Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al. v. Ken Hassen, et al.: HOA Court Case Guide

The rule in one sentence

Case Participants

What happened and why it matters

Three former board members and past presidents of the Val Vista Lakes Master-Planned Community Association in Gilbert, Arizona — Cheryl Marie McCoy, Marcianne Johnson, and Melissa Wilson (Scovel) — sued a group of fellow community members and former board members for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, an Arizona Fair Housing Act violation, and private nuisance. Their claims arose from an online ‘hate and disinformation campaign’ surrounding a November 2019 board election and a June 2020 recall election that removed two of them from the Board. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed all counts under Rule 12(b)(6) and entered Rule 54(b) judgments. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged only the dismissal of their defamation and false-light claims against Ken Hassen, the Kartageners, the Maidens, and Samantha Kelley (and her spouse William Suttell); the Kartageners cross-appealed the denial of their request for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and sanctions. Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissals, holding that because the plaintiffs had run for and held the presidency of an unusually large (2,280-member) community association, they were ‘limited purpose public figures’ who had to plead falsity and actual malice — which they failed to do — and that many of the challenged statements were non-actionable opinion or political speech about contested board elections. On the cross-appeal, the court held the superior court erred in summarily denying the Kartageners’ fee-and-sanctions request and remanded for reconsideration. Because it is an unpublished memorandum decision under Rule 111(c), it is not precedential.

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, the panel first rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural argument that the trial court should have converted the motions into summary judgment. Because the full text of the allegedly defamatory statements — which the defendants attached to their motions — was central to a complaint that otherwise offered only the plaintiffs’ own summaries, the court could consider those statements without conversion, consistent with Coleman v. City of Mesa and Strategic Development & Construction v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners.

The court then affirmed the threshold ruling that the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures. Each had not merely served on the Board but had run in elections for it and achieved the presidency of an unusually large association — the complaint alleged 2,280 members. Following the New Jersey decision Verna v. Links at Valleybrook Neighborhood Ass’n and decisions from California, Minnesota, and Wyoming, the court reasoned that HOA boards perform ‘quasi-municipal functions’ and that the Board’s composition was a matter of public concern to the community’s members. It rejected the argument that HOA governance is not of general public concern, explaining that protected speech need only concern matters interesting to ‘even a relatively small segment’ of the public, and it distinguished HOA boards from purely private boards because the legislature has extended First Amendment-type protections to association members through A.R.S. §§ 33-1804 and 33-1808. The court also found unavailing the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Planned Communities Act and their ‘private contract’ argument.

Because the plaintiffs were public figures, they had to prove — by clear and convincing evidence — falsity and actual malice under New York Times v. Sullivan, Gertz v. Robert Welch, and Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers. The complaint, consisting largely of conclusory characterizations rather than the actual statements, failed that heightened standard under BLK III, LLC v. Skelton. Independently, the court held the statements attached to the motions were non-actionable opinion or political speech about hotly contested board elections, incapable of being proven objectively true or false, and that many were not ‘of and concerning’ all three plaintiffs. It distinguished Tarter v. Bendt because Sharon Maiden’s comment about a ‘secret’ scheme referred to ‘ex-board members,’ not a secret Board meeting. The plaintiffs conceded that their false-light claims failed if they were public figures.

On the cross-appeal, reviewed de novo, the court held the superior court erred in summarily denying the Kartageners’ request for fees and sanctions. Under A.R.S. § 12-349 a court must assess reasonable fees and expenses (and may award limited double damages) against a party who brings a claim without substantial justification — meaning groundless and not made in good faith — proven by a preponderance of the evidence; under A.R.S. § 41-1491.36 a prevailing defendant may recover fees where the complaint was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The court found McCoy’s claims against the Kartageners had no factual basis and were groundless; the Fair Housing Act claim was frivolous and was not withdrawn as to the Kartageners for roughly five months; and the private-nuisance claim had no factual or legal basis. It declined to find Johnson’s and Wilson’s public-figure arguments irrational, and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the fee-and-sanctions request in light of the decision.

This memorandum decision is a clear Arizona illustration that people who run for and serve on a homeowners’ or community association board — especially as president of a large community — can be treated as ‘limited purpose public figures’ for defamation purposes. That status matters enormously: instead of the ordinary negligence standard available to private plaintiffs, a public-figure board member must plead and prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a challenged statement was both false and made with ‘actual malice’ (knowledge of falsity or conscious disregard of the truth). Statements of opinion and political speech about contested board elections generally cannot support a defamation claim at all. For board members bruised by online campaigns and recall fights, the case signals that heated criticism of association leadership enjoys strong First Amendment protection.

The decision also underscores the fee-and-sanctions exposure that comes with filing thin defamation and related claims. The court reversed the trial court’s routine denial of the Kartageners’ request under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 41-1491.36, emphasizing that a claim brought without any factual basis — such as McCoy’s claims against the Kartageners, the unfounded Fair Housing Act count, and the novel private-nuisance theory — can be ‘groundless and not made in good faith,’ exposing the filing party to attorneys’ fees, expenses, and even limited sanctions. Community-association litigants and their counsel should note both the substantive hurdle (public-figure/actual-malice) and the downside risk (mandatory fee-shifting) before suing neighbors over election-season speech.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al. v. Ken Hassen, et al. (1 CA-CV 21-0524). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al. v. Ken Hassen, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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