Patricia Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski Counsel
Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied and dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The documents requested (an email string among Board members) were informal communications and were not considered official records of the association because the Board never took formal action on the incident.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Board created or possessed any official documents related to the incident that they failed to produce, as the emails were deemed private, informal communications rather than official records.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to produce association records (un-redacted email string)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents, specifically an un-redacted email string among Board members concerning an incident where Petitioner's husband allegedly harassed potential property buyers.

Orders: Petition dismissed because the documents sought (un-redacted emails) were informal communications, not official records of the association required to be produced under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner records request, association records, informal communications, board quorum, records disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – 705044.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:38 (136.8 KB)

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918028-REL/684134.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:40 (149.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Briefing: Wiercincthe ki v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s demand for association records related to a June 19, 2017, incident where her husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly accosted and verbally abused potential buyers of a neighboring property, causing the sale to fail.

The Petitioner filed a claim alleging the Respondent violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents related to the Board of Directors’ handling of the incident. The case evolved through two distinct phases:

1. Initial Hearing (January 2019): The Petitioner argued that because a quorum of the Board discussed the incident via email, they were required to create official records (e.g., minutes of a formal decision), which were not produced. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied this petition, ruling that informal email discussions among volunteer board members do not constitute “official Board business” requiring formal action or record-keeping.

2. Rehearing (April 2019): After being granted a rehearing, the Petitioner changed her legal theory. She argued that the email chain itself constituted an official association record and demanded that the Respondent produce a fully un-redacted version. The Respondent maintained the emails were private communications provided as a courtesy and that names were redacted due to Mr. Coates’ documented history of “bullying and intimidating people.”

Conclusion: The ALJ dismissed the petition again, affirming the initial ruling. The Judge concluded that the email chain was not an official “record of the association.” Consequently, the Respondent was under no statutory obligation to produce it, let alone provide an un-redacted copy. The Judge found the Respondent’s decision to redact names was “not unreasonable” given the circumstances.

Case Background and Procedural History

The Parties

Name/Entity

Patricia Wiercinski

Petitioner; homeowner and member of the Respondent association.

Wayne Coates

Petitioner’s husband; central figure in the alleged incident.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.

Respondent; the Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.

Michael “Mike” Olson

President of the Respondent’s Board of Directors.

Gregg Arthur

Director on the Respondent’s Board; also a realtor.

Joe Zielinski

Director on the Respondent’s Board.

Kathy Andrews

Community Manager for the Respondent, employed by Hoamco.

John Allen

An HOA member who was attempting to sell his lot in June 2017.

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Office of Administrative Hearings.

Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Counsel for the Respondent, Goodman Law Group.

The Precipitating Incident (June 19, 2017)

On or about June 19, 2017, potential buyers, along with their builder, architect, and son, were visiting a lot for sale on Puntenney Rd. owned by John Allen. The lot was located across the street from the residence of Patricia Wiercinski and Wayne Coates. An incident occurred where Mr. Coates allegedly emerged from his home and confronted the visitors. According to emails later provided, Mr. Coates was “belligerent and cursing,” “verbally abusive,” and exhibited “extreme aggressive behavior,” telling the party that nothing was for sale and they needed to leave immediately. The potential buyers subsequently withdrew their interest in the lot, explicitly citing the confrontation.

Legal Proceedings

October 18, 2018: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce records of its deliberations and actions regarding the June 2017 incident.

January 10, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Diane Mihalsky.

January 22, 2019: The ALJ issues a decision denying the petition.

Post-January 2019: Petitioner requests a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grants the request.

April 22, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

May 1, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing the petition.

The Central Evidence: The Email Communications

The primary evidence in the case was an email chain from June 2017 that the Respondent voluntarily produced to the Petitioner, with the names of non-members (the potential buyers and their real estate agent) redacted. The communications reveal the immediate aftermath and concern surrounding the incident.

Key Excerpts from the Emails

From a Potential Purchaser (June 19, 2017):

Formal Account from Potential Purchasers (June 20, 2017):

From the Real Estate Agent (June 20, 2017):

From Board Director Gregg Arthur (June 20, 2017):

From Board Director Joe Zielinski (June 20, 2017):

Analysis of Legal Arguments and Rulings

Petitioner’s Arguments

1. Initial Argument: The Petitioner contended that the email discussion among a quorum of the Board legally constituted an informal meeting to discuss association business. As such, the Board was required to memorialize its decision, even a decision to take no action, in official records like meeting minutes. The failure to produce such records was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

2. Rehearing Argument: Shifting her legal theory, the Petitioner argued that the email chain itself was an “official record of the association.” She claimed a right to an un-redacted copy, stating that she and Mr. Coates “had a right to know who was accusing Mr. Coates of belligerence.”

Respondent’s Defense

Nature of Communications: The Respondent argued the emails were informal, private communications on personal servers between volunteer board members who are also neighbors. They were not official records kept in the course of association business.

Lack of Formal Action: The Board never voted, met in an executive or open session, or took any official action regarding the incident. Testimony confirmed that only two of the board members replied to the initial email.

Absence of Authority: The Respondent’s position was that the incident, while serious, was a personal dispute between neighbors and did not violate the association’s CC&Rs or bylaws. Therefore, the Board had no authority or jurisdiction to take official enforcement action.

Justification for Redactions: Board President Mike Olson testified that names were redacted because “Mr. Coates had a history of bullying and intimidating people.” This was done to protect the potential buyers and their agent from potential harassment.

Administrative Law Judge’s Determinations

The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both decisions, finding decisively in favor of the Respondent.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805.

“Official Records” Defined: The ALJ drew a clear distinction between informal discussion and official business. The ruling stated: “…the mere fact that a quorum of Board members may discuss a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not end up taking any action to make a matter board business.”

No Obligation to Create Records: The Judge found no statute requiring an HOA board to create a formal written record about topics they discuss informally but ultimately take no action on, calling such a requirement an “unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers.”

Ruling on Redacted Emails: In the rehearing decision, the ALJ concluded that because the email string was not an official record, the statute did not require the Respondent to provide it at all. Therefore, the Respondent was not obligated to provide an un-redacted version. The judge also noted the reason for the redaction “does not appear unreasonable.”

Final Order: Both petitions were denied and dismissed.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski and Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms, all based on the provided Administrative Law Judge Decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their roles?

2. What specific event on June 19, 2017, initiated the conflict that led to this case?

3. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner in her original petition filed on October 18, 2018?

4. Why did the Respondent’s Board President, Mike Olson, state that the names in the email string were redacted?

5. In the initial hearing, what did the Petitioner argue the Board was required to do after discussing the incident, even if it chose not to act?

6. What was the legal conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge following the first hearing on January 10, 2019?

7. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing of the case?

8. How did the Petitioner’s primary legal argument change between the first hearing and the rehearing?

9. According to the testimony of community manager Kathy Andrews, what types of documents are considered official records of the Association?

10. What was the final determination regarding the status of the email string and the Respondent’s obligation to produce an un-redacted version?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The Petitioner is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a complaint alleging the association violated state law. The Respondent is the homeowners’ association defending against the petition.

2. The initiating event was an incident where the Petitioner’s husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly acted belligerent, cursed at, and was verbally abusive to a potential buyer, their family, and their architect who were viewing a property for sale across the street from the Petitioner’s home. The potential buyers were so disturbed by the encounter that they decided to remove the lot from their list of considerations.

3. The Petitioner’s core allegation was that the Respondent had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents related to the Board’s deliberations, decisions, and actions concerning the June 19, 2017 incident involving her husband.

4. Mike Olson testified that the names of the potential purchasers and their real estate agent were redacted from the email string because Mr. Coates has a documented history of bullying, intimidating, and threatening people. The redaction was done to protect these individuals from potential harassment.

5. In the initial hearing, the Petitioner argued that if the Board decided not to take action against her husband over the incident, it was required to make a formal motion and arrive at a formal, written decision to that effect. She claimed she never received such a document or evidence that the Board addressed it in an official meeting.

6. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed that the Respondent had failed to produce, as the email discussions were informal and did not constitute official Board business.

7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing by alleging misconduct on the part of the Administrative Law Judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request, though the decision noted the Commissioner did not specify what the misconduct was or how it should have changed the outcome.

8. In the rehearing, the Petitioner changed her argument from claiming the Board failed to produce a formal decision to arguing that the email string itself constituted an official record of the Association’s business. Consequently, she contended that A.R.S. § 33-1805 required the Respondent to produce a fully un-redacted copy of it.

9. Kathy Andrews testified that official records include matters of record regarding the Association’s business, such as governing documents, architectural guidelines, Board and general meeting minutes, and anything submitted to the Board for action. Because the Board took no action on the June 19, 2017 incident, the email was not included in the Association’s archived records.

10. The final determination was that the email string was not an official record of the association but rather an informal communication. Therefore, A.R.S. § 33-1805 did not require the Respondent to provide an un-redacted version, and the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the legal distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between informal discussions among board members and official association business. How was A.R.S. § 33-1805 applied in this context, and what precedent might this set for volunteer HOA board members?

2. Discuss the evolution of Patricia Wiercinski’s legal argument from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each argument and explain why the second argument was also ultimately unsuccessful.

3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it applies to this case. Explain what the Petitioner was required to prove and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the judge to conclude she had not met this burden in either hearing.

4. The Respondent voluntarily provided the redacted email string after the petition was filed. Discuss the strategic implications of this action and how it influenced the proceedings. Furthermore, analyze the justification provided for the redactions and the judge’s assessment of its reasonableness.

5. Based on the testimony from individuals like Mike Olson, Gregg Arthur, and Kathy Andrews, construct a comprehensive narrative of the events and communications following the June 19, 2017 incident from the perspective of the HOA Board. How did their collective testimony undermine the Petitioner’s claim that official records were being withheld or that the emails constituted official business?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge, Diane Mihalsky, from the Office of Administrative Hearings who heard the evidence and issued the legal decisions.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner, which stipulates that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

An Arizona Revised Statute stating that a quorum of a board of directors meeting informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions, regardless of whether a vote is taken.

Department, The

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and adjudicate petitions from and about homeowners’ associations.

Hoamco

The property management company employed by the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association. Kathy Andrews is an employee of this company.

June 19, 2017 Incident

An altercation where Wayne Coates allegedly engaged in belligerent, cursing, and verbally abusive behavior towards potential property buyers, causing them to lose interest in the property.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners’ association for the Long Meadow Ranch East development in Prescott, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

Patricia Wiercinski, a homeowner in Long Meadow Ranch East and a member of the Respondent association who filed the legal petition.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard the Petitioner was required to meet. It is defined as proof that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc., which was the defendant in the petition filed by Patricia Wiercinski.

Wayne Coates

The husband of the Petitioner, Patricia Wiercinski. His alleged actions during the June 19, 2017 incident are the central subject of the dispute.

An acronym for the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, mentioned in an email as a potential agency to file charges for disorderly conduct/harassment.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


4 Shocking Lessons from One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA

Introduction: The Perils of Neighbor Disputes

Most people who live in a planned community harbor a quiet fear of two things: a “neighbor from hell” and a legal dispute with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA). For one Arizona homeowner, those fears collided in a dramatic fashion. When her husband was involved in an incident with prospective buyers of a neighboring lot, she took her HOA to court to demand records of the board’s discussions. The resulting public legal documents provide a masterclass in community association law, revealing several shocking and counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living under an HOA.

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1. Takeaway 1: A “Neighbor from Hell” Can Literally Destroy a Real Estate Deal

The case began with a single incident on June 19, 2017. According to court filings, the homeowner’s husband, Wayne Coates, first confronted the wife and son of a builder viewing a vacant lot across the street. The prospective buyers described Mr. Coates’ behavior as “belligerent and cursing,” telling them that “nothing was for sale around here and they shouldn’t be snooping around.” The wife and son then drove up to inform the builder and architect of the hostile encounter.

The confrontation was so severe that it directly caused the potential buyers to walk away from the deal. They documented their experience in an email that eventually became part of the court record.

In closing when we returned one thing that stands out is would we want to live next to this type of behavior of [a] neighbor? The answer is no, this lot was one that we had in our top 2 Lots as a consideration for purchase but due to the volatile potential of this man, we have decided at this point to remove it from our list.

This case is a rare and powerful illustration of tortious interference with a business relationship in a community association context, providing unambiguous, written proof—from the aggrieved party themselves—that a single resident’s conduct directly caused a quantifiable financial loss to a neighbor.

2. Takeaway 2: Your HOA Board’s Private Emails Aren’t Always “Official Records”

The homeowner, Patricia Wiercinski, filed the lawsuit because she believed an email discussion about the incident among a quorum of the HOA board members constituted official business. Therefore, she argued, those emails were “official records” of the association that she had a legal right to inspect.

In a surprising decision, the court disagreed. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that just because board members informally discuss a topic via email does not automatically make it official HOA business or create an official record. This is especially true if the board never takes any formal action on the matter.

The judge’s reasoning was grounded in the practical realities of volunteer-run corporations. To treat every informal chat as official, recordable business would impose “an unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers who are not compensated for their time who are may be neighbors and who may also be friends, in addition to being Board members.” This ruling reinforces a crucial legal boundary between governance and informal communication. It protects a board’s ability to “think out loud” and explore issues before committing to a formal course of action, an essential function for effective volunteer leadership.

3. Takeaway 3: An HOA’s Power Isn’t Unlimited

After learning that Mr. Coates’ actions had killed a property sale, some board members were immediately and deeply alarmed. They recognized the potential damage to property values for everyone in the community. Board member Gregg Arthur expressed this urgency in an email to his colleagues:

Wayne thru his actions appears to have interfered with and destroyed a property sale. We need to meet and take action on this matter as it will have a broad and chilling effect amongst the realtor community… action needs to be taken and quickly to prevent this from happening again.

Despite this initial alarm, the board ultimately took no formal action against Mr. Coates. Why? Because after reviewing the situation, they determined that the incident was a personal dispute between neighbors. Critically, his conduct did not violate any specific provision of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), bylaws, or other governing documents.

This decision underscores a vital legal principle: an HOA’s authority is fundamentally contractual, derived solely from the powers granted to it in its governing documents. It is not a governmental body with general police powers. Its authority is strictly limited to enforcing the community’s written rules, not policing all neighborhood conduct.

4. Takeaway 4: A Lawsuit Can Create a Devastating—and Public—Record

The petitioner’s goal was straightforward: to force the HOA to produce an un-redacted copy of the board’s private email chain. The result of her legal action, however, was a textbook example of the “Streisand Effect,” where an attempt to suppress information leads to it being publicized far more widely. In her attempt to access a private record, she created a permanent, public legal record that contained far more damaging information about her husband than the emails she sought.

Because of the lawsuit, the following details about Mr. Coates are now cemented in publicly accessible court documents:

• The full, detailed account from the potential buyers describing his “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational” behavior.

• A statement from a board member, Joe Zielinski, referencing Mr. Coates’ “arrest record and prison term and criminal history.”

• Sworn testimony from the HOA President, Mike Olson, explaining that names were redacted from the original email because Mr. Coates has a “history of bullying and intimidating people.”

The irony is devastating. In her quest to unmask the identities of her husband’s accusers in a private email, the petitioner inadvertently created a permanent, public, and deeply unflattering legal record that now constitutes a matter adjudicated by a court.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The High Cost of Conflict

This single, unfortunate neighborhood dispute offers powerful lessons for anyone living in a planned community. It clarifies the real-world impact of resident behavior on property rights, sets a clear boundary on what constitutes an “official” HOA record, demonstrates the legal limits of an HOA’s power, and serves as a sobering warning about the unforeseen consequences of litigation. It leaves us with a final, critical question to ponder: When conflict arises in a community, what is the true cost of escalating it, and is the official record you might create worth the price?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Wiercinski (petitioner)
  • Wayne Coates (petitioner's husband)
    Involved in the June 19, 2017 incident

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
  • Michael Olson (board member)
    President of Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Gregg Arthur (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Kathy Andrews (property manager)
    HOAMCO
    Community Manager; testified as witness
  • Jim Robertson (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Joe Zielinski (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Boris Biloskirka (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board (identified as former in one source)
  • Tom Reid (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Decision transmittal clerk

Other Participants

  • John Allen (HOA member)
    Property owner attempting to sell lot (also spelled Allan)
  • [Redacted Name] (potential purchaser/witness)
    Includes potential buyers, builder, builder's wife, son, and architect involved in the incident
  • [Redacted Name] (real estate agent/witness)
    Real estate agent(s) associated with John Allen's property

Patricia Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski Counsel
Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied and dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The documents requested (an email string among Board members) were informal communications and were not considered official records of the association because the Board never took formal action on the incident.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Board created or possessed any official documents related to the incident that they failed to produce, as the emails were deemed private, informal communications rather than official records.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to produce association records (un-redacted email string)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents, specifically an un-redacted email string among Board members concerning an incident where Petitioner's husband allegedly harassed potential property buyers.

Orders: Petition dismissed because the documents sought (un-redacted emails) were informal communications, not official records of the association required to be produced under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner records request, association records, informal communications, board quorum, records disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – 705044.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:46 (136.8 KB)

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918028-REL/684134.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:50:03 (149.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Briefing: Wiercincthe ki v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s demand for association records related to a June 19, 2017, incident where her husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly accosted and verbally abused potential buyers of a neighboring property, causing the sale to fail.

The Petitioner filed a claim alleging the Respondent violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents related to the Board of Directors’ handling of the incident. The case evolved through two distinct phases:

1. Initial Hearing (January 2019): The Petitioner argued that because a quorum of the Board discussed the incident via email, they were required to create official records (e.g., minutes of a formal decision), which were not produced. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied this petition, ruling that informal email discussions among volunteer board members do not constitute “official Board business” requiring formal action or record-keeping.

2. Rehearing (April 2019): After being granted a rehearing, the Petitioner changed her legal theory. She argued that the email chain itself constituted an official association record and demanded that the Respondent produce a fully un-redacted version. The Respondent maintained the emails were private communications provided as a courtesy and that names were redacted due to Mr. Coates’ documented history of “bullying and intimidating people.”

Conclusion: The ALJ dismissed the petition again, affirming the initial ruling. The Judge concluded that the email chain was not an official “record of the association.” Consequently, the Respondent was under no statutory obligation to produce it, let alone provide an un-redacted copy. The Judge found the Respondent’s decision to redact names was “not unreasonable” given the circumstances.

Case Background and Procedural History

The Parties

Name/Entity

Patricia Wiercinski

Petitioner; homeowner and member of the Respondent association.

Wayne Coates

Petitioner’s husband; central figure in the alleged incident.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.

Respondent; the Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.

Michael “Mike” Olson

President of the Respondent’s Board of Directors.

Gregg Arthur

Director on the Respondent’s Board; also a realtor.

Joe Zielinski

Director on the Respondent’s Board.

Kathy Andrews

Community Manager for the Respondent, employed by Hoamco.

John Allen

An HOA member who was attempting to sell his lot in June 2017.

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Office of Administrative Hearings.

Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Counsel for the Respondent, Goodman Law Group.

The Precipitating Incident (June 19, 2017)

On or about June 19, 2017, potential buyers, along with their builder, architect, and son, were visiting a lot for sale on Puntenney Rd. owned by John Allen. The lot was located across the street from the residence of Patricia Wiercinski and Wayne Coates. An incident occurred where Mr. Coates allegedly emerged from his home and confronted the visitors. According to emails later provided, Mr. Coates was “belligerent and cursing,” “verbally abusive,” and exhibited “extreme aggressive behavior,” telling the party that nothing was for sale and they needed to leave immediately. The potential buyers subsequently withdrew their interest in the lot, explicitly citing the confrontation.

Legal Proceedings

October 18, 2018: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce records of its deliberations and actions regarding the June 2017 incident.

January 10, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Diane Mihalsky.

January 22, 2019: The ALJ issues a decision denying the petition.

Post-January 2019: Petitioner requests a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grants the request.

April 22, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

May 1, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing the petition.

The Central Evidence: The Email Communications

The primary evidence in the case was an email chain from June 2017 that the Respondent voluntarily produced to the Petitioner, with the names of non-members (the potential buyers and their real estate agent) redacted. The communications reveal the immediate aftermath and concern surrounding the incident.

Key Excerpts from the Emails

From a Potential Purchaser (June 19, 2017):

Formal Account from Potential Purchasers (June 20, 2017):

From the Real Estate Agent (June 20, 2017):

From Board Director Gregg Arthur (June 20, 2017):

From Board Director Joe Zielinski (June 20, 2017):

Analysis of Legal Arguments and Rulings

Petitioner’s Arguments

1. Initial Argument: The Petitioner contended that the email discussion among a quorum of the Board legally constituted an informal meeting to discuss association business. As such, the Board was required to memorialize its decision, even a decision to take no action, in official records like meeting minutes. The failure to produce such records was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

2. Rehearing Argument: Shifting her legal theory, the Petitioner argued that the email chain itself was an “official record of the association.” She claimed a right to an un-redacted copy, stating that she and Mr. Coates “had a right to know who was accusing Mr. Coates of belligerence.”

Respondent’s Defense

Nature of Communications: The Respondent argued the emails were informal, private communications on personal servers between volunteer board members who are also neighbors. They were not official records kept in the course of association business.

Lack of Formal Action: The Board never voted, met in an executive or open session, or took any official action regarding the incident. Testimony confirmed that only two of the board members replied to the initial email.

Absence of Authority: The Respondent’s position was that the incident, while serious, was a personal dispute between neighbors and did not violate the association’s CC&Rs or bylaws. Therefore, the Board had no authority or jurisdiction to take official enforcement action.

Justification for Redactions: Board President Mike Olson testified that names were redacted because “Mr. Coates had a history of bullying and intimidating people.” This was done to protect the potential buyers and their agent from potential harassment.

Administrative Law Judge’s Determinations

The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both decisions, finding decisively in favor of the Respondent.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805.

“Official Records” Defined: The ALJ drew a clear distinction between informal discussion and official business. The ruling stated: “…the mere fact that a quorum of Board members may discuss a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not end up taking any action to make a matter board business.”

No Obligation to Create Records: The Judge found no statute requiring an HOA board to create a formal written record about topics they discuss informally but ultimately take no action on, calling such a requirement an “unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers.”

Ruling on Redacted Emails: In the rehearing decision, the ALJ concluded that because the email string was not an official record, the statute did not require the Respondent to provide it at all. Therefore, the Respondent was not obligated to provide an un-redacted version. The judge also noted the reason for the redaction “does not appear unreasonable.”

Final Order: Both petitions were denied and dismissed.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski and Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms, all based on the provided Administrative Law Judge Decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their roles?

2. What specific event on June 19, 2017, initiated the conflict that led to this case?

3. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner in her original petition filed on October 18, 2018?

4. Why did the Respondent’s Board President, Mike Olson, state that the names in the email string were redacted?

5. In the initial hearing, what did the Petitioner argue the Board was required to do after discussing the incident, even if it chose not to act?

6. What was the legal conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge following the first hearing on January 10, 2019?

7. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing of the case?

8. How did the Petitioner’s primary legal argument change between the first hearing and the rehearing?

9. According to the testimony of community manager Kathy Andrews, what types of documents are considered official records of the Association?

10. What was the final determination regarding the status of the email string and the Respondent’s obligation to produce an un-redacted version?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The Petitioner is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a complaint alleging the association violated state law. The Respondent is the homeowners’ association defending against the petition.

2. The initiating event was an incident where the Petitioner’s husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly acted belligerent, cursed at, and was verbally abusive to a potential buyer, their family, and their architect who were viewing a property for sale across the street from the Petitioner’s home. The potential buyers were so disturbed by the encounter that they decided to remove the lot from their list of considerations.

3. The Petitioner’s core allegation was that the Respondent had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents related to the Board’s deliberations, decisions, and actions concerning the June 19, 2017 incident involving her husband.

4. Mike Olson testified that the names of the potential purchasers and their real estate agent were redacted from the email string because Mr. Coates has a documented history of bullying, intimidating, and threatening people. The redaction was done to protect these individuals from potential harassment.

5. In the initial hearing, the Petitioner argued that if the Board decided not to take action against her husband over the incident, it was required to make a formal motion and arrive at a formal, written decision to that effect. She claimed she never received such a document or evidence that the Board addressed it in an official meeting.

6. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed that the Respondent had failed to produce, as the email discussions were informal and did not constitute official Board business.

7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing by alleging misconduct on the part of the Administrative Law Judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request, though the decision noted the Commissioner did not specify what the misconduct was or how it should have changed the outcome.

8. In the rehearing, the Petitioner changed her argument from claiming the Board failed to produce a formal decision to arguing that the email string itself constituted an official record of the Association’s business. Consequently, she contended that A.R.S. § 33-1805 required the Respondent to produce a fully un-redacted copy of it.

9. Kathy Andrews testified that official records include matters of record regarding the Association’s business, such as governing documents, architectural guidelines, Board and general meeting minutes, and anything submitted to the Board for action. Because the Board took no action on the June 19, 2017 incident, the email was not included in the Association’s archived records.

10. The final determination was that the email string was not an official record of the association but rather an informal communication. Therefore, A.R.S. § 33-1805 did not require the Respondent to provide an un-redacted version, and the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the legal distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between informal discussions among board members and official association business. How was A.R.S. § 33-1805 applied in this context, and what precedent might this set for volunteer HOA board members?

2. Discuss the evolution of Patricia Wiercinski’s legal argument from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each argument and explain why the second argument was also ultimately unsuccessful.

3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it applies to this case. Explain what the Petitioner was required to prove and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the judge to conclude she had not met this burden in either hearing.

4. The Respondent voluntarily provided the redacted email string after the petition was filed. Discuss the strategic implications of this action and how it influenced the proceedings. Furthermore, analyze the justification provided for the redactions and the judge’s assessment of its reasonableness.

5. Based on the testimony from individuals like Mike Olson, Gregg Arthur, and Kathy Andrews, construct a comprehensive narrative of the events and communications following the June 19, 2017 incident from the perspective of the HOA Board. How did their collective testimony undermine the Petitioner’s claim that official records were being withheld or that the emails constituted official business?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge, Diane Mihalsky, from the Office of Administrative Hearings who heard the evidence and issued the legal decisions.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner, which stipulates that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

An Arizona Revised Statute stating that a quorum of a board of directors meeting informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions, regardless of whether a vote is taken.

Department, The

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and adjudicate petitions from and about homeowners’ associations.

Hoamco

The property management company employed by the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association. Kathy Andrews is an employee of this company.

June 19, 2017 Incident

An altercation where Wayne Coates allegedly engaged in belligerent, cursing, and verbally abusive behavior towards potential property buyers, causing them to lose interest in the property.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners’ association for the Long Meadow Ranch East development in Prescott, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

Patricia Wiercinski, a homeowner in Long Meadow Ranch East and a member of the Respondent association who filed the legal petition.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard the Petitioner was required to meet. It is defined as proof that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc., which was the defendant in the petition filed by Patricia Wiercinski.

Wayne Coates

The husband of the Petitioner, Patricia Wiercinski. His alleged actions during the June 19, 2017 incident are the central subject of the dispute.

An acronym for the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, mentioned in an email as a potential agency to file charges for disorderly conduct/harassment.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


4 Shocking Lessons from One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA

Introduction: The Perils of Neighbor Disputes

Most people who live in a planned community harbor a quiet fear of two things: a “neighbor from hell” and a legal dispute with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA). For one Arizona homeowner, those fears collided in a dramatic fashion. When her husband was involved in an incident with prospective buyers of a neighboring lot, she took her HOA to court to demand records of the board’s discussions. The resulting public legal documents provide a masterclass in community association law, revealing several shocking and counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living under an HOA.

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1. Takeaway 1: A “Neighbor from Hell” Can Literally Destroy a Real Estate Deal

The case began with a single incident on June 19, 2017. According to court filings, the homeowner’s husband, Wayne Coates, first confronted the wife and son of a builder viewing a vacant lot across the street. The prospective buyers described Mr. Coates’ behavior as “belligerent and cursing,” telling them that “nothing was for sale around here and they shouldn’t be snooping around.” The wife and son then drove up to inform the builder and architect of the hostile encounter.

The confrontation was so severe that it directly caused the potential buyers to walk away from the deal. They documented their experience in an email that eventually became part of the court record.

In closing when we returned one thing that stands out is would we want to live next to this type of behavior of [a] neighbor? The answer is no, this lot was one that we had in our top 2 Lots as a consideration for purchase but due to the volatile potential of this man, we have decided at this point to remove it from our list.

This case is a rare and powerful illustration of tortious interference with a business relationship in a community association context, providing unambiguous, written proof—from the aggrieved party themselves—that a single resident’s conduct directly caused a quantifiable financial loss to a neighbor.

2. Takeaway 2: Your HOA Board’s Private Emails Aren’t Always “Official Records”

The homeowner, Patricia Wiercinski, filed the lawsuit because she believed an email discussion about the incident among a quorum of the HOA board members constituted official business. Therefore, she argued, those emails were “official records” of the association that she had a legal right to inspect.

In a surprising decision, the court disagreed. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that just because board members informally discuss a topic via email does not automatically make it official HOA business or create an official record. This is especially true if the board never takes any formal action on the matter.

The judge’s reasoning was grounded in the practical realities of volunteer-run corporations. To treat every informal chat as official, recordable business would impose “an unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers who are not compensated for their time who are may be neighbors and who may also be friends, in addition to being Board members.” This ruling reinforces a crucial legal boundary between governance and informal communication. It protects a board’s ability to “think out loud” and explore issues before committing to a formal course of action, an essential function for effective volunteer leadership.

3. Takeaway 3: An HOA’s Power Isn’t Unlimited

After learning that Mr. Coates’ actions had killed a property sale, some board members were immediately and deeply alarmed. They recognized the potential damage to property values for everyone in the community. Board member Gregg Arthur expressed this urgency in an email to his colleagues:

Wayne thru his actions appears to have interfered with and destroyed a property sale. We need to meet and take action on this matter as it will have a broad and chilling effect amongst the realtor community… action needs to be taken and quickly to prevent this from happening again.

Despite this initial alarm, the board ultimately took no formal action against Mr. Coates. Why? Because after reviewing the situation, they determined that the incident was a personal dispute between neighbors. Critically, his conduct did not violate any specific provision of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), bylaws, or other governing documents.

This decision underscores a vital legal principle: an HOA’s authority is fundamentally contractual, derived solely from the powers granted to it in its governing documents. It is not a governmental body with general police powers. Its authority is strictly limited to enforcing the community’s written rules, not policing all neighborhood conduct.

4. Takeaway 4: A Lawsuit Can Create a Devastating—and Public—Record

The petitioner’s goal was straightforward: to force the HOA to produce an un-redacted copy of the board’s private email chain. The result of her legal action, however, was a textbook example of the “Streisand Effect,” where an attempt to suppress information leads to it being publicized far more widely. In her attempt to access a private record, she created a permanent, public legal record that contained far more damaging information about her husband than the emails she sought.

Because of the lawsuit, the following details about Mr. Coates are now cemented in publicly accessible court documents:

• The full, detailed account from the potential buyers describing his “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational” behavior.

• A statement from a board member, Joe Zielinski, referencing Mr. Coates’ “arrest record and prison term and criminal history.”

• Sworn testimony from the HOA President, Mike Olson, explaining that names were redacted from the original email because Mr. Coates has a “history of bullying and intimidating people.”

The irony is devastating. In her quest to unmask the identities of her husband’s accusers in a private email, the petitioner inadvertently created a permanent, public, and deeply unflattering legal record that now constitutes a matter adjudicated by a court.

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Conclusion: The High Cost of Conflict

This single, unfortunate neighborhood dispute offers powerful lessons for anyone living in a planned community. It clarifies the real-world impact of resident behavior on property rights, sets a clear boundary on what constitutes an “official” HOA record, demonstrates the legal limits of an HOA’s power, and serves as a sobering warning about the unforeseen consequences of litigation. It leaves us with a final, critical question to ponder: When conflict arises in a community, what is the true cost of escalating it, and is the official record you might create worth the price?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Wiercinski (petitioner)
  • Wayne Coates (petitioner's husband)
    Involved in the June 19, 2017 incident

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
  • Michael Olson (board member)
    President of Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Gregg Arthur (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Kathy Andrews (property manager)
    HOAMCO
    Community Manager; testified as witness
  • Jim Robertson (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Joe Zielinski (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Boris Biloskirka (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board (identified as former in one source)
  • Tom Reid (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Decision transmittal clerk

Other Participants

  • John Allen (HOA member)
    Property owner attempting to sell lot (also spelled Allan)
  • [Redacted Name] (potential purchaser/witness)
    Includes potential buyers, builder, builder's wife, son, and architect involved in the incident
  • [Redacted Name] (real estate agent/witness)
    Real estate agent(s) associated with John Allen's property

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:10 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:11 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
Rehearing: April 1, 2019
Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

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1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:39 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:49:25 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
Rehearing: April 1, 2019
Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

——————————————————————————–

1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,

Michael Stoltenberg vs Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, as CC&R § 4.1 requires uniform assessment and no provision requires or allows Respondent to assess Petitioner less due to his rock yard and refusal of maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Assessment Uniformity Requirement

Petitioner, who had rock landscaping and refused HOA maintenance, alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by assessing him uniform dues, arguing he should pay less since HOA expenditures on lawn maintenance were substantial and primarily benefited neighbors with grass yards.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 4.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Uniform Dues, CC&R Enforcement, Landscaping Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:18 (141.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918038-REL


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918038-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict centered on Mr. Stoltenberg’s claim that he should pay lower HOA assessments because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards requiring more costly maintenance by the HOA.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition. The decision rested on an unambiguous interpretation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly obligate the HOA to maintain landscaping on all individual lots and, crucially, require assessments to be uniform for all members to cover these “common expenses.” The petitioner’s argument for a reduced assessment was unsupported by any provision in the governing documents. Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Stoltenberg had actively refused the HOA access to his property to install a community irrigation system and to perform the very landscaping maintenance that is a central component of the assessments.

Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918038-REL

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Rancho Del Oro.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA).

Hearing Date: March 19, 2019

Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Core Allegation: On December 29, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging the HOA violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs (§§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2) by levying the same assessment fees on his property as on neighboring properties with grass lawns.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Michael Stoltenberg)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the argument of fairness, contending that his assessment should be lower because his property does not utilize the HOA’s most expensive landscaping services.

Primary Argument: It is inequitable for the HOA to charge him the same amount as neighbors with grass yards, given that his front yard is rock and does not receive the same level of maintenance.

Financial Evidence: The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the HOA spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which constituted 39% of its total budget.

Refusal of Services: The Petitioner acknowledged that he refused to allow the HOA access to his property for two key purposes:

1. To install irrigation pipes connecting his lot to a new community well.

2. To perform any landscape maintenance on his front yard.

Justification for Refusal: The Petitioner accused the HOA of previously killing his trees during maintenance activities and stated that he now undertakes all maintenance of his own yard.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Rancho Del Oro HOA)

The HOA’s defense was grounded in its adherence to the plain language of its governing documents, arguing that its actions were not only permissible but mandated by the CC&Rs.

Primary Argument: The HOA is legally bound by its CC&Rs to levy uniform assessments on all members and is simultaneously obligated to maintain the landscaping on every individual lot.

Key Testimony (Diana Crites, Property Manager):

◦ CC&R § 5.1(a) explicitly requires the HOA to maintain the yards of its members.

◦ CC&R § 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly, without regard to the type of landscaping they have chosen or whether they permit the HOA to perform its maintenance duties.

◦ The Petitioner’s property is one of eight constructed by a different developer, who did not originally install grass or an irrigation system.

◦ The HOA has since drilled a community well to address water costs and has offered to remove rock and install grass for these properties, an offer the Petitioner could accept.

Supporting Evidence (Letter from Dawn Simpson, former bookkeeper):

◦ A 2013 HOA project was initiated to install a community well for landscaping and to connect all homes, including the Petitioner’s.

◦ The letter details an incident where the Petitioner “became very heated with [the] contractor” and “declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose.”

◦ This action directly halted all construction to connect his property to the irrigation system and ceased all landscaping services provided by the HOA.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision centered on the clear, unambiguous language of specific articles within the CC&Rs. The petitioner failed to identify any language that would permit or require a non-uniform assessment.

CC&R Section

Key Language

Implication & Ruling

Article IV, Section 4.1

Assessments “shall be used for the… common benefit… of the Owners” and “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

This establishes the principle of uniform, shared liability for common expenses, regardless of an individual owner’s specific use of a particular service.

Article V, Section 5.1(a)

“The Association shall maintain… landscaping… It shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.”

This article imposes a direct obligation on the HOA to maintain all members’ landscaping, not merely an optional service.

Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, held the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

Interpretation of Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The judge found the CC&Rs to be unambiguous, requiring a holistic interpretation. The documents clearly mandate that the HOA must maintain all yards and must assess all members equally to fund that maintenance.

Final Ruling: The Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. He failed to point to any provision within the CC&Rs that “allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard.”

Order: The petition was denied. The HOA’s practice of charging uniform assessments was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918038-REL


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 19F-H1918038-REL, Michael Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Short-Answer Quiz Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what was the financial basis for his claim of unfair assessment?

4. Describe the history of the water and irrigation system issue at the Petitioner’s property prior to 2013, as detailed in Dawn Simpson’s letter.

5. What action did the Petitioner take during the 2013 well construction project, and what were the consequences of this action?

6. According to Article V, Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs, what specific maintenance obligation does the homeowners’ association have regarding individual lots?

7. How did Diana Crites, the HOA’s property manager, justify the uniform assessment for all homeowners based on the CC&Rs?

8. What reason did Ms. Crites provide for why eight units, including the Petitioner’s, were originally landscaped with rock instead of grass?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this hearing, and on which party does the burden of proof rest?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core legal reasoning for this decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” Mr. Stoltenberg is a homeowner and member of the HOA who filed a complaint against the association. The Respondent is the governing HOA for the Rancho Del Oro community in Yuma, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated multiple sections of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). His central claim was that it was unfair for the HOA to charge him the same assessment fees as his neighbors because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards that require more maintenance.

3. The financial basis for his claim was the HOA’s budget. The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the Respondent spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which accounted for 39% of the total budget.

4. Prior to 2013, the Petitioner made several complaints that his home was not connected to the community water system. The HOA Board’s position was that the Petitioner knew his home was not connected to the system when he purchased it.

5. During the 2013 construction to install a well and connect all homes to an irrigation system, the Petitioner became “very heated” with the contractor. He declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose, which halted all construction in his backyard and all landscaping provided by the HOA for his front yard.

6. Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping even on privately owned lots.

7. Diana Crites testified that CC&R Section 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly. She stated this uniformity applies regardless of the type of landscaping an owner has chosen or whether they permit the HOA onto their property to perform maintenance.

8. Ms. Crites testified that the eight units were built by a different developer after the original construction and were not equipped with an irrigation system or grass. She believed rock was used in the front yards of these lots due to the high cost of water, an issue later resolved by the installation of a community well.

9. The legal standard is “a preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must be convincing enough to make the contention more probably true than not. The burden of proof to establish a CC&R violation rests on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning was that the Petitioner failed to bear his burden of proof because he could not point to any provision in the CC&Rs that allows or requires the HOA to assess him less than his neighbors based on his landscaping choice or his refusal to allow maintenance.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and CC&R provisions from the case document.

1. Analyze the central conflict between the Petitioner’s concept of fairness and the Respondent’s interpretation of the CC&Rs. Use specific clauses from the CC&Rs (e.g., Articles IV and V) to support the analysis of each party’s position.

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. How did the evidence presented by both the Petitioner (e.g., budget figures) and the Respondent (e.g., witness testimony and CC&Rs) contribute to the judge’s final decision regarding this standard?

3. Trace the history of the water and irrigation issue at the Petitioner’s property, from his initial complaints to his refusal to allow construction access. How did these past events impact the central issue of the 2019 hearing?

4. Explain the legal principle that “restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole.” How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this principle by referencing both Section 4.1 (Assessments) and Section 5.1(a) (Maintenance) of the CC&Rs to reach her conclusion?

5. Evaluate the actions of the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg. Based on the evidence presented, did his own actions—specifically, denying the HOA access to his property—undermine his legal argument for a reduced assessment? Explain your reasoning using facts from the hearing evidence.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency, and makes decisions in matters referred by state departments like the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Assessments

Charges levied by the homeowners’ association on its members. According to CC&R § 4.1, they are used for promoting the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of owners, including property maintenance, and are to be proportioned to each owner’s respective common interests.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to establish their claim. In this matter, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

Common Area

Defined in CC&R § 1.8 as “those portions of the Project to which title is held by the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners and excepting the individual units.”

Common Expenses

Defined in CC&R § 1.9 as the “actual and estimated expenses of operating the association,” including any reasonable reserves and all sums designated as Common Expense by project documents.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents for a planned community that outline the rules, obligations, and rights of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Easements

A right of use over the property of another. CC&R § 2.1 grants every owner a “non-exclusive easement and equitable right of use and enjoyment in, to, and throughout the Common Area.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing body for a planned community (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) whose members are the property owners within that community. It is responsible for managing common areas and enforcing the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Rancho Del Oro.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case. The source defines it as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The source notes that in Arizona, an unambiguous restrictive covenant is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be construed as a whole.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918038-REL


He Sued His HOA Over an ‘Unfair’ Fee—The Reason He Lost Is a Warning for Every Homeowner

Introduction: The HOA Fee Frustration

For many homeowners, the monthly or annual bill from the Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a source of constant frustration. It’s easy to look at the line items—landscaping, pool maintenance, common area repairs—and wonder if you’re truly getting your money’s worth, especially when you feel you aren’t using a particular service.

This was exactly the position of Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Arizona who believed he had an open-and-shut case to lower his HOA fees. His argument seemed logical, fair, and simple. But the ultimate ruling in his case, Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, reveals some surprising and crucial truths about how HOA rules actually work and serves as a powerful lesson for every person living in a planned community.

Takeaway 1: You Pay for the Service, Even If You Actively Refuse It

Michael Stoltenberg’s argument was straightforward: his front yard was landscaped with rocks, while his neighbors had grass. He pointed out that in 2016, lawn maintenance accounted for a significant 39% of the HOA’s total budget. He argued it was fundamentally unfair for him to pay the same assessment as his neighbors when he wasn’t consuming this costly service.

His sense of unfairness was rooted in the history of the development. His home was one of eight built by a different developer than the rest of the community. Likely due to high water costs at the time, these eight lots were constructed without irrigation systems or grass. From the very beginning, his property was different. This context makes the crucial twist in the case all the more telling. In 2013, the HOA undertook a community-wide project to drill a new well and install an irrigation system, an effort designed to rectify the inconsistency and bring these outlier properties up to the community standard. When the construction reached Stoltenberg’s property, he refused the workers access.

Testimony from the HOA’s former bookkeeper laid this fact bare:

At this time, [Petitioner] declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose. This was also to include his front yard. This halted all construction that was currently in place in his back yard, and all landscaping being provided by the HOA for the front yard.

Legally, this transformed the situation. Stoltenberg’s complaint was no longer about a service he didn’t need, but about a service he actively rejected. This case establishes a critical principle: HOA assessments are tied to your property ownership and membership in the community, not your individual consumption of services. By refusing the service, Mr. Stoltenberg did not absolve himself of the cost associated with its availability to the community.

Takeaway 2: “Common Benefit” Isn’t the Same as “Your Personal Benefit”

The legal foundation for the HOA’s position rested in the language of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Section 4.1 states that assessments are to be used for the “common benefit, and enjoyment of the Owners.”

In an HOA context, “common benefit” is a broad concept. It means that well-maintained landscaping throughout the entire neighborhood enhances curb appeal, creates a cohesive community aesthetic, and supports the property values of all residents. This includes Mr. Stoltenberg, whose home value is supported by the beautiful, uniform appearance of the neighborhood, regardless of whether his specific yard has grass. It’s the same reason a homeowner without children still pays for the upkeep of a community playground; the amenity benefits the community as a whole.

Further testimony reinforced this point. The HOA’s property manager stated that the association was still willing to remove the rock and install grass on his property, just as they had already done for two other homeowners in a similar situation. The benefit was available to him; he simply continued to refuse it.

Takeaway 3: The Rules Are a Package Deal, Not an A La Carte Menu

Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge’s role was not to rule on a general sense of fairness but to enforce the community’s governing documents as written. When examined together, two key clauses in the CC&Rs created a contractual vise, leaving the judge with no other legal option. The two clauses created a perfect, inescapable loop.

Section 5.1(a): This clause states the HOA has an obligation that “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” The HOA wasn’t just permitted to do the work; it was contractually required to.

Section 4.1: This clause, which also defines assessments as being for the “common benefit,” requires that they “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

The documents legally obligated the HOA to maintain all yards and to charge every owner the same proportional amount for doing so. The CC&Rs provided no mechanism for a homeowner to opt-out of a service and receive a corresponding discount. The judge’s final ruling was decisive, emphasizing the absolute nature of this contractual obligation:

Because Petitioner has not pointed to any CC&R that allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard, Petitioner has not borne his burden in this matter.

Conclusion: The Contract You Live In

The case of Michael Stoltenberg is a powerful reminder that an HOA’s CC&Rs are not just a set of neighborhood rules; they are restrictive covenants that run with the land. When you buy the property, you are irrevocably buying into the contract that governs it. These documents are designed to prioritize the uniform application of standards for the collective good, and they supersede an individual’s personal preferences or interpretation of what seems “fair.”

This case forces every potential buyer to ask a critical question: Are you simply purchasing a dwelling, or are you prepared to become a party to the binding legal contract that governs the entire community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Stoltenberg (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent Entity)
    Entity, not human
  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Diana Crites (Property Manager/Witness)
    Property manager for Respondent; testified
  • Dawn Simpson (Former Bookkeeper/Witness)
    Former bookkeeper for Respondent; provided a letter/testimony regarding history
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Received transmission of the Order

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received transmission of the Order
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Transmitted the decision

Michael Stoltenberg vs Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, as CC&R § 4.1 requires uniform assessment and no provision requires or allows Respondent to assess Petitioner less due to his rock yard and refusal of maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Assessment Uniformity Requirement

Petitioner, who had rock landscaping and refused HOA maintenance, alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by assessing him uniform dues, arguing he should pay less since HOA expenditures on lawn maintenance were substantial and primarily benefited neighbors with grass yards.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 4.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Uniform Dues, CC&R Enforcement, Landscaping Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:59 (141.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918038-REL


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918038-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict centered on Mr. Stoltenberg’s claim that he should pay lower HOA assessments because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards requiring more costly maintenance by the HOA.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition. The decision rested on an unambiguous interpretation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly obligate the HOA to maintain landscaping on all individual lots and, crucially, require assessments to be uniform for all members to cover these “common expenses.” The petitioner’s argument for a reduced assessment was unsupported by any provision in the governing documents. Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Stoltenberg had actively refused the HOA access to his property to install a community irrigation system and to perform the very landscaping maintenance that is a central component of the assessments.

Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918038-REL

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Rancho Del Oro.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA).

Hearing Date: March 19, 2019

Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Core Allegation: On December 29, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging the HOA violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs (§§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2) by levying the same assessment fees on his property as on neighboring properties with grass lawns.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Michael Stoltenberg)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the argument of fairness, contending that his assessment should be lower because his property does not utilize the HOA’s most expensive landscaping services.

Primary Argument: It is inequitable for the HOA to charge him the same amount as neighbors with grass yards, given that his front yard is rock and does not receive the same level of maintenance.

Financial Evidence: The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the HOA spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which constituted 39% of its total budget.

Refusal of Services: The Petitioner acknowledged that he refused to allow the HOA access to his property for two key purposes:

1. To install irrigation pipes connecting his lot to a new community well.

2. To perform any landscape maintenance on his front yard.

Justification for Refusal: The Petitioner accused the HOA of previously killing his trees during maintenance activities and stated that he now undertakes all maintenance of his own yard.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Rancho Del Oro HOA)

The HOA’s defense was grounded in its adherence to the plain language of its governing documents, arguing that its actions were not only permissible but mandated by the CC&Rs.

Primary Argument: The HOA is legally bound by its CC&Rs to levy uniform assessments on all members and is simultaneously obligated to maintain the landscaping on every individual lot.

Key Testimony (Diana Crites, Property Manager):

◦ CC&R § 5.1(a) explicitly requires the HOA to maintain the yards of its members.

◦ CC&R § 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly, without regard to the type of landscaping they have chosen or whether they permit the HOA to perform its maintenance duties.

◦ The Petitioner’s property is one of eight constructed by a different developer, who did not originally install grass or an irrigation system.

◦ The HOA has since drilled a community well to address water costs and has offered to remove rock and install grass for these properties, an offer the Petitioner could accept.

Supporting Evidence (Letter from Dawn Simpson, former bookkeeper):

◦ A 2013 HOA project was initiated to install a community well for landscaping and to connect all homes, including the Petitioner’s.

◦ The letter details an incident where the Petitioner “became very heated with [the] contractor” and “declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose.”

◦ This action directly halted all construction to connect his property to the irrigation system and ceased all landscaping services provided by the HOA.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision centered on the clear, unambiguous language of specific articles within the CC&Rs. The petitioner failed to identify any language that would permit or require a non-uniform assessment.

CC&R Section

Key Language

Implication & Ruling

Article IV, Section 4.1

Assessments “shall be used for the… common benefit… of the Owners” and “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

This establishes the principle of uniform, shared liability for common expenses, regardless of an individual owner’s specific use of a particular service.

Article V, Section 5.1(a)

“The Association shall maintain… landscaping… It shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.”

This article imposes a direct obligation on the HOA to maintain all members’ landscaping, not merely an optional service.

Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, held the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

Interpretation of Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The judge found the CC&Rs to be unambiguous, requiring a holistic interpretation. The documents clearly mandate that the HOA must maintain all yards and must assess all members equally to fund that maintenance.

Final Ruling: The Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. He failed to point to any provision within the CC&Rs that “allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard.”

Order: The petition was denied. The HOA’s practice of charging uniform assessments was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918038-REL


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 19F-H1918038-REL, Michael Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Short-Answer Quiz Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what was the financial basis for his claim of unfair assessment?

4. Describe the history of the water and irrigation system issue at the Petitioner’s property prior to 2013, as detailed in Dawn Simpson’s letter.

5. What action did the Petitioner take during the 2013 well construction project, and what were the consequences of this action?

6. According to Article V, Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs, what specific maintenance obligation does the homeowners’ association have regarding individual lots?

7. How did Diana Crites, the HOA’s property manager, justify the uniform assessment for all homeowners based on the CC&Rs?

8. What reason did Ms. Crites provide for why eight units, including the Petitioner’s, were originally landscaped with rock instead of grass?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this hearing, and on which party does the burden of proof rest?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core legal reasoning for this decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” Mr. Stoltenberg is a homeowner and member of the HOA who filed a complaint against the association. The Respondent is the governing HOA for the Rancho Del Oro community in Yuma, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated multiple sections of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). His central claim was that it was unfair for the HOA to charge him the same assessment fees as his neighbors because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards that require more maintenance.

3. The financial basis for his claim was the HOA’s budget. The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the Respondent spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which accounted for 39% of the total budget.

4. Prior to 2013, the Petitioner made several complaints that his home was not connected to the community water system. The HOA Board’s position was that the Petitioner knew his home was not connected to the system when he purchased it.

5. During the 2013 construction to install a well and connect all homes to an irrigation system, the Petitioner became “very heated” with the contractor. He declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose, which halted all construction in his backyard and all landscaping provided by the HOA for his front yard.

6. Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping even on privately owned lots.

7. Diana Crites testified that CC&R Section 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly. She stated this uniformity applies regardless of the type of landscaping an owner has chosen or whether they permit the HOA onto their property to perform maintenance.

8. Ms. Crites testified that the eight units were built by a different developer after the original construction and were not equipped with an irrigation system or grass. She believed rock was used in the front yards of these lots due to the high cost of water, an issue later resolved by the installation of a community well.

9. The legal standard is “a preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must be convincing enough to make the contention more probably true than not. The burden of proof to establish a CC&R violation rests on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning was that the Petitioner failed to bear his burden of proof because he could not point to any provision in the CC&Rs that allows or requires the HOA to assess him less than his neighbors based on his landscaping choice or his refusal to allow maintenance.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and CC&R provisions from the case document.

1. Analyze the central conflict between the Petitioner’s concept of fairness and the Respondent’s interpretation of the CC&Rs. Use specific clauses from the CC&Rs (e.g., Articles IV and V) to support the analysis of each party’s position.

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. How did the evidence presented by both the Petitioner (e.g., budget figures) and the Respondent (e.g., witness testimony and CC&Rs) contribute to the judge’s final decision regarding this standard?

3. Trace the history of the water and irrigation issue at the Petitioner’s property, from his initial complaints to his refusal to allow construction access. How did these past events impact the central issue of the 2019 hearing?

4. Explain the legal principle that “restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole.” How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this principle by referencing both Section 4.1 (Assessments) and Section 5.1(a) (Maintenance) of the CC&Rs to reach her conclusion?

5. Evaluate the actions of the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg. Based on the evidence presented, did his own actions—specifically, denying the HOA access to his property—undermine his legal argument for a reduced assessment? Explain your reasoning using facts from the hearing evidence.

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Glossary

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency, and makes decisions in matters referred by state departments like the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Assessments

Charges levied by the homeowners’ association on its members. According to CC&R § 4.1, they are used for promoting the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of owners, including property maintenance, and are to be proportioned to each owner’s respective common interests.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to establish their claim. In this matter, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

Common Area

Defined in CC&R § 1.8 as “those portions of the Project to which title is held by the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners and excepting the individual units.”

Common Expenses

Defined in CC&R § 1.9 as the “actual and estimated expenses of operating the association,” including any reasonable reserves and all sums designated as Common Expense by project documents.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents for a planned community that outline the rules, obligations, and rights of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Easements

A right of use over the property of another. CC&R § 2.1 grants every owner a “non-exclusive easement and equitable right of use and enjoyment in, to, and throughout the Common Area.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing body for a planned community (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) whose members are the property owners within that community. It is responsible for managing common areas and enforcing the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Rancho Del Oro.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case. The source defines it as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The source notes that in Arizona, an unambiguous restrictive covenant is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be construed as a whole.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918038-REL


He Sued His HOA Over an ‘Unfair’ Fee—The Reason He Lost Is a Warning for Every Homeowner

Introduction: The HOA Fee Frustration

For many homeowners, the monthly or annual bill from the Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a source of constant frustration. It’s easy to look at the line items—landscaping, pool maintenance, common area repairs—and wonder if you’re truly getting your money’s worth, especially when you feel you aren’t using a particular service.

This was exactly the position of Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Arizona who believed he had an open-and-shut case to lower his HOA fees. His argument seemed logical, fair, and simple. But the ultimate ruling in his case, Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, reveals some surprising and crucial truths about how HOA rules actually work and serves as a powerful lesson for every person living in a planned community.

Takeaway 1: You Pay for the Service, Even If You Actively Refuse It

Michael Stoltenberg’s argument was straightforward: his front yard was landscaped with rocks, while his neighbors had grass. He pointed out that in 2016, lawn maintenance accounted for a significant 39% of the HOA’s total budget. He argued it was fundamentally unfair for him to pay the same assessment as his neighbors when he wasn’t consuming this costly service.

His sense of unfairness was rooted in the history of the development. His home was one of eight built by a different developer than the rest of the community. Likely due to high water costs at the time, these eight lots were constructed without irrigation systems or grass. From the very beginning, his property was different. This context makes the crucial twist in the case all the more telling. In 2013, the HOA undertook a community-wide project to drill a new well and install an irrigation system, an effort designed to rectify the inconsistency and bring these outlier properties up to the community standard. When the construction reached Stoltenberg’s property, he refused the workers access.

Testimony from the HOA’s former bookkeeper laid this fact bare:

At this time, [Petitioner] declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose. This was also to include his front yard. This halted all construction that was currently in place in his back yard, and all landscaping being provided by the HOA for the front yard.

Legally, this transformed the situation. Stoltenberg’s complaint was no longer about a service he didn’t need, but about a service he actively rejected. This case establishes a critical principle: HOA assessments are tied to your property ownership and membership in the community, not your individual consumption of services. By refusing the service, Mr. Stoltenberg did not absolve himself of the cost associated with its availability to the community.

Takeaway 2: “Common Benefit” Isn’t the Same as “Your Personal Benefit”

The legal foundation for the HOA’s position rested in the language of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Section 4.1 states that assessments are to be used for the “common benefit, and enjoyment of the Owners.”

In an HOA context, “common benefit” is a broad concept. It means that well-maintained landscaping throughout the entire neighborhood enhances curb appeal, creates a cohesive community aesthetic, and supports the property values of all residents. This includes Mr. Stoltenberg, whose home value is supported by the beautiful, uniform appearance of the neighborhood, regardless of whether his specific yard has grass. It’s the same reason a homeowner without children still pays for the upkeep of a community playground; the amenity benefits the community as a whole.

Further testimony reinforced this point. The HOA’s property manager stated that the association was still willing to remove the rock and install grass on his property, just as they had already done for two other homeowners in a similar situation. The benefit was available to him; he simply continued to refuse it.

Takeaway 3: The Rules Are a Package Deal, Not an A La Carte Menu

Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge’s role was not to rule on a general sense of fairness but to enforce the community’s governing documents as written. When examined together, two key clauses in the CC&Rs created a contractual vise, leaving the judge with no other legal option. The two clauses created a perfect, inescapable loop.

Section 5.1(a): This clause states the HOA has an obligation that “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” The HOA wasn’t just permitted to do the work; it was contractually required to.

Section 4.1: This clause, which also defines assessments as being for the “common benefit,” requires that they “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

The documents legally obligated the HOA to maintain all yards and to charge every owner the same proportional amount for doing so. The CC&Rs provided no mechanism for a homeowner to opt-out of a service and receive a corresponding discount. The judge’s final ruling was decisive, emphasizing the absolute nature of this contractual obligation:

Because Petitioner has not pointed to any CC&R that allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard, Petitioner has not borne his burden in this matter.

Conclusion: The Contract You Live In

The case of Michael Stoltenberg is a powerful reminder that an HOA’s CC&Rs are not just a set of neighborhood rules; they are restrictive covenants that run with the land. When you buy the property, you are irrevocably buying into the contract that governs it. These documents are designed to prioritize the uniform application of standards for the collective good, and they supersede an individual’s personal preferences or interpretation of what seems “fair.”

This case forces every potential buyer to ask a critical question: Are you simply purchasing a dwelling, or are you prepared to become a party to the binding legal contract that governs the entire community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Stoltenberg (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent Entity)
    Entity, not human
  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Diana Crites (Property Manager/Witness)
    Property manager for Respondent; testified
  • Dawn Simpson (Former Bookkeeper/Witness)
    Former bookkeeper for Respondent; provided a letter/testimony regarding history
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Received transmission of the Order

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received transmission of the Order
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Transmitted the decision

Linda Curtin vs. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-05
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Linda Curtin Counsel
Respondent The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested association records within the statutory ten-day period. The petition was granted and Respondent was ordered to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide timely access to association financial records

Petitioner filed a single-issue petition alleging Respondent violated CC&Rs § 4.8 and A.R.S. § 33-1805 by refusing to make available association records or to produce a receipt identifying a contractor and the amount paid for a cinderblock wall built by the community’s clubhouse.

Orders: The petition was granted because Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to records within ten days of Petitioner’s September 12, 2018 request. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&R § 4.8

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records, Record Inspection, Timely Disclosure, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&R § 4.8
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918034-REL Decision – 692859.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:04 (151.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918034-REL


Briefing Document: Curtin v. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 19F-H1918034-REL, a dispute between homeowner Linda Curtin and The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict arose from the HOA’s failure to provide financial records related to a small construction project within the timeframe mandated by Arizona law.

The petitioner, Ms. Curtin, alleged that the HOA violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by not producing an invoice for a $1,000 cinderblock wall project at the community clubhouse. While the HOA did eventually provide the requested records, the ALJ found that it failed to do so within the legally required ten-day period following Ms. Curtin’s formal written request on September 12, 2018.

Consequently, the ALJ granted the petition in favor of Ms. Curtin, ruling that the HOA was in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The HOA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Curtin for her $500 petition filing fee. However, the ALJ dismissed all of the petitioner’s ancillary complaints, including suspicions of forgery, concerns about the contractor’s licensing status, and other issues of HOA governance, deeming them either unsubstantiated or outside the narrow scope of the single-issue petition. The ruling underscores the strict procedural compliance required of HOAs regarding member record requests while limiting the scope of such legal challenges to the specific violations alleged.

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I. Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918034-REL

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner: Linda Curtin (“Complainant”), a homeowner and HOA member.

Respondent: The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. (“HOA”), represented by Community Manager Tracy Schofield.

Administrative Law Judge: Diane Mihalsky

Core Allegation: The HOA violated its governing documents and state law by failing to make association records available to a member upon request. Specifically, the petitioner sought a receipt and contractor details for a cinderblock wall built at the community clubhouse.

II. Governing Rules and Statutes

The case centered on the interpretation and enforcement of the HOA’s internal rules and a specific Arizona statute governing planned communities.

Rule/Statute

Key Provision

CC&R § 4.8

Requires the HOA Board to keep “true and correct records of account in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles” and to make such books and records available for inspection by all owners upon request during normal business hours.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Mandates that all financial and other association records be made “reasonably available for examination” by any member. The statute explicitly requires the association to fulfill a request for examination within ten business days. A similar ten-day deadline applies for providing copies of records.

The respondent did not claim any legal privilege under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) that would permit it to withhold the requested documents.

III. Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict unfolded over several months, beginning with an informal inquiry and escalating to a formal legal petition.

August 1, 2018: Petitioner Linda Curtin first emails Community Manager Tracy Schofield for a contractor recommendation.

August 2 – September 11, 2018: In a subsequent email exchange, Ms. Curtin asks who built the garbage can walls at the clubhouse. Ms. Schofield provides the name “Roberto” but is unable to provide a contact number, stating that the Board’s Treasurer, Jim Mackiewicz, had arranged the work. The petitioner later characterized this exchange as “evasive.”

September 12, 2018: Ms. Curtin sends a formal written letter requesting “a copy of the invoice submitted to The Ridge HOA” for the wall construction. This action officially started the ten-day clock under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

September 24, 2018: Ms. Schofield responds, stating that she does not have the invoices at her office as records are retained “in the community.” She provides a printout of payments made to contractor Gualberto Castro, which includes a $1,000 check dated November 1, 2017, for “Block work – clubhouse.”

November 5, 2018: Ms. Curtin requests that the invoice be brought to that day’s HOA board meeting. The document is not provided.

November 28, 2018: After making an additional 15 phone calls regarding related meeting minutes without a satisfactory response, Ms. Curtin files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 10, 2018: The HOA files its answer, claiming the issue has been resolved. On the same day, Ms. Schofield emails the contractor’s invoice to Ms. Curtin. The invoice, from ValleyWide Custom Painting Inc. and dated November 2, 2017, details the $1,000 job.

December 11, 2018: Ms. Curtin requests additional documents, including a copy of the cashed check and the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) application for the project. Ms. Schofield is reported to have stated that ACC approval was not applicable to work on common areas.

Post-December 11, 2018: Ms. Schofield eventually provides a copy of the cancelled check for $1,000 made payable to Mr. Castro.

February 20, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before the ALJ.

IV. Analysis of Evidence and Arguments

A. Petitioner’s Position

Ms. Curtin’s case was built on the initial failure to produce records and expanded to include broader suspicions about the HOA’s conduct.

Primary Claim: The HOA violated state law by failing to fulfill her September 12, 2018 request for records within the ten-day statutory period.

Suspicions about Documentation: The petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with the documents eventually provided. She opined that the November 2, 2017 receipt “appeared to have two different kinds of handwriting and might be a forgery.” She also pointed to the fact that the check for payment was dated one day before the invoice date.

Ancillary Governance Concerns: Ms. Curtin raised several issues beyond the scope of her petition, including:

◦ The contractor, Mr. Castro, was not licensed as required by the Registrar of Contractors.

◦ The Board meeting minutes did not show authorization for the $1,000 expenditure.

◦ The HOA’s ACC approval process was not followed for the wall.

◦ A separate, unrelated $125,000 pool remodel project was approved improperly (this was refuted by Ms. Schofield’s testimony that it required a membership vote).

B. Respondent’s Position

The HOA, through Ms. Schofield, acknowledged the delay but argued it had ultimately complied and faced logistical constraints.

Eventual Compliance: The HOA’s primary defense was that it eventually provided all the documents in its possession related to the expenditure, thereby resolving the complaint.

Logistical Challenges: Ms. Schofield testified that she is an off-site community manager for numerous associations and does not keep records in her office. She stated that the HOA’s records are stored “in the community” at a separate depository.

Commitment to Future Compliance: Ms. Schofield testified that for any future requests, she would schedule a time for the petitioner to review records at the depository within the ten-day window.

Communication: Ms. Schofield maintained that she “communicated with Petitioner on every issue” and provided what information she had available.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was narrowly focused on the statutory violation, setting aside the petitioner’s other grievances.

A. Conclusions of Law

1. Violation Confirmed: The judge concluded that the petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The HOA “acknowledged that it did not provide the documents or provide access to Petitioner to view the documents within ten days of Petitioner’s September 12, 2018 request.”

2. Scope of Relief Limited: The ALJ determined that the statute only requires that records be kept and made available in a timely manner. The law “has not authorized the Department… that HOAs produce records that satisfy all of a members’ stated concerns.”

3. Ancillary Claims Dismissed: The judge explicitly rejected the petitioner’s broader concerns, stating: “Petitioner’s concern with ‘transparency’ and dissatisfaction and suspicions about the records that were eventually provided do not entitle her to any additional relief in this forum.” The forgery claim was dismissed for lack of evidence, as Ms. Curtin did not present the opinion of a handwriting expert. The issues related to contractor licensing and internal HOA procedures were deemed outside the jurisdiction of the hearing for an HOA petition.

B. Recommended Order

Based on the findings, the ALJ issued a two-part order:

1. Petition Granted: The petition was granted on the grounds that Ms. Curtin had proven the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

2. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The HOA was ordered to reimburse the petitioner the $500.00 she paid to file the single-issue petition.

The order, issued on March 5, 2019, was declared binding on both parties unless a request for rehearing was filed within 30 days.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918034-REL


Study Guide: Curtin v. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918034-REL, involving Petitioner Linda Curtin and Respondent The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based exclusively on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the single-issue petition filed by Linda Curtin on November 28, 2018?

3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute and CC&R section did the Petitioner claim the Respondent violated?

4. How did the HOA, through its community manager, initially attempt to resolve the records request that led to the petition?

5. What additional documents did Ms. Curtin request after receiving the contractor’s invoice on December 10, 2018?

6. What were Ms. Curtin’s specific suspicions and complaints regarding the quality and validity of the documents she eventually received?

7. What was Community Manager Tracy Schofield’s testimony regarding her role and the location of the association’s records?

8. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” what is the primary requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) regarding member requests for records?

9. On what specific point did the Administrative Law Judge find that the Respondent had violated the statute?

10. What was the final Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Linda Curtin, the Petitioner and a homeowner, and The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Tracy Schofield appeared for the HOA as its Community Manager, and Diane Mihalsky served as the Administrative Law Judge.

2. The central allegation was that the HOA violated its own rules and state law by refusing to make association records available. Specifically, Ms. Curtin sought a receipt identifying the contractor and the amount paid for a cinderblock wall built by the community clubhouse.

3. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent violated CC&R § 4.8, concerning the keeping and availability of accounting records, and A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs the examination of association records by members.

4. On September 24, 2018, Ms. Schofield responded to Ms. Curtin’s written request by stating she did not have invoices at her office. She did, however, provide a printout of payments made to the contractor, Gaulberto Castro, which included a $1,000.00 payment for “Block work – clubhouse.”

5. After receiving the invoice, Ms. Curtin requested a copy of the cashed check (front and back), the payee’s mailing address, and the completed Architectural Control Committee Application for the project, including the contractor’s address, license number, and insurance company.

6. Ms. Curtin complained that the contractor, Mr. Castro, was not licensed and that the job did not meet the exemption requirements for the Registrar of Contractors. She also opined that the receipt from November 2, 2017, appeared to be a forgery with two different kinds of handwriting.

7. Ms. Schofield testified that she is not an onsite manager, works for numerous associations, and does not keep any association records in her office. She stated that for future requests, she would schedule a time for Ms. Curtin to view the records at the Respondent’s records depository.

8. The primary requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) is that all financial and other records of an association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member. The statute mandates that the association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination or to provide copies.

9. The Judge found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) because, while it eventually provided all documents in its possession, it failed to provide the documents or access to them within the statutorily required ten-day period following Ms. Curtin’s September 12, 2018 request.

10. The Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be granted because she established the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Judge further ordered that the Respondent reimburse Ms. Curtin the $500.00 she paid to file her single-issue petition.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the timeline of communication between Linda Curtin and Tracy Schofield, from the initial informal inquiry on August 1, 2018, to the formal petition. How did the nature of the requests and the quality of the responses contribute to the escalation of the dispute?

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge used this standard to find the Respondent in violation of the ten-day rule while simultaneously dismissing the Petitioner’s other concerns about transparency and forgery.

3. The Petitioner raised several issues during the hearing that were not part of her original single-issue petition, such as the contractor’s licensing status, the lack of Board meeting minutes authorizing the project, and a proposed $125,000 pool remodel. Why did the Administrative Law Judge deem these points irrelevant to the final decision?

4. Evaluate the responsibilities of a Homeowners Association regarding record-keeping and member access as outlined in CC&R § 4.8 and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Based on the testimony and evidence, describe the specific procedural failures of The Ridge at Diamante del Lago HOA in this matter.

5. The Judge’s decision explicitly states that the Petitioner’s “dissatisfaction and suspicions about the records that were eventually provided do not entitle her to any additional relief in this forum.” Explore the distinction the ruling makes between a procedural violation (timeliness of access) and the substantive content or perceived legitimacy of the records themselves.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Diane Mihalsky of the Office of Administrative Hearings served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all financial and other records of a homeowners association be made reasonably available for examination by any member within ten business days of a request.

Complainant

An alternative term used in the document to refer to the Petitioner, Linda Curtin.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents that create and define the rules for a planned community. In this case, CC&R § 4.8, which deals with accounting records, was cited.

Department (The)

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from HOA members and HOAs.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where evidence is presented and testimony is given before an administrative law judge to resolve a factual dispute. The hearing in this case took place on February 20, 2019.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a planned community that creates and enforces rules for the properties and its members. The Respondent is The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Linda Curtin, a homeowner and member of the Respondent HOA.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. The Petitioner bears this burden of proof.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Restrictive Covenants

Legal obligations imposed in a deed upon the buyer of real estate. The document notes that if unambiguous, they are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Linda Curtin (petitioner)
    Also referred to as 'Complainant'; testified on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Tracy Schofield (community manager)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association
    Appeared for Respondent and testified as Community Manager
  • Jim Mackiewicz (board member)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association
    Board Treasurer
  • Mitch Kellogg (statutory agent)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Gualberto Castro (contractor)
    Gualberto Stucco & Repairs
    Contractor involved in the disputed work
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Linda Curtin vs. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-05
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Linda Curtin Counsel
Respondent The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested association records within the statutory ten-day period. The petition was granted and Respondent was ordered to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide timely access to association financial records

Petitioner filed a single-issue petition alleging Respondent violated CC&Rs § 4.8 and A.R.S. § 33-1805 by refusing to make available association records or to produce a receipt identifying a contractor and the amount paid for a cinderblock wall built by the community’s clubhouse.

Orders: The petition was granted because Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to records within ten days of Petitioner’s September 12, 2018 request. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&R § 4.8

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records, Record Inspection, Timely Disclosure, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&R § 4.8
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918034-REL Decision – 692859.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:53 (151.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918034-REL


Briefing Document: Curtin v. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 19F-H1918034-REL, a dispute between homeowner Linda Curtin and The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict arose from the HOA’s failure to provide financial records related to a small construction project within the timeframe mandated by Arizona law.

The petitioner, Ms. Curtin, alleged that the HOA violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by not producing an invoice for a $1,000 cinderblock wall project at the community clubhouse. While the HOA did eventually provide the requested records, the ALJ found that it failed to do so within the legally required ten-day period following Ms. Curtin’s formal written request on September 12, 2018.

Consequently, the ALJ granted the petition in favor of Ms. Curtin, ruling that the HOA was in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The HOA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Curtin for her $500 petition filing fee. However, the ALJ dismissed all of the petitioner’s ancillary complaints, including suspicions of forgery, concerns about the contractor’s licensing status, and other issues of HOA governance, deeming them either unsubstantiated or outside the narrow scope of the single-issue petition. The ruling underscores the strict procedural compliance required of HOAs regarding member record requests while limiting the scope of such legal challenges to the specific violations alleged.

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I. Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918034-REL

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner: Linda Curtin (“Complainant”), a homeowner and HOA member.

Respondent: The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. (“HOA”), represented by Community Manager Tracy Schofield.

Administrative Law Judge: Diane Mihalsky

Core Allegation: The HOA violated its governing documents and state law by failing to make association records available to a member upon request. Specifically, the petitioner sought a receipt and contractor details for a cinderblock wall built at the community clubhouse.

II. Governing Rules and Statutes

The case centered on the interpretation and enforcement of the HOA’s internal rules and a specific Arizona statute governing planned communities.

Rule/Statute

Key Provision

CC&R § 4.8

Requires the HOA Board to keep “true and correct records of account in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles” and to make such books and records available for inspection by all owners upon request during normal business hours.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Mandates that all financial and other association records be made “reasonably available for examination” by any member. The statute explicitly requires the association to fulfill a request for examination within ten business days. A similar ten-day deadline applies for providing copies of records.

The respondent did not claim any legal privilege under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) that would permit it to withhold the requested documents.

III. Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict unfolded over several months, beginning with an informal inquiry and escalating to a formal legal petition.

August 1, 2018: Petitioner Linda Curtin first emails Community Manager Tracy Schofield for a contractor recommendation.

August 2 – September 11, 2018: In a subsequent email exchange, Ms. Curtin asks who built the garbage can walls at the clubhouse. Ms. Schofield provides the name “Roberto” but is unable to provide a contact number, stating that the Board’s Treasurer, Jim Mackiewicz, had arranged the work. The petitioner later characterized this exchange as “evasive.”

September 12, 2018: Ms. Curtin sends a formal written letter requesting “a copy of the invoice submitted to The Ridge HOA” for the wall construction. This action officially started the ten-day clock under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

September 24, 2018: Ms. Schofield responds, stating that she does not have the invoices at her office as records are retained “in the community.” She provides a printout of payments made to contractor Gualberto Castro, which includes a $1,000 check dated November 1, 2017, for “Block work – clubhouse.”

November 5, 2018: Ms. Curtin requests that the invoice be brought to that day’s HOA board meeting. The document is not provided.

November 28, 2018: After making an additional 15 phone calls regarding related meeting minutes without a satisfactory response, Ms. Curtin files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 10, 2018: The HOA files its answer, claiming the issue has been resolved. On the same day, Ms. Schofield emails the contractor’s invoice to Ms. Curtin. The invoice, from ValleyWide Custom Painting Inc. and dated November 2, 2017, details the $1,000 job.

December 11, 2018: Ms. Curtin requests additional documents, including a copy of the cashed check and the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) application for the project. Ms. Schofield is reported to have stated that ACC approval was not applicable to work on common areas.

Post-December 11, 2018: Ms. Schofield eventually provides a copy of the cancelled check for $1,000 made payable to Mr. Castro.

February 20, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before the ALJ.

IV. Analysis of Evidence and Arguments

A. Petitioner’s Position

Ms. Curtin’s case was built on the initial failure to produce records and expanded to include broader suspicions about the HOA’s conduct.

Primary Claim: The HOA violated state law by failing to fulfill her September 12, 2018 request for records within the ten-day statutory period.

Suspicions about Documentation: The petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with the documents eventually provided. She opined that the November 2, 2017 receipt “appeared to have two different kinds of handwriting and might be a forgery.” She also pointed to the fact that the check for payment was dated one day before the invoice date.

Ancillary Governance Concerns: Ms. Curtin raised several issues beyond the scope of her petition, including:

◦ The contractor, Mr. Castro, was not licensed as required by the Registrar of Contractors.

◦ The Board meeting minutes did not show authorization for the $1,000 expenditure.

◦ The HOA’s ACC approval process was not followed for the wall.

◦ A separate, unrelated $125,000 pool remodel project was approved improperly (this was refuted by Ms. Schofield’s testimony that it required a membership vote).

B. Respondent’s Position

The HOA, through Ms. Schofield, acknowledged the delay but argued it had ultimately complied and faced logistical constraints.

Eventual Compliance: The HOA’s primary defense was that it eventually provided all the documents in its possession related to the expenditure, thereby resolving the complaint.

Logistical Challenges: Ms. Schofield testified that she is an off-site community manager for numerous associations and does not keep records in her office. She stated that the HOA’s records are stored “in the community” at a separate depository.

Commitment to Future Compliance: Ms. Schofield testified that for any future requests, she would schedule a time for the petitioner to review records at the depository within the ten-day window.

Communication: Ms. Schofield maintained that she “communicated with Petitioner on every issue” and provided what information she had available.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was narrowly focused on the statutory violation, setting aside the petitioner’s other grievances.

A. Conclusions of Law

1. Violation Confirmed: The judge concluded that the petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The HOA “acknowledged that it did not provide the documents or provide access to Petitioner to view the documents within ten days of Petitioner’s September 12, 2018 request.”

2. Scope of Relief Limited: The ALJ determined that the statute only requires that records be kept and made available in a timely manner. The law “has not authorized the Department… that HOAs produce records that satisfy all of a members’ stated concerns.”

3. Ancillary Claims Dismissed: The judge explicitly rejected the petitioner’s broader concerns, stating: “Petitioner’s concern with ‘transparency’ and dissatisfaction and suspicions about the records that were eventually provided do not entitle her to any additional relief in this forum.” The forgery claim was dismissed for lack of evidence, as Ms. Curtin did not present the opinion of a handwriting expert. The issues related to contractor licensing and internal HOA procedures were deemed outside the jurisdiction of the hearing for an HOA petition.

B. Recommended Order

Based on the findings, the ALJ issued a two-part order:

1. Petition Granted: The petition was granted on the grounds that Ms. Curtin had proven the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

2. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The HOA was ordered to reimburse the petitioner the $500.00 she paid to file the single-issue petition.

The order, issued on March 5, 2019, was declared binding on both parties unless a request for rehearing was filed within 30 days.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918034-REL


Study Guide: Curtin v. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918034-REL, involving Petitioner Linda Curtin and Respondent The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based exclusively on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the single-issue petition filed by Linda Curtin on November 28, 2018?

3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute and CC&R section did the Petitioner claim the Respondent violated?

4. How did the HOA, through its community manager, initially attempt to resolve the records request that led to the petition?

5. What additional documents did Ms. Curtin request after receiving the contractor’s invoice on December 10, 2018?

6. What were Ms. Curtin’s specific suspicions and complaints regarding the quality and validity of the documents she eventually received?

7. What was Community Manager Tracy Schofield’s testimony regarding her role and the location of the association’s records?

8. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” what is the primary requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) regarding member requests for records?

9. On what specific point did the Administrative Law Judge find that the Respondent had violated the statute?

10. What was the final Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Linda Curtin, the Petitioner and a homeowner, and The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Tracy Schofield appeared for the HOA as its Community Manager, and Diane Mihalsky served as the Administrative Law Judge.

2. The central allegation was that the HOA violated its own rules and state law by refusing to make association records available. Specifically, Ms. Curtin sought a receipt identifying the contractor and the amount paid for a cinderblock wall built by the community clubhouse.

3. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent violated CC&R § 4.8, concerning the keeping and availability of accounting records, and A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs the examination of association records by members.

4. On September 24, 2018, Ms. Schofield responded to Ms. Curtin’s written request by stating she did not have invoices at her office. She did, however, provide a printout of payments made to the contractor, Gaulberto Castro, which included a $1,000.00 payment for “Block work – clubhouse.”

5. After receiving the invoice, Ms. Curtin requested a copy of the cashed check (front and back), the payee’s mailing address, and the completed Architectural Control Committee Application for the project, including the contractor’s address, license number, and insurance company.

6. Ms. Curtin complained that the contractor, Mr. Castro, was not licensed and that the job did not meet the exemption requirements for the Registrar of Contractors. She also opined that the receipt from November 2, 2017, appeared to be a forgery with two different kinds of handwriting.

7. Ms. Schofield testified that she is not an onsite manager, works for numerous associations, and does not keep any association records in her office. She stated that for future requests, she would schedule a time for Ms. Curtin to view the records at the Respondent’s records depository.

8. The primary requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) is that all financial and other records of an association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member. The statute mandates that the association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination or to provide copies.

9. The Judge found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) because, while it eventually provided all documents in its possession, it failed to provide the documents or access to them within the statutorily required ten-day period following Ms. Curtin’s September 12, 2018 request.

10. The Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be granted because she established the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Judge further ordered that the Respondent reimburse Ms. Curtin the $500.00 she paid to file her single-issue petition.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the timeline of communication between Linda Curtin and Tracy Schofield, from the initial informal inquiry on August 1, 2018, to the formal petition. How did the nature of the requests and the quality of the responses contribute to the escalation of the dispute?

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge used this standard to find the Respondent in violation of the ten-day rule while simultaneously dismissing the Petitioner’s other concerns about transparency and forgery.

3. The Petitioner raised several issues during the hearing that were not part of her original single-issue petition, such as the contractor’s licensing status, the lack of Board meeting minutes authorizing the project, and a proposed $125,000 pool remodel. Why did the Administrative Law Judge deem these points irrelevant to the final decision?

4. Evaluate the responsibilities of a Homeowners Association regarding record-keeping and member access as outlined in CC&R § 4.8 and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Based on the testimony and evidence, describe the specific procedural failures of The Ridge at Diamante del Lago HOA in this matter.

5. The Judge’s decision explicitly states that the Petitioner’s “dissatisfaction and suspicions about the records that were eventually provided do not entitle her to any additional relief in this forum.” Explore the distinction the ruling makes between a procedural violation (timeliness of access) and the substantive content or perceived legitimacy of the records themselves.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Diane Mihalsky of the Office of Administrative Hearings served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all financial and other records of a homeowners association be made reasonably available for examination by any member within ten business days of a request.

Complainant

An alternative term used in the document to refer to the Petitioner, Linda Curtin.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents that create and define the rules for a planned community. In this case, CC&R § 4.8, which deals with accounting records, was cited.

Department (The)

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from HOA members and HOAs.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where evidence is presented and testimony is given before an administrative law judge to resolve a factual dispute. The hearing in this case took place on February 20, 2019.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a planned community that creates and enforces rules for the properties and its members. The Respondent is The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Linda Curtin, a homeowner and member of the Respondent HOA.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. The Petitioner bears this burden of proof.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Restrictive Covenants

Legal obligations imposed in a deed upon the buyer of real estate. The document notes that if unambiguous, they are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Linda Curtin (petitioner)
    Also referred to as 'Complainant'; testified on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Tracy Schofield (community manager)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association
    Appeared for Respondent and testified as Community Manager
  • Jim Mackiewicz (board member)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association
    Board Treasurer
  • Mitch Kellogg (statutory agent)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Gualberto Castro (contractor)
    Gualberto Stucco & Repairs
    Contractor involved in the disputed work
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Charles P. Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a); Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition alleging violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by the HOA. The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation, specifically concluding that the proposed cedar patio structure was a second detached structure or a temporary structure, both prohibited under the CC&Rs given the Petitioner already had a tool shed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by failing to prove that his proposed cedar patio structure was not a barred detached structure (since he already had a shed) or a barred temporary structure.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by HOA for denial of detached patio structure construction

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying his request to construct a approximately 150 square feet detached patio structure because he already had a tool shed on his property, while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16
  • CC&Rs § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:21 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918006-REL/669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:30 (91.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the conflict involves Mr. Mandela’s multiple failed attempts to gain approval for a 150-square-foot patio structure on his property, which already contained a tool shed.

Blue Ridge denied Mr. Mandela’s three separate requests on distinct grounds: the first for exceeding the size limit for a “play structure,” the second for submitting incomplete plans for an “attached structure,” and the third for violating the “one detached structure” rule. In response, Mr. Mandela filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Blue Ridge had violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and engaged in discriminatory practices.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge conclusively denied Mr. Mandela’s petition. The judge found that Mr. Mandela failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation by Blue Ridge. The decisions affirmed that the HOA’s denials were consistent with its governing documents, that Mr. Mandela’s interpretation of key terms like “detached structure” and “temporary structure” was incorrect, and that his allegations of discrimination were unsubstantiated by evidence. The final order from the rehearing is binding on both parties.

Case Overview

This case documents a series of requests and denials between a homeowner and his HOA, culminating in a formal legal dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties Involved

Name/Entity

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

Respondent’s Counsel

Paul Frame, Esq. (FRAME LAW PLLC)

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Timeline of Key Events

Date (Approx.)

Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request: a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied for exceeding the 80 sq. ft. size limit.

Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his second request: to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans.

Mar 8, 2018

Mr. Mandela’s second request is formally denied due to “incomplete information.”

Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an appeal with Blue Ridge regarding the denial, which is subsequently denied.

Undisclosed

Mr. Mandela submits his third request: to build a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied because he already has a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure.

Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a).

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, once again denying the petition. This order is binding.

Analysis of Petitioner’s Requests and HOA Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed patio structure, each of which was denied for violating a different set of rules.

Request 1: Play Structure Application

Mr. Mandela first attempted to gain approval by using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form from the Blue Ridge website.

Request Details: Construction of a cedar patio structure of approximately 150 square feet.

Reason for Denial: The request was denied because the structure’s size exceeded the established limit. The application form explicitly states that play structures such as a “Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort” cannot exceed 80 square feet.

Request 2: Attached Patio Shade Application

Mr. Mandela next submitted a request to attach the cedar patio shade directly to his home.

Request Details: The proposal involved attaching a structure to the main residence.

HOA Actions: Blue Ridge Chairman John Hart requested documents, such as plans and materials, to verify the structure would not be free-standing.

Petitioner’s Response: In a March 3, 2018 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof. The structures will be attached.”

Reason for Denial: The request was denied on March 8, 2018, due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter specified that Mr. Mandela needed to provide detailed drawings matching the proposed construction and use the official 9-page form as required by CC&R guidelines. The subsequent appeal was also denied, with the board noting a need for an “elevation drawing of your specific construction” showing dimensions, materials, and foundation/attachment methods.

Request 3: Detached Patio Structure Application

Finally, Mr. Mandela submitted a request to build the 150-square-foot structure as a detached unit.

Request Details: A free-standing, detached patio structure in his backyard.

Reason for Denial: This request was denied because Mr. Mandela already had a tool shed on his property. According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one detached structure is permitted on a lot.

Core Legal Arguments and Adjudication

In the hearings, Mr. Mandela presented several arguments to challenge the HOA’s decisions. The Administrative Law Judge addressed each claim and found that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Definition of a “Detached Structure”

Mandela’s Position: Argued that the proposed patio structure was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, unlike a shed, it could not be “easily converted into a second residence.” He claimed this interpretation was supported by a prior ALJ decision involving Blue Ridge.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Judge found this argument unpersuasive. The decision states that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.” It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela already had a shed, and the judge concluded the proposed patio was a “barred detached structure” under the governing rules.

Allegations of Discrimination and Unequal Enforcement

Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela contended that Blue Ridge was discriminating against him. His claims included:

1. The play structure rule allowing a second detached structure under 80 sq. ft. unfairly discriminates against residents without children.

2. Blue Ridge was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. limit against other homeowners.

3. Blue Ridge had previously approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member, showing unequal enforcement.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The petitioner failed to provide credible evidence for these claims. Testimony from Blue Ridge Vice President Joseph Hancock refuted Mandela’s specific examples, showing that cited lots either had no violations or contained structures predating the relevant rules. The judge found Hancock’s testimony credible and noted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over potential constitutional equal protection claims.

Definition of a “Temporary Structure”

Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela argued his proposed structure was not a prohibited temporary structure. He cited the product’s 5-year warranty against rot and his plan to use concrete pavers at the base, which he asserted constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules.

HOA’s Position: Joseph Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.”

ALJ’s Conclusion: The judge agreed with the HOA. The decision states: “The preponderance of the evidence shows that the proposed play structure is a temporary structure under the Blue Ridge CC&Rs because it does not have a cement or block foundation. The preponderance of the evidence shows that concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

Governing Rules and Regulations

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of specific sections of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs and the Architectural Committee’s aligned regulations.

Regulation

Summary of Provision

CC&R § 3.1

Restricts property use to “Single Family Residential Use.” Prohibits any building or structure separate from the main residence, with the exception of a garage.

Arch. Committee Reg. 3(D)

Modifies CC&R § 3.1 by allowing one detached structure to be constructed on a property with prior committee approval.

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Reg.

Prohibits temporary structures. Defines a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

CC&R § 3.24

Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any structure to be “commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered.”

Modified Rules (April 6, 2016)

Establishes rules for “Play Structures.” Allows for one of each type but no more than two total. Limits Tree Houses, Viewing Stands, and Play Houses/Forts to a maximum of 80 square feet.

Final Orders and Outcome

The legal proceedings resulted in a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association.

Initial Decision (November 6, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Rehearing Decision (February 28, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision on the rehearing is noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”






Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,.

Respondent Side

  • Paul K. Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Blue Ridge Estates HOA,.
  • John Hart (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Chairman of Blue Ridge,.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member/witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Vice President of Blue Ridge; presented testimony,.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision.

Charles P. Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:59 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918006-REL/669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:02 (91.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the conflict involves Mr. Mandela’s multiple failed attempts to gain approval for a 150-square-foot patio structure on his property, which already contained a tool shed.

Blue Ridge denied Mr. Mandela’s three separate requests on distinct grounds: the first for exceeding the size limit for a “play structure,” the second for submitting incomplete plans for an “attached structure,” and the third for violating the “one detached structure” rule. In response, Mr. Mandela filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Blue Ridge had violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and engaged in discriminatory practices.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge conclusively denied Mr. Mandela’s petition. The judge found that Mr. Mandela failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation by Blue Ridge. The decisions affirmed that the HOA’s denials were consistent with its governing documents, that Mr. Mandela’s interpretation of key terms like “detached structure” and “temporary structure” was incorrect, and that his allegations of discrimination were unsubstantiated by evidence. The final order from the rehearing is binding on both parties.

Case Overview

This case documents a series of requests and denials between a homeowner and his HOA, culminating in a formal legal dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties Involved

Name/Entity

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

Respondent’s Counsel

Paul Frame, Esq. (FRAME LAW PLLC)

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Timeline of Key Events

Date (Approx.)

Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request: a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied for exceeding the 80 sq. ft. size limit.

Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his second request: to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans.

Mar 8, 2018

Mr. Mandela’s second request is formally denied due to “incomplete information.”

Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an appeal with Blue Ridge regarding the denial, which is subsequently denied.

Undisclosed

Mr. Mandela submits his third request: to build a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied because he already has a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure.

Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a).

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, once again denying the petition. This order is binding.

Analysis of Petitioner’s Requests and HOA Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed patio structure, each of which was denied for violating a different set of rules.

Request 1: Play Structure Application

Mr. Mandela first attempted to gain approval by using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form from the Blue Ridge website.

Request Details: Construction of a cedar patio structure of approximately 150 square feet.

Reason for Denial: The request was denied because the structure’s size exceeded the established limit. The application form explicitly states that play structures such as a “Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort” cannot exceed 80 square feet.

Request 2: Attached Patio Shade Application

Mr. Mandela next submitted a request to attach the cedar patio shade directly to his home.

Request Details: The proposal involved attaching a structure to the main residence.

HOA Actions: Blue Ridge Chairman John Hart requested documents, such as plans and materials, to verify the structure would not be free-standing.

Petitioner’s Response: In a March 3, 2018 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof. The structures will be attached.”

Reason for Denial: The request was denied on March 8, 2018, due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter specified that Mr. Mandela needed to provide detailed drawings matching the proposed construction and use the official 9-page form as required by CC&R guidelines. The subsequent appeal was also denied, with the board noting a need for an “elevation drawing of your specific construction” showing dimensions, materials, and foundation/attachment methods.

Request 3: Detached Patio Structure Application

Finally, Mr. Mandela submitted a request to build the 150-square-foot structure as a detached unit.

Request Details: A free-standing, detached patio structure in his backyard.

Reason for Denial: This request was denied because Mr. Mandela already had a tool shed on his property. According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one detached structure is permitted on a lot.

Core Legal Arguments and Adjudication

In the hearings, Mr. Mandela presented several arguments to challenge the HOA’s decisions. The Administrative Law Judge addressed each claim and found that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Definition of a “Detached Structure”

Mandela’s Position: Argued that the proposed patio structure was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, unlike a shed, it could not be “easily converted into a second residence.” He claimed this interpretation was supported by a prior ALJ decision involving Blue Ridge.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Judge found this argument unpersuasive. The decision states that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.” It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela already had a shed, and the judge concluded the proposed patio was a “barred detached structure” under the governing rules.

Allegations of Discrimination and Unequal Enforcement

Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela contended that Blue Ridge was discriminating against him. His claims included:

1. The play structure rule allowing a second detached structure under 80 sq. ft. unfairly discriminates against residents without children.

2. Blue Ridge was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. limit against other homeowners.

3. Blue Ridge had previously approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member, showing unequal enforcement.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The petitioner failed to provide credible evidence for these claims. Testimony from Blue Ridge Vice President Joseph Hancock refuted Mandela’s specific examples, showing that cited lots either had no violations or contained structures predating the relevant rules. The judge found Hancock’s testimony credible and noted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over potential constitutional equal protection claims.

Definition of a “Temporary Structure”

Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela argued his proposed structure was not a prohibited temporary structure. He cited the product’s 5-year warranty against rot and his plan to use concrete pavers at the base, which he asserted constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules.

HOA’s Position: Joseph Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.”

ALJ’s Conclusion: The judge agreed with the HOA. The decision states: “The preponderance of the evidence shows that the proposed play structure is a temporary structure under the Blue Ridge CC&Rs because it does not have a cement or block foundation. The preponderance of the evidence shows that concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

Governing Rules and Regulations

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of specific sections of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs and the Architectural Committee’s aligned regulations.

Regulation

Summary of Provision

CC&R § 3.1

Restricts property use to “Single Family Residential Use.” Prohibits any building or structure separate from the main residence, with the exception of a garage.

Arch. Committee Reg. 3(D)

Modifies CC&R § 3.1 by allowing one detached structure to be constructed on a property with prior committee approval.

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Reg.

Prohibits temporary structures. Defines a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

CC&R § 3.24

Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any structure to be “commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered.”

Modified Rules (April 6, 2016)

Establishes rules for “Play Structures.” Allows for one of each type but no more than two total. Limits Tree Houses, Viewing Stands, and Play Houses/Forts to a maximum of 80 square feet.

Final Orders and Outcome

The legal proceedings resulted in a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association.

Initial Decision (November 6, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Rehearing Decision (February 28, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision on the rehearing is noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”






Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,.

Respondent Side

  • Paul K. Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Blue Ridge Estates HOA,.
  • John Hart (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Chairman of Blue Ridge,.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member/witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Vice President of Blue Ridge; presented testimony,.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision.