The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof to show the Respondent violated the open meeting statute (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)). The Board provided open meetings where the management contract discussions and votes occurred, including allowing the Petitioner and other homeowners to comment.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by a preponderance of the evidence.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of the open meeting statute regarding entering into a contract with a new Community Association Management Company.
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by canceling the existing community management contract and entering a contract with a new company (Haywood Realty & Investment, Inc.) without allowing open discussion, member comment, motion, and a vote regarding the change and the acquisition of Requests for Proposals (RFPs).
Orders: Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Management Contract, Request for Proposals, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
ARS 33-1804(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
24F-H011-REL Decision – 1116173.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:01:52 (111.6 KB)
Study Guide – 24F-H011-REL
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24F-H011-REL
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These sources document an administrative hearing regarding a dispute between Samuel T. Paparazzo and the Coronado Ranch Community Association over alleged open meeting violations. The petitioner contended that the board hired a new management company without proper public discussion, member input, or a formal vote as required by Arizona law. In response, the board treasurer testified that the transition was discussed across multiple open sessions and that the final decision was made during a meeting where the petitioner himself provided verbal testimony. Evidence showed that while the official meeting minutes were occasionally incomplete, the board had made significant efforts to inform homeowners through Facebook and email. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the association provided sufficient opportunity for member participation before executing the new contract.
What was the final outcome of the HOA dispute hearing?
How did the treasurer defend the board’s decision-making process?
Explain the member’s specific complaints about the new contract.
Thursday, February 12
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Blog Post – 24F-H011-REL
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These sources document an administrative hearing regarding a dispute between Samuel T. Paparazzo and the Coronado Ranch Community Association over alleged open meeting violations. The petitioner contended that the board hired a new management company without proper public discussion, member input, or a formal vote as required by Arizona law. In response, the board treasurer testified that the transition was discussed across multiple open sessions and that the final decision was made during a meeting where the petitioner himself provided verbal testimony. Evidence showed that while the official meeting minutes were occasionally incomplete, the board had made significant efforts to inform homeowners through Facebook and email. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the association provided sufficient opportunity for member participation before executing the new contract.
What was the final outcome of the HOA dispute hearing?
How did the treasurer defend the board’s decision-making process?
Explain the member’s specific complaints about the new contract.
Thursday, February 12
Save to note
Today • 3:35 PM
Video Overview
Mind Map
Reports
Flashcards
Quiz
Infographic
Slide Deck
Data Table
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Samuel T. Paparazzo(petitioner) Also appeared as Samuel Gene Everzo; testified on his own behalf.
Respondent Side
Ashley Turner(HOA attorney) Goodman Law Group Counsel for Coronado Ranch Community Association.
Kimberly Jackson(board member/treasurer) Coronado Ranch Community Association Board Appeared as a witness; sometimes referred to as Jim Jackson.
Sheree(board member) Coronado Ranch Community Association Board Director who obtained RFPs.
Michelle(board member) Coronado Ranch Community Association Board Director who obtained RFPs.
Cathy / Cassie(board member/secretary) Coronado Ranch Community Association Board Board member who read documents aloud; secretary who inadvertently left information off minutes.
Neutral Parties
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Also identified as Sandra Vanella.
Susan Nicolson(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
A. Hansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of decision transmission.
V. Nunez(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of decision transmission.
D. Jones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of decision transmission.
L. Abril(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of decision transmission.
Other Participants
Erica Martinson(attorney) prison law
Tony Rosetti(lawist) Spelled R O SS KTI.
Miss Lee(potential witness) Did not testify.
Rob Bishop(community manager) Renaissance Community Partners Son of owner of previous management company; facilitated virtual mic for Petitioner.
Tamara Lens(community assistant) Renaissance Community Partners Sent official meeting notice email.
Linda Palmer(homeowner) Coronado Ranch Community Association member Commented at the meeting.
The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.
Why this result: Issues 2 and 3 were moot. Issues 1 and 4 failed on the merits because the evidence did not prove the HOA violated the cited statute or rule.
Key Issues & Findings
Board conducted interviews of candidates in closed executive session.
Petitioner alleged the Board improperly conducted interviews for Board vacancies in closed sessions. The Board admitted to the practice but asserted they did so to elicit personal, health, or financial information, which is a statutory exception to the open meeting law.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Discriminately penalized homeowners/members (Italian American Club).
Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully penalized and denied use of facilities to the Italian American Club (IAC). This issue was based on a specific one-year prohibition on facility use imposed after the IAC violated rules regarding moving furniture.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Article V, Section C of the CC&Rs
Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A
Refusal of homeowners' use of facilities without authorization by rule.
Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully denied the Italian American Club use of facilities following an incident where club members moved tables against HOA rules, resulting in a one-year ban on facility use.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
Article IV, Section C.23 of the CC&Rs
Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A
Refusal to place written requests for Board action on the agenda.
Petitioner argued that Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to include every single written request from members on the next upcoming Board meeting agenda, which the Board had failed to do.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Executive Session, Mootness, Facility Use Suspension, Agenda Setting
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws
Article 5, Section C of the CC&Rs
Article IV, Section C(23) of the CC&Rs
Article XII, Section B of the CC&Rs
Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
Ventana Lake Rules 8.3.B
Ventana Lake Rules 8.4.A
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:55 (157.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020046-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision: Alandar vs. Ventana Lakes POA
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, involving a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association (the “Respondent” or “Board”). The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged multiple violations of state statutes and the Association’s governing documents. The ALJ ultimately denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence for any of her claims.
The key takeaways from the decision are as follows:
• Board Candidate Interviews: The Board’s practice of interviewing candidates for board vacancies in closed executive sessions was deemed permissible. The ALJ found that these sessions were appropriately used to elicit personal, health, or financial information relevant to a candidate’s ability to serve, which is an exception to Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
• Sanctions Against a Club: The Petitioner’s challenge to a one-year ban on facility use imposed upon the Italian American Club (IAC) was dismissed as moot. Because the one-year penalty had expired before the hearing date, the ALJ concluded there was no active issue to rule on or remedy to order.
• Agenda Setting Authority: The ALJ determined that the Board president possesses broad, inherent authority in setting the agenda for Board meetings. The governing rules do not require the president to place every written request from an Association member onto the agenda for the next meeting.
• Burden of Proof: Across all issues, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to convince the judge that her contentions were “more probably true than not.” The decision repeatedly highlights the lack of evidence to support the claims of improper conduct.
Case Overview
On February 3, 2020, Petitioner Susan L. Alandar filed a petition alleging that the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association violated Arizona state law and several provisions of its own Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs), Bylaws, and Rules. After paying an additional filing fee, the Petitioner presented four distinct issues for the hearing held on June 11, 2020. The final decision was issued on July 23, 2020.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
20F-H2020046-REL
Petitioner
Susan L. Alandar
Respondent
Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Hearing Date
June 11, 2020
Decision Date
July 23, 2020
Final Disposition
Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Detailed Analysis of Allegations and Rulings
Issue 1: Board Candidate Interviews in Executive Session
• Allegation: The Petitioner contended that the Board of Directors violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs) by interviewing candidates for Board appointments in closed executive sessions.
• Factual Background: The Respondent acknowledged that prior to June 2019, its practice was to conduct interviews, discussions, and votes to fill Board vacancies entirely within executive session, announcing the result in an open meeting. After this practice was questioned, the Board changed its procedure. Since June 2019, the Board has conducted candidate interviews in executive session specifically to “elicit private information that may impact the candidate’s ability to perform the duties of a Board member.” An example provided was a candidate who revealed his wife’s dementia diagnosis, which would take priority over Board duties. Under this revised process, the final vote on candidates is cast in an open session, and candidates also participate in an open forum where members can ask questions.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the uncontroverted evidence showed the executive sessions were used for the purpose of discussing “personal, health, or financial information,” which is a specific exception allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1804. The decision states, “While Petitioner may believe the interviews were being conducted in executive session for nefarious purposes, no evidence was presented to establish such motives existed.” Consequently, the Petitioner failed to establish a violation.
Issues 2 & 3: Penalties and Facility Use Denial for the Italian American Club
• Allegation: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent wrongfully penalized the Italian American Club (IAC) and denied its members use of facilities, asserting that this action was discriminatory and not authorized by rule, in violation of CC&R’s Article V Section C and other community documents.
• Factual Background:
◦ In January 2018, the Board met with the IAC regarding non-compliance with rules and warned that failure to comply could result in the loss of privileges to use the Yacht Club.
◦ On April 4, 2019, an incident occurred where IAC members, after their last-minute request for more tables and chairs was denied, were observed on security cameras moving furniture from a storage area themselves. This was against Association rules, reportedly due to insurance policy limitations on volunteers moving tables.
◦ The situation escalated into a verbal altercation. Even after staff agreed to set up the requested tables, IAC members were again seen moving more furniture.
◦ On April 17, 2019, after reviewing video and audio recordings of the incident, the Board revoked the IAC’s right to use all Association facilities for a one-year period, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had expired on April 30, 2020, prior to the June 11, 2020 hearing. As no evidence was presented that the revocation was still in effect, the matter was declared moot. The decision notes that even if the judge had found the revocation improper, she could not order any action because the penalty was no longer active. The ALJ did not rule on the merits of whether the Board’s action was initially justified.
Issue 4: Refusal to Place Member Items on Board Meeting Agenda
• Allegation: The Petitioner claimed the Board violated Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b by refusing to place homeowners’ written requests for Board action on the agenda for upcoming Board meetings. The Petitioner’s position was that the rule required the Board president to place any such item on the agenda.
• Factual Background: Both parties agreed that the Board president had received written requests from members that were not subsequently included on a meeting agenda. The Petitioner herself acknowledged during the hearing that it would be impractical for the president to include every single request if, for example, hundreds were received for a single meeting.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that the “plain language” of the rule does not mandate that all requests must be placed on the agenda. The judge used the Petitioner’s own hypothetical concession to demonstrate that the Board president must have “inherent authority to limit the number of items to be included.” The ruling concluded that the president’s authority in setting the agenda is “broad” and that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the rule.
Key Referenced Authority
The decision was based on an interpretation of the following Arizona statutes and Ventana Lakes governing documents:
Document
Provision
Relevance to the Case
Arizona Revised Statutes
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Open Meetings: Allows meetings to be closed for specific reasons, including discussion of “Personal, health or financial information about an individual member.”
Article III, Section A
Easements of Enjoyment: Gives the Board the right to suspend any Resident from using Common Areas and to regulate their use through rules.
Article IV, Section C
Health, Safety and Welfare: Allows the Board to make rules restricting activities deemed a nuisance or to adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of residents.
Article V, Section C
Ventana Lakes Rules: Grants the Association power to adopt and repeal rules governing the use of Common Areas, provided they are not discriminatory or inconsistent.
Bylaws
Article IV.E.8
Board Powers: Grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and enforce rules covering the operation and use of all property.
Ventana Lakes Rules
Rule 8.3.B
Board President Duties: States the president shall prepare agendas and “ensure that written requests for Board action…are placed on the agenda.” (Interpreted by ALJ).
Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge concluded the hearing with a definitive ruling:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”
This order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020046-REL
Study Guide: Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. What were the initial steps Susan L. Alandar took to begin the HOA dispute process, and when did she file her petition?
2. What was the Ventana Lakes Board’s practice regarding interviewing candidates for Board vacancies both before and after June 2019?
3. What was the core of the dispute regarding the Italian American Club (IAC), and what specific action by the club led to the conflict on April 4, 2019?
4. What penalty did the Board of Directors impose on the Italian American Club, and for what duration?
5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss Issues 2 and 3 (concerning the IAC) as moot?
6. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding the Board President’s responsibility for setting the meeting agenda under Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b?
7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the Board President’s authority and discretion in setting the agenda?
8. Which party bears the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?
9. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, when is it permissible for a Board of Directors to hold a closed or executive session?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Answer Key
1. On or about February 3, 2020, Susan L. Alandar filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. She initially indicated two issues would be presented and paid a $1000.00 filing fee.
2. Prior to June 2019, the Board conducted candidate interviews, discussions, and votes in closed executive sessions. After June 2019, the Board conducted interviews in executive session to elicit private information but held the final vote in an open session.
3. The dispute centered on the IAC’s non-compliance with association rules. The conflict on April 4, 2019, was triggered when IAC members were observed on security cameras moving tables and chairs from a storage area against the instructions of the facilities manager.
4. In an executive session on April 17, 2019, the Board revoked the Italian American Club’s ability to use all of the association’s facilities. The penalty was for a period of one year, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.
5. The Judge dismissed these issues as moot because the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had already expired at the time of the hearing. Since the penalty was no longer in effect, the Judge could not order the Respondent to take any corrective action.
6. The Petitioner argued that Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to place any written request for Board action from an association member onto the agenda for the next meeting. She contended this was a mandatory duty, regardless of the nature or number of requests.
7. The Judge concluded that the rule’s plain language does not require every request to be placed on the agenda. Citing the impracticality of including hundreds of hypothetical requests, the Judge found that the Board President has broad, inherent authority to limit the items on the agenda.
8. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations. The required standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
9. A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows a portion of a meeting to be closed to consider specific matters, including personal, health, or financial information about an individual member or employee of the association. The Board used this exception to justify holding candidate interviews in executive session.
10. The final order issued on July 23, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Formulate comprehensive answers based on the facts and legal reasoning presented in the decision.
1. Analyze the Board of Directors’ evolving practice for interviewing candidates for board vacancies (Issue 1). Discuss how their pre- and post-June 2019 methods relate to the specific language and exceptions outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804.
2. Explain the legal concept of “mootness” as it was applied to the sanctions against the Italian American Club (Issues 2 and 3). Why was the Administrative Law Judge unable to rule on the propriety of the Board’s actions, and what does this imply about the timing of legal challenges in HOA disputes?
3. Compare and contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b with the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation (Issue 4). Discuss the Judge’s reasoning for concluding that the Board President has “inherent authority” to limit agenda items.
4. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Using examples from at least two of the four issues raised in the petition, explain how the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.
5. Based on the referenced community documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws), describe the scope of the Ventana Lakes Board of Directors’ power to regulate Common Areas, suspend resident privileges, and enforce rules. How do these documents grant authority that was relevant to the Board’s actions against the Italian American Club?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions based on the evidence and applicable law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Bylaws
A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws addresses the Board’s powers and duties.
Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in a planned community, governing property use and the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the HOA.
Common Areas
Property within a planned community owned by the HOA for the common use and enjoyment of all residents, such as the Yacht Club and recreational facilities mentioned in the case.
Executive Session
A closed portion of a meeting of a deliberative body, such as an HOA board, which is not open to the general membership. A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifies the limited circumstances under which such a session can be held.
HOA (Homeowners Association)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.
A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The ALJ declared the issues regarding the Italian American Club moot because the one-year penalty had already expired.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action or administrative proceeding. In this case, Susan L. Alandar.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner had the burden to meet this standard.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020046-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Susan L. Alandar, the Petitioner, and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging four violations of statute and community documents by the HOA, requiring her to pay additional filing fees to pursue all four issues. The judge systematically addressed each of the four allegations, which included improper closed-door interviews for board candidates, discriminatory penalizing and facility denial against an Italian American Club, and the refusal to place all member-requested items on the board agenda. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition, finding that she failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and further determined that the facilities denial issue was moot as the one-year prohibition had expired.
What were the specific allegations and outcomes across the four distinct issues presented?
How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret governing documents regarding Board authority and rules?
What legal standards and statutes primarily governed the resolution of this HOA dispute petition?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Susan L. Alandar(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf.
The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.
Why this result: Issues 2 and 3 were moot. Issues 1 and 4 failed on the merits because the evidence did not prove the HOA violated the cited statute or rule.
Key Issues & Findings
Board conducted interviews of candidates in closed executive session.
Petitioner alleged the Board improperly conducted interviews for Board vacancies in closed sessions. The Board admitted to the practice but asserted they did so to elicit personal, health, or financial information, which is a statutory exception to the open meeting law.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Discriminately penalized homeowners/members (Italian American Club).
Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully penalized and denied use of facilities to the Italian American Club (IAC). This issue was based on a specific one-year prohibition on facility use imposed after the IAC violated rules regarding moving furniture.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Article V, Section C of the CC&Rs
Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A
Refusal of homeowners' use of facilities without authorization by rule.
Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully denied the Italian American Club use of facilities following an incident where club members moved tables against HOA rules, resulting in a one-year ban on facility use.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
Article IV, Section C.23 of the CC&Rs
Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A
Refusal to place written requests for Board action on the agenda.
Petitioner argued that Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to include every single written request from members on the next upcoming Board meeting agenda, which the Board had failed to do.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Executive Session, Mootness, Facility Use Suspension, Agenda Setting
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws
Article 5, Section C of the CC&Rs
Article IV, Section C(23) of the CC&Rs
Article XII, Section B of the CC&Rs
Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
Ventana Lake Rules 8.3.B
Ventana Lake Rules 8.4.A
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:59 (157.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020046-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision: Alandar vs. Ventana Lakes POA
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, involving a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association (the “Respondent” or “Board”). The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged multiple violations of state statutes and the Association’s governing documents. The ALJ ultimately denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence for any of her claims.
The key takeaways from the decision are as follows:
• Board Candidate Interviews: The Board’s practice of interviewing candidates for board vacancies in closed executive sessions was deemed permissible. The ALJ found that these sessions were appropriately used to elicit personal, health, or financial information relevant to a candidate’s ability to serve, which is an exception to Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
• Sanctions Against a Club: The Petitioner’s challenge to a one-year ban on facility use imposed upon the Italian American Club (IAC) was dismissed as moot. Because the one-year penalty had expired before the hearing date, the ALJ concluded there was no active issue to rule on or remedy to order.
• Agenda Setting Authority: The ALJ determined that the Board president possesses broad, inherent authority in setting the agenda for Board meetings. The governing rules do not require the president to place every written request from an Association member onto the agenda for the next meeting.
• Burden of Proof: Across all issues, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to convince the judge that her contentions were “more probably true than not.” The decision repeatedly highlights the lack of evidence to support the claims of improper conduct.
Case Overview
On February 3, 2020, Petitioner Susan L. Alandar filed a petition alleging that the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association violated Arizona state law and several provisions of its own Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs), Bylaws, and Rules. After paying an additional filing fee, the Petitioner presented four distinct issues for the hearing held on June 11, 2020. The final decision was issued on July 23, 2020.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
20F-H2020046-REL
Petitioner
Susan L. Alandar
Respondent
Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Hearing Date
June 11, 2020
Decision Date
July 23, 2020
Final Disposition
Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Detailed Analysis of Allegations and Rulings
Issue 1: Board Candidate Interviews in Executive Session
• Allegation: The Petitioner contended that the Board of Directors violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs) by interviewing candidates for Board appointments in closed executive sessions.
• Factual Background: The Respondent acknowledged that prior to June 2019, its practice was to conduct interviews, discussions, and votes to fill Board vacancies entirely within executive session, announcing the result in an open meeting. After this practice was questioned, the Board changed its procedure. Since June 2019, the Board has conducted candidate interviews in executive session specifically to “elicit private information that may impact the candidate’s ability to perform the duties of a Board member.” An example provided was a candidate who revealed his wife’s dementia diagnosis, which would take priority over Board duties. Under this revised process, the final vote on candidates is cast in an open session, and candidates also participate in an open forum where members can ask questions.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the uncontroverted evidence showed the executive sessions were used for the purpose of discussing “personal, health, or financial information,” which is a specific exception allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1804. The decision states, “While Petitioner may believe the interviews were being conducted in executive session for nefarious purposes, no evidence was presented to establish such motives existed.” Consequently, the Petitioner failed to establish a violation.
Issues 2 & 3: Penalties and Facility Use Denial for the Italian American Club
• Allegation: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent wrongfully penalized the Italian American Club (IAC) and denied its members use of facilities, asserting that this action was discriminatory and not authorized by rule, in violation of CC&R’s Article V Section C and other community documents.
• Factual Background:
◦ In January 2018, the Board met with the IAC regarding non-compliance with rules and warned that failure to comply could result in the loss of privileges to use the Yacht Club.
◦ On April 4, 2019, an incident occurred where IAC members, after their last-minute request for more tables and chairs was denied, were observed on security cameras moving furniture from a storage area themselves. This was against Association rules, reportedly due to insurance policy limitations on volunteers moving tables.
◦ The situation escalated into a verbal altercation. Even after staff agreed to set up the requested tables, IAC members were again seen moving more furniture.
◦ On April 17, 2019, after reviewing video and audio recordings of the incident, the Board revoked the IAC’s right to use all Association facilities for a one-year period, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had expired on April 30, 2020, prior to the June 11, 2020 hearing. As no evidence was presented that the revocation was still in effect, the matter was declared moot. The decision notes that even if the judge had found the revocation improper, she could not order any action because the penalty was no longer active. The ALJ did not rule on the merits of whether the Board’s action was initially justified.
Issue 4: Refusal to Place Member Items on Board Meeting Agenda
• Allegation: The Petitioner claimed the Board violated Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b by refusing to place homeowners’ written requests for Board action on the agenda for upcoming Board meetings. The Petitioner’s position was that the rule required the Board president to place any such item on the agenda.
• Factual Background: Both parties agreed that the Board president had received written requests from members that were not subsequently included on a meeting agenda. The Petitioner herself acknowledged during the hearing that it would be impractical for the president to include every single request if, for example, hundreds were received for a single meeting.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that the “plain language” of the rule does not mandate that all requests must be placed on the agenda. The judge used the Petitioner’s own hypothetical concession to demonstrate that the Board president must have “inherent authority to limit the number of items to be included.” The ruling concluded that the president’s authority in setting the agenda is “broad” and that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the rule.
Key Referenced Authority
The decision was based on an interpretation of the following Arizona statutes and Ventana Lakes governing documents:
Document
Provision
Relevance to the Case
Arizona Revised Statutes
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Open Meetings: Allows meetings to be closed for specific reasons, including discussion of “Personal, health or financial information about an individual member.”
Article III, Section A
Easements of Enjoyment: Gives the Board the right to suspend any Resident from using Common Areas and to regulate their use through rules.
Article IV, Section C
Health, Safety and Welfare: Allows the Board to make rules restricting activities deemed a nuisance or to adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of residents.
Article V, Section C
Ventana Lakes Rules: Grants the Association power to adopt and repeal rules governing the use of Common Areas, provided they are not discriminatory or inconsistent.
Bylaws
Article IV.E.8
Board Powers: Grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and enforce rules covering the operation and use of all property.
Ventana Lakes Rules
Rule 8.3.B
Board President Duties: States the president shall prepare agendas and “ensure that written requests for Board action…are placed on the agenda.” (Interpreted by ALJ).
Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge concluded the hearing with a definitive ruling:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”
This order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020046-REL
Study Guide: Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. What were the initial steps Susan L. Alandar took to begin the HOA dispute process, and when did she file her petition?
2. What was the Ventana Lakes Board’s practice regarding interviewing candidates for Board vacancies both before and after June 2019?
3. What was the core of the dispute regarding the Italian American Club (IAC), and what specific action by the club led to the conflict on April 4, 2019?
4. What penalty did the Board of Directors impose on the Italian American Club, and for what duration?
5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss Issues 2 and 3 (concerning the IAC) as moot?
6. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding the Board President’s responsibility for setting the meeting agenda under Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b?
7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the Board President’s authority and discretion in setting the agenda?
8. Which party bears the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?
9. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, when is it permissible for a Board of Directors to hold a closed or executive session?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Answer Key
1. On or about February 3, 2020, Susan L. Alandar filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. She initially indicated two issues would be presented and paid a $1000.00 filing fee.
2. Prior to June 2019, the Board conducted candidate interviews, discussions, and votes in closed executive sessions. After June 2019, the Board conducted interviews in executive session to elicit private information but held the final vote in an open session.
3. The dispute centered on the IAC’s non-compliance with association rules. The conflict on April 4, 2019, was triggered when IAC members were observed on security cameras moving tables and chairs from a storage area against the instructions of the facilities manager.
4. In an executive session on April 17, 2019, the Board revoked the Italian American Club’s ability to use all of the association’s facilities. The penalty was for a period of one year, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.
5. The Judge dismissed these issues as moot because the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had already expired at the time of the hearing. Since the penalty was no longer in effect, the Judge could not order the Respondent to take any corrective action.
6. The Petitioner argued that Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to place any written request for Board action from an association member onto the agenda for the next meeting. She contended this was a mandatory duty, regardless of the nature or number of requests.
7. The Judge concluded that the rule’s plain language does not require every request to be placed on the agenda. Citing the impracticality of including hundreds of hypothetical requests, the Judge found that the Board President has broad, inherent authority to limit the items on the agenda.
8. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations. The required standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
9. A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows a portion of a meeting to be closed to consider specific matters, including personal, health, or financial information about an individual member or employee of the association. The Board used this exception to justify holding candidate interviews in executive session.
10. The final order issued on July 23, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Formulate comprehensive answers based on the facts and legal reasoning presented in the decision.
1. Analyze the Board of Directors’ evolving practice for interviewing candidates for board vacancies (Issue 1). Discuss how their pre- and post-June 2019 methods relate to the specific language and exceptions outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804.
2. Explain the legal concept of “mootness” as it was applied to the sanctions against the Italian American Club (Issues 2 and 3). Why was the Administrative Law Judge unable to rule on the propriety of the Board’s actions, and what does this imply about the timing of legal challenges in HOA disputes?
3. Compare and contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b with the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation (Issue 4). Discuss the Judge’s reasoning for concluding that the Board President has “inherent authority” to limit agenda items.
4. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Using examples from at least two of the four issues raised in the petition, explain how the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.
5. Based on the referenced community documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws), describe the scope of the Ventana Lakes Board of Directors’ power to regulate Common Areas, suspend resident privileges, and enforce rules. How do these documents grant authority that was relevant to the Board’s actions against the Italian American Club?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions based on the evidence and applicable law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Bylaws
A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws addresses the Board’s powers and duties.
Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in a planned community, governing property use and the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the HOA.
Common Areas
Property within a planned community owned by the HOA for the common use and enjoyment of all residents, such as the Yacht Club and recreational facilities mentioned in the case.
Executive Session
A closed portion of a meeting of a deliberative body, such as an HOA board, which is not open to the general membership. A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifies the limited circumstances under which such a session can be held.
HOA (Homeowners Association)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.
A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The ALJ declared the issues regarding the Italian American Club moot because the one-year penalty had already expired.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action or administrative proceeding. In this case, Susan L. Alandar.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner had the burden to meet this standard.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020046-REL
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20F-H2020046-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Susan L. Alandar, the Petitioner, and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging four violations of statute and community documents by the HOA, requiring her to pay additional filing fees to pursue all four issues. The judge systematically addressed each of the four allegations, which included improper closed-door interviews for board candidates, discriminatory penalizing and facility denial against an Italian American Club, and the refusal to place all member-requested items on the board agenda. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition, finding that she failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and further determined that the facilities denial issue was moot as the one-year prohibition had expired.
What were the specific allegations and outcomes across the four distinct issues presented?
How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret governing documents regarding Board authority and rules?
What legal standards and statutes primarily governed the resolution of this HOA dispute petition?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Susan L. Alandar(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.
Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:01 (89.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL
Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.
The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Case Overview
Case Number
19F-H1919047-REL
Petitioner
Victor L. Pattarozzi
Respondent
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
May 16, 2019
Decision Date
June 5, 2019
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).
Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”
The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.
“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”
The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.
Competing Arguments
• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):
◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.
◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:
▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.
▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.
◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.
• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):
◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.
Findings of Fact
The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.
• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.
• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.
• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.
• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.
Legal Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.
Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”
The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.
The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.
The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.
Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument
The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”
The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Final Order
Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.
Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.
Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL
Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?
3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?
4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.
5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?
6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?
7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?
8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?
9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?
10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.
2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.
3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.
4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.
5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.
6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.
7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.
8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.
9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.
2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.
4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?
5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.
Architectural Review Committee (ARC)
A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.
Dismissed
The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.
Statutory Interpretation
The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL
Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.
The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Case Overview
Case Number
19F-H1919047-REL
Petitioner
Victor L. Pattarozzi
Respondent
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
May 16, 2019
Decision Date
June 5, 2019
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).
Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”
The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.
“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”
The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.
Competing Arguments
• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):
◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.
◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:
▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.
▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.
◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.
• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):
◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.
Findings of Fact
The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.
• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.
• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.
• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.
• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.
Legal Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.
Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”
The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.
The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.
The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.
Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument
The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”
The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Final Order
Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.
Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.
Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Victor L Pattarozzi(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Andrew Apodaca(attorney) Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C. Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Stuart Glenn(board member) Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Board president who presented testimony for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmittal
Felicia Del Sol(Administrative Staff) Listed in the final section of the document
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.
Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:08 (89.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL
Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.
The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Case Overview
Case Number
19F-H1919047-REL
Petitioner
Victor L. Pattarozzi
Respondent
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
May 16, 2019
Decision Date
June 5, 2019
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).
Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”
The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.
“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”
The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.
Competing Arguments
• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):
◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.
◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:
▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.
▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.
◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.
• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):
◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.
Findings of Fact
The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.
• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.
• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.
• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.
• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.
Legal Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.
Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”
The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.
The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.
The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.
Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument
The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”
The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Final Order
Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.
Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.
Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL
Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?
3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?
4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.
5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?
6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?
7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?
8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?
9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?
10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.
2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.
3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.
4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.
5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.
6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.
7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.
8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.
9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.
2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.
4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?
5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.
Architectural Review Committee (ARC)
A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.
Dismissed
The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.
Statutory Interpretation
The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL
Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.
The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Case Overview
Case Number
19F-H1919047-REL
Petitioner
Victor L. Pattarozzi
Respondent
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
May 16, 2019
Decision Date
June 5, 2019
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).
Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”
The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.
“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”
The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.
Competing Arguments
• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):
◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.
◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:
▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.
▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.
◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.
• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):
◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.
Findings of Fact
The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.
• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.
• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.
• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.
• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.
Legal Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.
Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”
The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.
The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.
The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.
Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument
The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”
The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Final Order
Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.
Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.
Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Victor L Pattarozzi(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Andrew Apodaca(attorney) Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C. Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Stuart Glenn(board member) Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Board president who presented testimony for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmittal
Felicia Del Sol(Administrative Staff) Listed in the final section of the document
