Tag Archives: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Tom Barrs V. Desert Ranch Homeowners Assocation (ROOT)

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Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222050-REL; 22F-H2222054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-02-21
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted Petitions 1 and 4 in part, finding the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide records where a Board Member was acting in official capacity (survey requests and City communications), even if the management company did not possess them. Petitions 2 (recordings) and 3 (roster) were denied in their entirety. No civil penalties were assessed due to the tumultuous relationship of the parties. The Tribunal ordered that the Association shall not reimburse the Petitioner's filing fees.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove recording violations or entitlement to the roster given privacy concerns. Filing fees were not reimbursed despite partial success.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records (April 2021, Nov 2021, Feb 2022 requests)

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide various records including survey bids and cleanup volunteer responses. The ALJ found the Association was required to provide the survey request records as the Secretary/Treasurer was acting in his capacity as a Board Member, regardless of whether the management company possessed them.

Orders: Petition 1 granted in relevant parts regarding survey requests; remaining portions denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Meeting recording violations

Petitioner alleged the HOA forbade video/audio recording and provided altered recordings. The ALJ found the Petitioner did not sustain his burden of proof regarding this violation.

Orders: Petition 2 denied in its entirety.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Failure to provide membership roster

Petitioner requested a membership roster. The ALJ denied this petition in its entirety, noting evidence that the Association stopped disseminating rosters due to complaints about Petitioner's unsolicited emails.

Orders: Petition 3 denied in its entirety.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Failure to provide records (Oct 2021-Mar 2022 requests)

Petitioner requested various records including emails regarding a Netflix filming event. The ALJ found the Association violated the statute by failing to provide Board Member communications regarding the event, as the member was acting in his capacity as a Board Member.

Orders: Petition 4 granted in relevant parts regarding Board Member communications; remaining portions denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 1000763.pdf

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22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 1002291.pdf

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22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 1035796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-26T14:45:56 (295.5 KB)

22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 980693.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-26T14:45:56 (54.2 KB)

22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 981784.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-26T14:45:56 (50.4 KB)

22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 982383.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-26T14:45:57 (55.5 KB)

22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 987368.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-26T14:45:57 (61.6 KB)

22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 987371.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-26T14:45:57 (8.5 KB)

22F-H2222050-REL Decision – 998623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-26T14:45:58 (45.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 22F-H2222050-REL


Briefing Document: Legal Proceedings and Testimony Regarding Desert Ranch HOA vs. Tom Bars

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the testimony and legal findings from the consolidated matters of Case Nos. 22 FH222050 REL and 22 SH22254 REL, presided over by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark. The proceedings center on a dispute between homeowner Tom Bars (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (Respondent), managed by Associated Asset Management (AAM).

The core of the dispute involves allegations that the HOA and AAM violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 33-1804 and 33-1805 by failing to provide complete records, prohibiting homeowners from recording meetings, and producing edited or incomplete audio/video recordings. The testimony of Lori Loch-Lee, Vice President of Client Services at AAM, highlights a significant transition from a self-managed association to professional management, which coincided with the adoption of more restrictive data privacy and recording policies.

Critical Takeaways:

• Recording Irregularities: Multiple board meeting recordings were found to be incomplete or contained abrupt cuts. AAM staff attributed these to technical errors or personal oversight (forgetting to start the recorder) rather than intentional editing.

• Access to Records: While the ALJ found that the majority of records requests were fulfilled, specific violations were identified regarding the failure to provide survey proposals and certain board communications.

• Privacy vs. Precedent: A significant conflict exists regarding homeowner rosters. Historically, the HOA provided unredacted rosters; however, under current management, AAM maintains that email addresses and phone numbers are private information and has withheld them from the Petitioner.

• Homeowner Recording Restrictions: The HOA implemented a policy and board resolution asserting its own recording as the “official” version and used Zoom settings to block homeowners from recording meetings directly to their devices.

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Witness Profile: Lori Loch-Lee

Lori Loch-Lee serves as the Vice President of Client Services for Associated Asset Management (AAM). She has been employed in this capacity for over nine years and has acted as the community manager for Desert Ranch HOA since approximately April 1, 2018.

Key Responsibilities:

• Financial management and accounting coordination with CPAs.

• Production of financial statements.

• Record-keeping for the association (though she clarifies that AAM is primarily a financial management company for this specific client).

• Attending board meetings and recording them via Zoom.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Record-Keeping and Transparency Disputes

1. Incomplete and “Edited” Meeting Recordings

A primary point of contention is the integrity of meeting recordings provided to the Petitioner.

• April 27, 2021 Meeting: The recording provided was 36 minutes and 48 seconds long, whereas the meeting itself lasted approximately one hour and six minutes. Loch-Lee testified that she “forgot to start the recording at the very beginning” and denied any intentional editing.

• September 2020 Meeting: This meeting involved an incident where the Petitioner was removed from a board member’s home. Testimony and video evidence showed an “abrupt cut” in the recording at 17 minutes and 20 seconds and another at 30 minutes and 24 seconds.

• Witness Defense: Loch-Lee repeatedly stated, “I do not edit anything. I’m lucky I turned it on and turn it off. I don’t know how to edit.” She attributed cuts to the Zoom platform or the suspension of meetings when disruptions occurred.

2. Policies on Homeowner Recording

The Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated statutory rights by prohibiting homeowners from making their own recordings.

• Technological Prohibitions: Evidence (Exhibit P243) showed a Zoom notification stating: “This meeting is not allowed to be recorded to your device. Please stop recording to continue the meeting.” Loch-Lee claimed she had never seen this message from her end.

• Board Resolutions: The board adopted a resolution stating that the HOA’s recording is the “official” version. Loch-Lee interpreted this as a means to prevent “intimidating” behavior by homeowners who would bring equipment and “cameras on their hats” to the business office, causing distress to staff.

• Consistency of Enforcement: While Loch-Lee stated she could not stop a homeowner from recording on their own side of a phone line, the HOA maintained a policy (Exhibit P71) that “no audio or visual equipment can be used by individual members of the association.”

3. Homeowner Roster and Data Privacy

The dispute over the membership roster highlights a shift in HOA policy following the hiring of AAM.

• Historical Context: Prior to 2018, the association (then self-managed) voluntarily provided unredacted rosters, including emails and phone numbers, to all homeowners.

• Current Stance: Loch-Lee testified that she treats emails and phone numbers as “private and personal and confidential.” She stated, “I have not been providing homeowner rosters to homeowners when they ask for it because it’s not a directory.”

• The “Opt-In” vs. “Opt-Out” Conflict: The Petitioner argued the association historically used an “opt-out” provision for sharing info. Loch-Lee contended that AAM uses an “opt-in” system through their mobile app, where homeowners must choose to share contact information.

• Justification for Restriction: The HOA alleged that the Petitioner used previous rosters to “blast” unsolicited emails to members, leading the board to stop disseminating the information in 2018.

——————————————————————————–

4. Bids and Financial Records

The Petitioner sought copies of various bids, particularly for street work and common area surveys.

• Retention Policy: Loch-Lee testified that she only retains bids if they are “contracted.” If the board procures a bid but does not accept it, she claims she does not keep it in the official files.

• Holbrook Asphalt Bid: Despite claims of not having certain bids, a proposal for $10,738.60 from Holbrook Asphalt was identified with Loch-Lee’s name in the “attention” line. She stated she had “no idea” why she was listed and denied destroying any documents.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Findings (ALJ Order – Case No. HO22-22050/22054)

The ALJ’s final order, issued February 21, 2023, summarized the findings based on the evidence and testimony provided during the January 2023 hearings.

Statutory Requirements (A.R.S. Title 33)

Statute

Requirement

§ 33-1804(A)

Meetings must be open to all members; any person may tape record or use a video camera subject to reasonable board rules.

§ 33-1805(A)

All financial and other records shall be made reasonably available for examination within 10 business days.

§ 33-1805(B)

Certain records may be withheld (e.g., attorney-client privilege, pending litigation, personal/health/financial info of individual members).

Summary of Rulings

• Records Compliance: The ALJ found that the “overwhelming majority” of the Petitioner’s records requests were complied with fully and timely.

• Specific Violations: The Respondent failed to timely and completely fulfill requests regarding:

◦ Survey proposals (April 27, 2021).

◦ Specific board communications involving Brian Schoeffler (December 07, 2021).

• Recordings: The ALJ noted that the beginning of the April 27 meeting was missing and that the September 2020 recording was stopped twice, but did not find sufficient evidence of “purposeful” or “flagrant” editing.

• Outcome: The ALJ ordered the Respondent to provide the missing survey proposals and communications. However, the request to levy civil penalties against the HOA was denied, and the Respondent was not required to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fees.

——————————————————————————–

Key Quotes from Testimony

On Recording Errors: “I provided the recording that I had and I forgot to start it at the very beginning. I believe this is the meeting that it happened in… I simply forgot.” — Lori Loch-Lee

On Historical Transparency: “That was then… I don’t know of any specific change, sir. What I do know is when I started managing, there’s never been any conversation about homeowner rosters.” — Lori Loch-Lee, responding to evidence that rosters were previously public.

On Data Privacy: “I’ve never sent a I don’t recall ever sending a redacted one. I have sent recently a roster with just the names on it, but homeowner addresses and email s are considered private information. I’ve always been trained that way.” — Lori Loch-Lee

On Recording Prohibitions: “I will remind you that no tape recording nor visual recording can or will be done in this business office… [the Petitioner’s family] were being very intimidating and causing a ruckus. So that’s when we stopped it.” — Lori Loch-Lee


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (Petitioner)
    Homeowner
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (Legal Counsel for Petitioner)
    Dessaules Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent)
    HOA
  • B. Austin Baillio (Legal Counsel for Respondent)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (Administrative Law Judge)

Amy Hillburn v. Stetson Valley Owners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-11-17
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Amy Hilburn Counsel —
Respondent Stetson Valley Owners Association Counsel Melissa Doolan, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804 and Article 6.2 of the Bylaws

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) had ceased holding regularly scheduled meetings since March 2022, thereby negating the statutory requirement that such committee meetings must be open to members.

Why this result: The ARC successfully argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) only mandates open access for 'any regularly scheduled committee meetings.' Since they transitioned to using an online portal on an irregular schedule, they were no longer holding 'regularly scheduled meetings,' meaning the statute did not require them to be open.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure of Architectural Review Committee (ARC) to hold open meetings where members can comment prior to a vote.

Petitioner alleged the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was violating A.R.S. § 33-1804 (open meetings statute) by failing to hold open meetings, particularly after the ARC began processing requests using an online portal which allows for discussion and voting among members outside of noticed meetings. Historically, the ARC held regularly scheduled meetings on the first Tuesday of every month until March 2022. The ALJ ultimately ruled that since March 2022, the ARC was not holding 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' as defined by the statute.

Orders: Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • Article 6.2 of the Bylaws
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meeting Law, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Regularly Scheduled Meetings, Online Portal, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • Article 6.2 of the Bylaws

Video Overview

Audio Overview

https://open.spotify.com/episode/5imRZJLqAyqtm153jinLJq

Decision Documents

23F-H008-REL Decision – 1005178.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:08 (48.8 KB)

23F-H008-REL Decision – 1013302.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:12 (110.8 KB)





Study Guide – 23F-H008-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H008-REL”, “case_title”: “Amy Hilburn v. Stetson Valley Owners Association”, “decision_date”: “2022-11-17”, “alj_name”: “Sondra J. Vanella”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Does my HOA’s architectural committee have to hold open meetings for every decision?”, “short_answer”: “No, only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open to members.”, “detailed_answer”: “The law specifically mandates that meetings of the members, the board of directors, and ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings be open. If a committee does not maintain a regular schedule, the open meeting requirement may not apply.”, “alj_quote”: “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Open Meetings”, “Committees”, “Homeowner Rights” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA committee conduct business through an online portal instead of meeting in person?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, utilizing an online portal to process requests is permitted and may result in the activity not being classified as a “regularly scheduled meeting.””, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that moving committee business to an online portal where members review and vote on their own time effectively meant they were not holding ‘regularly scheduled meetings,’ thus bypassing the open meeting requirement.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Miglio testified that since August 2022, the ARC has not held regularly scheduled meetings because the ARC conducts its business through an online portal.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(e)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Digital Tools”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA committee required by law to hold regularly scheduled meetings?”, “short_answer”: “No, there is generally no statutory requirement that committees must hold regularly scheduled meetings.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision explicitly states that nothing in the cited statutes or bylaws required the Architectural Review Committee to adhere to a regular meeting schedule.”, “alj_quote”: “…nothing in the provisions cited by Petitioner require the ARC to hold regularly scheduled meetings.”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 6”, “topic_tags”: [ “HOA Obligations”, “Committees”, “Scheduling” ] }, { “question”: “Do committee members have to discuss and vote on requests at the same time?”, “short_answer”: “No, committee members can review requests and vote asynchronously on their own time.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ accepted testimony that committee members could view requests and vote individually whenever they chose, rather than convening at a specific time.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Wilsey testified that there is no regularly scheduled time to look at the requests, comment, and/or vote.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(h)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Voting”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] }, { “question”: “What is the burden of proof for a homeowner suing their HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner must prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.””, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard means the homeowner must convince the judge that their claim is ‘more probably true than not.’ It refers to the convincing force of the evidence rather than the amount.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence… A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 2-3”, “topic_tags”: [ “Legal Standards”, “Burden of Proof”, “Dispute Process” ] }, { “question”: “Can committee members comment to each other online without it being an open meeting?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the ability to comment via a portal does not necessarily create a “meeting” if done asynchronously.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision noted that members could comment to each other through the portal, but because there was no regularly scheduled time for this interaction, it did not trigger the open meeting statute.”, “alj_quote”: “Members of the ARC have the ability to comment to each other through the portal and vote on the requests through the portal.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(g)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Communication”, “Committees”, “Open Meetings” ] }, { “question”: “If an HOA committee previously held regular meetings, are they forced to continue doing so?”, “short_answer”: “No, past practices do not mandate future behavior if the committee changes its process.”, “detailed_answer”: “Although the committee had a history of regular monthly meetings from 2011 to 2022, the ALJ ruled based on their current practice of using a portal, finding no violation because they were not currently meeting regularly.”, “alj_quote”: “The credible and probative evidence of record established that… prior to the ARC utilizing the online portal system, the ARC was holding regularly scheduled meetings. However, since March 2022, the ARC has not been holding regularly scheduled meetings…”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 6”, “topic_tags”: [ “Precedent”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 23F-H008-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H008-REL”, “case_title”: “Amy Hilburn v. Stetson Valley Owners Association”, “decision_date”: “2022-11-17”, “alj_name”: “Sondra J. Vanella”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Does my HOA’s architectural committee have to hold open meetings for every decision?”, “short_answer”: “No, only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open to members.”, “detailed_answer”: “The law specifically mandates that meetings of the members, the board of directors, and ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings be open. If a committee does not maintain a regular schedule, the open meeting requirement may not apply.”, “alj_quote”: “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Open Meetings”, “Committees”, “Homeowner Rights” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA committee conduct business through an online portal instead of meeting in person?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, utilizing an online portal to process requests is permitted and may result in the activity not being classified as a “regularly scheduled meeting.””, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that moving committee business to an online portal where members review and vote on their own time effectively meant they were not holding ‘regularly scheduled meetings,’ thus bypassing the open meeting requirement.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Miglio testified that since August 2022, the ARC has not held regularly scheduled meetings because the ARC conducts its business through an online portal.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(e)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Digital Tools”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA committee required by law to hold regularly scheduled meetings?”, “short_answer”: “No, there is generally no statutory requirement that committees must hold regularly scheduled meetings.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision explicitly states that nothing in the cited statutes or bylaws required the Architectural Review Committee to adhere to a regular meeting schedule.”, “alj_quote”: “…nothing in the provisions cited by Petitioner require the ARC to hold regularly scheduled meetings.”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 6”, “topic_tags”: [ “HOA Obligations”, “Committees”, “Scheduling” ] }, { “question”: “Do committee members have to discuss and vote on requests at the same time?”, “short_answer”: “No, committee members can review requests and vote asynchronously on their own time.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ accepted testimony that committee members could view requests and vote individually whenever they chose, rather than convening at a specific time.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Wilsey testified that there is no regularly scheduled time to look at the requests, comment, and/or vote.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(h)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Voting”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] }, { “question”: “What is the burden of proof for a homeowner suing their HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner must prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.””, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard means the homeowner must convince the judge that their claim is ‘more probably true than not.’ It refers to the convincing force of the evidence rather than the amount.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence… A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 2-3”, “topic_tags”: [ “Legal Standards”, “Burden of Proof”, “Dispute Process” ] }, { “question”: “Can committee members comment to each other online without it being an open meeting?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the ability to comment via a portal does not necessarily create a “meeting” if done asynchronously.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision noted that members could comment to each other through the portal, but because there was no regularly scheduled time for this interaction, it did not trigger the open meeting statute.”, “alj_quote”: “Members of the ARC have the ability to comment to each other through the portal and vote on the requests through the portal.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(g)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Communication”, “Committees”, “Open Meetings” ] }, { “question”: “If an HOA committee previously held regular meetings, are they forced to continue doing so?”, “short_answer”: “No, past practices do not mandate future behavior if the committee changes its process.”, “detailed_answer”: “Although the committee had a history of regular monthly meetings from 2011 to 2022, the ALJ ruled based on their current practice of using a portal, finding no violation because they were not currently meeting regularly.”, “alj_quote”: “The credible and probative evidence of record established that… prior to the ARC utilizing the online portal system, the ARC was holding regularly scheduled meetings. However, since March 2022, the ARC has not been holding regularly scheduled meetings…”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 6”, “topic_tags”: [ “Precedent”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Amy Hilburn (petitioner)
    Stetson Valley Owners Association member
    Appeared pro se; former Board President

Respondent Side

  • Melissa Doolan (HOA attorney)
    Travis Law Firm
  • Danielle Miglio (community manager, witness)
    Oasis Community Management
  • Ann Renee Wilsey (ARC member, witness)
    Stetson Valley Owners Association ARC
  • Nichollet Widner (board member, witness)
    Stetson Valley Owners Association Board President
  • Tom Young (board member, observer)
    Stetson Valley Owners Association Board
  • Pam Weller (ARC member, observer)
    Stetson Valley Owners Association ARC
  • Omar Chavez (board member, observer)
    Stetson Valley Owners Association Board
  • Miranda Alvarez (legal secretary)
    Travis Law Firm
    Transmitting staff
  • Elizabeth Franco (community manager staff)
    Oasis Community Management
    Referenced in Petitioner's Exhibit 6 testimony
  • Benjamin Butler (ARC chairperson)
    Stetson Valley Owners Association ARC
    Referenced in Petitioner's Exhibit 6 testimony

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Louis Dettorre (commissioner)
    ADRE
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • c. serrano (OAH staff)
    OAH
    Transmitting staff

Other Participants

  • Amanda McGawan (observer)
  • Lisa Vargas (observer)
  • Nick Jackson (observer)

Sean McCoy v. Barclay Place Homeowners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919062-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-08-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Sean McCoy Counsel —
Respondent Barclay Place Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1810
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner prevailed on the claim regarding the failure to provide financial compilations (ISS-002) and was awarded a filing fee refund. Respondent prevailed on claims regarding meeting recordings (ISS-001) and communication restrictions (ISS-003). A rehearing on ISS-003 affirmed the decision in favor of the Respondent.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove violations regarding meeting recordings (as the Board provided recordings) and communication restrictions (as the Board may manage communication channels for onerous requests).

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to allow videotaping

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated statute by prohibiting members from recording meetings. The ALJ found that because the Board recorded the meetings and made them available, prohibiting members from recording did not violate the statute.

Orders: Respondent deemed prevailing party on this item.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Failure to provide compiled financial statements

The HOA failed to complete and provide the 2017 financial compilation within the statutory timeframe (180 days after fiscal year end). Documents were not sent to the accountant until one month prior to the hearing.

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $500.00 (filing fee refund) within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Denial of reasonable access and communication

Petitioner alleged that requiring him to communicate solely through the HOA's attorney violated his rights. The ALJ found this was standard practice when requests become onerous and did not constitute a violation.

Orders: Respondent deemed prevailing party on this item.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Sean McCoy v. Barclay Place Homeowners Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919062-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-08-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Sean McCoy Counsel —
Respondent Barclay Place Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1810
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner prevailed on the claim regarding the failure to provide financial compilations (ISS-002) and was awarded a filing fee refund. Respondent prevailed on claims regarding meeting recordings (ISS-001) and communication restrictions (ISS-003). A rehearing on ISS-003 affirmed the decision in favor of the Respondent.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove violations regarding meeting recordings (as the Board provided recordings) and communication restrictions (as the Board may manage communication channels for onerous requests).

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to allow videotaping

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated statute by prohibiting members from recording meetings. The ALJ found that because the Board recorded the meetings and made them available, prohibiting members from recording did not violate the statute.

Orders: Respondent deemed prevailing party on this item.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Failure to provide compiled financial statements

The HOA failed to complete and provide the 2017 financial compilation within the statutory timeframe (180 days after fiscal year end). Documents were not sent to the accountant until one month prior to the hearing.

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $500.00 (filing fee refund) within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Denial of reasonable access and communication

Petitioner alleged that requiring him to communicate solely through the HOA's attorney violated his rights. The ALJ found this was standard practice when requests become onerous and did not constitute a violation.

Orders: Respondent deemed prevailing party on this item.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Decision Documents

19F-H1919062-REL-RHG Decision – 761767.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:16:51 (125.3 KB)

19F-H1919062-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1919062-REL/733895.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:16:51 (120.8 KB)

**Case Summary: McCoy v. Barclay Place Homeowners Association**
**Case No. 19F-H1919062-REL-RHG**

**Procedural Context**
This summary covers an administrative dispute before the Arizona Department of Real Estate involving a rehearing. It is critical to distinguish between the **Original Decision** (August 27, 2019) and the **Rehearing Decision** (January 2, 2020),. The rehearing was granted exclusively to reconsider "Complaint Item Three," while the findings on the first two complaints remained adjudicated under the original decision.

### I. Original Decision (August 2019)
In the initial proceeding, Petitioner Sean McCoy alleged three violations by the Respondent, Barclay Place HOA.

* **Complaint Item One (Videotaping):** Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by prohibiting him from recording meetings.
* *Finding:* The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled for the **Respondent**. The Board recorded meetings itself and made them available to members; therefore, restricting members from recording did not violate the statute,.
* **Complaint Item Two (Financials):** Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide compiled financial statements for 2017.
* *Finding:* The ALJ ruled for the **Petitioner**. The HOA failed to complete the compilation within 180 days of the fiscal year-end, violating A.R.S. § 33-1810,. The HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner $500.00.
* **Complaint Item Three (Communication Restrictions):** Petitioner argued that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by requiring him to communicate solely through the Board’s attorney rather than contacting the Board or management directly.
* *Finding:* The ALJ initially ruled for the **Respondent**, determining such restrictions are standard industry practice when a homeowner’s requests become onerous,.

### II. Rehearing Proceedings (December 2019)
The Department granted a rehearing specifically for **Complaint Item Three** regarding the denial of reasonable access and communication,.

**Key Facts and Arguments**
* **The Restriction:** In January 2019, the HOA's attorney issued a "cease and desist" letter to the Petitioner. It instructed him to direct all communications to the law firm via U.S. Mail and explicitly prohibited direct contact with the Board or management company.
* **The Incident:** On March 6, 2019, Petitioner emailed the management company directly to request contracts, citing A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The management company refused to accept the email, citing the legal directive to communicate only through counsel.
* **Petitioner’s Argument:** Petitioner argued that a letter sent by his own attorney to the HOA's counsel rescinded or terminated the "cease and desist" letter, restoring his right to direct communication.

**Legal Analysis and Decision**
The ALJ ruled in favor of the **Respondent**, maintaining the original outcome for Item Three based on the following legal points:
1. **Privileged Information:** An earlier request by Petitioner (Jan 14, 2019) sought information regarding Board authorizations. The ALJ found this sought privileged attorney-client communications, which the attorney was not required to provide.
2. **Validity of Communication Restrictions:** Regarding the March 6, 2019 request, the ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to provide any legal authority to support his assertion that his attorney's objection unilaterally terminated the HOA's cease and desist letter.
3. **No Statutory Violation:** Because the management company was acting under valid legal instructions to route communication through counsel, their failure to respond to Petitioner’s direct email did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1805.

### Final Outcome
* **Complaint Item Two:** Petitioner prevailed (Original Decision).

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sean McCoy (petitioner)
    appeared on his own behalf at hearing
  • James A. Whitehill (attorney)
    Sent correspondence on behalf of Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown/Olcott, PLLC
    Represented Respondent at hearing
  • Frank Puma (witness)
    Arizona Community Management Services, LLC (AZCMS)
    Vice President of Client Operations
  • Jamie Murad (witness)
    Arizona Community Management Services, LLC (AZCMS)
    Community Manager
  • Dana Young Jungclaus (witness)
  • Jonathan Olcott (HOA attorney)
    Brown/Olcott
    Authored cease and desist letters

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel —
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:37 (106.4 KB)

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1817005-REL/605190.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:42 (77.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing on the Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association Case

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions regarding a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA or Respondent). The core of the case, No. 18F-H1817005-REL, is the legal interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as it appears in Arizona’s open meeting statute for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The conflict arose when the DMMA Communications Committee held a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, which Mr. Moselle was barred from attending. He contended this violated the statute’s open meeting requirements. The DMMA argued the committee was exempt because its meetings were infrequent and not held at fixed intervals.

In two separate decisions—an initial ruling on December 7, 2017, and a second after a rehearing on May 10, 2018—Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer consistently ruled in favor of the DMMA. The judge concluded that “regularly scheduled” applies to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly). Since the Communications Committee met only four times in two years without a set schedule, it was not subject to the open meeting law. The judge determined that the statute’s general policy favoring openness does not override its more specific provisions. Ultimately, the petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute proceeded through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, culminating in a definitive ruling after a granted rehearing.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging DMMA violated open meeting laws.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Mr. Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

An initial hearing is conducted before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer.

December 7, 2017

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

January 4, 2018

Mr. Moselle files a request for rehearing, citing “newly discovered material evidence” and arguing the decision was contrary to law.

January 26, 2018

The Department of Real Estate grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted before the ALJ.

May 10, 2018

The ALJ issues a final decision after rehearing, again denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

Core Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The central legal question was whether the DMMA Communications Committee was subject to the open meeting requirements mandated by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. The resolution of the case hinged on the interpretation of specific language within the statute.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): “It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.”

Arguments Presented by the Parties

The petitioner and respondent presented starkly different interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled.”

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Mr. Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting scheduled in a “normal manner” or “ordinary fashion,” not necessarily one that recurs at fixed intervals.

• Primacy of Openness Policy: He emphasized the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), asserting that the statute’s clear preference for open meetings should guide the interpretation of any ambiguous terms.

• Arguments for Rehearing: In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Moselle cited newly discovered evidence (an email sent by the DMMA after the first hearing) and suggested the ALJ should evaluate whether the DMMA had misled the court regarding the Board’s actions on the committee’s recommendation.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA contended that the phrase “regularly scheduled” plainly refers to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals, “such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: As evidence, the DMMA testified that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed pattern, holding only four meetings in 2016 and 2017 (twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and the contested meeting of September 6, 2017).

• Lack of Board Action: The DMMA further argued that a recommendation from the committee to the Board of Directors was not acted upon, which it presented as evidence that the committee was not “conducting any actual business of the Board.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Rulings

Across both decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided a consistent legal analysis that ultimately favored the respondent’s interpretation of the statute.

Initial Decision (December 7, 2017)

• The ALJ concluded that the DMMA Communications Committee does not hold “regularly scheduled meetings.”

• Based on this finding, the committee was deemed not subject to the open meetings law.

• The decision to hold a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, was therefore ruled not to be a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

• The petitioner’s petition was denied.

Decision After Rehearing (May 10, 2018)

• Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ reaffirmed the conclusion that the “plain language” of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) applies to meetings that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the ALJ settled on this interpretation.

• Policy vs. Specifics: The decision explicitly states that the general policy favoring open meetings in subsection (F) “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

• Petitioner’s Testimony: The ALJ noted that during the rehearing, Mr. Moselle’s own testimony on cross-examination appeared to support the court’s interpretation. When questioned about other DMMA committees, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

• Final Ruling: The ALJ again concluded that the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings at the time of the incident and was therefore not in violation of the statute. The petition was denied for a final time.

Final Disposition

The petition filed by Gary W. Moselle against the Desert Mountain Master Association was denied. The Administrative Law Judge’s order of May 10, 2018, issued after the rehearing, was declared binding on the parties. As per the final notice, any further appeal would require a party to seek judicial review in superior court within thirty-five days of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (Respondent) concerning Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific event on September 6, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file his complaint?

3. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for why its Communications Committee was not subject to the open meetings law?

5. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the key statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

6. What evidence did the Respondent present regarding the frequency of the Communications Committee’s meetings in 2016 and 2017?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party had the responsibility to meet it?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the meaning of “regularly scheduled” in the context of the statute?

9. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued on December 7, 2017?

10. How did the judge weigh the general policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) against the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Gary W. Moselle, the Petitioner, and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), the Respondent. Mr. Moselle was a homeowner who filed a petition against the DMMA, which is the homeowners association for the community.

2. The Petitioner filed his complaint after he was not allowed to attend a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee that was held on September 6, 2017. He alleged this violated Arizona’s open meeting statute.

3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804. This statute governs open meetings for planned communities, such as homeowners associations.

4. The Respondent argued that the Communications Committee did not meet at regular, established intervals and therefore its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” as required by the statute to be open. They also asserted that the committee’s recommendation was not acted upon by the Board, suggesting it was not conducting official business.

5. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting that was scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He asserted this interpretation was supported by the statute’s general policy favoring open meetings.

6. The Respondent provided testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set interval, having held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017. These meetings occurred twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and on September 6, 2017.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring evidence to show that a fact is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, bore the burden of proving the Respondent’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plain language of the statute meant “regularly scheduled” referred to meetings that occur at regular intervals, such as monthly, quarterly, or annually. The judge rejected the Petitioner’s alternate interpretation.

9. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing by citing newly discovered material evidence (an email sent after the first hearing) and arguing the need to evaluate whether the Respondent had misled the judge. He also contended that the initial decision was contrary to law.

10. The judge acknowledged the state’s policy favoring open meetings as stated in subsection (F). However, the judge ruled that this general policy statement did not override the specific provision in subsection (A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing upon the facts, arguments, and legal reasoning presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the principles of statutory construction used by the Administrative Law Judge to resolve this dispute and explain why one interpretation was favored over the other.

2. Examine the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to the final order issued after the rehearing. What were the key legal steps, decisions, and turning points in the process?

3. Discuss the evidence presented by the Desert Mountain Master Association to support its case. How did testimony regarding meeting frequency and the Board’s actions on committee recommendations contribute to the final outcome?

4. Explain the legal relationship between A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Based on the judge’s decision, what is the hierarchy between a statute’s specific provisions and its general policy declarations?

5. During the rehearing, the Petitioner’s own testimony about other committees was noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Explain this apparent contradiction in the Petitioner’s argument and discuss its potential impact on the case.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions on behalf of a government agency.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the dispute, which governs open meetings for planned communities and their boards of directors and committees.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.

Conclusions of Law

The judge’s application of legal principles to the facts of the case to reach a decision.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and homeowners associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA)

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners association located in Scottsdale, Arizona, classified as a Planned Unit Development.

Findings of Fact

The determination of factual events made by a judge from the evidence presented in a trial or hearing.

Gary W. Moselle

The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner within the DMMA who filed the complaint.

Jurisdiction

The official power of a court or agency to hear a case and make legal decisions and judgments.

Open Meetings Law

A law, in this case A.R.S. § 33-1804, that requires meetings of certain entities to be open to all members or the public.

Petition

The formal written request filed with an administrative body or court to initiate a case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition and initiates a legal action.

Planned Unit Development (PUD)

A type of real estate development and community governed by specific state laws, such as those in A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows a fact is more probable than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the previous decision, typically granted due to new evidence or an argument of legal error.

Regularly Scheduled

The key statutory phrase in dispute. The judge interpreted it to mean meetings that occur at regular, established intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party defending against the complaint.

Statutory Construction

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, starting with the plain text of the statute.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Your HOA Committee Might Be Meeting in Secret—And It Could Be Perfectly Legal

As a homeowner in a planned community, you likely know you have the right to attend your HOA’s board of directors meetings. But what about the committee meetings? The finance, architectural, or communications committees often lay the critical groundwork for decisions that ultimately affect your property and fees. Do you have a right to observe their deliberations?

A recent legal case in Scottsdale, Arizona, hinged on the interpretation of a single, seemingly straightforward phrase and exposed a surprising rule about HOA transparency. The case, Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association, reveals critical lessons for any homeowner about the letter of the law and how it can sometimes create legal loopholes that allow committee meetings to happen behind closed doors.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Crucial Loophole: “Regularly Scheduled” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The entire dispute rested on how to interpret the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as written in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.

The Homeowner’s Argument The petitioner, homeowner Gary Moselle, argued that when the Communications Committee of the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA) scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2017, it should be open to all members. His logic was simple: a meeting that is formally scheduled and placed on the calendar is, by any common-sense definition, a “regularly scheduled” meeting.

The HOA’s Counter-Argument The DMMA countered with a different interpretation. They argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” implies a recurring, predictable pattern, such as meetings held monthly, quarterly, or on the third Thursday of every month. The association presented evidence that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set pattern, having convened only four times in 2016 and 2017. Because the meetings were sporadic, the HOA contended they were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore not subject to the open meeting law.

To bolster its case, the HOA added a second point: the committee’s work wasn’t essential to board business anyway. They noted that a recommendation from the committee was never acted upon by the board, suggesting the committee was not conducting “any actual business of the Board” and thus did not require the same level of transparency.

The Surprising Verdict Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer sided with the HOA. The final decision concluded that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings that occur at regular intervals. This created a legal distinction: HOA committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule must be open, but those that meet on an as-needed basis may not be.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Law’s “Spirit” Can Be Trumped by Its “Letter”

Adding another layer to the case was the law’s own powerful statement about its intent. The petitioner pointed to a specific section of the statute designed to ensure transparency.

The Policy Statement The Arizona law contains a strong policy statement declaring that all HOA meetings should be conducted openly. It explicitly directs anyone interpreting the law to favor open meetings.

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

The Legal Reasoning Despite this clear declaration, Judge Eigenheer ruled that a general policy statement does not override the specific and explicit language of the law. The statute does not say all committee meetings must be open; it says “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open. The judge concluded that this specific wording created a clear exception, and the broad policy in favor of transparency could not erase it.

The Impact This is a critical takeaway for understanding how laws are interpreted. This outcome reflects a fundamental principle of statutory construction: while the “spirit” or stated policy of a law provides guidance, it cannot override the plain meaning of the specific words—the “letter”—that the legislature chose to write.

——————————————————————————–

3. A Cautionary Tale: How a Petitioner Undermined His Own Case

The petitioner was granted a rehearing, giving him another chance to argue his case. However, a statement he made during his own testimony dramatically weakened his position.

The Key Testimony During the rehearing on April 20, 2018, the petitioner was asked about other committees within the DMMA. In explaining how they operated, he unintentionally adopted the very definition of “regularly scheduled” that the HOA was using against him. The judge recorded his exact words in the final decision:

…five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

The Consequence The judge seized on this admission in the final ruling. The decision notes that while “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the petitioner himself used the phrase to differentiate between committees that meet at fixed intervals and those that do not. By describing committees that “meet at the request of the chair” as being “not regularly scheduled,” he validated the very interpretation the court was now adopting.

The Lesson This moment serves as a dramatic lesson in the power and precision of language in legal proceedings. In an attempt to describe the function of other committees, the petitioner inadvertently validated his opponent’s core legal argument.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: A Question of Transparency

The ruling in Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association clarifies a significant point in HOA governance. Under this legal interpretation, committees that meet on an ad-hoc basis or “at the call of the chair” may not be subject to open meeting laws. Only those committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule are explicitly required to be open to homeowners.

This ruling draws a bright line between standing committees with fixed schedules and ad-hoc committees that meet “at the call of the chair.” Homeowners should now ask: Which of our committees fall into this second category, and are we comfortable with decisions being shaped behind closed doors?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary W. Moselle (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Desert Mountain Master Association (respondent)
    Organizational party (HOA)
  • Curtis Ekmark (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Charles Markle (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • AHansen (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • djones (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • DGardner (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • ncano (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
    Transmitting staff/clerk

Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel —
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 605190.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:04:02 (77.0 KB)

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

• Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

• Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

• Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL


Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association (No. 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Gary W. Moselle and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific event and action by the Respondent prompted the Petitioner to file his initial petition?

3. What was the Respondent’s primary argument at the November 17, 2017, hearing for why the Communications committee was not subject to the open meetings law?

4. What was the initial outcome of the case following the first hearing, as decided on December 7, 2017?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully file for a rehearing of the case?

6. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

7. How did the Respondent, DMMA, interpret the same phrase, “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

8. According to the document, what is the primary goal when construing a statute, and what is the first step in that process?

9. What was the significance of the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) regarding open meetings, and how did the judge rule on its applicability?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on May 10, 2018, and what was its legal effect on the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Gary W. Moselle, a homeowner, and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), an association of homeowners in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Moselle filed a petition against the DMMA.

2. The Petitioner filed his petition after the Chair of the DMMA’s Communications Committee alleged that a scheduled meeting was “closed” and not subject to Arizona’s open meeting statute. The Petitioner was subsequently not allowed to attend the closed committee meeting held on September 6, 2017.

3. The Respondent argued that the Communications committee did not meet regularly and was therefore not subject to the open meetings law. To support this, they presented testimony that the committee had only met four times in 2016 and 2017.

4. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision on December 7, 2017, in which the Petitioner’s petition was denied.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing based on what he cited as newly discovered material evidence, specifically an email sent by the Respondent after the first hearing concluded. He also argued the initial decision was contrary to law and that the Respondent may have misled the judge.

6. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He contended that because the September 6, 2017, meeting was scheduled in this manner, it should have been open.

7. The Respondent argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” meant meetings that occurred at regular intervals, such as on a specific day each month, quarterly, or annually. They contended that since the Communications committee met infrequently and without an established interval, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

8. The primary goal when construing a statute is to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The first step is to look at the text of the statute itself and ascribe its plain meaning if the language is clear.

9. The policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) declares that it is the state’s policy for all meetings of a planned community to be conducted openly. The judge ruled that this general policy statement does not override the specific provision in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings must be open.

10. The final order, issued on May 10, 2018, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. As this order was the result of a rehearing, it was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and Respondent. Discuss which argument the Administrative Law Judge found more compelling and explain the legal reasoning provided in the decision.

2. Discuss the role and significance of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(F) in this case. Explain how the Petitioner used this section to support his argument and why the Administrative Law Judge concluded it did not override the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

3. Trace the procedural history of the case from the initial petition filing on September 1, 2017, to the final order on May 10, 2018. Include key dates, events (hearings, decisions, requests), and the outcomes at each stage.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by the Respondent regarding the meeting frequency of the DMMA Communication committee. How did this evidence support the Respondent’s legal argument and influence the final decision?

5. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the standard of proof required in this proceeding (preponderance of the evidence) and the principles of statutory construction the judge applied to interpret the relevant statute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the legal dispute. It mandates that meetings of a members’ association, its board of directors, and any “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open to all members of the association.

Cross-examination

A phase during the hearing where a party or their representative questions a witness from the opposing side. Petitioner Moselle underwent cross-examination during the April 20, 2018, rehearing.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Petitioner filed his initial petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between homeowners and condominium owners associations.

An abbreviation for Desert Mountain Master Association, the Respondent in the case and the homeowners association for a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona.

Open Meetings Law

The legal requirement, as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804, that certain meetings of a homeowners association must be open to all members, who must be permitted to attend and speak.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the petitioner was homeowner Gary W. Moselle.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA).

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain legislative intent, first by looking at the plain language of the statute’s text.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL


Your HOA Can Legally Hold Secret Committee Meetings. Here’s How.

Most homeowners operate under a reasonable assumption: meetings that concern their community association should be open for them to attend. Transparency is a cornerstone of trust between residents and their HOA board. But what if some of those meetings, like committee meetings, could be held in private, entirely legally? The answer, revealed in a contentious Arizona case, lies in a two-word loophole that every homeowner should understand.

A legal case from Scottsdale, Arizona, Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association, hinged on this very issue. It revealed a surprising and important nuance in the law, showing how specific wording can create exceptions to the general rule of open governance.

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1. The “Regularly Scheduled” Loophole That Allows for Closed Meetings

The central conflict of the case began when a homeowner, Gary Moselle, was barred from attending a Communications Committee meeting for his HOA, the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA). He filed a petition, arguing this action violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities.

But the homeowner’s argument ran into a wall: the precise text of the law. The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling hinged on the wording of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which mandates openness for “any regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The judge found that the Communications Committee meeting was legally closed because it was not “regularly scheduled.”

Everything came down to the court’s interpretation of two words: “regularly scheduled.”

• The Homeowner’s Argument: Mr. Moselle contended that “regularly scheduled” simply meant “scheduled in a normal fashion.”

• The Court’s Conclusion: The HOA and the judge determined that the phrase means meetings that “occur at regular intervals,” such as monthly, quarterly, or annually.

The evidence supported the court’s conclusion. The DMMA Communications committee had only met four times in 2016 and 2017. This ad-hoc pattern was crucial evidence that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled” in the way the law required.

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2. Why a Law’s General Policy Doesn’t Always Overrule Its Specific Text

The petitioner argued that the law’s explicit policy statement, which strongly favors open meetings, should have been the guiding principle. He pointed to the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F):

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

The judge’s conclusion illustrates a fundamental principle of legal interpretation: the specific almost always trumps the general. Despite the clear declaration of policy, the judge found that it did not override the more precise provision in the law. The general policy favoring open meetings could not change the fact that A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) explicitly limits the open meeting requirement to only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings.

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3. A Petitioner’s Own Words Undercut His Argument

The case took a surprising turn, however, when the petitioner himself handed the association its strongest piece of evidence. While trying to make a point about other committees within the DMMA, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

This statement was a moment of legal irony that proved devastating to his case. The judge noted in the final decision that the petitioner’s own language aligned perfectly with the court’s ultimate interpretation. In a formal hearing, Mr. Moselle inadvertently defined the key term against his own interest, drawing a clear distinction between meetings called on an as-needed basis (“at the request of the chair”) and those that are “regularly scheduled.” This admission provided the exact plain-language interpretation the judge needed to resolve the ambiguity in the case at hand, significantly weakening the petitioner’s entire position.

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Conclusion: A Lesson in Legal Precision

The ultimate lesson from this case is that while homeowner transparency laws are powerful, their protections are defined by precise legal wording. Seemingly small details can have significant consequences. In this Arizona case, the distinction between ad-hoc meetings called as needed and those that occur at regular, predictable intervals was the deciding factor that allowed a committee meeting to be held behind closed doors.

This raises a critical question for homeowners and boards alike: Does this legal distinction provide necessary flexibility for informal committee work, or is it a loophole that ultimately undermines the spirit of open governance in our communities?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary W. Moselle (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Chair of the Communications Committee

Respondent Side

  • Curtis Ekmark (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Charles Markle (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Served order upon parties

Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel —
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

• Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

• Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

• Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.


Dennis J. Legere vs. Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 14F-H1414001-BFS-rhg
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal Office of Administrative Hearings
Decision Date 2015-04-23
Administrative Law Judge M. Douglas
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $2,000.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dennis J. Legere Counsel —
Respondent Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner on Rehearing. The Tribunal found that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by preventing members from speaking before board votes, failing to notice committee meetings, and using email unanimous consent (A.R.S. § 10-3821) to bypass open meeting requirements. The ALJ determined that A.R.S. § 33-1804 constitutes a specific statute that prevails over the general non-profit corporation statute allowing action without a meeting, and that the HOA cannot use Title 10 to impliedly repeal Title 33 open meeting mandates.

Key Issues & Findings

Open Meeting Law Violations

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by preventing members from speaking on agenda items, holding unannounced architectural committee meetings, and using email/unanimous consent to conduct business in closed sessions.

Orders: HOA ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1804(A); pay filing fee of $2,000 to Petitioner; pay civil penalty of $2,000 to the Department.

Filing fee: $2,000.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $2,000.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3821

Decision Documents

14F-H1414001-BFS-rhg Decision – 437956.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:29:51 (228.9 KB)

14F-H1414001-BFS-rhg Decision – 443321.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:29:51 (62.7 KB)

**Case Summary: Dennis J. Legere v. Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA**
**Case No. 14F-H1414001-BFS-rhg**

**Procedural History and Context**
This matter involves a dispute between Dennis J. Legere (Petitioner) and Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA (Respondent) regarding alleged violations of Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804),. The case includes an initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision issued in August 2014 and a subsequent **Decision on Rehearing** issued in April 2015,.

**Original Proceedings (July–August 2014)**
In the original hearing, the Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by conducting business via "email meetings" (closed sessions), failing to provide notice for architectural committee meetings, and preventing members from speaking before Board votes,,.

The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 10-3821 (Title 10) and its Bylaws permitted the Board to take action without a meeting if they obtained unanimous written consent, a practice they adopted for efficiency,.

In the original decision, the ALJ ruled that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding speaking rights and committee notices,. However, the ALJ declined to rule on the "email meeting" issue, stating the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine violations of Title 10 (Corporations) or resolve conflicts between Title 10 and Title 33.

**Rehearing Proceedings (March 2015)**
The Petitioner requested a rehearing, arguing the ALJ erroneously declined jurisdiction over the "email meeting" issue. The Petitioner asserted the issue was not whether the HOA violated Title 10, but whether complying with Title 10 allowed the HOA to evade the open meeting mandates of Title 33. The Department granted the rehearing.

**Key Legal Issues on Rehearing**
The central legal question was statutory interpretation: Can an HOA utilize A.R.S. § 10-3821 (allowing corporate action by unanimous written consent without a meeting) to bypass the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804,.

The HOA maintained that taking action by unanimous written consent via email was a legal right under Title 10 and its Bylaws. The Petitioner argued this practice violated the intent of the Open Meeting Law by precluding member observation and participation.

**Rehearing Analysis and Conclusions**
The ALJ rejected the HOA's reliance on Title 10 to avoid open meetings. The decision established the following legal principles:
* **Statutory Priority:** A.R.S. § 33-1804 unambiguously requires HOA meetings to be open. While Title 10 governs non-profit corporations generally, Title 33 specifically regulates planned communities.
* **Harmonization:** Statutes must be construed together; however, an agency cannot disregard clear legislative directives,.
* **Ruling:** A specific statute (Title 33) prevails over a general statute (Title 10). The ALJ held that HOAs cannot use Title 10 to "impliedly repeal" the open meeting statutes of Title 33.

Consequently, the ALJ ruled that the Board's practice of taking action via email/unanimous consent *violated* A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

**Final Decision and Order**
The Rehearing Decision affirmed the Petitioner as the prevailing party. The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. **Email Meetings:** The use of unanimous written consent via email in lieu of open meetings is a violation of A.R.S. § 33-180

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Dennis J. Legere (petitioner)
    Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA
    Homeowner and former board member
  • Tom Rawles (attorney)
    Represented Petitioner in original hearing

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (attorney)
    Mack, Watson & Stratman, PLC
    Represented Respondent in original hearing; listed as 'Tony Stratman' in service list
  • Maria R. Kupillas (attorney)
    Farley, Seletos & Choate
    Represented Respondent in rehearing
  • Michelle O’Robinson (witness)
    Vision Community Management
    Property Manager and Field Operations Supervisor
  • James T. Foxworthy (witness)
    Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA
    Board President (during original hearing)
  • John Edgar Schuler (witness)
    Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA
    Board President (as of March 2015)

Neutral Parties

  • M. Douglas (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Gene Palma (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Agency Director certifying the decision
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Certified the final administrative decision
  • Joni Cage (agency staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of transmitted decision
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed copy distribution

Legere, Dennis vs. Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA

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Case Summary

Case ID 14F-H1414001-BFS-rhg
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal Office of Administrative Hearings
Decision Date 2015-04-23
Administrative Law Judge M. Douglas
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $2,000.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dennis J. Legere Counsel Tom Rawles
Respondent Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by: 1) preventing members from speaking on agenda items before Board votes; 2) failing to provide notice for architectural committee meetings; and 3) conducting Board business and taking actions via unanimous written consent by email in lieu of open meetings. The ALJ rejected the HOA's defense that A.R.S. § 10-3821 allowed for email actions without meetings, stating that Title 33 open meeting requirements prevail. The HOA was ordered to comply with the statute and pay a $2,000 civil penalty and reimburse $2,000 in filing fees.

Key Issues & Findings

Speaking at Meetings

The Board prevented the petitioner from speaking on action items before the Board took formal action at meetings on November 26, 2013, January 14, 2014, and February 3, 2014.

Orders: HOA ordered to comply with speaking requirements.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 55
  • 127

Committee Meeting Notices

Pinnacle conducted regularly scheduled architectural committee meetings without providing notice to members of the association.

Orders: HOA ordered to comply with notice requirements.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 57
  • 129

Email Meetings / Action Without Meeting

The Board utilized an email process to take actions by unanimous written consent without holding a meeting, effectively deliberating and voting without member observation or participation.

Orders: HOA ordered to comply with open meeting statutes; corporate statute A.R.S. § 10-3821 does not override A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $2,000.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 131
  • 135

Closed Sessions

Petitioner alleged Board conducted non-privileged business in closed sessions. The Tribunal deemed Petitioner the prevailing party and awarded full filing fees.

Orders: Petitioner deemed prevailing party.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 4
  • 134

Decision Documents

14F-H1414001-BFS Decision – 406623.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:10:48 (172.9 KB)

14F-H1414001-BFS Decision – 437956.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:10:48 (228.9 KB)

14F-H1414001-BFS Decision – 443321.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:10:48 (62.7 KB)

**Case Summary: *Dennis J. Legere vs. Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA***
**Case No. 14F-H1414001-BFS**

**Overview**
This administrative case involves a dispute between Dennis J. Legere (Petitioner) and the Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA (Respondent) regarding violations of Arizona’s planned community open meeting laws. The matter was heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. The proceedings culminated in a decision on rehearing in April 2015, which was certified as final in June 2015,.

**Key Facts and Allegations**
The Petitioner, a homeowner and former board member, alleged that the HOA Board violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 on multiple counts,. The primary allegations included:
* **Closed Sessions via Email:** The Board routinely conducted business and voted on action items via email to avoid holding public meetings, citing efficiency and "unanimous consent" provisions in the Bylaws and corporate statutes,.
* **Denial of Right to Speak:** The Board refused to allow members to speak on agenda items during open meetings (specifically in November 2013, January 2014, and February 2014) prior to the Board taking a vote,.
* **Unnoticed Committee Meetings:** The Architectural Review Committee met regularly without providing notice to members or allowing them to attend,.

**Main Arguments and Legal Issues**
The central legal tension involved a conflict between general corporate statutes and specific HOA statutes.
* **Respondent’s Defense:** The HOA argued that under its Bylaws and A.R.S. § 10-3821 (non-profit corporation statutes), the Board could take action without a meeting if they obtained unanimous written consent from all directors,. They also argued that financial information and delinquency reports required closed sessions.
* **Petitioner’s Argument:** Legere argued that using email votes and unanimous consent provisions to conduct business in secret violated the specific open meeting mandates of A.R.S. § 33-1804, precluding member observation and participation,.
* **Rehearing on Jurisdiction:** The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially declined to rule on the validity of the "email meetings" under A.R.S. § 10-3821. Legere successfully petitioned for a rehearing to resolve whether corporate statutes could legally bypass HOA open meeting requirements.

**Findings and Conclusions of Law**
The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, establishing several key legal points:

1. **Conflict of Laws:** The Tribunal ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Title 33) specifically governs planned communities and mandates open meetings. This specific statute overrides the general non-profit corporate statute (A.R.S. § 10-3821) found in Title 10. The HOA cannot use corporate laws or Bylaws to impliedly repeal the open meeting protections guaranteed to homeowners in Title 33. Therefore, the practice of taking action via email "unanimous consent" violated the law.
2. **Right to Speak:** The ALJ found the HOA violated the law by preventing the Petitioner from speaking *after* the Board discussed items but *before* a vote was taken. While reasonable time restrictions are permitted, members must be allowed to speak before formal action is taken.
3. **Committee Meetings:** The Tribunal ruled that all regularly scheduled committee meetings, such as the Architectural Review Committee, must be noticed and open to members.
4. **Statute of Limitations:** A one-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-541) applied, barring claims for violations occurring prior to March 9, 2013.

**Outcome and Order**
Dennis J. Legere was deemed the prevailing party. The ALJ ordered the following:
* **Compliance:** The HOA was ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) in the future, effectively ending the practice of secret email meetings.
* **Filing Fee:** The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $2,000 filing fee.
* **Civil Penalty:** The HOA was ordered to pay a $2,000 civil penalty to the Department (which the HOA paid during the rehearing process).

The decision was certified

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Dennis J. Legere (petitioner)
    Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA (Member)
    Appeared on his own behalf at rehearing; former board member
  • Tom Rawles (attorney)
    Represented Petitioner at the July 31, 2014 hearing

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (attorney)
    Mack, Watson & Stratman, PLC
    Represented Respondent at the July 31, 2014 hearing; listed as 'Tony Stratman' in service list
  • Maria R. Kupillas (attorney)
    Farley, Seletos & Choate
    Represented Respondent at the March 31, 2015 rehearing
  • Michelle O’Robinson (witness)
    Vision Community Management
    Field operations supervisor/manager for HOA
  • James T. Foxworthy (witness)
    Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA (Board)
    Board President at time of first hearing
  • John Edgar Schuler (witness)
    Pinnacle Peak Shadows HOA (Board)
    Board President as of March 10, 2015

Neutral Parties

  • M. Douglas (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Gene Palma (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Agency Director
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Certified the decision
  • Joni Cage (administrative staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of transmitted decision
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed copy distribution