Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:45 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:49 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

——————————————————————————–

Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

——————————————————————————–

Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

——————————————————————————–

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL-RHG Decision – 733509.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-09T17:24:55 (38.6 KB)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

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Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:10 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:11 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
Rehearing: April 1, 2019
Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

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1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,

William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:04:52 (118.5 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:37 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL



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