The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner Richard J. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof to show the Association violated its Design Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement.
Why this result: Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement. Evidence indicated that the Petitioner was in violation of the existing Guidelines by failing to obtain prior approval for his driveway extension and failing to meet the required setback.
Key Issues & Findings
Petitioner alleged the Association violated Design Guidelines regarding setback requirements for driveway extensions and engaged in selective enforcement.
Petitioner filed a single issue petition asserting that Design Guidelines did not require a twelve-inch setback for driveway extensions from the property line and that the Association was selectively enforcing its rules. The Petitioner had installed a concrete driveway extension without obtaining prior ARC approval, and approval was denied due to the lack of the twelve-inch setback.
Orders: Richard J. Jones’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 173, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 173, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924982.pdf
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21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924983.pdf
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Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121038-REL
Briefing Document: Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge in the case of Richard J. Jones versus the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association (Case No. 21F-H2121038-REL). The dispute centered on a concrete driveway extension installed by Mr. Jones without the prior approval of the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC). Mr. Jones contested the Association’s denial of his post-installation application, alleging that the Design Guidelines were misinterpreted and selectively enforced.
The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed Mr. Jones’s petition. The decision rested on three key determinations:
1. Clear Violation: Mr. Jones was in direct violation of the Design Guidelines by failing to obtain prior approval for the modification and by not adhering to a mandatory 12-inch setback from the common block wall, a fact he acknowledged.
2. Reasonable Interpretation: The Association’s interpretation that the 12-inch setback requirement applied to the entire property line—not just the block wall—was deemed “not unreasonable,” particularly since the common wall is part of the property line.
3. Failure to Prove Selective Enforcement: Mr. Jones did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to prove his claim of selective enforcement. The Association provided credible evidence demonstrating consistent application of the setback rule to other homeowners.
The final order upholds the Association’s enforcement actions and dismisses the petitioner’s claims.
Case Overview
Parties and Jurisdictional Details
Name / Entity
Representation
Petitioner
Richard J. Jones
On his own behalf
Respondent
Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association
Troy Stratman, Esq.
Adjudicator
Thomas Shedden
Administrative Law Judge
Case No.
21F-H2121038-REL
Hearing Date
November 2, 2021
Decision Date
November 15, 2021
Core Dispute
The central conflict arose from a concrete driveway extension installed by Richard J. Jones on his property on May 11, 2020. The installation was performed without submitting a request for prior approval to the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC), a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. Following the installation, the ARC denied Mr. Jones’s retroactive application, citing its failure to meet a required 12-inch setback from the property line. This led to a notice of non-compliance and a fine, prompting Mr. Jones to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Chronology of Events
• April 2020: Mr. Jones contacted AAM, LLC, the Association’s property management company, to inquire about adding concrete strips. He was informed this was not allowed but that an employee could assist with an approval process for a paver driveway extension.
• May 11, 2020: Having not received further guidance from the management company, Mr. Jones proceeded to have the concrete driveway extension installed.
• Post-May 11, 2020: Mr. Jones submitted an application to the ARC for retroactive approval of the already-installed extension.
• December 2, 2020: The ARC formally denied Mr. Jones’s application. The denial letter stated the extension did not meet the 12-inch setback requirement and advised him to reapply after cutting the driveway back from the property line.
• January 12, 2021: The Association issued a Second Notice of Non-compliance/Fine.
• February 12, 2021: Mr. Jones filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association was misinterpreting and selectively enforcing its Design Guidelines.
• November 2, 2021: The administrative hearing was conducted.
• November 15, 2021: The Administrative Law Judge issued a decision dismissing Mr. Jones’s petition.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Richard J. Jones)
Mr. Jones’s case was built on two primary arguments:
• Interpretation of Design Guidelines: He contended that the Guidelines in effect at the time of installation required a 12-inch setback from the “common wall” but were silent regarding the “property line.” He argued that since the Guidelines explicitly mandated a property line setback for sidewalks, the absence of such language for driveway extensions meant the requirement did not apply.
• Allegation of Selective Enforcement: He asserted that the Association was applying its Guidelines and Rules inconsistently among homeowners.
During testimony, Mr. Jones acknowledged that his driveway extension did not comply with the 12-inch setback from the common wall and expressed a willingness to correct that specific deficiency. He also testified that his neighbors did not object to the extension as installed.
Respondent’s Position (Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association)
The Association, represented by counsel, presented a multi-faceted defense:
• Procedural Failure: A core issue was Mr. Jones’s failure to obtain prior approval from the ARC before installation, as mandated by Section 4.1.1 of the CC&Rs.
• Violation of Setback Rule: The Association maintained that the extension violated the required 12-inch setback. The property manager, Paul Favale, testified that this rule is intended to ensure water does not drain onto a neighbor’s property.
• Evidence of Consistent Enforcement: To counter the claim of selective enforcement, the Association submitted an “Architectural Status Report” for the period of August 27, 2020, through April 21, 2021. This report demonstrated that other homeowners’ requests for driveway extensions had also been denied for failing to meet the 12-inch property line setback.
It was also noted that the Design Guidelines have since been modified to explicitly require a 12-inch setback from both the common wall and the property line.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions
The Judge’s decision was based on a thorough analysis of the evidence presented and the applicable legal standards.
Key Findings of Fact
• Mr. Jones installed the driveway extension on May 11, 2020, without prior approval from the ARC.
• The extension does not have a 12-inch setback from the common block wall, which is part of the property line.
• The Design Guidelines at the time explicitly required a 12-inch setback from the block wall.
• Mr. Jones acknowledged his non-compliance with the block wall setback requirement.
Conclusions of Law
The Judge concluded that Mr. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof, which required demonstrating a violation by the Association by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
1. Petitioner’s Violation: Mr. Jones was found to be in violation of the Guidelines. His acknowledgment that the driveway did not comply with the 12-inch setback from the common wall was a critical factor.
2. Reasonableness of Association’s Interpretation: The Judge determined that the Association’s interpretation of the Guidelines—requiring a 12-inch setback along the entire property line—was “not unreasonable.” This conclusion was supported by two points: the common wall is physically part of the property line, and Mr. Jones had failed to follow the required prior approval process, where such ambiguities would have been clarified.
3. No Evidence of Selective Enforcement: The Association presented “credible evidence” via its Architectural Status Report showing that other members were subject to the same rule. Consequently, Mr. Jones “did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was selectively enforcing the Guidelines.”
Final Order and Implications
• Order: The Judge ordered that Richard J. Jones’s petition be dismissed.
• Legal Standing: The decision is binding on both parties.
• Appeal Process: The order can only be challenged through a request for rehearing, which must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (November 15, 2021).
Study Guide – 21F-H2121038-REL
Study Guide: Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 21F-H2121038-REL, involving Petitioner Richard J. Jones and Respondent Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final judgment.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their roles?
2. What specific modification did Richard J. Jones make to his property, and on what date did he complete it?
3. What critical step did Mr. Jones fail to take before installing the modification, as required by Section 4.1.1 of the CC&Rs?
4. According to the Design Guidelines in effect at the time of installation, what was the specific rule regarding the placement of driveway extensions that Mr. Jones’s project violated?
5. What was Mr. Jones’s main argument regarding the ambiguity of the Design Guidelines concerning the twelve-inch setback requirement?
6. What justification did the Association’s property manager, Paul Favale, provide for the setback requirement?
7. What were the two primary claims Mr. Jones made against the Association in his petition filed on February 12, 2021?
8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party carried the burden of meeting that standard?
9. How did the Association counter Mr. Jones’s claim that it was selectively enforcing its rules?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Richard J. Jones, a homeowner who appeared on his own behalf, and the Respondent, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association, which was represented by its counsel, Troy Stratman, Esq.
2. On May 11, 2020, Mr. Jones added a concrete driveway running from the street to a side gate on his property. This modification is referred to in the documents as a “driveway extension.”
3. Mr. Jones did not submit a request for prior approval to the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) before installing his driveway extension. This pre-approval is required for such modifications under the Association’s CC&Rs.
4. The driveway extension violated the rule requiring a twelve-inch setback from the common block wall. Mr. Jones acknowledged that his driveway did not comply with this specific requirement of the Design Guidelines.
5. Mr. Jones argued that since the Design Guidelines explicitly required a twelve-inch setback from the property line for sidewalks but did not explicitly state the same for driveway extensions, the requirement did not apply to his project along the full property line.
6. Mr. Favale testified that the purpose of the setback requirement is functional. It is designed to help ensure that water does not drain from one property onto a neighboring property.
7. Mr. Jones’s petition asserted that the Design Guidelines for driveway extensions did not require a setback from the property line (only the common wall). He also claimed that the Association was selectively enforcing its Guidelines and Rules against him.
8. The standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence. The Petitioner, Mr. Jones, bore the burden of proof to show that the Association had violated its own guidelines.
9. The Association submitted an Architectural Status Report covering August 27, 2020, to April 21, 2021. This report provided credible evidence that other Association members had also been denied requests for driveway extensions due to a failure to meet the twelve-inch setback requirement.
10. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ordered that Richard J. Jones’s petition be dismissed. The judge concluded that Mr. Jones had not met his burden of proof to show the Association had violated its guidelines or enforced them selectively.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.
1. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as they were applied in this case. Explain specifically how Mr. Jones failed to meet this burden for both of his primary claims.
2. Analyze the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to determine that the Association’s interpretation of its Design Guidelines was “not unreasonable.” Consider the judge’s reference to the common wall being part of the property line and Mr. Jones’s failure to obtain prior approval.
3. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Jones’s initial inquiry to AAM, LLC in April 2020 to the final order in November 2021. Discuss how Mr. Jones’s decision to proceed with construction without explicit approval ultimately weakened his legal position.
4. Evaluate the claim of “selective enforcement.” What kind of evidence would Mr. Jones have needed to present to successfully prove this claim, and why was the Association’s Architectural Status Report considered more compelling evidence by the court?
5. The “Conclusions of Law” section states that the Design Guidelines are part of a contract between the parties. Using the facts of this case, explain the legal and practical implications of this principle for a homeowner living within a master association.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
AAM, LLC
The property management company for the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The judge who presides over administrative hearings and renders decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.
Architectural Review Committee (ARC)
The committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and granting prior approval for modifications to properties, such as driveway extensions.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on the petitioner, Mr. Jones.
An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community or homeowners’ association.
Design Guidelines
A set of rules that are part of the contract between homeowners and the association, detailing requirements for property modifications.
Driveway Extension
As defined by the parties, a concrete driveway running from the street to a gate at the side of a house.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Richard J. Jones.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as evidence that has “the most convincing force” and is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association.
Selective Enforcement
The legal claim that an association is not applying its rules and guidelines uniformly, instead penalizing some members while allowing others to violate the same rules.
Setback
A required distance that a structure must be located away from a property line or other feature, such as a common wall. In this case, the requirement was for a twelve-inch setback.
Blog Post – 21F-H2121038-REL
He Fought the HOA Over 12 Inches of Concrete—and Lost. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons from His Case.
Navigating the rules of a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like walking through a minefield of regulations, where a small misstep can lead to notices, fines, and protracted disputes. For one homeowner, Richard J. Jones, a conflict with his HOA, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association, over a new driveway extension escalated all the way to a formal hearing. The official legal decision in his case reveals several counter-intuitive truths about how these disputes are won and lost, offering valuable lessons for any homeowner living under HOA governance.
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1. “Asking for Forgiveness” is a Losing Strategy.
The first major takeaway is that violating rules first and hoping for retroactive approval is an approach doomed to fail, even when the situation feels complex. The story here is more nuanced than simple defiance. In April 2020, before any work began, Mr. Jones contacted the HOA’s management company about his plans. After being told his initial idea for “two concrete strips” was not allowed, he was directed to another employee for help with an application for a different design. According to the case file, Mr. Jones “did not hear back from her and he had the driveway extension installed” on May 11, 2020.
While his frustration is relatable, this impatient miscalculation was his crucial error. Section 4.1.1 of the community’s CC&Rs requires prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). By proceeding without securing this written approval, Mr. Jones was in immediate violation. His subsequent application, submitted only after the work was done, was predictably denied on December 2, 2020. The lesson is stark: a breakdown in communication does not absolve a homeowner of their responsibility to follow procedure. The moment unapproved work begins, you are in breach of the community’s governing documents, and the merits of the project become secondary to the procedural failure.
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2. You Have to Prove the HOA is Wrong—Not the Other Way Around.
Many homeowners assume that in a dispute, the burden is on the HOA to prove the homeowner is wrong. The legal reality is the exact opposite. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision formally stated in Conclusion of Law #2 that Mr. Jones, as the petitioner who brought the case, bore the “burden of proof.”
To win, he had to demonstrate that the Association committed a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision cites the formal definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, which essentially means the evidence presented must be convincing enough to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. The reality for homeowners is surprising and crucial: in a formal dispute, the legal scales are not neutral. You must actively build a case and convincingly prove the HOA has violated its own rules. Mr. Jones failed to meet this standard.
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3. A Small Loophole Isn’t Enough to Win.
Mr. Jones’s central argument rested on a perceived loophole in the governing documents. He claimed the Design Guidelines required a 12-inch setback from the “common wall” but were silent about the “property line” as a whole, and therefore the rule didn’t apply to the entirety of his project. This highlights a key aspect of HOA governance: the purpose behind a rule matters. The property manager testified that the setback requirement exists to “ensure that water does not drain to the neighbor’s property,” transforming the rule from an arbitrary measurement into a practical and defensible standard.
Ultimately, the judge was unpersuaded by the loophole argument, and the reason is a masterclass in how these cases are decided. The judge’s decision, articulated in Conclusion of Law #7, pointed out that the common wall is fundamentally part of the property line. More importantly, the decision explicitly connected this conclusion to Mr. Jones’s prior actions: “…considering that Mr. Jones did not obtain prior approval from ARC before constructing his driveway extension, the Association’s interpretation…is not unreasonable.” This is the crucial insight: his procedural failure (Lesson #1) directly weakened his ability to argue about ambiguous wording. An HOA’s reasonable interpretation of its own rules is far more likely to be upheld when the homeowner has already disregarded clear procedural mandates. Tellingly, the Association later modified the guidelines to explicitly close this perceived loophole.
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4. Proving “Selective Enforcement” is Harder Than You Think.
A common defense from homeowners is that the HOA is engaging in “selective enforcement”—singling them out while letting others get away with similar violations. Mr. Jones made this exact claim, but the Association came prepared with meticulous documentation to defeat it.
As detailed in Finding of Fact #21, the HOA presented an “Architectural Status Report” covering August 27, 2020 through April 21, 2021. This document provided time-stamped evidence that other homeowners’ requests for similar driveway extensions had also been consistently denied for failing to meet the same 12-inch setback requirement. This report systematically dismantled the selective enforcement argument. For homeowners, this underscores a critical point: the feeling of being singled out is not evidence. To win a selective enforcement claim, you must provide clear proof that other members in the exact same situation were treated differently, a high bar that an HOA with good records can easily overcome.
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Conclusion: A Contract is a Contract
The overarching theme from this case is that HOA governing documents are not merely suggestions; they are legally binding. As stated in Conclusion of Law #5, the Design Guidelines are part of a contract between the homeowner and the association. While HOA rules can often feel arbitrary or frustrating, they carry the weight of a contract. The path to successfully challenging them is narrow and requires a clear, well-documented case that proves the HOA, not the homeowner, has breached its duties.
This case serves as a powerful reminder for all community members. How well do you really know the contract you’re living under?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Richard J Jones(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Troy Stratman(attorney) Stratman Law Firm, PLC Counsel for Respondent
Paul Favale(property manager) Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association Testified for Respondent
Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.
Key Issues & Findings
View Obstruction by Pergola Approval
Petitioners alleged that Respondent, by granting approval in February 2018 for the construction of a pergola on lot 47, violated the CC&Rs requirement that an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains be maintained for owners of View Lots (Lot 46) and sought a civil penalty.
Orders: Respondent acknowledged the violation, rescinded the pergola approval prior to the Notice of Hearing, and was ordered to pay Petitioners the $500.00 filing fee. A civil penalty was sought but denied.
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (No. 21F-H2120005-REL). The central conflict involved an allegation by Petitioners that the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving a pergola on an adjacent property that obstructed their mountain view.
The Respondent initially defended its approval but, after the Petitioners filed a formal complaint, reversed its position, admitted the approval was an error, and rescinded it. Despite this corrective action, the hearing proceeded. The ALJ’s final decision declared the Petitioners the “prevailing party,” as their legal action prompted the resolution. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioners’ $500 filing fee. However, the ALJ denied the Petitioners’ request for an additional civil penalty, stating they had not met the burden of proof for such an assessment. The decision effectively resolved the core dispute in the Petitioners’ favor while limiting the financial penalty on the Respondent.
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Case Overview
This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute over view obstruction within a planned community.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges, Petitioner, vs. San Ignacio Heights, Inc., Respondent.
Case Number
21F-H2120005-REL
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Hearing Date
November 3, 2020
Decision Date
November 20, 2020
Core Allegation
Respondent violated its own CC&Rs, specifically Article VI (D) “View Obstructions,” which mandates that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”
Petitioners’ Property
Lot 46, located at 1546 West Acala Street in Green Valley, a designated “view lot.”
Disputed Structure
A pergola constructed on the neighboring Lot 47.
The hearing was conducted without testimony, with the decision based on the administrative record and closing arguments from both parties.
Chronology of Key Events
The dispute unfolded over a period of more than two years, marked by the Respondent’s significant change in position after formal legal action was initiated.
• February 2018: The Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) grants approval to the owners of Lot 47 to construct a pergola.
• On or Before July 30, 2018: Petitioners purchase Lot 46. They contend the pergola was built after the previous owners of their lot had moved but before their purchase was finalized.
• December 2019: Petitioners attempt to resolve the issue directly with the owners of Lot 47 but are unsuccessful.
• January 15, 2020: In a letter, the Respondent’s Board informs the Petitioners that it is standing by its February 2018 decision to approve the pergola.
• July 24, 2020: Petitioners file a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• August 20, 2020: The Respondent’s Board holds a special executive session and determines that the approval of the pergola was “made in error.” The Board rescinds the approval.
• August 25, 2020: The Respondent files its answer to the petition, stating the approval has been rescinded and requesting the Department dismiss the matter.
• October 5, 2020: The Department does not dismiss the matter and issues a Notice of Hearing.
• November 3, 2020: At the hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informs the tribunal that a contractor is scheduled to remove the pergola on the following day.
Central Arguments and Positions
Petitioners (Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges)
• Violation: The pergola on Lot 47 constitutes a view obstruction in direct violation of CC&R Article VI(D).
• Relief Sought: The Petitioners initially sought the removal of the structure. After the Respondent rescinded its approval, the Petitioners argued that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty for the violation.
Respondent (San Ignacio Heights, Inc.)
• Initial Defense (Pre-Litigation): The Respondent offered two primary reasons for upholding its initial approval:
1. The previous owners of the Petitioners’ lot (Lot 46) were given notice of the pergola request and did not object at the time of its approval in February 2018.
2. The configuration of the nine lots on West Acala Street makes a “truly unobstructed view” impossible, and for the Petitioners, achieving such a view would require removing eight other houses.
• Post-Petition Position: After the formal petition was filed, the Respondent’s position shifted entirely.
1. Admission of Error: The Respondent formally acknowledged that the approval of the pergola was a mistake and rescinded it.
2. Mootness: The Respondent argued that because it had provided the relief the Petitioners requested (rescission of approval), the matter was resolved and should be dismissed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s decision addressed the acknowledged violation, the status of the parties, and the appropriateness of financial penalties.
Findings on the Violation
• The Respondent explicitly acknowledged its violation of CC&R Article VI(D) by granting approval for the pergola.
• Because the Respondent had already rescinded its approval and the structure was scheduled for removal, the ALJ determined that an order compelling the Respondent to abide by the CC&Rs was unnecessary.
Prevailing Party Status
• Despite the Respondent’s admission of error and corrective actions occurring before the formal hearing, the ALJ designated the Petitioners as the prevailing party.
• The rationale is that the Petitioners’ legal action was the catalyst for the Respondent’s decision to rescind its approval and resolve the violation.
Financial Orders and Penalties
• Filing Fee: Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the ALJ is required to order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee if the petitioner prevails. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioners’ $500.00 filing fee.
• Civil Penalty: The Petitioners argued for the assessment of a civil penalty against the Respondent. The ALJ denied this request, stating in the Conclusions of Law that “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.” The decision does not provide further detail on the reasoning for this conclusion.
Legal Framework
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate has authority over the matter under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, as the case involves alleged violations of community documents.
• Standard of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proof, which is a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119.
Final Order
The decision, issued on November 20, 2020, concluded with the following binding orders:
1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges are the prevailing party in this matter.
2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent San Ignacio Heights Inc. must pay to Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of receipt of the Order.
The order is final unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120005-REL
Study Guide: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2120005-REL)
This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges (Petitioners) and San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms.
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Short Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?
2. What specific rule from the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?
3. What physical structure caused the dispute, and where was it located relative to the Petitioners’ property?
4. What two arguments did the Respondent initially use to defend its decision to approve the structure?
5. At what point did the Respondent’s Board change its position, and what action did it take?
6. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party had the burden of meeting it?
7. Despite the Respondent admitting its error before the hearing, why were the Petitioners declared the “prevailing party”?
8. What specific financial penalty was ordered against the Respondent in the final decision?
9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decide not to levy a civil penalty against the Respondent?
10. What did the Respondent’s counsel state at the hearing regarding the future of the structure in question?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges, and the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc. The Petitioners filed a complaint against the homeowners’ association for allegedly violating community rules.
2. The dispute centered on Article VI (D) of the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” titled “View Obstructions.” This rule states that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”
3. The dispute was caused by a pergola that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approved for construction on lot 47. This lot was adjacent to the Petitioners’ property, lot 46, which is designated as a “view lot” under the CC&Rs.
4. The Respondent initially argued that the approval was valid because (1) the previous owners of lot 46 were notified but did not object, and (2) the configuration of the lots meant a truly unobstructed view was impossible and would require removing eight other houses.
5. The Board changed its position on August 20, 2020, after the Petitioners had already filed their complaint. In a special executive session, the Board determined its February 2018 approval of the pergola was an error and officially rescinded that approval.
6. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.
7. The Petitioners were declared the “prevailing party” because their legal action was the cause of the Respondent’s decision to rescind the erroneous approval. Under Arizona statute, a tribunal is required to order the respondent to pay the filing fee to the prevailing party.
8. The Judge ordered the Respondent, San Ignacio Heights Inc., to pay the Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00. The payment was to be made within thirty days of receipt of the order.
9. The Judge did not levy a civil penalty because the decision explicitly states, “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.”
10. At the November 3, 2020 hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informed the tribunal that the owners of lot 47 had a contractor scheduled to remove the pergola the very next day.
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Essay Questions for Further Study
The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the timeline of events from the initial approval of the pergola in February 2018 to the final order in November 2020. How did the Respondent’s actions and communications contribute to the escalation of the dispute, and at what points could it have potentially been resolved before reaching a formal hearing?
2. Discuss the legal concept of the “prevailing party” as it applies to this case. Explain why the Petitioners were granted this status and what financial remedy it entitled them to, even though the Respondent had already conceded the central issue before the hearing.
3. Examine the two initial arguments made by the Respondent to justify its approval of the pergola. Based on the case outcome, why were these arguments ultimately insufficient to defend its position, leading the Board to rescind its approval?
4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the role and authority of the Administrative Law Judge in this type of dispute. What specific powers did the judge have according to Arizona statutes, and how were they applied or not applied in the final order?
5. The decision notes that no testimony was taken and the ruling was based on the administrative record. Discuss the potential advantages and disadvantages of this approach for both the Petitioners and the Respondent in this specific case.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a binding legal decision and order.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
The section of Arizona’s administrative rules cited in the decision that establishes the “preponderance of the evidence” as the standard of proof for the matter.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
The Arizona state law that grants the ALJ the authority to order parties to abide by community documents, levy civil penalties, and order a losing respondent to pay the prevailing petitioner’s filing fee.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.
An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. In this case, it refers to the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” the official governing documents for the San Ignacio Heights community.
Civil Penalty
A monetary fine that an ALJ may levy for each violation of a statute or community document. A civil penalty was considered but not assessed in this case.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with legal authority over disputes concerning alleged violations of a community’s CC&Rs.
Filing Fee
The fee ($500.00 in this case) required by Arizona statute to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate. The Judge ordered the Respondent to repay this fee to the Petitioners.
Petitioner
The party that initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in the hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party that wins a legal case. The Petitioners were declared the prevailing party, which legally entitled them to have their filing fee reimbursed by the Respondent.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc.
View Lot
A specific property designation defined in the CC&Rs, such as the Petitioners’ lot 46, which is guaranteed an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains.
View Obstructions
The title of Article VI (D) of the CC&Rs, the specific rule that the Petitioners alleged the Respondent violated by approving the construction of the pergola.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120005-REL
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This administrative law judge decision details a dispute between Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges and Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. regarding a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioners alleged that a pergola approved by the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee was a view obstruction in violation of Article VI(D) of the CC&Rs. Although the Respondent acknowledged its error and rescinded the approval for the pergola before the hearing, the matter was not dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioners to be the prevailing party and ordered the Respondent to pay the petitioners’ $500 filing fee, though no additional civil penalty was assessed.
What are the core legal and procedural issues decided in this administrative hearing?
How did the Respondent’s actions impact the Petitioners’ prevailing party status and remedy?
What is the significance of the CC&Rs and view obstruction clause in this dispute?
Audio Overview
Video Overview Video Overview
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Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Donald S Fern(petitioner)
Judith A. Hedges(petitioner)
Lance Leslie(petitioner attorney) Law Office of Susan A Siwek
Respondent Side
Michael S. Shupe(respondent attorney) Goldschmidt | Shupe, PLLC
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.
Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:01 (89.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL
Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.
The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Case Overview
Case Number
19F-H1919047-REL
Petitioner
Victor L. Pattarozzi
Respondent
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
May 16, 2019
Decision Date
June 5, 2019
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).
Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”
The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.
“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”
The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.
Competing Arguments
• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):
◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.
◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:
▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.
▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.
◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.
• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):
◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.
Findings of Fact
The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.
• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.
• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.
• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.
• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.
Legal Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.
Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”
The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.
The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.
The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.
Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument
The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”
The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Final Order
Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.
Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.
Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL
Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?
3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?
4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.
5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?
6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?
7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?
8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?
9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?
10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.
2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.
3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.
4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.
5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.
6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.
7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.
8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.
9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.
2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.
4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?
5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.
Architectural Review Committee (ARC)
A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.
Dismissed
The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.
Statutory Interpretation
The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL
Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.
The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Case Overview
Case Number
19F-H1919047-REL
Petitioner
Victor L. Pattarozzi
Respondent
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
May 16, 2019
Decision Date
June 5, 2019
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).
Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”
The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.
“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”
The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.
Competing Arguments
• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):
◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.
◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:
▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.
▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.
◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.
• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):
◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.
Findings of Fact
The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.
• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.
• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.
• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.
• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.
Legal Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.
Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”
The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.
The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.
The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.
Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument
The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”
The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Final Order
Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.
Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.
Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Victor L Pattarozzi(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Andrew Apodaca(attorney) Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C. Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Stuart Glenn(board member) Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Board president who presented testimony for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmittal
Felicia Del Sol(Administrative Staff) Listed in the final section of the document
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.
Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:08 (89.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL
Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.
The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Case Overview
Case Number
19F-H1919047-REL
Petitioner
Victor L. Pattarozzi
Respondent
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
May 16, 2019
Decision Date
June 5, 2019
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).
Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”
The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.
“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”
The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.
Competing Arguments
• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):
◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.
◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:
▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.
▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.
◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.
• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):
◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.
Findings of Fact
The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.
• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.
• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.
• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.
• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.
Legal Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.
Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”
The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.
The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.
The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.
Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument
The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”
The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Final Order
Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.
Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.
Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL
Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?
3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?
4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.
5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?
6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?
7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?
8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?
9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?
10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.
2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.
3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.
4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.
5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.
6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.
7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.
8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.
9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.
2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.
4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?
5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.
Architectural Review Committee (ARC)
A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.
Dismissed
The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.
Statutory Interpretation
The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL
Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.
The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Case Overview
Case Number
19F-H1919047-REL
Petitioner
Victor L. Pattarozzi
Respondent
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
May 16, 2019
Decision Date
June 5, 2019
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).
Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”
Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”
The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.
“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”
The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.
Competing Arguments
• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):
◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.
◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:
▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.
▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.
◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.
• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):
◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.
Findings of Fact
The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.
• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.
• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.
• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.
• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.
Legal Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.
Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”
The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.
The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.
The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.
Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument
The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”
The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.
Final Order
Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.
Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.
Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Victor L Pattarozzi(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Andrew Apodaca(attorney) Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C. Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Stuart Glenn(board member) Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Board president who presented testimony for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmittal
Felicia Del Sol(Administrative Staff) Listed in the final section of the document
