Ninth Circuit (Unpublished) • FDCPA & HOA Assessments
An Arizona homeowner’s FDCPA suit against his HOA’s collection law firm turned on a single question: is a rental-property assessment a consumer debt or a commercial one?
Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Glawe v. Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC; 9th Cir. No. 19-17090 (memorandum disposition); D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01282-JAS (D. Ariz.).
Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.
The rule in one sentence
The relevant “transaction” under the FDCPA’s definition of “debt” is the purchase of the property that gave rise to the HOA assessment obligation, and whether that obligation is a consumer debt turns on the primary purpose of the purchase measured when the obligation was incurred—not on the owner’s later use of the property as a rental. Because an obligation associated with a rental property is not automatically commercial and a genuine factual dispute existed about the Glawes’ purpose in acquiring the properties, the district court erred in granting summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Case Participants
Neutral Parties
- Curtis G. Glawe (Party)
Plaintiff-Appellant; homeowner and Sundance HOA member who brought the FDCPA claim. Appeared pro se on appeal. - Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC (Party)
Defendant-Appellee; the law firm that served as collection counsel for the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association. (Spelled ‘Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado, & Boren PLC’ in the body of the memorandum.) - Javier Delgado (Party)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Defendant-Appellee; individual attorney named as a defendant. - Mark Holmgreen (Party)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Defendant-Appellee; individual attorney named as a defendant. - Mark K. Sahl (Party)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Defendant-Appellee; individual attorney named as a defendant. - Gregory A. Stein (Party)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Defendant-Appellee; individual attorney named as a defendant. - Curtis G. Glawe (Counsel)
Pro Se
Appeared pro se (self-represented) for Plaintiff-Appellant. - Donald Wilson, Jr. (Counsel)
Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees. - Alicyn Marie Freeman (Counsel)
Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees. - Kim McLane Wardlaw (Judge)
Ninth Circuit Judge on the panel. - Ronald M. Gould (Judge)
Ninth Circuit Judge on the panel. - James Donato (Judge)
U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. - James Alan Soto (Judge)
U.S. District Judge who presided over the case below and granted summary judgment.
What happened and why it matters
In 2009, Iowa residents Curtis and Lorri Glawe purchased a home in Buckeye, Arizona (the “Mohave Property”) and a second lot in the same subdivision (the “228th Lane Property”). Ownership made them members of the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association, Inc. and bound them to the community’s CC&Rs and assessment obligations. The Glawes never lived in the homes and consistently rented them to tenants. After they fell behind on assessments, the HOA—through its collection law firm, Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC—twice sued them in Arizona state court for unpaid assessments and late fees and was awarded court costs and attorneys’ fees. Glawe then sued the firm and several of its attorneys in federal court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the firm, reasoning that because the property was a rental, the assessment obligation was commercial rather than consumer in nature and therefore not a “debt” covered by the FDCPA. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the relevant “transaction” was the original 2009 purchase of the property, and that the purpose of that purchase—measured when the obligation was incurred—controls, not the owner’s later rental use. Because an obligation tied to a rental property is not automatically commercial and a genuine factual dispute existed over the Glawes’ purpose in buying the properties, the panel remanded for the district court to determine the true purpose of the acquisition. The decision is an unpublished, non-precedential memorandum.
The panel began with the FDCPA’s threshold limitation: the statute reaches only consumer—as opposed to commercial—debt, citing Bloom v. I.C. Systems, Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 1992). The FDCPA defines “debt” as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). The court read this to require two things: (1) an obligation arising out of a transaction, and (2) that the subject of the transaction be primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
The dispositive question was how to identify the “transaction.” The appellees urged the court to focus on the assessments and attorneys’ fees incurred after the Glawes bought the home and while it was being used as a rental. The panel rejected that framing. It held that the “transaction” at issue is the purchase of the Mohave Property itself. The Glawes bought the property in 2009 and were, at that moment, subject to the HOA’s CC&Rs, which required them to pay assessments. Because the appellees’ efforts to collect the allegedly late assessments, late fees, court costs, and attorneys’ fees are what produced the FDCPA claim, the underlying obligation “ar[ose] out of” the purchase of the property under a plain reading of the statute.
Having fixed the transaction as the purchase, the court framed the real inquiry as whether that purchase was primarily consumer or commercial in nature, and it emphasized timing: courts “determine the debtor’s purpose as of the time the debt was incurred,” quoting In re Cherrett, 873 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2017). The district court had erred by concluding categorically that an obligation associated with a rental property cannot be primarily consumer in nature. To decide the purpose question, a court must “examine the transaction as a whole, paying particular attention to the purpose for which the credit was extended,” quoting Slenk v. Transworld Systems, Inc., 236 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). That determination can be made as a matter of law, but a genuine dispute of fact relevant to the inquiry can preclude summary judgment. Here, the Glawes’ affidavits and deposition testimony—that they initially intended to use the home as a future retirement residence and only later decided to rent—created such a dispute. The panel therefore reversed and remanded for the district court to make a factual determination of the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of both the Mohave Property and the 228th Lane Property, using whatever procedures it deemed appropriate. Because the reversal resolved the appeal, the panel did not reach Glawe’s challenges to the denial of his motion to amend or his motion for reconsideration.
For Arizona homeowners and community associations, this memorandum illustrates a recurring dividing line in assessment-collection disputes: whether the FDCPA even applies to an HOA’s efforts to collect unpaid dues. The FDCPA governs only “consumer” debt, and the Ninth Circuit’s analysis makes clear that the character of an HOA assessment obligation is judged by the primary purpose of the original property purchase, measured when the obligation was incurred—not by how the owner later uses the home. An owner who buys a residence for personal or family use does not necessarily lose FDCPA protection simply by later renting it out, and a court cannot treat every rental-property assessment as categorically commercial. That has practical stakes for both sides: if the debt is consumer in nature, the collecting law firm must comply with the FDCPA’s disclosure and conduct rules; if it is commercial, those federal protections do not apply.
The decision also underscores that the consumer-versus-commercial question is fact-intensive and can defeat summary judgment. Owner intent at the time of purchase—documented through affidavits, deposition testimony, and the surrounding circumstances of the acquisition—can create a genuine dispute that a court must resolve on a full record. Because the disposition is unpublished and non-precedential under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, it does not bind future panels, but it is a useful window into how the court frames the “transaction” and “primary purpose” elements when HOA assessment debt intersects with federal debt-collection law. This page is educational and neutral; it is not legal advice, and anyone facing an assessment or collection dispute should consult a qualified Arizona attorney about their specific facts.
Step-by-step litigation record
Complete uploaded source-document index
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Opinion
Type: Decision or judgment
Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.
FAQ
What was Glawe v. Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC about?
It was a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) lawsuit brought by an Arizona homeowner, Curtis Glawe, against the law firm that acted as collection counsel for his community association, the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association. After the HOA twice sued the Glawes in state court for unpaid assessments, late fees, court costs, and attorneys’ fees, Glawe sued the firm in federal court, claiming its collection efforts violated the FDCPA. The central legal question was whether the HOA assessment obligation qualified as a consumer ‘debt’ that the FDCPA protects.
What did the Ninth Circuit decide?
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the law firm and remanded the case. It held that the relevant ‘transaction’ for the FDCPA analysis is the original purchase of the property, and that whether the assessment obligation is a consumer or commercial debt depends on the primary purpose of that purchase—measured when the obligation was incurred—not on how the owner later used the property. The court directed the district court to make a factual finding about the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of both properties.
Does renting out a home automatically make HOA dues a commercial debt?
No. The court expressly rejected the idea that an obligation associated with a rental property cannot be consumer in nature. The district court had erred by treating the rental use as automatically making the debt commercial. Instead, a court must examine the transaction as a whole and focus on the purpose for which the property was acquired at the time the obligation arose. An owner who bought a home for personal or family use does not necessarily lose FDCPA protection just by later renting it out.
Why did the timing of the ‘debt’ matter?
The FDCPA defines a consumer debt by reference to a transaction whose subject is ‘primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.’ The Ninth Circuit, quoting In re Cherrett, explained that courts determine the debtor’s purpose ‘as of the time the debt was incurred.’ Because the Glawes’ assessment obligation arose out of their 2009 purchase of the property, the relevant question was their purpose at that time—here complicated by affidavits stating they initially planned to retire in the home and only later chose to rent it out.
Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?
No. The disposition is an unpublished memorandum marked ‘NOT FOR PUBLICATION,’ and under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 it is not precedent except in limited circumstances. It does not bind future panels or district courts as controlling authority. It can still be informative as an illustration of how the Ninth Circuit frames the consumer-versus-commercial debt question when HOA assessments intersect with the FDCPA, but it should not be treated as settled law.
What happens after a reversal and remand like this?
A reversal and remand sends the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate ruling. Here, the Ninth Circuit did not decide who wins; it instructed the district court to make a factual determination of the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of the Mohave Property and the 228th Lane Property, using whatever procedures the court finds appropriate. Depending on that finding, the FDCPA claim may proceed or be resolved. This summary is educational only and is not legal advice.
Case Dossier
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Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 9th Cir. No. 19-17090 (memorandum disposition) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Federal Court |
| Decision / key date | June 8, 2021 |
| Judge / panel | Kim McLane Wardlaw (Circuit Judge), Ronald M. Gould (Circuit Judge), James Donato (U.S. District Judge, N.D. Cal., sitting by designation) |
| Parties | Curtis G. Glawe (pro se homeowner and HOA member) v. Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC and individual attorneys Javier Delgado, Mark Holmgreen, Mark K. Sahl, and Gregory A. Stein (collection counsel for the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association). |
| Governing law |
|
| Topics | fdcpaassessmentscc-and-rsattorneys-feesprocedure |
| Outcome / holding | The relevant “transaction” under the FDCPA’s definition of “debt” is the purchase of the property that gave rise to the HOA assessment obligation, and whether that obligation is a consumer debt turns on the primary purpose of the purchase measured when the obligation was incurred—not on the owner’s later use of the property as a rental. Because an obligation associated with a rental property is not automatically commercial and a genuine factual dispute existed about the Glawes’ purpose in acquiring the properties, the district court erred in granting summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | 1 PDF |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 6 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 1 download link |
Key Issues & Findings
In 2009, Iowa residents Curtis and Lorri Glawe purchased a home in Buckeye, Arizona (the “Mohave Property”) and a second lot in the same subdivision (the “228th Lane Property”). Ownership made them members of the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association, Inc. and bound them to the community’s CC&Rs and assessment obligations. The Glawes never lived in the homes and consistently rented them to tenants. After they fell behind on assessments, the HOA—through its collection law firm, Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC—twice sued them in Arizona state court for unpaid assessments and late fees and was awarded court costs and attorneys’ fees. Glawe then sued the firm and several of its attorneys in federal court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the firm, reasoning that because the property was a rental, the assessment obligation was commercial rather than consumer in nature and therefore not a “debt” covered by the FDCPA. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the relevant “transaction” was the original 2009 purchase of the property, and that the purpose of that purchase—measured when the obligation was incurred—controls, not the owner’s later rental use. Because an obligation tied to a rental property is not automatically commercial and a genuine factual dispute existed over the Glawes’ purpose in buying the properties, the panel remanded for the district court to determine the true purpose of the acquisition. The decision is an unpublished, non-precedential memorandum.
The panel began with the FDCPA’s threshold limitation: the statute reaches only consumer—as opposed to commercial—debt, citing Bloom v. I.C. Systems, Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 1992). The FDCPA defines “debt” as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). The court read this to require two things: (1) an obligation arising out of a transaction, and (2) that the subject of the transaction be primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
The dispositive question was how to identify the “transaction.” The appellees urged the court to focus on the assessments and attorneys’ fees incurred after the Glawes bought the home and while it was being used as a rental. The panel rejected that framing. It held that the “transaction” at issue is the purchase of the Mohave Property itself. The Glawes bought the property in 2009 and were, at that moment, subject to the HOA’s CC&Rs, which required them to pay assessments. Because the appellees’ efforts to collect the allegedly late assessments, late fees, court costs, and attorneys’ fees are what produced the FDCPA claim, the underlying obligation “ar[ose] out of” the purchase of the property under a plain reading of the statute.
Having fixed the transaction as the purchase, the court framed the real inquiry as whether that purchase was primarily consumer or commercial in nature, and it emphasized timing: courts “determine the debtor’s purpose as of the time the debt was incurred,” quoting In re Cherrett, 873 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2017). The district court had erred by concluding categorically that an obligation associated with a rental property cannot be primarily consumer in nature. To decide the purpose question, a court must “examine the transaction as a whole, paying particular attention to the purpose for which the credit was extended,” quoting Slenk v. Transworld Systems, Inc., 236 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). That determination can be made as a matter of law, but a genuine dispute of fact relevant to the inquiry can preclude summary judgment. Here, the Glawes’ affidavits and deposition testimony—that they initially intended to use the home as a future retirement residence and only later decided to rent—created such a dispute. The panel therefore reversed and remanded for the district court to make a factual determination of the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of both the Mohave Property and the 228th Lane Property, using whatever procedures it deemed appropriate. Because the reversal resolved the appeal, the panel did not reach Glawe’s challenges to the denial of his motion to amend or his motion for reconsideration.
For Arizona homeowners and community associations, this memorandum illustrates a recurring dividing line in assessment-collection disputes: whether the FDCPA even applies to an HOA’s efforts to collect unpaid dues. The FDCPA governs only “consumer” debt, and the Ninth Circuit’s analysis makes clear that the character of an HOA assessment obligation is judged by the primary purpose of the original property purchase, measured when the obligation was incurred—not by how the owner later uses the home. An owner who buys a residence for personal or family use does not necessarily lose FDCPA protection simply by later renting it out, and a court cannot treat every rental-property assessment as categorically commercial. That has practical stakes for both sides: if the debt is consumer in nature, the collecting law firm must comply with the FDCPA’s disclosure and conduct rules; if it is commercial, those federal protections do not apply.
The decision also underscores that the consumer-versus-commercial question is fact-intensive and can defeat summary judgment. Owner intent at the time of purchase—documented through affidavits, deposition testimony, and the surrounding circumstances of the acquisition—can create a genuine dispute that a court must resolve on a full record. Because the disposition is unpublished and non-precedential under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, it does not bind future panels, but it is a useful window into how the court frames the “transaction” and “primary purpose” elements when HOA assessment debt intersects with federal debt-collection law. This page is educational and neutral; it is not legal advice, and anyone facing an assessment or collection dispute should consult a qualified Arizona attorney about their specific facts.