Foreclosure & Assessment Liens | A.R.S. §§ 33-1807, 33-420 | CV2014-094169
In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a delinquent Troon North owner argued that paying the assessments off in full after years of delinquency defeated the association’s foreclosure count under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A). The court read the statute’s “has been delinquent” language as a trigger: once an owner has been delinquent for a year or for $1,200 or more, a later payoff of the regular assessments does not end the association’s lien or its right to foreclose — a right the court found the association also holds independently under Article 7 of its CC&Rs. The A.R.S. § 33-420 counterclaim against the association and its attorney over an unreleased lis pendens was dismissed with prejudice because the underlying debt was admittedly owed when the lis pendens took effect.
Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094169.
Scope note: This page covers Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094169) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling on the cross-motions for partial summary judgment and the June 26, 2015 final judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 26, 2015 judgment, which states that no further matters remained and that it was a final judgment entered under Rule 54(c) — any later appellate history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.
The takeaway
The superior court held that Troon North Association could foreclose its assessment lien even though the owner paid off the delinquent assessments after years of nonpayment. It read A.R.S. § 33-1807(A)’s “has been delinquent” language as a triggering mechanism: once an owner has been delinquent for a period of one year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies, and a later payoff of the regular assessments does not let the owner avoid the statute’s foreclosure provisions or extinguish the association’s lien. The court also found the association holds a separate contractual right to lien and foreclose under Article 7 of its CC&Rs — specifically Sections 7.02, 7.04, and 7.07 — which the Planned Community Act does not preempt. The owner’s A.R.S. § 33-420 special action and counterclaim against the association and its attorney over an unreleased lis pendens was dismissed with prejudice because the owner admitted owing $1,682.00 when the lis pendens took effect. Final judgment for the association, including attorneys’ fees and costs, was entered June 26, 2015.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Troon North Association (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
Homeowners association that sued to foreclose its lien for delinquent assessments on a property at 28695 North 94th Place in Scottsdale and prevailed on every claim, ending the case with a judgment that included its attorneys’ fees and costs. - Mark W. Waldron (Counsel / Counterdefendant)
Attorney listed for the association in the early minute entries and present on its behalf at the April 3, 2015 oral argument; also named as a counterdefendant because the A.R.S. § 33-420 counterclaim sought to hold him and the association responsible for failing to release the lis pendens. - Charles E. Maxwell (Counsel)
Counsel present on behalf of the association at the April 3, 2015 oral argument and listed as its counsel of record in the spring 2015 minute entries. - Paul R. Neil (Counsel)
Counsel present on behalf of the association at the April 3, 2015 oral argument; replaced as counsel of record by substitution within the firm in June 2015. - Samuel C. Richardson (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Substituted in on June 22, 2015 as attorney of record for the association and counterdefendant Mark W. Waldron, in place of Paul R. Neil.
Respondent Side
- Ripson Holdings, LLC (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
Defendant that moved for partial summary judgment against the foreclosure count and brought the A.R.S. § 33-420 special action and counterclaim against the association and attorney Mark W. Waldron; the counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. - 4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
Co-defendant; the association applied for default judgment against it in December 2014, and its June 2015 request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A) was denied in the final judgment. - City of Scottsdale (Defendant (dismissed))
Municipal defendant dismissed on the association’s notice of dismissal by order entered August 12, 2014. - Elijah W. Rosov (Counsel)
Counsel of record for defendants Ripson Holdings, LLC and 4AAR Holdings, LLC; present on behalf of the defendants at the April 3, 2015 oral argument. - Eric C. Anderson (Counsel)
Attorney listed in the 2014 minute entries for Defendant City of Scottsdale, which was dismissed in August 2014.
Neutral Parties
- David K. Udall (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the cross-motions, issued the April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling, and signed the June 2015 final judgment. - Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge initially assigned to the case; ordered the dismissal of the City of Scottsdale in August 2014 before the case was reassigned on the association’s notice of change of judge. - John Rea (Judge)
Civil Presiding Judge who reassigned the case to Judge Udall in September 2014 after a notice of change of judge was filed.
What happened
Troon North Association is a homeowners association in Scottsdale. In 2014 it sued Ripson Holdings, LLC, 4AAR Holdings, LLC, and the City of Scottsdale in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2014-094169), including a count to foreclose its assessment lien on a property at 28695 North 94th Place. The court later found that the owner — referred to in the ruling as “Defendant Ripson,” with Michael Ripson personally present at the 2015 oral argument — became delinquent on assessment fees in 2009 and remained delinquent every year through 2014, when the delinquent assessments were finally paid off on August 4, 2014. The City of Scottsdale was dismissed early, on the association’s own notice, by an August 12, 2014 order, and after the association filed a notice of change of judge the case moved from Judge Mark F. Aceto to Judge David K. Udall in September 2014.
The defense answered with a counterattack. Ripson Holdings brought a special action and counterclaim under A.R.S. § 33-420 — Arizona’s wrongful-recording statute — seeking to hold the association and its attorney, Mark W. Waldron, responsible for failing to release a lis pendens that had been recorded against the property. Meanwhile, in December 2014 the association applied for default judgment against 4AAR Holdings; the assigned judge took no action on the e-filed application and directed that Rule 55(b) default proceedings be handled by Commissioner Margaret Benny, with the default packet hand-delivered as required by administrative order.
The case came to a head on cross-motions. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment against the association’s foreclosure count and on their counterclaim; the association and Waldron cross-moved for partial summary judgment. Judge Udall heard oral argument on April 3, 2015 — Charles Maxwell, Mark Waldron, and Paul Neil appearing for the association, Elijah Rosov for the defendants — ordered the defendants to respond to the association’s motion to strike, and took the matter under advisement.
The April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling resolved everything in the association’s favor. The court first granted the motion to strike, finding the defendants had improperly cited a ruling by Judge Aceto, and refused to consider those references. It then dismissed the § 33-420 special action and counterclaim with prejudice: at the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00 and admitted owing it, so as a matter of law § 33-420 did not apply. On the foreclosure count, the defendants argued the association had no right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because the assessments had since been paid. The court disagreed, interpreting the statute’s “has been delinquent” phrase as a triggering mechanism — once an owner has been delinquent for over a year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies, and the owner cannot later pay the full assessment fees to avoid its foreclosure provisions. The association’s lien, the court found, did not end with the payment of the regular-assessment portion of the debt.
The ruling also gave the association a second, independent path. Under Article 7 of the CC&Rs — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — the association has the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them, along with the right to levy special assessments, and Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its ability to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The court found the Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual lien and foreclosure rights: while A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) contains language showing the legislature’s intent to preempt contractual or other statutory rights, no such language limits an association’s right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). The court therefore denied the defendants’ motion, granted the association’s cross-motion — finding no genuine issues of material fact and a right to foreclose under both theories — and allowed the association to seek its attorneys’ fees and costs.
The endgame ran through June 2015. The court denied the association’s request for a hearing on the remaining issues in May and warned that the case would be dismissed if the parties did not submit the required joint report or a form of final judgment; in early June it granted short extensions for the defendants to respond to the fee application and proposed judgment, and on June 22 Samuel C. Richardson of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. substituted in as the association’s counsel of record. On June 26, 2015 the court entered judgment: it denied 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A), granted the association’s application for attorneys’ fees, entered judgment for the association and against the defendants, and dismissed Ripson Holdings’ special action and counterclaim against the association and Waldron with prejudice. The court noted that no further matters remained and that the judgment was final under Rule 54(c).
Procedural timeline
Complete uploaded source-document index
This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/troon-north-association-v-ripson-holdings/raw/: 13 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Default Judgment
Type: Decision or judgment
Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.
Oral Argument Set
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Under Advisement Ruling
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Under Advisement Ruling
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
FAQ
Can a homeowner stop an HOA foreclosure by paying off the delinquent assessments?
Not according to this ruling. The court interpreted A.R.S. § 33-1807(A)’s “has been delinquent” language as a triggering mechanism: once an owner has been delinquent for a period of one year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies to that owner. The court expressly declined to read the statute as allowing a delinquent homeowner to pay the full assessment fees at any point and thereby avoid its foreclosure provisions, and it found the association’s lien did not end when the owner paid the regular-assessment portion of the debt.
What does A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) require before an HOA can foreclose?
As quoted in the ruling, the association’s lien for assessments, late charges, reasonable collection fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs may be foreclosed in the same manner as a mortgage on real estate — but only if the owner has been delinquent in the payment of money secured by the lien, excluding those fees and charges, for a period of one year or for an amount of $1,200.00 or more, whichever occurs first. Here the court found the owner became delinquent in 2009 and remained delinquent each year through 2014, satisfying the trigger.
What happened to the counterclaim against the association and its attorney?
It was dismissed with prejudice. Ripson Holdings brought a special action and counterclaim under A.R.S. § 33-420, Arizona’s wrongful-recording statute, seeking to hold the association and attorney Mark W. Waldron responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens. The court found that at the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00, admitted owing that money, and that as a matter of law § 33-420 does not apply in those circumstances. The final judgment repeated the dismissal with prejudice.
Can an HOA foreclose under its CC&Rs even apart from the statute?
In this case, yes. The court found that Article 7 of the CC&Rs — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — gives the association the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them, and that Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its ability to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. It held the Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual rights: A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) shows the legislature included preemption language where it intended preemption, and no such language restricts an association’s right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). The association therefore had a separate right to foreclose under its CC&Rs as well as under the statute.
Who ultimately won, and what did the judgment include?
The association won on every dispositive issue. The April 15, 2015 ruling denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, granted the association’s cross-motion, dismissed the § 33-420 counterclaim with prejudice, and allowed the association to seek fees. The June 26, 2015 final judgment granted the association’s application for attorneys’ fees, denied 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure, entered judgment for the association against the defendants, and again dismissed Ripson Holdings’ counterclaim against the association and Waldron with prejudice.
Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?
No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how one Arizona trial court read the “has been delinquent” trigger in A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), how CC&R lien provisions can supply an independent contractual foreclosure right, and why a § 33-420 wrongful-recording claim fails when the underlying debt was admittedly owed when the document was recorded. The collected minute entries end with the June 26, 2015 final judgment, so any appellate history is outside these records.
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | CV2014-094169 (Maricopa County Superior Court) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Superior Court |
| Decision / key date | April 15, 2015 |
| Judge / panel | Hon. David K. Udall, Hon. Mark F. Aceto |
| Parties | Troon North Association (Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, homeowners association) v. Ripson Holdings, LLC and 4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendants/Counterclaimants); Mark W. Waldron (Counterdefendant); City of Scottsdale (Defendant, dismissed August 2014) |
| Governing law | |
| Topics | foreclosureassessmentscc-and-rsattorneys-fees |
| Outcome / holding | The superior court granted the association partial summary judgment on its foreclosure count and dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice, holding that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) an owner who has been delinquent for over a year or $1,200 or more cannot avoid foreclosure by later paying the full assessment fees, that the association’s lien did not end with payment of the regular-assessment portion, that the association has a separate, non-preempted right to foreclose under Sections 7.02, 7.04, and 7.07 of its CC&Rs, and that A.R.S. § 33-420 did not apply to the unreleased lis pendens because the underlying debt was admittedly owed when it took effect. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | 13 PDFs |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 11 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 1 download link |
Key Issues & Findings
Troon North Association, a Scottsdale homeowners association, sued in 2014 to foreclose its assessment lien on a property at 28695 North 94th Place whose owner had been delinquent on assessments from 2009 through 2014, paying them off only on August 4, 2014. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the payoff defeated the association’s right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), and Ripson Holdings counterclaimed under A.R.S. § 33-420 to hold the association and its attorney, Mark W. Waldron, responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens. In an April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling, Judge David K. Udall held the statute’s “has been delinquent” language is a trigger — once the one-year or $1,200 threshold is met, a later payoff of the regular assessments does not avoid foreclosure or end the lien — and that the association also holds an independent contractual right to lien and foreclose under Article 7 of its CC&Rs, which the Planned Community Act does not preempt. The § 33-420 counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice because the defendant admitted owing $1,682.00 when the lis pendens took effect. Final judgment for the association, including attorneys’ fees and costs, was entered June 26, 2015.
On the counterclaim, the court found that Ripson Holdings’ special action under A.R.S. § 33-420 — which attempted to hold attorney Waldron and the association responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens — failed as a matter of law. At the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00 and admitted owing that money, so the wrongful-recording statute simply did not apply in those circumstances. The court dismissed the special action and counterclaim with prejudice, a dismissal the final judgment later repeated as to both the association and Waldron.
On the foreclosure count, the defendants argued the association had no right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because the assessments had since been paid in full on August 4, 2014. The court quoted the statute — the lien may be foreclosed only if the owner “has been” delinquent for a period of one year or in an amount of $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first — and interpreted “has been” as a triggering mechanism, analogous to a jurisdictional question: once the delinquent party has been in arrears past either threshold, the statute applies to that owner from that point. The court refused to read the language as allowing a delinquent homeowner to pay the full assessment fees at any time and thereby avoid the statute’s foreclosure provisions, and it found the association’s lien did not end with the defendant’s payment of the regular-assessment portion, since the lien also secures late charges, collection costs, and attorneys’ fees.
The court then held the association has a second, independent foreclosure path under its own CC&Rs. Article 7 — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — gives the association the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them and to levy special assessments, and Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its right to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual rights: A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) contains language showing the legislature’s intent to preempt contractual or other statutory rights where it so chose, and no such language appears with respect to an association’s right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). Finding no genuine issues of material fact and a right to foreclose under both theories, the court denied the defendants’ motion, granted the association’s cross-motion, and allowed the association its attorneys’ fees and costs. The June 26, 2015 final judgment granted the fee application, denied 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A), and entered judgment for the association against the defendants under Rule 54(c).
This case answers a question delinquent owners often raise: can you cut off an HOA foreclosure by writing a check for the past-due assessments once the lawsuit is underway? Under this court’s reading of A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), no — the “has been delinquent” language is a one-way trigger. Once an owner has been delinquent for a year or for $1,200 or more, the association’s statutory foreclosure right attaches, and paying off the regular assessments later does not erase the lien, which continues to secure late charges, collection costs, and attorneys’ fees.
The ruling also illustrates two other recurring points. First, a planned community’s CC&Rs can supply an independent contractual lien-and-foreclosure right that survives alongside the statute — the court found no preemption language in § 33-1807(A), contrasting it with subsection (K), where the legislature spoke expressly. Second, A.R.S. § 33-420 wrongful-recording claims over a lis pendens fail when the underlying debt was admittedly owed at the time of recording. The financial coda is familiar: the owner entities ended the case with a judgment against them that included the association’s attorneys’ fees and costs. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties; the collected minute entries end with the June 2015 final judgment.