Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michelle Ruffo Counsel
Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 12-349
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:18 (270.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818044-REL


Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

March 30, 2017: $50.00

June 6, 2017: $200.00

June 26, 2017: $200.00

August 9, 2017: $200.00

September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

October 17, 2017: $100.00

November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818044-REL


Study Guide: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

This guide is designed to review and assess understanding of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, Michelle Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who are the primary parties in this case, and what is the central dispute between them?

2. What was the Petitioner’s main justification for parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit?

3. According to the Association’s CC&Rs, what is the formal procedure required to reallocate a Limited Common Element, such as a parking space?

4. Describe the key enforcement actions the Condo Association took against the Petitioner in response to the ongoing parking violations.

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge determine that Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1242(B) and (C) did not apply in this case?

6. Summarize the incident involving the tow truck on September 27, 2017.

7. What reason did the Association’s attorney provide for requiring the Petitioner to pay a $200 fee before another hearing would be scheduled?

8. What evidence did the Petitioner submit to demonstrate that her own assigned parking space, #131, was frequently occupied by others?

9. Identify the two property managers who provided telephonic testimony on behalf of the Respondent.

10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for this decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michelle Ruffo, the Petitioner and owner of unit 52, and Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association, the Respondent. The central dispute is over fines imposed by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for her repeated violations of parking rules by parking in spaces not assigned to her unit.

2. The Petitioner justified her actions by claiming she had long-standing written permission from other unit owners or tenants to use their spaces. Specifically, she cited a 2006 agreement with the owners of unit #56 to use space #40 and more recent permission from a tenant in unit #53 to use space #38.

3. According to Section 2.8.3 of the CC&Rs, reallocating a Limited Common Element requires an amendment to the Declaration. This amendment must be executed by the owners involved, state how the element is being reallocated, and be submitted to the Board of Directors for approval before it can be recorded.

4. The Association’s enforcement actions escalated over time, beginning with a “Friendly Reminder” and moving to a “Notice of Violation” and a “Final Non-Compliance Notice.” Subsequently, the Association assessed escalating monetary fines, suspended the Petitioner’s access to amenities like the pool and fitness room, and attempted to have her vehicle towed.

5. The judge ruled the statute did not apply because it specifically pertains to written notices about the condition of the property owned by the unit owner. The dispute in this case was not about the condition of Ms. Ruffo’s unit (#52) but about her use of Limited Common Elements (parking spaces) that were not assigned to her.

6. On September 27, 2017, the Association attempted to tow the Petitioner’s vehicle from a space not assigned to her. The Petitioner was inside her vehicle and refused to leave, calling the Pima County Sheriff’s Office. The responding officer instructed the tow truck driver to remove the equipment and try again at another time.

7. The Association required the $200 fee to reimburse it for the attorney’s fees it incurred for a Board meeting scheduled on August 31, 2017. The Petitioner and her attorney at the time, Mr. Williman, failed to attend this meeting and did not provide notice of their absence until a few minutes before it was scheduled to begin.

8. The Petitioner submitted a series of dated photographs showing various other vehicles parked in her assigned space, #131. These vehicles included maintenance trucks bearing the Associa logo, a landscaping contractor’s truck and trailer, and several other private cars.

9. The two property managers who testified for the Respondent were Gabino Trejo, the current manager, and Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (referred to as Ms. Chapman), the former manager.

10. The final ruling was a denial of Michelle Ruffo’s petition. The judge found that the Petitioner had not established that the Respondent violated any CC&Rs or statutes, concluding that the Association was justified in assessing fines for her repeated and clear violations of CC&R § 4.7, which requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer in a standard essay format.

1. Analyze the arguments and evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the specific CC&R sections, witness testimonies, and exhibits each side used to support their claims, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Respondent’s position more convincing.

2. The concept of “Limited Common Elements” is central to this case. Using the definitions provided in the CC&Rs (Sections 1.31, 1.36, and 2.8.1(e)), explain the legal significance of this designation in the dispute over parking spaces. How did the specific rules for reallocating these elements (CC&R § 2.8.3) undermine the Petitioner’s primary defense?

3. Trace the timeline of communication and escalating enforcement actions taken by the Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association against Michelle Ruffo, beginning with the “Friendly Reminder” in August 2016. Evaluate whether the Association followed its own Violation Enforcement Policy and the powers granted to it in the CC&Rs throughout this process.

4. Discuss the role of legal representation and the various attorneys involved in this case (Nathan Tennyson, Mark F. Williman, Eric J. Thomae, Jonathan Olcott). How did their actions, communications, and, in one instance, inaction, impact the proceedings and the relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent?

5. The Petitioner argued that her right to due process was violated because the violation notices she received did not contain photographs or identify the person who observed the violation. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning for rejecting this argument, specifically referencing the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 and the distinction made between a violation concerning the “condition of the property owned” versus the use of common elements.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Diane Mihalsky presided over the hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. Several statutes, including those under Title 33 (Property) and Title 32 (Professions and Occupations), were cited in the case.

Associa Property Management Services

The property management company employed by the Respondent to manage the condominium complex. Both Ms. Chapman and Mr. Trejo were employees of Associa.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The CC&Rs define the rights and obligations of the homeowners’ association and its members.

Gabino Trejo

The current property manager for the Respondent at the time of the hearing.

Limited Common Elements

As defined in CC&R § 1.31, a portion of the Common Elements allocated for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than all, of the Units. Parking spaces are explicitly defined as Limited Common Elements.

Mark F. Williman, Esq.

An attorney and friend of the Petitioner who agreed to help her resolve issues with the Board. He failed to attend a scheduled Board meeting on her behalf on August 31, 2017.

Michelle Ruffo

The Petitioner in the case, owner of condominium unit 52, and member of the Respondent association.

Parking Space

As defined in CC&R § 1.36, a portion of the Limited Common Elements intended for parking a single motor vehicle and allocated to a specific Unit Owner for their exclusive use.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, Michelle Ruffo.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

The Respondent in the case; the condominium unit owners’ association for the development where the Petitioner resides.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (Ms. Chapman)

The former property manager for the Respondent (from 2012 to early 2018) who handled most of the interactions and sent most of the violation notices to the Petitioner.

Violation Enforcement Policy

The Respondent’s official policy that outlines the procedure for addressing violations, including sending a “Friendly Reminder” and a “Notice of Violation,” and provides for a hearing if requested within 14 days.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818044-REL


How a Parking Spot Deal Led to a Tow Truck Standoff and a $2,544 HOA Bill: 4 Lessons

Introduction: The Handshake Deal That Cost a Fortune

It’s a common scenario in community living: you make a friendly, informal agreement with a neighbor. Maybe you agree to switch parking spots for convenience or let them use your guest pass. These simple handshake deals seem harmless, but what happens when they collide with the ironclad rules of a homeowners’ association (HOA)?

The real-life case of Michelle Ruffo and her condo association serves as a stark cautionary tale. A long-standing, informal parking arrangement escalated into a bitter dispute that culminated in a tow truck standoff, loss of amenities, and a final bill for $2,544 in fines and fees. This case reveals several surprising and critical lessons for anyone living in a community governed by an association.

1. Your Neighbor’s Permission Can Be Legally Worthless

The core of the dispute was Ms. Ruffo’s belief that she had the right to park in spaces other than her own. Since 2006, she had an agreement with another owner to use space #40. Later, she began parking in space #38, believing she had permission from that unit’s tenant. From her perspective, she had done her due diligence. This is the core conflict in community living: the perceived authority of a neighbor’s handshake versus the legal authority of the governing documents.

The association, however, operated under its official Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Those documents told a different story.

Section 4.7 explicitly required owners to park only in their assigned spaces.

Section 2.8.3 detailed the only valid procedure for changing parking allocations. Because parking spaces are “Limited Common Elements,” any reallocation required a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved, submitted to the Board for approval, and then officially recorded.

Crucially, the property manager testified that the owner of the unit assigned to space #38 had explicitly denied giving Ms. Ruffo permission and reported that his tenants were complaining. Because Ms. Ruffo never followed the formal procedure, her informal agreements were not recognized or enforceable. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlighted the critical importance of these rules:

Because Petitioner never submitted any written agreement with another owner regarding reallocation of parking spaces to Respondent’s Board for its tacit approval, as CC&R § 2.8.3 requires, subsequent tenants and owners have no notice of Petitioner’s alleged agreements with their predecessors regarding parking spaces. If everyone adopted Petitioner’s sense of entitlement as to parking spaces at the Reflections, no one would be able to park their car with any security or plan.

2. Ignoring Official Notices Leads to More Than Just Fines

This conflict didn’t begin with a massive fine. The property management company, Associa, followed a documented escalation process that provided Ms. Ruffo with multiple opportunities to comply. For any homeowner, this documented paper trail should have been a five-alarm fire, signaling a problem that required immediate and formal resolution.

The warnings began on August 2, 2016, with a “Friendly Reminder,” followed by a “Notice of Violation” and a “Final Non-Compliance Notice.” The first fine of just $50 wasn’t assessed until March 30, 2017. But as the violations continued, so did the consequences. After a July 11, 2017 letter, the association shut off Ms. Ruffo’s “electric-key access to the pool and fitness center for the community,” a tangible loss of amenities.

The financial penalties then began to skyrocket. Fines of $200 were assessed in June and August. Then, on September 25, 2017, the association dropped the hammer: a single letter assessing $1,400 for 14 separate observed violations. Just two days later, on September 27, the dispute reached its climax. The association attempted to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. She was inside the car and refused to leave, prompting her to call the Sheriff’s Office to intervene. The situation had moved from letters and fines to a physical standoff in the parking lot.

3. Skipping a Hearing Can Get You a Bill for the HOA’s Lawyer

After retaining an attorney, Ms. Ruffo was scheduled to have her case heard by the Board on August 31, 2017. The association, anticipating a formal legal discussion, also had its own attorney present. In any formal dispute, failing to appear at your own requested hearing is a critical error. In this case, it not only cost Ruffo credibility but also came with an immediate invoice.

Minutes before the meeting, while the Board and its lawyer were waiting, Ruffo’s attorney sent a message that neither he nor his client would be attending. This last-minute cancellation had a direct financial consequence. The association’s attorney charged it $200 for the time spent on the aborted meeting. The Board then refused to schedule another hearing until Ms. Ruffo reimbursed the association for that $200 fee. This failure to engage was immediately followed by the association’s most severe actions: the $1,400 fine and the attempt to tow her vehicle.

4. “But They Do It Too!” Is Not a Winning Legal Defense

A common response to a violation notice is to point out that others are breaking the rules as well. Ms. Ruffo attempted this strategy, presenting photographic evidence that her own assigned space, #131, was frequently occupied by other vehicles, including maintenance vans bearing the property management company’s logo.

While the property manager testified that she had addressed the issue with the maintenance crew, the Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive. The ruling contained a crucial insight: The lesson isn’t just that this defense failed, but why it failed. The Judge noted that Ms. Ruffo “did not present any evidence… that she made any effort to report others parking in her assigned space when there was something that the property manager or Respondent could have done about it.” By failing to formally and properly report her own issue, she undermined her claim that the association was negligent, making it impossible to excuse her own persistent violations.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print Before You Shake On It

This case serves as a powerful reminder of a fundamental truth of community living: in an HOA, the official, written governing documents are the ultimate authority. Informal “handshake deals,” no matter how reasonable they seem, can lead to serious consequences when they conflict with the rules. This dispute didn’t just involve letters; it led to escalating fines, the loss of amenities, a physical standoff with a tow truck, and ultimately a legal judgment.

This entire conflict, which cost thousands of dollars and countless hours, started with a parking spot—when was the last time you read your community’s rules?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michelle Ruffo (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf.
  • Carol Lundberg (witness)
    Resides in Unit 45; presented testimony by Petitioner.
  • Julie Ruiz (witness)
    Unit 53 Tenant
    Provided email confirming she gave Petitioner permission to park in Unit 53's space.
  • Mark F. Williman (attorney)
    Retained by Petitioner; failed to attend the August 31, 2017 Board meeting.
  • Eric J. Thomae (attorney)
    Retained by Petitioner sometime after October 24, 2017.

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
  • Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (property manager)
    Associa Property Management Services
    Former manager; referred to as Ms. Chapman in the decision.
  • Gabino Trejo (property manager)
    Associa Property Management Services
    Current manager.
  • John Pohlig (unit owner)
    Owner of unit assigned space #38; communicated he had not given Petitioner permission to park there.
  • Jonathan Olcott (HOA attorney)
  • Mitch Treese (HOA president)
    Alleged by Petitioner's attorney to have misappropriated HOA funds.

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically.

Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michelle Ruffo Counsel
Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 12-349
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:52 (270.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818044-REL


Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

March 30, 2017: $50.00

June 6, 2017: $200.00

June 26, 2017: $200.00

August 9, 2017: $200.00

September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

October 17, 2017: $100.00

November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818044-REL


Study Guide: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

This guide is designed to review and assess understanding of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, Michelle Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who are the primary parties in this case, and what is the central dispute between them?

2. What was the Petitioner’s main justification for parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit?

3. According to the Association’s CC&Rs, what is the formal procedure required to reallocate a Limited Common Element, such as a parking space?

4. Describe the key enforcement actions the Condo Association took against the Petitioner in response to the ongoing parking violations.

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge determine that Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1242(B) and (C) did not apply in this case?

6. Summarize the incident involving the tow truck on September 27, 2017.

7. What reason did the Association’s attorney provide for requiring the Petitioner to pay a $200 fee before another hearing would be scheduled?

8. What evidence did the Petitioner submit to demonstrate that her own assigned parking space, #131, was frequently occupied by others?

9. Identify the two property managers who provided telephonic testimony on behalf of the Respondent.

10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for this decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michelle Ruffo, the Petitioner and owner of unit 52, and Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association, the Respondent. The central dispute is over fines imposed by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for her repeated violations of parking rules by parking in spaces not assigned to her unit.

2. The Petitioner justified her actions by claiming she had long-standing written permission from other unit owners or tenants to use their spaces. Specifically, she cited a 2006 agreement with the owners of unit #56 to use space #40 and more recent permission from a tenant in unit #53 to use space #38.

3. According to Section 2.8.3 of the CC&Rs, reallocating a Limited Common Element requires an amendment to the Declaration. This amendment must be executed by the owners involved, state how the element is being reallocated, and be submitted to the Board of Directors for approval before it can be recorded.

4. The Association’s enforcement actions escalated over time, beginning with a “Friendly Reminder” and moving to a “Notice of Violation” and a “Final Non-Compliance Notice.” Subsequently, the Association assessed escalating monetary fines, suspended the Petitioner’s access to amenities like the pool and fitness room, and attempted to have her vehicle towed.

5. The judge ruled the statute did not apply because it specifically pertains to written notices about the condition of the property owned by the unit owner. The dispute in this case was not about the condition of Ms. Ruffo’s unit (#52) but about her use of Limited Common Elements (parking spaces) that were not assigned to her.

6. On September 27, 2017, the Association attempted to tow the Petitioner’s vehicle from a space not assigned to her. The Petitioner was inside her vehicle and refused to leave, calling the Pima County Sheriff’s Office. The responding officer instructed the tow truck driver to remove the equipment and try again at another time.

7. The Association required the $200 fee to reimburse it for the attorney’s fees it incurred for a Board meeting scheduled on August 31, 2017. The Petitioner and her attorney at the time, Mr. Williman, failed to attend this meeting and did not provide notice of their absence until a few minutes before it was scheduled to begin.

8. The Petitioner submitted a series of dated photographs showing various other vehicles parked in her assigned space, #131. These vehicles included maintenance trucks bearing the Associa logo, a landscaping contractor’s truck and trailer, and several other private cars.

9. The two property managers who testified for the Respondent were Gabino Trejo, the current manager, and Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (referred to as Ms. Chapman), the former manager.

10. The final ruling was a denial of Michelle Ruffo’s petition. The judge found that the Petitioner had not established that the Respondent violated any CC&Rs or statutes, concluding that the Association was justified in assessing fines for her repeated and clear violations of CC&R § 4.7, which requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer in a standard essay format.

1. Analyze the arguments and evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the specific CC&R sections, witness testimonies, and exhibits each side used to support their claims, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Respondent’s position more convincing.

2. The concept of “Limited Common Elements” is central to this case. Using the definitions provided in the CC&Rs (Sections 1.31, 1.36, and 2.8.1(e)), explain the legal significance of this designation in the dispute over parking spaces. How did the specific rules for reallocating these elements (CC&R § 2.8.3) undermine the Petitioner’s primary defense?

3. Trace the timeline of communication and escalating enforcement actions taken by the Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association against Michelle Ruffo, beginning with the “Friendly Reminder” in August 2016. Evaluate whether the Association followed its own Violation Enforcement Policy and the powers granted to it in the CC&Rs throughout this process.

4. Discuss the role of legal representation and the various attorneys involved in this case (Nathan Tennyson, Mark F. Williman, Eric J. Thomae, Jonathan Olcott). How did their actions, communications, and, in one instance, inaction, impact the proceedings and the relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent?

5. The Petitioner argued that her right to due process was violated because the violation notices she received did not contain photographs or identify the person who observed the violation. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning for rejecting this argument, specifically referencing the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 and the distinction made between a violation concerning the “condition of the property owned” versus the use of common elements.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Diane Mihalsky presided over the hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. Several statutes, including those under Title 33 (Property) and Title 32 (Professions and Occupations), were cited in the case.

Associa Property Management Services

The property management company employed by the Respondent to manage the condominium complex. Both Ms. Chapman and Mr. Trejo were employees of Associa.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The CC&Rs define the rights and obligations of the homeowners’ association and its members.

Gabino Trejo

The current property manager for the Respondent at the time of the hearing.

Limited Common Elements

As defined in CC&R § 1.31, a portion of the Common Elements allocated for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than all, of the Units. Parking spaces are explicitly defined as Limited Common Elements.

Mark F. Williman, Esq.

An attorney and friend of the Petitioner who agreed to help her resolve issues with the Board. He failed to attend a scheduled Board meeting on her behalf on August 31, 2017.

Michelle Ruffo

The Petitioner in the case, owner of condominium unit 52, and member of the Respondent association.

Parking Space

As defined in CC&R § 1.36, a portion of the Limited Common Elements intended for parking a single motor vehicle and allocated to a specific Unit Owner for their exclusive use.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, Michelle Ruffo.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

The Respondent in the case; the condominium unit owners’ association for the development where the Petitioner resides.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (Ms. Chapman)

The former property manager for the Respondent (from 2012 to early 2018) who handled most of the interactions and sent most of the violation notices to the Petitioner.

Violation Enforcement Policy

The Respondent’s official policy that outlines the procedure for addressing violations, including sending a “Friendly Reminder” and a “Notice of Violation,” and provides for a hearing if requested within 14 days.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818044-REL


How a Parking Spot Deal Led to a Tow Truck Standoff and a $2,544 HOA Bill: 4 Lessons

Introduction: The Handshake Deal That Cost a Fortune

It’s a common scenario in community living: you make a friendly, informal agreement with a neighbor. Maybe you agree to switch parking spots for convenience or let them use your guest pass. These simple handshake deals seem harmless, but what happens when they collide with the ironclad rules of a homeowners’ association (HOA)?

The real-life case of Michelle Ruffo and her condo association serves as a stark cautionary tale. A long-standing, informal parking arrangement escalated into a bitter dispute that culminated in a tow truck standoff, loss of amenities, and a final bill for $2,544 in fines and fees. This case reveals several surprising and critical lessons for anyone living in a community governed by an association.

1. Your Neighbor’s Permission Can Be Legally Worthless

The core of the dispute was Ms. Ruffo’s belief that she had the right to park in spaces other than her own. Since 2006, she had an agreement with another owner to use space #40. Later, she began parking in space #38, believing she had permission from that unit’s tenant. From her perspective, she had done her due diligence. This is the core conflict in community living: the perceived authority of a neighbor’s handshake versus the legal authority of the governing documents.

The association, however, operated under its official Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Those documents told a different story.

Section 4.7 explicitly required owners to park only in their assigned spaces.

Section 2.8.3 detailed the only valid procedure for changing parking allocations. Because parking spaces are “Limited Common Elements,” any reallocation required a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved, submitted to the Board for approval, and then officially recorded.

Crucially, the property manager testified that the owner of the unit assigned to space #38 had explicitly denied giving Ms. Ruffo permission and reported that his tenants were complaining. Because Ms. Ruffo never followed the formal procedure, her informal agreements were not recognized or enforceable. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlighted the critical importance of these rules:

Because Petitioner never submitted any written agreement with another owner regarding reallocation of parking spaces to Respondent’s Board for its tacit approval, as CC&R § 2.8.3 requires, subsequent tenants and owners have no notice of Petitioner’s alleged agreements with their predecessors regarding parking spaces. If everyone adopted Petitioner’s sense of entitlement as to parking spaces at the Reflections, no one would be able to park their car with any security or plan.

2. Ignoring Official Notices Leads to More Than Just Fines

This conflict didn’t begin with a massive fine. The property management company, Associa, followed a documented escalation process that provided Ms. Ruffo with multiple opportunities to comply. For any homeowner, this documented paper trail should have been a five-alarm fire, signaling a problem that required immediate and formal resolution.

The warnings began on August 2, 2016, with a “Friendly Reminder,” followed by a “Notice of Violation” and a “Final Non-Compliance Notice.” The first fine of just $50 wasn’t assessed until March 30, 2017. But as the violations continued, so did the consequences. After a July 11, 2017 letter, the association shut off Ms. Ruffo’s “electric-key access to the pool and fitness center for the community,” a tangible loss of amenities.

The financial penalties then began to skyrocket. Fines of $200 were assessed in June and August. Then, on September 25, 2017, the association dropped the hammer: a single letter assessing $1,400 for 14 separate observed violations. Just two days later, on September 27, the dispute reached its climax. The association attempted to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. She was inside the car and refused to leave, prompting her to call the Sheriff’s Office to intervene. The situation had moved from letters and fines to a physical standoff in the parking lot.

3. Skipping a Hearing Can Get You a Bill for the HOA’s Lawyer

After retaining an attorney, Ms. Ruffo was scheduled to have her case heard by the Board on August 31, 2017. The association, anticipating a formal legal discussion, also had its own attorney present. In any formal dispute, failing to appear at your own requested hearing is a critical error. In this case, it not only cost Ruffo credibility but also came with an immediate invoice.

Minutes before the meeting, while the Board and its lawyer were waiting, Ruffo’s attorney sent a message that neither he nor his client would be attending. This last-minute cancellation had a direct financial consequence. The association’s attorney charged it $200 for the time spent on the aborted meeting. The Board then refused to schedule another hearing until Ms. Ruffo reimbursed the association for that $200 fee. This failure to engage was immediately followed by the association’s most severe actions: the $1,400 fine and the attempt to tow her vehicle.

4. “But They Do It Too!” Is Not a Winning Legal Defense

A common response to a violation notice is to point out that others are breaking the rules as well. Ms. Ruffo attempted this strategy, presenting photographic evidence that her own assigned space, #131, was frequently occupied by other vehicles, including maintenance vans bearing the property management company’s logo.

While the property manager testified that she had addressed the issue with the maintenance crew, the Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive. The ruling contained a crucial insight: The lesson isn’t just that this defense failed, but why it failed. The Judge noted that Ms. Ruffo “did not present any evidence… that she made any effort to report others parking in her assigned space when there was something that the property manager or Respondent could have done about it.” By failing to formally and properly report her own issue, she undermined her claim that the association was negligent, making it impossible to excuse her own persistent violations.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print Before You Shake On It

This case serves as a powerful reminder of a fundamental truth of community living: in an HOA, the official, written governing documents are the ultimate authority. Informal “handshake deals,” no matter how reasonable they seem, can lead to serious consequences when they conflict with the rules. This dispute didn’t just involve letters; it led to escalating fines, the loss of amenities, a physical standoff with a tow truck, and ultimately a legal judgment.

This entire conflict, which cost thousands of dollars and countless hours, started with a parking spot—when was the last time you read your community’s rules?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michelle Ruffo (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf.
  • Carol Lundberg (witness)
    Resides in Unit 45; presented testimony by Petitioner.
  • Julie Ruiz (witness)
    Unit 53 Tenant
    Provided email confirming she gave Petitioner permission to park in Unit 53's space.
  • Mark F. Williman (attorney)
    Retained by Petitioner; failed to attend the August 31, 2017 Board meeting.
  • Eric J. Thomae (attorney)
    Retained by Petitioner sometime after October 24, 2017.

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
  • Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (property manager)
    Associa Property Management Services
    Former manager; referred to as Ms. Chapman in the decision.
  • Gabino Trejo (property manager)
    Associa Property Management Services
    Current manager.
  • John Pohlig (unit owner)
    Owner of unit assigned space #38; communicated he had not given Petitioner permission to park there.
  • Jonathan Olcott (HOA attorney)
  • Mitch Treese (HOA president)
    Alleged by Petitioner's attorney to have misappropriated HOA funds.

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically.

Peter Biondi, Jr. vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818048-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-21
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr. Counsel
Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1243, Respondent’s Bylaw Article II, Section 3 and Article III, Sections 2 and 3, and Respondent’s CC&Rs Section 8.13

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA's remaining Director acted permissibly and reasonably upon legal advice in refusing to defend a previous legal action, as the initial Board decision to remove fellow directors was contrary to mandatory statutory procedures outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1243, which requires removal by unit owners, not by the board.

Why this result: The Board's previous action of removing directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243 because director removal must be performed by a member vote. Because the HOA lacked a legal defense to the directors' challenge, the current petition failed to prove a violation when the sole remaining Director chose not to incur unnecessary fees contesting an unwinnable case, which was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the sole remaining Director to defend a prior petition challenging the board's removal of two directors.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated governing documents and statutes when the remaining Director chose not to contest a prior Department petition filed by two removed Directors, resulting in their reinstatement. The ALJ found that the initial removal of the Directors by fellow Directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243(B) and (H), which reserves removal power to members. Because the HOA lacked a good legal defense, the remaining Director's decision not to defend the prior petition, based on legal advice, was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and not a violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, HOA Director Removal, Board Authority, Condo Bylaws
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818048-REL Decision – 654904.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:48 (155.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818048-REL


Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in Case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, where a petition filed by homeowner Peter Biondi, Jr. against the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association (HOA) was denied. The central conflict revolved around the HOA Board’s removal of two directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, for alleged violations of the association’s leasing restrictions.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical point of law: the HOA Board acted improperly and in violation of Arizona state statute when it removed two of its own members. According to A.R.S. § 33-1243, the power to remove a board director is reserved exclusively for the association’s members (the unit owners) through a formal petition and vote, not for the Board of Directors itself.

Because the initial removal was legally invalid, the subsequent actions of the sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden, were deemed reasonable and permissible. Her decision not to defend the HOA against a petition from the improperly removed directors, a choice made upon the advice of three separate attorneys, was not a violation of her duties. The governing statute (A.R.S. § 33-1242) uses the permissive term “may” regarding the defense of litigation, and the ALJ concluded that no entity is required to mount a defense that is ill-advised and likely to fail. Consequently, Henden’s reinstatement of the directors was a logical correction of the Board’s unlawful action. The factual question of whether the directors had violated the leasing rules was considered secondary to this overriding procedural and statutory failure by the Board.

Case Background and Procedural History

The dispute originated from complaints by HOA members that two serving directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, were violating Section 8.13 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rental By Owner (“VRBOs”).

1. Initial Board Action: The Board of Directors met to consider the complaints, concluded that Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs, and gave them 14 days to remedy the violation by presenting compliant long-term rental agreements.

2. Removal of Directors: At a contentious executive session on January 4, 2018, the five other directors voted to remove or disqualify Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board. Board member Bonnie Henden testified that she felt this action was a “vendetta” against the two directors for taking opposing positions on other issues.

3. Board Collapse: Following the removal, the Board structure disintegrated. The petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., and another director, Jeffrey Washburn, “decided to resign in order to restore calm in the community.” A third director was removed or resigned due to non-payment of assessments. By March or April 2018, this left Bonnie Henden as the sole remaining director.

4. Legal Challenge and Reinstatement: Luzzis and Dubasquier filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to protest their removal. After consulting with three different attorneys, Henden chose not to file an answer on behalf of the HOA. The Department subsequently issued a decision in favor of Luzzis and Dubasquier. Following this outcome, Henden reinstated them to the Board to complete their elected terms and cancelled the planned election for their replacements.

5. Petitioner’s Complaint: On May 9, 2018, Peter Biondi, Jr. filed the current petition, alleging that Henden’s refusal to defend the HOA and her decision to reinstate the two directors constituted a violation of Arizona statutes (§§ 33-1242 and 33-1243), HOA Bylaws, and CC&Rs.

Central Legal Issues and Findings

The ALJ determined that the petitioner, Biondi, bore the burden of proof but that the operative facts of the case were not in dispute. The core of the case was not a factual determination but a legal one.

The Dispositive Question: Legality of Director Removal

The judge identified the central legal question as the primary determinant of the case’s outcome:

“…the dispositive issue is not the factual issue of whether Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier violated CC&R Section 8.13 by using their units as short-term VRBOs, but the legal issue of whether the other directors on Respondent’s Board properly removed them from the Board…”

The ruling established that the Board’s method of removal was the critical point of failure, rendering the underlying CC&R violation secondary.

Analysis of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The decision was grounded in a de novo review of A.R.S. § 33-1243, which governs the powers and removal of a condominium association’s board of directors.

A.R.S. § 33-1243(B): This subsection explicitly prohibits a board from acting on behalf of the association to “determine the qualifications, powers and duties or terms of office of board of directors members.” The ALJ found that the Board’s vote to disqualify Luzzis and Dubasquier was in direct violation of this provision.

A.R.S. § 33-1243(H): This subsection establishes the exclusive procedure for removing a director, stating that its provisions apply “notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary.” The statute mandates that removal can only be accomplished by:

1. A petition signed by a specified percentage or number of eligible unit owners (e.g., 25% or 100 votes, whichever is less, for an association of 1,000 or fewer members).

2. A majority vote of the unit owners at a special meeting called for this purpose within 30 days of receiving the petition.

The ALJ’s conclusion was unequivocal: “The referenced provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1243 specifically and unequivocally require that the members who elected a director must remove the director.” Because the Board failed to follow this statutory procedure, its removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier was legally invalid, and the HOA “lacked any good legal defense” to their subsequent petition.

The Legality of the Sole Director’s Actions

Based on the finding that the initial removal was unlawful, the ALJ assessed the actions taken by the sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden.

Decision Not to Defend the HOA

The petitioner argued Henden had a duty to defend the HOA against the petition from Luzzis and Dubasquier. The ALJ rejected this argument by citing A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(4), which states an association “may… defend or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings.”

The judge’s legal interpretation was that the word “may” indicates permissive intent, not a mandatory requirement. Henden was not statutorily obligated to contest the petition. Her decision was further supported by the legal advice she received from three attorneys, who advised that a defense would likely fail and result in unnecessary legal fees for the association. The ALJ affirmed this prudence, stating, “No statute requires a condominium association or a director to take an ill-advised act or to mount a defense of a previously taken ill-advised act that likely will fail on its merits.”

Reinstatement of Removed Directors

Henden’s decision to reinstate Luzzis and Dubasquier to the Board was found to be a direct and logical consequence of the legally improper removal. By reinstating them, she was correcting the Board’s previous unlawful action.

Relevant Governing Documents and Testimony

Document/Testimony

Key Provisions or Content

Relevance to Decision

A.R.S. § 33-1243

Prohibits boards from determining member qualifications and mandates that only unit owners can remove directors via a petition and vote.

This was the controlling statute that rendered the Board’s initial removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier unlawful.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

States an association “may” defend itself in litigation.

Provided the legal basis for Henden’s discretionary and permissible decision not to defend the HOA.

HOA CC&Rs Section 8.13

Prohibits leasing for “transient, hotel, club, timeshare or similar purposes” and requires all leases to be for a minimum of six months.

This section was the basis for the original complaint but was deemed not the dispositive issue in the case.

HOA Bylaws Article III

Governs director qualifications, number, and the filling of vacancies.

While relevant to Board governance, these bylaws were superseded by the conflicting and more specific state statute (A.R.S. § 33-1243).

Bonnie Henden Testimony

Stated the removal felt like a “vendetta” and that she consulted three attorneys before deciding not to defend the HOA.

Provided context for the internal Board conflict and established that her actions were taken after seeking extensive legal counsel.

Peter Biondi, Jr. Evidence

Submitted exhibits showing Luzzis and Dubasquier were continuing to advertise their units as VRBOs.

The evidence was acknowledged but deemed irrelevant to the central legal question of whether the Board had the authority to remove them.

Final Order and Conclusion

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

The final decision establishes a clear legal principle: a homeowners association’s Board of Directors does not have the authority to remove its own members in Arizona. That power is reserved for the unit owners through a specific statutory process. Any action taken by a board in contravention of this statute is legally invalid. Consequently, a director’s decision not to defend such an invalid action, especially when based on legal advice, is not a breach of duty but a prudent measure to avoid wasting association resources on a defense with no legal merit.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818048-REL


Study Guide: Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, concerning a dispute between a condominium owner and a homeowners association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific event prompted the Petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs (Section 8.13), what were the rules regarding the leasing of condominium units?

4. Why were Board Directors Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier initially removed from their positions by the other directors?

5. How did Bonnie Henden become the sole remaining member of the Respondent’s Board of Directors?

6. What was the “dispositive issue” that the Administrative Law Judge identified as central to the case?

7. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243(H), what is the proper procedure for removing a member of a condominium association’s board of directors?

8. Why did Ms. Henden choose not to defend the association against the petition filed by Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier?

9. What does the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” mean, as defined in the decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr., who is a condominium owner and a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association. The Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association itself.

2. The Petitioner filed the petition because the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the association against a petition filed by two former directors. Instead of defending the board’s prior action, Ms. Henden reinstated the two directors who had been removed.

3. Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs stipulated that all leases must be for a minimum of six months and that units could not be leased for transient, hotel, or similar purposes. Owners were also limited to leasing their unit no more than two separate times in any 12-month period and had to provide a signed copy of the lease to the association.

4. Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier were removed after other Board members concluded they had violated CC&R Section 8.13 by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rentals By Owner (VRBOs). The removal occurred after they were given 14 days to remedy the violation and failed to do so to the Board’s satisfaction.

5. After the removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier, the Petitioner and another director resigned to “restore calm.” A third director was removed or resigned for failing to pay an assessment, which left Ms. Henden as the only director on the Board.

6. The dispositive issue was not the factual question of whether Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs. Rather, it was the legal issue of whether the other directors had the authority to properly remove them from the Board in the first place.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) states that unit owners may remove a board member by a majority vote at a meeting. This process must be initiated by a petition signed by a specific percentage or number of the association’s members who are eligible to vote.

8. Ms. Henden consulted three different attorneys who advised her that the association would likely lose the case. Their legal advice was based on A.R.S. § 33-1243, which states that board members cannot remove other board members, and defending the improper removal would incur unnecessary legal fees.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Board’s initial removal of the two directors was improper under state law and that Ms. Henden was not required to defend that ill-advised act.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis and synthesis of the case details. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the authority granted to the Board in the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Bylaws (Article III, Sections 2 & 3) and the limitations placed upon it by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243. Explain which document takes precedence in the matter of director removal and why, citing the reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge.

2. Discuss the role and actions of Bonnie Henden after she became the sole remaining director. Evaluate her decision to reinstate Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, considering the legal advice she received, her powers as the sole director, and the potential consequences for the homeowners association.

3. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, beginning with the initial complaints about VRBOs and culminating in the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Identify the key actions, legal filings, and turning points for each party involved (Luzzis/Dubasquier, the Board, Peter Biondi, and Bonnie Henden).

4. The judge states that the case hinges on a legal issue, not a factual one. Explain the difference between the factual issue (the VRBO rentals) and the legal issue (the removal process) and detail how this distinction was fundamental to the case’s outcome.

5. Based on the statutes cited in the decision, outline the correct, legally compliant process that the members of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association should have followed if they wished to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board of Directors. Contrast this with the actions the Board actually took.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, in this case Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The decision references several statutes from Title 33 concerning property and condominiums.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations adopted by an organization, such as a homeowners association, for its internal governance. In this case, they govern matters like annual meetings and the composition of the Board of Directors.

Abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deed that govern what homeowners can and cannot do with their property. Section 8.13 on leasing was a key CC&R in this case.

De Novo Review

A type of legal review where a court or administrative body decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous party that heard the case. It is used for determining the construction and application of statutes.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium associations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof (the Petitioner in this matter) to present evidence that is more convincing and more likely to be true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association.

Abbreviation for Vacation Rental By Owner, referring to the practice of renting out properties on a short-term basis, similar to a hotel. This practice was alleged to be in violation of the association’s CC&Rs.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818048-REL


Study Guide: Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, concerning a dispute between a condominium owner and a homeowners association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific event prompted the Petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs (Section 8.13), what were the rules regarding the leasing of condominium units?

4. Why were Board Directors Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier initially removed from their positions by the other directors?

5. How did Bonnie Henden become the sole remaining member of the Respondent’s Board of Directors?

6. What was the “dispositive issue” that the Administrative Law Judge identified as central to the case?

7. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243(H), what is the proper procedure for removing a member of a condominium association’s board of directors?

8. Why did Ms. Henden choose not to defend the association against the petition filed by Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier?

9. What does the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” mean, as defined in the decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr., who is a condominium owner and a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association. The Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association itself.

2. The Petitioner filed the petition because the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the association against a petition filed by two former directors. Instead of defending the board’s prior action, Ms. Henden reinstated the two directors who had been removed.

3. Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs stipulated that all leases must be for a minimum of six months and that units could not be leased for transient, hotel, or similar purposes. Owners were also limited to leasing their unit no more than two separate times in any 12-month period and had to provide a signed copy of the lease to the association.

4. Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier were removed after other Board members concluded they had violated CC&R Section 8.13 by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rentals By Owner (VRBOs). The removal occurred after they were given 14 days to remedy the violation and failed to do so to the Board’s satisfaction.

5. After the removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier, the Petitioner and another director resigned to “restore calm.” A third director was removed or resigned for failing to pay an assessment, which left Ms. Henden as the only director on the Board.

6. The dispositive issue was not the factual question of whether Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs. Rather, it was the legal issue of whether the other directors had the authority to properly remove them from the Board in the first place.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) states that unit owners may remove a board member by a majority vote at a meeting. This process must be initiated by a petition signed by a specific percentage or number of the association’s members who are eligible to vote.

8. Ms. Henden consulted three different attorneys who advised her that the association would likely lose the case. Their legal advice was based on A.R.S. § 33-1243, which states that board members cannot remove other board members, and defending the improper removal would incur unnecessary legal fees.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Board’s initial removal of the two directors was improper under state law and that Ms. Henden was not required to defend that ill-advised act.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis and synthesis of the case details. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the authority granted to the Board in the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Bylaws (Article III, Sections 2 & 3) and the limitations placed upon it by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243. Explain which document takes precedence in the matter of director removal and why, citing the reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge.

2. Discuss the role and actions of Bonnie Henden after she became the sole remaining director. Evaluate her decision to reinstate Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, considering the legal advice she received, her powers as the sole director, and the potential consequences for the homeowners association.

3. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, beginning with the initial complaints about VRBOs and culminating in the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Identify the key actions, legal filings, and turning points for each party involved (Luzzis/Dubasquier, the Board, Peter Biondi, and Bonnie Henden).

4. The judge states that the case hinges on a legal issue, not a factual one. Explain the difference between the factual issue (the VRBO rentals) and the legal issue (the removal process) and detail how this distinction was fundamental to the case’s outcome.

5. Based on the statutes cited in the decision, outline the correct, legally compliant process that the members of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association should have followed if they wished to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board of Directors. Contrast this with the actions the Board actually took.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, in this case Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The decision references several statutes from Title 33 concerning property and condominiums.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations adopted by an organization, such as a homeowners association, for its internal governance. In this case, they govern matters like annual meetings and the composition of the Board of Directors.

Abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deed that govern what homeowners can and cannot do with their property. Section 8.13 on leasing was a key CC&R in this case.

De Novo Review

A type of legal review where a court or administrative body decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous party that heard the case. It is used for determining the construction and application of statutes.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium associations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof (the Petitioner in this matter) to present evidence that is more convincing and more likely to be true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association.

Abbreviation for Vacation Rental By Owner, referring to the practice of renting out properties on a short-term basis, similar to a hotel. This practice was alleged to be in violation of the association’s CC&Rs.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Peter Biondi, Jr. (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; also a unit owner and HOA member
  • Jeffrey Washburn (witness)
    Former Board member; presented testimony by Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Maria R. Kupillas (HOA attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
    Represented Respondent
  • Bonnie Henden (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Sole remaining Director; presented testimony
  • Jim Luzzis (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Director whose removal was overturned/reinstated
  • Jerry Dubasquier (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Director whose removal was overturned/reinstated

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
    Transmitting agent
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission

Peter Biondi, Jr. vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818048-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-21
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr. Counsel
Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1243, Respondent’s Bylaw Article II, Section 3 and Article III, Sections 2 and 3, and Respondent’s CC&Rs Section 8.13

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA's remaining Director acted permissibly and reasonably upon legal advice in refusing to defend a previous legal action, as the initial Board decision to remove fellow directors was contrary to mandatory statutory procedures outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1243, which requires removal by unit owners, not by the board.

Why this result: The Board's previous action of removing directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243 because director removal must be performed by a member vote. Because the HOA lacked a legal defense to the directors' challenge, the current petition failed to prove a violation when the sole remaining Director chose not to incur unnecessary fees contesting an unwinnable case, which was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the sole remaining Director to defend a prior petition challenging the board's removal of two directors.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated governing documents and statutes when the remaining Director chose not to contest a prior Department petition filed by two removed Directors, resulting in their reinstatement. The ALJ found that the initial removal of the Directors by fellow Directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243(B) and (H), which reserves removal power to members. Because the HOA lacked a good legal defense, the remaining Director's decision not to defend the prior petition, based on legal advice, was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and not a violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, HOA Director Removal, Board Authority, Condo Bylaws
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818048-REL Decision – 654904.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:58 (155.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818048-REL


Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in Case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, where a petition filed by homeowner Peter Biondi, Jr. against the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association (HOA) was denied. The central conflict revolved around the HOA Board’s removal of two directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, for alleged violations of the association’s leasing restrictions.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical point of law: the HOA Board acted improperly and in violation of Arizona state statute when it removed two of its own members. According to A.R.S. § 33-1243, the power to remove a board director is reserved exclusively for the association’s members (the unit owners) through a formal petition and vote, not for the Board of Directors itself.

Because the initial removal was legally invalid, the subsequent actions of the sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden, were deemed reasonable and permissible. Her decision not to defend the HOA against a petition from the improperly removed directors, a choice made upon the advice of three separate attorneys, was not a violation of her duties. The governing statute (A.R.S. § 33-1242) uses the permissive term “may” regarding the defense of litigation, and the ALJ concluded that no entity is required to mount a defense that is ill-advised and likely to fail. Consequently, Henden’s reinstatement of the directors was a logical correction of the Board’s unlawful action. The factual question of whether the directors had violated the leasing rules was considered secondary to this overriding procedural and statutory failure by the Board.

Case Background and Procedural History

The dispute originated from complaints by HOA members that two serving directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, were violating Section 8.13 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rental By Owner (“VRBOs”).

1. Initial Board Action: The Board of Directors met to consider the complaints, concluded that Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs, and gave them 14 days to remedy the violation by presenting compliant long-term rental agreements.

2. Removal of Directors: At a contentious executive session on January 4, 2018, the five other directors voted to remove or disqualify Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board. Board member Bonnie Henden testified that she felt this action was a “vendetta” against the two directors for taking opposing positions on other issues.

3. Board Collapse: Following the removal, the Board structure disintegrated. The petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., and another director, Jeffrey Washburn, “decided to resign in order to restore calm in the community.” A third director was removed or resigned due to non-payment of assessments. By March or April 2018, this left Bonnie Henden as the sole remaining director.

4. Legal Challenge and Reinstatement: Luzzis and Dubasquier filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to protest their removal. After consulting with three different attorneys, Henden chose not to file an answer on behalf of the HOA. The Department subsequently issued a decision in favor of Luzzis and Dubasquier. Following this outcome, Henden reinstated them to the Board to complete their elected terms and cancelled the planned election for their replacements.

5. Petitioner’s Complaint: On May 9, 2018, Peter Biondi, Jr. filed the current petition, alleging that Henden’s refusal to defend the HOA and her decision to reinstate the two directors constituted a violation of Arizona statutes (§§ 33-1242 and 33-1243), HOA Bylaws, and CC&Rs.

Central Legal Issues and Findings

The ALJ determined that the petitioner, Biondi, bore the burden of proof but that the operative facts of the case were not in dispute. The core of the case was not a factual determination but a legal one.

The Dispositive Question: Legality of Director Removal

The judge identified the central legal question as the primary determinant of the case’s outcome:

“…the dispositive issue is not the factual issue of whether Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier violated CC&R Section 8.13 by using their units as short-term VRBOs, but the legal issue of whether the other directors on Respondent’s Board properly removed them from the Board…”

The ruling established that the Board’s method of removal was the critical point of failure, rendering the underlying CC&R violation secondary.

Analysis of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The decision was grounded in a de novo review of A.R.S. § 33-1243, which governs the powers and removal of a condominium association’s board of directors.

A.R.S. § 33-1243(B): This subsection explicitly prohibits a board from acting on behalf of the association to “determine the qualifications, powers and duties or terms of office of board of directors members.” The ALJ found that the Board’s vote to disqualify Luzzis and Dubasquier was in direct violation of this provision.

A.R.S. § 33-1243(H): This subsection establishes the exclusive procedure for removing a director, stating that its provisions apply “notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary.” The statute mandates that removal can only be accomplished by:

1. A petition signed by a specified percentage or number of eligible unit owners (e.g., 25% or 100 votes, whichever is less, for an association of 1,000 or fewer members).

2. A majority vote of the unit owners at a special meeting called for this purpose within 30 days of receiving the petition.

The ALJ’s conclusion was unequivocal: “The referenced provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1243 specifically and unequivocally require that the members who elected a director must remove the director.” Because the Board failed to follow this statutory procedure, its removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier was legally invalid, and the HOA “lacked any good legal defense” to their subsequent petition.

The Legality of the Sole Director’s Actions

Based on the finding that the initial removal was unlawful, the ALJ assessed the actions taken by the sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden.

Decision Not to Defend the HOA

The petitioner argued Henden had a duty to defend the HOA against the petition from Luzzis and Dubasquier. The ALJ rejected this argument by citing A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(4), which states an association “may… defend or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings.”

The judge’s legal interpretation was that the word “may” indicates permissive intent, not a mandatory requirement. Henden was not statutorily obligated to contest the petition. Her decision was further supported by the legal advice she received from three attorneys, who advised that a defense would likely fail and result in unnecessary legal fees for the association. The ALJ affirmed this prudence, stating, “No statute requires a condominium association or a director to take an ill-advised act or to mount a defense of a previously taken ill-advised act that likely will fail on its merits.”

Reinstatement of Removed Directors

Henden’s decision to reinstate Luzzis and Dubasquier to the Board was found to be a direct and logical consequence of the legally improper removal. By reinstating them, she was correcting the Board’s previous unlawful action.

Relevant Governing Documents and Testimony

Document/Testimony

Key Provisions or Content

Relevance to Decision

A.R.S. § 33-1243

Prohibits boards from determining member qualifications and mandates that only unit owners can remove directors via a petition and vote.

This was the controlling statute that rendered the Board’s initial removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier unlawful.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

States an association “may” defend itself in litigation.

Provided the legal basis for Henden’s discretionary and permissible decision not to defend the HOA.

HOA CC&Rs Section 8.13

Prohibits leasing for “transient, hotel, club, timeshare or similar purposes” and requires all leases to be for a minimum of six months.

This section was the basis for the original complaint but was deemed not the dispositive issue in the case.

HOA Bylaws Article III

Governs director qualifications, number, and the filling of vacancies.

While relevant to Board governance, these bylaws were superseded by the conflicting and more specific state statute (A.R.S. § 33-1243).

Bonnie Henden Testimony

Stated the removal felt like a “vendetta” and that she consulted three attorneys before deciding not to defend the HOA.

Provided context for the internal Board conflict and established that her actions were taken after seeking extensive legal counsel.

Peter Biondi, Jr. Evidence

Submitted exhibits showing Luzzis and Dubasquier were continuing to advertise their units as VRBOs.

The evidence was acknowledged but deemed irrelevant to the central legal question of whether the Board had the authority to remove them.

Final Order and Conclusion

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

The final decision establishes a clear legal principle: a homeowners association’s Board of Directors does not have the authority to remove its own members in Arizona. That power is reserved for the unit owners through a specific statutory process. Any action taken by a board in contravention of this statute is legally invalid. Consequently, a director’s decision not to defend such an invalid action, especially when based on legal advice, is not a breach of duty but a prudent measure to avoid wasting association resources on a defense with no legal merit.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818048-REL


Study Guide: Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, concerning a dispute between a condominium owner and a homeowners association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific event prompted the Petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs (Section 8.13), what were the rules regarding the leasing of condominium units?

4. Why were Board Directors Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier initially removed from their positions by the other directors?

5. How did Bonnie Henden become the sole remaining member of the Respondent’s Board of Directors?

6. What was the “dispositive issue” that the Administrative Law Judge identified as central to the case?

7. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243(H), what is the proper procedure for removing a member of a condominium association’s board of directors?

8. Why did Ms. Henden choose not to defend the association against the petition filed by Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier?

9. What does the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” mean, as defined in the decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr., who is a condominium owner and a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association. The Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association itself.

2. The Petitioner filed the petition because the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the association against a petition filed by two former directors. Instead of defending the board’s prior action, Ms. Henden reinstated the two directors who had been removed.

3. Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs stipulated that all leases must be for a minimum of six months and that units could not be leased for transient, hotel, or similar purposes. Owners were also limited to leasing their unit no more than two separate times in any 12-month period and had to provide a signed copy of the lease to the association.

4. Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier were removed after other Board members concluded they had violated CC&R Section 8.13 by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rentals By Owner (VRBOs). The removal occurred after they were given 14 days to remedy the violation and failed to do so to the Board’s satisfaction.

5. After the removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier, the Petitioner and another director resigned to “restore calm.” A third director was removed or resigned for failing to pay an assessment, which left Ms. Henden as the only director on the Board.

6. The dispositive issue was not the factual question of whether Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs. Rather, it was the legal issue of whether the other directors had the authority to properly remove them from the Board in the first place.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) states that unit owners may remove a board member by a majority vote at a meeting. This process must be initiated by a petition signed by a specific percentage or number of the association’s members who are eligible to vote.

8. Ms. Henden consulted three different attorneys who advised her that the association would likely lose the case. Their legal advice was based on A.R.S. § 33-1243, which states that board members cannot remove other board members, and defending the improper removal would incur unnecessary legal fees.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Board’s initial removal of the two directors was improper under state law and that Ms. Henden was not required to defend that ill-advised act.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis and synthesis of the case details. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the authority granted to the Board in the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Bylaws (Article III, Sections 2 & 3) and the limitations placed upon it by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243. Explain which document takes precedence in the matter of director removal and why, citing the reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge.

2. Discuss the role and actions of Bonnie Henden after she became the sole remaining director. Evaluate her decision to reinstate Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, considering the legal advice she received, her powers as the sole director, and the potential consequences for the homeowners association.

3. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, beginning with the initial complaints about VRBOs and culminating in the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Identify the key actions, legal filings, and turning points for each party involved (Luzzis/Dubasquier, the Board, Peter Biondi, and Bonnie Henden).

4. The judge states that the case hinges on a legal issue, not a factual one. Explain the difference between the factual issue (the VRBO rentals) and the legal issue (the removal process) and detail how this distinction was fundamental to the case’s outcome.

5. Based on the statutes cited in the decision, outline the correct, legally compliant process that the members of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association should have followed if they wished to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board of Directors. Contrast this with the actions the Board actually took.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, in this case Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The decision references several statutes from Title 33 concerning property and condominiums.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations adopted by an organization, such as a homeowners association, for its internal governance. In this case, they govern matters like annual meetings and the composition of the Board of Directors.

Abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deed that govern what homeowners can and cannot do with their property. Section 8.13 on leasing was a key CC&R in this case.

De Novo Review

A type of legal review where a court or administrative body decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous party that heard the case. It is used for determining the construction and application of statutes.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium associations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof (the Petitioner in this matter) to present evidence that is more convincing and more likely to be true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association.

Abbreviation for Vacation Rental By Owner, referring to the practice of renting out properties on a short-term basis, similar to a hotel. This practice was alleged to be in violation of the association’s CC&Rs.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818048-REL


Study Guide: Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, concerning a dispute between a condominium owner and a homeowners association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific event prompted the Petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs (Section 8.13), what were the rules regarding the leasing of condominium units?

4. Why were Board Directors Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier initially removed from their positions by the other directors?

5. How did Bonnie Henden become the sole remaining member of the Respondent’s Board of Directors?

6. What was the “dispositive issue” that the Administrative Law Judge identified as central to the case?

7. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243(H), what is the proper procedure for removing a member of a condominium association’s board of directors?

8. Why did Ms. Henden choose not to defend the association against the petition filed by Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier?

9. What does the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” mean, as defined in the decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr., who is a condominium owner and a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association. The Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association itself.

2. The Petitioner filed the petition because the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the association against a petition filed by two former directors. Instead of defending the board’s prior action, Ms. Henden reinstated the two directors who had been removed.

3. Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs stipulated that all leases must be for a minimum of six months and that units could not be leased for transient, hotel, or similar purposes. Owners were also limited to leasing their unit no more than two separate times in any 12-month period and had to provide a signed copy of the lease to the association.

4. Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier were removed after other Board members concluded they had violated CC&R Section 8.13 by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rentals By Owner (VRBOs). The removal occurred after they were given 14 days to remedy the violation and failed to do so to the Board’s satisfaction.

5. After the removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier, the Petitioner and another director resigned to “restore calm.” A third director was removed or resigned for failing to pay an assessment, which left Ms. Henden as the only director on the Board.

6. The dispositive issue was not the factual question of whether Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs. Rather, it was the legal issue of whether the other directors had the authority to properly remove them from the Board in the first place.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) states that unit owners may remove a board member by a majority vote at a meeting. This process must be initiated by a petition signed by a specific percentage or number of the association’s members who are eligible to vote.

8. Ms. Henden consulted three different attorneys who advised her that the association would likely lose the case. Their legal advice was based on A.R.S. § 33-1243, which states that board members cannot remove other board members, and defending the improper removal would incur unnecessary legal fees.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Board’s initial removal of the two directors was improper under state law and that Ms. Henden was not required to defend that ill-advised act.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis and synthesis of the case details. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the authority granted to the Board in the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Bylaws (Article III, Sections 2 & 3) and the limitations placed upon it by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243. Explain which document takes precedence in the matter of director removal and why, citing the reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge.

2. Discuss the role and actions of Bonnie Henden after she became the sole remaining director. Evaluate her decision to reinstate Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, considering the legal advice she received, her powers as the sole director, and the potential consequences for the homeowners association.

3. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, beginning with the initial complaints about VRBOs and culminating in the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Identify the key actions, legal filings, and turning points for each party involved (Luzzis/Dubasquier, the Board, Peter Biondi, and Bonnie Henden).

4. The judge states that the case hinges on a legal issue, not a factual one. Explain the difference between the factual issue (the VRBO rentals) and the legal issue (the removal process) and detail how this distinction was fundamental to the case’s outcome.

5. Based on the statutes cited in the decision, outline the correct, legally compliant process that the members of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association should have followed if they wished to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board of Directors. Contrast this with the actions the Board actually took.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, in this case Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The decision references several statutes from Title 33 concerning property and condominiums.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations adopted by an organization, such as a homeowners association, for its internal governance. In this case, they govern matters like annual meetings and the composition of the Board of Directors.

Abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deed that govern what homeowners can and cannot do with their property. Section 8.13 on leasing was a key CC&R in this case.

De Novo Review

A type of legal review where a court or administrative body decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous party that heard the case. It is used for determining the construction and application of statutes.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium associations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof (the Petitioner in this matter) to present evidence that is more convincing and more likely to be true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association.

Abbreviation for Vacation Rental By Owner, referring to the practice of renting out properties on a short-term basis, similar to a hotel. This practice was alleged to be in violation of the association’s CC&Rs.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Peter Biondi, Jr. (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; also a unit owner and HOA member
  • Jeffrey Washburn (witness)
    Former Board member; presented testimony by Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Maria R. Kupillas (HOA attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
    Represented Respondent
  • Bonnie Henden (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Sole remaining Director; presented testimony
  • Jim Luzzis (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Director whose removal was overturned/reinstated
  • Jerry Dubasquier (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Director whose removal was overturned/reinstated

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
    Transmitting agent
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome total
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:07 (142.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818042-REL


Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818042-REL


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818042-REL, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action by the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA) prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. What were the allegations made against candidates Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell prior to the March 20, 2018 election?

4. State the vote counts for the top three candidates who were elected to the Board of Directors on March 20, 2018.

5. What was the reason given by the Board’s president, Lance Van Horne, for calling a special recall election for April 24, 2018?

6. What were the specific outcomes for each of the three board members facing recall in the April 24, 2018 election?

7. Which two Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) were at the center of the legal dispute, and what general topics do they cover?

8. What was the HOA’s primary legal argument for why its president was permitted to call the special recall meeting?

9. What legal principle of statutory construction did the Administrative Law Judge use to resolve the conflict between the two statutes?

10. What two things was the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, ordered to do in the final ruling?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, the Petitioner, who is a homeowner and member of the association, and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner initiated the legal action against the HOA.

2. The Petitioner filed the complaint because the HOA’s president called a special meeting to hold a vote on recalling three recently elected members of the Board of Directors. The Petitioner alleged this action violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition signed by homeowners.

3. Prior to the March election, reports were made that Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell were going door-to-door disseminating allegedly false information about the HOA’s finances. They were also accused of “harvesting ballots” from members based on this information.

4. The top three candidates elected on March 20, 2018, were Roxanne Gould with 30 votes, Steve Brownell with 26 votes, and Trish Brownell with 25 votes.

5. Board president Lance Van Horne called the special recall election because he felt the election’s outcome was compromised. He believed the dissemination of allegedly false information and the harvesting of votes by the Brownells and Ms. Gould had tainted the results.

6. In the April 24 recall election, Roxanne Gould survived the recall with 27 votes against to 25 for. Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell were both removed from the board, with 27 votes for their recall and 25 against.

7. The statutes at the center of the dispute were A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically covers the “Removal of board member; special meeting,” while A.R.S. § 33-1804 is a more general statute concerning “Open meetings.”

8. The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the only procedure for calling a recall meeting. It contended that the procedures in the more general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which allows the president to call a special meeting, could also be used.

9. The judge applied the well-established common law principle that when a general statute and a specific statute on the same subject are in conflict, the specific statute controls. Therefore, the specific procedures for recall in A.R.S. § 33-1813 took precedence over the general meeting rules in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the removed board members, Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell. The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

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Essay Questions

1. Trace the complete timeline of events described in the decision, beginning with the failed meeting on February 20, 2018, and concluding with the judge’s final order. For each key date, describe the event that occurred, the people involved, and the outcome of the event.

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of Arizona state law presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Explain which specific clauses of A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 each party relied upon to justify their position regarding the legality of the April 24, 2018 recall meeting.

3. The decision states that the case presents a “pure legal issue of statutory interpretation.” Explain what this means and how it affects the burden of proof. Describe in detail the canons of statutory construction cited by the judge and how she applied them to rule in favor of the Petitioner.

4. Discuss the role of the allegations of misconduct (disseminating false information and harvesting ballots) against the newly elected board members. How did these allegations act as a catalyst for the recall election, and what was their ultimate relevance (or lack thereof) to the final legal conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge?

5. Based on the judge’s “Conclusions of Law,” explain the definitive legal procedure for an HOA in Arizona, with 1,000 or fewer members, to initiate the removal of a board member. Detail the petition requirements, signature thresholds, and meeting notice timelines as established by the controlling statute, A.R.S. § 33-1813.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the homeowners’ association, elected by the members.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation.

De Novo Review

A type of review where a court or judge decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the previous party in the case. This was applied because the issue was a pure matter of statutory interpretation.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Standard

The level of proof required to convince the trier of fact. In this case, the standard was a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that governs the Carter Ranch development, of which all lot owners are members.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, it was homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is more probably true than not.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at a meeting for the proceedings of that meeting to be valid. In the March 20 election, the quorum was 47 homeowners.

Recall Election

A special vote held to determine whether to remove an elected official (in this case, board members) from office before the end of their term.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of an association’s members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled annual meetings. The April 24 recall vote was a special meeting.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used common-law canons of statutory construction to resolve the conflict between the two A.R.S. sections.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818042-REL


Majority Rules? Not in This HOA: How One Homeowner Overturned a Recall Election on a Technicality

The Unruly World of Neighborhood Politics

In the world of Homeowners Associations, a majority vote is typically the final word. But for the Carter Ranch HOA, a 27-to-25 recall vote meant to oust two board members became the start of a legal battle, not the end. This case reveals a crucial lesson in community governance: when a board president’s unilateral action clashes with statutory procedure, the will of the majority can be rendered completely irrelevant.

A Democratic Vote Can Be Completely Ignored

On April 24, 2018, the Carter Ranch HOA held a special recall election targeting three recently elected board members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell. A quorum of 52 homeowners participated, and the vote was a split decision. Roxanne Gould survived the recall attempt, with 27 votes against her removal and 25 for it. However, Steve and Trish Brownell were successfully voted off the board by a clear majority of 27 to 25.

The twist came later, in a judge’s chambers. Despite the democratic outcome, an Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reinstate the Brownells. This counter-intuitive decision wasn’t the result of voter fraud or a miscount. The entire election was nullified because of a critical procedural error made by the HOA president before a single ballot was cast.

An HOA President Can’t Unilaterally Oust Board Members

The conflict began after a heated board election on March 20, 2018. The board president at the time, Lance Van Horne, felt the election’s outcome was “compromised.” He believed three newly elected members had won their seats by disseminating “allegedly false information” and “harvesting of votes.”

In response, Mr. Van Horne took decisive action. Believing he was correcting a wrong, he personally called for a special meeting to hold a recall election. This unilateral action became the sole basis for the legal challenge that followed. While the president’s concerns about election integrity were the catalyst for the drama, the court’s subsequent decision would demonstrate that his motives were entirely irrelevant. The only thing that mattered was the procedure he followed—or in this case, failed to follow.

The “Specific Beats General” Rule Is King

The HOA’s legal defense rested on a general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which grants an association’s president the power to call special meetings for various purposes. They argued this general power included the authority to call a recall meeting.

However, the homeowner who challenged the recall pointed to a different, more specific law. A.R.S. § 33-1813 is a statute written exclusively for the purpose of removing board members. This specific law dictates that a recall process can only be initiated upon receipt of a petition signed by a required number of homeowners. The president cannot simply decide to do it alone.

The judge’s decision hinged on a foundational principle of legal interpretation. As cited in the final order:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Because the HOA president initiated the recall without first receiving the required petition from the homeowners, he failed to follow the specific procedure mandated by law. As a result, the entire recall election was declared invalid from the start.

One Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge an Entire HOA

This entire case was set in motion not by a group of disgruntled residents, but by a single individual. Homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a “single-issue petition” with the state, challenging the validity of the president’s action. His understanding of the specific rules governing board member removal proved to be the key that unraveled the HOA’s actions.

The final court order was a complete victory for the petitioner:

• His petition was granted.

• The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members, Steve and Trish Brownell.

• The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the petitioner for his $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome serves as an empowering example of how a single member, armed with knowledge of the governing documents and statutes, can hold an association’s leadership accountable and ensure that proper procedures are followed.

Conclusion: Rules, Not Rulers

The Carter Ranch case is a powerful illustration that in community governance, established process is not a technicality—it is the bedrock of legitimacy. The board’s failure to adhere to the specific statute for recalls (A.R.S. § 33-1813) created a fatal procedural flaw that no amount of good intention or majority support could cure. This serves as a stark reminder for all HOA boards: power is derived from the meticulous application of rules, not the perceived authority of rulers. Ignoring this principle doesn’t just invalidate an action; it exposes the association to legal challenges, financial penalties, and a loss of credibility with the community it governs. Do you know the specific rules that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Chad M. Gallacher (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Represented Respondent
  • Mary Chaira (Community Manager)
    Witness for Respondent
  • Lance Van Horne (Board President)
    Called the special recall election which led to the petition,,

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received decision
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Roxanne Gould (board member)
    Elected board member; subject of recall attempt,,
  • Steve Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Trish Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Steve F. (candidate)
    Candidate in board election
  • Dave (candidate)
    Candidate in board election

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome total
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:50 (142.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818042-REL


Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818042-REL


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818042-REL, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action by the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA) prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. What were the allegations made against candidates Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell prior to the March 20, 2018 election?

4. State the vote counts for the top three candidates who were elected to the Board of Directors on March 20, 2018.

5. What was the reason given by the Board’s president, Lance Van Horne, for calling a special recall election for April 24, 2018?

6. What were the specific outcomes for each of the three board members facing recall in the April 24, 2018 election?

7. Which two Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) were at the center of the legal dispute, and what general topics do they cover?

8. What was the HOA’s primary legal argument for why its president was permitted to call the special recall meeting?

9. What legal principle of statutory construction did the Administrative Law Judge use to resolve the conflict between the two statutes?

10. What two things was the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, ordered to do in the final ruling?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, the Petitioner, who is a homeowner and member of the association, and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner initiated the legal action against the HOA.

2. The Petitioner filed the complaint because the HOA’s president called a special meeting to hold a vote on recalling three recently elected members of the Board of Directors. The Petitioner alleged this action violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition signed by homeowners.

3. Prior to the March election, reports were made that Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell were going door-to-door disseminating allegedly false information about the HOA’s finances. They were also accused of “harvesting ballots” from members based on this information.

4. The top three candidates elected on March 20, 2018, were Roxanne Gould with 30 votes, Steve Brownell with 26 votes, and Trish Brownell with 25 votes.

5. Board president Lance Van Horne called the special recall election because he felt the election’s outcome was compromised. He believed the dissemination of allegedly false information and the harvesting of votes by the Brownells and Ms. Gould had tainted the results.

6. In the April 24 recall election, Roxanne Gould survived the recall with 27 votes against to 25 for. Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell were both removed from the board, with 27 votes for their recall and 25 against.

7. The statutes at the center of the dispute were A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically covers the “Removal of board member; special meeting,” while A.R.S. § 33-1804 is a more general statute concerning “Open meetings.”

8. The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the only procedure for calling a recall meeting. It contended that the procedures in the more general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which allows the president to call a special meeting, could also be used.

9. The judge applied the well-established common law principle that when a general statute and a specific statute on the same subject are in conflict, the specific statute controls. Therefore, the specific procedures for recall in A.R.S. § 33-1813 took precedence over the general meeting rules in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the removed board members, Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell. The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

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Essay Questions

1. Trace the complete timeline of events described in the decision, beginning with the failed meeting on February 20, 2018, and concluding with the judge’s final order. For each key date, describe the event that occurred, the people involved, and the outcome of the event.

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of Arizona state law presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Explain which specific clauses of A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 each party relied upon to justify their position regarding the legality of the April 24, 2018 recall meeting.

3. The decision states that the case presents a “pure legal issue of statutory interpretation.” Explain what this means and how it affects the burden of proof. Describe in detail the canons of statutory construction cited by the judge and how she applied them to rule in favor of the Petitioner.

4. Discuss the role of the allegations of misconduct (disseminating false information and harvesting ballots) against the newly elected board members. How did these allegations act as a catalyst for the recall election, and what was their ultimate relevance (or lack thereof) to the final legal conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge?

5. Based on the judge’s “Conclusions of Law,” explain the definitive legal procedure for an HOA in Arizona, with 1,000 or fewer members, to initiate the removal of a board member. Detail the petition requirements, signature thresholds, and meeting notice timelines as established by the controlling statute, A.R.S. § 33-1813.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the homeowners’ association, elected by the members.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation.

De Novo Review

A type of review where a court or judge decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the previous party in the case. This was applied because the issue was a pure matter of statutory interpretation.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Standard

The level of proof required to convince the trier of fact. In this case, the standard was a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that governs the Carter Ranch development, of which all lot owners are members.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, it was homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is more probably true than not.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at a meeting for the proceedings of that meeting to be valid. In the March 20 election, the quorum was 47 homeowners.

Recall Election

A special vote held to determine whether to remove an elected official (in this case, board members) from office before the end of their term.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of an association’s members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled annual meetings. The April 24 recall vote was a special meeting.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used common-law canons of statutory construction to resolve the conflict between the two A.R.S. sections.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818042-REL


Majority Rules? Not in This HOA: How One Homeowner Overturned a Recall Election on a Technicality

The Unruly World of Neighborhood Politics

In the world of Homeowners Associations, a majority vote is typically the final word. But for the Carter Ranch HOA, a 27-to-25 recall vote meant to oust two board members became the start of a legal battle, not the end. This case reveals a crucial lesson in community governance: when a board president’s unilateral action clashes with statutory procedure, the will of the majority can be rendered completely irrelevant.

A Democratic Vote Can Be Completely Ignored

On April 24, 2018, the Carter Ranch HOA held a special recall election targeting three recently elected board members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell. A quorum of 52 homeowners participated, and the vote was a split decision. Roxanne Gould survived the recall attempt, with 27 votes against her removal and 25 for it. However, Steve and Trish Brownell were successfully voted off the board by a clear majority of 27 to 25.

The twist came later, in a judge’s chambers. Despite the democratic outcome, an Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reinstate the Brownells. This counter-intuitive decision wasn’t the result of voter fraud or a miscount. The entire election was nullified because of a critical procedural error made by the HOA president before a single ballot was cast.

An HOA President Can’t Unilaterally Oust Board Members

The conflict began after a heated board election on March 20, 2018. The board president at the time, Lance Van Horne, felt the election’s outcome was “compromised.” He believed three newly elected members had won their seats by disseminating “allegedly false information” and “harvesting of votes.”

In response, Mr. Van Horne took decisive action. Believing he was correcting a wrong, he personally called for a special meeting to hold a recall election. This unilateral action became the sole basis for the legal challenge that followed. While the president’s concerns about election integrity were the catalyst for the drama, the court’s subsequent decision would demonstrate that his motives were entirely irrelevant. The only thing that mattered was the procedure he followed—or in this case, failed to follow.

The “Specific Beats General” Rule Is King

The HOA’s legal defense rested on a general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which grants an association’s president the power to call special meetings for various purposes. They argued this general power included the authority to call a recall meeting.

However, the homeowner who challenged the recall pointed to a different, more specific law. A.R.S. § 33-1813 is a statute written exclusively for the purpose of removing board members. This specific law dictates that a recall process can only be initiated upon receipt of a petition signed by a required number of homeowners. The president cannot simply decide to do it alone.

The judge’s decision hinged on a foundational principle of legal interpretation. As cited in the final order:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Because the HOA president initiated the recall without first receiving the required petition from the homeowners, he failed to follow the specific procedure mandated by law. As a result, the entire recall election was declared invalid from the start.

One Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge an Entire HOA

This entire case was set in motion not by a group of disgruntled residents, but by a single individual. Homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a “single-issue petition” with the state, challenging the validity of the president’s action. His understanding of the specific rules governing board member removal proved to be the key that unraveled the HOA’s actions.

The final court order was a complete victory for the petitioner:

• His petition was granted.

• The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members, Steve and Trish Brownell.

• The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the petitioner for his $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome serves as an empowering example of how a single member, armed with knowledge of the governing documents and statutes, can hold an association’s leadership accountable and ensure that proper procedures are followed.

Conclusion: Rules, Not Rulers

The Carter Ranch case is a powerful illustration that in community governance, established process is not a technicality—it is the bedrock of legitimacy. The board’s failure to adhere to the specific statute for recalls (A.R.S. § 33-1813) created a fatal procedural flaw that no amount of good intention or majority support could cure. This serves as a stark reminder for all HOA boards: power is derived from the meticulous application of rules, not the perceived authority of rulers. Ignoring this principle doesn’t just invalidate an action; it exposes the association to legal challenges, financial penalties, and a loss of credibility with the community it governs. Do you know the specific rules that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Chad M. Gallacher (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Represented Respondent
  • Mary Chaira (Community Manager)
    Witness for Respondent
  • Lance Van Horne (Board President)
    Called the special recall election which led to the petition,,

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received decision
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Roxanne Gould (board member)
    Elected board member; subject of recall attempt,,
  • Steve Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Trish Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Steve F. (candidate)
    Candidate in board election
  • Dave (candidate)
    Candidate in board election

Debbie Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-04-26
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debbie Westerman Counsel
Respondent Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. aka Bridgewood Townhomes Counsel Mark E. Lines and R. Patrick Whelan

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 5(G)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the HOA's denial was unreasonable or that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU block was inferior to the 8” x 8” x 16” CMU block she requested, and compliance with the HOA's reasonable specifications was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable denial of architectural request to build a courtyard wall

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks, which did not comply with the HOA's Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner failed to establish that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request which did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • CC&R § 5(G)
  • CC&R § 7(B)
  • CC&R § 5(J)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Review, Wall Construction, CMU block, Architectural Standard
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818028-REL Decision – 631265.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:15 (161.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818028-REL


Briefing Document: Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818028-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Debbie Westerman versus the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict involved the HOA’s denial of Ms. Westerman’s architectural request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) blocks, which deviated from the association’s established standard of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s architectural standards were reasonable and established to maintain the community’s original design integrity. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the HOA’s denial was unreasonable or that the specified building materials were in any significant way inferior. The HOA successfully argued that its “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” in place since 2005, were created to preserve the architectural continuity of the original “Al Beadle design” and have been consistently applied to numerous other homeowner projects.

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

Parties:

Petitioner: Debbie Westerman, owner of condominium unit 31 in Bridgewood Townhomes.

Respondent: Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (also known as Bridgewood Townhomes).

Jurisdiction: The case was heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2018.

Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to build a courtyard wall with 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks. The HOA’s established specification required the use of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

2. Chronology of the Dispute

The key events leading to the administrative hearing occurred between October 2017 and January 2018.

Oct 25, 2017

Michael Brubaker, the HOA Board President, emailed the petitioner with the association’s “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

Oct 25, 2017

The petitioner submitted an Architectural Request to build a wall with 8″ x 8″ x 16″ CMU blocks, acknowledging the deviation from specifications.

Oct 25, 2017

Mr. Brubaker sent a follow-up email cautioning the petitioner not to pre-order non-conforming materials as her request was not yet approved.

Nov 29, 2017

Mr. Brubaker emailed the petitioner, acknowledging her request as “extraordinary” and stating the Board would need to meet to consider it.

Dec 28, 2017

The petitioner was formally notified of a Board meeting scheduled for January 2, 2018, to review her request.

Jan 2, 2018

The petitioner attended the Board meeting. The Board unanimously rejected her request because it was contrary to the established specifications and “the historical aspects of our compliance structure.” The Board noted its willingness to approve a compliant wall, but the petitioner “stated that she [was] unwilling to comply.”

Jan 8, 2018

The HOA’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioner summarizing the legal basis for the denial.

Jan 23, 2018

The petitioner filed her formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence (Debbie Westerman)

The petitioner’s case was built on three main arguments: the superiority of her proposed materials, the inconsistency of community standards, and the questionable validity of the HOA’s rules.

Material Superiority: The petitioner claimed her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” blocks were stronger, less expensive, and visually identical to the required blocks.

Evidence: She testified that three different contractors advised her that the larger blocks would be cheaper due to needing fewer units and less mortar.

Evidence: Her subcontractor, Richard Ross, testified that using twice as many blocks (as required by the 4″ specification) “doubles the chance of the wall failing.”

Inconsistent Community Standards: The petitioner argued that the HOA did not enforce a uniform aesthetic, negating the need for strict adherence to the block size specification.

Evidence: She submitted photographs (Exhibits A5, A6) of walls at units 34 and 38, owned by Board President Michael Brubaker, which she claimed were built with larger blocks visible through stucco.

Evidence: She submitted a photograph (Exhibit A11) showing courtyard walls of different heights, although wall height was not the subject of her dispute.

Questionable Rule Authenticity: At the hearing, the petitioner challenged the validity of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” document itself.

Argument: She argued the document was not authentic because the HOA did not produce the official Board meeting minutes from 2005 when the rules were allegedly adopted. This challenge was raised for the first time at the hearing.

4. Respondent’s Arguments and Evidence (Bridgewood HOA)

The HOA’s defense was centered on its legal authority, the reasonableness of its established architectural standards, and the consistent enforcement of its rules.

Adherence to Established Architectural Standards: The HOA’s primary defense was that its denial was based on a reasonable and long-standing architectural rule.

Authority: The HOA cited CC&R § 5(J), which grants the Board the authority to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of common elements. Rule 7(a) requires Board approval for any exterior alterations.

Evidence: The HOA submitted the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” (Exhibit 3), which Mr. Brubaker credibly testified was adopted by the Board on March 22, 2005.

Purpose of the Rule: Mr. Brubaker stated the rule’s purpose was to ensure architectural continuity. An email to the petitioner (Exhibit 7) explained:

Consistent Enforcement: The HOA demonstrated that the rule was not arbitrary but had been consistently applied.

Evidence: Mr. Brubaker testified that since the program’s adoption, “twenty-nine homeowners have had applications approved and constructed courtyard walls to specification.” Four additional compliant applications were approved since the petitioner’s submission. A photograph of a recently completed, compliant wall (Ms. Warren’s) was submitted as Exhibit 16.

Rebuttal of Petitioner’s Claims: The HOA directly countered the petitioner’s key arguments.

On Inconsistency: Mr. Brubaker testified that the non-conforming walls at units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980 by the original developer, prior to the HOA assuming control of the property (Exhibit 14).

On Structural Integrity: The HOA submitted two technical bulletins from the National Concrete Masonry Association (Exhibits 19 and 20). These documents stated that 4″ high (“half-high”) units can be considered “structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-in. (203-mm) high unit” as long as the cross-section is the same.

On Cost: The HOA submitted a bid from J E Bowen Construction for $6,165.00 to build a compliant wall for the petitioner’s unit (Exhibit 17). It also noted that another homeowner’s recent compliant wall cost only $4,268.23 (Exhibit 15).

5. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found comprehensively in favor of the Respondent (HOA), denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the petitioner bore the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and failed to do so.

Reasonableness of HOA Standards: The decision affirmed the HOA’s right to establish and enforce aesthetic standards.

Validity of Specifications: The petitioner’s challenge to the authenticity of the HOA’s rules was dismissed. The ALJ found that she “did not establish that Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions was fraudulent or improperly adopted.”

Materiality of Block Type: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her central claim that the larger blocks were superior.

Aesthetic Impact: The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s proposed wall would violate the community’s aesthetic standards, noting that a wall using the larger blocks “would be noticeably different from walls that were constructed in compliance with the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions and other Al Beadle design elements.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request to build a block wall around her patio that did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

The order, issued on April 26, 2018, is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818028-REL


Study Guide: Westerman v. Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818028-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific action by the Respondent was the Petitioner challenging in her petition?

3. According to the Respondent, what was the primary purpose of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions”?

4. What were the three main arguments the Petitioner presented in favor of using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks instead of the specified size?

5. How did the Petitioner attempt to demonstrate that the Respondent’s enforcement of wall specifications was inconsistent?

6. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the non-conforming walls cited by the Petitioner?

7. What evidence did the Respondent present to counter the Petitioner’s claim that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were structurally inferior?

8. Which party bore the “burden of proof” in this case, and what did that require them to establish?

9. On what date did the Respondent’s Board of Directors originally adopt the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions?

10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for the decision?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debbie Westerman, the Petitioner, and the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Ms. Westerman owns condominium unit 31 in the Bridgewood Townhomes development and is therefore a member of the Respondent homeowners’ association.

2. The Petitioner was challenging the Respondent’s denial of her Architectural Request to build a wall around her patio. Specifically, she alleged that the Respondent had unreasonably denied her request to use 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) block, which violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

3. The “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” were developed to provide architectural continuity and standards for courtyard walls. They were intended to ensure that any new walls conformed to the original Al Beadle design represented by other structures on the property, such as the perimeter wall and pool enclosure.

4. The Petitioner argued that her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were stronger, less expensive (requiring fewer blocks and less mortar), and looked the same as the specified blocks. This information was based on advice she received from three different contractors.

5. The Petitioner submitted photographs of courtyard walls at unit nos. 34 and 38, which she testified had larger blocks visible through stucco. She used these examples to argue that walls within the community were not consistent.

6. The Respondent’s Board president, Michael Brubaker, testified that the walls for units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980. This was before the original developer turned the property over to the Respondent homeowners’ association, and therefore before the current specifications were in place.

7. The Respondent submitted two technical documents (TEK 5-15 and TEK 2-2B) from the National Concrete Masonry Association. These documents stated that 4-inch high (“half-high”) units are structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-inch high counterparts, provided the face shell and web thicknesses are the same.

8. The Petitioner, Ms. Westerman, bore the burden of proof. This required her to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request.

9. Michael Brubaker, the Respondent’s Board president, credibly testified that the Board adopted the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions on March 22, 2005.

10. The final ruling was that the Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent’s Board acted unreasonably in denying her request, as the Board’s decision to maintain architectural consistency with the original Al Beadle design was reasonable.

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to test a deeper understanding of the case’s themes and legal principles. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the legal concept of a “restrictive covenant.” Using the CC&Rs from the Bridgewood Townhomes development as an example, explain how these covenants function to regulate property use and how they are interpreted and enforced in a legal dispute.

2. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the structural integrity and cost of the different CMU block sizes. Discuss the quality of the evidence (e.g., expert testimony, technical documents, contractor bids) and explain which side made a more compelling argument on this point.

3. Discuss the role and authority of a homeowners’ association Board of Directors as demonstrated in this case. How did the Board use its authority under the CC&Rs to create and enforce the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” and what does the judge’s decision say about the reasonableness of its actions?

4. The concept of “architectural continuity” and preserving the original “Al Beadle design” was central to the Respondent’s argument. Explain the significance of this argument and analyze why the Administrative Law Judge found it to be a reasonable basis for denying the Petitioner’s request.

5. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, from the Petitioner’s initial Architectural Request in October 2017 through the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision. What do the steps taken by both parties reveal about the formal processes for dispute resolution within this planned community?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition (as used in the source document)

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an agency separate from the Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Request

A formal application submitted by a homeowner to the homeowners’ association for approval of any alterations or additions to the exterior of a unit.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. A set of rules recorded with the county that governs the rights and obligations of property owners within a planned community or condominium development.

Concrete Masonry Unit. A standard-size rectangular block used in construction. In this case, the dispute centered on two sizes: 4” x 8” x 16” and 8” x 8” x 16”.

Common Area

Areas within the development owned by the Homeowners’ Association in trust for the benefit and use of all lot owners.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

Limited Common Elements

Areas, such as the patios or courtyards adjacent to individual units, that are part of the common area but are reserved for the exclusive use of a specific owner.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowner, Debbie Westerman.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil case. It is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the homeowners’ association, Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of the property. The judge notes that if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Subpoena Duces Tecum

A legal order requiring a person to appear and bring specified documents or evidence with them. The decision notes the Petitioner did not request one for the Board meeting minutes.

TEK 2-2B & TEK 5-15

Titles of technical publications from the National Concrete Masonry Association, submitted as evidence by the Respondent to demonstrate the structural equivalence of different-sized CMU blocks.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818028-REL


Why Your HOA Cares About Your Bricks: A Real-Life Legal Battle, Deconstructed

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is a source of quiet frustration. It often involves rules that seem arbitrary, overly specific, or just plain unreasonable. You want to make a practical improvement to your property, but the HOA’s governing documents stand in the way, citing regulations you never knew existed. This friction between individual desire and community standards is common, but rarely does it escalate into a formal legal dispute.

When it does, however, the results can be surprisingly illuminating. Such is the case of Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA in Arizona. Their legal battle wasn’t over a major renovation or a loud party; it was about the specific size of concrete blocks for a new patio wall. On the surface, it seems like a minor disagreement. But a closer look at the administrative law judge’s decision reveals powerful, practical lessons for every homeowner about the hidden legal realities of community governance.

By deconstructing the judge’s final decision, we can uncover four critical lessons that reveal how HOAs wield power and how homeowners can protect themselves.

Takeaway 1: Aesthetic Vision Can Legally Outweigh Practicality

At the heart of the dispute was a simple disagreement over materials. The petitioner, Debbie Westerman, wanted to build her patio wall using 8″x8″x16″ concrete blocks. Her reasoning was entirely practical: a licensed contractor advised her that the larger blocks were “stronger, less expensive, and looks the same.” From a homeowner’s perspective, this seems like an open-and-shut case for approval.

The HOA, however, denied the request. Their position was based not on practicality, but on a specific design vision. The association’s rules, established back in 2005, explicitly required the use of 4″x8″x16″ blocks. The reason? To maintain “architectural continuity” with the property’s original “Al Beadle design.” This wasn’t a vague preference; it was a documented standard intended to conform new construction to the existing visual language of the community, as seen in the “property’s perimeter wall, the original block buildings, the pool area enclosure and buildings, the parking structures, and the walls around the parking areas.”

Ultimately, the judge sided with the HOA. The decision found that the association’s requirement was reasonable because it was aimed at keeping new construction consistent with “significant elements of Bridgewood Townhomes.” This is a crucial lesson: a homeowner’s logical arguments about cost, strength, and appearance can be legally superseded by a community’s well-documented commitment to a specific, even if less tangible, design aesthetic.

Takeaway 2: The Power is in the Paper Trail

The HOA’s entire case rested on the strength of a single key document: the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.” This document, which the board officially adopted on March 22, 2005, clearly outlined the requirement for the 4-inch blocks.

Crucially, the petitioner only challenged the authenticity of this document for the first time during the hearing itself, arguing the HOA had not produced the original meeting minutes that adopted it. The judge deemed this last-minute challenge inadmissible. Why? Crucially, the judge noted that the homeowner had failed to use the proper legal procedures to demand the HOA produce those records ahead of time, making her challenge too little, too late. The HOA, meanwhile, demonstrated a long history of consistent enforcement. Before Ms. Westerman’s request, the association had already approved 29 other courtyard walls, all built according to the 2005 specifications.

This highlights a critical lesson: an HOA’s power is codified in its paper trail. The governing documents—from the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) down to specific board-adopted rules—carry immense legal weight.

Pro Tip: Your HOA’s governing documents are more than just the CC&Rs you received at closing. Formally request and review all board-adopted rules, architectural guidelines, and meeting minutes related to your planned project hiring a contractor or submitting an application.

Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner

Many people might assume that in a dispute, the powerful organization (the HOA) has the responsibility to prove its rules are fair and justified. The legal reality is often the exact opposite.

The judge’s decision explicitly stated that the “burden of proof” was on Ms. Westerman to establish that the HOA had acted unreasonably. It was not the HOA’s job to prove their rule was perfect; it was the homeowner’s job to prove the denial was improper. To meet this high legal standard, defined as a “preponderance of the evidence,” you need convincing proof.

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

This case provides a masterclass in what constitutes convincing proof. Ms. Westerman’s evidence that the 8-inch blocks were superior came from the testimony of her contractor’s unlicensed subcontractor. In sharp contrast, the HOA submitted two technical documents from the National Concrete Masonry Association—a neutral, expert authority—which demonstrated that the required 4-inch blocks are “structurally equivalent” to their 8-inch counterparts. The homeowner brought an opinion to a legal fight; the HOA brought expert documentation.

Actionable Advice: If you choose to challenge an HOA decision, understand that personal testimony and contractor opinions are often insufficient. To meet the ‘burden of proof,’ you must be prepared to counter the HOA’s documented rules with equally strong evidence, such as independent engineering reports, surveys, or expert testimony.

Takeaway 4: An HOA Rule Can Be a “Win-Win Program”

While it’s easy to view HOA rules as purely restrictive, the association’s board president, Michael Brubaker, offered a completely different perspective. He framed the wall policy not as a limitation, but as a benefit designed to increase the value and security of the entire community.

In an email to the petitioner, he explained the board’s original thinking behind allowing the walls in the first place, calling it a “win win program.”

A courtyard wall allowed homeowners to expand their homes with an exclusive-use courtyard space, enhance privacy, and improve security, which resulted in an increased individual property value that subsequently raised all property values. Additionally, the Association reduced costs by reducing the common area to be maintained. This is a win win program.

This viewpoint is bolstered by another critical fact: the HOA assumes maintenance responsibility for the walls after they are built. This reinforces the logic behind the rule. Uniformity isn’t just about aesthetics; it’s about the long-term, collective cost and labor of maintaining these structures, making a consistent standard a practical and financial concern for the entire association.

Conclusion: Beyond the Bricks

The dispute between Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA was, on its face, about the size of concrete blocks. But the legal decision reveals a much deeper story about community living. It’s a story about how a shared aesthetic vision, when properly documented, can become legally enforceable. It’s a confirmation of the immense power of written rules and the critical importance of bringing credible evidence to a dispute. And it’s a reminder that the legal burden often falls on the individual to challenge the collective.

This case demonstrates that behind a seemingly petty disagreement lies a complex reality of legal precedent, established processes, and a community’s right to define and defend its character. The next time you encounter a seemingly arbitrary HOA rule, will you see it as a simple restriction, or will you look for the deeper story of community standards and legal precedent behind it?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debbie Westerman (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf
  • Kelly Zernich (witness)
    Petitioner's realtor
  • Richard Ross (witness)
    Petitioner's contractor's subcontractor

Respondent Side

  • Mark E. Lines (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines, LLC
  • R. Patrick Whelan (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines, LLC
  • Michael Brubaker (board member/witness)
    Respondent's Board president

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barb Warren (homeowner/applicant)
    Application approved by the Board (used for comparison)
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
    Transmitted the decision electronically

Debbie Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-04-26
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debbie Westerman Counsel
Respondent Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. aka Bridgewood Townhomes Counsel Mark E. Lines and R. Patrick Whelan

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 5(G)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the HOA's denial was unreasonable or that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU block was inferior to the 8” x 8” x 16” CMU block she requested, and compliance with the HOA's reasonable specifications was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable denial of architectural request to build a courtyard wall

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks, which did not comply with the HOA's Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner failed to establish that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request which did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • CC&R § 5(G)
  • CC&R § 7(B)
  • CC&R § 5(J)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Review, Wall Construction, CMU block, Architectural Standard
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818028-REL Decision – 631265.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:31 (161.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818028-REL


Briefing Document: Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818028-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Debbie Westerman versus the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict involved the HOA’s denial of Ms. Westerman’s architectural request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) blocks, which deviated from the association’s established standard of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s architectural standards were reasonable and established to maintain the community’s original design integrity. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the HOA’s denial was unreasonable or that the specified building materials were in any significant way inferior. The HOA successfully argued that its “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” in place since 2005, were created to preserve the architectural continuity of the original “Al Beadle design” and have been consistently applied to numerous other homeowner projects.

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

Parties:

Petitioner: Debbie Westerman, owner of condominium unit 31 in Bridgewood Townhomes.

Respondent: Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (also known as Bridgewood Townhomes).

Jurisdiction: The case was heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2018.

Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to build a courtyard wall with 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks. The HOA’s established specification required the use of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

2. Chronology of the Dispute

The key events leading to the administrative hearing occurred between October 2017 and January 2018.

Oct 25, 2017

Michael Brubaker, the HOA Board President, emailed the petitioner with the association’s “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

Oct 25, 2017

The petitioner submitted an Architectural Request to build a wall with 8″ x 8″ x 16″ CMU blocks, acknowledging the deviation from specifications.

Oct 25, 2017

Mr. Brubaker sent a follow-up email cautioning the petitioner not to pre-order non-conforming materials as her request was not yet approved.

Nov 29, 2017

Mr. Brubaker emailed the petitioner, acknowledging her request as “extraordinary” and stating the Board would need to meet to consider it.

Dec 28, 2017

The petitioner was formally notified of a Board meeting scheduled for January 2, 2018, to review her request.

Jan 2, 2018

The petitioner attended the Board meeting. The Board unanimously rejected her request because it was contrary to the established specifications and “the historical aspects of our compliance structure.” The Board noted its willingness to approve a compliant wall, but the petitioner “stated that she [was] unwilling to comply.”

Jan 8, 2018

The HOA’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioner summarizing the legal basis for the denial.

Jan 23, 2018

The petitioner filed her formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence (Debbie Westerman)

The petitioner’s case was built on three main arguments: the superiority of her proposed materials, the inconsistency of community standards, and the questionable validity of the HOA’s rules.

Material Superiority: The petitioner claimed her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” blocks were stronger, less expensive, and visually identical to the required blocks.

Evidence: She testified that three different contractors advised her that the larger blocks would be cheaper due to needing fewer units and less mortar.

Evidence: Her subcontractor, Richard Ross, testified that using twice as many blocks (as required by the 4″ specification) “doubles the chance of the wall failing.”

Inconsistent Community Standards: The petitioner argued that the HOA did not enforce a uniform aesthetic, negating the need for strict adherence to the block size specification.

Evidence: She submitted photographs (Exhibits A5, A6) of walls at units 34 and 38, owned by Board President Michael Brubaker, which she claimed were built with larger blocks visible through stucco.

Evidence: She submitted a photograph (Exhibit A11) showing courtyard walls of different heights, although wall height was not the subject of her dispute.

Questionable Rule Authenticity: At the hearing, the petitioner challenged the validity of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” document itself.

Argument: She argued the document was not authentic because the HOA did not produce the official Board meeting minutes from 2005 when the rules were allegedly adopted. This challenge was raised for the first time at the hearing.

4. Respondent’s Arguments and Evidence (Bridgewood HOA)

The HOA’s defense was centered on its legal authority, the reasonableness of its established architectural standards, and the consistent enforcement of its rules.

Adherence to Established Architectural Standards: The HOA’s primary defense was that its denial was based on a reasonable and long-standing architectural rule.

Authority: The HOA cited CC&R § 5(J), which grants the Board the authority to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of common elements. Rule 7(a) requires Board approval for any exterior alterations.

Evidence: The HOA submitted the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” (Exhibit 3), which Mr. Brubaker credibly testified was adopted by the Board on March 22, 2005.

Purpose of the Rule: Mr. Brubaker stated the rule’s purpose was to ensure architectural continuity. An email to the petitioner (Exhibit 7) explained:

Consistent Enforcement: The HOA demonstrated that the rule was not arbitrary but had been consistently applied.

Evidence: Mr. Brubaker testified that since the program’s adoption, “twenty-nine homeowners have had applications approved and constructed courtyard walls to specification.” Four additional compliant applications were approved since the petitioner’s submission. A photograph of a recently completed, compliant wall (Ms. Warren’s) was submitted as Exhibit 16.

Rebuttal of Petitioner’s Claims: The HOA directly countered the petitioner’s key arguments.

On Inconsistency: Mr. Brubaker testified that the non-conforming walls at units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980 by the original developer, prior to the HOA assuming control of the property (Exhibit 14).

On Structural Integrity: The HOA submitted two technical bulletins from the National Concrete Masonry Association (Exhibits 19 and 20). These documents stated that 4″ high (“half-high”) units can be considered “structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-in. (203-mm) high unit” as long as the cross-section is the same.

On Cost: The HOA submitted a bid from J E Bowen Construction for $6,165.00 to build a compliant wall for the petitioner’s unit (Exhibit 17). It also noted that another homeowner’s recent compliant wall cost only $4,268.23 (Exhibit 15).

5. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found comprehensively in favor of the Respondent (HOA), denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the petitioner bore the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and failed to do so.

Reasonableness of HOA Standards: The decision affirmed the HOA’s right to establish and enforce aesthetic standards.

Validity of Specifications: The petitioner’s challenge to the authenticity of the HOA’s rules was dismissed. The ALJ found that she “did not establish that Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions was fraudulent or improperly adopted.”

Materiality of Block Type: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her central claim that the larger blocks were superior.

Aesthetic Impact: The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s proposed wall would violate the community’s aesthetic standards, noting that a wall using the larger blocks “would be noticeably different from walls that were constructed in compliance with the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions and other Al Beadle design elements.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request to build a block wall around her patio that did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

The order, issued on April 26, 2018, is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818028-REL


Study Guide: Westerman v. Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818028-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific action by the Respondent was the Petitioner challenging in her petition?

3. According to the Respondent, what was the primary purpose of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions”?

4. What were the three main arguments the Petitioner presented in favor of using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks instead of the specified size?

5. How did the Petitioner attempt to demonstrate that the Respondent’s enforcement of wall specifications was inconsistent?

6. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the non-conforming walls cited by the Petitioner?

7. What evidence did the Respondent present to counter the Petitioner’s claim that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were structurally inferior?

8. Which party bore the “burden of proof” in this case, and what did that require them to establish?

9. On what date did the Respondent’s Board of Directors originally adopt the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions?

10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for the decision?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debbie Westerman, the Petitioner, and the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Ms. Westerman owns condominium unit 31 in the Bridgewood Townhomes development and is therefore a member of the Respondent homeowners’ association.

2. The Petitioner was challenging the Respondent’s denial of her Architectural Request to build a wall around her patio. Specifically, she alleged that the Respondent had unreasonably denied her request to use 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) block, which violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

3. The “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” were developed to provide architectural continuity and standards for courtyard walls. They were intended to ensure that any new walls conformed to the original Al Beadle design represented by other structures on the property, such as the perimeter wall and pool enclosure.

4. The Petitioner argued that her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were stronger, less expensive (requiring fewer blocks and less mortar), and looked the same as the specified blocks. This information was based on advice she received from three different contractors.

5. The Petitioner submitted photographs of courtyard walls at unit nos. 34 and 38, which she testified had larger blocks visible through stucco. She used these examples to argue that walls within the community were not consistent.

6. The Respondent’s Board president, Michael Brubaker, testified that the walls for units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980. This was before the original developer turned the property over to the Respondent homeowners’ association, and therefore before the current specifications were in place.

7. The Respondent submitted two technical documents (TEK 5-15 and TEK 2-2B) from the National Concrete Masonry Association. These documents stated that 4-inch high (“half-high”) units are structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-inch high counterparts, provided the face shell and web thicknesses are the same.

8. The Petitioner, Ms. Westerman, bore the burden of proof. This required her to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request.

9. Michael Brubaker, the Respondent’s Board president, credibly testified that the Board adopted the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions on March 22, 2005.

10. The final ruling was that the Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent’s Board acted unreasonably in denying her request, as the Board’s decision to maintain architectural consistency with the original Al Beadle design was reasonable.

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to test a deeper understanding of the case’s themes and legal principles. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the legal concept of a “restrictive covenant.” Using the CC&Rs from the Bridgewood Townhomes development as an example, explain how these covenants function to regulate property use and how they are interpreted and enforced in a legal dispute.

2. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the structural integrity and cost of the different CMU block sizes. Discuss the quality of the evidence (e.g., expert testimony, technical documents, contractor bids) and explain which side made a more compelling argument on this point.

3. Discuss the role and authority of a homeowners’ association Board of Directors as demonstrated in this case. How did the Board use its authority under the CC&Rs to create and enforce the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” and what does the judge’s decision say about the reasonableness of its actions?

4. The concept of “architectural continuity” and preserving the original “Al Beadle design” was central to the Respondent’s argument. Explain the significance of this argument and analyze why the Administrative Law Judge found it to be a reasonable basis for denying the Petitioner’s request.

5. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, from the Petitioner’s initial Architectural Request in October 2017 through the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision. What do the steps taken by both parties reveal about the formal processes for dispute resolution within this planned community?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition (as used in the source document)

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an agency separate from the Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Request

A formal application submitted by a homeowner to the homeowners’ association for approval of any alterations or additions to the exterior of a unit.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. A set of rules recorded with the county that governs the rights and obligations of property owners within a planned community or condominium development.

Concrete Masonry Unit. A standard-size rectangular block used in construction. In this case, the dispute centered on two sizes: 4” x 8” x 16” and 8” x 8” x 16”.

Common Area

Areas within the development owned by the Homeowners’ Association in trust for the benefit and use of all lot owners.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

Limited Common Elements

Areas, such as the patios or courtyards adjacent to individual units, that are part of the common area but are reserved for the exclusive use of a specific owner.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowner, Debbie Westerman.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil case. It is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the homeowners’ association, Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of the property. The judge notes that if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Subpoena Duces Tecum

A legal order requiring a person to appear and bring specified documents or evidence with them. The decision notes the Petitioner did not request one for the Board meeting minutes.

TEK 2-2B & TEK 5-15

Titles of technical publications from the National Concrete Masonry Association, submitted as evidence by the Respondent to demonstrate the structural equivalence of different-sized CMU blocks.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818028-REL


Why Your HOA Cares About Your Bricks: A Real-Life Legal Battle, Deconstructed

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is a source of quiet frustration. It often involves rules that seem arbitrary, overly specific, or just plain unreasonable. You want to make a practical improvement to your property, but the HOA’s governing documents stand in the way, citing regulations you never knew existed. This friction between individual desire and community standards is common, but rarely does it escalate into a formal legal dispute.

When it does, however, the results can be surprisingly illuminating. Such is the case of Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA in Arizona. Their legal battle wasn’t over a major renovation or a loud party; it was about the specific size of concrete blocks for a new patio wall. On the surface, it seems like a minor disagreement. But a closer look at the administrative law judge’s decision reveals powerful, practical lessons for every homeowner about the hidden legal realities of community governance.

By deconstructing the judge’s final decision, we can uncover four critical lessons that reveal how HOAs wield power and how homeowners can protect themselves.

Takeaway 1: Aesthetic Vision Can Legally Outweigh Practicality

At the heart of the dispute was a simple disagreement over materials. The petitioner, Debbie Westerman, wanted to build her patio wall using 8″x8″x16″ concrete blocks. Her reasoning was entirely practical: a licensed contractor advised her that the larger blocks were “stronger, less expensive, and looks the same.” From a homeowner’s perspective, this seems like an open-and-shut case for approval.

The HOA, however, denied the request. Their position was based not on practicality, but on a specific design vision. The association’s rules, established back in 2005, explicitly required the use of 4″x8″x16″ blocks. The reason? To maintain “architectural continuity” with the property’s original “Al Beadle design.” This wasn’t a vague preference; it was a documented standard intended to conform new construction to the existing visual language of the community, as seen in the “property’s perimeter wall, the original block buildings, the pool area enclosure and buildings, the parking structures, and the walls around the parking areas.”

Ultimately, the judge sided with the HOA. The decision found that the association’s requirement was reasonable because it was aimed at keeping new construction consistent with “significant elements of Bridgewood Townhomes.” This is a crucial lesson: a homeowner’s logical arguments about cost, strength, and appearance can be legally superseded by a community’s well-documented commitment to a specific, even if less tangible, design aesthetic.

Takeaway 2: The Power is in the Paper Trail

The HOA’s entire case rested on the strength of a single key document: the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.” This document, which the board officially adopted on March 22, 2005, clearly outlined the requirement for the 4-inch blocks.

Crucially, the petitioner only challenged the authenticity of this document for the first time during the hearing itself, arguing the HOA had not produced the original meeting minutes that adopted it. The judge deemed this last-minute challenge inadmissible. Why? Crucially, the judge noted that the homeowner had failed to use the proper legal procedures to demand the HOA produce those records ahead of time, making her challenge too little, too late. The HOA, meanwhile, demonstrated a long history of consistent enforcement. Before Ms. Westerman’s request, the association had already approved 29 other courtyard walls, all built according to the 2005 specifications.

This highlights a critical lesson: an HOA’s power is codified in its paper trail. The governing documents—from the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) down to specific board-adopted rules—carry immense legal weight.

Pro Tip: Your HOA’s governing documents are more than just the CC&Rs you received at closing. Formally request and review all board-adopted rules, architectural guidelines, and meeting minutes related to your planned project hiring a contractor or submitting an application.

Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner

Many people might assume that in a dispute, the powerful organization (the HOA) has the responsibility to prove its rules are fair and justified. The legal reality is often the exact opposite.

The judge’s decision explicitly stated that the “burden of proof” was on Ms. Westerman to establish that the HOA had acted unreasonably. It was not the HOA’s job to prove their rule was perfect; it was the homeowner’s job to prove the denial was improper. To meet this high legal standard, defined as a “preponderance of the evidence,” you need convincing proof.

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

This case provides a masterclass in what constitutes convincing proof. Ms. Westerman’s evidence that the 8-inch blocks were superior came from the testimony of her contractor’s unlicensed subcontractor. In sharp contrast, the HOA submitted two technical documents from the National Concrete Masonry Association—a neutral, expert authority—which demonstrated that the required 4-inch blocks are “structurally equivalent” to their 8-inch counterparts. The homeowner brought an opinion to a legal fight; the HOA brought expert documentation.

Actionable Advice: If you choose to challenge an HOA decision, understand that personal testimony and contractor opinions are often insufficient. To meet the ‘burden of proof,’ you must be prepared to counter the HOA’s documented rules with equally strong evidence, such as independent engineering reports, surveys, or expert testimony.

Takeaway 4: An HOA Rule Can Be a “Win-Win Program”

While it’s easy to view HOA rules as purely restrictive, the association’s board president, Michael Brubaker, offered a completely different perspective. He framed the wall policy not as a limitation, but as a benefit designed to increase the value and security of the entire community.

In an email to the petitioner, he explained the board’s original thinking behind allowing the walls in the first place, calling it a “win win program.”

A courtyard wall allowed homeowners to expand their homes with an exclusive-use courtyard space, enhance privacy, and improve security, which resulted in an increased individual property value that subsequently raised all property values. Additionally, the Association reduced costs by reducing the common area to be maintained. This is a win win program.

This viewpoint is bolstered by another critical fact: the HOA assumes maintenance responsibility for the walls after they are built. This reinforces the logic behind the rule. Uniformity isn’t just about aesthetics; it’s about the long-term, collective cost and labor of maintaining these structures, making a consistent standard a practical and financial concern for the entire association.

Conclusion: Beyond the Bricks

The dispute between Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA was, on its face, about the size of concrete blocks. But the legal decision reveals a much deeper story about community living. It’s a story about how a shared aesthetic vision, when properly documented, can become legally enforceable. It’s a confirmation of the immense power of written rules and the critical importance of bringing credible evidence to a dispute. And it’s a reminder that the legal burden often falls on the individual to challenge the collective.

This case demonstrates that behind a seemingly petty disagreement lies a complex reality of legal precedent, established processes, and a community’s right to define and defend its character. The next time you encounter a seemingly arbitrary HOA rule, will you see it as a simple restriction, or will you look for the deeper story of community standards and legal precedent behind it?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debbie Westerman (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf
  • Kelly Zernich (witness)
    Petitioner's realtor
  • Richard Ross (witness)
    Petitioner's contractor's subcontractor

Respondent Side

  • Mark E. Lines (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines, LLC
  • R. Patrick Whelan (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines, LLC
  • Michael Brubaker (board member/witness)
    Respondent's Board president

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barb Warren (homeowner/applicant)
    Application approved by the Board (used for comparison)
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
    Transmitted the decision electronically

Thomas J Stedronsky vs. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817016-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-01-24
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J Stedronsky Counsel
Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches POA Counsel John S. Perlman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section III (d) and (m)
CC&Rs Section VI (6.02, 6.03, 6.04, 6.05)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition entirely. The HOA did not violate CC&Rs regarding road maintenance or abuse its discretion in enforcement against Lot 77.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the Respondent violated its planned community documents.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent has maintained the roadway Sundance Lane properly

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by failing to properly maintain Sundance Lane. Respondent countered that limited funds necessitated prioritizing roads for full-time residents, but Sundance Lane was accessible.

Orders: Complaint regarding road maintenance dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Section III
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Whether Respondent has taken appropriate action against the owner of lot 77 in as much as that property allegedly resembles a junk yard

Petitioner alleged Lot 77 violated CC&Rs due to excessive storage and inoperable vehicles. Respondent showed it monitors the property, has written letters, and the owner has previously complied with HOA and County cleanup efforts.

Orders: Complaint regarding enforcement against Lot 77 dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Section VI
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817016-REL Decision – 613995.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:06 (200.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817016-REL


Briefing: Stedronsky v. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817016-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas J. Stedronsky and Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to properly maintain a roadway, Sundance Lane, and by failing to take appropriate action against a neighboring property, Lot 77, which allegedly resembled a junkyard.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Diane Mihalsky, denied the petition in its entirety. The decision found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for both allegations. Regarding road maintenance, the ALJ concluded the POA acted within its reasonable discretion by prioritizing its limited funds ($35,000-$40,000 annually for 20 miles of roads) to maintain roadways used by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents. Despite the poor condition of the northern section of Sundance Lane, the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via a passenger car from the south.

Concerning Lot 77, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner did not establish a persistent violation of the CC&Rs. The evidence showed the POA had previously addressed complaints with the lot owner, who had been responsive. Furthermore, the alleged violations were largely located behind the required property buffer zone and were not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property without a telephoto lens. The decision suggests the Petitioner’s long-standing complaints were primarily motivated by his inability to sell his topographically challenging and undeveloped property.

Case Details

Case Information

Details

Case Number

18F-H1817016-REL

Petitioner

Thomas J. Stedronsky (Owner of Lot 76)

Respondent

Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

Presiding Judge

Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

January 10, 2018

Decision Date

January 24, 2018

Final Order

The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Core Issues

1. Whether the Respondent properly maintained the roadway Sundance Lane.
2. Whether the Respondent took appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77.

Detailed Analysis of Allegations

Allegation 1: Improper Roadway Maintenance of Sundance Lane

The Petitioner alleged that the POA failed to maintain Sundance Lane in accordance with the CC&Rs, particularly the northern section providing access to his Lot 76.

Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photographs from September 2017 comparing well-maintained roads like Black Peak Parkway and Copper Hills Road with the poor condition of the northern portion of Sundance Lane near his property. These photos depicted the northern section as a “barely visible road running along the side of a steep hillside that is overgrown with vegetation and has a large number of large boulders.”

Accessibility Issues: The Petitioner testified that in September 2017, he needed to rent a four-wheel drive truck to access his lot from the northeast via an unnamed road connecting to Sundance Lane.

Plat Reference: The Petitioner submitted an undated and unsigned preliminary plat that stated “Roadbed 8” Native Gravel Fill Compacted to 95% Maximum Density,” but acknowledged this did not constitute an enforceable requirement for the POA.

Admission of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that his lot was usually accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane, where it connects with Black Peak Parkway.

Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

Road Characteristics: Mr. Wilson described Sundance Lane as an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.” He noted the northern part was rough but not impassable with four-wheel drive.

Maintenance Schedule: The POA blades every roadway, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year. Sundance Lane was bladed in September 2017 and December 2017. More intensive dozer work is sometimes performed on the worst roads.

Prioritization of Resources: The POA board prioritizes maintenance on roads needed by the approximately 35 full-time residents to access their parcels. With an annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000 to maintain 20 miles of roads, funds are used to better maintain the most traveled roadways.

Financial Constraints: Blading all roads costs $15,000 to $20,000 per year. Paving all 20 miles would cost millions of dollars, requiring a prohibitive assessment of approximately $50,000 per parcel to raise just $1 million.

Access Confirmation: Mr. Wilson testified that the resident of Lot 77 accesses his property from the south on Sundance Lane, and the Petitioner could access his lot from the south at any time. There are no residences that require access from the north side of Sundance Lane.

Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted photos from December 2017 and January 9, 2018, showing Sundance Lane graded, passable, and cleared of vegetation following maintenance.

Section III (d): Grants the POA authority to “Grade and maintain the roadways as needed, provide for proper drainage of roadways, install culverts where necessary.”

Section III (m): Requires the POA to “maintain, care for, and otherwise manage the roadways…in as good condition (deterioration loss by damage due to environmental occurrences which cannot be reasonabl[y] avoided or insured against excepted)[.]”

Section III (b): Authorizes acts “necessary, in the reasonable discretion of the Members, for the betterment of the Property and for the general benefit and welfare of the owners.”

Allegation 2: Failure to Enforce CC&Rs against Lot 77

The Petitioner alleged the POA failed to take appropriate action against the owner of neighboring Lot 77, Jerry Hamlin, for violations including inoperable vehicles and junk, creating a nuisance.

Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photos of Lot 77 taken in September 2017, many with a telephoto lens. These photos showed multiple vehicles (some with hoods up), a backhoe, a trailer, and vehicle parts. Notations on the photos claimed vehicles were inoperable and had been sitting for years, though this was not apparent from the images themselves.

Potential for Nuisance: The Petitioner testified to his belief that vehicles might be leaking oil and other fluids, potentially polluting the groundwater. He acknowledged he had no direct proof as he was unwilling to trespass.

History of Complaints: The Petitioner acknowledged filing numerous complaints about Lot 77 with both the POA and Gila County over many years.

Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

Enforcement Actions Taken: The POA has written letters to Mr. Hamlin in response to complaints, and Mr. Hamlin has removed vehicles and cleaned up the lot in the past.

Owner’s Responsiveness: Mr. Hamlin has previously cooperated with the POA and Gila County. However, he expressed frustration with being “hassled” by the Petitioner’s continuing complaints after taking remedial action.

Gila County Dismissal: A complaint filed by the Gila County Community Development Division against Mr. Hamlin was dismissed on November 6, 2013, after an inspector determined the property was “no longer in violation of Gila County Zoning Ordinances.”

Condition of Vehicles: Mr. Hamlin stated to Mr. Wilson that all vehicles on the property were operable. Mr. Wilson noted that in rural areas, vehicle hoods are often left open to prevent vermin from nesting in the engine.

Strategic Enforcement: The POA prefers not to take a “heavy hand” with Mr. Hamlin, as he is the “sort of man who would dig in his heels,” potentially leading to costly litigation that would deplete funds for road maintenance.

Limited Enforcement Power: The POA’s primary enforcement mechanisms are writing letters and, after three failures to comply, liening the property.

Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted recent photos showing the area was cleaner (a tire seen in the Petitioner’s photo had been removed) and that, from a distance without a telephoto lens, there were no apparent CC&R violations.

6.03 Storage: Allows up to 5% of a parcel for unenclosed storage, provided it is neat, orderly, and maintained at least 100 feet from the nearest property line.

6.04 Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment: Prohibits the repair or storage of more than one unregistered, inoperable motor vehicle within property boundaries.

6.05 Hazardous Materials and Nuisances: Prohibits storage of hazardous materials in a way that constitutes a fire hazard or nuisance.

Underlying Context: Petitioner’s Motivation and Property Challenges

The hearing evidence strongly suggests the Petitioner’s complaints were linked to his long-term inability to sell his unimproved 15-acre parcel, Lot 76.

History of Complaints: The Petitioner sent numerous letters to the POA between 2012 and 2017, explicitly stating that the condition of Sundance Lane and the “junk on Lot 77” were preventing him from selling the property. A 2009 letter complained about the amount of the annual assessment due to his fixed income.

POA’s Perspective: A September 27, 2017, letter from the POA to the Petitioner stated: “You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. … You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property.”

Property Characteristics: The Petitioner’s Lot 76 is located at the top of a steep, rocky hill. The POA President testified that it would be “difficult to build” on the lot, as it has “no level place on which to construct a building pad” and would require a “significant amount of bulldozer work.”

Development Plans: While the Petitioner stated he would like to build a house, he had never planned construction dates or performed a percolation test. His proposed building site was located as close as possible to Lot 77’s garage.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Regarding Sundance Lane: The ALJ concluded that the POA did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to prioritize maintenance on roads used by full-time residents was deemed reasonable given its limited financial resources. The fact that Lot 76 remained accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane was a key factor.

Regarding Lot 77: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other violations were more than a “transitory condition.” The decision notes that the POA monitors the lot and that the owner is “generally responsive.” Crucially, the ALJ found that the vehicles and storage on Lot 77 “occur behind the buffer zone and are not easily visible from Petitioner’s Lot 76 without binoculars or a telephoto lens.”

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817016-REL


Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817016-REL

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Stedronsky (Petitioner) vs. Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (Respondent). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions presented in the hearing.

Case Summary

The case involves a dispute between a property owner, Thomas J. Stedronsky, and the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). Mr. Stedronsky, who owns the unimproved Lot 76, filed a petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, focused on two primary issues: whether the POA properly maintained a roadway known as Sundance Lane, and whether the POA took appropriate action against the owner of the adjacent Lot 77, which was alleged to resemble a junkyard. The Judge ultimately denied the Petitioner’s petition on both counts.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the two specific issues adjudicated at the January 10, 2018 hearing?

3. Describe the financial situation of the Copper Canyon Ranches POA as detailed in the hearing evidence.

4. What was the Petitioner’s specific complaint regarding the condition of Sundance Lane, and what evidence did he provide?

5. How did the Respondent, through its president Joe Wilson, defend its maintenance practices for Sundance Lane?

6. What were the Petitioner’s allegations against the owner of Lot 77, and what specific CC&R sections were potentially violated?

7. What actions had the Respondent and Gila County previously taken regarding complaints about Lot 77?

8. According to the legal conclusions, what is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and did he succeed?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Respondent did not abuse its discretion in its road maintenance practices?

10. On what grounds was the Petitioner’s complaint regarding Lot 77 dismissed?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Stedronsky, the “Petitioner,” and the Copper Canyon Ranches POA, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner owned Lot 76 in the development and filed the complaint, while the Respondent was the property owners’ association responsible for maintaining the community and enforcing its rules.

2. The two issues were: 1) Whether the Respondent had properly maintained the roadway known as Sundance Lane, and 2) Whether the Respondent had taken appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77, which the Petitioner alleged resembled a junkyard.

3. The POA receives between $35,000 and $40,000 annually from assessments of $250 per parcel. It costs the POA between $15,000 and $20,000 per year just to blade the 20 miles of roadways twice, with additional costs for culverts, backfill, and drainage ditches.

4. The Petitioner complained that the northern portion of Sundance Lane, which provides one access route to his Lot 76, was barely visible, overgrown, and required a four-wheel drive vehicle. He provided photographs taken in September 2017 showing this condition, contrasting them with photos of better-maintained roads in the development.

5. Joe Wilson testified that Sundance Lane is an old, steep mining road that is difficult to maintain perfectly. He stated that the POA blades every road, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year and prioritizes maintenance on roads used by full-time residents due to limited funds. He also provided evidence that Lot 76 was always accessible from the southern portion of Sundance Lane.

6. The Petitioner alleged that Lot 77 was used for storage of inoperable vehicles and junk, resembling a junkyard. The relevant CC&Rs included Section 6.02 (Trash Removal), 6.03 (Storage), 6.04 (Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment), and 6.05 (Hazardous Materials and Nuisances).

7. In response to past complaints, the Respondent had written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, who subsequently removed vehicles. Gila County also pursued a code enforcement action against Mr. Hamlin, which was dismissed in November 2013 after the property was determined to no longer be in violation of county ordinances.

8. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden for either of his complaints.

9. The Judge concluded the Respondent did not abuse its discretion because it reasonably prioritized maintaining roads used by full-time residents given its limited financial resources. The decision noted that it would be an “absurdity” to expect perfect maintenance on all 20 miles of dirt roads and that the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via the southern end of Sundance Lane.

10. The complaint was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to establish there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other issues were more than a transitory condition. The Judge found that the Respondent did monitor the lot, that the owner was generally responsive to requests, and that the items in question were behind the CC&R-required buffer zone and not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property.

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Essay Questions

Based on the source document, formulate a comprehensive response to the following prompts. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the concept of “reasonable discretion” as it applies to the Copper Canyon Ranches POA’s duties under the CC&Rs. How did the POA’s financial limitations and the physical characteristics of the development influence the Judge’s interpretation of this standard?

2. Evaluate the photographic evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the conditions of Sundance Lane and Lot 77. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s visual evidence, including the use of different lenses and the timing of the photographs.

3. Discuss the challenges of enforcing CC&Rs in a large, rural community like Copper Canyon Ranches. Using the dispute over Lot 77 as a case study, explain the enforcement mechanisms available to the POA and the strategic reasons a board might choose not to pursue enforcement with a “heavy hand.”

4. Examine the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Explain how this burden of proof was applied to both of the Petitioner’s claims and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the Judge to rule that the Petitioner had not met this standard.

5. Synthesize the evidence presented in the “Petitioner’s Efforts to Sell or Plans to Improve Lot 76” section. What does this evidence suggest about the Petitioner’s underlying motivations for filing the petition against the POA, and how did the Respondent use this history of complaints in its defense?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition within the Context of the Document

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on petitions.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party (in this case, the Petitioner) to establish their claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents for the Copper Canyon Ranches community, stating they should be construed to protect the value and attractiveness of the property. They outline the POA’s powers and members’ obligations.

Copper Canyon Ranches

A rural development north of Globe, Arizona, consisting of 194 large, multi-acre parcels. It is the planned community governed by the Respondent POA.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for petitions referred to it by other state bodies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition, Thomas J. Stedronsky. He is the owner of Lot 76 and a member of the Respondent association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of an issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed, the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA).

Roadways

Defined in the CC&Rs as all roads and rights-of-way that the Association owns or is obligated to maintain within the development.

Use Restrictions

A section (Section VI) of the CC&Rs that outlines rules for property owners regarding trash removal, storage of items, inoperable vehicles, and hazardous materials.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817016-REL


We Read a 14-Page HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons.

Introduction: The Dream of a Rural Escape Meets Reality

For many homeowners, a letter from their Homeowners Association (HOA) or Property Owners’ Association (POA) is a source of instant frustration. It often feels like a one-sided relationship governed by arbitrary rules. But what happens when a homeowner decides they’ve had enough and takes their association to court?

The story of Thomas Stedronsky offers a fascinating glimpse into this exact scenario. In 2003, he purchased a 15-acre unimproved lot in a rugged, rural Arizona development called Copper Canyon Ranches, likely dreaming of a quiet escape. Crucially, he never built on the property and does not reside there. Over the years, that dream soured, leading him to sue his Property Owners’ Association over a “barely visible” road and a neighbor’s property that he claimed resembled a “junkyard.” The official court decision reveals several surprising and counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner.

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1. Your HOA Doesn’t Have to Be Perfect, Just “Reasonable”

One of Mr. Stedronsky’s core complaints was that Sundance Lane, the road leading to his remote lot, was in terrible condition. His photos showed a path that was overgrown, rocky, and barely visible. Meanwhile, he argued, other main roads in the development were wide and well-maintained. His argument was clear: the POA was failing in its duty. But the POA’s defense was grounded in the harsh realities of the terrain. The president testified that Sundance Lane wasn’t just any road; it was an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.”

This historical context was bolstered by financial reality. The POA operated on a limited annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000, which had to cover the maintenance of 20 miles of roadways. The board president testified that they made a strategic decision to prioritize maintenance on the roads used daily by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents.

Ultimately, the judge ruled in favor of the POA. The court found that the association did not abuse its discretion. Prioritizing road maintenance based on usage and a limited budget was deemed a reasonable action. The key takeaway for homeowners is powerful: an HOA isn’t legally obligated to maintain every amenity to the same perfect standard, especially when faced with financial constraints. Their actions only need to be “reasonable.”

2. The “Rural Reality” Can Override Suburban Rules

Mr. Stedronsky’s second major complaint centered on his neighbor’s property, Lot 77, which he alleged was a junkyard filled with inoperable vehicles and clutter, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). To prove his point, he submitted photographic evidence taken with a telephoto lens. However, the credibility of his evidence was undermined when the court noted he had added his own notations to the photos—such as “All vehicles have been sitting for years”—which “were not apparent in the photograph.”

More importantly, the judge’s perspective was heavily influenced by the setting. In its final conclusion, the court officially determined that because Copper Canyon Ranches consists of large parcels in a remote area, “The CC&Rs also contemplate that parcel owners will have vehicles and other stored items on their parcels, as is common in remote rural areas.”

This point was brought to life by the colorful testimony of the POA president, Mr. Wilson. He explained that in rural areas, it’s common practice to leave vehicle hoods open. Why? To prevent mice and rats from nesting inside the engines. What looks like a clear violation in a manicured suburb is often standard, practical procedure in a rural development. This case shows that homeowner expectations—and an HOA’s enforcement standards—must adapt to the local context and culture.

3. Sometimes, an HOA’s Best Move IsNotto Enforce a Rule

Behind every HOA violation notice is a decision-making process, and this case pulls back the curtain on the strategic thinking involved. The POA president testified that they had, in fact, written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, in the past and that he was “generally responsive.” However, they were hesitant to take a “heavy hand” with him, characterizing him as “the sort of man who would dig in his heels.”

The president’s testimony reveals a fascinating look into the pragmatic balancing act an HOA board must perform. He explained the board’s strategic calculation:

If Mr. Hamlin is pushed beyond the point where Lot 77 needs to be in compliance with the zoning code and CC&Rs, he will resist and Respondent will incur litigation costs that will decrease the amount of money available for road maintenance.

This is a crucial lesson in community governance. The board made a calculated decision that avoiding a costly and protracted legal battle with one resident was more beneficial for the community as a whole than strictly enforcing every rule to the letter. It was a choice between pursuing a single violation and preserving the limited funds needed for essential services for everyone.

4. An Unsellable Property Can Fuel a Losing Battle

While the lawsuit focused on roads and junkyards, the court documents reveal a deeper, underlying motivation. Mr. Stedronsky’s complaints were not new; they started as far back as 2009 and were often linked in his letters to his “inability to sell his property.” His frustration was made more tangible by the fact that he had informed the POA in 2013 that the lot was under contract for sale, a deal that apparently fell through.

From the POA’s perspective, the problem wasn’t the road or the neighbor—it was the lot itself. The board president described Lot 76 as “undesirable” because it was steep, rocky, and would require a significant amount of bulldozer work just to create a level place to build.

After years of complaints, the POA president sent a blunt and revealing letter to Mr. Stedronsky that was included as evidence in the case:

“You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. Many properties have been unable to sell due to Rural Rugged area. You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property. The POA has done its due diligence in this matter. Please cease complaints to the POA on this matter.”

While Mr. Stedronsky’s frustration was evident, the judge ultimately found that he failed to meet the burden of proof for his claims. The case was dismissed. This serves as a powerful reminder that feeling wronged, even for years, is not enough to win a legal dispute.

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Conclusion: A Lesson in Pragmatism

The case of Lot 76 is a powerful story about the gap between homeowner expectations and the messy, pragmatic reality of community governance. It demonstrates that an association’s decisions are often a complex calculation involving limited budgets, local norms, and strategic risk management.

It reminds us that boards are not faceless corporations but groups of neighbors tasked with making difficult choices for the collective good. The next time you disagree with your HOA, will you see them as an adversary, or as a group of neighbors managing limited resources with “reasonable discretion”?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J Stedronsky (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • John S. Perlman (attorney)
    Copper Canyon Ranches POA
  • Joe Wilson (board president, witness)
    Copper Canyon Ranches POA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the decision

Other Participants

  • Jerry Hamlin (property owner)
    Lot 77
    Subject of CC&R enforcement action
  • Helen Hamlin (property owner)
    Lot 77
    Named in Gila County enforcement action related to Lot 77

Thomas J Stedronsky vs. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817016-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-01-24
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J Stedronsky Counsel
Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches POA Counsel John S. Perlman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section III (d) and (m)
CC&Rs Section VI (6.02, 6.03, 6.04, 6.05)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition entirely. The HOA did not violate CC&Rs regarding road maintenance or abuse its discretion in enforcement against Lot 77.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the Respondent violated its planned community documents.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent has maintained the roadway Sundance Lane properly

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by failing to properly maintain Sundance Lane. Respondent countered that limited funds necessitated prioritizing roads for full-time residents, but Sundance Lane was accessible.

Orders: Complaint regarding road maintenance dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Section III
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Whether Respondent has taken appropriate action against the owner of lot 77 in as much as that property allegedly resembles a junk yard

Petitioner alleged Lot 77 violated CC&Rs due to excessive storage and inoperable vehicles. Respondent showed it monitors the property, has written letters, and the owner has previously complied with HOA and County cleanup efforts.

Orders: Complaint regarding enforcement against Lot 77 dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Section VI
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817016-REL Decision – 613995.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:09 (200.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817016-REL


Briefing: Stedronsky v. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817016-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas J. Stedronsky and Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to properly maintain a roadway, Sundance Lane, and by failing to take appropriate action against a neighboring property, Lot 77, which allegedly resembled a junkyard.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Diane Mihalsky, denied the petition in its entirety. The decision found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for both allegations. Regarding road maintenance, the ALJ concluded the POA acted within its reasonable discretion by prioritizing its limited funds ($35,000-$40,000 annually for 20 miles of roads) to maintain roadways used by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents. Despite the poor condition of the northern section of Sundance Lane, the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via a passenger car from the south.

Concerning Lot 77, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner did not establish a persistent violation of the CC&Rs. The evidence showed the POA had previously addressed complaints with the lot owner, who had been responsive. Furthermore, the alleged violations were largely located behind the required property buffer zone and were not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property without a telephoto lens. The decision suggests the Petitioner’s long-standing complaints were primarily motivated by his inability to sell his topographically challenging and undeveloped property.

Case Details

Case Information

Details

Case Number

18F-H1817016-REL

Petitioner

Thomas J. Stedronsky (Owner of Lot 76)

Respondent

Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

Presiding Judge

Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

January 10, 2018

Decision Date

January 24, 2018

Final Order

The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Core Issues

1. Whether the Respondent properly maintained the roadway Sundance Lane.
2. Whether the Respondent took appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77.

Detailed Analysis of Allegations

Allegation 1: Improper Roadway Maintenance of Sundance Lane

The Petitioner alleged that the POA failed to maintain Sundance Lane in accordance with the CC&Rs, particularly the northern section providing access to his Lot 76.

Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photographs from September 2017 comparing well-maintained roads like Black Peak Parkway and Copper Hills Road with the poor condition of the northern portion of Sundance Lane near his property. These photos depicted the northern section as a “barely visible road running along the side of a steep hillside that is overgrown with vegetation and has a large number of large boulders.”

Accessibility Issues: The Petitioner testified that in September 2017, he needed to rent a four-wheel drive truck to access his lot from the northeast via an unnamed road connecting to Sundance Lane.

Plat Reference: The Petitioner submitted an undated and unsigned preliminary plat that stated “Roadbed 8” Native Gravel Fill Compacted to 95% Maximum Density,” but acknowledged this did not constitute an enforceable requirement for the POA.

Admission of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that his lot was usually accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane, where it connects with Black Peak Parkway.

Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

Road Characteristics: Mr. Wilson described Sundance Lane as an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.” He noted the northern part was rough but not impassable with four-wheel drive.

Maintenance Schedule: The POA blades every roadway, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year. Sundance Lane was bladed in September 2017 and December 2017. More intensive dozer work is sometimes performed on the worst roads.

Prioritization of Resources: The POA board prioritizes maintenance on roads needed by the approximately 35 full-time residents to access their parcels. With an annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000 to maintain 20 miles of roads, funds are used to better maintain the most traveled roadways.

Financial Constraints: Blading all roads costs $15,000 to $20,000 per year. Paving all 20 miles would cost millions of dollars, requiring a prohibitive assessment of approximately $50,000 per parcel to raise just $1 million.

Access Confirmation: Mr. Wilson testified that the resident of Lot 77 accesses his property from the south on Sundance Lane, and the Petitioner could access his lot from the south at any time. There are no residences that require access from the north side of Sundance Lane.

Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted photos from December 2017 and January 9, 2018, showing Sundance Lane graded, passable, and cleared of vegetation following maintenance.

Section III (d): Grants the POA authority to “Grade and maintain the roadways as needed, provide for proper drainage of roadways, install culverts where necessary.”

Section III (m): Requires the POA to “maintain, care for, and otherwise manage the roadways…in as good condition (deterioration loss by damage due to environmental occurrences which cannot be reasonabl[y] avoided or insured against excepted)[.]”

Section III (b): Authorizes acts “necessary, in the reasonable discretion of the Members, for the betterment of the Property and for the general benefit and welfare of the owners.”

Allegation 2: Failure to Enforce CC&Rs against Lot 77

The Petitioner alleged the POA failed to take appropriate action against the owner of neighboring Lot 77, Jerry Hamlin, for violations including inoperable vehicles and junk, creating a nuisance.

Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photos of Lot 77 taken in September 2017, many with a telephoto lens. These photos showed multiple vehicles (some with hoods up), a backhoe, a trailer, and vehicle parts. Notations on the photos claimed vehicles were inoperable and had been sitting for years, though this was not apparent from the images themselves.

Potential for Nuisance: The Petitioner testified to his belief that vehicles might be leaking oil and other fluids, potentially polluting the groundwater. He acknowledged he had no direct proof as he was unwilling to trespass.

History of Complaints: The Petitioner acknowledged filing numerous complaints about Lot 77 with both the POA and Gila County over many years.

Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

Enforcement Actions Taken: The POA has written letters to Mr. Hamlin in response to complaints, and Mr. Hamlin has removed vehicles and cleaned up the lot in the past.

Owner’s Responsiveness: Mr. Hamlin has previously cooperated with the POA and Gila County. However, he expressed frustration with being “hassled” by the Petitioner’s continuing complaints after taking remedial action.

Gila County Dismissal: A complaint filed by the Gila County Community Development Division against Mr. Hamlin was dismissed on November 6, 2013, after an inspector determined the property was “no longer in violation of Gila County Zoning Ordinances.”

Condition of Vehicles: Mr. Hamlin stated to Mr. Wilson that all vehicles on the property were operable. Mr. Wilson noted that in rural areas, vehicle hoods are often left open to prevent vermin from nesting in the engine.

Strategic Enforcement: The POA prefers not to take a “heavy hand” with Mr. Hamlin, as he is the “sort of man who would dig in his heels,” potentially leading to costly litigation that would deplete funds for road maintenance.

Limited Enforcement Power: The POA’s primary enforcement mechanisms are writing letters and, after three failures to comply, liening the property.

Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted recent photos showing the area was cleaner (a tire seen in the Petitioner’s photo had been removed) and that, from a distance without a telephoto lens, there were no apparent CC&R violations.

6.03 Storage: Allows up to 5% of a parcel for unenclosed storage, provided it is neat, orderly, and maintained at least 100 feet from the nearest property line.

6.04 Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment: Prohibits the repair or storage of more than one unregistered, inoperable motor vehicle within property boundaries.

6.05 Hazardous Materials and Nuisances: Prohibits storage of hazardous materials in a way that constitutes a fire hazard or nuisance.

Underlying Context: Petitioner’s Motivation and Property Challenges

The hearing evidence strongly suggests the Petitioner’s complaints were linked to his long-term inability to sell his unimproved 15-acre parcel, Lot 76.

History of Complaints: The Petitioner sent numerous letters to the POA between 2012 and 2017, explicitly stating that the condition of Sundance Lane and the “junk on Lot 77” were preventing him from selling the property. A 2009 letter complained about the amount of the annual assessment due to his fixed income.

POA’s Perspective: A September 27, 2017, letter from the POA to the Petitioner stated: “You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. … You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property.”

Property Characteristics: The Petitioner’s Lot 76 is located at the top of a steep, rocky hill. The POA President testified that it would be “difficult to build” on the lot, as it has “no level place on which to construct a building pad” and would require a “significant amount of bulldozer work.”

Development Plans: While the Petitioner stated he would like to build a house, he had never planned construction dates or performed a percolation test. His proposed building site was located as close as possible to Lot 77’s garage.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Regarding Sundance Lane: The ALJ concluded that the POA did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to prioritize maintenance on roads used by full-time residents was deemed reasonable given its limited financial resources. The fact that Lot 76 remained accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane was a key factor.

Regarding Lot 77: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other violations were more than a “transitory condition.” The decision notes that the POA monitors the lot and that the owner is “generally responsive.” Crucially, the ALJ found that the vehicles and storage on Lot 77 “occur behind the buffer zone and are not easily visible from Petitioner’s Lot 76 without binoculars or a telephoto lens.”

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817016-REL


Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817016-REL

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Stedronsky (Petitioner) vs. Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (Respondent). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions presented in the hearing.

Case Summary

The case involves a dispute between a property owner, Thomas J. Stedronsky, and the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). Mr. Stedronsky, who owns the unimproved Lot 76, filed a petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, focused on two primary issues: whether the POA properly maintained a roadway known as Sundance Lane, and whether the POA took appropriate action against the owner of the adjacent Lot 77, which was alleged to resemble a junkyard. The Judge ultimately denied the Petitioner’s petition on both counts.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the two specific issues adjudicated at the January 10, 2018 hearing?

3. Describe the financial situation of the Copper Canyon Ranches POA as detailed in the hearing evidence.

4. What was the Petitioner’s specific complaint regarding the condition of Sundance Lane, and what evidence did he provide?

5. How did the Respondent, through its president Joe Wilson, defend its maintenance practices for Sundance Lane?

6. What were the Petitioner’s allegations against the owner of Lot 77, and what specific CC&R sections were potentially violated?

7. What actions had the Respondent and Gila County previously taken regarding complaints about Lot 77?

8. According to the legal conclusions, what is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and did he succeed?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Respondent did not abuse its discretion in its road maintenance practices?

10. On what grounds was the Petitioner’s complaint regarding Lot 77 dismissed?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Stedronsky, the “Petitioner,” and the Copper Canyon Ranches POA, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner owned Lot 76 in the development and filed the complaint, while the Respondent was the property owners’ association responsible for maintaining the community and enforcing its rules.

2. The two issues were: 1) Whether the Respondent had properly maintained the roadway known as Sundance Lane, and 2) Whether the Respondent had taken appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77, which the Petitioner alleged resembled a junkyard.

3. The POA receives between $35,000 and $40,000 annually from assessments of $250 per parcel. It costs the POA between $15,000 and $20,000 per year just to blade the 20 miles of roadways twice, with additional costs for culverts, backfill, and drainage ditches.

4. The Petitioner complained that the northern portion of Sundance Lane, which provides one access route to his Lot 76, was barely visible, overgrown, and required a four-wheel drive vehicle. He provided photographs taken in September 2017 showing this condition, contrasting them with photos of better-maintained roads in the development.

5. Joe Wilson testified that Sundance Lane is an old, steep mining road that is difficult to maintain perfectly. He stated that the POA blades every road, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year and prioritizes maintenance on roads used by full-time residents due to limited funds. He also provided evidence that Lot 76 was always accessible from the southern portion of Sundance Lane.

6. The Petitioner alleged that Lot 77 was used for storage of inoperable vehicles and junk, resembling a junkyard. The relevant CC&Rs included Section 6.02 (Trash Removal), 6.03 (Storage), 6.04 (Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment), and 6.05 (Hazardous Materials and Nuisances).

7. In response to past complaints, the Respondent had written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, who subsequently removed vehicles. Gila County also pursued a code enforcement action against Mr. Hamlin, which was dismissed in November 2013 after the property was determined to no longer be in violation of county ordinances.

8. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden for either of his complaints.

9. The Judge concluded the Respondent did not abuse its discretion because it reasonably prioritized maintaining roads used by full-time residents given its limited financial resources. The decision noted that it would be an “absurdity” to expect perfect maintenance on all 20 miles of dirt roads and that the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via the southern end of Sundance Lane.

10. The complaint was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to establish there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other issues were more than a transitory condition. The Judge found that the Respondent did monitor the lot, that the owner was generally responsive to requests, and that the items in question were behind the CC&R-required buffer zone and not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property.

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Essay Questions

Based on the source document, formulate a comprehensive response to the following prompts. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the concept of “reasonable discretion” as it applies to the Copper Canyon Ranches POA’s duties under the CC&Rs. How did the POA’s financial limitations and the physical characteristics of the development influence the Judge’s interpretation of this standard?

2. Evaluate the photographic evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the conditions of Sundance Lane and Lot 77. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s visual evidence, including the use of different lenses and the timing of the photographs.

3. Discuss the challenges of enforcing CC&Rs in a large, rural community like Copper Canyon Ranches. Using the dispute over Lot 77 as a case study, explain the enforcement mechanisms available to the POA and the strategic reasons a board might choose not to pursue enforcement with a “heavy hand.”

4. Examine the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Explain how this burden of proof was applied to both of the Petitioner’s claims and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the Judge to rule that the Petitioner had not met this standard.

5. Synthesize the evidence presented in the “Petitioner’s Efforts to Sell or Plans to Improve Lot 76” section. What does this evidence suggest about the Petitioner’s underlying motivations for filing the petition against the POA, and how did the Respondent use this history of complaints in its defense?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition within the Context of the Document

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on petitions.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party (in this case, the Petitioner) to establish their claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents for the Copper Canyon Ranches community, stating they should be construed to protect the value and attractiveness of the property. They outline the POA’s powers and members’ obligations.

Copper Canyon Ranches

A rural development north of Globe, Arizona, consisting of 194 large, multi-acre parcels. It is the planned community governed by the Respondent POA.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for petitions referred to it by other state bodies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition, Thomas J. Stedronsky. He is the owner of Lot 76 and a member of the Respondent association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of an issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed, the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA).

Roadways

Defined in the CC&Rs as all roads and rights-of-way that the Association owns or is obligated to maintain within the development.

Use Restrictions

A section (Section VI) of the CC&Rs that outlines rules for property owners regarding trash removal, storage of items, inoperable vehicles, and hazardous materials.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817016-REL


We Read a 14-Page HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons.

Introduction: The Dream of a Rural Escape Meets Reality

For many homeowners, a letter from their Homeowners Association (HOA) or Property Owners’ Association (POA) is a source of instant frustration. It often feels like a one-sided relationship governed by arbitrary rules. But what happens when a homeowner decides they’ve had enough and takes their association to court?

The story of Thomas Stedronsky offers a fascinating glimpse into this exact scenario. In 2003, he purchased a 15-acre unimproved lot in a rugged, rural Arizona development called Copper Canyon Ranches, likely dreaming of a quiet escape. Crucially, he never built on the property and does not reside there. Over the years, that dream soured, leading him to sue his Property Owners’ Association over a “barely visible” road and a neighbor’s property that he claimed resembled a “junkyard.” The official court decision reveals several surprising and counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner.

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1. Your HOA Doesn’t Have to Be Perfect, Just “Reasonable”

One of Mr. Stedronsky’s core complaints was that Sundance Lane, the road leading to his remote lot, was in terrible condition. His photos showed a path that was overgrown, rocky, and barely visible. Meanwhile, he argued, other main roads in the development were wide and well-maintained. His argument was clear: the POA was failing in its duty. But the POA’s defense was grounded in the harsh realities of the terrain. The president testified that Sundance Lane wasn’t just any road; it was an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.”

This historical context was bolstered by financial reality. The POA operated on a limited annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000, which had to cover the maintenance of 20 miles of roadways. The board president testified that they made a strategic decision to prioritize maintenance on the roads used daily by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents.

Ultimately, the judge ruled in favor of the POA. The court found that the association did not abuse its discretion. Prioritizing road maintenance based on usage and a limited budget was deemed a reasonable action. The key takeaway for homeowners is powerful: an HOA isn’t legally obligated to maintain every amenity to the same perfect standard, especially when faced with financial constraints. Their actions only need to be “reasonable.”

2. The “Rural Reality” Can Override Suburban Rules

Mr. Stedronsky’s second major complaint centered on his neighbor’s property, Lot 77, which he alleged was a junkyard filled with inoperable vehicles and clutter, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). To prove his point, he submitted photographic evidence taken with a telephoto lens. However, the credibility of his evidence was undermined when the court noted he had added his own notations to the photos—such as “All vehicles have been sitting for years”—which “were not apparent in the photograph.”

More importantly, the judge’s perspective was heavily influenced by the setting. In its final conclusion, the court officially determined that because Copper Canyon Ranches consists of large parcels in a remote area, “The CC&Rs also contemplate that parcel owners will have vehicles and other stored items on their parcels, as is common in remote rural areas.”

This point was brought to life by the colorful testimony of the POA president, Mr. Wilson. He explained that in rural areas, it’s common practice to leave vehicle hoods open. Why? To prevent mice and rats from nesting inside the engines. What looks like a clear violation in a manicured suburb is often standard, practical procedure in a rural development. This case shows that homeowner expectations—and an HOA’s enforcement standards—must adapt to the local context and culture.

3. Sometimes, an HOA’s Best Move IsNotto Enforce a Rule

Behind every HOA violation notice is a decision-making process, and this case pulls back the curtain on the strategic thinking involved. The POA president testified that they had, in fact, written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, in the past and that he was “generally responsive.” However, they were hesitant to take a “heavy hand” with him, characterizing him as “the sort of man who would dig in his heels.”

The president’s testimony reveals a fascinating look into the pragmatic balancing act an HOA board must perform. He explained the board’s strategic calculation:

If Mr. Hamlin is pushed beyond the point where Lot 77 needs to be in compliance with the zoning code and CC&Rs, he will resist and Respondent will incur litigation costs that will decrease the amount of money available for road maintenance.

This is a crucial lesson in community governance. The board made a calculated decision that avoiding a costly and protracted legal battle with one resident was more beneficial for the community as a whole than strictly enforcing every rule to the letter. It was a choice between pursuing a single violation and preserving the limited funds needed for essential services for everyone.

4. An Unsellable Property Can Fuel a Losing Battle

While the lawsuit focused on roads and junkyards, the court documents reveal a deeper, underlying motivation. Mr. Stedronsky’s complaints were not new; they started as far back as 2009 and were often linked in his letters to his “inability to sell his property.” His frustration was made more tangible by the fact that he had informed the POA in 2013 that the lot was under contract for sale, a deal that apparently fell through.

From the POA’s perspective, the problem wasn’t the road or the neighbor—it was the lot itself. The board president described Lot 76 as “undesirable” because it was steep, rocky, and would require a significant amount of bulldozer work just to create a level place to build.

After years of complaints, the POA president sent a blunt and revealing letter to Mr. Stedronsky that was included as evidence in the case:

“You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. Many properties have been unable to sell due to Rural Rugged area. You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property. The POA has done its due diligence in this matter. Please cease complaints to the POA on this matter.”

While Mr. Stedronsky’s frustration was evident, the judge ultimately found that he failed to meet the burden of proof for his claims. The case was dismissed. This serves as a powerful reminder that feeling wronged, even for years, is not enough to win a legal dispute.

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Conclusion: A Lesson in Pragmatism

The case of Lot 76 is a powerful story about the gap between homeowner expectations and the messy, pragmatic reality of community governance. It demonstrates that an association’s decisions are often a complex calculation involving limited budgets, local norms, and strategic risk management.

It reminds us that boards are not faceless corporations but groups of neighbors tasked with making difficult choices for the collective good. The next time you disagree with your HOA, will you see them as an adversary, or as a group of neighbors managing limited resources with “reasonable discretion”?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J Stedronsky (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • John S. Perlman (attorney)
    Copper Canyon Ranches POA
  • Joe Wilson (board president, witness)
    Copper Canyon Ranches POA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the decision

Other Participants

  • Jerry Hamlin (property owner)
    Lot 77
    Subject of CC&R enforcement action
  • Helen Hamlin (property owner)
    Lot 77
    Named in Gila County enforcement action related to Lot 77