Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's petition was affirmed in part and denied in part. Petitioner prevailed on Complaint #1 (improper use of email/unanimous written consent for non-privileged business), but lost on Complaint #2 (alleged improper emergency executive session). Respondent was ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1804 and reimburse the $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the violation related to the emergency executive session (Complaint #2).

Key Issues & Findings

Non-privileged Association Business Conducted in Closed Session (Complaint #1)

The HOA used unanimous written consents obtained via individual emails from board members to approve association business (such as approving repairs, replacement of equipment, and pruning) outside of open meetings, violating the requirement that all meetings of the board of directors must be open to members.

Orders: Respondent ordered to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee and comply with A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward. No civil penalty assessed due to the COVID-19 pandemic circumstances.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 10-3821

Association Business Conducted in an Emergency Executive Session (Complaint #2)

Petitioner alleged misuse of emergency executive sessions. Respondent represented that the sessions only addressed issues under statutory exceptions. Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that this violation occurred.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Executive Session, COVID-19
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 10-3821
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120001-REL-RHG Decision – 864802.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:10 (101.9 KB)

21F-H2120001-REL-RHG Decision – ../21F-H2120001-REL/838004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:13 (125.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Brief: Morin vs. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative case (No. 21F-H2120001-REL) involving homeowner Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent). The core issue revolved around the association’s adherence to Arizona’s open meeting laws for planned communities, as stipulated in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that the Solera Chandler HOA violated this statute by conducting non-privileged association business without an open meeting. The Board of Directors made numerous decisions between March and July 2020—including approving contracts for repairs, appointing committee members, and changing design guidelines—through a process of “unanimous written consent” executed via individual emails. This method circumvented statutory requirements for 48-hour notice to members, published agendas, and the opportunity for homeowners to speak before a vote.

The HOA defended its actions by citing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and a separate statute, A.R.S. § 10-3821, which permits non-profit corporations to act without a meeting. However, the Judge ruled that the specific requirements of the HOA open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) take precedence, emphasizing the state’s explicit policy in favor of transparency and open meetings for homeowners’ associations.

While the petitioner’s primary complaint was affirmed, a second allegation regarding the misuse of emergency executive sessions was denied due to insufficient evidence. The final order directed the HOA to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1804 in the future and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee. No civil penalty was assessed, with the judge acknowledging the “unprecedented global pandemic” as a mitigating circumstance.

Case Overview

Case Number

21F-H2120001-REL

Petitioner

Debra K. Morin

Respondent

Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Timeline of Adjudication

July 10, 2020: Debra Morin files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

October 29, 2020: The initial administrative hearing is held.

November 18, 2020: The first Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued.

February 25, 2021: A rehearing is held at the Respondent’s request to clarify a finding of fact.

March 17, 2021: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, affirming the original conclusion with a factual correction.

Petitioner’s Allegations

The petitioner, Debra K. Morin, focused her case on two specific complaints alleging violations of Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs (A.R.S. § 33-1804).

Complaint #1: Improper Use of Closed Sessions and Unanimous Written Consent

The petitioner alleged that the Solera HOA Board of Directors conducted non-privileged association business in closed sessions without proper procedure. Specifically, the Board was accused of:

• Failing to provide members with 48-hour notice of meetings.

• Failing to provide agendas for the business being conducted.

• Denying members the opportunity to speak prior to the Board taking action on key issues.

• Using “unanimous written consent” to bypass open meeting requirements.

Complaint #2: Misuse of “Emergency Executive Sessions”

The petitioner further alleged that the Board conducted privileged association business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions” improperly by:

• Failing to identify the specific statutory exception to the open meeting law that permitted the closed session.

• Failing to provide an agenda and 48-hour notice where possible.

• Failing to produce minutes stating the reason for the emergency and submitting them at the next board meeting.

Respondent’s Actions and Defense

The Solera Chandler HOA acknowledged using unanimous written consents but argued its actions were a necessary response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented in-person meetings. The Board asserted its actions were legally authorized under A.R.S. § 10-3821, a statute governing non-profit corporations.

Use of Unanimous Written Consent

Evidence presented at the rehearing established the Board’s procedure. For each action, an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to solicit a “yes” or “no” vote. If all members voted “yes,” the action was considered passed by unanimous consent, and the Board President would sign the formal consent document. The HOA stated it had not used this method before the pandemic and did not intend to continue its use.

The following actions were taken by the Board using this method and were later ratified at the August 5, 2020, open Board meeting:

Action Taken via Unanimous Written Consent

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of sidewalk and community center entrance.

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of cool decking around both pools.

April 30, 2020

Approve Kirk Sandquist as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

April 30, 2020

Approve Tom Dusbabek as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

May 5, 2020

Approve Gilbert Road retention basin project, related irrigation replacement, and addition of 420 tons of granite.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of a Carrier 6-ton heat pump.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of two Carrier 5-ton heat pumps.

May 27, 2020

Approve hiring Ken Eller to draft architectural drawings.

June 4, 2020

Approve a change to the Design Guidelines at the request of the Architectural Review Committee.

July 1, 2020

Approve the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Chronology of Executive Sessions

In addition to the actions taken by written consent, the Board held numerous executive (closed) sessions between March and August 2020, citing specific exceptions in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A). Minutes for these meetings were approved at the August 5, 2020 executive session but were redacted to conceal the substance of the discussions.

Date of Session

Cited Statutory Exceptions for Closed Session (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A))

March 13, 2020

(1) Legal advice, (2) Pending litigation, (4) Employee matters

March 16, 2020

(1) Legal advice, (2) Pending litigation

March 19, 2020

(1) Legal advice

March 24, 2020

(4) Employee matters

April 6, 2020

(4) Employee matters

April 10, 2020

(4) Employee matters

May 4, 2020

(4) Employee matters

May 12, 2020*

(1) Legal advice, (2) Pending litigation, (4) Employee matters

May 15, 2020

(1) Legal advice, (2) Pending litigation

May 27, 2020

(2) Pending litigation, (4) Employee matters

June 24, 2020

(2) Pending litigation, (3) Personal/health/financial information

August 5, 2020

(1) Legal advice, (2) Pending litigation, (3) Personal/health/financial information

*Designated an “emergency executive session.”

Adjudication and Legal Rulings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision rested on the interpretation and primacy of Arizona’s statutes governing homeowners’ associations.

Statutory Conflict and Interpretation

The central legal question was the conflict between two state laws:

A.R.S. § 33-1804: Specifically requires all HOA Board meetings to be open to all members, with limited exceptions for closed executive sessions. It explicitly states a policy that statutes should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

A.R.S. § 10-3821: A general corporate law that allows boards of non-profit corporations to take action “without a meeting” if there is unanimous written consent from all directors.

The Judge concluded that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 may apply to non-profits generally, the more specific statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, governs the conduct of HOA boards. The requirement for open meetings in the HOA statute overrides the provision allowing for action without a meeting in the general non-profit statute.

Ruling on Complaint #1 (Improper Closed Business)

Finding: In favor of the Petitioner.

• The Judge ruled that the Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent committed the violation.

• The decision states, “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via email rather than in meetings open to the members.”

• An initial finding that the business was conducted via “conference calls” was corrected after the rehearing to specify the method was individual emails, but this did not change the outcome.

• The Judge gave “consideration to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic” and found that no civil penalty was appropriate under the circumstances.

Ruling on Complaint #2 (Misuse of Executive Sessions)

Finding: In favor of the Respondent.

• The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for this allegation.

• The decision notes, “Nothing in the record suggested the Board discussed other issues that did not fall under the exceptions listed and/or that the May 12, 2020 executive session was not an emergency.”

Final Order and Directives

The Administrative Law Judge’s final, binding order issued on March 17, 2021, included the following directives:

1. Petition Affirmed in Part: The petitioner’s petition was affirmed on the issue of Complaint #1 and denied on the issue of Complaint #2.

2. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Respondent (Solera Chandler HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner (Debra Morin) her $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed.

3. Compliance Mandate: Respondent was directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.






Study Guide – 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Debra K. Morin and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. It includes short-answer questions with an answer key, essay questions for further analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information from the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two main complaints filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent’s Board of Directors?

3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Petitioner allege the Respondent violated, and what is the general policy purpose of this statute?

4. How did the Respondent justify its use of unanimous written consents and its decision to forgo open meetings from March to July 2020?

5. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final ruling on Complaint #1, which concerned conducting non-privileged association business?

6. What was the ruling on Complaint #2, which concerned the use of emergency executive sessions, and what was the reason for this outcome?

7. A rehearing was granted after the initial decision. What specific factual conclusion from the first decision was the focus of this rehearing?

8. How did the evidence presented at the rehearing clarify the method used by the Board of Directors to pass unanimous written consents?

9. Despite finding the Respondent in violation of state law, why did the Administrative Law Judge decide not to impose a civil penalty?

10. What two actions was the Respondent ordered to take as a result of the final ruling?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debra K. Morin, the Petitioner, and Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging statutory violations by the Respondent homeowners’ association.

2. The Petitioner’s first complaint alleged that the Respondent conducted non-privileged business in closed sessions using unanimous written consent, without providing proper notice, agendas, or an opportunity for members to speak. The second complaint alleged the Respondent conducted privileged business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions” without proper justification or documentation.

3. The Petitioner alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The stated policy of this statute is that all meetings of a planned community should be conducted openly, with notices and agendas provided to reasonably inform members and ensure they have the ability to speak before a vote is taken.

4. The Respondent argued that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, its Board of Directors was unable to meet in person to protect the health of its members and directors. The Respondent asserted that taking action via unanimous written consents was authorized under a different statute, A.R.S. § 10-3821, which applies to non-profit corporations.

5. The Judge affirmed the Petitioner’s first complaint, finding that she had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent improperly conducted association business. The Judge ruled that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows for action without a meeting, A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifically requires that HOA board meetings be open to members.

6. The Judge denied the Petitioner’s second complaint. The ruling stated that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the executive sessions were improper, as nothing in the record suggested the Board discussed issues outside of the legally permitted exceptions or that the May 12, 2020 session was not a true emergency.

7. The rehearing focused on Conclusion of Law 8 from the initial decision, which stated that the “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via conference calls.” The Respondent disputed that the business related to the unanimous written consents was conducted via conference call.

8. Evidence at the rehearing established that an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to request a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all members voted “yes,” the action was considered passed by unanimous consent, which the Judge still found to be a violation of the open meeting law.

9. The Judge gave consideration to the fact that the Respondent was “faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes.” Because of these unique circumstances, the Judge found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

10. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner her $500.00 filing fee for the complaint on which she prevailed. The Respondent was also directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the statutory conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1804 (HOA open meetings) and A.R.S. § 10-3821 (non-profit action without a meeting) as presented in this case. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to determine that the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 took precedence for a homeowners’ association.

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” How did the Petitioner successfully meet this evidentiary burden for Complaint #1 but fail to meet it for Complaint #2?

3. Evaluate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the actions of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association and the final judgment of the Administrative Law Judge. How did this external event influence both the violation itself and the penalty phase of the ruling?

4. According to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), what is the stated public policy of Arizona regarding meetings of planned communities? How did this explicit policy statement likely influence the judge’s interpretation of the law and the final decision regarding Complaint #1?

5. Describe the full procedural history of this case, from the initial petition through the rehearing and final order. What does the granting of a rehearing to correct a factual finding demonstrate about the legal process and the importance of accuracy in judicial decisions?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over administrative hearings, in this case within the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on the applicable laws and facts.

A.R.S. § 10-3821

An Arizona Revised Statute pertaining to non-profit corporations. It allows a corporation’s board of directors to take action without a meeting if the action is approved by a unanimous written consent signed by every director.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

An Arizona Revised Statute specifically governing planned communities (homeowners’ associations). It mandates that all board of directors meetings be open to association members, requires 48-hour notice and an agenda, and allows members to speak.

Executive Session

A portion of a board meeting that is closed to association members. A.R.S. § 33-1804 strictly limits these sessions to specific topics, such as receiving legal advice, discussing pending litigation, or reviewing confidential personal, health, or financial information of an individual.

Hearing

A formal proceeding before an Administrative Law Judge where parties present evidence and arguments related to a legal dispute. In this case, hearings were held on October 29, 2020, and February 25, 2021.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this matter, the Arizona Department of Real Estate had jurisdiction to hear disputes between a property owner and a homeowners’ association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Debra K. Morin was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative case. It means the evidence presented must be more convincing and probable than the evidence offered in opposition, showing the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine an issue from an initial hearing. In this case, a rehearing was granted at the Respondent’s request to address the factual finding of how it conducted business (conference calls vs. email).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., was the Respondent.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, beginning with the plain text of the statute.

Unanimous Written Consent

A procedure, authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821, where an action is approved in writing by all members of a board of directors without a formal meeting. The Respondent used this method for actions such as approving repairs, appointing committee members, and changing design guidelines.






Blog Post – 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG


4 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Legal Battle with Her HOA

Introduction: When Your HOA Goes Dark

In the chaos of early 2020, as the world shut down, many Homeowners’ Association boards faced a critical challenge: how to govern when gathering in person was impossible? For residents of the Solera Chandler community, the answer was alarming—their board went dark. Citing the global crisis, the board began making major community decisions in secret, bypassing open meetings entirely. This raised a crucial legal question for every homeowner in the state: can an HOA board use a pandemic as justification to govern by private email? The legal battle launched by one determined resident, Debra K. Morin, provides a fascinating and unexpected answer.

1. Your HOA Board Can’t Govern by Email—Even in a Pandemic

At first glance, the Solera Chandler HOA board’s actions seemed like a practical response to an unprecedented crisis. To keep community business moving, the board began approving actions through a series of votes conducted via email. Using this process, the board made several significant decisions, including:

• Approving repairs for sidewalks and the community center entrance.

• Approving the replacement of cool decking around both pools.

• Appointing two new members to the Architectural Review Committee.

• Approving a major retention basin project, including irrigation replacement and the addition of 420 tons of granite.

• Hiring an architect to draft drawings.

The board’s defense rested on a clever, but ultimately flawed, legal argument. They cited Arizona statute A.R.S. § 10-3821, which allows general non-profit corporations to take action via “unanimous written consent” without a formal meeting. It was a reasonable assumption. However, an Administrative Law Judge ruled their actions were a clear violation of state law.

The legal reasoning is a vital lesson in statutory interpretation. The judge affirmed that when two laws conflict, the more specific statute prevails. In this case, the highly specific HOA Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804), which explicitly requires board meetings to be open to all members, overrides the more general rule for non-profits. The ruling provided a clear interpretation of the law: even a global pandemic does not grant an HOA board the power to circumvent its duty of transparency. In fact, a rehearing in the case clarified the board was making decisions through a series of individual emails—a method that completely prevented any form of an open meeting.

2. The Law Prioritizes Transparency Above All Else

The judge’s decision was not a mere technicality. It was a firm defense of the core policy undergirding Arizona’s HOA laws. The statute itself contains a powerful mission statement that leaves no room for ambiguity. A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) declares:

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for those meetings that contain the information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members of the matters to be discussed or decided and to ensure that members have the ability to speak after discussion of agenda items, but before a vote of the board of directors or members is taken.

This principle is the bedrock of community governance. It ensures that homeowners can observe deliberations and have their say before a final decision is made. This right to be heard is lost when a board approves a costly pool deck repair or appoints a new committee member through a series of private emails, with homeowners only finding out after the fact. The court affirmed that this right is not a suggestion; it is a non-negotiable legal requirement.

3. A Legal “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean Punishment

After proving a clear violation of state law, the homeowner won… but the HOA received no punishment. Here’s why that isn’t a contradiction. Although Debra K. Morin successfully demonstrated that the board had broken the law, the Administrative Law Judge decided against imposing any civil penalty.

The judge’s reasoning highlights the law’s capacity for context. “Consideration is given to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes and conduct association business,” the decision stated.

Instead of a punitive fine, the consequences were corrective. The board was formally ordered to comply with the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) going forward, and the association was required to reimburse Ms. Morin for her $500 filing fee. This outcome reveals a surprising nuance in administrative law: a judgment can simultaneously vindicate a petitioner and uphold the law while acknowledging mitigating circumstances, focusing on future compliance rather than past punishment.

4. One Determined Homeowner Can Make a Difference

This entire legal challenge was initiated by a single resident: Debra K. Morin. Her story, however, is a realistic and therefore more empowering example of homeowner advocacy. Ms. Morin actually filed two separate complaints. While she won her landmark case regarding secret email voting, she did not prevail on a second, unrelated claim concerning the board’s use of “emergency executive sessions.”

This partial victory makes her success on the transparency issue even more significant. It shows that the legal system carefully parsed her arguments, affirming the one with the broadest implications for community governance. By filing her petition, she secured a formal order compelling her HOA to follow the law and was refunded the costs she incurred.

Morin’s petition demonstrates that community governance is not a spectator sport. It proves that one homeowner with a grasp of the rules and the determination to see them enforced can successfully realign a board with its fundamental duty of transparency.

Conclusion: Is Your HOA Playing by the Rules?

The case of Morin vs. Solera Chandler HOA delivers a sharp, unambiguous message: the legal requirement for transparency is absolute, even in the face of extraordinary circumstances. While the board’s pandemic-related pressures earned it leniency from fines, the foundational principle of open governance was decisively upheld. This case serves as a powerful reminder of the rights of homeowners and the duties of their elected boards. It sets a clear standard for openness—does your own HOA’s process for making decisions live up to it?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf,

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Also cited as Lydia Linsmeier,,,
  • Joshua M. Bolen (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Gail Ryan (board member (President))
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Resigned August 5, 2020

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • f. del sol (clerk/staff)
    Signed transmission notice,
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient

Other Participants

  • Kirk Sandquist (committee member (ARC))
    Approved to Architectural Review Committee
  • Tom Dusbabek (committee member (ARC))
    Approved to Architectural Review Committee
  • Ken Eller (consultant)
    Approved to draft architectural drawings

Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120001-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The petition was affirmed in part (Complaint #1) and denied in part (Complaint #2). The Respondent HOA was found to have improperly conducted non-privileged business via email/unanimous written consent in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the $500 filing fee and comply with the statute, but no civil penalty was imposed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the alleged violation concerning the improper use of emergency executive sessions (Complaint #2).

Key Issues & Findings

Non-privileged Association Business Conducted in Closed Session

The HOA improperly conducted association business, which should have been open to members, through unanimous written consent solicited via individual emails during the COVID-19 shutdown, violating the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward and to reimburse Petitioner her $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1804
  • A.R.S. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, HOA Governance, Unanimous Written Consent, COVID-19, Executive Session
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1804
  • A.R.S. 10-3821
  • A.R.S. 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 838004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:04 (125.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120001-REL


Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Morin vs. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative law case involving a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by conducting association business and making decisions without open meetings accessible to its members.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner on her primary complaint. The investigation and subsequent hearings revealed that the HOA Board, citing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, utilized a process of “unanimous written consent” to approve numerous actions. This process, facilitated through individual emails to board members, was found to be an improper substitute for the open meetings required by law. The ALJ concluded that the specific transparency requirements for homeowners’ associations in A.R.S. § 33-1804 supersede the more general provisions for non-profit corporations in A.R.S. § 10-3821, which the HOA had cited as justification.

While the violation was established, no civil penalty was assessed due to the “unprecedented global pandemic.” The HOA was ordered to comply with the open meeting law moving forward and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee. A second complaint from the petitioner, alleging the improper use of emergency executive sessions, was not proven and was therefore denied. A rehearing clarified the precise method of the violation—email voting rather than conference calls—but did not alter the final judgment.

Case Background and Allegations

This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed on July 10, 2020. The case centered on the actions of the Solera Chandler HOA’s Board of Directors between March and August 2020.

Petitioner: Debra K. Morin

Respondent: Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Case Number: 21F-H2120001-REL

Key Dates:

◦ Initial Hearing: October 29, 2020

◦ Initial Decision: November 18, 2020

◦ Rehearing: February 25, 2021

◦ Final Decision After Rehearing: March 17, 2021

Petitioner’s Formal Complaints

After being ordered to clarify her initial filing, the petitioner proceeded with two specific alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1804:

1. Complaint #1: Non-Privileged Business in Closed Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted non-privileged association business in closed sessions by using unanimous written consent. This practice circumvented statutory requirements for providing members with agendas, giving 48-hour notice, and allowing them an opportunity to speak on key issues before the Board took action.

2. Complaint #2: Improper Emergency Executive Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted privileged business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions.” This was done without properly identifying the legal exception to the open meeting law, providing an agenda or 48-hour notice, or submitting minutes at the next board meeting that stated the reason for the emergency.

Key Evidence and Factual Findings

The evidence presented centered on the HOA’s governance practices during the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Respondent’s Justification

The HOA’s defense rested on two main arguments:

• The COVID-19 pandemic made it impossible for the Board to meet in person, necessitating alternative methods to conduct business while protecting the health of directors and members.

• The use of unanimous written consents was authorized under A.R.S. § 10-3821, a statute that permits non-profit corporations to take action without a formal meeting if all directors consent in writing. The HOA acknowledged it had not used this method before the pandemic and did not intend to continue its use.

Unanimous Written Consents

At an open Board of Directors meeting on August 5, 2020, the Board formally ratified a series of actions taken via unanimous written consent during the “Covid 19 Shutdown.” A rehearing clarified the precise mechanism: a community management company would email each board member individually to solicit a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all votes were “yes,” the Board President would sign the written consent on behalf of the Board.

The actions taken through this process included:

Action Taken by Unanimous Written Consent

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of cool decking surrounding both pools.

April 30, 2020

Approve Kirk Sandquist as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

April 30, 2020

Approve Tom Dusbabek as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

May 5, 2020

Approve the Gilbert Road retention basin project, related irrigation replacement, and the addition of 420 tons of granite.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of a Carrier 6-ton heat pump.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of two Carrier 5-ton heat pumps.

May 27, 2020

Approve hiring Ken Eller to draft architectural drawings.

June 4, 2020

Approve a change to the Design Guidelines at the request of the Architectural Review Committee.

July 1, 2020

Approve the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Executive Sessions

The Board held numerous executive (closed) sessions during this period, including on March 13, March 16, March 19, March 24, April 6, April 10, May 4, May 15, May 27, June 24, and August 5, 2020. An “emergency executive session” was held on May 12, 2020. The agendas for these meetings cited specific legal exceptions under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) as justification for the closure.

Legal Analysis and Rulings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the interpretation and primacy of two competing Arizona statutes.

The Core Statutory Conflict

A.R.S. § 33-1804 (HOA Open Meeting Law): This statute establishes a strong state policy that all HOA board and member meetings “be conducted openly.” It mandates that members receive at least 48-hours’ notice, be provided with agendas, and be permitted to “attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The statute explicitly directs that any interpretation of its provisions must be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

A.R.S. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting for Non-Profits): This statute, which applies more broadly to non-profit corporations, allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if the action is approved by one or more written consents signed by all directors.

Ruling on Complaint #1 (Violation Established)

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the open meeting law. The core of the ruling is that the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for homeowners’ associations must be followed, even if A.R.S. § 10-3821 provides a different mechanism for general non-profits.

The final decision states: “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via email rather than in meetings open to the members.” The use of email voting to achieve unanimous consent was deemed a violation because it denied members the notice, agenda, and opportunity to speak that are guaranteed by the HOA open meeting law.

However, the ALJ gave “consideration to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic” and found that “no civil penalty is appropriate given the circumstances.”

Ruling on Complaint #2 (Violation Not Established)

The ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board conducted improper emergency executive sessions. The decision notes that there was “nothing in the record” to suggest the Board discussed topics outside the legally permitted exceptions for closed sessions, nor was there evidence to suggest the May 12, 2020, meeting was not a genuine emergency.

Final Order and Disposition

The final judgment, issued after the rehearing, is binding on both parties.

Outcome: The petitioner’s petition was affirmed in part (regarding Complaint #1) and denied in part (regarding Complaint #2).

Directives to Respondent (HOA):

1. The HOA is ordered to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

2. The HOA is directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

Appeal: Any appeal of the final order must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.






Study Guide – 21F-H2120001-REL


Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent), as detailed in Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 21F-H2120001-REL and No. 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and outcomes.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based only on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central accusation in the Petitioner’s first complaint against the Respondent?

3. What two primary justifications did the Respondent provide for its actions during the COVID-19 pandemic?

4. According to the findings of the rehearing, what specific procedure did the Respondent use to obtain “unanimous written consents”?

5. Identify the two main Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that were central to the legal dispute and briefly describe the function of each.

6. What was the final ruling on Complaint #1, and what was the judge’s reasoning?

7. Why did the Petitioner fail to prove the allegations in Complaint #2?

8. What specific factual error in the first Administrative Law Judge Decision prompted the Respondent to request a rehearing?

9. What two orders were issued against the Respondent in the final decision?

10. What specific circumstance did the Administrative Law Judge cite as a reason for not imposing a civil penalty on the Respondent?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debra K. Morin, the Petitioner and homeowner, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Respondent violated state law, while the Respondent defended its actions before an Administrative Law Judge.

2. The Petitioner’s first complaint accused the Solera Homeowners’ Association Board of Directors of conducting non-privileged association business in closed sessions. Specifically, she alleged they used unanimous written consent to take action without providing agendas, giving 48-hour notice, or allowing members an opportunity to speak on key issues.

3. The Respondent argued that the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the Board of Directors from meeting in person to protect the health of members and directors. The Respondent also asserted that its use of unanimous written consents was legally authorized for non-profit corporations under A.R.S. § 10-3821.

4. The rehearing established that an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to request a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all members replied “yes,” the item was considered passed by unanimous consent, and the Board President would sign the formal consent document.

5. The central statutes were A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821. A.R.S. § 33-1804 is the state’s open meeting law for homeowners’ associations, requiring meetings to be open to members with proper notice, while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent.

6. The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner on Complaint #1, affirming the violation. The judge reasoned that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows for action without a meeting, the more specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 mandate that all HOA board meetings be open to members, a requirement the Respondent violated by conducting business via email.

7. The Petitioner failed to prove Complaint #2 because she did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent’s executive sessions were improper. The judge found nothing in the record to suggest the Board discussed issues outside the legal exceptions listed in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) or that the May 12, 2020, session was not a genuine emergency.

8. The Respondent requested a rehearing to correct a finding in Conclusion of Law 8 of the initial decision, which incorrectly stated that the association business at issue was conducted in closed sessions via “conference calls.” The Respondent acknowledged using conference calls for executive sessions but denied using them for the actions taken by unanimous written consent.

9. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed. Additionally, the Respondent was directed to comply with all requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 in the future.

10. The Administrative Law Judge gave consideration to the fact that the Respondent was “faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes and conduct association business.” Because of these unique circumstances, the judge found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

1. Discuss the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821 as it relates to the actions of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this imply about the hierarchy of state laws governing specific entities versus general corporations?

2. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that the COVID-19 pandemic justified their actions. To what extent did the Administrative Law Judge accept this argument, and how did it influence the final order?

3. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and detail how it was applied to both Complaint #1 and Complaint #2. Why did the Petitioner meet this burden for the first complaint but not the second?

4. Trace the evolution of the case from the initial hearing to the rehearing. What specific finding of fact was corrected, and why was this correction significant for the legal record, even though it did not change the ultimate outcome for either complaint?

5. Based on the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), discuss the stated policy of the state of Arizona regarding homeowner association meetings. How did the Respondent’s actions, specifically the use of email for unanimous consents, contravene this policy?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 10-3821

An Arizona Revised Statute that allows the board of directors of a non-profit corporation to take action without a formal meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and evidenced by one or more written consents.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

An Arizona Revised Statute, also known as the open meeting law for planned communities, which mandates that all meetings of an HOA board of directors must be open to all members. It requires 48-hour notice and allows for closed “executive sessions” only for specific, limited purposes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims.

Executive Session

A portion of a meeting that is closed to association members. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), executive sessions are only permitted for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, discussing pending litigation, or addressing confidential personal or financial information.

Open Meeting

A meeting of an HOA’s board of directors that, according to A.R.S. § 33-1804, must be open to all members of the association, who must be permitted to attend and speak.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Debra K. Morin.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than opposing evidence, showing that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to re-examine specific issues or correct errors from an initial decision. A rehearing was granted in this case to clarify how the unanimous written consents were executed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the statute’s plain language.

Unanimous Written Consent

A procedure, authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821, where a board takes action without a meeting through written consents signed by all directors. The HOA used this method via individual emails to approve business, which was found to be a violation of HOA open meeting laws.






Blog Post – 21F-H2120001-REL


She Sued Her HOA Over Secret Pandemic Votes—And Won. Here’s What Every Homeowner Needs to Know.

Introduction: The Closed Doors of Your HOA

For many homeowners, it can feel like their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) board makes its most important decisions behind closed doors. You see the results—a new rule, a major repair project, a change in vendors—but the discussion and the vote happen out of sight. While the COVID-19 pandemic forced many organizations to find new ways to operate, for one Arizona HOA, their adaptation to remote work crossed a legal line, sparking a legal challenge from a resident.

The central conflict was straightforward: a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, filed a petition against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. She alleged they were making official decisions in secret through email, violating state law that guarantees homeowners the right to open meetings. While not all of her claims were affirmed, her primary complaint—that the board was conducting business in secret—led to a landmark decision for homeowner rights. The outcome of her case reveals several surprising and crucial lessons for every person living in an HOA community.

Takeaway 1: An HOA’s Open Meeting Law Trumps General Non-Profit Rules

1. Even a Pandemic Doesn’t Suspend a Homeowner’s Right to an Open Meeting

The Solera Chandler HOA board believed it was acting within the law. They argued that because they were a non-profit corporation, they could make decisions using “unanimous written consents” without a formal meeting. This practice is allowed for many non-profits under a general Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 10-3821). During the pandemic, this seemed like a practical way to conduct business without meeting in person.

However, the Administrative Law Judge ruled against the HOA. The judge’s key finding was that a more specific law takes precedence. The statute governing planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804, explicitly requires that all meetings of the board must be open to all members of the association. This is a critical legal lesson: when a specific law exists to govern a specific entity (like the Open Meeting Law for HOAs), it almost always overrides a more general law (like the one for all non-profits).

While the judge acknowledged the challenges of the “unprecedented global pandemic,” this did not excuse the violation, though it was cited as a reason not to issue a civil penalty.

Takeaway 2: “Meeting” by Email Is Still a Secret Meeting

2. A String of Individual Emails Can Constitute an Illegal Meeting

In the initial ruling, the judge found the board conducted business improperly, believing it was done via conference calls. Seizing on this factual error, the HOA challenged the decision and requested a rehearing, arguing their method was different and therefore permissible. In the rehearing, they clarified their actual process: the community management company would email each board member individually to request a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. The HOA argued that because there was no simultaneous group discussion, this process wasn’t technically a “meeting.”

The challenge backfired. The judge’s final decision made it clear that this distinction didn’t matter. Whether by conference call or a series of individual emails, the result was the same: an illegal secret meeting. The method effectively prevented homeowners from observing the board’s process and speaking on agenda items before a vote was taken, as required by law. The HOA won their technical correction but lost the war, as the judge affirmed that the principle of transparency is more important than the specific technology used to circumvent it.

These weren’t minor housekeeping issues. The board was making substantial financial and operational decisions entirely out of public view, including:

• Repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.

• Repair and replacement of the cool decking around both pools.

• Appointing new members to the Architectural Review Committee.

• Approving a retention basin project and the purchase of 420 tons of granite.

• Approving the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Takeaway 3: The Law Is Built to Favor Transparency

3. The Law Itself Has a Built-in Bias for Openness

The judge’s decision wasn’t just a narrow interpretation; it was guided by a powerful policy statement built directly into the Arizona statute for planned communities. The law itself tells judges, board members, and community managers exactly how it should be interpreted.

The text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) leaves no room for doubt:

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for those meetings that contain the information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members of the matters to be discussed or decided and to ensure that members have the ability to speak after discussion of agenda items, but before a vote of the board of directors or members is taken. Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions…shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

This is a critical point. The law explicitly directs anyone interpreting it—including an HOA board—to resolve any ambiguity in favor of transparency and homeowner access. The default position is openness.

Takeaway 4: A Single Homeowner Can Force a Change

4. One Determined Homeowner Can Win

This case serves as an empowering lesson for homeowners who feel their board is operating in the shadows. Morin’s persistence paid off, proving that a single homeowner can successfully force a board to follow the law.

Her victory was clear and decisive. The court orders resulted in three key outcomes:

• The judge affirmed her petition, officially recognizing that the HOA had violated the law.

• The HOA was formally ordered to comply with the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

• The HOA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Morin her $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome demonstrates that the system can work. An individual homeowner with a valid complaint can navigate the process and achieve a binding legal victory that forces their HOA board to operate correctly.

Conclusion: Is Your Board Operating in the Open?

The lesson from the Solera Chandler HOA case is simple: transparency in HOA governance is not optional. It is a legal requirement designed to protect the rights of every homeowner to observe and participate in the governance of their community. The convenience of an email vote cannot replace the legal mandate for an open meeting.

Don’t assume your board is operating correctly. Review your meeting minutes. Ask questions about decisions that seem to appear without public discussion. Remember, the law explicitly favors openness, and as Debra Morin proved, it’s an enforceable right.

This case was about secret votes via email, but it highlights a larger principle of transparency. Does your HOA board make it easy for you to know what is being decided and to have your voice heard?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Also cited as Lydia Linsmeier
  • Joshua M. Bolen (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Gail Ryan (board member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    President of Board, resigned August 5, 2020
  • Kirk Sandquist (ARC member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Appointment approved April 30, 2020
  • Tom Dusbabek (ARC member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Appointment approved April 30, 2020
  • Ken Eller (contractor)
    Approved to be hired to draft architectural drawings

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Granted Request for Rehearing
  • f. del sol (Admin staff)
    Transmitted decisions

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:47 (132.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020045-REL


Administrative Law Judge Decision: Trezza Irrevocable Trust vs. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA/Respondent). The ALJ denied the Petitioner’s petition on all issues, finding in favor of the HDCA and deeming it the prevailing party.

The core of the dispute was a carport constructed by the Petitioner in August 2019 without prior approval from the HDCA and in violation of a 10-foot property line setback requirement detailed in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner challenged the validity of the CC&Rs, alleged selective enforcement by the HDCA, and argued the setback rule was unreasonable.

The ALJ’s decision rested on several key conclusions:

• The HDCA’s 2017 CC&Rs, including the 10-foot setback rule in Section 21(m), were properly adopted and are legally enforceable. The Petitioner’s challenge to the voting procedure was unfounded, as it incorrectly cited corporate voting law instead of the statute governing planned communities.

• The HOA has the right to enforce rules that are more restrictive than municipal codes, rendering the Pima County code’s zero-foot setback irrelevant.

• There was no evidence of selective enforcement. The HDCA’s denial was based on the substantive setback violation, not the procedural failure to obtain prior approval, and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cure the issue.

• The Petitioner is solely responsible for any financial burden associated with bringing the carport into compliance, as the situation was created by the failure to seek prior approval before construction.

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Case Number: 20F-H2020045-REL

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone

Date of Decision: November 18, 2020

Parties:

Petitioner: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq.

Respondent: Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Central Issue: The legal enforceability of the HDCA’s CC&Rs, specifically Section 21(m), which prohibits the construction of structures within ten feet of any side or back property line for specified lots. The Petitioner sought relief after the HDCA denied approval for a carport built in violation of this rule.

II. Factual Background

Steven Trezza, trustee for the Petitioner, testified that he has resided at the property for approximately 14 years. In August 2019, he designed and built a carport on the property. Crucially, he admitted to the following:

• He had not read the community’s CC&Rs prior to the HDCA’s denial of his application.

• He failed to obtain prior approval from the HDCA Board for the carport’s construction.

• He failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

The HDCA Board President, Brad Johns, testified that he first noticed the carport construction in late August 2019 and placed architectural approval forms on the Petitioner’s door. Johns clarified that the eventual denial was not based on the failure to obtain prior approval but on the substantive violation of the 10-foot setback rule.

On November 14, 2019, the HDCA’s Secretary/Treasurer, Philip Worcester, sent formal correspondence informing the Petitioner of the failure to submit a proposal and providing an additional thirty days to do so before facing penalties.

III. Petitioner’s Core Arguments

The Petitioner, represented by Mr. Trezza, presented several arguments to invalidate the HDCA’s enforcement action:

Invalidity of the 2017 CC&Rs Vote: Mr. Trezza claimed the 2017 vote that adopted the current CC&Rs was improper.

◦ He argued the ballot was defective under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide a place to vote “no.”

◦ He contended that Section 21(m), the setback rule, was not “redlined” in the proposed document sent to homeowners, implying it was not a change and therefore not properly adopted.

Invalidity of the 1993 Amendment: The language of Section 21(m) originated in a 1993 Amendment. Mr. Trezza argued this amendment was also passed via an invalid vote. He claimed the statute of limitations had not expired on challenging it, as he only became aware of the 1993 Amendment during the course of the present dispute.

Conflict with Pima County Code: Mr. Trezza testified that the 10-foot setback is incorrect under Pima County code, which he stated requires a zero-foot setback. He argued the HDCA Board had misinterpreted zoning requirements in 1993.

Selective Enforcement: Mr. Trezza asserted that he was not treated fairly, claiming other HDCA members who had failed to obtain prior approval for projects were later granted it.

Unreasonable Withholding of Approval: The Petitioner argued that the HDCA’s approval was unreasonably withheld because the carport was not unattractive, did not devalue community property, and did not violate county code.

IV. Respondent’s (HDCA) Position and Testimony

The HDCA countered each of the Petitioner’s claims through legal arguments and witness testimony:

Validity of the CC&Rs: Ms. Briggs, counsel for the HDCA, argued that the 2017 vote was valid pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817, the statute governing planned communities. This statute requires only an “affirmative vote or written consent,” which was obtained. She asserted that the “redlining” argument was irrelevant because the entire CC&Rs document was presented to homeowners for a vote, and they could have rejected it if they disagreed with any provision, changed or not. This rendered the challenge to the 1993 amendment moot.

Absence of Discrimination:

◦ HDCA President Brad Johns testified that the denial was based solely on the 10-foot setback violation, not the failure to obtain prior approval.

◦ He stated that the Board had successfully worked with other homeowners who failed to seek prior approval, but Mr. Trezza’s case was different because it involved a stand-alone structure rather than an addition.

◦ Both Mr. Johns and Secretary/Treasurer Philip Worcester testified that they had not known or interacted with Mr. Trezza prior to this issue, negating any claim of personal bias.

Fair Process and Opportunity to Cure: Mr. Worcester testified that he complied with multiple document requests from Mr. Trezza and offered on at least two occasions for Mr. Trezza to accompany him to the association’s storage facility, an offer that was not accepted. The Board provided a 30-day window for the Petitioner to submit a formal proposal to resolve the issue.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale

The ALJ methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s arguments and found the HDCA’s position to be supported by law and evidence.

1. The CC&Rs Contain Legally Enforceable Setback Language:

◦ The Judge concluded that the 2017 CC&Rs vote was proper. The Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 (corporate voting) was “unfounded.” The correct and controlling statute is A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) (planned community voting), which only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent.”

◦ The argument that Section 21(m) was not “redlined” was deemed “not persuasive,” as the entire proposed document was provided to members, who voted to accept the CC&Rs as written.

◦ An HOA may require different, and more restrictive, setback requirements than a municipality. Therefore, the Pima County code does not override the CC&Rs.

2. The Petitioner is Bound by the CC&Rs:

◦ The Judge found the argument regarding the 1993 Amendment and the statute of limitations “unpersuasive.” Upon purchasing the property, the Petitioner became bound by the CC&Rs in existence at that time, “whether he read them or not.”

3. No Selective Enforcement Occurred:

◦ Evidence showed that the Board “routinely allowed homeowners to provide a chance to cure their failure to obtain prior approval.”

◦ Testimony from Mr. Johns and Mr. Worcester clearly established that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but the substantive setback violation. The Petitioner was offered the same opportunity to cure the problem as others but chose not to.

4. The Cost of Compliance is Reasonable:

◦ The Judge concluded that it is reasonable to compel the Petitioner to comply with the setback requirement, regardless of the cost. The decision states: “it brought the additional expenses upon itself for failure to obtain prior approval.” By not seeking approval beforehand, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the financial burden of a remedy.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on November 18, 2020:

• The Petition filed by the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust is denied on all issues.

• The Respondent, Haciendas Del Conde Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

• No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020045-REL


Study Guide: Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust and the Haciendas Del Conde Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test factual recall, essay questions to encourage deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific provision of the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What structure did the Petitioner build, and what two key approvals were initially neglected?

4. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument for why the 2017 vote on the CCRs was improper?

5. How did the Petitioner challenge the validity of the original 1993 Amendment concerning the setback?

6. What was the Respondent’s reasoning for denying the carport application, separate from the failure to get prior approval?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) distinguish between the two Arizona statutes cited regarding voting procedures?

8. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim of selective enforcement?

9. Why did the ALJ rule that it was reasonable to force the Petitioner to bear the cost of moving the carport?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq. The Respondent was the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), a Homeowners Association represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

2. The dispute centered on the Haciendas Del Conde Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs), specifically Section 21(m). This section mandates a ten-foot setback from any side or back property line for structures on specific lots.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Trezza, designed and built a carport in August 2019. He failed to obtain prior approval from the HOA’s Board and also failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

4. The Petitioner argued that the ballot used for the 2017 vote was defective under A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide an option to vote “no.” He contended this made the entire vote improper and the resulting CCRs invalid.

5. The Petitioner argued that the 1993 Amendment, which first introduced the 10-foot setback, was itself based on an invalid vote. He also argued that because this language was not “redlined” as a change in the 2017 CCRs, homeowners were not properly notified of its adoption.

6. Brad Johns, President of the HDCA, testified that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but specifically because the carport violated the 10-foot setback requirement outlined in Section 21(m) of the CCRs.

7. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 was unfounded because it applies to corporation voting. The judge determined that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), which governs planned community voting and only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent,” was the controlling statute.

8. The ALJ concluded there was no selective enforcement. Evidence showed that the Board routinely worked with other homeowners who failed to get prior approval, and that Mr. Trezza was not discriminated against but was given an opportunity to cure the problem.

9. The ALJ reasoned that by failing to seek prior approval before construction, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the expenses required to remedy the situation. Therefore, it was reasonable to make the Petitioner comply with the CCRs, regardless of the cost.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be denied on all issues. The judge further ordered that the Respondent (Haciendas Del Conde Association) be deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an argument using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the case document.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the invalidity of the 1993 Amendment and the 2017 CCRs. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find these arguments, including the “redlining” and statute of limitations claims, to be unpersuasive?

2. Discuss the concept of “selective enforcement” as an affirmative defense in this case. What evidence did the Petitioner and Respondent present on this issue, and how did the judge ultimately rule?

3. Examine the legal distinction made between A.R.S. § 10-3708 and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). Explain how this distinction was critical to the judge’s conclusion about the validity of the 2017 CCRs and the enforceability of Section 21(m).

4. Evaluate the significance of the Petitioner’s failure to obtain prior Board and Pima County approval for the carport. How did this action impact the judge’s ruling, particularly concerning the reasonableness of the enforcement costs and the allegation of unfair treatment?

5. Compare and contrast the testimony presented by the Petitioner’s side (Steven Trezza, Phil Rosenberg) with the testimony from the Respondent’s side (Brad Johns, Philip Worcester). How did their differing accounts shape the central issues of the hearing?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, in this case, for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments presented by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the legal consequences of the petitioner’s claim. In this case, “selective enforcement” was an affirmative defense.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules and regulations that govern a planned community or subdivision, which property owners agree to abide by upon purchasing property.

Easement

A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific purpose. The Petitioner unsuccessfully argued for an easement for the carport under Section 33 of the CCRs.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Haciendas Del Conde Association is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, it was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a contention is more likely true than not. The Petitioner bore this burden to prove their claims.

Redlined

A method of marking a document to show additions, deletions, or changes, typically by underlining new text and striking through deleted text. The Petitioner argued a lack of redlining was misleading.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Haciendas Del Conde Association.

Setback

The minimum required distance that a building or other structure must be located from a property line, street, or other feature. The dispute centered on a 10-foot setback requirement.

Statute of Limitations

A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. The Petitioner argued the statute of limitations had not run for challenging the 1993 Amendment.

Trustee

An individual or entity that holds and administers property or assets for the benefit of a third party. Steven Trezza, Esq. appeared as Trustee for the Petitioner.

Variance

An officially granted exception to zoning ordinances or CCRs. The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought a variance for the carport.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020045-REL



📔

20F-H2020045-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (Respondent). This Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute arose because the Petitioner constructed a carport without prior approval, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s), specifically a ten-foot setback requirement in Section 21(m). The Petitioner argued that the setback language was unenforceable due to flawed voting procedures in both 1993 and 2017 when the CCR’s were adopted, and also claimed selective enforcement. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that the CCR’s were legally enforceable and properly adopted, concluding that the Petitioner must comply with the setback rule, and denied all issues raised in the petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Stephen Trezza (Trustee)
    Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust
    Appeared for Petitioner; Testified on behalf of Petitioner
  • Philip Rosenberg (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Sharon Briggs (HOA attorney)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
  • Brad Johns (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    President of HDCA; Testified for Respondent
  • Philip Worcester (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    Secretary/Treasurer of HDCA; Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Order transmitted electronically to

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:55 (132.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020045-REL


Administrative Law Judge Decision: Trezza Irrevocable Trust vs. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA/Respondent). The ALJ denied the Petitioner’s petition on all issues, finding in favor of the HDCA and deeming it the prevailing party.

The core of the dispute was a carport constructed by the Petitioner in August 2019 without prior approval from the HDCA and in violation of a 10-foot property line setback requirement detailed in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner challenged the validity of the CC&Rs, alleged selective enforcement by the HDCA, and argued the setback rule was unreasonable.

The ALJ’s decision rested on several key conclusions:

• The HDCA’s 2017 CC&Rs, including the 10-foot setback rule in Section 21(m), were properly adopted and are legally enforceable. The Petitioner’s challenge to the voting procedure was unfounded, as it incorrectly cited corporate voting law instead of the statute governing planned communities.

• The HOA has the right to enforce rules that are more restrictive than municipal codes, rendering the Pima County code’s zero-foot setback irrelevant.

• There was no evidence of selective enforcement. The HDCA’s denial was based on the substantive setback violation, not the procedural failure to obtain prior approval, and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cure the issue.

• The Petitioner is solely responsible for any financial burden associated with bringing the carport into compliance, as the situation was created by the failure to seek prior approval before construction.

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Case Number: 20F-H2020045-REL

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone

Date of Decision: November 18, 2020

Parties:

Petitioner: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq.

Respondent: Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Central Issue: The legal enforceability of the HDCA’s CC&Rs, specifically Section 21(m), which prohibits the construction of structures within ten feet of any side or back property line for specified lots. The Petitioner sought relief after the HDCA denied approval for a carport built in violation of this rule.

II. Factual Background

Steven Trezza, trustee for the Petitioner, testified that he has resided at the property for approximately 14 years. In August 2019, he designed and built a carport on the property. Crucially, he admitted to the following:

• He had not read the community’s CC&Rs prior to the HDCA’s denial of his application.

• He failed to obtain prior approval from the HDCA Board for the carport’s construction.

• He failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

The HDCA Board President, Brad Johns, testified that he first noticed the carport construction in late August 2019 and placed architectural approval forms on the Petitioner’s door. Johns clarified that the eventual denial was not based on the failure to obtain prior approval but on the substantive violation of the 10-foot setback rule.

On November 14, 2019, the HDCA’s Secretary/Treasurer, Philip Worcester, sent formal correspondence informing the Petitioner of the failure to submit a proposal and providing an additional thirty days to do so before facing penalties.

III. Petitioner’s Core Arguments

The Petitioner, represented by Mr. Trezza, presented several arguments to invalidate the HDCA’s enforcement action:

Invalidity of the 2017 CC&Rs Vote: Mr. Trezza claimed the 2017 vote that adopted the current CC&Rs was improper.

◦ He argued the ballot was defective under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide a place to vote “no.”

◦ He contended that Section 21(m), the setback rule, was not “redlined” in the proposed document sent to homeowners, implying it was not a change and therefore not properly adopted.

Invalidity of the 1993 Amendment: The language of Section 21(m) originated in a 1993 Amendment. Mr. Trezza argued this amendment was also passed via an invalid vote. He claimed the statute of limitations had not expired on challenging it, as he only became aware of the 1993 Amendment during the course of the present dispute.

Conflict with Pima County Code: Mr. Trezza testified that the 10-foot setback is incorrect under Pima County code, which he stated requires a zero-foot setback. He argued the HDCA Board had misinterpreted zoning requirements in 1993.

Selective Enforcement: Mr. Trezza asserted that he was not treated fairly, claiming other HDCA members who had failed to obtain prior approval for projects were later granted it.

Unreasonable Withholding of Approval: The Petitioner argued that the HDCA’s approval was unreasonably withheld because the carport was not unattractive, did not devalue community property, and did not violate county code.

IV. Respondent’s (HDCA) Position and Testimony

The HDCA countered each of the Petitioner’s claims through legal arguments and witness testimony:

Validity of the CC&Rs: Ms. Briggs, counsel for the HDCA, argued that the 2017 vote was valid pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817, the statute governing planned communities. This statute requires only an “affirmative vote or written consent,” which was obtained. She asserted that the “redlining” argument was irrelevant because the entire CC&Rs document was presented to homeowners for a vote, and they could have rejected it if they disagreed with any provision, changed or not. This rendered the challenge to the 1993 amendment moot.

Absence of Discrimination:

◦ HDCA President Brad Johns testified that the denial was based solely on the 10-foot setback violation, not the failure to obtain prior approval.

◦ He stated that the Board had successfully worked with other homeowners who failed to seek prior approval, but Mr. Trezza’s case was different because it involved a stand-alone structure rather than an addition.

◦ Both Mr. Johns and Secretary/Treasurer Philip Worcester testified that they had not known or interacted with Mr. Trezza prior to this issue, negating any claim of personal bias.

Fair Process and Opportunity to Cure: Mr. Worcester testified that he complied with multiple document requests from Mr. Trezza and offered on at least two occasions for Mr. Trezza to accompany him to the association’s storage facility, an offer that was not accepted. The Board provided a 30-day window for the Petitioner to submit a formal proposal to resolve the issue.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale

The ALJ methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s arguments and found the HDCA’s position to be supported by law and evidence.

1. The CC&Rs Contain Legally Enforceable Setback Language:

◦ The Judge concluded that the 2017 CC&Rs vote was proper. The Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 (corporate voting) was “unfounded.” The correct and controlling statute is A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) (planned community voting), which only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent.”

◦ The argument that Section 21(m) was not “redlined” was deemed “not persuasive,” as the entire proposed document was provided to members, who voted to accept the CC&Rs as written.

◦ An HOA may require different, and more restrictive, setback requirements than a municipality. Therefore, the Pima County code does not override the CC&Rs.

2. The Petitioner is Bound by the CC&Rs:

◦ The Judge found the argument regarding the 1993 Amendment and the statute of limitations “unpersuasive.” Upon purchasing the property, the Petitioner became bound by the CC&Rs in existence at that time, “whether he read them or not.”

3. No Selective Enforcement Occurred:

◦ Evidence showed that the Board “routinely allowed homeowners to provide a chance to cure their failure to obtain prior approval.”

◦ Testimony from Mr. Johns and Mr. Worcester clearly established that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but the substantive setback violation. The Petitioner was offered the same opportunity to cure the problem as others but chose not to.

4. The Cost of Compliance is Reasonable:

◦ The Judge concluded that it is reasonable to compel the Petitioner to comply with the setback requirement, regardless of the cost. The decision states: “it brought the additional expenses upon itself for failure to obtain prior approval.” By not seeking approval beforehand, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the financial burden of a remedy.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on November 18, 2020:

• The Petition filed by the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust is denied on all issues.

• The Respondent, Haciendas Del Conde Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

• No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020045-REL


Study Guide: Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust and the Haciendas Del Conde Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test factual recall, essay questions to encourage deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific provision of the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What structure did the Petitioner build, and what two key approvals were initially neglected?

4. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument for why the 2017 vote on the CCRs was improper?

5. How did the Petitioner challenge the validity of the original 1993 Amendment concerning the setback?

6. What was the Respondent’s reasoning for denying the carport application, separate from the failure to get prior approval?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) distinguish between the two Arizona statutes cited regarding voting procedures?

8. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim of selective enforcement?

9. Why did the ALJ rule that it was reasonable to force the Petitioner to bear the cost of moving the carport?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq. The Respondent was the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), a Homeowners Association represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

2. The dispute centered on the Haciendas Del Conde Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs), specifically Section 21(m). This section mandates a ten-foot setback from any side or back property line for structures on specific lots.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Trezza, designed and built a carport in August 2019. He failed to obtain prior approval from the HOA’s Board and also failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

4. The Petitioner argued that the ballot used for the 2017 vote was defective under A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide an option to vote “no.” He contended this made the entire vote improper and the resulting CCRs invalid.

5. The Petitioner argued that the 1993 Amendment, which first introduced the 10-foot setback, was itself based on an invalid vote. He also argued that because this language was not “redlined” as a change in the 2017 CCRs, homeowners were not properly notified of its adoption.

6. Brad Johns, President of the HDCA, testified that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but specifically because the carport violated the 10-foot setback requirement outlined in Section 21(m) of the CCRs.

7. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 was unfounded because it applies to corporation voting. The judge determined that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), which governs planned community voting and only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent,” was the controlling statute.

8. The ALJ concluded there was no selective enforcement. Evidence showed that the Board routinely worked with other homeowners who failed to get prior approval, and that Mr. Trezza was not discriminated against but was given an opportunity to cure the problem.

9. The ALJ reasoned that by failing to seek prior approval before construction, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the expenses required to remedy the situation. Therefore, it was reasonable to make the Petitioner comply with the CCRs, regardless of the cost.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be denied on all issues. The judge further ordered that the Respondent (Haciendas Del Conde Association) be deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an argument using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the case document.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the invalidity of the 1993 Amendment and the 2017 CCRs. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find these arguments, including the “redlining” and statute of limitations claims, to be unpersuasive?

2. Discuss the concept of “selective enforcement” as an affirmative defense in this case. What evidence did the Petitioner and Respondent present on this issue, and how did the judge ultimately rule?

3. Examine the legal distinction made between A.R.S. § 10-3708 and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). Explain how this distinction was critical to the judge’s conclusion about the validity of the 2017 CCRs and the enforceability of Section 21(m).

4. Evaluate the significance of the Petitioner’s failure to obtain prior Board and Pima County approval for the carport. How did this action impact the judge’s ruling, particularly concerning the reasonableness of the enforcement costs and the allegation of unfair treatment?

5. Compare and contrast the testimony presented by the Petitioner’s side (Steven Trezza, Phil Rosenberg) with the testimony from the Respondent’s side (Brad Johns, Philip Worcester). How did their differing accounts shape the central issues of the hearing?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, in this case, for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments presented by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the legal consequences of the petitioner’s claim. In this case, “selective enforcement” was an affirmative defense.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules and regulations that govern a planned community or subdivision, which property owners agree to abide by upon purchasing property.

Easement

A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific purpose. The Petitioner unsuccessfully argued for an easement for the carport under Section 33 of the CCRs.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Haciendas Del Conde Association is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, it was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a contention is more likely true than not. The Petitioner bore this burden to prove their claims.

Redlined

A method of marking a document to show additions, deletions, or changes, typically by underlining new text and striking through deleted text. The Petitioner argued a lack of redlining was misleading.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Haciendas Del Conde Association.

Setback

The minimum required distance that a building or other structure must be located from a property line, street, or other feature. The dispute centered on a 10-foot setback requirement.

Statute of Limitations

A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. The Petitioner argued the statute of limitations had not run for challenging the 1993 Amendment.

Trustee

An individual or entity that holds and administers property or assets for the benefit of a third party. Steven Trezza, Esq. appeared as Trustee for the Petitioner.

Variance

An officially granted exception to zoning ordinances or CCRs. The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought a variance for the carport.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020045-REL



📔

20F-H2020045-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (Respondent). This Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute arose because the Petitioner constructed a carport without prior approval, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s), specifically a ten-foot setback requirement in Section 21(m). The Petitioner argued that the setback language was unenforceable due to flawed voting procedures in both 1993 and 2017 when the CCR’s were adopted, and also claimed selective enforcement. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that the CCR’s were legally enforceable and properly adopted, concluding that the Petitioner must comply with the setback rule, and denied all issues raised in the petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Stephen Trezza (Trustee)
    Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust
    Appeared for Petitioner; Testified on behalf of Petitioner
  • Philip Rosenberg (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Sharon Briggs (HOA attorney)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
  • Brad Johns (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    President of HDCA; Testified for Respondent
  • Philip Worcester (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    Secretary/Treasurer of HDCA; Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Order transmitted electronically to

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199