Attorneys’ Fees | A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) | 1 CA-CV 05-0296
Division One holds that a CC&R “all attorney fees” provision is an enforceable contract: the association recovers its full, properly documented fees unless the objecting owner proves specific amounts are clearly excessive.
Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association, Inc. v. James F. Simons; 216 Ariz. 266, 165 P.3d 667 (App. 2007).
Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.
The rule in one sentence
Because a homeowners association’s CC&Rs are a contract, a trial court must enforce a provision entitling the association to “all” attorney fees incurred in enforcement and lacks discretion to reduce a prevailing association’s fee award except as to fees that are clearly or “obviously” excessive. Once the association makes a prima facie showing of its fees under Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, the objecting owner bears the burden of proving that the requested fees are clearly excessive. The trial court’s unexplained 50% reduction, entered without any finding of excessiveness and without the hearing the owner requested, was not supported by the record, so the fee award was vacated and remanded.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association, Inc. (Appellant)
Arizona nonprofit corporation and homeowners association; plaintiff below. Sued Simons to enforce the CC&Rs’ architectural-approval requirement and appealed the trial court’s 50% reduction of its contractual attorneys’ fees. - Scott B. Carpenter (Counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC
Attorney for plaintiff/appellant McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association, Inc. (Tempe). - Jeffrey B. Corben (Counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC
Attorney for plaintiff/appellant McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association, Inc. (Tempe). - J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC
Attorney for plaintiff/appellant McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association, Inc. (Tempe).
Respondent Side
- James F. Simons (Appellee)
Homeowner and defendant below; appeared in propria persona (self-represented). Objected to the fee request and filed no answering brief on appeal. (Caption spells the name James F. Simons; the head matter spells it James P. Simons.) - James F. Simons (Counsel)
In Propria Persona
Appeared in propria persona (self-represented) for defendant/appellee (Scottsdale).
Neutral Parties
- Philip Hall (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, Department D
Authored the majority opinion. - Sheldon H. Weisberg (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, Department D
Presiding Judge; concurred in the majority opinion. - Patricia A. Orozco (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, Department D
Dissented; would have affirmed the trial court’s award as an implicit finding that the fees were excessive. - The Honorable Rebecca A. Albrecht (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial judge who reduced the fee award to $4,000 (identified in the opinion’s record notes).
What happened and why it matters
McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association, an Arizona nonprofit homeowners association in Scottsdale, sued homeowner James F. Simons in January 2004 for injunctive relief after he began a construction project at the rear of his home without the architectural approval his community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) required. Simons did not answer the complaint or appear at the injunction hearings; the trial court entered a permanent injunction, and the association pursued contempt proceedings until Simons began moving toward compliance. The association then sought its attorneys’ fees under CC&R Article XV, Section 15.14, which obligated an offending owner to pay “all attorney fees and court costs incurred” by the association in enforcing the CC&Rs, and it requested $8,000 in fees plus costs. Without holding the hearing Simons had asked for, the trial court crossed out the requested figure and awarded only $4,000, giving no explanation. On appeal, Division One held that CC&Rs are a contract and that a court generally must enforce a contractual fee provision, reducing the amount only where the fees are clearly or “obviously” excessive—a showing the objecting owner bears the burden to make. Finding no record support for the 50% reduction, the court vacated the fee award and remanded. Judge Orozco dissented.
The Court of Appeals began from the settled principle that a community’s CC&Rs “constitute a contract between the subdivision’s property owners as a whole and individual lot owners” (Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n v. Turner). It distinguished contractual fee provisions from the discretionary fee statute, A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A): unlike statutory fees, a court “lacks discretion to refuse to award fees under a contractual provision” (Chase Bank of Ariz. v. Acosta), and contracts for the payment of attorneys’ fees are enforced according to their terms (Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser). In Heritage Heights, the court had held that a homeowner became contractually bound to a deed provision requiring the offending owner to pay all attorneys’ fees and costs the enforcing party incurred, and that recovery of all such fees, including on appeal, had to be granted.
The court then recognized a limit drawn from Elson Development Co. v. Arizona Savings & Loan Ass’n: a contractual fee provision is “binding only to the extent that it is reasonable,” but “where the services have been rendered, and the amount stipulated is not obviously excessive, the stipulation as to the amount should govern.” Reading Section 15.14 as closer to the “all fees” language of Heritage Heights than to the fixed percentage in Elson, the court held that the association was entitled to all of its fees except those that are obviously or clearly excessive. Surveying decisions from other jurisdictions, it adopted the rule that fees fixed by a fee-shifting contract are presumptively reasonable and that the party challenging them bears the burden of proving excessiveness. Because the association had submitted two fee applications satisfying Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, it made a prima facie showing, and the burden shifted to Simons to demonstrate that the requested fees were clearly excessive.
Applying those rules, the court found the trial court had erred. By cutting the request in half without explanation—and without holding the hearing Simons requested—the trial court appeared to have placed the burden of proving reasonableness on the association and to have exercised the broad discretion that applies to statutory fee awards under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and § 12-2030. That discretion is more narrowly circumscribed when the parties have contractually agreed that the prevailing party recovers all of its fees. The record did not support a determination that 50% of the association’s fees were clearly excessive, so the award was vacated. On remand, the trial court may hold a hearing to consider any evidence Simons offers and then award all fees properly incurred except those it expressly finds clearly excessive (noting that a $200 charge for a demand letter about an unrelated recreational-vehicle violation not pleaded in the complaint should be subtracted). The court also awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-342, upon compliance with Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 21.
For Arizona homeowners associations and the owners they regulate, this published opinion clarifies how much control a trial court has over attorneys’ fees when the governing documents contain an “all fees” enforcement clause. The court treats such CC&R provisions as an enforceable contract: if the association prevails and documents its fees properly, it is presumptively entitled to the full amount, and the court may not simply trim the request as it might under the discretionary fee statute. The practical effect is that the burden shifts to the objecting owner, who must come forward with evidence that specific fees are clearly or obviously excessive rather than relying on the court to police reasonableness on its own.
At the same time, the decision is not a blank check for associations. Fees must still be documented in a proper China Doll application, work unrelated to the pleaded violations can be excluded (as with the $200 recreational-vehicle demand letter here), and an owner who requests a hearing on excessiveness is generally entitled to be heard before the court rules. The opinion also drew a dissent from Judge Orozco, who read Heritage Heights and Elson to preserve the trial court’s duty to assess reasonableness and who would have affirmed the 50% reduction as an implicit finding that the fees were excessive—illustrating that the scope of judicial review over contractual fee awards remained genuinely contested.
Step-by-step litigation record
FAQ
What was this dispute about?
McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association sued homeowner James F. Simons for injunctive relief after he began a construction project at the rear of his home without the architectural approval the community’s CC&Rs required. After obtaining a permanent injunction and pursuing contempt proceedings, the association sought its attorneys’ fees under the CC&Rs. The only issue on appeal was whether the trial court could award the association just half of the fees it requested.
What did the CC&Rs say about attorneys’ fees?
Article XV, Section 15.14 of the Declaration provided that when the association employs an attorney to enforce compliance with the CC&Rs, the offending owner “shall pay to the Association, upon demand, all attorney fees and court costs incurred by the Association, whether or not suit is filed.” The court treated this as an enforceable contractual fee-shifting provision rather than a discretionary statutory fee request.
Can a trial court reduce a fee award that CC&Rs require?
Only in limited circumstances. Because CC&Rs are a contract, the court held that a trial court generally must enforce an “all fees” provision and cannot trim the award as it could under the discretionary fee statute (A.R.S. § 12-341.01). The one exception, drawn from Elson Development Co. v. Arizona Savings & Loan Ass’n, is that fees that are clearly or “obviously” excessive need not be awarded.
Who has the burden to prove the fees are excessive?
The objecting owner. Once the association submits a proper fee application under Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, it establishes a prima facie entitlement to the amount requested. The burden then shifts to the owner to show that specific fees are clearly excessive. If the owner does not make that showing, the association is entitled to its full fees.
Why did the Court of Appeals vacate the 50% reduction?
The trial court cut the request from $8,000 to $4,000 without explanation and without holding the hearing Simons had requested. That approach suggested the court had wrongly placed the burden of proving reasonableness on the association and exercised the broad discretion that applies to statutory fees. Because nothing in the record supported a finding that half the fees were clearly excessive, the appeals court vacated the award and remanded for a proper determination.
Is this decision binding precedent, and was it unanimous?
Yes, it is a published, precedential opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals (216 Ariz. 266, 165 P.3d 667). It was not unanimous: Presiding Judge Weisberg concurred, but Judge Orozco dissented, reasoning that reasonableness is implied in every fee provision and that the trial court’s decision to halve the fees was itself an implicit finding of excessiveness that should have been affirmed.
Case Dossier
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Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 216 Ariz. 266, 165 P.3d 667 (App. 2007) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Court of Appeals |
| Decision / key date | August 10, 2007 |
| Judge / panel | Philip Hall (author, majority), Sheldon H. Weisberg (Presiding Judge, concurring), Patricia A. Orozco (dissenting) |
| Parties | McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association, Inc. (plaintiff/appellant) v. James F. Simons (defendant/appellee, self-represented) |
| Governing law | |
| Topics | attorneys-feescc-and-rsarchitectural-reviewprocedure |
| Outcome / holding | Because a homeowners association’s CC&Rs are a contract, a trial court must enforce a provision entitling the association to “all” attorney fees incurred in enforcement and lacks discretion to reduce a prevailing association’s fee award except as to fees that are clearly or “obviously” excessive. Once the association makes a prima facie showing of its fees under Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, the objecting owner bears the burden of proving that the requested fees are clearly excessive. The trial court’s unexplained 50% reduction, entered without any finding of excessiveness and without the hearing the owner requested, was not supported by the record, so the fee award was vacated and remanded. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | No raw source-folder files found for this slug |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 14 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 0 download links |
Key Issues & Findings
McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association, an Arizona nonprofit homeowners association in Scottsdale, sued homeowner James F. Simons in January 2004 for injunctive relief after he began a construction project at the rear of his home without the architectural approval his community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) required. Simons did not answer the complaint or appear at the injunction hearings; the trial court entered a permanent injunction, and the association pursued contempt proceedings until Simons began moving toward compliance. The association then sought its attorneys’ fees under CC&R Article XV, Section 15.14, which obligated an offending owner to pay “all attorney fees and court costs incurred” by the association in enforcing the CC&Rs, and it requested $8,000 in fees plus costs. Without holding the hearing Simons had asked for, the trial court crossed out the requested figure and awarded only $4,000, giving no explanation. On appeal, Division One held that CC&Rs are a contract and that a court generally must enforce a contractual fee provision, reducing the amount only where the fees are clearly or “obviously” excessive—a showing the objecting owner bears the burden to make. Finding no record support for the 50% reduction, the court vacated the fee award and remanded. Judge Orozco dissented.
The Court of Appeals began from the settled principle that a community’s CC&Rs “constitute a contract between the subdivision’s property owners as a whole and individual lot owners” (Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n v. Turner). It distinguished contractual fee provisions from the discretionary fee statute, A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A): unlike statutory fees, a court “lacks discretion to refuse to award fees under a contractual provision” (Chase Bank of Ariz. v. Acosta), and contracts for the payment of attorneys’ fees are enforced according to their terms (Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser). In Heritage Heights, the court had held that a homeowner became contractually bound to a deed provision requiring the offending owner to pay all attorneys’ fees and costs the enforcing party incurred, and that recovery of all such fees, including on appeal, had to be granted.
The court then recognized a limit drawn from Elson Development Co. v. Arizona Savings & Loan Ass’n: a contractual fee provision is “binding only to the extent that it is reasonable,” but “where the services have been rendered, and the amount stipulated is not obviously excessive, the stipulation as to the amount should govern.” Reading Section 15.14 as closer to the “all fees” language of Heritage Heights than to the fixed percentage in Elson, the court held that the association was entitled to all of its fees except those that are obviously or clearly excessive. Surveying decisions from other jurisdictions, it adopted the rule that fees fixed by a fee-shifting contract are presumptively reasonable and that the party challenging them bears the burden of proving excessiveness. Because the association had submitted two fee applications satisfying Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, it made a prima facie showing, and the burden shifted to Simons to demonstrate that the requested fees were clearly excessive.
Applying those rules, the court found the trial court had erred. By cutting the request in half without explanation—and without holding the hearing Simons requested—the trial court appeared to have placed the burden of proving reasonableness on the association and to have exercised the broad discretion that applies to statutory fee awards under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and § 12-2030. That discretion is more narrowly circumscribed when the parties have contractually agreed that the prevailing party recovers all of its fees. The record did not support a determination that 50% of the association’s fees were clearly excessive, so the award was vacated. On remand, the trial court may hold a hearing to consider any evidence Simons offers and then award all fees properly incurred except those it expressly finds clearly excessive (noting that a $200 charge for a demand letter about an unrelated recreational-vehicle violation not pleaded in the complaint should be subtracted). The court also awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-342, upon compliance with Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 21.
For Arizona homeowners associations and the owners they regulate, this published opinion clarifies how much control a trial court has over attorneys’ fees when the governing documents contain an “all fees” enforcement clause. The court treats such CC&R provisions as an enforceable contract: if the association prevails and documents its fees properly, it is presumptively entitled to the full amount, and the court may not simply trim the request as it might under the discretionary fee statute. The practical effect is that the burden shifts to the objecting owner, who must come forward with evidence that specific fees are clearly or obviously excessive rather than relying on the court to police reasonableness on its own.
At the same time, the decision is not a blank check for associations. Fees must still be documented in a proper China Doll application, work unrelated to the pleaded violations can be excluded (as with the $200 recreational-vehicle demand letter here), and an owner who requests a hearing on excessiveness is generally entitled to be heard before the court rules. The opinion also drew a dissent from Judge Orozco, who read Heritage Heights and Elson to preserve the trial court’s duty to assess reasonableness and who would have affirmed the 50% reduction as an implicit finding that the fees were excessive—illustrating that the scope of judicial review over contractual fee awards remained genuinely contested.