Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition based on a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 because the Petitioner's failure to respond by certified mail within 21 days meant the HOA's duties to provide further information or notice of the right to petition ADRE were never triggered.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof to show that the Respondent committed the alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was deemed not obligated to provide the specific statutory disclosures because the Petitioner did not respond to the notices of violation by certified mail within 21 calendar days.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA notice requirements

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to provide specific information (observer name, notice of ADRE petition right) and restricting the 21-day response period in violation notices concerning short term lease provisions. The ALJ found that because the Petitioner did not respond by certified mail within 21 days, the HOA was not required to provide the information under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) or the notice of administrative hearing option under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, notice of violation, statutory interpretation, right to respond, administrative hearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:25 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918009-REL/671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:37 (85.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”). The core of the dispute was Mr. Garcia’s allegation that Villagio violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 in its handling of violation notices related to an alleged breach of short-term rental policies.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that he failed to meet the burden of proof. The decisions consistently hinged on a critical point: Mr. Garcia did not respond to Villagio’s violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period prescribed by the statute. This failure meant that the HOA’s subsequent obligations under the statute—specifically, to provide the name of the violation’s observer and to give notice of the right to a state administrative hearing—were never triggered. Villagio successfully argued that by including its own internal appeal process in the violation notices, it had fulfilled its legal requirements under the circumstances. The final ruling deemed Villagio the prevailing party, with the decision after rehearing being binding on both parties.

Background of the Dispute

The case, No. 19F-H1918009-REL, was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, following a petition filed by Mr. Garcia with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Timeline of Notices and Fines

Villagio issued a series of notices to Mr. Garcia alleging that his unit was being rented in violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) regarding short-term leases.

Date of Notice

Allegation / Action Taken

Instructions Provided to Homeowner

March 8, 2018

Alleged violation of short-term lease provisions.

“If you wish to contest this notice… file an appeal with the Board of Directors… Requests for an appeal must be received within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

March 22, 2018

A fine of $1,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days. The notice also included the phrase, “Please bring this issue into compliance within 10 days of this notice.”

April 5, 2018

A fine of $2,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days.

Procedural History

1. Violation Notices: Villagio sent the three notices in March and April 2018.

2. Homeowner Inaction (Statutory): Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the notices by sending a certified letter within the 21-day period allowed by A.R.S. § 33-1242(B).

3. Homeowner Action (Internal): Mr. Garcia did eventually file an appeal with Villagio regarding the violation and fines, but the HOA did not change its position.

4. Petition Filed: On or about August 17, 2018, Mr. Garcia filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Villagio violated state statutes.

5. Initial Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on October 30, 2018.

6. First Decision: On November 19, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

7. Rehearing Granted: Mr. Garcia requested a rehearing, which was granted and scheduled.

8. Rehearing: The rehearing was held on February 12, 2019, with testimony from Mr. Garcia and Tom Gordon, Villagio’s Community Manager.

9. Final Decision: On March 4, 2019, the ALJ issued a final decision again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition. This order was declared binding and appealable only to the superior court.

Core Legal Arguments and Statutory Interpretation

The case centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs the process for notifying and responding to violations of condominium documents.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1242

Section (B): A unit owner receiving a violation notice may provide the association with a written response via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice date.

Section (C): If the owner sends a response as described in Section (B), the association must then respond within 10 business days with specific information, including the name of the person who observed the violation and the process to contest the notice.

Section (D): An association must give a unit owner written notice of their option to petition for a state administrative hearing unless the information regarding the contest process (required in Section C, paragraph 4) is already provided in the initial violation notice.

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 on several grounds:

• The violation letters did not allow him to respond by certified mail within 21 days.

• The notices failed to include the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

• The notices failed to inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

• During the rehearing, he contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from using the 21-day statutory response period. He claimed the rapid succession of notices (14 days apart) and the language demanding compliance “within 10 days” led him to believe he “would only be 10 days before he would acquire another violation.”

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio disputed all of Mr. Garcia’s allegations, arguing that its actions were fully compliant with the statute:

• The obligation to provide the observer’s name under Section (C) is only triggered after the homeowner first submits a timely certified mail response, which Mr. Garcia failed to do.

• The obligation to provide notice of the right to a state administrative hearing under Section (D) was not applicable because Villagio did provide its internal process for contesting the notice in every letter sent.

• They did not prevent Mr. Garcia from responding. At the rehearing, Mr. Garcia admitted under cross-examination that he was not prohibited by any court order from sending a response.

• Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified that while the HOA’s policy gives homeowners 10 days to contest internally, the association does not restrict them from also using the 21-day statutory response period.

• As a further defense in the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 was not applicable at all, asserting the statute addresses violations concerning the “condition of the property,” whereas Mr. Garcia’s violation concerned the “use of his property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ruling decisively in favor of the Respondent, Villagio.

Burden of Proof

In both decisions, the Judge established that Mr. Garcia, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof to show that a violation occurred. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the “most convincing force.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Homeowner’s Failure to Respond Was Decisive: The Judge found it was “undisputed” that Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-day period via certified mail. This failure was the central reason his petition was dismissed.

2. HOA Obligations Were Not Triggered: Because Mr. Garcia did not initiate the process described in A.R.S. § 33-1242(B), Villagio’s corresponding obligation under Section (C) to provide the observer’s name was never activated.

3. Internal Appeal Process Satisfied Statutory Requirement: The Judge concluded that because Villagio included instructions on how to contest the notice (i.e., appeal to the Board of Directors) in its letters, it was not required under Section (D) to provide separate notice of the right to a state administrative hearing.

4. No Evidence of Prevention: The Judge found that Mr. Garcia “provided no evidence to establish that Villagio prevented him from responding.” The issuance of subsequent notices and fines before the 21-day period had lapsed was not found to constitute a legal barrier that prevented Mr. Garcia from exercising his statutory right to respond.

5. Final Order: Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. His petition was ordered to be dismissed, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party. The order issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties and can only be appealed by seeking judicial review in the superior court within 35 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia?

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C?

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices?

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property?

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent?

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department?

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia? The initial violation alleged by Villagio was that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of the short-term lease provisions located in Villagio’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The first notice of this violation was mailed to Mr. Garcia on March 8, 2018.

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C? To trigger the association’s obligations, a unit owner who receives a written notice of violation must provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required? The petitioner, Mr. Garcia, bears the burden of proof to show that the respondent committed the alleged violation. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with the most convincing force that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation? The judge ruled that Villagio was not required to provide the observer’s name because that obligation is only triggered after a unit owner responds to the violation notice in writing by certified mail within 21 days. It is undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the notices within the 21-day period, so Villagio’s obligation was never activated.

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices? Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio prevented him from responding by certified mail within 21 days because it failed to wait 21 days before issuing additional notices and imposing fines. He stated that the notices’ language requiring compliance within 10 days made him believe he would acquire another violation before the 21-day statutory response period had passed.

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property? Villagio contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 does not apply to this case at all because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition” of the property. Villagio argued that it notified Mr. Garcia that the “use” of his property violated its short-term rental policy, not that a physical condition of the property was in violation.

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent? A fine of $1,000 was posted to Mr. Garcia’s account, with the notice being sent on March 22, 2018. Subsequently, a $2,000 fine was posted to his account for the same violation, and that notice was sent on April 5, 2018.

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department? The Judge concluded that Villagio was not obligated to provide this information because A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) only requires it if the association fails to provide the unit owner with the process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s notices all contained instructions on how to contest the violation, specifically by filing an appeal with the Board of Directors via a provided website.

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice? Tom Gordon testified that homeowners are provided with 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio, pursuant to Villagio’s short-term rental policy. When asked if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” (A.R.S. § 33-1242) if Mr. Garcia had responded in twenty-one days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.”

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019? In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party.

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Essay Questions

Develop detailed essay-format answers to the following prompts, drawing evidence and examples exclusively from the provided source documents.

1. Analyze the central arguments presented by both Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association regarding the application of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statute in relation to these arguments in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

3. Trace the timeline of events from the first notice sent by Villagio on March 8, 2018, to the final order on March 4, 2019. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s actions, or lack thereof, at key moments influenced the legal obligations of the association and the ultimate outcome of the case.

4. Evaluate Villagio’s argument that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge’s decision did not ultimately hinge on this point, discuss the potential implications of this distinction in homeowner association disputes.

5. Explain the two distinct procedural paths available to a unit owner after receiving a violation notice as outlined in this case: the association’s internal appeal process and the statutory process under A.R.S. § 33-1242. Why did the path Mr. Garcia chose fail to trigger the statutory protections he sought?

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Glossary

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing and rehearing, evaluates evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona that regulate condominiums and planned communities.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency that has authority over homeowner association disputes and with which homeowners may petition for a hearing.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents of the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, which contain the short-term lease provisions Mr. Garcia was alleged to have violated.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the evidentiary hearing and rehearing for this matter were held.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing on a matter, granted in this case at Mr. Garcia’s request after the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


He Fought His HOA and Followed Their Rules. Here’s Why He Still Lost.

1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded Letter

For many homeowners, it’s a familiar and unwelcome sight: a crisp envelope from the Homeowners Association (HOA) containing a formal, intimidating violation notice. Your first instinct is to act, to follow the instructions, and to fight back against what feels like an unfair accusation. You read the letter, see a process for an appeal, and dutifully follow it, believing you are protecting your rights. But what if the process outlined in the letter isn’t the one that truly matters under the law?

This isn’t a theoretical warning. It’s the hard lesson learned by a real homeowner in Arizona, Rogelio A. Garcia, who took on his HOA, Villagio at Tempe. He believed the association had violated his rights, and unlike many homeowners, he didn’t ignore the notices—he took action. He filed an appeal with the HOA, just as their letter instructed. Yet, he lost his case, not because he was wrong on the facts, but because he fell into a subtle procedural trap, following the HOA’s internal process while missing a separate, more powerful one defined by state law.

This article breaks down the top three legal takeaways from that court decision. It reveals how taking the wrong action can be just as costly as taking no action at all, offering crucial strategic insights for any homeowner facing a dispute with their association.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Your Rights Often Have an ‘On’ Switch You Must Flip First

Mr. Garcia’s primary complaint was that the HOA failed to provide him with the name of the person who reported his alleged violation—a requirement under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1242. On the surface, this seems like a clear-cut right afforded to homeowners.

However, the court revealed a counter-intuitive legal reality. The HOA’s legal obligation to provide the reporter’s name was not automatic. That right only became active—the obligation was only triggered—if the homeowner first took a specific, formal step: sending a written response to the violation notice via certified mail within 21 calendar days. The record was clear that Mr. Garcia did not send such a response to the March 8, March 22, or April 5 notices. This single procedural failure was fatal to his claim.

The judge’s finding on this point was direct and unambiguous:

“Because Mr. Garcia did not respond in the 21 day period, Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the first and last name of the person or persons who observed the violation.”

This illustrates a critical principle: your most important legal rights may exist in state law, but they often lie dormant. To activate them, you must flip the “on” switch by taking the precise action required by statute, which may be entirely different from the process described in the HOA’s notice.

3.0 Takeaway 2: An Internal Process Can Legally Replace—and Distract From—a State-Level One

So why would an engaged homeowner like Mr. Garcia, who went so far as to file an appeal, neglect to send the critical 21-day certified letter? The answer lies in the second key takeaway: the HOA’s violation notice offered its own, separate appeal process with a much shorter deadline, creating a critical and costly distraction.

Mr. Garcia’s second major argument was that Villagio violated the law by not informing him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department. Again, the law contained a crucial nuance. Under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), an HOA is only required to notify a homeowner of the state hearing option if it fails to provide its own process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s letters did include a process: the homeowner could “file an appeal with the Board of Directors… within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

Court records show Mr. Garcia followed this path and “filed an appeal with Villagio.” By doing so, he engaged with the HOA on their terms, likely focusing all his energy on meeting that urgent 10-day deadline. Because Villagio provided this internal process, the judge concluded it had met its legal obligation and was not required to inform Mr. Garcia about the alternative state-level hearing. This created a procedural trap: the HOA satisfied its legal requirement by offering an internal process that simultaneously diverted the homeowner’s attention from the more powerful, but less obvious, 21-day statutory deadline that would have unlocked his other rights.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Conflicting Deadlines Can Create a Legal Minefield

During a rehearing, Mr. Garcia argued that the HOA’s communication style effectively “prevented” him from using his full 21-day statutory response window. The notices demanded compliance within 10 days and were sent every 14 days with escalating fines. He felt the rapid succession of notices created a pressure cooker, making it impossible to properly exercise his rights.

The court flatly rejected this argument, highlighting a harsh legal truth. The judge found no evidence that Villagio had explicitly told Mr. Garcia he could not respond or had physically prevented him from sending a certified letter. The issuance of a second notice with a demanding 10-day timeline did not legally nullify the 21-day window he had to respond to the first. When asked directly if he was prohibited by a court order from sending a response, Mr. Garcia answered, “No.”

This reveals a common tactic, whether intentional or not, in HOA disputes. The violation notices contained two conflicting timelines: a prominent, urgent “10 days to comply” demand and the less obvious, but legally superior, 21-day statutory right to respond. This conflict creates confusion and pressure, causing homeowners to focus on the immediate threat (the 10-day deadline) while missing the most important legal one. The court, however, places the burden squarely on the homeowner to navigate this minefield, as feeling pressured is not a legal defense for failing to meet a statutory deadline.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Play the Game

The case of Mr. Garcia versus the Villagio at Tempe HOA is a powerful reminder that successfully challenging an HOA is not about being “right,” or even about taking action. It is about taking the correct, procedurally perfect action defined by law.

Mr. Garcia was not passive; he engaged and appealed the violation. His case was lost because he followed the path laid out for him by the HOA, not the one laid out for him by state statute. This crucial distinction—between an association’s internal process and the homeowner’s statutory rights—can mean the difference between victory and defeat. Before you act on any violation notice, you must first understand the precise rules of engagement, which may not be written in the notice itself.

If you received a violation notice today, would you know whether the appeal process in the letter is your only option, or a potential distraction from the legal first step required to truly protect your rights?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rogelio A. Garcia (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
  • Tom Gordon (community manager)
    Villagio / AAMAZ
    Testified as witness for Villagio
  • Amanda Shaw (property manager/agent)
    AAM LLC
    Listed as agent for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918029-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nathan Brown Counsel
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition
Additional Citations:

  • 33-1803(E)
  • 32-2199.01
  • 33-1803(C)
  • 33-1803(D)
  • R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:46 (88.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918029-REL


Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

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Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

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Background and Timeline of Events

October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

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Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918029-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 19F-H1918029-REL)

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What specific statute did the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, allege that the Respondent violated?

3. What was the initial issue that prompted the Respondent to contact Mr. Brown on October 18, 2018?

4. What was Nathan Brown’s central legal argument concerning the “Notice of Non-Compliance”?

5. How did the Val Vista Lakes Community Association characterize the “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and why was this distinction critical to its defense?

6. According to the Findings of Fact, what procedural step did Mr. Brown fail to take after receiving the initial notice from the association?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

8. What were the Administrative Law Judge’s two primary legal conclusions that led to the dismissal of the petition?

9. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 2019?

10. What recourse was available to the parties following the judge’s Order, and what was the specified time limit for that action?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Nathan Brown, who served as the Petitioner, and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was the Respondent. Mr. Brown brought the complaint against the association, which was defending its actions.

2. Nathan Brown alleged that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). This section concerns an association’s obligation to provide a member with written notice of their option to petition for an administrative hearing.

3. The Respondent contacted Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard, which was considered a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. The “Notice of Non-Compliance” requested that he remedy the situation by November 1, 2018.

4. Mr. Brown’s central argument was that the “Notice of Non-Compliance” was, in fact, a “Notice of Violation.” Therefore, he contended it should have included written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department, as required by statute.

5. The Association characterized the notice as a “courtesy letter,” which is a common practice for providing an initial warning before formal action. This distinction was critical because the Association argued that as a mere courtesy letter and not a formal “Notice of Violation,” it was not subject to the statutory disclosure requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803.

6. Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Respondent via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice. This response is an option provided to members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C).

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, to show that the Respondent had violated the statute.

8. First, the judge concluded that a reasonable reading of the document shows it was not a “Notice of Violation” because it explicitly threatened that one would be issued later. Second, the judge concluded that even if it were a “Notice of Violation,” the statute does not require the hearing disclosure to be in the initial notice, and since Mr. Brown did not follow the response procedure, the Respondent’s obligation to provide that disclosure had not yet been triggered.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition be dismissed. The judge also deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate comprehensive, evidence-based answers using only the information and legal reasoning presented in the case decision.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “Notice of Non-Compliance” (or “courtesy letter”) and a “Notice of Violation” as presented in this case. Discuss why this distinction was the central point of contention and how the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the document’s plain language resolved the issue.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Discuss how Nathan Brown’s failure to meet this standard, as the party with the burden of proof, was fundamental to the dismissal of his petition.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the procedural requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C), (D), and (E). How does the judge’s “sensible reading” of the statute’s timeline and reciprocal obligations undermine the Petitioner’s claim, even setting aside the debate over the notice’s title?

4. Describe the complete procedural timeline of this case, from the initial notice sent by the association to the final order from the Administrative Law Judge. Identify the key dates and actions taken by each party and by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. Discuss the role of statutory interpretation in this legal decision. How did the judge apply established legal principles, such as aiming for a “fair and sensible result” and avoiding “absurd and unreasonable construction,” to support the final ruling against the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at the center of this case is section 33-1803.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The decision implies these are the governing community documents that Mr. Brown was accused of violating due to dead vegetation.

Courtesy Letter

A term used by the Respondent to describe the “Notice of Non-Compliance.” It is characterized as a common industry practice to inform a resident of an issue before issuing a formal Notice of Violation.

Notice of Non-Compliance

The specific document dated October 18, 2018, sent to Mr. Brown. It informed him of dead vegetation, requested a remedy, and warned that a “Notice of Violation” could follow.

Notice of Violation

A formal notification that a violation has occurred. The decision establishes this as a distinct and more serious step than a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and one was issued to Mr. Brown on November 11, 2018.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Nathan Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A legal process to have a case heard again. The parties were notified of their right to request a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918029-REL



📔

19F-H1918029-REL

1 source

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision for a case titled Nathan Brown vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on whether a Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard constitutes a Notice of Violation under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). Mr. Brown argued that the Association violated this statute by failing to include written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing in the initial notice. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the initial document was merely a courtesy letter and not a formal Notice of Violation, and further concluded that the statute does not require the disclosure of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate within the initial violation notice. Ultimately, the judge determined that the Association was not required to provide Mr. Brown with the notice of his right to petition at any relevant time and dismissed Mr. Brown’s petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nathan Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared for the Respondent
  • Simone McGinnis (general manager)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Presented testimony
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission
  • Clint Brown (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission (listed separately from Clint Goodman)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F Del Sol (admin staff)
    Transmitted document

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918029-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nathan Brown Counsel
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition
Additional Citations:

  • 33-1803(E)
  • 32-2199.01
  • 33-1803(C)
  • 33-1803(D)
  • R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:49 (88.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918029-REL


Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918029-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 19F-H1918029-REL)

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What specific statute did the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, allege that the Respondent violated?

3. What was the initial issue that prompted the Respondent to contact Mr. Brown on October 18, 2018?

4. What was Nathan Brown’s central legal argument concerning the “Notice of Non-Compliance”?

5. How did the Val Vista Lakes Community Association characterize the “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and why was this distinction critical to its defense?

6. According to the Findings of Fact, what procedural step did Mr. Brown fail to take after receiving the initial notice from the association?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

8. What were the Administrative Law Judge’s two primary legal conclusions that led to the dismissal of the petition?

9. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 2019?

10. What recourse was available to the parties following the judge’s Order, and what was the specified time limit for that action?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Nathan Brown, who served as the Petitioner, and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was the Respondent. Mr. Brown brought the complaint against the association, which was defending its actions.

2. Nathan Brown alleged that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). This section concerns an association’s obligation to provide a member with written notice of their option to petition for an administrative hearing.

3. The Respondent contacted Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard, which was considered a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. The “Notice of Non-Compliance” requested that he remedy the situation by November 1, 2018.

4. Mr. Brown’s central argument was that the “Notice of Non-Compliance” was, in fact, a “Notice of Violation.” Therefore, he contended it should have included written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department, as required by statute.

5. The Association characterized the notice as a “courtesy letter,” which is a common practice for providing an initial warning before formal action. This distinction was critical because the Association argued that as a mere courtesy letter and not a formal “Notice of Violation,” it was not subject to the statutory disclosure requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803.

6. Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Respondent via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice. This response is an option provided to members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C).

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, to show that the Respondent had violated the statute.

8. First, the judge concluded that a reasonable reading of the document shows it was not a “Notice of Violation” because it explicitly threatened that one would be issued later. Second, the judge concluded that even if it were a “Notice of Violation,” the statute does not require the hearing disclosure to be in the initial notice, and since Mr. Brown did not follow the response procedure, the Respondent’s obligation to provide that disclosure had not yet been triggered.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition be dismissed. The judge also deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate comprehensive, evidence-based answers using only the information and legal reasoning presented in the case decision.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “Notice of Non-Compliance” (or “courtesy letter”) and a “Notice of Violation” as presented in this case. Discuss why this distinction was the central point of contention and how the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the document’s plain language resolved the issue.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Discuss how Nathan Brown’s failure to meet this standard, as the party with the burden of proof, was fundamental to the dismissal of his petition.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the procedural requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C), (D), and (E). How does the judge’s “sensible reading” of the statute’s timeline and reciprocal obligations undermine the Petitioner’s claim, even setting aside the debate over the notice’s title?

4. Describe the complete procedural timeline of this case, from the initial notice sent by the association to the final order from the Administrative Law Judge. Identify the key dates and actions taken by each party and by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. Discuss the role of statutory interpretation in this legal decision. How did the judge apply established legal principles, such as aiming for a “fair and sensible result” and avoiding “absurd and unreasonable construction,” to support the final ruling against the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at the center of this case is section 33-1803.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The decision implies these are the governing community documents that Mr. Brown was accused of violating due to dead vegetation.

Courtesy Letter

A term used by the Respondent to describe the “Notice of Non-Compliance.” It is characterized as a common industry practice to inform a resident of an issue before issuing a formal Notice of Violation.

Notice of Non-Compliance

The specific document dated October 18, 2018, sent to Mr. Brown. It informed him of dead vegetation, requested a remedy, and warned that a “Notice of Violation” could follow.

Notice of Violation

A formal notification that a violation has occurred. The decision establishes this as a distinct and more serious step than a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and one was issued to Mr. Brown on November 11, 2018.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Nathan Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A legal process to have a case heard again. The parties were notified of their right to request a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918029-REL



📔

19F-H1918029-REL

1 source

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision for a case titled Nathan Brown vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on whether a Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard constitutes a Notice of Violation under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). Mr. Brown argued that the Association violated this statute by failing to include written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing in the initial notice. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the initial document was merely a courtesy letter and not a formal Notice of Violation, and further concluded that the statute does not require the disclosure of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate within the initial violation notice. Ultimately, the judge determined that the Association was not required to provide Mr. Brown with the notice of his right to petition at any relevant time and dismissed Mr. Brown’s petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nathan Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared for the Respondent
  • Simone McGinnis (general manager)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Presented testimony
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission
  • Clint Brown (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission (listed separately from Clint Goodman)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F Del Sol (admin staff)
    Transmitted document

Lewis Smith v. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-29
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lewis Smith Counsel Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq.
Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel William D. Condray, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner's request for relief, finding that the Respondent HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) by failing to provide adequate notice and agenda information regarding the proposed CC&R amendment to prohibit short term rentals. The Respondent was ordered to pay the filing fee to the Petitioner.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting and notice requirements regarding CC&R amendment

The Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) when it failed to provide notice or an agenda to all of its members of information that was reasonably necessary to inform the members that an amendment to the CC&Rs to prohibit short term members would be discussed at its special board of directors meetings held on November 8, 2017 and November 20, 2017.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was granted. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(E)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, HOA Governance, Notice Requirements, CC&R Amendment, Short Term Rentals
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(E)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 629473.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:47 (46.2 KB)

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 629515.pdf

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18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 636989.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:54 (139.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817020-REL


Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Smith vs. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between Petitioner Lewis Smith and Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. The core of the case revolves around allegations that the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting laws.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the Petitioner, finding that the Desert Isle HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F). The decision established that the Board failed to provide its members with agendas containing information “reasonably necessary to inform the members” about discussions concerning a proposed amendment to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that would prohibit short-term rentals. This failure occurred during Board of Directors meetings held on November 8 and November 20, 2017.

As a result of this finding, the Petitioner’s petition was granted, and the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee. The ruling underscores the state’s policy that planned community meetings must be conducted with transparency, and agendas must provide sufficient detail for members to understand the matters to be discussed or decided.

Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1817020-REL

Tribunal

Office of Administrative Hearings (Phoenix, Arizona)

Petitioner

Lewis Smith

Respondent

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date

April 16, 2018

Decision Date

May 29, 2018

Central Allegation

On or about December 5, 2017, Petitioner Lewis Smith filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the Desert Isle HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The petition contended that the Board of Directors discussed and advanced a significant CC&R amendment without proper notification to the association members.

The petition states, in part:

“All Board members have been meeting to discuss and add an amendment to the CC&R’s [sic] Prohibiting short term renters. These meetings have not been conducted openly and no notice or agenda were provided containing information necessary to inform members of the association of the matters to be discussed… At no time was the issue to add an amendment for short term rentals properly noticed or on an agenda for discussion before it became a ballot vote.”

Chronology of Events

October 23, 2017:

• Lewis Smith, William H. Winn, Kevin Barnett, and Chester Jay submit a formal request to the Board for a special members’ meeting.

• The stated purposes of the meeting were to:

1. Select and fund an attorney to update the HOA’s bylaws and CC&Rs to comply with current Arizona law.

2. Discuss obtaining a reserve study for the association’s capital needs.

3. Discuss a separate attorney letter regarding HOA governance.

October 24, 2017:

• Board President Doug Robinson responds to the request, expressing support for a meeting but stating that more than 30 days would be needed to gather supporting documentation.

October 31, 2017:

• A second group of homeowners, including Board members Greg Yacoubian, Doug Robinson, Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews, submits a request to add an item to the agenda of the forthcoming special meeting.

• Their request was to “amend the CC&Rs by adding a section prohibiting ‘Short Term Rentals’ and defining minimum time allowed for Rentals.”

November 5, 2017:

• The Board provides an agenda for a Board of Directors meeting scheduled for November 8, 2017. The agenda did not include any item related to the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals.

November 8, 2017:

• The Board of Directors meeting is held.

• The Board votes to call a special members’ meeting before November 23, 2017, to address the two petitions.

• During the “BOARD INPUT” section, member Curt Carlson “spoke of past issues about short term renting,” but this was not a formal agenda item for discussion or action.

November 10, 2017:

• The Board emails Lewis Smith, acknowledging his petition and requesting a “narrative explanation from you on each of your subjects” by November 17, 2017, to prepare the meeting information package for all homeowners.

November 18, 2017:

• The Board sends an agenda for another Board of Directors meeting scheduled for November 20, 2017.

• The agenda lists “Review/approval of special meeting mailing package” as a topic but provides no specific details regarding the proposed amendment on short-term rentals.

December 1, 2017:

• Board President Doug Robinson emails all homeowners to explain the upcoming special meeting on December 16, 2017.

• The email states: “To avoid cost and time we put both petitions together and are having one meeting that will required [sic] all owners to vote for or against these two petitions.”

• The agenda for the December 16 meeting is attached, which explicitly lists a vote on prohibiting short-term rentals.

December 16, 2017:

• The special members’ meeting is held. A vote is taken on the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals.

Vote Result: 9 homeowners in favor, 6 homeowners against.

Legal Framework and Analysis

The case centered on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statutes related to planned communities.

Key Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

This statute governs meetings and notices for planned communities. The judge’s decision rested heavily on the policy outlined in subsection (F).

§ 33-1804(B): Requires that notice for any special meeting of members must state the purpose, including “the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.”

§ 33-1804(E)(1): Requires that the agenda for a Board of Directors meeting be made available to all members in attendance.

§ 33-1804(F): This subsection contains the state’s declaration of policy, which was central to the judge’s conclusion. It states:

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Lewis Smith, bore the burden of proving that the Respondent violated the statute by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that is sufficient “to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Findings and Conclusion of the Court

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner successfully met the burden of proof. The decision concludes that the agendas for the November 8 and November 20 Board of Directors meetings were legally insufficient.

Conclusion of Law #4:

“Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) when it failed to provide notice or an agenda to all of its members of information that was reasonably necessary to inform the members that an amendment to the CC&Rs to prohibit short term members would be discussed at its special board of directors meetings held on November 8, 2017 and November 20, 2017.”

Final Order

• The Petitioner’s petition in the matter was granted.

• Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the Respondent (Desert Isle HOA) was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee.

• The Order is legally binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Parties and Legal Representation

Address

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Lewis Smith
5459 E. Sorrento Dr.
Long Beach, CA 90803

Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq.
The Bainbridge Law Firm LLC
2122 E. Highland Ave. Ste. 250
Phoenix, AZ 85016-4779

Respondent

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
411 Riverfront Dr. #7
Bullhead City, AZ 86442

William D. Condray, Esq.
2031 Highway 95 Ste. 2
Bullhead City, AZ 86442-6004






Study Guide – 18F-H1817020-REL


Study Guide: Smith v. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 18F-H1817020-REL between Petitioner Lewis Smith and Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms and entities involved in the matter.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in case No. 18F-H1817020-REL, and who represented them legally?

2. What was the three-part purpose of the special meeting requested by Lewis Smith and other homeowners on October 23, 2017?

3. A second petition was submitted on October 31, 2017. What was its purpose and who were the petitioners?

4. What key actions were taken regarding officers and a special meeting during the Board of Directors meeting on November 8, 2017?

5. What did the Desert Isle HOA Board demand from Lewis Smith in its email on November 10, 2017, to proceed with the special meeting?

6. What was the central allegation Lewis Smith made in his petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate on December 5, 2017?

7. What was the outcome of the vote on the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals at the December 16, 2017 special meeting?

8. Which specific section of the Arizona Revised Statutes did the Administrative Law Judge find the Board had violated?

9. According to the case documents, what is the definition of “preponderance of the evidence”?

10. What was the final ruling issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson on May 29, 2018?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Lewis Smith, and the Respondent, Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. Lewis Smith was represented by Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq., and the Desert Isle HOA was represented by William D. Condray, Esq.

2. The purpose of the meeting was threefold: to select and fund an attorney to update the HOA’s bylaws and CC&Rs to comply with current Arizona law; to discuss obtaining a reserve study for the association’s capital needs; and to discuss an attorney letter regarding HOA governance.

3. Greg Yacoubian, Doug Robinson, Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews submitted a request to amend the CC&Rs by adding a section to prohibit “Short Term Rentals.” They requested this subject be added to the agenda of the special meeting already requested by Lewis Smith’s group to save time and money.

4. At the November 8, 2017 meeting, a motion passed unanimously to remove the existing VP, treasurer, and secretary. New officers and assistants were elected, and another motion passed to call the special meeting requested by the two groups of owners before November 23, 2017.

5. The Board requested a “narrative explanation” from Lewis Smith for each of his proposed subjects. The Board stated it would expect four narratives plus any referenced attorney engagement letters and needed the materials by November 17, 2017, to prepare the special meeting package.

6. Lewis Smith alleged that the Desert Isle HOA Board members met to discuss and add an amendment prohibiting short-term rentals without conducting the meetings openly. He stated that no proper notice or agenda was provided to inform members of the matters to be discussed before the issue became a ballot vote.

7. At the December 16, 2017 meeting, the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals was voted on by homeowners. Nine homeowners voted in favor of the amendment, and six homeowners voted against it.

8. The Judge found that the Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F). The violation occurred when the Board failed to provide an agenda with information reasonably necessary to inform members that an amendment to the CC&Rs prohibiting short-term rentals would be discussed at the board meetings on November 8 and November 20, 2017.

9. The documents provide two definitions. The first is “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The second, from Black’s Law Dictionary, is “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge’s order required the Respondent (Desert Isle HOA) to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by statute.

Essay Questions

1. Construct a detailed timeline of events from the initial petition by Lewis Smith on October 23, 2017, to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision on May 29, 2018. Include all key meetings, communications, and legal filings mentioned in the documents.

2. Analyze the ways in which the Desert Isle Homeowners Association Board failed to comply with the open meeting policies outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Use specific examples from the meeting agendas and communications to support the analysis.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain who held the burden of proof for the violation and any affirmative defenses, and how the “preponderance of the evidence” standard was met by the Petitioner.

4. Compare and contrast the two petitions submitted by homeowners in October 2017. Evaluate how the Board handled each request and the procedural steps it took that ultimately led to the legal dispute.

5. Based on the findings of fact, evaluate the communication between the Desert Isle HOA Board and its members. Discuss the effectiveness and legality of the Board’s notices, agendas, and email correspondence regarding the special meeting and the proposed CC&R amendment.

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on findings of fact and conclusions of law.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804

An Arizona state statute governing meetings in planned communities. It requires open meetings, proper notice to members (between 10 and 50 days prior), and agendas that are reasonably necessary to inform members of matters to be discussed or decided.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01

An Arizona state statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or relevant statutes.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. At the time of the events, key members included Doug Robinson (President), Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden for any affirmative defenses.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents of the Desert Isle planned community. The petitions submitted by homeowners sought to amend these documents.

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; the planned community organization and non-profit corporation responsible for managing the Desert Isle community.

Lewis Smith

The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner in the Desert Isle community who filed a petition against the HOA.

Notice of Hearing

A formal notification issued by the Department of Real Estate setting the date and location for an administrative hearing. In this case, it was issued on January 22, 2018.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state tribunal where the hearing for this case was conducted.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Lewis Smith.

Post-hearing Briefs

Written legal arguments submitted by parties after a hearing has concluded. The record in this case was held open until May 9, 2018, to receive these briefs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

Reserve Study

A study to determine an association’s long-term capital needs for its common areas. Lewis Smith’s petition requested a discussion about obtaining one.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Special Meeting

A meeting of association members called for a specific purpose outside of regularly scheduled meetings. Both petitions in this case requested a special meeting.






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