Case

The petitioner was granted a rehearing, giving him another chance to argue his case. However, a statement he made during his own testimony dramatically weakened his position.

The Key Testimony During the rehearing on April 20, 2018, the petitioner was asked about other committees within the DMMA. In explaining how they operated, he unintentionally adopted the very definition of “regularly scheduled” that the HOA was using against him. The judge recorded his exact words in the final decision:

…five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

The Consequence The judge seized on this admission in the final ruling. The decision notes that while “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the petitioner himself used the phrase to differentiate between committees that meet at fixed intervals and those that do not. By describing committees that “meet at the request of the chair” as being “not regularly scheduled,” he validated the very interpretation the court was now adopting.

The Lesson This moment serves as a dramatic lesson in the power and precision of language in legal proceedings. In an attempt to describe the function of other committees, the petitioner inadvertently validated his opponent’s core legal argument.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: A Question of Transparency

The ruling in Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association clarifies a significant point in HOA governance. Under this legal interpretation, committees that meet on an ad-hoc basis or “at the call of the chair” may not be subject to open meeting laws. Only those committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule are explicitly required to be open to homeowners.

This ruling draws a bright line between standing committees with fixed schedules and ad-hoc committees that meet “at the call of the chair.” Homeowners should now ask: Which of our committees fall into this second category, and are we comfortable with decisions being shaped behind closed doors?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary W. Moselle (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Desert Mountain Master Association (respondent)
    Organizational party (HOA)
  • Curtis Ekmark (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Charles Markle (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • AHansen (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • djones (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • DGardner (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • ncano (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
    Transmitting staff/clerk