Category Archives: Court of Appeals

Arizona Court of Appeals opinions

John W. Shamrock, Arthur A. and Lois J. Gilcrease Family Trust, David H. Hemmings, The Pollard Family Trust, J.C. & C. Investments, L.L.C., Edward E. Smith and Margaret Smith, Lewis Revocable Trust, Joe Kaczmarski and Ada Kaczmarski, and William R. Detor v. Wagon Wheel Park Homeowners Association

Posted on by

John W. Shamrock, Arthur A. and Lois J. Gilcrease Family Trust, David H. Hemmings, The Pollard Family Trust, J.C. & C. Investments, L.L.C., Edward E. Smith and Margaret Smith, Lewis Revocable Trust, Joe Kaczmarski and Ada Kaczmarski, and William R. Detor v. Wagon Wheel Park Homeowners Association

1 CA-CV 02-0403 · Court of Appeals · August 26, 2003

At a Glance

Parties Subdivision lot owners challenged a nonprofit association’s claim that ownership automatically made them mandatory members obligated to pay assessments.
Panel Judge Ann A. Scott Timmer, Presiding Judge Daniel A. Barker, Judge William F. Garbarino
Statutes interpreted

Summary

This case asks a basic but important HOA-law question: how do you turn a neighborhood with recorded restrictions into one with mandatory HOA membership and compulsory assessments? The court answered that it must be done through recorded deed restrictions, not just through articles of incorporation or bylaws of a nonprofit association. Wagon Wheel argued that its corporate documents and amended bylaws made all lot owners mandatory members. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that owners in an existing subdivision cannot be forced into mandatory membership unless the recorded land restrictions themselves impose that burden in the manner allowed by the existing declaration. Because those recorded restrictions did not do so during the relevant period, the association’s assessments and related encumbrances against nonmembers were not valid for that period.

Holding

The court held that mandatory membership in a new HOA for owners in an existing subdivision can be imposed only through properly recorded deed restrictions, not by corporate articles or bylaws alone.

Reasoning

The court began with nonprofit-corporation law and the principle that membership cannot be imposed without consent. It then turned to real-property law and explained that mandatory membership and assessment duties must arise from recorded covenants that run with the land.

The association tried to combine old declarations, articles of incorporation, and later bylaws into a single functional declaration. The court rejected that approach. The Planned Communities Act defined which associations are covered, but it did not supply a shortcut for creating mandatory membership burdens. Because the existing recorded declaration had not yet been properly amended to require membership, the association’s internal corporate documents could not do the job.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is a major Arizona authority on whether an association can bootstrap itself into mandatory status. It is especially useful in disputes involving older subdivisions, informal neighborhood associations, and retrofitted assessment schemes.

For boards and developers, the lesson is blunt: if the burden is supposed to run with the land, it must be created and amended through the recorded land documents, not by internal corporate paperwork.

Topics

cc-and-rsassessmentsboard-governance

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

David C. Johnson and Wendee L. Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, Inc., Patrick Boyle, and Carol Boyle

Posted on by

David C. Johnson and Wendee L. Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, Inc., Patrick Boyle, and Carol Boyle

205 Ariz. 485 (Ct. App. 2003), 1 CA-CV 02-0160 · Court of Appeals · July 31, 2003

At a Glance

Parties Homeowners sued their HOA and neighbors after the HOA declined to require compliance with architectural and exterior-maintenance restrictions in the declaration.
Panel Judge Snow

Summary

The Johnsons claimed their HOA should have required their neighbors to obtain approval for an exterior stucco change and should have enforced declaration provisions dealing with exposed wiring. The trial court sided with the HOA after deciding it should defer to the association’s choices so long as they were made in good faith. The Court of Appeals vacated that ruling. It explained that recorded restrictions are contracts and that courts do not simply hand off contract interpretation to an HOA board whenever the text can be judicially read and applied. The opinion is useful because it separates deference to discretionary community management from the court’s independent role in interpreting and enforcing governing documents. Associations are not free to treat clear restrictions as optional just because they believe a relaxed approach is sensible.

Holding

The court held that the superior court erred by deferring as a matter of public policy to the HOA’s good-faith decisions on declaration compliance instead of independently analyzing the governing documents and the claimed violations.

Reasoning

The court treated the declaration as a contract running with the land and emphasized that contract interpretation remains a judicial function. That meant the trial court first needed to decide what the governing language required before deciding whether the HOA or the neighbors had complied.

The opinion rejected a blanket rule that would insulate HOA enforcement decisions whenever the board claimed good faith. The court distinguished between areas where an HOA truly exercises granted discretion and situations where the declaration itself imposes concrete obligations. Where the document speaks clearly, a court must determine its meaning and then decide whether it was violated.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is a foundational Arizona case for homeowners arguing selective or non-enforcement. It limits the idea that a board can avoid judicial review by labeling a dispute as an exercise of association discretion.

For boards, the case is a warning that they need a document-based reason for enforcement choices, especially when the declaration imposes specific exterior-control or maintenance rules.

Topics

cc-and-rsarchitectural-reviewselective-enforcement

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Scott Canady, Ralph and Margaret Canady, and Pamela Garapich v. Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Association, Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Association Board of Directors, and Don Larson, President

Posted on by

Scott Canady, Ralph and Margaret Canady, and Pamela Garapich v. Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Association, Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Association Board of Directors, and Don Larson, President

204 Ariz. 91 (Ct. App. 2002), 1 CA-CV 02-0138 · Court of Appeals · November 26, 2002

At a Glance

Parties Disabled adult son and his parents, plus a seller, sued the HOA after the HOA refused to waive an age-restriction rule in a senior community.
Panel Judge Ehrlich, Presiding Judge William F. Garbarino, Judge Jon W. Thompson
Statutes interpreted

Summary

This case arose after a 55-plus community refused to let a severely developmentally disabled 26-year-old live with his qualifying parents because the community’s CC&Rs separately barred residents under age 35. The Court of Appeals held that Arizona and federal fair-housing law required the association to make a reasonable accommodation. The court rejected the HOA’s argument that allowing the son to live there would destroy the community’s lawful status as housing for older persons. It explained that the older-housing exemption protects age-based occupancy rules from familial-status claims, but it does not erase the separate duty to accommodate disability. The court also emphasized that accommodation law can require changing an otherwise valid rule when that change is necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.

Holding

The court held that the HOA violated Arizona fair-housing law by refusing a reasonable disability accommodation and that granting the accommodation would not jeopardize the community’s 55-plus status.

Reasoning

The court started with the disability-accommodation provisions in the Arizona Fair Housing Act and the parallel federal statute. It treated federal case law as persuasive because the Arizona provisions are materially similar. Under those statutes, a facially neutral rule can still be unlawful if the association refuses a reasonable exception that is necessary for a disabled person to use and enjoy housing on equal terms.

The HOA argued that its age restriction was lawful and that a waiver would undercut the development’s status as housing for older persons. The court disagreed. Because at least one occupant in the household would still be over 55, the statutory occupancy threshold stayed intact. And making an exception to comply with disability law did not show abandonment of the community’s senior-housing purpose. The accommodation was therefore both legally required and practically compatible with the governing scheme.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is one of the clearest Arizona HOA cases on disability accommodations. Boards cannot assume that a valid CC&R or age restriction automatically ends the analysis when a disability-related request is made.

For homeowners and counsel, the case is a strong reminder that fair-housing duties can override otherwise enforceable private-use restrictions when a targeted exception is necessary and reasonable.

Topics

fair-housingcc-and-rs

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Gelb v. Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

Posted on by

Gelb v. Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

No. 1 CA-CV 09-0744 (Ariz. App. Oct. 28, 2010) · Court of Appeals · October 28, 2010

At a Glance

Parties Chris Gelb (homeowner/plaintiff-appellant) v. Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety and Sedona Casa Contenta Homeowners Association, Inc. (defendants-appellees).
Panel Judge Samuel A. Thumma, Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop, Judge Patrick Irvine
Statutes interpreted

Summary

This case addressed Arizona’s old administrative hearing system for planned-community disputes. A homeowner used that process to challenge her HOA’s conduct before the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The court of appeals held that the administrative process, as applied to planned-community disputes, violated Arizona’s separation-of-powers doctrine. The key problem was that the agency had no real regulatory authority or subject-matter expertise over planned communities, their governing documents, or HOA disputes. It was essentially adjudicating private CC&R fights without being part of a genuine regulatory program tied to that subject. The court therefore vacated the superior court’s judgment upholding the administrative result and ordered the complaint dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Holding

Arizona’s former administrative hearing process for planned-community HOA disputes was unconstitutional because it gave an agency adjudicative authority over private CC&R disputes without the regulatory nexus required by separation-of-powers principles.

Reasoning

The court applied Arizona’s established separation-of-powers analysis, which asks what power is being exercised, how much control the agency has, what the legislature’s regulatory objective is, and what practical effects the arrangement creates. It found that deciding private HOA document disputes is a judicial function and that the Department’s statutory mission concerned fire, building, and manufactured-housing matters, not planned communities.

Because the agency had no real regulatory authority over HOAs, it could not claim the sort of specialized oversight that sometimes justifies agency adjudication. The lack of a genuine nexus between the agency’s mission and planned-community disputes made the scheme constitutionally defective. The court therefore ordered dismissal for lack of jurisdiction rather than reaching the merits of the landscaping dispute.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is the key Arizona appellate case for understanding older OAH-style HOA rulings and why that earlier administrative structure collapsed. If a dispute involves historic DFBLS or OAH HOA orders, Gelb is essential.

More broadly, the case is useful whenever parties argue that some agency forum can or cannot decide HOA fights. It teaches that jurisdiction in HOA disputes is not just a policy choice; the legislature must tie adjudicative power to a real regulatory framework and a proper constitutional role.

Topics

procedurecc-and-rs

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association v. Kitchukov

Posted on by

Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association v. Kitchukov

No. 1 CA-CV 06-0474 (Ariz. App. Aug. 9, 2007) · Court of Appeals · August 9, 2007

At a Glance

Parties Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association (plaintiff-appellant) v. Todor and Mariana Kitchukov (homeowners/defendants-appellees).
Panel Judge Philip Hall, Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen, Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop

Summary

This is Arizona’s leading architectural-review reasonableness case. Homeowners sought approval for the location of a detached garage, and the HOA’s architectural committee rejected the proposal. The trial court granted summary judgment for the homeowners, holding the association acted unreasonably. The court of appeals reversed. It adopted an objective reasonableness framework for discretionary architectural-control decisions and held the summary-judgment record could support either side. That meant neither side was entitled to automatic victory at that stage. The case is important because it rejects both extremes: the HOA does not get blind deference just because the declaration gives the committee discretion, but owners do not win merely by showing the committee said no. The real question is whether the decision was reasonable and made in good faith under the governing standards and facts.

Holding

When an HOA exercises discretionary architectural-review power, its decision is judged by an objective reasonableness standard. Because the record could support competing views on reasonableness, summary judgment for the homeowners was improper.

Reasoning

The court drew from the Restatement approach to property servitudes and held that discretionary design-control authority is not unchecked. An HOA must exercise that authority reasonably and in good faith, based on legitimate community standards rather than arbitrary preference. The court therefore rejected any notion that a committee’s decision becomes unreviewable simply because the declaration grants discretion.

At the same time, the court found the evidentiary record was not one-sided. Community aesthetics, lot layout, and the association’s stated concerns could support a finding that the denial was reasonable, even though a factfinder might also conclude otherwise. Because both outcomes were possible on the record, the dispute had to go back for further proceedings.

Why This Matters for HOAs

If an Arizona HOA dispute is about a denied architectural request, this case should be on the list. It gives boards a lawful path to say no, but only if they can articulate objective, fact-based reasons connected to the governing standards.

For homeowners, Tierra Ranchos is equally valuable because it confirms architectural committees are reviewable. Owners challenging a denial should build evidence on inconsistency, arbitrariness, comparable approvals, site conditions, and lack of actual harm. Boards that fail to document their reasons or apply standards consistently are vulnerable under this case.

Topics

architectural-reviewcc-and-rs

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimey

Posted on by

Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimey

No. 1 CA-CV 08-0388 (Ariz. App. Mar. 16, 2010) · Court of Appeals · March 16, 2010

At a Glance

Parties Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. (plaintiff-appellant) v. Raimey and other homeowners (defendants-appellees).
Panel Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson, Judge Daniel A. Barker, Chief Judge Ann A. Scott Timmer
Statutes interpreted

Summary

This is a landmark Arizona case on surprise HOA-style obligations. In Dreamland Villa, a voluntary recreation club tried to use majority-vote amendments to recorded restrictions to force homeowners in several sections to become mandatory members and pay dues and assessments, even though those sections had no common areas and no original deed-based right to the club’s facilities. The court held the amendments could not be enforced against the objecting owners. Membership in a nonprofit corporation requires consent, and a generic amendment clause in old deed restrictions was not enough notice to let a majority impose entirely new mandatory club obligations on a minority later on. The court rejected the idea that broad amendment power equals consent to any future burden the majority wants to create.

Holding

A generic majority-amendment clause did not authorize homeowners in a community with no original common-area or mandatory-club obligations to impose mandatory association membership, assessments, and liens on dissenting owners. The amendments were unenforceable.

Reasoning

The court looked at the original bargain reflected in the recorded restrictions. For the sections before it, ownership did not automatically include appurtenant rights in common amenities, and club membership had historically been voluntary. That mattered because the proposed amendments would fundamentally change the burdens running with the land.

Relying on notice and reasonable-expectations principles, the court held that owners who buy subject to an amendment clause do not thereby consent to any new servitude the majority later dreams up. The court distinguished earlier cases where common amenities were part of the community from the start. Here, the amendments created new affirmative obligations for optional amenities, which was too large a change to force through a generic amendment provision.

Why This Matters for HOAs

Dreamland remains one of the most cited Arizona HOA cases because it stopped a board or majority from using amendment boilerplate to rewrite the ownership deal after the fact. It is especially useful where the dispute involves new dues, mandatory memberships, recreation-club tie-ins, or other burdens not clearly embedded in the original declaration.

The case also laid the groundwork for Kalway. If a board is trying to justify a new payment obligation or mandatory membership arrangement by saying the declaration can be amended by majority vote, Dreamland is a core answer to that argument.

Topics

assessmentscc-and-rsboard-governance

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association v. Fisher

Posted on by

Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association v. Fisher

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0455 (Ariz. App. Oct. 26, 2017) · Court of Appeals · October 26, 2017

At a Glance

Parties Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association (plaintiff-appellee) v. Lynne A. Fisher (homeowner/defendant-appellant).
Panel Judge Jon W. Thompson, Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani, Judge Paul J. McMurdie
Statutes interpreted

Summary

The HOA sued over visible property-condition violations and obtained both an injunction and monetary penalties. The court of appeals split the result. It upheld the injunction requiring cleanup and repair work but reversed the penalty award and the related fee award. The reason was straightforward: Arizona law allows HOA boards to impose reasonable monetary penalties after notice and an opportunity to be heard, but the HOA failed to prove it had adopted and properly promulgated a preexisting fine schedule. Instead, the record showed only ad hoc penalty amounts. Arizona appellate law treats ad hoc fines as per se unreasonable. So even though the homeowner could still be ordered to comply with the CC&Rs, the HOA could not keep the money judgment for penalties without competent proof that its fines were set in advance and reasonably established.

Holding

An HOA may obtain injunctive relief to enforce CC&Rs, but monetary penalties under A.R.S. section 33-1803 must be supported by a reasonable, preexisting, promulgated fine schedule. Ad hoc fines are per se unreasonable and cannot stand.

Reasoning

The court separated substantive enforcement from monetary punishment. On the injunction, the homeowner had not preserved a meaningful challenge to several ordered repairs, and the trial court had sufficient basis to require compliance. That part of the judgment remained in place.

The fines were different. Section 33-1803 requires monetary penalties to be reasonable, and prior Arizona authority had already said retroactive or ad hoc fee schemes are not reasonable. The HOA produced ledgers and testimony, but it did not prove that a valid fine schedule had been adopted and in force before the penalties were imposed. Without that foundational proof, the penalty award failed as a matter of law, and the fee award tied to that result failed too.

Why This Matters for HOAs

For Arizona HOA fine disputes, this case is extremely practical. It tells boards that they need more than a violation letter and a ledger. They need an actual adopted fine schedule, notice, and evidence that the schedule existed before the fines started.

For homeowners, Turtle Rock is a strong challenge tool. If the association cannot produce the written fine policy and proof of adoption, the penalties may be vulnerable even when the owner still has to correct the violation itself.

Topics

finescc-and-rsattorneys-fees

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Colette McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by

Colette McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.

1 CA-CV 15-0744 · Court of Appeals · October 13, 2016

At a Glance

Parties A duly elected board member sued the HOA after the board voted to exclude her from executive sessions.
Panel Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould, Judge Peter B. Swann, Judge Patricia A. Orozco

Summary

After internal conflict on the board, Sun Lakes voted to bar one of its own elected directors from executive sessions. The excluded director sought injunctive relief, arguing the board had no authority to cut her out of board deliberations simply because other directors believed she had breached confidentiality or loyalty duties. The Court of Appeals agreed with her and reversed. The court treated board membership as carrying the right to participate in board meetings, including executive sessions, unless some legally valid removal or other recognized mechanism had been used. It would not let the rest of the board create an ad hoc punishment that effectively stripped an elected director of core board functions without following the governing legal framework.

Holding

The court held that the HOA board lacked authority to exclude a duly elected director from executive sessions and reversed the denial of injunctive relief.

Reasoning

The court focused on the nature of board office itself. A director is elected to participate in governing the corporation, and executive sessions are still board meetings, not separate private clubs for a board majority. Without a valid removal, suspension, or other recognized authority, the majority could not invent a partial-disqualification remedy.

The association argued that exclusion was justified by the director’s alleged misconduct and by the board’s need to protect confidential matters. The court was not persuaded that those concerns created authority where none existed. Governance has to follow the corporation’s legal structure and governing documents, not improvisation by fellow directors.

Why This Matters for HOAs

McNally is highly useful in HOA board-power disputes. It limits majority control tactics against dissident directors and reinforces that board process must track real authority, not political convenience.

For directors and members, the case supports the idea that elected office in an HOA carries enforceable participation rights unless the association follows the proper path to remove or discipline the director.

Topics

board-governancemeetings-and-records

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Iqtunheimr, LLC v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on by

Iqtunheimr, LLC v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0095 (Ariz. App. Feb. 10, 2026) · Court of Appeals · February 10, 2026

At a Glance

Parties Iqtunheimr, LLC (homeowner/member/plaintiff-appellant) v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association and a board member (defendants-appellees).
Panel Hon. Jennifer M. Perkins, Hon. David D. Weinzweig, Hon. Cynthia J. Bailey
Statutes interpreted

Summary

A homeowner entity sued its HOA and a board member over alleged failure to maintain common areas and amenities such as parks, pools, lakes, greenbelts, and the clubhouse. The court of appeals held that the claims were derivative, not direct. The alleged harm was to common property and the community as a whole, so the claim legally belonged to the nonprofit association rather than to one owner acting alone. Because Arizona’s nonprofit derivative-suit statutes require either a large enough voting bloc or enough members plus a written demand on the corporation, the plaintiff lacked standing and the case was dismissed. The opinion is important because it squarely applies Title 10 derivative-suit rules to an HOA and explains how Arizona courts separate community-wide injuries from owner-specific injuries.

Holding

When a homeowner’s complaint is really about alleged damage to or mismanagement of common areas, the claim is derivative and must satisfy Arizona’s nonprofit derivative-suit statutes. A single owner who lacks the required support and who makes no written demand cannot bring that claim directly.

Reasoning

The court focused on the gravamen of the complaint, not the labels the plaintiff used. The alleged breaches all concerned shared amenities and common infrastructure. That kind of alleged injury affects the association’s property and all members collectively, so it is derivative in nature. The court relied on settled Arizona law that direct claims exist only when the plaintiff suffers a distinct personal injury or is owed a separate duty.

Once the court classified the suit as derivative, the statutory barriers mattered. Under sections 10-3631 and 10-3632, a member of a nonprofit corporation must have sufficient voting support or enough members behind the claim and must make a written demand before suing, absent narrow exceptions. The plaintiff had done neither, so dismissal was mandatory.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is a high-value modern case for Arizona HOAs organized as nonprofit corporations. Boards defending common-area maintenance suits now have a clear appellate decision saying that one dissatisfied owner usually cannot litigate a community-wide maintenance dispute as a personal contract case.

For homeowners, the case is a roadmap too. If the complaint is really about the whole community, they need to organize other owners, satisfy demand requirements, and think strategically about derivative standing before filing. Otherwise they risk dismissal, fees, and possibly sanctions.

Topics

board-governanceprocedurecc-and-rs

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Tortosa Homeowners Association v. Garcia

Posted on by

Tortosa Homeowners Association v. Garcia

No. 2 CA-CV 2021-0114 (Ariz. App. Aug. 1, 2022) · Court of Appeals · August 1, 2022

At a Glance

Parties Tortosa Homeowners Association (foreclosing HOA/plaintiff) v. Davis Garcia (homeowner/defendant), with Maricopoly, LLC and Durable Investments, LLC litigating over foreclosure surplus proceeds.
Panel Judge Espinosa, Presiding Judge Eckerstrom, Chief Judge Vásquez
Statutes interpreted

Summary

After an HOA judicial foreclosure sale produced surplus money beyond the HOA’s judgment, a purchaser that later paid off the first mortgage claimed the surplus as assignee of the senior lender. The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected that claim. It held that surplus proceeds from a junior-lien foreclosure do not belong to a senior lienholder because the senior lien is not wiped out by the junior foreclosure and still remains attached to the property. In other words, the senior lienholder has not lost its security and therefore has no claim on the junior foreclosure surplus. The court read the distribution statute together with Arizona’s related sale statutes and mortgage principles, and it concluded that only liens or interests terminated by the foreclosure are paid from the surplus before the remainder goes to the homeowner or the homeowner’s assignee.

Holding

Excess proceeds generated by foreclosure of a junior HOA lien are not payable to a senior deed-of-trust holder or its assignee. Because the senior lien survives the sale, the surplus is distributed to extinguished interests and then to the debtor or the debtor’s assignee.

Reasoning

The court acknowledged that the text of section 33-727(B), read in isolation, might seem broad enough to include any other lien. But it refused to read the statute in isolation. Looking at execution-sale rules, trustee-sale statutes, and accepted mortgage principles, the court held that surplus proceeds are meant to substitute for interests terminated by the sale, not to create an extra recovery stream for a senior lien that was never cut off.

The court also relied on the Restatement’s treatment of foreclosure surplus and Arizona authority recognizing that senior liens ride through junior foreclosures unaffected. Because the senior lender kept its lien on the property, it had no legal need to reach into the surplus fund. The court therefore affirmed payment to the debtor-side claimant rather than the supposed senior-lien assignee.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is one of the most useful Arizona cases for sorting out who gets the money left over after an HOA foreclosure. Investors and surplus-claim purchasers often press aggressive theories about who owns the pot. Tortosa narrows those fights.

For homeowners and their counsel, the case is valuable because it confirms that the existence of a first mortgage does not automatically drain away surplus from a junior HOA foreclosure sale. For HOAs and sale buyers, it clarifies the legal landscape after judgment and helps avoid bad assumptions about how excess proceeds will be distributed.

Topics

foreclosureassessmentsprocedure

View the original opinion →

← Back to Court of Appeals cases