Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowner’s Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners' Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

Bylaw 2.4

Outcome Summary

In the initial decision, Petitioner established violations of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (election materials disposal) and A.R.S. § 33-1804 (closed/improperly noticed meetings), but failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Issue 1). The rehearing only addressed Issue 1, which was ultimately dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 violation) because the ALJ found that while the Bylaw applied to Members, Petitioner failed to show it prohibited a Director from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned, and the investigation was initiated by a Board member immediately following the meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Election Objection Waiver)

Whether Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on an objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting, given that the Bylaw requires members to object to irregularities 'at the meeting' to avoid waiver.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed as to Issue 1.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Election Challenge, Bylaw Violation, Meeting Notice, Record Retention, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Bylaw 3.3
  • Bylaw 2.4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – 678304.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:44 (117.5 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – 678305.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:47 (38.8 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818035-REL/655766.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:50 (113.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Tom Barrs vs. Desert Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative legal dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning the HOA’s board election of March 18, 2017. The core of the dispute involved the HOA board’s decision to investigate and ultimately overturn the initially announced election results, leading to a run-off election.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) overseeing the case and a subsequent rehearing issued a mixed final decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, successfully proved that the Desert Ranch HOA committed two statutory violations:

1. Destruction of Election Materials: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by destroying ballot envelopes shortly after the election, materials which are required to be retained for at least one year.

2. Improper Closed Meeting: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding a board meeting with its attorney at a private residence without providing the required notice to its members.

However, the Petitioner’s primary challenge—that the board violated its own Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned—was dismissed. The ALJ ruled that the bylaw’s waiver of claims applied to general “Members” but not to “Directors” acting in their official capacity. This ruling effectively upheld the board’s authority to investigate the election, which led to the discovery of invalid ballots and the eventual run-off election won by Brian Schoeffler.

As the prevailing party on two of the three issues, Mr. Barrs was awarded a reimbursement of his $1,000.00 filing fee. The judge, however, found that no civil penalty against the HOA was appropriate.

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I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Tom Barrs

Respondent: Desert Ranch HOA, represented by Catherine Overby (President) and Brian Schoeffler (Vice President)

Case Number: 18F-H1818035-REL

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Subject of Dispute: Alleged violations of Arizona statutes and HOA bylaws related to the handling and outcome of the March 18, 2017, annual board election.

II. Chronology of the Contested Election

The dispute originated from the following sequence of events surrounding the 2017 election for two vacant seats on the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors.

1. Pre-Election: Absentee ballots were distributed to members, listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates and providing a space for a write-in candidate.

2. March 18, 2017 (Annual Meeting): Ballots were submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger (a write-in) were announced as the winning candidates. No members present objected to the results before the meeting was adjourned.

3. Immediately Following the Meeting: Board member Patrick Rice gathered the ballots and “expressed his concerns with the election results.”

4. Circa March 18, 2017: All ballot envelopes from the election were destroyed.

5. March 19, 2017: Candidate Brian Schoeffler sent an email regarding the election, stating, “I’m asking you to review the situation and make a decision if there is enough concern that there should be a revote.”

6. March 20, 2017: Board President Catherine Overby emailed the members, announcing that the election had been “contested.” In the email, she asserted that the bylaws did not permit write-in candidates and declared that she and Mr. Schoeffler were the new directors.

7. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Ms. Overby and Mr. Rice, held an unannounced meeting with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s home. During this meeting, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot” had been improperly counted.

8. Post-March 29, 2017: After consulting the attorney, the board determined that the valid vote count resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board decided to hold a run-off election.

9. April 29, 2017: The run-off election was held, and Brian Schoeffler was announced as the winner.

10. May 10, 2017: The newly constituted Board of Directors held its organizational meeting.

III. Adjudicated Issues and Rulings

The petition, originally filed as a single issue, was converted to a multiple-issue case. At the hearing, the dispute was clarified into three distinct issues, each with a specific ruling from the ALJ.

Petitioner’s Allegation

Legal Basis

Final Ruling

The HOA improperly overturned the election results based on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned.

Bylaw 2.4

Dismissed

The HOA unlawfully discarded ballot envelopes and related election materials.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)

Violation Found

The HOA held closed board meetings without providing proper notice to the membership.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Violation Found

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A. Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Improperly Overturning Election)

Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs contended that the board was barred from investigating or acting on any concerns about the election after the meeting had concluded. His argument was based on Bylaw 2.4, which states:

ALJ Finding: The petition on this issue was dismissed. The judge’s finding was affirmed after a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.

ALJ Rationale:

1. Initiation of Investigation: Testimony established that Board member Patrick Rice expressed concerns “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” Therefore, Mr. Schoeffler’s email the following day did not initiate the board’s investigation.

2. Distinction Between “Member” and “Director”: The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. The waiver in Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member,” and the Petitioner failed to prove that a “Director” was prohibited from raising questions about the validity of an election after a meeting.

B. Issue 2: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (Destruction of Election Materials)

Statutory Requirement: Arizona law mandates that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… for at least one year after completion of the election.”

Respondent’s Action: The HOA destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election.

ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.

ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” presented at the hearing that established the destruction of the materials.

C. Issue 3: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Improper Closed Meetings)

Statutory Requirement: Arizona law requires all HOA board meetings to be open to all members. A meeting can only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must provide notice and cite the legal authority for entering a closed session.

Respondent’s Action: Certain board members met with an attorney at a private residence on March 29, 2017, to discuss the election. No notice was provided to the membership regarding this meeting.

ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.

ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” that the meeting occurred and that the board “did not provide any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or provide notice that the meeting would be closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.”

IV. Final Order and Disposition

The final decision, issued on August 23, 2018, and upheld after a rehearing decision on December 26, 2018, ordered the following:

Dismissal: The petition regarding Issue 1 (violation of Bylaw 2.4) was dismissed.

Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Tom Barrs, was deemed the prevailing party as to Issue 2 and Issue 3.

Monetary Award: The Respondent, Desert Ranch HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00.

Civil Penalty: The judge determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Finality: The decision after rehearing was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


Study Guide:Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 23, 2018, and December 26, 2018.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the initially announced results of the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors election on March 18, 2017?

3. What were the two primary procedural violations that the Desert Ranch HOA Board committed following the March 18, 2017 election?

4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the violation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismiss the Petitioner’s claim regarding Bylaw 2.4?

6. Explain the violation related to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1812(A)(7) that the ALJ found the Respondent had committed.

7. Describe the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 concerning open meetings.

8. What was the final order from the initial hearing on August 23, 2018?

9. What was the specific focus of the rehearing held on December 6, 2018?

10. What was the ultimate outcome of the rehearing, and what legal recourse was available to the parties afterward?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Tom Barrs, who filed the dispute, and Respondent Desert Ranch HOA. The HOA was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. At the Annual Board Meeting on March 18, 2017, the ballots were counted and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates for the two vacant seats on the Board of Directors. No members present raised an objection before the meeting was adjourned.

3. The HOA Board committed two primary procedural violations. First, they destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election, and second, certain Board members met with an attorney without providing notice to the association members that a meeting was being held or that it would be a closed session.

4. The Petitioner argued that candidate Brian Schoeffler’s challenge to the election was invalid because it was raised the day after the meeting adjourned. According to Bylaw 2.4, any “Member” who fails to object to an irregularity at the meeting waives their claim, and the Petitioner argued this rule should also apply to Board members.

5. The ALJ dismissed the claim because the investigation was initiated by Board member Patrick Rice, who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting, not by Mr. Schoeffler’s later email. The judge also determined that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific, non-interchangeable meanings, and the Petitioner failed to show that a Director was barred from raising concerns after a meeting.

6. The ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) based on uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing. This statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related election materials be retained for at least one year after an election, but the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.

7. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when certain Board members met with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s house on March 29, 2017. The HOA failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the members and did not announce that the meeting would be closed to discuss legal advice, as required by the statute.

8. In the initial order, the ALJ dismissed the petition as to Issue 1 (the Bylaw 2.4 violation) but found the Petitioner to be the prevailing party on Issues 2 and 3 (the statutory violations). The judge ordered the Respondent HOA to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00 but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

9. The rehearing focused exclusively on the first issue from the initial hearing: whether the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on objections to the election results after the Annual Meeting had adjourned. The Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the lack of penalties for the other two violations.

10. The rehearing upheld the original decision, dismissing the petition as to Issue 1. The decision from the rehearing was final and binding, and any party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing upon specific facts and legal arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4, specifically the distinction between a “Member” and a “Director.” Discuss the strength of the Petitioner’s counter-argument and why the judge’s reasoning ultimately prevailed.

2. Examine the series of actions taken by the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors following the March 18, 2017 election announcement. Evaluate whether their actions to investigate irregularities, consult an attorney, and hold a run-off election were ultimately justified, despite the procedural violations they committed.

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as the burden of proof in this case. For each of the three issues presented, explain how the Petitioner either met or failed to meet this standard, citing specific evidence mentioned in the decisions.

4. Based on the events described, from the initial election to the final administrative ruling, critique the effectiveness of the HOA’s internal governance and dispute resolution processes. What systemic failures are evident, and how did they lead to a formal administrative hearing?

5. Although the Petitioner was the “prevailing party” on two of the three issues, the remedy was limited to a refund of his filing fee, with no civil penalty imposed. Argue for or against the appropriateness of this remedy, considering the nature of the HOA’s violations and their impact on the integrity of the election process.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on evidence and law. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all meetings of a homeowners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. A meeting may only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must state the statutory reason for closing the meeting.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)

An Arizona Revised Statute that mandates the retention of election materials, including ballots and envelopes, in either electronic or paper format for at least one year after the completion of an election for member inspection.

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

An Arizona statute that permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4

A provision in the HOA’s bylaws stating, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal proceeding against their HOA for alleged violations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Tom Barrs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to consider a decision that has already been made, typically granted if there are perceived errors of law, misconduct, or if the decision was not supported by the evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch HOA.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Botched Election—Here Are 3 Lessons Every Board Should Learn

Friction between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) board is a common feature of community living, and nowhere is that friction more apparent than in disputes over elections and rule enforcement. But what happens when a board, trying to correct an error, makes the situation exponentially worse?

This article is a deep dive into the real administrative law case of Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, a seemingly straightforward dispute that reveals surprising and practical lessons for anyone living in or governing a planned community. It’s a story of a cascade of errors, where initial election confusion led to a panicked and procedurally flawed response, compounded by a pre-existing failure in record-keeping. As we’ll see, the outcome wasn’t what anyone expected, and the board’s biggest mistakes weren’t the ones they thought they were fighting.

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1. You Can Lose the Main Argument But Still Win the Case

The dispute began at the Desert Ranch HOA’s annual meeting, where election results were announced. The trouble started immediately after the meeting adjourned when a board Director, Patrick Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed concerns about irregularities. A day later, a losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, echoed those concerns via email. Citing the Director’s objection, the board overturned the initial results, prompting homeowner Tom Barrs to file a petition arguing this was a violation of the HOA’s own rules.

Barrs’ case hinged on Bylaw 2.4, which stated that any “Member” must object to irregularities during the meeting itself, or else they waive their right to complain. Barrs argued that since no one objected before adjournment, the results should stand. However, the judge disagreed, pointing to two critical distinctions in the evidence. First, the investigation was triggered by the concerns of a “Director,” not the losing candidate’s later email. Second, a close reading of the bylaws showed that the terms “Member” and “Director” were used as distinct categories and were not interchangeable. Since the bylaw only restricted “Members,” it did not prevent a Director from raising concerns after the meeting. Barrs lost his primary argument.

Despite this, in a counter-intuitive twist, the judge declared Barrs the “prevailing party” in the overall case and ordered the HOA to repay his $1,000 filing fee. Why? Because while investigating the petitioner’s main claim, the judge found the board had committed other clear violations of state law while trying to “fix” the election. This outcome underscores a critical principle for all boards: procedural integrity is paramount. The HOA won the battle over its right to review the election but lost the war because of its flawed process.

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2. Your Records (or Lack Thereof) Will Be Your Downfall

One of the board’s most significant errors was a simple but critical failure of administrative duty: they destroyed election materials in direct violation of state law. The HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), which is unambiguous about an HOA’s responsibility.

According to A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), “Ballots, envelopes and related materials…shall be retained…for at least one year after completion of the election.”

The legal decision states the evidence was “uncontroverted” that the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. Because the HOA could not dispute this fact, it was an easy violation for the petitioner to prove.

This wasn’t just a minor administrative oversight; it was a catastrophic error. By destroying the envelopes, the board not only violated the law but also eliminated any possibility of independently verifying the vote count after their own director discovered irregularities. This single failure trapped them in a procedural corner of their own making. It made a definitive resolution of the election challenge impossible, leading to the messy and expensive situation of declaring a tie and holding a run-off, all of which could have been avoided if the primary evidence had been preserved as required by law.

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3. “Private” Board Business Can Be an Illegal Secret Meeting

In an attempt to resolve the election dispute correctly, the board took what it likely considered a responsible step: seeking legal advice. After the election was contested, certain board members met with an attorney at a board member’s house to figure out how to proceed. However, the way they did it constituted another clear violation of state law.

This private meeting violated Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804. While the statute does allow a board to enter a closed session to receive legal advice, it has strict procedural requirements. The board must first provide notice of the meeting to all members and then, at that public meeting, officially vote to enter the closed session for that specific, legally permissible reason. The evidence was “uncontroverted” that the board failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the association members.

The board’s desire for confidential legal advice was understandable, but their method created an unforced legal error. The correct procedure—notifying members of a meeting and then voting to enter a closed session—protects the board by demonstrating procedural propriety. The shortcut they took exposed them to a clear-cut violation that was impossible to defend. For an HOA board, transparency is the default, and secrecy is a narrow, legally defined exception. The process of going private matters as much as the reason for doing so.

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Conclusion: It’s Not Just What You Do, It’s How You Do It

The Desert Ranch HOA board, in its attempt to correct a perceived election error, committed two clear statutory violations. In their haste, they held an illegal secret meeting and were hamstrung by their prior failure to properly retain election records—the very evidence needed for a clean resolution. These procedural missteps ultimately cost them the case.

The ultimate lesson from Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA is that for any governing body, procedural correctness is just as important as substantive correctness. This case serves as a stark reminder that good intentions are no defense against procedural law. When a crisis hits, does your board have the discipline to follow procedure, or will the rush to find a solution lead you to commit unforced errors that are far worse than the original problem?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Stephen Barrs (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Catherine Overby (board president, witness)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Brian Schoeffler (board vice president, witness)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Patrick Rice (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Board member who expressed concerns with election results

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Jerome Klinger (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Director elected in disputed election

John A Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918010-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John A Sellers Counsel
Respondent Rancho Madera Condominium Association Counsel Edward D. O'Brien

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.10

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the HOA (Respondent) did not violate CC&R Section 3.10. The CC&Rs imposed the duty of keeping the drainage area clear primarily on the Unit Owners, and the HOA only retained the right to enforce this requirement, not an explicit obligation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the CC&Rs because the HOA did not have an obligation to enforce clearance requirements against unit owners under the cited covenant provisions.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to require unit owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel behind their homes.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.10 by failing to compel unit owners to clear vegetation and debris (including chicken wire) from the stormwater drainage channel, asserting this failure created a flood risk to unit 12. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs placed the primary maintenance responsibility on Unit Owners, and the HOA only had the right, but not the obligation, to enforce clearance requirements.

Orders: The petition was denied and dismissed. No action was required of Respondent because Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated the CC&Rs regarding maintenance of the drainage easement.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • Title 33, Chapter 9
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Drainage, Maintenance, Enforcement, Condominium
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • Title 33, Chapter 9
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 667122.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:27 (50.0 KB)

19F-H1918010-REL Decision – 678371.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:27 (129.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918010-REL


Briefing Document: Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case John A Sellers, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association, Respondent (Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a claim by Petitioner John Sellers that his homeowner’s association (HOA) violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to compel other homeowners to remove vegetation and fencing from a common stormwater drainage channel, which he alleged created a flood risk to his property, Unit 12.

The petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful. It was denied first in an initial evidentiary hearing and again in a subsequent rehearing. The central finding of the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in both decisions was a critical distinction between an HOA’s right to enforce rules and an obligation to do so. The ALJs determined that the CC&Rs placed the primary responsibility for maintaining the drainage easement on the individual unit owners. The HOA’s mandatory duty to intervene was found to be triggered only by actual damage resulting from an owner’s negligence, not by the mere potential for future damage. As no flooding or damage had ever occurred, the HOA was found to have acted within its authority and had not violated the CC&Rs. The petitioner’s personal circumstances, including a contentious divorce and court-ordered sale of the property, were noted but deemed legally irrelevant to the determination of a CC&R violation.

Case Chronology and Procedural History

The case progressed through an initial petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final decision on rehearing. A notable procedural anomaly occurred when a hearing scheduled for November 5, 2018, was officially vacated due to a withdrawal notice from the petitioner, yet the hearing proceeded on that date as originally planned.

Details

Aug 23, 2018

Petition Filed

John A. Sellers filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated CC&R § 3.10.

Oct 23, 2018

Hearing Vacated

An order was issued by ALJ Diane Mihalsky vacating the November 5 hearing because the petitioner had notified the Department of his wish to withdraw the petition.

Nov 5 & Dec 12, 2018

Initial Hearing

Despite the prior vacating order, an evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ Mihalsky.

Dec 26, 2018

Initial Decision

ALJ Mihalsky issued a decision finding that the petitioner failed to prove his case. The petition was denied.

Feb 1, 2019

Rehearing Requested

The petitioner filed a request for a rehearing, alleging procedural irregularities and errors in the initial decision.

Feb 22, 2019

Rehearing Granted

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

Apr 15, 2019

Rehearing Held

A rehearing was held before a new judge, ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer.

May 7, 2019

Post-Hearing Filing Stricken

The petitioner submitted an unauthorized supplemental argument after the rehearing. ALJ Eigenheer issued an order striking the filing from the record and closing the record.

May 10, 2019

Final Decision on Rehearing

ALJ Eigenheer issued a final decision, again finding for the respondent and dismissing the petition.

Core Dispute Analysis

Petitioner’s Position and Allegations

Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent) violated CC&R § 3.10 by failing to enforce its rules. Specifically, the Association did not require owners of “Drainage Easement Units” to remove obstructions—such as large succulents, cacti, shrubs, and chicken wire fencing—from a 3′ x 3′ stormwater drainage canal located behind their homes.

Perceived Risk: The petitioner testified that these items could catch storm debris, clog the channel, and cause flooding that would damage his property, Unit 12. He submitted videos of heavy rains to support his concern.

Evolving Legal Argument: In the rehearing, the petitioner’s argument shifted. He acknowledged that the CC&Rs gave the Association the right to enforce maintenance standards but argued that “at a certain point exercising a right becomes an obligation,” particularly when matters of safety and property values are implicated.

Claimed Financial Damages: The petitioner testified he was undergoing a contentious divorce and his condominium was being sold by order of the Maricopa County Superior Court. He asserted that due to the unresolved flood risk, which he was obligated to disclose, the sale price of Unit 12 was “$40,000 less than it would have been.”

Respondent’s Position and Actions

Denial of Violation: The Association denied it had violated any CC&Rs by its handling of the drainage channel.

Evidence and Testimony: The Association, represented by its President, Jeffrey Kaplan, presented several key points:

No History of Flooding: Mr. Kaplan testified that Unit 12 had never sustained any flood damage since the development was built in 2012, including during a “100-year storm” in 2014. After a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he personally inspected the easement and saw no water in it.

Origin of Plants: Mr. Kaplan stated that the builder had originally planted the vegetation in the drainage easement that the petitioner was concerned about.

No Other Complaints: No other members of the 46-unit Association had expressed any concerns about drainage.

Proactive Communication: To assuage the petitioner’s concerns, the Association’s management company sent letters to the relevant homeowners on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminding them of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions.

Due Diligence: Mr. Kaplan contacted officials at the Maricopa County Flood Control District and the Town of Cave Creek, who confirmed the drainage area was not on any official floodplain maps and that the Association was solely responsible for its maintenance.

Key CC&R Provisions and Legal Interpretation

The ALJs’ decisions hinged on a close reading of the Rancho Madera CC&Rs. The analysis consistently differentiated between the duties of individual owners and the duties of the Association.

CC&R § 3.10.2 — Unit Owner Responsibility: This section places the primary maintenance burden directly on the homeowners of the Drainage Easement Units.

Interpretation: The legal conclusion was that this provision unambiguously makes individual owners responsible for keeping their portion of the easement clear.

CC&R § 3.10.4 — Association Responsibility: This section defines the specific circumstance under which the Association is required to act.

Interpretation: Both ALJs found that this clause creates a reactionary, not a proactive, duty for the Association. Its obligation to repair is triggered by actual damage occurring, not by a perceived risk of future damage.

CC&R § 13.1.1 — Association Enforcement Power: This section, highlighted in the rehearing, grants the Association authority to act.

Interpretation: The ALJ in the rehearing ruled that this language grants a discretionary right, not a mandatory obligation. The CC&Rs contain no provision that converts this right into a duty under the circumstances presented by the petitioner.

Judicial Findings and Rulings

Initial Decision (ALJ Diane Mihalsky, Dec 26, 2018)

Burden of Proof: The petitioner failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Findings of Fact: The petitioner successfully established that plants and chicken wire existed in the stormwater canal. However, he failed to establish that these items actually impeded the flow of water.

Conclusion: The respondent proved that the drainage canal had functioned as intended since 2012 and that Unit 12 had never flooded. The petitioner’s divorce was noted to have “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint” but was irrelevant to the legal issue. The petition was denied.

Rehearing Decision (ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer, May 10, 2019)

Central Legal Finding: The CC&Rs clearly intend for unit owners to bear the primary responsibility for keeping the drainage area clear. The Association’s only specified obligation is to repair damage after it has occurred and bill the responsible owner.

Right vs. Obligation: The decision explicitly states, “While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”

Final Order: The petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Section 3.10 of the CC&Rs. The petition was dismissed.

Notable Evidence

A key piece of evidence submitted by the respondent was a June 22, 2018, email from the petitioner’s wife, Debborah Sellers, which directly refuted the petitioner’s claims. In the email, she stated:

“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”






Study Guide – 19F-H1918010-REL


Study Guide for Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation John A. Sellers made against the Rancho Madera Condominium Association in his petition filed on August 23, 2018?

2. Identify the key responsibilities assigned to individual unit owners of Drainage Easement Units according to Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs.

3. Who is Jeffrey Kaplan, and what key testimony did he provide on behalf of the Respondent?

4. What specific actions did the Respondent’s management company take in April and July of 2018 to address the Petitioner’s concerns?

5. According to the decision by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, what did the Petitioner fail to establish regarding the plants and chicken wire in the drainage canal?

6. On what grounds did John A. Sellers file his Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request on February 1, 2019?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument regarding the Association’s “right to enforce” the CC&Rs versus an “obligation to enforce” them?

8. What was the final conclusion of Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer regarding the Association’s responsibilities under the CC&Rs?

9. What occurred after the April 15, 2019 rehearing when the Petitioner attempted to submit supplemental information to the Office of Administrative Hearings?

10. Describe the evidence presented in an email from Debborah Sellers and its relevance to the case.

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Answer Key

1. John A. Sellers alleged that the Rancho Madera Condominium Association violated Section 3.10 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He claimed the Association failed to require condominium owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel, creating a flood risk for his unit.

2. Section 3.10.2 of the CC&Rs requires each Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit to keep their respective Drainage Easement Area free of weeds and other debris. The purpose is to ensure that stormwater can flow freely and that no improvement, including plant materials, impedes this flow.

3. Jeffrey Kaplan is the President of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association. He testified that the drainage easement had never failed, even during a 100-year storm in 2014, that the original builder had planted the vegetation in question, and that he had consulted with county and town officials about the drainage area.

4. To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent’s management company sent letters to the owners of the Drainage Easement Units. Letters sent on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminded owners of their responsibility to keep the drainage area free of obstructions, weeds, and debris.

5. Judge Mihalsky’s decision on December 26, 2018, concluded that the Petitioner established the presence of plants and chicken wire but failed to establish that these items actually impede the flow of water. The judge found that the drainage system functions as intended and there was no unreasonable risk of flooding.

6. The Petitioner filed for a rehearing based on several alleged issues with the original proceeding. These included an irregularity in the proceedings, the existence of newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, and a belief that the findings of fact or decision were arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence.

7. The Petitioner argued that while the CC&Rs grant the Association the “right to enforce” maintenance requirements, this right becomes an “obligation” when issues of property values and safety are at stake. He maintained that the potential for flooding created such an obligation for the Association to act.

8. Judge Eigenheer concluded that the CC&Rs intend for unit owners to bear the responsibility of keeping the Drainage Easement Area clear. She determined that while the Association has the right to enforce this, nothing in the CC&Rs creates an obligation for it to do so, and its only specified responsibility is to repair damage after it occurs, billing the responsible unit owner.

9. After the rehearing, the Petitioner submitted supplemental authority and argument without having requested leave to do so. The Respondent’s counsel argued this filing was untimely and introduced new arguments, requesting it be struck. On May 7, 2019, Judge Eigenheer ordered the filing struck from the record and closed the record.

10. The Respondent submitted a June 22, 2018 email from Debborah Sellers, the Petitioner’s wife. In the email, she stated there had never been an issue with the storm drain, called his concerns “nonsense,” and noted that the developer had done a good job, undermining the Petitioner’s claim of a significant and obvious flood risk.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer to dismiss the petition after the rehearing. Contrast her interpretation of the Association’s duties under the CC&Rs with the findings presented by Judge Diane Mihalsky in the initial decision.

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal documents. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explaining why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet this burden of proof in both hearings.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 19F-H1918010-REL. Identify and explain the significance of key events, including the initial petition, the vacated hearing, the first Administrative Law Judge Decision, the request for rehearing, and the final order dismissing the case.

4. Examine the role and responsibilities of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association versus the individual unit owners as defined by Sections 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4, and 13.1.1 of the CC&Rs. How did the interpretation of these sections form the basis of the final legal decision?

5. Evaluate the different types of evidence presented in the hearings, including witness testimony (Sellers, Kaplan), documentary evidence (CC&Rs, letters, emails), and physical evidence (photographs, videos). How did each type of evidence contribute to the final outcome of the case?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Tammy L. Eigenheer served as ALJs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium association. In this case, the CC&Rs for Rancho Madera were the central document in the dispute.

Drainage Easement

A perpetual, non-exclusive legal right created over a specific portion of property (the eastern five feet of Units 9-18) for constructing and maintaining a stormwater drainage channel.

Drainage Easement Area

The specific portion of land encumbered by the Drainage Easement, defined as the eastern five feet of the designated units.

Drainage Improvements

The physical components of the drainage system, such as the channel, decomposed granite, rip rap (large stones), or concrete, as originally constructed by the developer.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, John A. Sellers.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, making a contention more probably true than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted by the Commissioner in this instance, to re-examine the issues based on claims such as procedural irregularities, newly discovered evidence, or errors in the original decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.

The Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium unit owners’ associations.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918010-REL


I Read an Entire HOA Lawsuit. Here Are 4 Shocking Lessons About Power, Rules, and Reality.

The Anatomy of a Neighborhood War

Living under a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex world of rules, regulations, and neighborhood politics. For most, disagreements are minor annoyances. But sometimes, a seemingly small issue can escalate into a full-blown legal war.

This is the story of one homeowner’s single-minded crusade against his HOA over a stormwater drainage channel he believed was a serious flooding risk. After filing a formal petition, the dispute escalated into a multi-stage legal battle that spanned nearly a year. The official court documents reveal that even after a judge ruled decisively against him, the homeowner doubled down, demanding a rare rehearing.

A deep dive into this protracted case reveals a fascinating and cautionary tale. The legal reasoning that ultimately settled the matter highlights several surprising lessons that apply to anyone living in a planned community.

1. Proving a Rule Was Broken Isn’t the Same as Proving Harm

The initial hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky in late 2018, centered on a seemingly straightforward argument from the petitioner, John Sellers. He pointed out that his neighbors had placed plants—including large succulents, shrubs, and cacti—as well as chicken wire in a stormwater drainage channel. This, he argued, was a clear violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which stated that no improvement “shall be constructed, installed or allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water.”

But in her December 26, 2018 decision, the judge ruled against him. While Sellers successfully proved the obstructions existed, he failed to meet the legal burden of proof that they actually “impede the flow of water.” His claim was defeated by testimony from the HOA President, Jeffrey Kaplan, who stated that the unit had never sustained any flood damage, not even during a “100-year storm in 2014.”

The lesson from this first round is stark: in this legal context, simply pointing out a technical rule break was not enough. The petitioner had to prove that the violation was causing a tangible, negative impact. Without evidence of actual harm or impeded water flow, the theoretical risk was insufficient to win the case.

2. An HOA’s “Right” to Enforce Is Not an “Obligation”

After losing the first round on a question of evidence, Sellers’ argument evolved. He requested a rehearing, which was granted, and the case landed before a new judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, in the spring of 2019. This shifted the legal focus from physical proof of impeded water flow to a more fundamental question of the HOA’s duties.

Sellers argued that because safety and property values were at stake, the association had a duty to enforce the CC&Rs and compel his neighbors to clear the drainage channel. He contended that at a certain point, an organization’s “right” to act becomes an “obligation.”

The judge’s final decision on May 10, 2019, was clear, absolute, and is where the most powerful lesson of the entire case lies.

“While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”

This distinction is critical for any homeowner. An HOA can possess the legal power to act but may not be legally compelled to use it. According to the judge’s interpretation, the governing documents placed the responsibility for keeping the channel clear on the individual unit owners. The association’s only stated obligation was to repair damage after it happened, with the cost being billed back to the responsible party.

3. Outside Conflicts Can Cast a Long Shadow

Legal disputes are rarely just about the facts of the case. During the initial hearing, it was revealed that the petitioner was going through a “contentious divorce” and that the condo unit at the center of the dispute was a community asset being sold by the court.

The most dramatic evidence, however, came from an email written by the petitioner’s own wife, Debborah Sellers. The email, submitted as evidence by the HOA, directly undermined his claims about the severity of the drainage issue.

“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”

In her decision, Judge Mihalsky officially stated that the divorce was “not relevant” to the technical question of whether the HOA violated the CC&Rs. However, she immediately added that the situation “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint,” suggesting that the personal context, and especially the damaging email, severely harmed the petitioner’s credibility.

4. Writing Letters Isn’t the Same as Being Heard

Throughout the dispute, the petitioner made his concerns known by writing “many letters” to the HOA president. He was persistent in his written communications, attempting to force the issue onto the association’s radar.

Yet, this effort was contrasted with a notable lack of direct participation. According to the testimony of HOA President Kaplan during the first hearing, Sellers “never attended any of Respondent’s noticed Board meetings” where his concerns could have been discussed among the board members.

The HOA’s response to his letters was limited; it sent two general reminder letters to all residents in the affected area but did not take direct enforcement action against any specific homeowner. The practical takeaway is that to effect change or be taken seriously in an HOA dispute, visibility and participation are critical. Writing letters is a start, but attending official meetings to present a case in person can be a more effective strategy for ensuring an issue is formally addressed.

A Cautionary Tale for Any Homeowner

What began as a seemingly straightforward complaint about drainage and rule enforcement devolved into a legal battle that consumed nearly a year, involving two multi-day hearings before two different administrative law judges. The petitioner lost his case on the evidence, then lost it again on the law.

It serves as a potent cautionary tale, demonstrating that in the world of HOA disputes, the obvious path is not always the winning one. It leaves every homeowner with a final, thought-provoking question to ponder: When you see a problem in your community, how do you decide if a fight is worth the cost—not just in money, but in time, credibility, and peace?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John A Sellers (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Edward D. O’Brien (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Edith I. Rudder (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Jeffrey Kaplan (HOA President/witness)
    Rancho Madera Condominium Association
    Testified on behalf of Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    OAH
    ALJ for initial proceedings
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    ALJ for rehearing
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • c. serrano (Clerical staff)
    Transmitted document
  • F. Del Sol (Clerical staff)
    Transmitted document

Other Participants

  • Debborah Sellers (witness)
    Petitioner's wife, email submitted as evidence

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.

The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.

The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.

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1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)

Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)

Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: December 4, 2018

Decision Date: December 20, 2018

The Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.

The Respondent’s Position

The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

2. Relevant CC&R Provisions

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.

Section

Title / Subject

Description

10.11.4

Inoperable Vehicles

Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”

10.11.2

Street Parking

Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.

Nuisances

Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline

Violation Notices and Fines

Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.

The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:

September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.

October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.

December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.

January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.

April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.

Competing Testimonies

Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.

Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:

◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.

◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.

◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”

4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof

The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Judge’s Rationale

The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.

2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).






Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL


Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?

2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?

3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?

4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?

5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?

6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.

7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?

8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.

2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.

4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.

5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.

6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.

7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.

8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.

9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.

3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?

4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.

5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.

Appearances

A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.

The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.

Community Manager

An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Nuisance

A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.

Operating Condition

A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL



🏛️

19F-H18020-REL

1 source

The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry R. Collis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
  • Lisa Riesland (community manager)
    Laveen Meadows HOA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • f del sol (admin support)
    Signed copy distribution notice

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:31 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.

The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.

The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)

Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)

Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: December 4, 2018

Decision Date: December 20, 2018

The Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.

The Respondent’s Position

The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

2. Relevant CC&R Provisions

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.

Section

Title / Subject

Description

10.11.4

Inoperable Vehicles

Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”

10.11.2

Street Parking

Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.

Nuisances

Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline

Violation Notices and Fines

Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.

The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:

September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.

October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.

December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.

January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.

April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.

Competing Testimonies

Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.

Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:

◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.

◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.

◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”

4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof

The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Judge’s Rationale

The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.

2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).






Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL


Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?

2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?

3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?

4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?

5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?

6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.

7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?

8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.

2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.

4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.

5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.

6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.

7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.

8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.

9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.

3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?

4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.

5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.

Appearances

A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.

The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.

Community Manager

An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Nuisance

A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.

Operating Condition

A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL



🏛️

19F-H18020-REL

1 source

The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry R. Collis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
  • Lisa Riesland (community manager)
    Laveen Meadows HOA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • f del sol (admin support)
    Signed copy distribution notice

George E Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918013-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner George E Lord Counsel
Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association Counsel Maria Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, and CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any statute or covenant alleged. The core findings supported the HOA's position that the lessee was engaging in prohibited business activity and subletting, and that the charged attorney fees were permissible.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations concerning notice procedures, leasing restrictions, prohibited business use, and excessive fees.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to include proper citations in violation notices, violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 and CC&Rs by imposing illegal restrictions on occupancy dates and prohibiting tenant guests, and violated fee limits under A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) by charging $250 in attorney fees.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, HOA dispute, leasing restrictions, short-term rental, business use, notice procedure, attorney fees
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:32 (115.9 KB)

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:32 (47.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918013-REL


Briefing Document: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918013-REL, involving Petitioner George E. Lord and Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association. The judge ultimately dismissed all claims brought by the Petitioner, ruling that the Association acted within the bounds of Arizona statutes and its governing documents.

The core of the dispute centered on Mr. Lord’s leasing of three condominium units to an individual, Barrie Shepley, who used the properties to house participants for his commercial fitness training camps. The Association contended this arrangement constituted a prohibited short-term sublease and an improper business use of the units, leading them to suspend amenity access for the occupants.

The judge’s decision affirmed the Association’s position on all counts. Key takeaways include:

Substance Over Form: The judge concluded that despite the absence of a formal sublease agreement, the nature of the arrangement—specifically a camp pricing structure that varied based on the number of occupants per condo—was effectively a sublet designed to house an “itinerant population,” contrary to the “spirit and purpose” of the community’s rules.

Business Use Violation: The operation was found to be a business activity that violated the CC&Rs by requiring persons (camp participants) to come to the residential units.

Procedural Compliance: The Association’s violation notices were deemed compliant with Arizona law. The judge noted that the statute only requires a detailed citation of the violated rule after the owner responds to the initial notice, which the Petitioner failed to do.

Legality of Fees: A $250 charge levied by the Association’s counsel was determined to be a permissible charge for attorney’s fees related to potential collection, not an illegal penalty for leasing information as the Petitioner alleged.

As a result of these findings, the Petitioner’s request for relief was denied, and the petition was dismissed in its entirety.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: George E. Lord (unit owner)

Respondent: The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Number: 19F-H1918013-REL

Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: November 26, 2018

Decision Date: December 17, 2018

Final Disposition: The petition filed by George E. Lord was dismissed.

II. Factual Background and Timeline of Events

1. Lease Agreements: On or about December 4, 2017, Petitioner George Lord, through his management company, leased two units at The Boulders to Barrie Shepley for a term from March 7, 2018, to April 30, 2018. A third unit was subsequently leased to Mr. Shepley on or about January 15, 2018.

2. Commercial Use: Mr. Shepley operated a Canadian fitness business, “Personal Best,” which offered training camps in Tucson. Accommodations at The Boulders were included in the camp packages. The price for a camp varied based on occupancy:

◦ $950.00 each for four campers in a condo

◦ $1075.00 each for three campers in a condo

◦ $1299.00 each for two campers in a condo

3. Occupancy Begins: On March 7, 2018, guests of Mr. Shepley (camp participants) began arriving to occupy the three leased units.

4. Association Intervention: On March 9, 2018, Community Manager Danielle Morris emailed Mr. Lord, stating the Association’s belief that he was in violation of the CC&Rs by allowing subleasing for periods less than the 30-day minimum. Ms. Morris informed him that amenity access cards for the three units were deactivated.

5. Dispute Escalation: Mr. Lord contended that the occupants were merely “guests” of Mr. Shepley, not subletters. Ms. Morris countered that the Association required the names of all occupants and the duration of their stays, and that each occupant must stay for a minimum of 30 days.

6. Information Provided: On March 13, 2018, Mr. Lord provided the names of the occupants and their dates of occupancy, requesting that amenities be restored.

7. Violation Reiterated: On March 16, 2018, Ms. Morris stated the violation was ongoing, as occupants staying from March 7 to March 31 did not meet the 30-day minimum stay requirement.

8. Formal Notice of Violation: On March 18, 2018, Mr. Lord received formal Notices of Violations for the three units. The notices stated that amenity access was suspended because the HOA was not provided with the names of adult occupants and their timeframes. The notice warned that a $300 fine could be applied. Mr. Lord did not respond to these notices.

9. Attorney Involvement: On March 22, 2018, Mr. Lord received a letter from the Association’s legal counsel outlining its legal position and noting an amount due of $250 for attorney’s fees already incurred.

10. Lease Cancellation & Financial Loss: On April 2, 2018, Mr. Shepley cancelled the remainder of the leases due to the lack of amenities for his guests. Mr. Lord asserted a resulting financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018.

11. Petition Filing: On August 31, 2018, Mr. Lord filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association violated state statutes and its own CC&Rs.

III. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Lord’s petition was based on three primary allegations against the Association:

Allegation 1: Defective Violation Notice (A.R.S. § 33-1242): The Petitioner argued that the Notices of Violations were legally deficient because they failed to cite the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

Allegation 2: Unlawful Occupancy Requirements (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 & CC&Rs): The Petitioner asserted that the Association overstepped its authority by demanding that each occupant, whom he characterized as a “guest” of the primary lessee, must stay for a minimum of 30 days. He argued the 30-day minimum lease term applied only to the primary lease with Mr. Shepley, not to the occupants.

Allegation 3: Improper Fees (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)): The Petitioner claimed that the $250 charge from the Association’s attorney constituted an illegal fee, penalty, or charge related to providing leasing information, which he argued was prohibited by statute.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for any of his allegations and dismissed the petition. The judge’s reasoning is detailed below.

Finding 1: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Violation Notice)

The judge determined that the Association’s initial Notices of Violations were legally sufficient.

Legal Reasoning: A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) requires an association to cite the specific provision of the condominium documents that has been violated. However, this obligation is only triggered after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail.

Factual Basis: The Petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the formal Notices of Violations he received.

Conclusion: Because the Petitioner did not take the legally required step to trigger the Association’s duty to provide a specific citation, the Association did not violate the statute.

Finding 2: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 or CC&Rs (Leasing Rules)

The judge concluded that the Association was justified in its actions regarding the occupancy of the units.

The Arrangement was a “Form” of Subletting: The judge ruled against the Petitioner’s argument that the occupants were merely “guests.” The fact that the price of the fitness camp changed based on how many people shared a unit was seen as evidence that Mr. Shepley was, in effect, subletting the units for his business.

Prohibited Business Activity: The judge found that Mr. Shepley was operating a business from the units in a manner prohibited by Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs, which disallows business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.”

Spirit of the Law: The decision acknowledged that the specific facts of the case “falls between the cracks of the specific language of the statutes and the regulations.” However, the judge emphasized that the Association’s actions were consistent with the broader intent of its rules, stating, “given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.”

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated leasing statutes or its own CC&Rs.

Finding 3: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) (Fees)

The judge found that the $250 charge was not an illegal penalty.

Nature of the Charge: The evidence showed that no fines for the lease policy violation had actually been assessed. The $250 charge was explicitly for attorney’s fees related to the potential collection of assessments.

Legal Reasoning: The judge stated, “Nothing in the cited statute or the CC&Rs prohibits such a charge being implemented.” The fee was not a penalty for “incomplete or late information” as covered by the statute, but a charge for legal costs incurred by the Association.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish a violation regarding the assessed fees.

V. Referenced Statutes and Governing Documents

Reference

Provision Summary

Relevance to Case

A.R.S. § 33-1242(B)&(C)

Outlines the process for a unit owner to respond to a violation notice and the association’s subsequent duty to provide specific details of the violation.

The judge found no violation because the Petitioner did not follow the procedure to trigger the association’s duty.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(C)

Limits the information an association can require about a tenant to names, contact info for adults, lease period, and vehicle information.

The Petitioner’s case rested on interpreting this statute; the judge found the Association’s inquiries justified by the unique circumstances.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)

Prohibits an association from imposing fees greater than $15 for incomplete or late leasing information.

The Petitioner argued the $250 attorney fee violated this, but the judge found it was a permissible charge for legal costs, not a penalty.

CC&R Section 7.21

Requires leases to be in writing, for a term of not less than 30 days, and requires owners to provide lessee names and lease dates.

The Association argued the arrangement violated the 30-day minimum stay rule for occupants, which the judge upheld in spirit.

CC&R Section 7.3

Prohibits business activities within a unit that involve persons coming to the unit.

The judge found Mr. Shepley’s fitness camp, which housed participants in the units, was a clear violation of this provision.

Leasing Policy

States a $300 fine may be imposed for violations of the 30-day minimum lease policy.

The Notice of Violation referenced this potential fine, though it was never actually assessed.

VI. Final Order and Procedural Notes

Order: Based on the above findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed.

Binding Nature: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Related Filings: On the same day the decision was issued, December 17, 2018, the court also issued a separate “Order Vacating Hearing,” likely a procedural filing to cancel a future hearing that was rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of the case.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918013-REL


Study Guide: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918013-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The case involves a dispute between a condominium unit owner, George E. Lord, and his condominium association, The Boulders at La Reserve, concerning leasing policies, occupant regulations, and alleged statutory violations.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. Describe the business arrangement that Barrie Shepley, the petitioner’s lessee, was operating from the leased condominium units.

3. What was the first official action the Condominium Association’s management took in response to the arrival of Barrie Shepley’s guests, and what was their stated reason?

4. According to the Association, what two specific provisions of the governing documents were being violated by the petitioner and his lessee?

5. What was the petitioner’s central argument for why the occupants of the units were not in violation of the Association’s 30-day minimum stay requirement?

6. On what procedural grounds did the petitioner, George Lord, claim that the Association’s “Notice of Violations” was itself a violation of Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242)?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1242?

8. How did the judge interpret the fact that the price for Barrie Shepley’s fitness camps varied based on the number of people sharing a condo?

9. What financial loss did the petitioner claim to have suffered, and what was the direct cause of this loss?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were George E. Lord, the petitioner and owner of multiple condominium units, and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association, the respondent and governing body for the community. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. Barrie Shepley operated a fitness business called “Personal Best” that offered training camps in the Tucson area. The price for these camps included accommodations at The Boulders, with the cost per person varying based on how many campers shared a condominium unit.

3. The Association’s first action was to deactivate the amenity access cards for the three units leased by Shepley. Danielle Morris, the Community Manager, stated this was due to a belief that the petitioner’s lessee was subleasing the units for periods of less than the 30-day minimum in violation of the CC&Rs.

4. The Association alleged violations of the CC&Rs related to subleasing for less than the 30-day minimum timeframe. The formal Notices of Violations also cited the failure to provide the names of all adult occupants and the timeframes of their stays to the HOA.

5. The petitioner argued that because his lessee, Mr. Shepley, was not charging a specific rental fee to the occupants, they were merely “guests” and not sub-lessees. Therefore, the 30-day minimum stay requirement applicable to leases did not apply to them.

6. The petitioner alleged that the Association’s failure to include a citation to the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated in the initial Notice of Violations was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242.

7. The judge ruled against the petitioner because A.R.S. § 33-1242 only requires an association to provide the specific provision violated after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail. The petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the Notices of Violations.

8. The judge found that the tiered pricing structure supported the conclusion that Mr. Shepley was, “in a form, subletting the units.” The fact that the camp price decreased as more people shared a unit indicated that the occupants were paying for their accommodations, not simply staying as guests.

9. The petitioner asserted a financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018. This loss was directly caused by Barrie Shepley canceling the remainder of his leases due to the lack of amenities for his occupants.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s final order was that the Petition filed by George E. Lord be dismissed. This decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts, arguments, and legal interpretations from the case file.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Barrie Shepley was “in a form, subletting” the units. Discuss the evidence cited and the concept of the “spirit and purpose” of the rules versus their literal interpretation.

2. Examine the procedural misstep made by the petitioner, George Lord, after receiving the Notices of Violations. How did this action directly impact the judge’s ruling on his claim regarding A.R.S. § 33-1242?

3. Discuss the conflict between a unit owner’s right to lease their property and a condominium association’s right to enforce its governing documents, using the specific provisions of the CC&Rs (Sections 7.21 and 7.3) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01) as examples from the case.

4. Explain the distinction the judge made between the $300 potential fine mentioned in the Notice of Violations and the $250 attorney’s fee charged to the petitioner. How did this distinction relate to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E), and why was the Association’s action deemed permissible?

5. Evaluate the concept of an “itinerant population” as mentioned by the judge. How did Barrie Shepley’s business model contribute to this concern for the Association, and how did it ultimately weigh into the judge’s decision to dismiss the petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Name

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings on disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified body of laws for the state of Arizona. The petitioner alleged violations of specific statutes within this code, namely A.R.S. § 33-1242 and § 33-1260.01.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

A state law governing the process for notifying a unit owner of a violation of condominium documents and the procedures for the owner to respond and contest the notice.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01

A state law that places limitations on what information an association can require from a unit owner regarding a tenant and caps certain fees or penalties for incomplete information at $15.

Amenity

A feature or facility of a property that provides comfort, convenience, or pleasure. In this case, access to amenities was controlled by key cards, which the Association deactivated.

Barrie Shepley

The individual who leased three condominium units from the petitioner. He operated a fitness business, “Personal Best,” and used the units to house clients attending his training camps.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Association alleged Shepley’s use of the units violated Sections 7.21 (leasing limitations) and 7.3 (business use limitations).

George E. Lord

The Petitioner in the case. He was the owner of multiple condominium units at The Boulders at La Reserve and filed the petition against the Association.

Itinerant population

A term used by the judge to describe a population of short-term, transient occupants. The judge concluded that the purpose of the Association’s rules was, in part, to prevent this type of occupancy.

Notice of Violations

A formal written document sent by the Association to the petitioner informing him of alleged violations of the governing documents and outlining potential consequences, such as fines.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, George E. Lord.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the petitioner had the burden of showing that the facts they sought to prove were “more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association.

Subletting

The practice of a tenant leasing a rented property to a third party. The Association contended Shepley was subletting the units to his campers, while the petitioner argued they were merely guests.

The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case. The homeowners’ association (HOA) responsible for governing the condominium community in Oro Valley, Arizona.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918013-REL


The $6,900 ‘Guest’ Mistake: 3 Hard Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit

A $6,900 loss in rental income and a losing legal battle with his HOA—all because of a dispute over the definition of a “guest.” This case between owner George Lord and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association is a masterclass in how quickly and completely an owner can lose when they misinterpret the rules and underestimate an association’s power.

For any homeowner or landlord, this dispute provides three crucial lessons distilled from the administrative court’s decision. Understanding these precedents is essential before you ever find yourself at odds with your own HOA.

Lesson 1: The “Spirit of the Rule” Can Outweigh Your Clever Workaround

The dispute began when the property owner, Mr. Lord, leased three condos to Barrie Shepley, who ran fitness training camps. Mr. Shepley then used the condos to house his camp attendees, often for periods shorter than the HOA’s 30-day minimum lease term.

The owner argued his arrangement complied with the rules. He claimed his tenant, Mr. Shepley, was not subleasing the units; the attendees were merely “guests,” and therefore not subject to the 30-day minimum. It was a clever workaround, but it fell apart under scrutiny for two distinct reasons.

First, the judge looked past the “guest” label to the financial substance of the arrangement. A key piece of evidence was the camp’s pricing: the cost changed based on how many campers shared a condo ($950 each for four campers vs. $1299 each for two). The judge saw this as clear proof that housing was being paid for, making it a form of subletting.

Second, the judge found that the arrangement constituted a prohibited business activity. The association’s CC&Rs (Section 7.3) explicitly forbade any business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.” Since the fitness camp required attendees to come to the condos for lodging, it was a direct violation. The judge’s decision was therefore not just based on a subjective interpretation, but was also grounded in a concrete rule violation.

The court looked at the “totality of the circumstances” to make its ruling, a point powerfully summarized in the final decision:

However, given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.

Pro Tip: Before implementing a workaround, ask yourself: “Does this honor the community’s stated goal?” If the answer is no, you’re on thin ice, even if you think you’ve found a loophole.

Lesson 2: You Must Follow Procedure to the Letter, Or You Forfeit Your Rights

Confident in his “guest” interpretation, the homeowner made his next critical error by underestimating the importance of legal procedure. He argued that the HOA’s initial “Notice of Violations” was invalid because it failed to cite the specific CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

This argument was swiftly dismissed due to a simple but fatal mistake: the owner never sent a formal written response to the notice by certified mail.

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242), an owner’s formal written response via certified mail triggers the HOA’s obligation to provide the specific provision that was violated. Without that trigger, the HOA’s duty to explain further is never activated. The homeowner failed to pull the trigger. Because he did not follow this exact procedure, his claim was thrown out, and the HOA had no further legal obligation to detail its case.

Analyst’s Takeaway: In a legal dispute, communication that isn’t sent via the officially mandated channel (like certified mail) is legally equivalent to communication that never happened.

Lesson 3: The HOA’s Legal Fees Can Hit Your Wallet Sooner Than You Think

Early in the dispute, the owner received a letter from the HOA’s legal counsel. The letter outlined the association’s position and included a charge for $250.00. This was not a fine for the violation. It was a fee for the lawyer’s time, as explained in the letter:

“As you know, the Association is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees from you, including $250.00 already incurred for the preparation of this letter.”

Many governing documents contain clauses that allow an HOA to recover its “costs of enforcement.” This letter was an enforcement action, and the legal fee was the cost. The judge found that nothing in the law or CC&Rs prohibited the HOA from immediately passing this expense to the owner.

This initial charge was a precursor to a much larger financial blow. As an enforcement tool for the violations discussed in Lesson 1, the HOA suspended the tenants’ access to community amenities. This pressure tactic worked perfectly. The tenant, Mr. Shepley, cancelled his leases due to the lack of amenity access, leading to the owner’s stated loss of $6,900 in rental fees.

Pro Tip: Assume your HOA’s first legal letter starts a running tab. Budget for legal costs from day one of a formal dispute, not just for potential fines.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

The case of Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve establishes three clear precedents for owners: a rule’s intent can supersede its literal interpretation, procedural shortcuts void your rights, and the financial clock starts ticking the moment an HOA retains counsel.

This case is a firm reminder of an HOA’s power to enforce its rules, but it also highlights the owner’s responsibility to understand them. It begs the question: In our own communities, are we fully aware of the rules we’ve agreed to live by?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • George E. Lord (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Maria Kupillas (respondent attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
  • Danielle Morris (community manager)
    The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barrie Shepley (renter/key individual)

George E Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918013-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner George E Lord Counsel
Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association Counsel Maria Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, and CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any statute or covenant alleged. The core findings supported the HOA's position that the lessee was engaging in prohibited business activity and subletting, and that the charged attorney fees were permissible.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations concerning notice procedures, leasing restrictions, prohibited business use, and excessive fees.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to include proper citations in violation notices, violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 and CC&Rs by imposing illegal restrictions on occupancy dates and prohibiting tenant guests, and violated fee limits under A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) by charging $250 in attorney fees.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, HOA dispute, leasing restrictions, short-term rental, business use, notice procedure, attorney fees
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:46 (115.9 KB)

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:49 (47.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918013-REL


Briefing Document: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918013-REL, involving Petitioner George E. Lord and Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association. The judge ultimately dismissed all claims brought by the Petitioner, ruling that the Association acted within the bounds of Arizona statutes and its governing documents.

The core of the dispute centered on Mr. Lord’s leasing of three condominium units to an individual, Barrie Shepley, who used the properties to house participants for his commercial fitness training camps. The Association contended this arrangement constituted a prohibited short-term sublease and an improper business use of the units, leading them to suspend amenity access for the occupants.

The judge’s decision affirmed the Association’s position on all counts. Key takeaways include:

Substance Over Form: The judge concluded that despite the absence of a formal sublease agreement, the nature of the arrangement—specifically a camp pricing structure that varied based on the number of occupants per condo—was effectively a sublet designed to house an “itinerant population,” contrary to the “spirit and purpose” of the community’s rules.

Business Use Violation: The operation was found to be a business activity that violated the CC&Rs by requiring persons (camp participants) to come to the residential units.

Procedural Compliance: The Association’s violation notices were deemed compliant with Arizona law. The judge noted that the statute only requires a detailed citation of the violated rule after the owner responds to the initial notice, which the Petitioner failed to do.

Legality of Fees: A $250 charge levied by the Association’s counsel was determined to be a permissible charge for attorney’s fees related to potential collection, not an illegal penalty for leasing information as the Petitioner alleged.

As a result of these findings, the Petitioner’s request for relief was denied, and the petition was dismissed in its entirety.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: George E. Lord (unit owner)

Respondent: The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Number: 19F-H1918013-REL

Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: November 26, 2018

Decision Date: December 17, 2018

Final Disposition: The petition filed by George E. Lord was dismissed.

II. Factual Background and Timeline of Events

1. Lease Agreements: On or about December 4, 2017, Petitioner George Lord, through his management company, leased two units at The Boulders to Barrie Shepley for a term from March 7, 2018, to April 30, 2018. A third unit was subsequently leased to Mr. Shepley on or about January 15, 2018.

2. Commercial Use: Mr. Shepley operated a Canadian fitness business, “Personal Best,” which offered training camps in Tucson. Accommodations at The Boulders were included in the camp packages. The price for a camp varied based on occupancy:

◦ $950.00 each for four campers in a condo

◦ $1075.00 each for three campers in a condo

◦ $1299.00 each for two campers in a condo

3. Occupancy Begins: On March 7, 2018, guests of Mr. Shepley (camp participants) began arriving to occupy the three leased units.

4. Association Intervention: On March 9, 2018, Community Manager Danielle Morris emailed Mr. Lord, stating the Association’s belief that he was in violation of the CC&Rs by allowing subleasing for periods less than the 30-day minimum. Ms. Morris informed him that amenity access cards for the three units were deactivated.

5. Dispute Escalation: Mr. Lord contended that the occupants were merely “guests” of Mr. Shepley, not subletters. Ms. Morris countered that the Association required the names of all occupants and the duration of their stays, and that each occupant must stay for a minimum of 30 days.

6. Information Provided: On March 13, 2018, Mr. Lord provided the names of the occupants and their dates of occupancy, requesting that amenities be restored.

7. Violation Reiterated: On March 16, 2018, Ms. Morris stated the violation was ongoing, as occupants staying from March 7 to March 31 did not meet the 30-day minimum stay requirement.

8. Formal Notice of Violation: On March 18, 2018, Mr. Lord received formal Notices of Violations for the three units. The notices stated that amenity access was suspended because the HOA was not provided with the names of adult occupants and their timeframes. The notice warned that a $300 fine could be applied. Mr. Lord did not respond to these notices.

9. Attorney Involvement: On March 22, 2018, Mr. Lord received a letter from the Association’s legal counsel outlining its legal position and noting an amount due of $250 for attorney’s fees already incurred.

10. Lease Cancellation & Financial Loss: On April 2, 2018, Mr. Shepley cancelled the remainder of the leases due to the lack of amenities for his guests. Mr. Lord asserted a resulting financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018.

11. Petition Filing: On August 31, 2018, Mr. Lord filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association violated state statutes and its own CC&Rs.

III. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Lord’s petition was based on three primary allegations against the Association:

Allegation 1: Defective Violation Notice (A.R.S. § 33-1242): The Petitioner argued that the Notices of Violations were legally deficient because they failed to cite the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

Allegation 2: Unlawful Occupancy Requirements (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 & CC&Rs): The Petitioner asserted that the Association overstepped its authority by demanding that each occupant, whom he characterized as a “guest” of the primary lessee, must stay for a minimum of 30 days. He argued the 30-day minimum lease term applied only to the primary lease with Mr. Shepley, not to the occupants.

Allegation 3: Improper Fees (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)): The Petitioner claimed that the $250 charge from the Association’s attorney constituted an illegal fee, penalty, or charge related to providing leasing information, which he argued was prohibited by statute.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for any of his allegations and dismissed the petition. The judge’s reasoning is detailed below.

Finding 1: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Violation Notice)

The judge determined that the Association’s initial Notices of Violations were legally sufficient.

Legal Reasoning: A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) requires an association to cite the specific provision of the condominium documents that has been violated. However, this obligation is only triggered after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail.

Factual Basis: The Petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the formal Notices of Violations he received.

Conclusion: Because the Petitioner did not take the legally required step to trigger the Association’s duty to provide a specific citation, the Association did not violate the statute.

Finding 2: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 or CC&Rs (Leasing Rules)

The judge concluded that the Association was justified in its actions regarding the occupancy of the units.

The Arrangement was a “Form” of Subletting: The judge ruled against the Petitioner’s argument that the occupants were merely “guests.” The fact that the price of the fitness camp changed based on how many people shared a unit was seen as evidence that Mr. Shepley was, in effect, subletting the units for his business.

Prohibited Business Activity: The judge found that Mr. Shepley was operating a business from the units in a manner prohibited by Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs, which disallows business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.”

Spirit of the Law: The decision acknowledged that the specific facts of the case “falls between the cracks of the specific language of the statutes and the regulations.” However, the judge emphasized that the Association’s actions were consistent with the broader intent of its rules, stating, “given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.”

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated leasing statutes or its own CC&Rs.

Finding 3: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) (Fees)

The judge found that the $250 charge was not an illegal penalty.

Nature of the Charge: The evidence showed that no fines for the lease policy violation had actually been assessed. The $250 charge was explicitly for attorney’s fees related to the potential collection of assessments.

Legal Reasoning: The judge stated, “Nothing in the cited statute or the CC&Rs prohibits such a charge being implemented.” The fee was not a penalty for “incomplete or late information” as covered by the statute, but a charge for legal costs incurred by the Association.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish a violation regarding the assessed fees.

V. Referenced Statutes and Governing Documents

Reference

Provision Summary

Relevance to Case

A.R.S. § 33-1242(B)&(C)

Outlines the process for a unit owner to respond to a violation notice and the association’s subsequent duty to provide specific details of the violation.

The judge found no violation because the Petitioner did not follow the procedure to trigger the association’s duty.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(C)

Limits the information an association can require about a tenant to names, contact info for adults, lease period, and vehicle information.

The Petitioner’s case rested on interpreting this statute; the judge found the Association’s inquiries justified by the unique circumstances.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)

Prohibits an association from imposing fees greater than $15 for incomplete or late leasing information.

The Petitioner argued the $250 attorney fee violated this, but the judge found it was a permissible charge for legal costs, not a penalty.

CC&R Section 7.21

Requires leases to be in writing, for a term of not less than 30 days, and requires owners to provide lessee names and lease dates.

The Association argued the arrangement violated the 30-day minimum stay rule for occupants, which the judge upheld in spirit.

CC&R Section 7.3

Prohibits business activities within a unit that involve persons coming to the unit.

The judge found Mr. Shepley’s fitness camp, which housed participants in the units, was a clear violation of this provision.

Leasing Policy

States a $300 fine may be imposed for violations of the 30-day minimum lease policy.

The Notice of Violation referenced this potential fine, though it was never actually assessed.

VI. Final Order and Procedural Notes

Order: Based on the above findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed.

Binding Nature: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Related Filings: On the same day the decision was issued, December 17, 2018, the court also issued a separate “Order Vacating Hearing,” likely a procedural filing to cancel a future hearing that was rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of the case.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918013-REL


Study Guide: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918013-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The case involves a dispute between a condominium unit owner, George E. Lord, and his condominium association, The Boulders at La Reserve, concerning leasing policies, occupant regulations, and alleged statutory violations.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. Describe the business arrangement that Barrie Shepley, the petitioner’s lessee, was operating from the leased condominium units.

3. What was the first official action the Condominium Association’s management took in response to the arrival of Barrie Shepley’s guests, and what was their stated reason?

4. According to the Association, what two specific provisions of the governing documents were being violated by the petitioner and his lessee?

5. What was the petitioner’s central argument for why the occupants of the units were not in violation of the Association’s 30-day minimum stay requirement?

6. On what procedural grounds did the petitioner, George Lord, claim that the Association’s “Notice of Violations” was itself a violation of Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242)?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1242?

8. How did the judge interpret the fact that the price for Barrie Shepley’s fitness camps varied based on the number of people sharing a condo?

9. What financial loss did the petitioner claim to have suffered, and what was the direct cause of this loss?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were George E. Lord, the petitioner and owner of multiple condominium units, and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association, the respondent and governing body for the community. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. Barrie Shepley operated a fitness business called “Personal Best” that offered training camps in the Tucson area. The price for these camps included accommodations at The Boulders, with the cost per person varying based on how many campers shared a condominium unit.

3. The Association’s first action was to deactivate the amenity access cards for the three units leased by Shepley. Danielle Morris, the Community Manager, stated this was due to a belief that the petitioner’s lessee was subleasing the units for periods of less than the 30-day minimum in violation of the CC&Rs.

4. The Association alleged violations of the CC&Rs related to subleasing for less than the 30-day minimum timeframe. The formal Notices of Violations also cited the failure to provide the names of all adult occupants and the timeframes of their stays to the HOA.

5. The petitioner argued that because his lessee, Mr. Shepley, was not charging a specific rental fee to the occupants, they were merely “guests” and not sub-lessees. Therefore, the 30-day minimum stay requirement applicable to leases did not apply to them.

6. The petitioner alleged that the Association’s failure to include a citation to the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated in the initial Notice of Violations was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242.

7. The judge ruled against the petitioner because A.R.S. § 33-1242 only requires an association to provide the specific provision violated after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail. The petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the Notices of Violations.

8. The judge found that the tiered pricing structure supported the conclusion that Mr. Shepley was, “in a form, subletting the units.” The fact that the camp price decreased as more people shared a unit indicated that the occupants were paying for their accommodations, not simply staying as guests.

9. The petitioner asserted a financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018. This loss was directly caused by Barrie Shepley canceling the remainder of his leases due to the lack of amenities for his occupants.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s final order was that the Petition filed by George E. Lord be dismissed. This decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts, arguments, and legal interpretations from the case file.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Barrie Shepley was “in a form, subletting” the units. Discuss the evidence cited and the concept of the “spirit and purpose” of the rules versus their literal interpretation.

2. Examine the procedural misstep made by the petitioner, George Lord, after receiving the Notices of Violations. How did this action directly impact the judge’s ruling on his claim regarding A.R.S. § 33-1242?

3. Discuss the conflict between a unit owner’s right to lease their property and a condominium association’s right to enforce its governing documents, using the specific provisions of the CC&Rs (Sections 7.21 and 7.3) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01) as examples from the case.

4. Explain the distinction the judge made between the $300 potential fine mentioned in the Notice of Violations and the $250 attorney’s fee charged to the petitioner. How did this distinction relate to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E), and why was the Association’s action deemed permissible?

5. Evaluate the concept of an “itinerant population” as mentioned by the judge. How did Barrie Shepley’s business model contribute to this concern for the Association, and how did it ultimately weigh into the judge’s decision to dismiss the petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Name

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings on disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified body of laws for the state of Arizona. The petitioner alleged violations of specific statutes within this code, namely A.R.S. § 33-1242 and § 33-1260.01.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

A state law governing the process for notifying a unit owner of a violation of condominium documents and the procedures for the owner to respond and contest the notice.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01

A state law that places limitations on what information an association can require from a unit owner regarding a tenant and caps certain fees or penalties for incomplete information at $15.

Amenity

A feature or facility of a property that provides comfort, convenience, or pleasure. In this case, access to amenities was controlled by key cards, which the Association deactivated.

Barrie Shepley

The individual who leased three condominium units from the petitioner. He operated a fitness business, “Personal Best,” and used the units to house clients attending his training camps.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Association alleged Shepley’s use of the units violated Sections 7.21 (leasing limitations) and 7.3 (business use limitations).

George E. Lord

The Petitioner in the case. He was the owner of multiple condominium units at The Boulders at La Reserve and filed the petition against the Association.

Itinerant population

A term used by the judge to describe a population of short-term, transient occupants. The judge concluded that the purpose of the Association’s rules was, in part, to prevent this type of occupancy.

Notice of Violations

A formal written document sent by the Association to the petitioner informing him of alleged violations of the governing documents and outlining potential consequences, such as fines.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, George E. Lord.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the petitioner had the burden of showing that the facts they sought to prove were “more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association.

Subletting

The practice of a tenant leasing a rented property to a third party. The Association contended Shepley was subletting the units to his campers, while the petitioner argued they were merely guests.

The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case. The homeowners’ association (HOA) responsible for governing the condominium community in Oro Valley, Arizona.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918013-REL


The $6,900 ‘Guest’ Mistake: 3 Hard Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit

A $6,900 loss in rental income and a losing legal battle with his HOA—all because of a dispute over the definition of a “guest.” This case between owner George Lord and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association is a masterclass in how quickly and completely an owner can lose when they misinterpret the rules and underestimate an association’s power.

For any homeowner or landlord, this dispute provides three crucial lessons distilled from the administrative court’s decision. Understanding these precedents is essential before you ever find yourself at odds with your own HOA.

Lesson 1: The “Spirit of the Rule” Can Outweigh Your Clever Workaround

The dispute began when the property owner, Mr. Lord, leased three condos to Barrie Shepley, who ran fitness training camps. Mr. Shepley then used the condos to house his camp attendees, often for periods shorter than the HOA’s 30-day minimum lease term.

The owner argued his arrangement complied with the rules. He claimed his tenant, Mr. Shepley, was not subleasing the units; the attendees were merely “guests,” and therefore not subject to the 30-day minimum. It was a clever workaround, but it fell apart under scrutiny for two distinct reasons.

First, the judge looked past the “guest” label to the financial substance of the arrangement. A key piece of evidence was the camp’s pricing: the cost changed based on how many campers shared a condo ($950 each for four campers vs. $1299 each for two). The judge saw this as clear proof that housing was being paid for, making it a form of subletting.

Second, the judge found that the arrangement constituted a prohibited business activity. The association’s CC&Rs (Section 7.3) explicitly forbade any business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.” Since the fitness camp required attendees to come to the condos for lodging, it was a direct violation. The judge’s decision was therefore not just based on a subjective interpretation, but was also grounded in a concrete rule violation.

The court looked at the “totality of the circumstances” to make its ruling, a point powerfully summarized in the final decision:

However, given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.

Pro Tip: Before implementing a workaround, ask yourself: “Does this honor the community’s stated goal?” If the answer is no, you’re on thin ice, even if you think you’ve found a loophole.

Lesson 2: You Must Follow Procedure to the Letter, Or You Forfeit Your Rights

Confident in his “guest” interpretation, the homeowner made his next critical error by underestimating the importance of legal procedure. He argued that the HOA’s initial “Notice of Violations” was invalid because it failed to cite the specific CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

This argument was swiftly dismissed due to a simple but fatal mistake: the owner never sent a formal written response to the notice by certified mail.

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242), an owner’s formal written response via certified mail triggers the HOA’s obligation to provide the specific provision that was violated. Without that trigger, the HOA’s duty to explain further is never activated. The homeowner failed to pull the trigger. Because he did not follow this exact procedure, his claim was thrown out, and the HOA had no further legal obligation to detail its case.

Analyst’s Takeaway: In a legal dispute, communication that isn’t sent via the officially mandated channel (like certified mail) is legally equivalent to communication that never happened.

Lesson 3: The HOA’s Legal Fees Can Hit Your Wallet Sooner Than You Think

Early in the dispute, the owner received a letter from the HOA’s legal counsel. The letter outlined the association’s position and included a charge for $250.00. This was not a fine for the violation. It was a fee for the lawyer’s time, as explained in the letter:

“As you know, the Association is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees from you, including $250.00 already incurred for the preparation of this letter.”

Many governing documents contain clauses that allow an HOA to recover its “costs of enforcement.” This letter was an enforcement action, and the legal fee was the cost. The judge found that nothing in the law or CC&Rs prohibited the HOA from immediately passing this expense to the owner.

This initial charge was a precursor to a much larger financial blow. As an enforcement tool for the violations discussed in Lesson 1, the HOA suspended the tenants’ access to community amenities. This pressure tactic worked perfectly. The tenant, Mr. Shepley, cancelled his leases due to the lack of amenity access, leading to the owner’s stated loss of $6,900 in rental fees.

Pro Tip: Assume your HOA’s first legal letter starts a running tab. Budget for legal costs from day one of a formal dispute, not just for potential fines.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

The case of Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve establishes three clear precedents for owners: a rule’s intent can supersede its literal interpretation, procedural shortcuts void your rights, and the financial clock starts ticking the moment an HOA retains counsel.

This case is a firm reminder of an HOA’s power to enforce its rules, but it also highlights the owner’s responsibility to understand them. It begs the question: In our own communities, are we fully aware of the rules we’ve agreed to live by?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • George E. Lord (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Maria Kupillas (respondent attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
  • Danielle Morris (community manager)
    The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barrie Shepley (renter/key individual)

John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome win
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John W. Gray Counsel
Respondent Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:18 (139.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918004-REL


Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

Specific Violations Alleged:

Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

Evidence Presented at Hearing:

Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

Core Arguments:

Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

Actions Taken by MCIII:

Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL


Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?

3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?

4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.

5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?

6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?

7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?

9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.

2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.

3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.

4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.

5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.

6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.

7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.

8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.

9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.

10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.

2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.

4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?

5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.

Common Elements

Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.

Community Manager

An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.

Inoperable Vehicle

A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.

A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Prevailing Party

The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL


He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.

Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking

For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.

This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.

The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.

1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work

The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.

The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.

The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:

MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.

2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon

John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:

• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.

• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.

• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.

The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.

3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures

In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.

The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.

This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.

4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis

Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.

Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.

The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:

Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.

The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.

5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient

Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:

• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.

• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.

The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.

For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.

Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One

The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John W. Gray (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Austin Baillio (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan PC
    Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
  • Andrea Lacombe (community manager)
    Curtiss Management
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome win
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John W. Gray Counsel
Respondent Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:52 (139.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918004-REL


Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

Specific Violations Alleged:

Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

Evidence Presented at Hearing:

Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

Core Arguments:

Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

Actions Taken by MCIII:

Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL


Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?

3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?

4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.

5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?

6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?

7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?

9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.

2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.

3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.

4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.

5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.

6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.

7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.

8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.

9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.

10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.

2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.

4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?

5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.

Common Elements

Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.

Community Manager

An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.

Inoperable Vehicle

A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.

A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Prevailing Party

The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL


He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.

Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking

For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.

This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.

The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.

1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work

The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.

The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.

The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:

MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.

2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon

John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:

• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.

• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.

• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.

The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.

3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures

In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.

The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.

This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.

4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis

Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.

Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.

The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:

Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.

The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.

5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient

Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:

• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.

• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.

The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.

For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.

Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One

The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John W. Gray (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Austin Baillio (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan PC
    Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
  • Andrea Lacombe (community manager)
    Curtiss Management
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Notice Violation, A.R.S. 33-1242, Statutory Construction, Homeowner Petition Dismissed
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
  • Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:23 (85.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL


Briefing Document: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the case is Mr. Garcia’s allegation that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 by failing to follow specific procedures after issuing notices for a violation of its short-term rental policy.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The central finding was that Mr. Garcia failed to meet a critical prerequisite outlined in the statute: he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period. This failure meant that the HOA’s corresponding statutory obligations—such as providing the name of the person who observed the violation—were never triggered.

Furthermore, the judge determined that the HOA was not required to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to an administrative hearing because the violation notices themselves included instructions on the HOA’s internal process for contesting the matter. Mr. Garcia’s argument that the HOA’s rapid issuance of fines and subsequent notices prevented him from responding was found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The decisions underscore a strict interpretation of the statute, placing the initial burden of response on the unit owner.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings after a petition was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involved an initial hearing and a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

Rogelio A. Garcia

Respondent

Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”)

Respondent’s Counsel

Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Case Number (Initial)

19F-H1918009-REL

Case Number (Rehearing)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG

Core Allegation

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 by the Respondent.

II. Chronology of Events

March 8, 2018: Villagio mails the first letter to Mr. Garcia, alleging a violation of short-term lease provisions in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The letter instructs him to file an appeal with the Board of Directors within 10 days of receipt.

March 22, 2018: Villagio mails a second notice for the same violation, informing Mr. Garcia that a $1,000 fine has been posted to his account. This notice also contains instructions for contesting the violation.

April 5, 2018: Villagio mails a third notice, informing Mr. Garcia that a $2,000 fine has been posted to his account for the continuing violation.

Response from Garcia: Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-calendar-day period specified by statute. He did, at some point, file an appeal directly with Villagio, which held a hearing but did not change its position.

August 17, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Garcia files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally initiating the administrative hearing process.

October 30, 2018: The first evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

November 19, 2018: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

January 3, 2019 (approx.): The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an order setting a rehearing for the matter, following a request from Mr. Garcia.

February 12, 2019: The rehearing is held. Mr. Garcia testifies on his own behalf, and Villagio presents testimony from Community Manager Tom Gordon.

March 4, 2019: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

III. Central Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242

The entire dispute centered on the procedural requirements laid out in A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs how an HOA must handle notices of violation to a unit owner. The key provisions are:

Unit Owner’s Responsibility (Subsection B): A unit owner who receives a written notice of violation may provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

Association’s Obligations upon Response (Subsection C): Within ten business days after receiving the certified mail response, the association must provide a written explanation that includes:

1. The specific provision of the condominium documents allegedly violated.

2. The date the violation occurred or was observed.

3. The first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

4. The process the unit owner must follow to contest the notice.

Association’s Obligation Regarding Administrative Hearings (Subsection D): An association must provide written notice of the owner’s option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department unless the information required in Subsection C, paragraph 4 (the contest process) is provided in the initial notice of violation.

IV. Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia’s arguments, presented across both hearings, focused on three primary claims of statutory violation by Villagio:

1. Failure to Provide Required Information: Villagio violated the statute by not providing him with the first and last name of the person who observed the violation.

2. Failure to Notify of Hearing Rights: Villagio did not inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

3. Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from responding via certified mail within the 21-day statutory period. He argued that the notices’ demand for compliance within 10 days, combined with the issuance of a second notice and a fine just 14 days after the first, led him to believe he only had 10 days to act before incurring another violation.

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio presented a defense based on a direct reading of the statute and Mr. Garcia’s inaction:

1. Statutory Obligations Not Triggered: Villagio’s central argument was that its obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C)—including the duty to name the observer—are only triggered after a unit owner submits a written response by certified mail within 21 days. Since Mr. Garcia never sent such a response, these obligations never came into effect.

2. Internal Contest Process Satisfied Statute: Per A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), the duty to notify an owner of their right to an administrative hearing only applies if the HOA fails to provide its own contest process. Villagio argued that because all three notices explicitly stated the process for appealing to the Board of Directors, it had fulfilled its statutory duty.

3. No Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia was never legally or physically prevented from sending a certified letter. During cross-examination, he admitted he was not under any court order prohibiting him from responding.

4. Statute Inapplicability (Argument from Rehearing): Villagio further contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies specifically to violations concerning the “condition of the property,” not the “use” of the property. Since short-term renting is a use, Villagio argued the statute did not apply to this situation at all.

Key Testimony from Rehearing

During the February 12, 2019 rehearing, Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified.

• On direct examination, Mr. Gordon stated that Villagio does not restrict homeowners from responding to violation notices within the 21-day period.

• On cross-examination, when asked by Mr. Garcia if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” had he responded in 21 days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.” He explained this by stating that homeowners are given 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio pursuant to its own short-term rental policy.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions and Rationale

The judge’s findings were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, leading to the same conclusion in each instance.

Initial Decision (November 19, 2018)

Finding of Fact: It was undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the March 8, March 22, or April 5, 2018 notices within 21 calendar days.

Conclusion 1: Because Mr. Garcia did not respond within the 21-day period, Villagio was not required to provide him with the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

Conclusion 2: Because Villagio notified Mr. Garcia of the process for contesting the notice, it was not required under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) to provide him with notice of the right to petition for an administrative hearing.

Outcome: Mr. Garcia failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (March 4, 2019)

The judge reaffirmed the initial findings and addressed Mr. Garcia’s argument that he was prevented from responding.

Finding on “Prevention”: The judge found no evidence that Villagio informed Mr. Garcia he could not respond within 21 days or otherwise prevented him from doing so. The issuance of a second notice 14 days after the first was not deemed a preventative act that nullified Mr. Garcia’s statutory window to respond to the first notice.

Statutory Construction: The decision invoked the legal principle that “what the Legislature means, it will say,” indicating a strict, literal interpretation of the statute’s requirements.

Reaffirmed Conclusions: The judge again concluded that because Mr. Garcia failed to submit a written response by certified mail, Villagio’s obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) were not triggered, and its inclusion of an internal appeal process satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).

Outcome: Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed for a second time, with Villagio deemed the prevailing party.

VI. Final Disposition

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Garcia’s petition be dismissed. The decision issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL


Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case between Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, as detailed in case number 19F-H1918009-REL.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source context.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association initially accuse Mr. Garcia of committing?

3. What was the core of Mr. Garcia’s legal complaint against the Homeowners Association?

4. According to the court’s findings, what crucial step did Mr. Garcia fail to take after receiving the violation notices?

5. What was Villagio’s main argument for why it was not obligated to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

6. Under what circumstance did Villagio argue it was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with notice of his right to petition for an administrative hearing?

7. What new fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia in the notices dated March 22, 2018, and April 5, 2018?

8. At the rehearing, what was Mr. Garcia’s explanation for why he was unable to respond to the notices within the statutory 21-day period?

9. What argument did Villagio introduce at the rehearing concerning the distinction between a property’s “condition” and its “use”?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Rogelio A. Garcia, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, the Respondent defending against the complaint. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

2. Villagio accused Mr. Garcia of violating the short-term lease provisions located in the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The association alleged that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of its short-term rental policy.

3. Mr. Garcia alleged that Villagio violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. He claimed Villagio failed to provide him the opportunity to respond by certified mail within 21 days, did not inform him of his right to an administrative hearing, and did not provide the name of the person who observed the violation.

4. The court found that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the violation notices sent on March 8, March 22, and April 5, 2018. Specifically, he failed to provide the association with a written response by sending it via certified mail within 21 calendar days after the date of the notices.

5. Villagio argued that its obligation to provide the observer’s name under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) is only triggered if the unit owner first submits a written response by certified mail within the 21-day period. Because Mr. Garcia did not do so, Villagio was not required to provide that information.

6. Villagio argued it was not required to provide notice of the right to petition for a hearing because it had already fulfilled its legal obligation under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D). The violation notices it sent to Mr. Garcia contained instructions on the process for contesting the notice with the Board of Directors.

7. The notice dated March 22, 2018, informed Mr. Garcia that a fine of $1,000 had been posted to his account. The subsequent notice on April 5, 2018, stated that an additional $2,000 fine had been posted for the same violation.

8. Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio prevented him from responding because it did not wait 21 days before issuing subsequent notices and fines. He believed he only had 10 days to comply based on language in the notices, which created confusion and pressure.

9. At the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition of the property.” Villagio asserted its notices concerned the “use” of Mr. Garcia’s property (short-term renting), not its physical condition.

10. In both the initial hearing decision issued on November 19, 2018, and the rehearing decision issued on March 4, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove Villagio had violated the statute. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to provoke deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing evidence and reasoning exclusively from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson to dismiss Mr. Garcia’s petition. How did the judge interpret and apply the specific subsections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242 to the facts presented in the initial hearing and the rehearing?

2. Trace the progression of arguments made by both Rogelio A. Garcia and Villagio from the initial petition through the rehearing. How did their claims and defenses evolve, and what new evidence or legal theories were introduced in the second hearing?

3. Discuss the significance of the “burden of proof” in this case, which rested upon Mr. Garcia. Explain the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decision and detail why the judge concluded Mr. Garcia failed to meet this standard.

4. Evaluate the strength and potential implications of Villagio’s argument, introduced at the rehearing, that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge did not base the final decision on this point, discuss how this interpretation could affect future disputes between homeowners and associations.

5. Based on the dates and actions described in the two decisions, construct a detailed procedural timeline of this case. Begin with the first violation letter from Villagio and conclude with the notice of the right to appeal the rehearing decision, including all key notices, filings, hearings, and fines.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The central statute in this case was A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this matter, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof to show that Villagio committed the alleged violation.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents that dictate how a condominium or planned community must be operated and maintained, and which contain the rules that unit owners must follow. Mr. Garcia was accused of violating the short-term lease provisions of Villagio’s CC&Rs.

Certified Mail

A type of mail service that provides the sender with a mailing receipt and electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made. A.R.S. § 33-1242(B) specifies this method for a unit owner’s written response to a violation notice.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding, similar to a trial, where parties present evidence (such as testimony and documents) to a neutral decision-maker. Hearings were held in this case on October 30, 2018, and February 12, 2019.

Office of Administrative Hearings

A state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies, boards, and commissions. This office was responsible for conducting the hearings in this case.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the original decision, often granted to review the evidence or arguments. Mr. Garcia requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association was the Respondent.

Unit Owner

A person who owns a unit within a condominium or planned community and is subject to the association’s governing documents. Mr. Garcia is a unit owner in the Villagio at Tempe community.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL



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