Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:37 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:38 (959.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717026-REL


Briefing Document: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between homeowner Tom Pyron (“Petitioner”) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board of Directors position was open for election in 2017, whereas the Petitioner contended two positions should have been open.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the association’s bylaws, specifically Article III, § 3.02, which governs the staggered terms of office for the three-member board. The ALJ found that a board member’s personal understanding of their term length could not amend the plain language of the bylaws. Based on the bylaw’s schedule for staggered terms, the judge concluded that a pivotal 2015 election could only have filled a one-year and a three-year term, which sequentially led to only one position being open in 2017. The Petitioner’s petition was denied, and this decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Tom Pyron, a condominium owner and member of the Respondent association.

Respondent: Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc., represented by B. Austin Baillio, Esq., of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Case Numbers: 17F-H1717026-REL; HO 17-17/026

Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Final Order By: Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: June 12, 2017.

Final Order Date: July 12, 2017.

The case was initiated when Tom Pyron filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 16, 2017, alleging a violation of the homeowners’ association’s bylaws concerning the 2017 Board of Directors election.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner’s claim centered on the belief that the Respondent improperly noticed the number of available Board positions for the 2017 election.

Core Allegation: The Respondent violated its Bylaws (Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06) by informing members that only one Board position for a one-year term was available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner’s Contention: Two positions—one for a one-year term and one for a two-year term—should have been up for election in 2017.

Basis of Argument: The Petitioner’s argument was built upon the 2015 election of Barbara Ahlstrand. He contended, supported by Ahlstrand’s testimony, that she was elected to a two-year term. Following this logic:

1. Ahlstrand’s term would run from 2015 to 2017.

2. When she resigned in August 2015, her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was appointed to serve the remainder of that two-year term, which would expire in 2017.

3. Therefore, Jeff Oursland should not have been on the ballot for the 2016 election, and his two-year position should have been one of the two seats open for election in 2017.

III. Respondent’s Position and Pre-Hearing Actions

The Respondent denied any violation of its bylaws and maintained that its actions were consistent with the governing documents.

Pre-Hearing Resolution Attempts: In response to the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued election ballots. The Respondent also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution, an offer the Petitioner did not accept.

Core Defense: The Respondent’s position was based on a direct interpretation of Bylaw § 3.02, which dictates the schedule of staggered terms.

Basis of Argument: The Respondent argued that according to the bylaw’s prescribed cycle, only the one-year and three-year positions were up for election in 2015.

1. As it was agreed that Sandra Singer received the most votes and was elected to the three-year term, Barbara Ahlstrand must have been elected to the available one-year term.

2. Therefore, Ahlstrand’s term was set to expire in 2016.

3. Her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was correctly appointed to serve only until the 2016 election.

4. Consequently, Oursland was properly elected to a new two-year term in 2016 (expiring in 2018), and the only seat open in 2017 was the one-year term completed by Steve Molever.

IV. Chronology of Board Elections and Appointments

The dispute originated from differing interpretations of election outcomes from 2014 onward. The Board of Directors has consistently been comprised of three members.

Election Year

Agreed Facts & Election Results

Petitioner’s Interpretation/Contention

Respondent’s Interpretation/Position

Anne Fugate elected to a 3-year term.
John Haunschild elected to a 2-year term.
Ron Cadaret elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Ron Cadaret re-elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Minutes state “the election of Sandra Singer was unanimously passed by acclamation.”

Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term. No other officers were elected.

Based on bylaw § 3.02 and the 2015 Board composition, John Haunschild must have been re-elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2016), and Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term (expiring 2015).

Sandra Singer and Barbara Ahlstrand were elected. Singer received the most votes and was elected to a 3-year term. Ahlstrand resigned 8/3/2015.

Ahlstrand believed she was elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2017).

Per bylaw § 3.02, only the 1-year and 3-year terms were open. Since Singer got the 3-year term, Ahlstrand must have been elected to the 1-year term (expiring 2016).

Appointment

The Board appointed Jeff Oursland to serve the remainder of Ahlstrand’s term.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2017.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2016.

Jeff Oursland was elected to a 2-year term.
Steve Molever was elected to a 1-year term.

Oursland should not have been on the ballot, as his term was not set to expire until 2017.

Oursland’s appointed term expired, so he was properly elected to a new 2-year term (expiring 2018).

No election had been held due to the pending petition.

Two positions should be open for election: the 2-year term (Ahlstrand/Oursland’s) and the 1-year term (Molever’s).

Only one position is open for election: the 1-year term completed by Molever.

V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the legal standard of “a preponderance of the evidence” and a strict textual interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation.

Primacy of Bylaw Language: The judge’s central legal conclusion was that the bylaws must be interpreted based on their plain meaning. Key quotes from the decision include:

Key Legal Finding: The pivotal determination concerned the 2015 election. The ALJ found that under the “plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015.”

◦ Because the parties agreed that Ms. Singer was elected to the three-year term, the judge concluded that “Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term.”

◦ This finding invalidated the Petitioner’s core premise that Ahlstrand had begun a two-year term.

Consequential Logic: This central finding created a direct logical chain that affirmed the Respondent’s actions:

1. Ms. Ahlstrand’s term was for one year, expiring in 2016.

2. When she resigned, the Board appointed Mr. Oursland to serve the remainder of her term, which correctly ended at the 2016 election.

3. Mr. Oursland was therefore “properly elected to a two-year term at that time [2016], which will expire in 2018.”

VI. Final Disposition

Based on the analysis of the bylaws and the sequence of elections, the ALJ ruled against the Petitioner.

Recommended Order (June 19, 2017): The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

Final Order (July 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Final Order states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. The document outlines eight potential causes for which a rehearing or review may be granted, including procedural irregularities, misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, or a finding of fact that is arbitrary or contrary to law.


Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:49 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:50 (959.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717026-REL


Briefing Document: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between homeowner Tom Pyron (“Petitioner”) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board of Directors position was open for election in 2017, whereas the Petitioner contended two positions should have been open.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the association’s bylaws, specifically Article III, § 3.02, which governs the staggered terms of office for the three-member board. The ALJ found that a board member’s personal understanding of their term length could not amend the plain language of the bylaws. Based on the bylaw’s schedule for staggered terms, the judge concluded that a pivotal 2015 election could only have filled a one-year and a three-year term, which sequentially led to only one position being open in 2017. The Petitioner’s petition was denied, and this decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Tom Pyron, a condominium owner and member of the Respondent association.

Respondent: Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc., represented by B. Austin Baillio, Esq., of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Case Numbers: 17F-H1717026-REL; HO 17-17/026

Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Final Order By: Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: June 12, 2017.

Final Order Date: July 12, 2017.

The case was initiated when Tom Pyron filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 16, 2017, alleging a violation of the homeowners’ association’s bylaws concerning the 2017 Board of Directors election.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner’s claim centered on the belief that the Respondent improperly noticed the number of available Board positions for the 2017 election.

Core Allegation: The Respondent violated its Bylaws (Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06) by informing members that only one Board position for a one-year term was available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner’s Contention: Two positions—one for a one-year term and one for a two-year term—should have been up for election in 2017.

Basis of Argument: The Petitioner’s argument was built upon the 2015 election of Barbara Ahlstrand. He contended, supported by Ahlstrand’s testimony, that she was elected to a two-year term. Following this logic:

1. Ahlstrand’s term would run from 2015 to 2017.

2. When she resigned in August 2015, her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was appointed to serve the remainder of that two-year term, which would expire in 2017.

3. Therefore, Jeff Oursland should not have been on the ballot for the 2016 election, and his two-year position should have been one of the two seats open for election in 2017.

III. Respondent’s Position and Pre-Hearing Actions

The Respondent denied any violation of its bylaws and maintained that its actions were consistent with the governing documents.

Pre-Hearing Resolution Attempts: In response to the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued election ballots. The Respondent also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution, an offer the Petitioner did not accept.

Core Defense: The Respondent’s position was based on a direct interpretation of Bylaw § 3.02, which dictates the schedule of staggered terms.

Basis of Argument: The Respondent argued that according to the bylaw’s prescribed cycle, only the one-year and three-year positions were up for election in 2015.

1. As it was agreed that Sandra Singer received the most votes and was elected to the three-year term, Barbara Ahlstrand must have been elected to the available one-year term.

2. Therefore, Ahlstrand’s term was set to expire in 2016.

3. Her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was correctly appointed to serve only until the 2016 election.

4. Consequently, Oursland was properly elected to a new two-year term in 2016 (expiring in 2018), and the only seat open in 2017 was the one-year term completed by Steve Molever.

IV. Chronology of Board Elections and Appointments

The dispute originated from differing interpretations of election outcomes from 2014 onward. The Board of Directors has consistently been comprised of three members.

Election Year

Agreed Facts & Election Results

Petitioner’s Interpretation/Contention

Respondent’s Interpretation/Position

Anne Fugate elected to a 3-year term.
John Haunschild elected to a 2-year term.
Ron Cadaret elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Ron Cadaret re-elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Minutes state “the election of Sandra Singer was unanimously passed by acclamation.”

Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term. No other officers were elected.

Based on bylaw § 3.02 and the 2015 Board composition, John Haunschild must have been re-elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2016), and Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term (expiring 2015).

Sandra Singer and Barbara Ahlstrand were elected. Singer received the most votes and was elected to a 3-year term. Ahlstrand resigned 8/3/2015.

Ahlstrand believed she was elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2017).

Per bylaw § 3.02, only the 1-year and 3-year terms were open. Since Singer got the 3-year term, Ahlstrand must have been elected to the 1-year term (expiring 2016).

Appointment

The Board appointed Jeff Oursland to serve the remainder of Ahlstrand’s term.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2017.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2016.

Jeff Oursland was elected to a 2-year term.
Steve Molever was elected to a 1-year term.

Oursland should not have been on the ballot, as his term was not set to expire until 2017.

Oursland’s appointed term expired, so he was properly elected to a new 2-year term (expiring 2018).

No election had been held due to the pending petition.

Two positions should be open for election: the 2-year term (Ahlstrand/Oursland’s) and the 1-year term (Molever’s).

Only one position is open for election: the 1-year term completed by Molever.

V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the legal standard of “a preponderance of the evidence” and a strict textual interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation.

Primacy of Bylaw Language: The judge’s central legal conclusion was that the bylaws must be interpreted based on their plain meaning. Key quotes from the decision include:

Key Legal Finding: The pivotal determination concerned the 2015 election. The ALJ found that under the “plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015.”

◦ Because the parties agreed that Ms. Singer was elected to the three-year term, the judge concluded that “Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term.”

◦ This finding invalidated the Petitioner’s core premise that Ahlstrand had begun a two-year term.

Consequential Logic: This central finding created a direct logical chain that affirmed the Respondent’s actions:

1. Ms. Ahlstrand’s term was for one year, expiring in 2016.

2. When she resigned, the Board appointed Mr. Oursland to serve the remainder of her term, which correctly ended at the 2016 election.

3. Mr. Oursland was therefore “properly elected to a two-year term at that time [2016], which will expire in 2018.”

VI. Final Disposition

Based on the analysis of the bylaws and the sequence of elections, the ALJ ruled against the Petitioner.

Recommended Order (June 19, 2017): The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

Final Order (July 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Final Order states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. The document outlines eight potential causes for which a rehearing or review may be granted, including procedural irregularities, misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, or a finding of fact that is arbitrary or contrary to law.


Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:26 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:26 (959.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717026-REL


Briefing Document: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between homeowner Tom Pyron (“Petitioner”) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board of Directors position was open for election in 2017, whereas the Petitioner contended two positions should have been open.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the association’s bylaws, specifically Article III, § 3.02, which governs the staggered terms of office for the three-member board. The ALJ found that a board member’s personal understanding of their term length could not amend the plain language of the bylaws. Based on the bylaw’s schedule for staggered terms, the judge concluded that a pivotal 2015 election could only have filled a one-year and a three-year term, which sequentially led to only one position being open in 2017. The Petitioner’s petition was denied, and this decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Tom Pyron, a condominium owner and member of the Respondent association.

Respondent: Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc., represented by B. Austin Baillio, Esq., of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Case Numbers: 17F-H1717026-REL; HO 17-17/026

Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Final Order By: Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: June 12, 2017.

Final Order Date: July 12, 2017.

The case was initiated when Tom Pyron filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 16, 2017, alleging a violation of the homeowners’ association’s bylaws concerning the 2017 Board of Directors election.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner’s claim centered on the belief that the Respondent improperly noticed the number of available Board positions for the 2017 election.

Core Allegation: The Respondent violated its Bylaws (Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06) by informing members that only one Board position for a one-year term was available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner’s Contention: Two positions—one for a one-year term and one for a two-year term—should have been up for election in 2017.

Basis of Argument: The Petitioner’s argument was built upon the 2015 election of Barbara Ahlstrand. He contended, supported by Ahlstrand’s testimony, that she was elected to a two-year term. Following this logic:

1. Ahlstrand’s term would run from 2015 to 2017.

2. When she resigned in August 2015, her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was appointed to serve the remainder of that two-year term, which would expire in 2017.

3. Therefore, Jeff Oursland should not have been on the ballot for the 2016 election, and his two-year position should have been one of the two seats open for election in 2017.

III. Respondent’s Position and Pre-Hearing Actions

The Respondent denied any violation of its bylaws and maintained that its actions were consistent with the governing documents.

Pre-Hearing Resolution Attempts: In response to the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued election ballots. The Respondent also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution, an offer the Petitioner did not accept.

Core Defense: The Respondent’s position was based on a direct interpretation of Bylaw § 3.02, which dictates the schedule of staggered terms.

Basis of Argument: The Respondent argued that according to the bylaw’s prescribed cycle, only the one-year and three-year positions were up for election in 2015.

1. As it was agreed that Sandra Singer received the most votes and was elected to the three-year term, Barbara Ahlstrand must have been elected to the available one-year term.

2. Therefore, Ahlstrand’s term was set to expire in 2016.

3. Her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was correctly appointed to serve only until the 2016 election.

4. Consequently, Oursland was properly elected to a new two-year term in 2016 (expiring in 2018), and the only seat open in 2017 was the one-year term completed by Steve Molever.

IV. Chronology of Board Elections and Appointments

The dispute originated from differing interpretations of election outcomes from 2014 onward. The Board of Directors has consistently been comprised of three members.

Election Year

Agreed Facts & Election Results

Petitioner’s Interpretation/Contention

Respondent’s Interpretation/Position

Anne Fugate elected to a 3-year term.
John Haunschild elected to a 2-year term.
Ron Cadaret elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Ron Cadaret re-elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Minutes state “the election of Sandra Singer was unanimously passed by acclamation.”

Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term. No other officers were elected.

Based on bylaw § 3.02 and the 2015 Board composition, John Haunschild must have been re-elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2016), and Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term (expiring 2015).

Sandra Singer and Barbara Ahlstrand were elected. Singer received the most votes and was elected to a 3-year term. Ahlstrand resigned 8/3/2015.

Ahlstrand believed she was elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2017).

Per bylaw § 3.02, only the 1-year and 3-year terms were open. Since Singer got the 3-year term, Ahlstrand must have been elected to the 1-year term (expiring 2016).

Appointment

The Board appointed Jeff Oursland to serve the remainder of Ahlstrand’s term.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2017.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2016.

Jeff Oursland was elected to a 2-year term.
Steve Molever was elected to a 1-year term.

Oursland should not have been on the ballot, as his term was not set to expire until 2017.

Oursland’s appointed term expired, so he was properly elected to a new 2-year term (expiring 2018).

No election had been held due to the pending petition.

Two positions should be open for election: the 2-year term (Ahlstrand/Oursland’s) and the 1-year term (Molever’s).

Only one position is open for election: the 1-year term completed by Molever.

V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the legal standard of “a preponderance of the evidence” and a strict textual interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation.

Primacy of Bylaw Language: The judge’s central legal conclusion was that the bylaws must be interpreted based on their plain meaning. Key quotes from the decision include:

Key Legal Finding: The pivotal determination concerned the 2015 election. The ALJ found that under the “plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015.”

◦ Because the parties agreed that Ms. Singer was elected to the three-year term, the judge concluded that “Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term.”

◦ This finding invalidated the Petitioner’s core premise that Ahlstrand had begun a two-year term.

Consequential Logic: This central finding created a direct logical chain that affirmed the Respondent’s actions:

1. Ms. Ahlstrand’s term was for one year, expiring in 2016.

2. When she resigned, the Board appointed Mr. Oursland to serve the remainder of her term, which correctly ended at the 2016 election.

3. Mr. Oursland was therefore “properly elected to a two-year term at that time [2016], which will expire in 2018.”

VI. Final Disposition

Based on the analysis of the bylaws and the sequence of elections, the ALJ ruled against the Petitioner.

Recommended Order (June 19, 2017): The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

Final Order (July 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Final Order states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. The document outlines eight potential causes for which a rehearing or review may be granted, including procedural irregularities, misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, or a finding of fact that is arbitrary or contrary to law.






Study Guide – 17F-H1717026-REL


Study Guide: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1717026-REL between Tom Pyron (Petitioner) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (Respondent). It covers the central arguments, key evidence, relevant bylaws, and the final legal decision.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the single issue at the heart of Tom Pyron’s petition filed on March 16, 2017?

2. According to the Association’s bylaws, how are Board of Director terms structured when the board consists of three members?

3. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding Jeff Oursland’s term on the Board of Directors?

4. What was the Respondent’s counter-argument regarding Barbara Ahlstrand’s 2015 election and, subsequently, Jeff Oursland’s term?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in an attempt to resolve the dispute with the Petitioner before the hearing?

6. Who was the key witness for the Respondent, and what was their role?

7. Explain the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined in the case documents.

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s core legal reasoning for concluding that only one board position was open in 2017?

9. What was the final outcome of the case as stated in the Recommended Order and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. Following the Final Order issued on July 12, 2017, what legal recourse was available to a party dissatisfied with the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Tom Pyron’s petition alleged that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board position was open for a one-year term in the 2017 election. Pyron contended that two positions—one for a one-year term and another for a two-year term—should have been up for election.

2. Bylaw Article III, § 3.02 specifies that for a three-person board, the directors hold staggered terms of one year, two years, and three years. The bylaw further dictates which terms end at which annual meetings (e.g., the two-year term ends at the second, fourth, sixth, etc., annual meetings).

3. The Petitioner argued that Barbara Ahlstrand was elected to a two-year term in 2015. Therefore, when Jeff Oursland was appointed to fill her vacancy, his term should have expired in 2017, meaning his two-year position should have been on the 2017 ballot.

4. The Respondent argued that under the plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since Sandra Singer received the most votes and secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, meaning Mr. Oursland’s appointed term expired in 2016.

5. In response to the petition, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued ballots to include all candidates who had submitted an application. The Association also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with this resolution.

6. The key witness for the Respondent was Cynthia Quillen. She served as the Community Manager for the Association’s management company, Associated Property Management, and testified about the Board’s composition and her interpretation of the bylaws.

7. “A preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence, which is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The Judge’s decision was based on the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02. This bylaw dictated that only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since the parties agreed Ms. Singer won the three-year term, the Judge concluded Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, making the Respondent’s subsequent actions and election notices correct.

9. The Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate in a Final Order, making it binding on the parties.

10. According to the Final Order, a dissatisfied party could request a rehearing within thirty days by filing a petition setting forth the reasons. The document lists eight specific causes for a rehearing. A party could also appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the 2015 election presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02 to resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the interpretation of governing documents in legal disputes?

2. Trace the chain of events from the 2012 election to the 2017 dispute. Explain how the board composition, terms of office, and specific actions (like Ms. Ahlstrand’s resignation) compounded to create the disagreement at the heart of this case.

3. Discuss the burden of proof in this administrative hearing. Define “preponderance of the evidence” and explain why the Petitioner, Tom Pyron, failed to meet this standard in the view of the Administrative Law Judge.

4. Examine the roles and authorities of the different entities involved: the homeowners’ association Board, the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Administrative Law Judge. How do these bodies interact to resolve disputes within a planned community?

5. Based on the Final Order, outline the legal recourse available to Tom Pyron following the denial of his petition. What specific grounds for a rehearing are mentioned, and what is the process for further appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Acclamation

A form of election where a candidate is declared elected without opposition, as when Sandra Singer’s election was “unanimously passed by acclamation” in 2014.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, draws conclusions of law, and issues a recommended decision. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations. The Commissioner of the Department, Judy Lowe, issued the Final Order in this case.

Bylaws

The governing documents of the homeowners’ association that outline its rules and procedures, including the number of directors, terms of office, and process for filling vacancies.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which accepts and adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order becomes effective and can only be changed by a successful rehearing or judicial appeal.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Pyron, a homeowner in the association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing, defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The Petitioner bore this burden to prove the Respondent violated its bylaws.

Recommended Order

The decision and order issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. In this case, it recommended that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Rehearing

A formal request to have a case heard again. The Final Order specifies that a petition for rehearing must be filed within thirty days and may be granted for specific causes, such as newly discovered evidence or an arbitrary decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Staggered Terms

A system where not all board members are elected at the same time. As defined in Bylaw § 3.02, the three-person board had terms of one, two, and three years to ensure continuity.

Unexpired Portion of the Prior Director’s Term

The remainder of a board member’s term that an appointee serves after the original member resigns or is removed, as specified in Bylaw § 3.6.






Blog Post – 17F-H1717026-REL


We Read an HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To: 3 Shocking Lessons Hidden in the Bylaws

1. Introduction: The Hidden Drama in Your Community’s Fine Print

If you live in a condominium association or a planned community, you’re familiar with the thick packet of governing documents you received at closing—the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Bylaws. For many, these documents are filed away and forgotten, seen as a collection of mundane rules about trash cans and paint colors. But hidden within that legalese is the complete operating manual for your community, and a simple misunderstanding of its contents can have significant consequences.

What happens when a homeowner’s interpretation of the rules clashes with the association’s? In a case from Arizona involving homeowner Tom Pyron and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, the dispute escalated into a formal administrative hearing. The central question was simple: how many board seats were open for election in 2017? But this wasn’t just a procedural disagreement. Court documents reveal that before the hearing, the association offered to re-issue ballots to include all candidates and even “offered to pay Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution.” The homeowner refused.

This decision transforms the case from a simple rules dispute into a cautionary tale about how a deeply held belief can override a pragmatic, no-cost compromise. The official court documents offer a fascinating look at how community governance can go awry, revealing powerful, practical lessons for any homeowner or board member who believes they know what the rules should say.

2. Takeaway 1: Your Beliefs Don’t Overrule the Bylaws

What You Think the Rules Say Doesn’t Matter—Only What They Actually Say

The core of the dispute rested on a belief held by a former board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, who was elected in 2015. She testified that she believed she had been elected to a two-year term. Based on this belief, the petitioner argued that the director appointed to replace her after her resignation should have served until 2017, meaning a two-year position was open for election that year.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, looked not at what anyone believed, but at the “plain language” of the community’s governing documents. The judge’s conclusion was a matter of inescapable logic derived directly from the bylaws:

1. First, Bylaw § 3.02 clearly states that in an election with multiple open seats, “the person receiving the most votes will become the Director with the longest term.”

2. Next, the court record shows that “the parties agreed that… because she got the most votes, Ms. Singer was elected to a three-year term” in the 2015 election.

3. Finally, the judge determined that according to the same bylaw, only the one-year and three-year terms were available in 2015. Since Ms. Singer secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand, by definition, must have been elected to the only other available position: the one-year term.

The lesson is stark and unambiguous: an individual’s interpretation or assumption, however sincere, cannot change the written rules. The bylaws are the ultimate authority. As the judge stated in the final decision, the documents speak for themselves.

The Bylaws do not allow their plain language to be modified or amended by a member’s understanding.

3. Takeaway 2: The Domino Effect of a Single Resignation

A Single Resignation Can Create Years of Confusion

This entire legal conflict was set in motion by a single, routine event: a board member’s resignation. The timeline of events shows how one small action, when combined with a misunderstanding of the rules, can create a ripple effect with long-lasting consequences.

1. On August 3, 2015, the newly elected board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, resigned.

2. The Board then appointed another member, Jeff Oursland, to serve the remainder of her term, as permitted by the bylaws.

3. The critical point of contention became the length of that “remainder.” Was it the rest of a one-year term ending in 2016, or a two-year term ending in 2017?

4. The judge’s determination that Ahlstrand’s original term was only one year (as explained above) meant that Mr. Oursland’s appointed term correctly expired in 2016. He was then properly elected to a new two-year term at the 2016 meeting.

5. This sequence confirmed that the association was correct all along: only one board position (a one-year term) was actually open for election in 2017.

A single resignation created two years of confusion that ultimately required an administrative hearing to resolve. It’s a powerful reminder of how crucial it is for boards to precisely follow their own procedures, especially when handling vacancies and appointments, as one small error can cascade into years of conflict.

4. Takeaway 3: The Hidden Complexity of “Staggered Terms”

“Staggered Terms” Are Designed for Stability, But Can Cause Chaos

Many associations use staggered terms for their board of directors. The concept, outlined in Bylaw § 3.02 for the Cliffs at North Mountain, is simple: instead of all directors being elected at once, they serve terms of varying lengths (in this case, one, two, and three years). This is a common and effective practice designed to ensure leadership continuity and prevent the entire board from turning over in a single election.

However, this case reveals the hidden downside of that system: complexity. The staggered terms created an election cycle where the available term lengths changed every single year. The court documents show that in 2014, the one-year and two-year positions were on the ballot. In 2015, the one-year and three-year terms were available. This rotating schedule was difficult for members—and apparently even some board members—to track accurately.

This built-in complexity was the root cause of the entire disagreement. The system’s lack of intuitive clarity created the exact conditions necessary for a personal belief, like Ms. Ahlstrand’s, to seem plausible even when it was contrary to the bylaws. The very governance structure intended to create stability inadvertently created the fertile ground for confusion, allowing a misunderstanding to grow into a lawsuit.

5. Conclusion: The Power Is in the Paperwork

The overarching theme from this case is that in the world of community associations, the governing documents are the ultimate source of truth. They are not merely suggestions; they are the binding legal framework that dictates how the community must operate. A board’s actions and a homeowner’s rights are all defined within that paperwork.

In the end, the homeowner’s petition was denied, and the judge’s order affirmed the association’s position. The written rules, as found in the bylaws, prevailed over individual beliefs and interpretations. The case stands as a powerful testament to the importance of reading, understanding, and strictly adhering to your community’s foundational documents.

This entire conflict stemmed from a few lines in a legal document—when was the last time you read yours?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Pyron (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Cynthia Quillen (property manager)
    Associated Property Management
    Community Manager

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (coordinator)
    HOA Coordinator/Admin Official listed for rehearing requests and transmission

Other Participants

  • Anne Fugate (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Barbara Ahlstrand (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2015
  • Kevin Downey (witness)
    Candidate for 2017 election
  • John Haunschild (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Ron Cadaret (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012, re-elected 2013
  • Sandra Singer (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2014 and 2015
  • Jeff Oursland (board member)
    Appointed to the Board in 2015, elected 2016
  • Steve Molever (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2016

Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:38 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:41 (959.2 KB)

  • 2016




Study Guide – 17F-H1717026-REL


Study Guide: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1717026-REL between Tom Pyron (Petitioner) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (Respondent). It covers the central arguments, key evidence, relevant bylaws, and the final legal decision.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the single issue at the heart of Tom Pyron’s petition filed on March 16, 2017?

2. According to the Association’s bylaws, how are Board of Director terms structured when the board consists of three members?

3. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding Jeff Oursland’s term on the Board of Directors?

4. What was the Respondent’s counter-argument regarding Barbara Ahlstrand’s 2015 election and, subsequently, Jeff Oursland’s term?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in an attempt to resolve the dispute with the Petitioner before the hearing?

6. Who was the key witness for the Respondent, and what was their role?

7. Explain the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined in the case documents.

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s core legal reasoning for concluding that only one board position was open in 2017?

9. What was the final outcome of the case as stated in the Recommended Order and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. Following the Final Order issued on July 12, 2017, what legal recourse was available to a party dissatisfied with the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Tom Pyron’s petition alleged that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board position was open for a one-year term in the 2017 election. Pyron contended that two positions—one for a one-year term and another for a two-year term—should have been up for election.

2. Bylaw Article III, § 3.02 specifies that for a three-person board, the directors hold staggered terms of one year, two years, and three years. The bylaw further dictates which terms end at which annual meetings (e.g., the two-year term ends at the second, fourth, sixth, etc., annual meetings).

3. The Petitioner argued that Barbara Ahlstrand was elected to a two-year term in 2015. Therefore, when Jeff Oursland was appointed to fill her vacancy, his term should have expired in 2017, meaning his two-year position should have been on the 2017 ballot.

4. The Respondent argued that under the plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since Sandra Singer received the most votes and secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, meaning Mr. Oursland’s appointed term expired in 2016.

5. In response to the petition, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued ballots to include all candidates who had submitted an application. The Association also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with this resolution.

6. The key witness for the Respondent was Cynthia Quillen. She served as the Community Manager for the Association’s management company, Associated Property Management, and testified about the Board’s composition and her interpretation of the bylaws.

7. “A preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence, which is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The Judge’s decision was based on the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02. This bylaw dictated that only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since the parties agreed Ms. Singer won the three-year term, the Judge concluded Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, making the Respondent’s subsequent actions and election notices correct.

9. The Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate in a Final Order, making it binding on the parties.

10. According to the Final Order, a dissatisfied party could request a rehearing within thirty days by filing a petition setting forth the reasons. The document lists eight specific causes for a rehearing. A party could also appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the 2015 election presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02 to resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the interpretation of governing documents in legal disputes?

2. Trace the chain of events from the 2012 election to the 2017 dispute. Explain how the board composition, terms of office, and specific actions (like Ms. Ahlstrand’s resignation) compounded to create the disagreement at the heart of this case.

3. Discuss the burden of proof in this administrative hearing. Define “preponderance of the evidence” and explain why the Petitioner, Tom Pyron, failed to meet this standard in the view of the Administrative Law Judge.

4. Examine the roles and authorities of the different entities involved: the homeowners’ association Board, the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Administrative Law Judge. How do these bodies interact to resolve disputes within a planned community?

5. Based on the Final Order, outline the legal recourse available to Tom Pyron following the denial of his petition. What specific grounds for a rehearing are mentioned, and what is the process for further appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Acclamation

A form of election where a candidate is declared elected without opposition, as when Sandra Singer’s election was “unanimously passed by acclamation” in 2014.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, draws conclusions of law, and issues a recommended decision. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations. The Commissioner of the Department, Judy Lowe, issued the Final Order in this case.

Bylaws

The governing documents of the homeowners’ association that outline its rules and procedures, including the number of directors, terms of office, and process for filling vacancies.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which accepts and adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order becomes effective and can only be changed by a successful rehearing or judicial appeal.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Pyron, a homeowner in the association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing, defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The Petitioner bore this burden to prove the Respondent violated its bylaws.

Recommended Order

The decision and order issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. In this case, it recommended that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Rehearing

A formal request to have a case heard again. The Final Order specifies that a petition for rehearing must be filed within thirty days and may be granted for specific causes, such as newly discovered evidence or an arbitrary decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Staggered Terms

A system where not all board members are elected at the same time. As defined in Bylaw § 3.02, the three-person board had terms of one, two, and three years to ensure continuity.

Unexpired Portion of the Prior Director’s Term

The remainder of a board member’s term that an appointee serves after the original member resigns or is removed, as specified in Bylaw § 3.6.






Blog Post – 17F-H1717026-REL


We Read an HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To: 3 Shocking Lessons Hidden in the Bylaws

1. Introduction: The Hidden Drama in Your Community’s Fine Print

If you live in a condominium association or a planned community, you’re familiar with the thick packet of governing documents you received at closing—the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Bylaws. For many, these documents are filed away and forgotten, seen as a collection of mundane rules about trash cans and paint colors. But hidden within that legalese is the complete operating manual for your community, and a simple misunderstanding of its contents can have significant consequences.

What happens when a homeowner’s interpretation of the rules clashes with the association’s? In a case from Arizona involving homeowner Tom Pyron and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, the dispute escalated into a formal administrative hearing. The central question was simple: how many board seats were open for election in 2017? But this wasn’t just a procedural disagreement. Court documents reveal that before the hearing, the association offered to re-issue ballots to include all candidates and even “offered to pay Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution.” The homeowner refused.

This decision transforms the case from a simple rules dispute into a cautionary tale about how a deeply held belief can override a pragmatic, no-cost compromise. The official court documents offer a fascinating look at how community governance can go awry, revealing powerful, practical lessons for any homeowner or board member who believes they know what the rules should say.

2. Takeaway 1: Your Beliefs Don’t Overrule the Bylaws

What You Think the Rules Say Doesn’t Matter—Only What They Actually Say

The core of the dispute rested on a belief held by a former board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, who was elected in 2015. She testified that she believed she had been elected to a two-year term. Based on this belief, the petitioner argued that the director appointed to replace her after her resignation should have served until 2017, meaning a two-year position was open for election that year.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, looked not at what anyone believed, but at the “plain language” of the community’s governing documents. The judge’s conclusion was a matter of inescapable logic derived directly from the bylaws:

1. First, Bylaw § 3.02 clearly states that in an election with multiple open seats, “the person receiving the most votes will become the Director with the longest term.”

2. Next, the court record shows that “the parties agreed that… because she got the most votes, Ms. Singer was elected to a three-year term” in the 2015 election.

3. Finally, the judge determined that according to the same bylaw, only the one-year and three-year terms were available in 2015. Since Ms. Singer secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand, by definition, must have been elected to the only other available position: the one-year term.

The lesson is stark and unambiguous: an individual’s interpretation or assumption, however sincere, cannot change the written rules. The bylaws are the ultimate authority. As the judge stated in the final decision, the documents speak for themselves.

The Bylaws do not allow their plain language to be modified or amended by a member’s understanding.

3. Takeaway 2: The Domino Effect of a Single Resignation

A Single Resignation Can Create Years of Confusion

This entire legal conflict was set in motion by a single, routine event: a board member’s resignation. The timeline of events shows how one small action, when combined with a misunderstanding of the rules, can create a ripple effect with long-lasting consequences.

1. On August 3, 2015, the newly elected board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, resigned.

2. The Board then appointed another member, Jeff Oursland, to serve the remainder of her term, as permitted by the bylaws.

3. The critical point of contention became the length of that “remainder.” Was it the rest of a one-year term ending in 2016, or a two-year term ending in 2017?

4. The judge’s determination that Ahlstrand’s original term was only one year (as explained above) meant that Mr. Oursland’s appointed term correctly expired in 2016. He was then properly elected to a new two-year term at the 2016 meeting.

5. This sequence confirmed that the association was correct all along: only one board position (a one-year term) was actually open for election in 2017.

A single resignation created two years of confusion that ultimately required an administrative hearing to resolve. It’s a powerful reminder of how crucial it is for boards to precisely follow their own procedures, especially when handling vacancies and appointments, as one small error can cascade into years of conflict.

4. Takeaway 3: The Hidden Complexity of “Staggered Terms”

“Staggered Terms” Are Designed for Stability, But Can Cause Chaos

Many associations use staggered terms for their board of directors. The concept, outlined in Bylaw § 3.02 for the Cliffs at North Mountain, is simple: instead of all directors being elected at once, they serve terms of varying lengths (in this case, one, two, and three years). This is a common and effective practice designed to ensure leadership continuity and prevent the entire board from turning over in a single election.

However, this case reveals the hidden downside of that system: complexity. The staggered terms created an election cycle where the available term lengths changed every single year. The court documents show that in 2014, the one-year and two-year positions were on the ballot. In 2015, the one-year and three-year terms were available. This rotating schedule was difficult for members—and apparently even some board members—to track accurately.

This built-in complexity was the root cause of the entire disagreement. The system’s lack of intuitive clarity created the exact conditions necessary for a personal belief, like Ms. Ahlstrand’s, to seem plausible even when it was contrary to the bylaws. The very governance structure intended to create stability inadvertently created the fertile ground for confusion, allowing a misunderstanding to grow into a lawsuit.

5. Conclusion: The Power Is in the Paperwork

The overarching theme from this case is that in the world of community associations, the governing documents are the ultimate source of truth. They are not merely suggestions; they are the binding legal framework that dictates how the community must operate. A board’s actions and a homeowner’s rights are all defined within that paperwork.

In the end, the homeowner’s petition was denied, and the judge’s order affirmed the association’s position. The written rules, as found in the bylaws, prevailed over individual beliefs and interpretations. The case stands as a powerful testament to the importance of reading, understanding, and strictly adhering to your community’s foundational documents.

This entire conflict stemmed from a few lines in a legal document—when was the last time you read yours?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Pyron (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Cynthia Quillen (property manager)
    Associated Property Management
    Community Manager

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (coordinator)
    HOA Coordinator/Admin Official listed for rehearing requests and transmission

Other Participants

  • Anne Fugate (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Barbara Ahlstrand (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2015
  • Kevin Downey (witness)
    Candidate for 2017 election
  • John Haunschild (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Ron Cadaret (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012, re-elected 2013
  • Sandra Singer (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2014 and 2015
  • Jeff Oursland (board member)
    Appointed to the Board in 2015, elected 2016
  • Steve Molever (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2016

Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark Kristopher Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge found Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots during the 2016 board election,. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee,. The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4),.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4), which specifies timing requirements for ballots; the ALJ noted that a meeting ballot did not need to contain a received-by date or be mailed seven days in advance if it had been substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot,,,.

Key Issues & Findings

Ballot must provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.

The use of two substantively different ballots in the March 2016 election violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) because members who did not attend the meeting were unaware of an additional candidate (Eric Thompson) listed on the meeting ballot, thereby denying those members the opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot,. This finding does not require ballots to be identical, but substantive changes must be presented to all members,,.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was granted, and Respondent was ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00,. No other relief was available.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Condominium, Board Election, Absentee Ballot, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • Article VII CC&Rs

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL-RHG Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:25 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL-RHG Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:28 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL-RHG Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:31 (689.5 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL-RHG Decision – ../17F-H1716002-REL/523915.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:34 (103.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Paul Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association. The core issue revolves around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots during its March 14, 2016, Board of Directors election, a practice the petitioner alleged violated state law and the Association’s governing documents.

The central finding, established after a rehearing, is that the Royal Riviera Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1250(C)(2). The violation occurred because an absentee ballot listed six candidates with a write-in option, while a separate ballot distributed at the annual meeting listed seven candidates with no write-in option. This discrepancy deprived members voting by absentee ballot of the opportunity to vote for or against the seventh candidate, thereby denying them their full voting rights.

An initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision on October 18, 2016, had dismissed the petition, finding no explicit rule against the Association’s actions. However, this ruling was overturned following a rehearing. The second ALJ decision, issued on June 2, 2017, concluded that while ballots need not be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure a fair election. The Respondent’s argument that the issue was moot due to a subsequent election was explicitly rejected.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the second ALJ’s decision in a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Association was ordered to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and the ruling was declared a final, binding administrative action.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Paul Gounder

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Jurisdiction: Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

Case Numbers: 17F-H1716002-REL, 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG, HO-17-16/002

Core Allegation: On June 23, 2016, Paul Gounder filed a petition alleging that the Royal Riviera Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its annual meeting on March 14, 2016.

——————————————————————————–

2. Factual Background of the Disputed Election

The facts surrounding the March 14, 2016 election were described as “essentially undisputed” in the initial hearing.

Election Context: The Royal Riviera development consists of approximately 32 condominiums. The Association has a seven-member Board of Directors. All seven positions were up for election at the March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

Nomination Process:

◦ In December 2015, the Association notified members of the upcoming election and requested nominating forms.

◦ Three members submitted forms.

◦ Three incumbent board members indicated via email or phone their willingness to continue serving.

Creation of the Absentee Ballot:

◦ The Association prepared an “absentee/write-in ballot” (also referred to as the “Mail Ballot”) containing the names of the six members who had indicated a willingness to serve.

◦ The ballot included a blank line for a write-in candidate and stipulated that it must be received by 12:00 p.m. on March 14, 2016, to be counted.

Emergence of a Seventh Candidate:

◦ Prior to the meeting, the Association received absentee ballots with three write-in candidates.

◦ One write-in candidate indicated they were unwilling to serve.

◦ The other two write-in candidates shared a unit and requested that only one of their names, Eric Thompson, be considered.

Creation of the Meeting Ballot:

◦ To accommodate the seven willing candidates for the seven open positions, the Association prepared a second ballot for members attending the meeting in person.

◦ This “Ballot” listed the original six candidates plus Eric Thompson.

◦ Crucially, this second ballot did not contain a space for write-in candidates.

Election Results:

◦ Approximately seventeen members attended the annual meeting.

◦ A member, Al DeFalco, was nominated from the floor.

◦ Despite the floor nomination, the seven candidates listed on the meeting ballot received the most votes and were elected to the Board.

——————————————————————————–

3. Procedural History and Rulings

The case proceeded through an initial hearing, a dismissal, a rehearing, a reversal, and a final administrative order.

3.1. Initial Hearing and Decision (October 2016)

Hearing Date: October 17, 2016

Presiding ALJ: Diane Mihalsky

Petitioner’s Argument: The use of a second, different ballot at the meeting violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)’s requirement that ballots “provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

ALJ Mihalsky’s Conclusion (October 18, 2016): The petition was recommended for dismissal. The judge reasoned that “no statute, CC&R, or bylaw by its plain language prevents Respondent from adding to the ballot that will used at the annual election that names of all members who have indicated a willingness to serve on the Board.” The decision noted that Board members are uncompensated volunteers and found no requirement for the Association to re-contact members who had not submitted nomination forms.

3.2. Rehearing and Second Decision (May-June 2017)

The initial decision was certified by the OAH, and the Petitioner successfully requested a rehearing from the Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: May 17, 2017

Presiding ALJ: Suzanne Marwil

Key Arguments at Rehearing:

Petitioner: The addition of a seventh candidate to the meeting ballot deprived absentee voters of their right to vote for or against all proposed actions. The meeting ballot also violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4) as it was not mailed seven days in advance.

Respondent: No violation occurred, as statutes do not require identical ballots. It is common practice for HOAs to use different absentee and meeting ballots. The matter was moot because a new election was held in 2017.

ALJ Marwil’s Conclusions of Law (June 2, 2017): The second decision granted the Petitioner’s petition, finding a statutory violation.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) Found: The use of two substantively different ballots was a violation. The decision stated: “Because the members who did not attend the meeting in person were not told of Mr. Thompson’s wiliness to run for the board, these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification on “Identical Ballots”: The ruling explicitly noted that it “does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

Mootness Argument Rejected: The ALJ found that the subsequent 2017 election did not render the matter moot, stating that the Judge “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The absentee ballot complied with this subsection’s mailing and deadline requirements. A meeting ballot would not need to meet these requirements if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The problem arose specifically because the ballots were different.

3.3. Final Order (June 12, 2017)

• Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order accepting and adopting the ALJ decision of June 2, 2017.

• The order was declared final and effective immediately.

Mandate: The Respondent, Royal Riviera Condominium Association, was ordered to “reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.”

——————————————————————————–

4. Key Statutes and Governing Documents

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) – Voting and Ballots

This Arizona statute provides procedures for voting in condominium associations. Key subsections cited in the case are:

General Provision: “The association shall provide for votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot…”

1. The ballot shall set forth each proposed action.

2. The ballot shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action. (This was the basis for the final ruling).

3. The ballot is valid for only one specified election or meeting…

4. The ballot specifies the time and date by which the ballot must be delivered… which shall be at least seven days after the date that the board delivers the unvoted ballot to the member.

Royal Riviera CC&Rs, Article VII – Membership and Voting

Section 2: The Association has one class of voting membership, with all owners entitled to one vote per apartment owned.

Section 4: Every owner has the right to cumulate votes in an election for the Board. The number of votes equals the number of apartments owned multiplied by the number of directors to be elected.

——————————————————————————–

5. Notable Testimony and Quotes

Witness/Party

Affiliation

Key Testimony or Statement

Marlys Kleck

Petitioner’s Witness

Testified that after being given the new ballot at the meeting, she “hurriedly completed” it, then realized it was more appropriate to use her absentee ballot. She asked for the new ballot back and submitted her original. She stated she “believed that the March 14, 2016 election was a fraud.”

Dan Peterson

Respondent’s Witness

Testified that it was “hard to find seven members to accept Board positions” and that “most elections of Board members were not contested.” Explained the process for verifying candidate eligibility.

Paul Gounder

Petitioner

Argued that the Respondent “had arbitrarily selected the members whom it contacted about serving on the Board and that to be fair, Respondent should have called all of its members about whether they were willing to serve.”

ALJ Diane Mihalsky

First ALJ Decision

“No statute, CC&R, or bylaw by its plain language prevents Respondent from adding to the ballot… the names of all members who have indicated a willingness to serve on the Board.”

ALJ Suzanne Marwil

Second ALJ Decision

“Finding this violation does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”






Study Guide – 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG


Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association: A Study Guide

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central violation alleged by the Petitioner, Paul Gounder, in his petition filed on June 23, 2016?

2. Describe the key differences between the “Mail Ballot” and the “Ballot” used for the March 14, 2016 election.

3. How did Eric Thompson’s name come to be added to the ballot used at the annual meeting?

4. What was the initial ruling issued by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky on October 18, 2016?

5. What was the Respondent’s argument that the case should be considered “moot,” and how did the Administrative Law Judge in the rehearing address this claim?

6. According to the rehearing decision by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil, which specific Arizona statute did the Respondent violate?

7. What was the testimony of witness Marlys Kleck regarding her experience with the two ballots at the annual meeting?

8. According to Article VII, Section 4 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, what is “cumulative voting”?

9. Did the final ruling require that the absentee ballot and the meeting ballot be identical in all future elections?

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on June 12, 2017?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Paul Gounder alleged that the Royal Riviera Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and Article VII of its CC&Rs. The core of the allegation was that the association improperly used two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at the March 14, 2016 annual meeting.

2. The “Mail Ballot” (absentee ballot) listed six candidates and included a blank line for write-in candidates. The “Ballot” provided at the meeting was different in that it listed seven candidates (adding Eric Thompson) and had no space for write-in candidates.

3. Eric Thompson was initially a write-in candidate on absentee ballots. After the association received these ballots, its management company contacted the write-in candidates to confirm their willingness to serve; Mr. Thompson was the only one who agreed and was subsequently added to the ballot used at the meeting.

4. The initial ruling by Judge Mihalsky recommended dismissing the petition. She concluded that no statute, CC&R, or bylaw prevented the association from adding the names of all members who had indicated a willingness to serve to the ballot used at the annual election.

5. The Respondent argued the matter was moot because it had already held another election in 2017 and had a new board. Judge Marwil rejected this, stating that the fact a new board was seated did not render the matter moot, as she could still find that the Respondent committed a statutory violation during its 2016 election.

6. Judge Marwil found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). She reasoned that because members who did not attend the meeting were not told of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action, specifically the action of electing him.

7. Marlys Kleck testified that she brought her completed absentee ballot to the meeting but was given the new ballot with seven names. She hurriedly filled out the new ballot but then realized it would have been more appropriate to submit her original one, leading her to ask for the new ballot back and submit her absentee ballot instead.

8. Cumulative voting gives every owner the right to a number of votes equal to the number of apartments they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. The owner can then give all their votes to one candidate or divide them among any number of candidates.

9. No, the ruling did not impose a requirement that ballots be identical. Judge Marwil’s decision explicitly stated that finding a violation “simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

10. The final order, issued by Commissioner Judy Lowe, accepted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. It ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be granted and that the Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal arguments, and rulings presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze and contrast the legal reasoning of Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky’s initial decision with Judge Suzanne Marwil’s final decision. What specific interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1250 was central to the reversal of the outcome?

2. Discuss the Respondent’s argument that using two different ballots is “common practice” for homeowners’ associations. Based on the final ruling, evaluate the validity of relying on common practice when it appears to conflict with specific statutory requirements.

3. Examine the rights of absentee voters within a homeowners’ association election, using the events of this case as a primary example. How did the association’s actions and procedures during the 2016 election impact these rights, and what principle did the final ruling establish to protect them?

4. The Respondent argued the case was moot because a new election had already occurred and a new board was seated. Explain the legal concept of mootness and discuss why the Administrative Law Judge rejected this argument, finding that a statutory violation could still be identified and ruled upon.

5. Evaluate the association’s process for identifying and finalizing its slate of candidates for the board election. Based on the testimony and events described, what procedural weaknesses were exposed, and how did they directly contribute to the legal dispute over the two ballots?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the state of Arizona.

Absentee Ballot

A ballot that allows a member to vote without being physically present at the election meeting. In this case, it was also referred to as a “Mail Ballot.”

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Suzanne Marwil served as ALJs for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are rules that govern a planned community or condominium development, which are legally binding on the property owners.

Cumulative Voting

As defined in the Respondent’s CC&Rs, a voting method where an owner has a number of votes equal to their apartments multiplied by the number of board seats open. The owner can cast all votes for one candidate or distribute them among multiple candidates.

Final Order

A legally binding decision issued at the conclusion of an administrative legal process. In this case, it was issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, accepting the ALJ’s decision and making it enforceable.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Royal Riviera Condominium Association is the HOA in this case.

A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The Respondent argued the case was moot because a new election had already taken place.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Paul Gounder is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to review the decision of the first hearing. A rehearing was granted to the Petitioner after the initial dismissal of his petition.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Royal Riviera Condominium Association is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG


He Sued His HOA Over One Name on a Ballot—And Won. Here’s What Every Homeowner Needs to Know.

1.0 Introduction: The David vs. Goliath of Community Living

Every homeowner in a managed community knows the feeling: a letter from the HOA arrives, and a sense of powerlessness follows. But one Arizona owner proved the rules are not just a one-way street. The board, often backed by management companies and law firms, can seem unchallengeable, but a surprising case demonstrates that the system can be held accountable, sometimes because of the smallest details.

This is the story of Paul Gounder, a condominium owner who single-handedly challenged his HOA’s election process and won. Without a lawyer, he filed a petition that resulted in a state-level ruling against his association. This article unpacks the key takeaways from the legal battle of Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association—lessons that are essential for any homeowner living in a managed community.

2.0Takeaway 1: One Person Can Successfully Challenge the System

On June 23, 2016, Paul Gounder, an owner in the 32-unit Royal Riviera Condominium Association, filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. His core allegation was straightforward: the association had violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)) by using two different ballots for its board member election held on March 14, 2016.

Throughout the proceedings, the HOA was represented by a law firm. Mr. Gounder represented himself. Despite this imbalance, he ultimately prevailed. The final order not only found the association in violation but required it to reimburse Mr. Gounder for his $500.00 filing fee, proving that a well-founded challenge from a single member can succeed.

3.0Takeaway 2: “Common Practice” Is Not a Legal Defense

In its defense, the Royal Riviera Condominium Association argued that it was “common practice for homeowners associations to use one absentee ballot and a different meeting ballot” and that they had not committed any violation. They essentially claimed they were doing what many other HOAs do.

The final judge’s decision, however, was based strictly on the statute. The “common practice” defense was disregarded entirely. The ruling makes it clear that what is customary is irrelevant when it contradicts the explicit requirements of the law. Adherence to governing statutes is paramount. This principle was even acknowledged in the initial judge’s decision, which, despite siding with the HOA at first, noted the high standard boards are held to:

Board members are volunteers who are not compensated for their service to the community. Although Respondent is bound by the unequivocal language of applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and bylaws…

4.0Takeaway 3: A Fair Election Can Hinge on the Smallest Detail

The central issue of the case was a seemingly minor detail in the election materials. The HOA prepared an absentee/mail-in ballot that listed six candidates for seven open board seats and included a blank line for a write-in. However, after some members used the write-in option, the HOA identified a seventh willing candidate, Eric Thompson.

For the in-person meeting, the HOA prepared a different ballot. This new ballot included Mr. Thompson’s name, bringing the total to seven candidates. Critically, this meeting ballot had no space for new write-in candidates. This difference was the fatal flaw. The final Administrative Law Judge explained why this was a violation of the law:

Because the members who did not attend the meeting in person were not told of Mr. Thompson’s willingness [sic] to run for the board, these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot. Finding this violation does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.

This ruling protects the rights of members who vote absentee. It ensures that those who cannot attend a meeting in person have the exact same opportunity to consider and vote for all candidates as those who are physically present.

5.0Takeaway 4: An Initial Loss Isn’t the End of the Road

Mr. Gounder’s victory was not immediate. His case demonstrates the importance of persistence when a member believes a rule has been broken.

First Hearing (October 17, 2016): The first Administrative Law Judge, Diane Mihalsky, initially ruled in favor of the HOA, recommending that the petition be dismissed.

Rehearing: Undeterred, the petitioner requested a rehearing, which was granted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Final Decision (June 2, 2017): A new judge, Suzanne Marwil, reviewed the case. She reversed the initial outcome, finding that the HOA had committed a statutory violation by using two substantively different ballots.

Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate officially accepted Judge Marwil’s decision, making it a binding order.

This sequence highlights that an initial unfavorable ruling is not necessarily the final word. The appeals and review processes exist to correct errors and ensure the law is applied properly.

6.0 Conclusion: Why Procedural Fairness Matters

The case of Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association serves as a powerful reminder that the rules governing HOA elections are not just formalities. They are essential safeguards designed to ensure fair, transparent, and equal participation for all members of a community, whether they cast their vote by mail or in person.

This case was decided by a single name on a ballot—what small details in your community’s governance might be more important than they appear?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul Gounder (petitioner)
  • Frederick C. Zehm (witness)
    Respondent member
    Testified for Petitioner
  • Marlys Kleck (witness)
    Respondent member
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Royal Riviera Condominium Association (respondent)
    Entity, not a human individual
  • Mark Kristopher Sahl (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen PLC
  • Dan Peterson (property manager)
    Owner of Respondent's management company
    Testified for Respondent
  • Eric Thompson (Board member)
    Candidate whose name was added to meeting ballot

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    ALJ for initial hearing (Oct 2016)
  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
    ALJ for rehearing (May/June 2017)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Also listed as A. Hansen
  • L. Dettorre (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D. Jones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • J. Marshall (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • N. Cano (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Aguirre (Admin Staff)
    Handled transmission of May 17, 2017 Order

Other Participants

  • Al DeFalco (candidate)
    Nominated from the floor at the annual meeting

Barry Saxion vs. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716023-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-05-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Barry Saxion Counsel
Respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Declaration Section 12.1

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted the ALJ Decision, ordering the petition be dismissed because the governing documents require the claim be handled through internal dispute resolution prior to administrative action.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to use the mandatory dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Declaration before filing the administrative action.

Key Issues & Findings

Requirement for mandatory dispute resolution procedures

The Petition was dismissed because the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II requires that all covered claims must be resolved using internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of initiating administrative proceedings.

Orders: The ALJ recommended that the Petition be dismissed, and the Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Mandatory Dispute Resolution, Dismissal, Standing Issue Denied
Additional Citations:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564668.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:21 (51.2 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564672.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:21 (54.6 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 568837.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:22 (425.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716023-REL


Briefing on Case No. 17F-H1716023-REL: Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing details the administrative proceedings and final disposition of the case involving petitioners Barry and Sandra Saxion and respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. The petition was ultimately dismissed by the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which adopted the recommendation of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The dismissal was based on a procedural failure by the petitioners to adhere to the mandatory dispute resolution process outlined in the HOA’s governing documents before initiating administrative action.

The respondent’s motion for dismissal presented two primary arguments. The first, challenging petitioner Barry Saxion’s standing due to non-ownership of property, was denied by the ALJ, who found that co-petitioner Sandra Saxion did own property and had standing. The second, and decisive, argument was that the HOA’s Declaration explicitly requires all “covered claims” to be resolved through its internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of administrative proceedings. The ALJ agreed with this argument, leading to a recommendation for dismissal, the vacating of a scheduled hearing, and the issuance of a final order confirming the dismissal.

Case Overview

This section outlines the primary participants, key identifiers, and procedural timeline of the administrative action.

Affiliation

Petitioner

Barry Saxion

Petitioner

Sandra Saxion

Property owner within the Association

Respondent

Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Adjudicator

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Judy Lowe

Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Respondent’s Counsel

Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Identifier

Case Number

HO 17-16/023

Docket Number

17F-H1716023-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), Phoenix, Arizona

Referring Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

Petition Filed: Both Barry and Sandra Saxion signed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Referral to OAH: The Department of Real Estate referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings, creating the caption Barry Saxion v. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Motion for Summary Judgment: The Respondent HOA filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

May 16, 2017: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issued a decision recommending the petition be dismissed.

May 16, 2017: A Minute Entry was issued, vacating the hearing scheduled for May 22, 2017, based on the dismissal recommendation.

May 30, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and officially dismissing the petition.

Analysis of the Motion for Summary Judgment

The Silverton II HOA’s Motion for Summary Judgment was the pivotal filing in this case. It presented two distinct arguments for dismissal, which were addressed separately by the Administrative Law Judge.

Respondent’s Arguments

1. Lack of Standing: The initial argument was that the petitioner, identified in the case caption as Barry Saxion, did not own property within the Association and therefore lacked the legal standing necessary to pursue the action.

2. Failure to Adhere to Governing Documents: The second argument was that the petition must be dismissed because it violated the procedural requirements set forth in the HOA’s governing documents. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II (the “Declaration”) mandates a specific internal dispute resolution process for all “covered claims.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The ALJ’s decision, issued on May 16, 2017, analyzed both of the respondent’s arguments and made distinct recommendations for each.

• The ALJ recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied on the grounds of standing.

• The judge acknowledged the fact, undisputed by the petitioner, that Barry Saxion does not own property within the association.

• However, the judge’s review of the original HOA Dispute Process Petition revealed that Sandra Saxion, who does own property, had also signed the petition as a petitioner. The judge concluded that the case caption, which named only Barry Saxion, was an administrative creation by the Department of Real Estate upon referral.

• The finding was that Sandra Saxion clearly “has standing to pursue this action,” thereby nullifying the argument for dismissal based on a lack of standing.

• The ALJ recommended that the petition be dismissed for failing to follow the mandatory dispute resolution procedures outlined in the HOA’s Declaration.

• The judge cited Section 12.1 of the Declaration, which defines “covered claims” as “all claims, grievances, controversies, disagreements, or disputes that arise in whole or part out of . . . the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Declaration or the other Project Documents.”

• The judge found that the current dispute fell squarely within this definition.

• The decision states that the “plain language of the Declaration prevents this dispute… to be brought in the Office of Administrative Hearings and mandates that the dispute must be handled through the dispute resolution process set forth in the Declaration and Bylaws.”

• The conclusion was that the petition was improperly filed, as the internal remedies had not been pursued first.

Final Disposition and Subsequent Actions

The ALJ’s recommendation to dismiss directly led to the final resolution of the case.

Vacating of Hearing

A Minute Entry dated May 16, 2017, formally vacated the hearing that was scheduled for May 22, 2017. The order was a direct result of the ALJ’s decision recommending the complaint be dismissed.

Final Order from the Department of Real Estate

On May 30, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order that officially concluded the matter.

Adoption of ALJ Decision: The Order explicitly states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed as the applicable governing documents require that the claim must be handled through the dispute resolution process prior to administrative proceedings being brought.”

Effective Date: The Order was designated a “final administrative action” and was effective immediately from the date of service.

Appellate Rights: The parties were informed of their right to file for a rehearing or review within 30 days of the order. They were also advised of their right to appeal for a judicial review by filing a complaint pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6. A court-obtained stay would be required to delay the order during a judicial review.

Official Communications

The Final Order and related documents were formally transmitted to all parties of record via certified mail or electronic means on May 30, 2017. Recipients included:

• Barry Saxion

• Troy B. Stratman, Esq. (counsel for the HOA)

• The Office of Administrative Hearings

• Judy Lowe and other staff at the Arizona Department of Real Estate


Barry Saxion vs. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716023-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-05-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Barry Saxion Counsel
Respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Declaration Section 12.1

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted the ALJ Decision, ordering the petition be dismissed because the governing documents require the claim be handled through internal dispute resolution prior to administrative action.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to use the mandatory dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Declaration before filing the administrative action.

Key Issues & Findings

Requirement for mandatory dispute resolution procedures

The Petition was dismissed because the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II requires that all covered claims must be resolved using internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of initiating administrative proceedings.

Orders: The ALJ recommended that the Petition be dismissed, and the Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Mandatory Dispute Resolution, Dismissal, Standing Issue Denied
Additional Citations:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564668.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:32 (51.2 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564672.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:33 (54.6 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 568837.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:34 (425.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716023-REL


Briefing on Case No. 17F-H1716023-REL: Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing details the administrative proceedings and final disposition of the case involving petitioners Barry and Sandra Saxion and respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. The petition was ultimately dismissed by the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which adopted the recommendation of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The dismissal was based on a procedural failure by the petitioners to adhere to the mandatory dispute resolution process outlined in the HOA’s governing documents before initiating administrative action.

The respondent’s motion for dismissal presented two primary arguments. The first, challenging petitioner Barry Saxion’s standing due to non-ownership of property, was denied by the ALJ, who found that co-petitioner Sandra Saxion did own property and had standing. The second, and decisive, argument was that the HOA’s Declaration explicitly requires all “covered claims” to be resolved through its internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of administrative proceedings. The ALJ agreed with this argument, leading to a recommendation for dismissal, the vacating of a scheduled hearing, and the issuance of a final order confirming the dismissal.

Case Overview

This section outlines the primary participants, key identifiers, and procedural timeline of the administrative action.

Affiliation

Petitioner

Barry Saxion

Petitioner

Sandra Saxion

Property owner within the Association

Respondent

Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Adjudicator

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Judy Lowe

Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Respondent’s Counsel

Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Identifier

Case Number

HO 17-16/023

Docket Number

17F-H1716023-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), Phoenix, Arizona

Referring Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

Petition Filed: Both Barry and Sandra Saxion signed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Referral to OAH: The Department of Real Estate referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings, creating the caption Barry Saxion v. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Motion for Summary Judgment: The Respondent HOA filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

May 16, 2017: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issued a decision recommending the petition be dismissed.

May 16, 2017: A Minute Entry was issued, vacating the hearing scheduled for May 22, 2017, based on the dismissal recommendation.

May 30, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and officially dismissing the petition.

Analysis of the Motion for Summary Judgment

The Silverton II HOA’s Motion for Summary Judgment was the pivotal filing in this case. It presented two distinct arguments for dismissal, which were addressed separately by the Administrative Law Judge.

Respondent’s Arguments

1. Lack of Standing: The initial argument was that the petitioner, identified in the case caption as Barry Saxion, did not own property within the Association and therefore lacked the legal standing necessary to pursue the action.

2. Failure to Adhere to Governing Documents: The second argument was that the petition must be dismissed because it violated the procedural requirements set forth in the HOA’s governing documents. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II (the “Declaration”) mandates a specific internal dispute resolution process for all “covered claims.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The ALJ’s decision, issued on May 16, 2017, analyzed both of the respondent’s arguments and made distinct recommendations for each.

• The ALJ recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied on the grounds of standing.

• The judge acknowledged the fact, undisputed by the petitioner, that Barry Saxion does not own property within the association.

• However, the judge’s review of the original HOA Dispute Process Petition revealed that Sandra Saxion, who does own property, had also signed the petition as a petitioner. The judge concluded that the case caption, which named only Barry Saxion, was an administrative creation by the Department of Real Estate upon referral.

• The finding was that Sandra Saxion clearly “has standing to pursue this action,” thereby nullifying the argument for dismissal based on a lack of standing.

• The ALJ recommended that the petition be dismissed for failing to follow the mandatory dispute resolution procedures outlined in the HOA’s Declaration.

• The judge cited Section 12.1 of the Declaration, which defines “covered claims” as “all claims, grievances, controversies, disagreements, or disputes that arise in whole or part out of . . . the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Declaration or the other Project Documents.”

• The judge found that the current dispute fell squarely within this definition.

• The decision states that the “plain language of the Declaration prevents this dispute… to be brought in the Office of Administrative Hearings and mandates that the dispute must be handled through the dispute resolution process set forth in the Declaration and Bylaws.”

• The conclusion was that the petition was improperly filed, as the internal remedies had not been pursued first.

Final Disposition and Subsequent Actions

The ALJ’s recommendation to dismiss directly led to the final resolution of the case.

Vacating of Hearing

A Minute Entry dated May 16, 2017, formally vacated the hearing that was scheduled for May 22, 2017. The order was a direct result of the ALJ’s decision recommending the complaint be dismissed.

Final Order from the Department of Real Estate

On May 30, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order that officially concluded the matter.

Adoption of ALJ Decision: The Order explicitly states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed as the applicable governing documents require that the claim must be handled through the dispute resolution process prior to administrative proceedings being brought.”

Effective Date: The Order was designated a “final administrative action” and was effective immediately from the date of service.

Appellate Rights: The parties were informed of their right to file for a rehearing or review within 30 days of the order. They were also advised of their right to appeal for a judicial review by filing a complaint pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6. A court-obtained stay would be required to delay the order during a judicial review.

Official Communications

The Final Order and related documents were formally transmitted to all parties of record via certified mail or electronic means on May 30, 2017. Recipients included:

• Barry Saxion

• Troy B. Stratman, Esq. (counsel for the HOA)

• The Office of Administrative Hearings

• Judy Lowe and other staff at the Arizona Department of Real Estate


Barry Saxion vs. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716023-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-05-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Barry Saxion Counsel
Respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Declaration Section 12.1

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted the ALJ Decision, ordering the petition be dismissed because the governing documents require the claim be handled through internal dispute resolution prior to administrative action.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to use the mandatory dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Declaration before filing the administrative action.

Key Issues & Findings

Requirement for mandatory dispute resolution procedures

The Petition was dismissed because the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II requires that all covered claims must be resolved using internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of initiating administrative proceedings.

Orders: The ALJ recommended that the Petition be dismissed, and the Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Mandatory Dispute Resolution, Dismissal, Standing Issue Denied
Additional Citations:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564668.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:18 (51.2 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564672.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:18 (54.6 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 568837.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:18 (425.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716023-REL


Briefing on Case No. 17F-H1716023-REL: Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing details the administrative proceedings and final disposition of the case involving petitioners Barry and Sandra Saxion and respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. The petition was ultimately dismissed by the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which adopted the recommendation of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The dismissal was based on a procedural failure by the petitioners to adhere to the mandatory dispute resolution process outlined in the HOA’s governing documents before initiating administrative action.

The respondent’s motion for dismissal presented two primary arguments. The first, challenging petitioner Barry Saxion’s standing due to non-ownership of property, was denied by the ALJ, who found that co-petitioner Sandra Saxion did own property and had standing. The second, and decisive, argument was that the HOA’s Declaration explicitly requires all “covered claims” to be resolved through its internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of administrative proceedings. The ALJ agreed with this argument, leading to a recommendation for dismissal, the vacating of a scheduled hearing, and the issuance of a final order confirming the dismissal.

Case Overview

This section outlines the primary participants, key identifiers, and procedural timeline of the administrative action.

Affiliation

Petitioner

Barry Saxion

Petitioner

Sandra Saxion

Property owner within the Association

Respondent

Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Adjudicator

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Judy Lowe

Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Respondent’s Counsel

Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Identifier

Case Number

HO 17-16/023

Docket Number

17F-H1716023-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), Phoenix, Arizona

Referring Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

Petition Filed: Both Barry and Sandra Saxion signed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Referral to OAH: The Department of Real Estate referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings, creating the caption Barry Saxion v. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Motion for Summary Judgment: The Respondent HOA filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

May 16, 2017: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issued a decision recommending the petition be dismissed.

May 16, 2017: A Minute Entry was issued, vacating the hearing scheduled for May 22, 2017, based on the dismissal recommendation.

May 30, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and officially dismissing the petition.

Analysis of the Motion for Summary Judgment

The Silverton II HOA’s Motion for Summary Judgment was the pivotal filing in this case. It presented two distinct arguments for dismissal, which were addressed separately by the Administrative Law Judge.

Respondent’s Arguments

1. Lack of Standing: The initial argument was that the petitioner, identified in the case caption as Barry Saxion, did not own property within the Association and therefore lacked the legal standing necessary to pursue the action.

2. Failure to Adhere to Governing Documents: The second argument was that the petition must be dismissed because it violated the procedural requirements set forth in the HOA’s governing documents. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II (the “Declaration”) mandates a specific internal dispute resolution process for all “covered claims.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The ALJ’s decision, issued on May 16, 2017, analyzed both of the respondent’s arguments and made distinct recommendations for each.

• The ALJ recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied on the grounds of standing.

• The judge acknowledged the fact, undisputed by the petitioner, that Barry Saxion does not own property within the association.

• However, the judge’s review of the original HOA Dispute Process Petition revealed that Sandra Saxion, who does own property, had also signed the petition as a petitioner. The judge concluded that the case caption, which named only Barry Saxion, was an administrative creation by the Department of Real Estate upon referral.

• The finding was that Sandra Saxion clearly “has standing to pursue this action,” thereby nullifying the argument for dismissal based on a lack of standing.

• The ALJ recommended that the petition be dismissed for failing to follow the mandatory dispute resolution procedures outlined in the HOA’s Declaration.

• The judge cited Section 12.1 of the Declaration, which defines “covered claims” as “all claims, grievances, controversies, disagreements, or disputes that arise in whole or part out of . . . the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Declaration or the other Project Documents.”

• The judge found that the current dispute fell squarely within this definition.

• The decision states that the “plain language of the Declaration prevents this dispute… to be brought in the Office of Administrative Hearings and mandates that the dispute must be handled through the dispute resolution process set forth in the Declaration and Bylaws.”

• The conclusion was that the petition was improperly filed, as the internal remedies had not been pursued first.

Final Disposition and Subsequent Actions

The ALJ’s recommendation to dismiss directly led to the final resolution of the case.

Vacating of Hearing

A Minute Entry dated May 16, 2017, formally vacated the hearing that was scheduled for May 22, 2017. The order was a direct result of the ALJ’s decision recommending the complaint be dismissed.

Final Order from the Department of Real Estate

On May 30, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order that officially concluded the matter.

Adoption of ALJ Decision: The Order explicitly states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed as the applicable governing documents require that the claim must be handled through the dispute resolution process prior to administrative proceedings being brought.”

Effective Date: The Order was designated a “final administrative action” and was effective immediately from the date of service.

Appellate Rights: The parties were informed of their right to file for a rehearing or review within 30 days of the order. They were also advised of their right to appeal for a judicial review by filing a complaint pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6. A court-obtained stay would be required to delay the order during a judicial review.

Official Communications

The Final Order and related documents were formally transmitted to all parties of record via certified mail or electronic means on May 30, 2017. Recipients included:

• Barry Saxion

• Troy B. Stratman, Esq. (counsel for the HOA)

• The Office of Administrative Hearings

• Judy Lowe and other staff at the Arizona Department of Real Estate






Study Guide – 17F-H1716023-REL


Study Guide: Saxion v. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the primary parties involved in case number 17F-H1716023-REL and their respective roles.

2. What was the initial argument made by the Respondent, Silverton II HOA, in its Motion for Summary Judgement?

3. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) resolve the issue of Barry Saxion’s standing to pursue the action?

4. What was the second, and ultimately successful, argument presented by the Respondent for the case’s dismissal?

5. According to the HOA’s governing documents, what is the definition of a “covered claim”?

6. What was the final recommendation made by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in her decision dated May 16, 2017?

7. What immediate procedural action was taken as a result of the ALJ’s recommended decision on May 16, 2017?

8. Who formally accepted the ALJ’s decision, and what was the title of the document that finalized this acceptance?

9. What process must the petitioners now follow to resolve their dispute with the HOA, according to the final ruling?

10. Following the issuance of the Final Order on May 30, 2017, what right did the parties have if they disagreed with the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, Barry and Sandra Saxion, and the Respondent, Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. The Saxions initiated the dispute process, and the Homeowners Association was the entity against which the claim was filed.

2. The Respondent initially argued that the case should be dismissed because Petitioner Barry Saxion did not own property within the Association. This lack of ownership, they claimed, meant he did not possess the legal standing required to pursue the action.

3. The ALJ found that although Barry Saxion did not own property, Sandra Saxion did own property and had also signed the petition. Therefore, Sandra Saxion had standing to pursue the action, and the ALJ recommended denying the motion to dismiss on these grounds.

4. The Respondent’s successful argument was that Section 12.1 of the HOA’s Declaration required all covered claims to be resolved using the internal dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Declaration and Bylaws. They argued this must be done in lieu of initiating administrative proceedings.

5. A “covered claim” is defined as “all claims, grievances, controversies, disagreements, or disputes that arise in whole or part out of . . . the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Declaration or the other Project Documents.”

6. On May 16, 2017, the ALJ recommended that the Petition be dismissed. She concluded that the plain language of the HOA’s governing documents required the claim to be handled through the internal dispute resolution process before any administrative proceedings could be brought.

7. As a result of the ALJ’s recommendation, an order was issued vacating the hearing that was scheduled for May 22, 2017. The parties were advised of this through a Minute Entry.

8. Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, formally accepted the ALJ’s decision. This was finalized in a document titled “Final Order,” dated May 30, 2017.

9. The petitioners must handle their claim through the dispute resolution process set forth in the Silverton II Declaration and Bylaws. The Final Order mandates that this internal process must be used prior to bringing administrative proceedings.

10. After the Final Order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a party had the right to file a motion for rehearing or review within thirty (30) days. They also had the right to appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions require a more detailed analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing connections between the different documents and legal concepts presented.

1. Analyze the concept of “standing” as it was presented and resolved in this case. Discuss why Barry Saxion’s lack of property ownership did not result in the case’s dismissal on those grounds, and explain the role of the original Petition in the ALJ’s finding.

2. Explain the legal hierarchy and procedural flow of this dispute. Trace the case from the initial petition to the Final Order, identifying the specific roles and actions of the Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

3. Discuss the significance of Section 12.1 of the “Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II.” How did the “plain language” of this specific clause determine the ultimate outcome of the administrative proceeding?

4. Evaluate the two distinct arguments made by the Respondent in their Motion for Summary Judgement. Compare the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge in her recommendations for each argument and explain why one argument failed while the other succeeded.

5. Describe the post-decision options available to the parties following the issuance of the Final Order on May 30, 2017. What specific steps could a party take if they disagreed with the outcome, what were the associated deadlines, and to whom would a request for rehearing be addressed?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, and issues a recommended decision. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Administrative Law Judge Decision

The formal written recommendation of the ALJ. In this matter, the decision recommended that the petition be dismissed based on the HOA’s governing documents.

Commissioner

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. In this case, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision and issued the Final Order.

Covered Claims

A specific category of disputes defined in the HOA’s Declaration. It includes all claims, grievances, or disputes related to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the HOA’s governing documents.

Declaration

The short name for the “Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II.” This is a core governing document for the HOA that dictates required procedures, such as dispute resolution.

Department of Real Estate (Department)

The Arizona state agency that referred the HOA dispute to the Office of Administrative Hearings and whose Commissioner issued the Final Order.

Final Order

A binding order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate that accepts the ALJ’s decision. This order made the dismissal of the petition official and effective immediately.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The governing body for the Silverton II community, which was the Respondent in this case.

Minute Entry

A brief entry on the case record noting a court or judge’s order or action. In this case, a Minute Entry was issued to vacate the scheduled May 22, 2017 hearing.

Motion for Summary Judgement

A formal request made by a party (in this case, the Respondent) asking the judge to rule in their favor without a full hearing, based on the argument that there are no disputed facts and the law is on their side.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state office where the case was heard. It provides a neutral forum for resolving disputes involving state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the petitioners were Barry and Sandra Saxion.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Standing

The legal right to bring a lawsuit or administrative action. In this context, standing was initially questioned based on property ownership within the HOA.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716023-REL


Why This Homeowner’s Complaint Against Their HOA Was Dismissed Before It Began

Dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can be one of the most frustrating aspects of homeownership. When you feel the association is overstepping its bounds or failing to enforce the rules fairly, the natural impulse is to seek a formal resolution. Homeowners have rights, and there are official channels, like administrative hearings, designed to address these disputes.

But what if the path to justice has a mandatory detour you didn’t know about? The case of Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA is a powerful cautionary tale for any homeowner who believes they have a legitimate grievance. A close look at the official documents reveals surprising lessons, and it’s a stark reminder that in an HOA dispute, being right is not enough; you must also be procedurally perfect.

1. The Fine Print Is Your First Hurdle

The primary reason the homeowners’ petition was dismissed had nothing to do with the merits of their actual complaint. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) never weighed in on whether the homeowners were right or the HOA was wrong. Instead, the case was dismissed because the homeowners failed to follow the mandatory dispute resolution process required by their own HOA’s governing documents before they filed for an administrative hearing.

The association’s own rules legally required an internal process to be completed first. By going straight to an administrative filing, the homeowners had unintentionally bypassed a mandatory first step outlined in their governing documents. The ALJ pointed to the specific language in the HOA’s Declaration, which was the ultimate authority on the matter.

all covered claims “must be resolved using the dispute resolution procedures set forth . . . in [the] Declaration and the Bylaws in lieu of filing a lawsuit or initiating administrative proceedings.”

2. A Simple Clerical Error Can Jeopardize Your Entire Case

Before even getting to the core procedural issue, the HOA made another challenge that could have ended the case immediately. They argued that the petitioner officially named in the case caption, Barry Saxion, didn’t actually own property in the association and therefore had no legal standing.

This error, however, wasn’t made by the homeowners. The case documents reveal a critical lesson: when the Arizona Department of Real Estate referred the matter for a hearing, it was the agency that created the incorrect caption. This bureaucratic mistake could have been fatal, but the petition was saved because the ALJ noted that the original paperwork was signed by both Barry Saxion and Sandra Saxion, who did own property. Because both their names and signatures were on the petition, the ALJ could overlook the agency’s error. This highlights the need for homeowners to be vigilant, double-checking all official documents—even those prepared by a state agency.

3. A “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean Justice Was Served

The final outcome was not a judgment on the underlying disagreement. The petition was simply “dismissed.” This means the core issues the homeowners wanted to resolve were never actually heard or ruled on by the Administrative Law Judge.

The process itself is revealing. On May 16, 2017, the ALJ, Tammy L. Eigenheer, issued a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed. This recommendation was then reviewed by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, who accepted it and issued a FINAL ORDER making the dismissal official on May 30, 2017. For the HOA, this was a victory won on a technicality. For the homeowners, it was a procedural dead end, preventing their core complaints from being heard in the administrative hearing. This shows how a legal victory can be won entirely on procedure, preventing the central conflict from ever being addressed.

Conclusion

The core lesson from the Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA case is clear: in a dispute with your HOA, understanding the procedural rules in your governing documents is just as important as the substance of your complaint. Failing to read and follow these rules can render your entire effort, no matter how justified, completely invalid. It can cost you time, money, and the opportunity to have your case heard at all. Before you take on your HOA, have you read the rulebook they require you to play by?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Barry Saxion (petitioner)
  • Sandra Saxion (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Troy B. Stratman (Respondent attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • L. Dettorre (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D. Jones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • J. Marshall (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • N. Cano (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Aguirre (Staff)

Barry Saxion vs. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716023-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-05-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Barry Saxion Counsel
Respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Declaration Section 12.1

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted the ALJ Decision, ordering the petition be dismissed because the governing documents require the claim be handled through internal dispute resolution prior to administrative action.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to use the mandatory dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Declaration before filing the administrative action.

Key Issues & Findings

Requirement for mandatory dispute resolution procedures

The Petition was dismissed because the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II requires that all covered claims must be resolved using internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of initiating administrative proceedings.

Orders: The ALJ recommended that the Petition be dismissed, and the Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Mandatory Dispute Resolution, Dismissal, Standing Issue Denied
Additional Citations:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564668.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:09 (51.2 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564672.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:11 (54.6 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 568837.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:14 (425.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716023-REL


Briefing on Case No. 17F-H1716023-REL: Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing details the administrative proceedings and final disposition of the case involving petitioners Barry and Sandra Saxion and respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. The petition was ultimately dismissed by the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which adopted the recommendation of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The dismissal was based on a procedural failure by the petitioners to adhere to the mandatory dispute resolution process outlined in the HOA’s governing documents before initiating administrative action.

The respondent’s motion for dismissal presented two primary arguments. The first, challenging petitioner Barry Saxion’s standing due to non-ownership of property, was denied by the ALJ, who found that co-petitioner Sandra Saxion did own property and had standing. The second, and decisive, argument was that the HOA’s Declaration explicitly requires all “covered claims” to be resolved through its internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of administrative proceedings. The ALJ agreed with this argument, leading to a recommendation for dismissal, the vacating of a scheduled hearing, and the issuance of a final order confirming the dismissal.

Case Overview

This section outlines the primary participants, key identifiers, and procedural timeline of the administrative action.

Affiliation

Petitioner

Barry Saxion

Petitioner

Sandra Saxion

Property owner within the Association

Respondent

Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Adjudicator

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Judy Lowe

Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Respondent’s Counsel

Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Identifier

Case Number

HO 17-16/023

Docket Number

17F-H1716023-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), Phoenix, Arizona

Referring Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

Petition Filed: Both Barry and Sandra Saxion signed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Referral to OAH: The Department of Real Estate referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings, creating the caption Barry Saxion v. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Motion for Summary Judgment: The Respondent HOA filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

May 16, 2017: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issued a decision recommending the petition be dismissed.

May 16, 2017: A Minute Entry was issued, vacating the hearing scheduled for May 22, 2017, based on the dismissal recommendation.

May 30, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and officially dismissing the petition.

Analysis of the Motion for Summary Judgment

The Silverton II HOA’s Motion for Summary Judgment was the pivotal filing in this case. It presented two distinct arguments for dismissal, which were addressed separately by the Administrative Law Judge.

Respondent’s Arguments

1. Lack of Standing: The initial argument was that the petitioner, identified in the case caption as Barry Saxion, did not own property within the Association and therefore lacked the legal standing necessary to pursue the action.

2. Failure to Adhere to Governing Documents: The second argument was that the petition must be dismissed because it violated the procedural requirements set forth in the HOA’s governing documents. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II (the “Declaration”) mandates a specific internal dispute resolution process for all “covered claims.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The ALJ’s decision, issued on May 16, 2017, analyzed both of the respondent’s arguments and made distinct recommendations for each.

• The ALJ recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied on the grounds of standing.

• The judge acknowledged the fact, undisputed by the petitioner, that Barry Saxion does not own property within the association.

• However, the judge’s review of the original HOA Dispute Process Petition revealed that Sandra Saxion, who does own property, had also signed the petition as a petitioner. The judge concluded that the case caption, which named only Barry Saxion, was an administrative creation by the Department of Real Estate upon referral.

• The finding was that Sandra Saxion clearly “has standing to pursue this action,” thereby nullifying the argument for dismissal based on a lack of standing.

• The ALJ recommended that the petition be dismissed for failing to follow the mandatory dispute resolution procedures outlined in the HOA’s Declaration.

• The judge cited Section 12.1 of the Declaration, which defines “covered claims” as “all claims, grievances, controversies, disagreements, or disputes that arise in whole or part out of . . . the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Declaration or the other Project Documents.”

• The judge found that the current dispute fell squarely within this definition.

• The decision states that the “plain language of the Declaration prevents this dispute… to be brought in the Office of Administrative Hearings and mandates that the dispute must be handled through the dispute resolution process set forth in the Declaration and Bylaws.”

• The conclusion was that the petition was improperly filed, as the internal remedies had not been pursued first.

Final Disposition and Subsequent Actions

The ALJ’s recommendation to dismiss directly led to the final resolution of the case.

Vacating of Hearing

A Minute Entry dated May 16, 2017, formally vacated the hearing that was scheduled for May 22, 2017. The order was a direct result of the ALJ’s decision recommending the complaint be dismissed.

Final Order from the Department of Real Estate

On May 30, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order that officially concluded the matter.

Adoption of ALJ Decision: The Order explicitly states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed as the applicable governing documents require that the claim must be handled through the dispute resolution process prior to administrative proceedings being brought.”

Effective Date: The Order was designated a “final administrative action” and was effective immediately from the date of service.

Appellate Rights: The parties were informed of their right to file for a rehearing or review within 30 days of the order. They were also advised of their right to appeal for a judicial review by filing a complaint pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6. A court-obtained stay would be required to delay the order during a judicial review.

Official Communications

The Final Order and related documents were formally transmitted to all parties of record via certified mail or electronic means on May 30, 2017. Recipients included:

• Barry Saxion

• Troy B. Stratman, Esq. (counsel for the HOA)

• The Office of Administrative Hearings

• Judy Lowe and other staff at the Arizona Department of Real Estate






Study Guide – 17F-H1716023-REL


Study Guide: Saxion v. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the primary parties involved in case number 17F-H1716023-REL and their respective roles.

2. What was the initial argument made by the Respondent, Silverton II HOA, in its Motion for Summary Judgement?

3. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) resolve the issue of Barry Saxion’s standing to pursue the action?

4. What was the second, and ultimately successful, argument presented by the Respondent for the case’s dismissal?

5. According to the HOA’s governing documents, what is the definition of a “covered claim”?

6. What was the final recommendation made by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in her decision dated May 16, 2017?

7. What immediate procedural action was taken as a result of the ALJ’s recommended decision on May 16, 2017?

8. Who formally accepted the ALJ’s decision, and what was the title of the document that finalized this acceptance?

9. What process must the petitioners now follow to resolve their dispute with the HOA, according to the final ruling?

10. Following the issuance of the Final Order on May 30, 2017, what right did the parties have if they disagreed with the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, Barry and Sandra Saxion, and the Respondent, Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. The Saxions initiated the dispute process, and the Homeowners Association was the entity against which the claim was filed.

2. The Respondent initially argued that the case should be dismissed because Petitioner Barry Saxion did not own property within the Association. This lack of ownership, they claimed, meant he did not possess the legal standing required to pursue the action.

3. The ALJ found that although Barry Saxion did not own property, Sandra Saxion did own property and had also signed the petition. Therefore, Sandra Saxion had standing to pursue the action, and the ALJ recommended denying the motion to dismiss on these grounds.

4. The Respondent’s successful argument was that Section 12.1 of the HOA’s Declaration required all covered claims to be resolved using the internal dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Declaration and Bylaws. They argued this must be done in lieu of initiating administrative proceedings.

5. A “covered claim” is defined as “all claims, grievances, controversies, disagreements, or disputes that arise in whole or part out of . . . the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Declaration or the other Project Documents.”

6. On May 16, 2017, the ALJ recommended that the Petition be dismissed. She concluded that the plain language of the HOA’s governing documents required the claim to be handled through the internal dispute resolution process before any administrative proceedings could be brought.

7. As a result of the ALJ’s recommendation, an order was issued vacating the hearing that was scheduled for May 22, 2017. The parties were advised of this through a Minute Entry.

8. Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, formally accepted the ALJ’s decision. This was finalized in a document titled “Final Order,” dated May 30, 2017.

9. The petitioners must handle their claim through the dispute resolution process set forth in the Silverton II Declaration and Bylaws. The Final Order mandates that this internal process must be used prior to bringing administrative proceedings.

10. After the Final Order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a party had the right to file a motion for rehearing or review within thirty (30) days. They also had the right to appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions require a more detailed analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing connections between the different documents and legal concepts presented.

1. Analyze the concept of “standing” as it was presented and resolved in this case. Discuss why Barry Saxion’s lack of property ownership did not result in the case’s dismissal on those grounds, and explain the role of the original Petition in the ALJ’s finding.

2. Explain the legal hierarchy and procedural flow of this dispute. Trace the case from the initial petition to the Final Order, identifying the specific roles and actions of the Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

3. Discuss the significance of Section 12.1 of the “Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II.” How did the “plain language” of this specific clause determine the ultimate outcome of the administrative proceeding?

4. Evaluate the two distinct arguments made by the Respondent in their Motion for Summary Judgement. Compare the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge in her recommendations for each argument and explain why one argument failed while the other succeeded.

5. Describe the post-decision options available to the parties following the issuance of the Final Order on May 30, 2017. What specific steps could a party take if they disagreed with the outcome, what were the associated deadlines, and to whom would a request for rehearing be addressed?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, and issues a recommended decision. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Administrative Law Judge Decision

The formal written recommendation of the ALJ. In this matter, the decision recommended that the petition be dismissed based on the HOA’s governing documents.

Commissioner

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. In this case, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision and issued the Final Order.

Covered Claims

A specific category of disputes defined in the HOA’s Declaration. It includes all claims, grievances, or disputes related to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the HOA’s governing documents.

Declaration

The short name for the “Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II.” This is a core governing document for the HOA that dictates required procedures, such as dispute resolution.

Department of Real Estate (Department)

The Arizona state agency that referred the HOA dispute to the Office of Administrative Hearings and whose Commissioner issued the Final Order.

Final Order

A binding order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate that accepts the ALJ’s decision. This order made the dismissal of the petition official and effective immediately.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The governing body for the Silverton II community, which was the Respondent in this case.

Minute Entry

A brief entry on the case record noting a court or judge’s order or action. In this case, a Minute Entry was issued to vacate the scheduled May 22, 2017 hearing.

Motion for Summary Judgement

A formal request made by a party (in this case, the Respondent) asking the judge to rule in their favor without a full hearing, based on the argument that there are no disputed facts and the law is on their side.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state office where the case was heard. It provides a neutral forum for resolving disputes involving state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the petitioners were Barry and Sandra Saxion.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Standing

The legal right to bring a lawsuit or administrative action. In this context, standing was initially questioned based on property ownership within the HOA.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716023-REL


Why This Homeowner’s Complaint Against Their HOA Was Dismissed Before It Began

Dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can be one of the most frustrating aspects of homeownership. When you feel the association is overstepping its bounds or failing to enforce the rules fairly, the natural impulse is to seek a formal resolution. Homeowners have rights, and there are official channels, like administrative hearings, designed to address these disputes.

But what if the path to justice has a mandatory detour you didn’t know about? The case of Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA is a powerful cautionary tale for any homeowner who believes they have a legitimate grievance. A close look at the official documents reveals surprising lessons, and it’s a stark reminder that in an HOA dispute, being right is not enough; you must also be procedurally perfect.

1. The Fine Print Is Your First Hurdle

The primary reason the homeowners’ petition was dismissed had nothing to do with the merits of their actual complaint. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) never weighed in on whether the homeowners were right or the HOA was wrong. Instead, the case was dismissed because the homeowners failed to follow the mandatory dispute resolution process required by their own HOA’s governing documents before they filed for an administrative hearing.

The association’s own rules legally required an internal process to be completed first. By going straight to an administrative filing, the homeowners had unintentionally bypassed a mandatory first step outlined in their governing documents. The ALJ pointed to the specific language in the HOA’s Declaration, which was the ultimate authority on the matter.

all covered claims “must be resolved using the dispute resolution procedures set forth . . . in [the] Declaration and the Bylaws in lieu of filing a lawsuit or initiating administrative proceedings.”

2. A Simple Clerical Error Can Jeopardize Your Entire Case

Before even getting to the core procedural issue, the HOA made another challenge that could have ended the case immediately. They argued that the petitioner officially named in the case caption, Barry Saxion, didn’t actually own property in the association and therefore had no legal standing.

This error, however, wasn’t made by the homeowners. The case documents reveal a critical lesson: when the Arizona Department of Real Estate referred the matter for a hearing, it was the agency that created the incorrect caption. This bureaucratic mistake could have been fatal, but the petition was saved because the ALJ noted that the original paperwork was signed by both Barry Saxion and Sandra Saxion, who did own property. Because both their names and signatures were on the petition, the ALJ could overlook the agency’s error. This highlights the need for homeowners to be vigilant, double-checking all official documents—even those prepared by a state agency.

3. A “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean Justice Was Served

The final outcome was not a judgment on the underlying disagreement. The petition was simply “dismissed.” This means the core issues the homeowners wanted to resolve were never actually heard or ruled on by the Administrative Law Judge.

The process itself is revealing. On May 16, 2017, the ALJ, Tammy L. Eigenheer, issued a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed. This recommendation was then reviewed by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, who accepted it and issued a FINAL ORDER making the dismissal official on May 30, 2017. For the HOA, this was a victory won on a technicality. For the homeowners, it was a procedural dead end, preventing their core complaints from being heard in the administrative hearing. This shows how a legal victory can be won entirely on procedure, preventing the central conflict from ever being addressed.

Conclusion

The core lesson from the Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA case is clear: in a dispute with your HOA, understanding the procedural rules in your governing documents is just as important as the substance of your complaint. Failing to read and follow these rules can render your entire effort, no matter how justified, completely invalid. It can cost you time, money, and the opportunity to have your case heard at all. Before you take on your HOA, have you read the rulebook they require you to play by?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Barry Saxion (petitioner)
  • Sandra Saxion (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Troy B. Stratman (Respondent attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • L. Dettorre (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D. Jones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • J. Marshall (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • N. Cano (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Aguirre (Staff)

John Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716021-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-30
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John Sellers Counsel
Respondent Rancho Madera Condominium Association Counsel Lydia Peirce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the Respondent HOA complied with A.R.S. § 33-1258 by providing documents related to expenditures, and was not required to provide bank signature cards or read-only online access credentials.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 because the statute does not require the association to provide records (like signature cards or usernames/passwords) which are not financial records showing actual expenditures and are often held by the financial institution.

Key Issues & Findings

Association financial and other records; applicability

Petitioner, a member of the HOA, alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 by refusing access to bank account signature cards and read-only user names/passwords. The ALJ found that these items were not 'financial and other records' that the association was statutorily required to provide, as they related to mechanisms for disbursement rather than actual expenditure, and would be maintained by the bank, not the association.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied and dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Condominium Act, Access to Records, Financial Records, Bank Records
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716021-REL Decision – 549566.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:15 (60.9 KB)

17F-H1716021-REL Decision – 554490.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:16 (88.6 KB)

17F-H1716021-REL Decision – 558591.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:17 (757.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716021-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcome of the administrative case John Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association. The core of the dispute was Petitioner John Sellers’s allegation that the Respondent, Rancho Madera Condominium Association, violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1258 by refusing to produce specific records: bank account signature cards and read-only online banking credentials for the association’s account with Mutual of Omaha.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately recommended the petition be denied, a decision that was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The ruling hinged on a narrow interpretation of the statute. The ALJ concluded that the requested items were not “financial and other records of the association” as required by law. Key findings supporting this conclusion were:

Custody: The signature cards, if they exist, are records held by the bank (Mutual of Omaha), not the association.

Nature of Request: Online user names and passwords constitute “information,” not a “document” or “record” in the statutory sense.

Sufficient Disclosure: The association had already provided a comprehensive set of financial documents (bank statements, contracts, resolutions, etc.) sufficient for a member to ascertain whether the association was prudently managing its funds, thereby satisfying the plain-meaning purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1258.

The petitioner’s arguments that such records must exist under federal banking regulations and that electronic access is superior to paper records were deemed policy arguments to be addressed to the legislature, not grounds for finding a statutory violation.

Case Overview

Case Name

John Sellers, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association, Respondent

Case Number

No. 17F-H1716021-REL (also listed as DOCKET NO. 17F-H1716021-REL and CASE NO. HO 17-16/021)

Petitioner

John Sellers (Appeared on his own behalf)

Respondent

Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Lydia Peirce Linsmeier, Esq., Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Reviewing Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Diane Mihalsky

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation and Legal Framework

Petitioner’s Claim

On or about December 20, 2016, John Sellers, a condominium owner and member of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association, filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The petition alleged that the association had violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 by refusing to provide two specific items related to its bank account at Mutual of Omaha:

1. Bank account signature cards.

2. Read-only user names and passwords for online access to the account.

Sellers argued that these documents must exist, citing federal banking statutes and regulations intended to combat terrorism.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1258

The case revolved around the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1258, “Association financial and other records.” The key provisions of this statute state:

A. Right to Examine: “Except as provided in subsection B of this section, all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member…”

Timeline: An association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination and ten business days to provide copies upon request.

Fees: An association may charge a fee of not more than fifteen cents per page for copies.

B. Withholdable Records: The statute allows an association to withhold records related to:

1. Privileged attorney-client communication.

2. Pending litigation.

3. Records of board meetings not required to be open to all members.

4. Personal, health, or financial records of individual members or employees.

5. Records related to job performance or complaints against employees.

C. Legal Prohibitions: An association is not required to disclose records if doing so would violate state or federal law.

The Uniform Condominium Act, of which this statute is a part, does not provide a more specific definition of “financial and other records.”

Factual Findings and Evidence Presented

Records Provided by the Association

Prior to the hearing, the Respondent had already provided the Petitioner with a substantial volume of financial records. Emails attached to the initial petition indicated that the following documents were furnished:

• All bank statements

• Account opening documentation

• Forms for members’ direct debit authorizations

• The Board’s resolution authorizing the opening of the bank account

• Agreements between the property management company, Trestle Management Group, and Mutual of Omaha regarding fees, indemnities, and netting

• The association’s insurance certificate

• The association’s management contract with Trestle Management Group

Witness Testimony

A hearing was held on March 7, 2017, where testimony was presented by both parties.

Petitioner’s Testimony: John Sellers testified on his own behalf and submitted ten exhibits.

Respondent’s Witnesses:

Marc Vasquez (Vice President of Trestle Management Group): Testified that all signature cards for the association’s bank accounts were held by the bank at which the accounts were opened. He stated that Mutual of Omaha was the custodian of those cards.

Alan Simpson (Vice President of Respondent’s Board) & Marc Kaplan (President of Respondent’s Board): Both testified that they did not have user names and passwords for the association’s Mutual of Omaha account. They believed, however, that the association’s treasurer may have had such credentials to access the account online.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 29, 2017, denied the Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning was based on a direct interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1258 and the evidence presented.

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent had violated the statute. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that “convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ determined that the “plain meaning” of A.R.S. § 33-1258 is to provide members with access to documents that allow them to “ascertain whether the association is prudently managing its members’ assessments.” The decision explicitly states that the numerous documents already provided by the Respondent fulfilled this purpose.

Custody and Control: A central finding was that the requested items were not “records of the association.” The signature cards were records held and maintained by a third party, Mutual of Omaha. The statute does not compel an association to produce records that are not in its possession or under its control.

Information vs. Documents: The decision drew a distinction between records and information, stating, “The user names and passwords are information, not a document.” Furthermore, it noted that these items “do not relate to Respondent’s actual expenditure of members’ assessments” but rather to the mechanisms for disbursing funds.

Scope of the Statute: The ALJ concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1258 does not require an association to “create, maintain, or provide this information or documentation to Petitioner, either to serve his convenience or to allow him to ascertain Respondent’s or Mutual of Omaha’s compliance with federal banking statutes that are not incorporated in the Uniform Condominium Act.”

Policy Arguments: The Petitioner’s contention that “paper access to the account information is inferior to electronic access” was dismissed as “a policy argument that should be addressed to the Legislature.” The statute only requires that records be made “reasonably available,” which the Respondent had done.

Procedural History and Final Outcome

c. Dec. 20, 2016

John Sellers files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Mar. 7, 2017

An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Diane Mihalsky. An order is issued holding the record open for the parties to submit legal memoranda regarding the scope of A.R.S. § 33-1258.

Mar. 21, 2017

The deadline for submitting legal memoranda passes, and the record on the matter is closed.

Mar. 29, 2017

ALJ Diane Mihalsky issues the “Administrative Law Judge Decision,” which includes Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Recommended Order to deny the Petitioner’s petition.

Mar. 30, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a “Final Order.” This order formally accepts and adopts the ALJ’s decision, and the petition is denied.

The Final Order, effective immediately upon service, represented the final administrative action in the matter. The order noted that parties could file a motion for rehearing within 30 days or appeal the final administrative decision through judicial review.