Open Meetings | A.R.S. §§ 33-1804, 33-420 | 2 CA-SA 2018-0031
After homeowners won on open-meeting-law and slander-of-title claims against their HOA, Division Two clarified that the attorney fees in the judgment are not “damages” for setting the appeal bond — a published decision touching both board transparency and appellate procedure.
Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Chula Vista Homeowners Association v. Hon. Charles Irwin, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Cochise, Respondent, and Rodney Olson and Gloria Olson, husband and wife, Real Parties in Interest, 2 CA-SA 2018-0031, 426 P.3d 1228 (App. 2018).
Scope note: This page covers Chula Vista Homeowners Association v. Hon. Charles Irwin, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Cochise, Respondent, and Rodney Olson and Gloria Olson, husband and wife, Real Parties in Interest (2 CA-SA 2018-0031, 426 P.3d 1228 (App. 2018)) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division Two. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.
The takeaway
Attorney fees awarded on the homeowners’ declaratory-relief, open-meeting-law, and slander-of-title claims under fee-authorizing statutes (A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and § 12-341.01) are not “damages” for purposes of calculating a supersedeas bond under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. The trial court abused its discretion by including those fees in the bond, so the bond order was vacated.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Chula Vista Homeowners Association (Petitioner)
Non-profit corporation organized pursuant to the Chula Vista CC&Rs; defendant below and appellant; petitioner in this special action challenging the supersedeas bond. - Jason E. Smith (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Counsel for petitioner Chula Vista Homeowners Association (Tucson). - Kaycee S. Wamsley (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Counsel for petitioner Chula Vista Homeowners Association (Tucson).
Respondent Side
- Rodney Olson (Real Party in Interest)
Homeowner and plaintiff below who prevailed on all counts; opposed the special action. - Gloria Olson (Real Party in Interest)
Homeowner and plaintiff below who prevailed on all counts; opposed the special action. - Robert D. Stachel Jr. (Counsel)
Stachel & Associates P.C.
Counsel for real parties in interest Rodney and Gloria Olson (Sierra Vista). - Alberta Chu (Counsel)
Stachel & Associates P.C.
Counsel for real parties in interest Rodney and Gloria Olson (Sierra Vista).
Neutral Parties
- Hon. Charles Irwin (Respondent Judge)
Cochise County Superior Court
Trial judge whose order setting the supersedeas bond was challenged; nominal respondent in the special action. - Hon. Peter J. Eppich (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Authored the opinion. - Hon. Garye L. Vásquez (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Presiding Judge; concurred. - Hon. Philip G. Espinosa (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Concurred.
What happened
The Olsons own property within the Chula Vista community in Cochise County, subject to the Chula Vista Protective Covenants (CC&Rs). In 2009 they obtained a permit to build a 6,000-square-foot steel structure intended to be ancillary to a planned residence. Unable to afford a separate primary residence, they obtained a county permit to convert the structure into a family residence. In 2011 the HOA rejected their conversion plan as noncompliant with the CC&Rs but granted a three-year variance allowing them to live in the structure while building a home.
The Olsons did not build another home. In 2015 the HOA took the position that they violated the CC&Rs because the structure was “nontraditional” and not a “First Class Private Dwelling” under the 2007 amendment to the covenants. The HOA recorded a Notice of Violation, removed it, then recorded a second Notice stating its purpose was to adversely affect the Olsons’ ability to convey marketable title. The HOA also imposed fines and denied the Olsons’ appeal.
In February 2016 the Olsons sued the HOA in Cochise County Superior Court (No. CV201600084). They sought declaratory relief that the 2007 CC&R amendment was invalid and the relevant section unenforceable; alleged the HOA violated the open meeting laws under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(5); and brought a slander-of-title claim under A.R.S. § 33-420(A).
After trial, the respondent judge ruled for the Olsons on all counts, finding the HOA had violated the open meeting laws and slandered the Olsons’ title. The court directed the HOA to record a Notice of Removal to clear title, vacated the previously imposed penalty, and awarded $5,000 in statutory damages under § 33-420(A), $318 in costs, and $35,000 in reasonable attorney fees — a total judgment of $40,318.
The HOA filed a notice of appeal and moved for a supersedeas bond, arguing the bond should be based only on $5,318 (the statutory damages plus costs) and exclude the attorney fees. The Olsons argued the fees were part of the damages. The respondent judge concluded the fees were a legal consequence of the original wrongful act and recoverable as damages, and set the bond at the full $40,318. The HOA brought this special action.
The Court of Appeals accepted special-action jurisdiction, held that the attorney fees were not damages under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, vacated the order setting the bond, and directed the trial court to enter a new order consistent with the decision.
Procedural timeline
FAQ
What did the Court of Appeals decide in this case?
The court held that attorney fees awarded to the Olsons on their declaratory-relief, open-meeting-law, and slander-of-title claims are not “damages” for purposes of setting a supersedeas (appeal) bond under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. The trial court abused its discretion by including the fees in the bond, so the court vacated the bond order and directed a recalculation.
What is a supersedeas bond and why did the amount matter here?
A supersedeas bond is posted by a party appealing a judgment in order to stay (pause) enforcement or collection while the appeal is pending. Under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, the bond is generally the lesser of the total damages awarded (excluding punitive damages), fifty percent of the appellant’s net worth, or twenty-five million dollars. Here the $40,318 judgment included only $5,318 in statutory damages and costs but $35,000 in attorney fees, so whether fees counted as damages changed the bond substantially.
What were the underlying claims the homeowners won?
The Olsons prevailed on all counts in Cochise County Superior Court: declaratory relief that the 2007 CC&R amendment was invalid and unenforceable, a violation of the open meeting laws under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(5), and slander of title under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). They were awarded $5,000 in statutory damages, $318 in costs, and $35,000 in attorney fees.
Why aren’t attorney fees considered ‘damages’ for the bond?
Arizona courts treat “damages” and “judgment” as different things: fees and costs can be part of a judgment but are generally not damages. Only narrow exceptions (such as the “tort of another” principle or wrongful injunction, attachment, garnishment, or execution) treat fees as damages. Here the fees were awarded under statutes that independently authorize fees (A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and § 12-341.01) and were incurred in the parties’ own litigation, so no exception applied.
Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?
Yes. The opinion is published (precedential), so it can be cited and relied upon in later Arizona cases involving the calculation of supersedeas bonds and the treatment of attorney fees.
Does this case mean homeowners cannot recover attorney fees against an HOA?
No. The homeowners’ $35,000 fee award remained part of the judgment. The decision addresses only how the bond amount is calculated for an appeal — it holds that the fees are excluded from the bond figure, not that the fee award itself was improper.
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 2 CA-SA 2018-0031, 426 P.3d 1228 (App. 2018) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Court of Appeals |
| Decision / key date | July 27, 2018 |
| Judge / panel | Hon. Peter J. Eppich (author), Hon. Garye L. Vásquez (Presiding Judge, concurring), Hon. Philip G. Espinosa (concurring) |
| Parties | Chula Vista Homeowners Association (petitioner) sought special-action relief from a Cochise County order setting a supersedeas bond; Rodney and Gloria Olson, the prevailing homeowners below, were the real parties in interest. |
| Governing law |
|
| Topics | procedureattorneys-feesmeetings-and-recordscc-and-rs |
| Outcome / holding | Attorney fees awarded on the homeowners’ declaratory-relief, open-meeting-law, and slander-of-title claims under fee-authorizing statutes (A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and § 12-341.01) are not “damages” for purposes of calculating a supersedeas bond under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. The trial court abused its discretion by including those fees in the bond, so the bond order was vacated. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | No raw source-folder files found for this slug |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 7 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 0 download links |
Key Issues & Findings
In this published special action, Arizona’s Court of Appeals, Division Two, decided whether attorney fees awarded to prevailing homeowners count as “damages” when a trial court sets a supersedeas (appeal) bond under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. The Olsons had sued the Chula Vista Homeowners Association in Cochise County and won on all counts, including declaratory relief, violation of the open meeting laws under A.R.S. § 33-1804, and slander of title under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). The judgment totaled $40,318, which included $5,000 in statutory damages, $318 in costs, and $35,000 in attorney fees. When the HOA appealed, the trial court set the bond at the full $40,318. The Court of Appeals held that the fees were not damages, vacated the bond order, and directed the trial court to recalculate the bond.
The court began with the statutory text: under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, the bond amount is the lesser of the total damages awarded (excluding punitive damages), fifty percent of the appellant’s net worth, or twenty-five million dollars. Following City Center Executive Plaza v. Jantzen, the court emphasized that “damages” and “judgment” are not synonymous: attorney fees and costs may be part of a judgment, but they are generally not damages. Only narrow exceptions treat fees as damages, such as the “tort of another” principle, wrongful repudiation of insurance coverage, or wrongful injunction, attachment, garnishment, or execution.
The court found none of those exceptions applied. The fees here were awarded under statutes that independently authorize fees (A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and § 12-341.01) and were incurred in the litigation between these two parties, not in third-party litigation. That distinguished Desert Mountain Properties v. Liberty Mutual, a “tort of another” case on which the trial court appeared to rely. The court read A.R.S. § 33-420(A) by its plain language: the slander-of-title statute provides for a separate damages award (the greater of $5,000 per claimant or treble actual damages) and separately authorizes reasonable attorney fees, so the fees were distinct from the damage award.
The court also rejected the Olsons’ argument that their slander-of-title claim was “akin to a provisional remedy” like a wrongful writ of attachment or injunction; the claim was purely statutory and the statute itself separated damages from fees. And although the trial court found the action arose out of contract because CC&Rs are a contract, the court explained that a statute permitting a fee award does not transform those fees into damages, particularly where the Olsons brought no breach-of-contract claim. Because including the fees was an error of law, it was an abuse of discretion.
This is a published Arizona appellate decision arising directly out of homeowner-association litigation that included open-meeting-law violations under A.R.S. § 33-1804 and slander of title under A.R.S. § 33-420(A) — the kinds of board-transparency and recording disputes that recur in Arizona communities. Because it is precedential, it can be cited in later cases, and it confirms that homeowners can prevail on open-meeting and slander-of-title claims and recover statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.
Its central practical lesson concerns appeals. When an HOA (or a homeowner) appeals and posts a supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of a judgment, the bond is calculated on the damages awarded, not on the attorney fees. Here that distinction mattered: of a $40,318 judgment, only $5,318 reflected statutory damages and costs, while $35,000 was fees. Clarifying that fees are generally excluded from the bond affects how much an appealing party must post to stay collection during an appeal.