William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:51 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:51 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:58 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:00 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.


Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark Kristopher Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge found Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots during the 2016 board election,. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee,. The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4),.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4), which specifies timing requirements for ballots; the ALJ noted that a meeting ballot did not need to contain a received-by date or be mailed seven days in advance if it had been substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot,,,.

Key Issues & Findings

Ballot must provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.

The use of two substantively different ballots in the March 2016 election violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) because members who did not attend the meeting were unaware of an additional candidate (Eric Thompson) listed on the meeting ballot, thereby denying those members the opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot,. This finding does not require ballots to be identical, but substantive changes must be presented to all members,,.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was granted, and Respondent was ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00,. No other relief was available.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Condominium, Board Election, Absentee Ballot, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • Article VII CC&Rs

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL-RHG Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:25 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL-RHG Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:28 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL-RHG Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:31 (689.5 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL-RHG Decision – ../17F-H1716002-REL/523915.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:34 (103.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Paul Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association. The core issue revolves around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots during its March 14, 2016, Board of Directors election, a practice the petitioner alleged violated state law and the Association’s governing documents.

The central finding, established after a rehearing, is that the Royal Riviera Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1250(C)(2). The violation occurred because an absentee ballot listed six candidates with a write-in option, while a separate ballot distributed at the annual meeting listed seven candidates with no write-in option. This discrepancy deprived members voting by absentee ballot of the opportunity to vote for or against the seventh candidate, thereby denying them their full voting rights.

An initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision on October 18, 2016, had dismissed the petition, finding no explicit rule against the Association’s actions. However, this ruling was overturned following a rehearing. The second ALJ decision, issued on June 2, 2017, concluded that while ballots need not be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure a fair election. The Respondent’s argument that the issue was moot due to a subsequent election was explicitly rejected.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the second ALJ’s decision in a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Association was ordered to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and the ruling was declared a final, binding administrative action.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Paul Gounder

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Jurisdiction: Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

Case Numbers: 17F-H1716002-REL, 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG, HO-17-16/002

Core Allegation: On June 23, 2016, Paul Gounder filed a petition alleging that the Royal Riviera Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its annual meeting on March 14, 2016.

——————————————————————————–

2. Factual Background of the Disputed Election

The facts surrounding the March 14, 2016 election were described as “essentially undisputed” in the initial hearing.

Election Context: The Royal Riviera development consists of approximately 32 condominiums. The Association has a seven-member Board of Directors. All seven positions were up for election at the March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

Nomination Process:

◦ In December 2015, the Association notified members of the upcoming election and requested nominating forms.

◦ Three members submitted forms.

◦ Three incumbent board members indicated via email or phone their willingness to continue serving.

Creation of the Absentee Ballot:

◦ The Association prepared an “absentee/write-in ballot” (also referred to as the “Mail Ballot”) containing the names of the six members who had indicated a willingness to serve.

◦ The ballot included a blank line for a write-in candidate and stipulated that it must be received by 12:00 p.m. on March 14, 2016, to be counted.

Emergence of a Seventh Candidate:

◦ Prior to the meeting, the Association received absentee ballots with three write-in candidates.

◦ One write-in candidate indicated they were unwilling to serve.

◦ The other two write-in candidates shared a unit and requested that only one of their names, Eric Thompson, be considered.

Creation of the Meeting Ballot:

◦ To accommodate the seven willing candidates for the seven open positions, the Association prepared a second ballot for members attending the meeting in person.

◦ This “Ballot” listed the original six candidates plus Eric Thompson.

◦ Crucially, this second ballot did not contain a space for write-in candidates.

Election Results:

◦ Approximately seventeen members attended the annual meeting.

◦ A member, Al DeFalco, was nominated from the floor.

◦ Despite the floor nomination, the seven candidates listed on the meeting ballot received the most votes and were elected to the Board.

——————————————————————————–

3. Procedural History and Rulings

The case proceeded through an initial hearing, a dismissal, a rehearing, a reversal, and a final administrative order.

3.1. Initial Hearing and Decision (October 2016)

Hearing Date: October 17, 2016

Presiding ALJ: Diane Mihalsky

Petitioner’s Argument: The use of a second, different ballot at the meeting violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)’s requirement that ballots “provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

ALJ Mihalsky’s Conclusion (October 18, 2016): The petition was recommended for dismissal. The judge reasoned that “no statute, CC&R, or bylaw by its plain language prevents Respondent from adding to the ballot that will used at the annual election that names of all members who have indicated a willingness to serve on the Board.” The decision noted that Board members are uncompensated volunteers and found no requirement for the Association to re-contact members who had not submitted nomination forms.

3.2. Rehearing and Second Decision (May-June 2017)

The initial decision was certified by the OAH, and the Petitioner successfully requested a rehearing from the Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: May 17, 2017

Presiding ALJ: Suzanne Marwil

Key Arguments at Rehearing:

Petitioner: The addition of a seventh candidate to the meeting ballot deprived absentee voters of their right to vote for or against all proposed actions. The meeting ballot also violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4) as it was not mailed seven days in advance.

Respondent: No violation occurred, as statutes do not require identical ballots. It is common practice for HOAs to use different absentee and meeting ballots. The matter was moot because a new election was held in 2017.

ALJ Marwil’s Conclusions of Law (June 2, 2017): The second decision granted the Petitioner’s petition, finding a statutory violation.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) Found: The use of two substantively different ballots was a violation. The decision stated: “Because the members who did not attend the meeting in person were not told of Mr. Thompson’s wiliness to run for the board, these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification on “Identical Ballots”: The ruling explicitly noted that it “does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

Mootness Argument Rejected: The ALJ found that the subsequent 2017 election did not render the matter moot, stating that the Judge “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The absentee ballot complied with this subsection’s mailing and deadline requirements. A meeting ballot would not need to meet these requirements if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The problem arose specifically because the ballots were different.

3.3. Final Order (June 12, 2017)

• Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order accepting and adopting the ALJ decision of June 2, 2017.

• The order was declared final and effective immediately.

Mandate: The Respondent, Royal Riviera Condominium Association, was ordered to “reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.”

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4. Key Statutes and Governing Documents

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) – Voting and Ballots

This Arizona statute provides procedures for voting in condominium associations. Key subsections cited in the case are:

General Provision: “The association shall provide for votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot…”

1. The ballot shall set forth each proposed action.

2. The ballot shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action. (This was the basis for the final ruling).

3. The ballot is valid for only one specified election or meeting…

4. The ballot specifies the time and date by which the ballot must be delivered… which shall be at least seven days after the date that the board delivers the unvoted ballot to the member.

Royal Riviera CC&Rs, Article VII – Membership and Voting

Section 2: The Association has one class of voting membership, with all owners entitled to one vote per apartment owned.

Section 4: Every owner has the right to cumulate votes in an election for the Board. The number of votes equals the number of apartments owned multiplied by the number of directors to be elected.

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5. Notable Testimony and Quotes

Witness/Party

Affiliation

Key Testimony or Statement

Marlys Kleck

Petitioner’s Witness

Testified that after being given the new ballot at the meeting, she “hurriedly completed” it, then realized it was more appropriate to use her absentee ballot. She asked for the new ballot back and submitted her original. She stated she “believed that the March 14, 2016 election was a fraud.”

Dan Peterson

Respondent’s Witness

Testified that it was “hard to find seven members to accept Board positions” and that “most elections of Board members were not contested.” Explained the process for verifying candidate eligibility.

Paul Gounder

Petitioner

Argued that the Respondent “had arbitrarily selected the members whom it contacted about serving on the Board and that to be fair, Respondent should have called all of its members about whether they were willing to serve.”

ALJ Diane Mihalsky

First ALJ Decision

“No statute, CC&R, or bylaw by its plain language prevents Respondent from adding to the ballot… the names of all members who have indicated a willingness to serve on the Board.”

ALJ Suzanne Marwil

Second ALJ Decision

“Finding this violation does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”






Study Guide – 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG


Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association: A Study Guide

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central violation alleged by the Petitioner, Paul Gounder, in his petition filed on June 23, 2016?

2. Describe the key differences between the “Mail Ballot” and the “Ballot” used for the March 14, 2016 election.

3. How did Eric Thompson’s name come to be added to the ballot used at the annual meeting?

4. What was the initial ruling issued by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky on October 18, 2016?

5. What was the Respondent’s argument that the case should be considered “moot,” and how did the Administrative Law Judge in the rehearing address this claim?

6. According to the rehearing decision by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil, which specific Arizona statute did the Respondent violate?

7. What was the testimony of witness Marlys Kleck regarding her experience with the two ballots at the annual meeting?

8. According to Article VII, Section 4 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, what is “cumulative voting”?

9. Did the final ruling require that the absentee ballot and the meeting ballot be identical in all future elections?

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on June 12, 2017?

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Answer Key

1. Paul Gounder alleged that the Royal Riviera Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and Article VII of its CC&Rs. The core of the allegation was that the association improperly used two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at the March 14, 2016 annual meeting.

2. The “Mail Ballot” (absentee ballot) listed six candidates and included a blank line for write-in candidates. The “Ballot” provided at the meeting was different in that it listed seven candidates (adding Eric Thompson) and had no space for write-in candidates.

3. Eric Thompson was initially a write-in candidate on absentee ballots. After the association received these ballots, its management company contacted the write-in candidates to confirm their willingness to serve; Mr. Thompson was the only one who agreed and was subsequently added to the ballot used at the meeting.

4. The initial ruling by Judge Mihalsky recommended dismissing the petition. She concluded that no statute, CC&R, or bylaw prevented the association from adding the names of all members who had indicated a willingness to serve to the ballot used at the annual election.

5. The Respondent argued the matter was moot because it had already held another election in 2017 and had a new board. Judge Marwil rejected this, stating that the fact a new board was seated did not render the matter moot, as she could still find that the Respondent committed a statutory violation during its 2016 election.

6. Judge Marwil found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). She reasoned that because members who did not attend the meeting were not told of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action, specifically the action of electing him.

7. Marlys Kleck testified that she brought her completed absentee ballot to the meeting but was given the new ballot with seven names. She hurriedly filled out the new ballot but then realized it would have been more appropriate to submit her original one, leading her to ask for the new ballot back and submit her absentee ballot instead.

8. Cumulative voting gives every owner the right to a number of votes equal to the number of apartments they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. The owner can then give all their votes to one candidate or divide them among any number of candidates.

9. No, the ruling did not impose a requirement that ballots be identical. Judge Marwil’s decision explicitly stated that finding a violation “simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

10. The final order, issued by Commissioner Judy Lowe, accepted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. It ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be granted and that the Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal arguments, and rulings presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze and contrast the legal reasoning of Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky’s initial decision with Judge Suzanne Marwil’s final decision. What specific interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1250 was central to the reversal of the outcome?

2. Discuss the Respondent’s argument that using two different ballots is “common practice” for homeowners’ associations. Based on the final ruling, evaluate the validity of relying on common practice when it appears to conflict with specific statutory requirements.

3. Examine the rights of absentee voters within a homeowners’ association election, using the events of this case as a primary example. How did the association’s actions and procedures during the 2016 election impact these rights, and what principle did the final ruling establish to protect them?

4. The Respondent argued the case was moot because a new election had already occurred and a new board was seated. Explain the legal concept of mootness and discuss why the Administrative Law Judge rejected this argument, finding that a statutory violation could still be identified and ruled upon.

5. Evaluate the association’s process for identifying and finalizing its slate of candidates for the board election. Based on the testimony and events described, what procedural weaknesses were exposed, and how did they directly contribute to the legal dispute over the two ballots?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the state of Arizona.

Absentee Ballot

A ballot that allows a member to vote without being physically present at the election meeting. In this case, it was also referred to as a “Mail Ballot.”

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Suzanne Marwil served as ALJs for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are rules that govern a planned community or condominium development, which are legally binding on the property owners.

Cumulative Voting

As defined in the Respondent’s CC&Rs, a voting method where an owner has a number of votes equal to their apartments multiplied by the number of board seats open. The owner can cast all votes for one candidate or distribute them among multiple candidates.

Final Order

A legally binding decision issued at the conclusion of an administrative legal process. In this case, it was issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, accepting the ALJ’s decision and making it enforceable.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Royal Riviera Condominium Association is the HOA in this case.

A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The Respondent argued the case was moot because a new election had already taken place.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Paul Gounder is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to review the decision of the first hearing. A rehearing was granted to the Petitioner after the initial dismissal of his petition.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Royal Riviera Condominium Association is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG


He Sued His HOA Over One Name on a Ballot—And Won. Here’s What Every Homeowner Needs to Know.

1.0 Introduction: The David vs. Goliath of Community Living

Every homeowner in a managed community knows the feeling: a letter from the HOA arrives, and a sense of powerlessness follows. But one Arizona owner proved the rules are not just a one-way street. The board, often backed by management companies and law firms, can seem unchallengeable, but a surprising case demonstrates that the system can be held accountable, sometimes because of the smallest details.

This is the story of Paul Gounder, a condominium owner who single-handedly challenged his HOA’s election process and won. Without a lawyer, he filed a petition that resulted in a state-level ruling against his association. This article unpacks the key takeaways from the legal battle of Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association—lessons that are essential for any homeowner living in a managed community.

2.0Takeaway 1: One Person Can Successfully Challenge the System

On June 23, 2016, Paul Gounder, an owner in the 32-unit Royal Riviera Condominium Association, filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. His core allegation was straightforward: the association had violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)) by using two different ballots for its board member election held on March 14, 2016.

Throughout the proceedings, the HOA was represented by a law firm. Mr. Gounder represented himself. Despite this imbalance, he ultimately prevailed. The final order not only found the association in violation but required it to reimburse Mr. Gounder for his $500.00 filing fee, proving that a well-founded challenge from a single member can succeed.

3.0Takeaway 2: “Common Practice” Is Not a Legal Defense

In its defense, the Royal Riviera Condominium Association argued that it was “common practice for homeowners associations to use one absentee ballot and a different meeting ballot” and that they had not committed any violation. They essentially claimed they were doing what many other HOAs do.

The final judge’s decision, however, was based strictly on the statute. The “common practice” defense was disregarded entirely. The ruling makes it clear that what is customary is irrelevant when it contradicts the explicit requirements of the law. Adherence to governing statutes is paramount. This principle was even acknowledged in the initial judge’s decision, which, despite siding with the HOA at first, noted the high standard boards are held to:

Board members are volunteers who are not compensated for their service to the community. Although Respondent is bound by the unequivocal language of applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and bylaws…

4.0Takeaway 3: A Fair Election Can Hinge on the Smallest Detail

The central issue of the case was a seemingly minor detail in the election materials. The HOA prepared an absentee/mail-in ballot that listed six candidates for seven open board seats and included a blank line for a write-in. However, after some members used the write-in option, the HOA identified a seventh willing candidate, Eric Thompson.

For the in-person meeting, the HOA prepared a different ballot. This new ballot included Mr. Thompson’s name, bringing the total to seven candidates. Critically, this meeting ballot had no space for new write-in candidates. This difference was the fatal flaw. The final Administrative Law Judge explained why this was a violation of the law:

Because the members who did not attend the meeting in person were not told of Mr. Thompson’s willingness [sic] to run for the board, these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot. Finding this violation does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.

This ruling protects the rights of members who vote absentee. It ensures that those who cannot attend a meeting in person have the exact same opportunity to consider and vote for all candidates as those who are physically present.

5.0Takeaway 4: An Initial Loss Isn’t the End of the Road

Mr. Gounder’s victory was not immediate. His case demonstrates the importance of persistence when a member believes a rule has been broken.

First Hearing (October 17, 2016): The first Administrative Law Judge, Diane Mihalsky, initially ruled in favor of the HOA, recommending that the petition be dismissed.

Rehearing: Undeterred, the petitioner requested a rehearing, which was granted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Final Decision (June 2, 2017): A new judge, Suzanne Marwil, reviewed the case. She reversed the initial outcome, finding that the HOA had committed a statutory violation by using two substantively different ballots.

Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate officially accepted Judge Marwil’s decision, making it a binding order.

This sequence highlights that an initial unfavorable ruling is not necessarily the final word. The appeals and review processes exist to correct errors and ensure the law is applied properly.

6.0 Conclusion: Why Procedural Fairness Matters

The case of Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association serves as a powerful reminder that the rules governing HOA elections are not just formalities. They are essential safeguards designed to ensure fair, transparent, and equal participation for all members of a community, whether they cast their vote by mail or in person.

This case was decided by a single name on a ballot—what small details in your community’s governance might be more important than they appear?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul Gounder (petitioner)
  • Frederick C. Zehm (witness)
    Respondent member
    Testified for Petitioner
  • Marlys Kleck (witness)
    Respondent member
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Royal Riviera Condominium Association (respondent)
    Entity, not a human individual
  • Mark Kristopher Sahl (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen PLC
  • Dan Peterson (property manager)
    Owner of Respondent's management company
    Testified for Respondent
  • Eric Thompson (Board member)
    Candidate whose name was added to meeting ballot

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    ALJ for initial hearing (Oct 2016)
  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
    ALJ for rehearing (May/June 2017)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Also listed as A. Hansen
  • L. Dettorre (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D. Jones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • J. Marshall (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • N. Cano (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Aguirre (Admin Staff)
    Handled transmission of May 17, 2017 Order

Other Participants

  • Al DeFalco (candidate)
    Nominated from the floor at the annual meeting

Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:13 (83.7 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:13 (794.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716019-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716019-REL


Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (No. 17F-H1716019-REL). It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to aid in understanding the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What was the central action taken by the Respondent’s Board that led to this legal dispute?

3. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument against the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”?

4. How did the Respondent justify its use of a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” instead of a full vote by lot owners?

5. Describe the conflict of interest alleged by the Petitioner against the Respondent’s Board.

6. How did the 2009 First Amendment alter Section 6.8 of the HOA’s 2005 Declaration?

7. What was the direct financial consequence for developed lot owners following the Board’s actions in 2016?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final ruling regarding the validity of the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”?

9. Despite invalidating the Board’s action, what did the Judge decide regarding the increased assessment on developed lots?

10. What was the final order issued in the case, and what was the Respondent required to do?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jay Janicek and Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. Janicek, a lot owner, brought the petition against the Homeowner’s Association to challenge a decision made by its Board of Directors.

2. The Respondent’s Board, by a 3-2 vote, adopted a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” on August 3, 2016. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment to the HOA’s governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was not a simple correction but a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he contended it was an amendment that required approval by a vote of seventy-five percent of the lot owners, not just a Board vote.

4. The Respondent argued that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was merely intended to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of developed versus undeveloped lots, which was inadvertently deleted from the 2009 revision. The Board’s President, Steven Russo, testified that they acted on the recommendation of their legal counsel.

5. The Petitioner alleged a conflict of interest because three members of the Respondent’s Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owns the undeveloped lots. The Petitioner argued that these members stood to benefit from assessment changes that favored undeveloped lots.

6. The 2009 First Amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 and replaced it with new language. This new language explicitly allowed annual dues to be assessed at different uniform rates for “Completed Lots” and “Uncompleted Lots,” a distinction not present in the original uniform rate structure.

7. Following the adoption of the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error,” the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00. The assessment for undeveloped lots was left unchanged.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was an invalid amendment to the Declaration. The Judge found that it was a substantive change that required a vote of the lot owners as specified in A.R.S. §33-1817, and that calling it a correction of a clerical error after seven years “defies logic.”

9. The Judge ruled that the increased assessment on developed lots could stand. The ruling was based on the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment, which expressly permitted the HOA to assess different rates for completed and uncompleted lots, independent of the invalidated “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.”

10. The final order granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate a comprehensive response drawing upon the specific facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to invalidate the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” while simultaneously upholding the increased assessment on developed lots. Explain how both parts of this ruling were supported by different governing documents.

2. Discuss the conflict of interest allegation raised by Jay Janicek under A.R.S. § 33-1811. Why did the Tribunal ultimately reject this argument, and what does this rejection imply about the Board’s authority to set assessments under the Declaration?

3. Trace the evolution of Section 6.8 of the Declaration from the original 2005 version, through the 2009 First Amendment, to the attempted 2016 change. Explain the significance of the “Completed Lots” definition and how its omission and attempted reinsertion became the central point of the dispute.

4. Evaluate the Respondent’s argument that it was simply correcting an inadvertent clerical error. What evidence and reasoning did the Administrative Law Judge use to conclude that this was, in fact, an improper amendment?

5. Describe the legal requirements for amending an HOA declaration as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1817. Explain precisely how the actions of the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Board violated this statute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge in the administrative hearing, in this case, Suzanne Marwil. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on the facts and applicable laws.

A.R.S. § 33-1811

An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that addresses conflicts of interest for members of an HOA board of directors. The Tribunal found the Petitioner’s interpretation of this statute to be overbroad.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that outlines the legal requirements and procedures for amending an HOA’s declaration. The ALJ found the Respondent violated this statute.

Completed Lots

As defined in the original 2005 Declaration, this refers to any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy, including installed carpets, cabinets, plumbing, etc. This definition was central to the dispute.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration)

The primary governing legal document of the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, which outlines the rules, assessments, and rights of the property owners.

Declaration of Scrivener’s Error

The legal instrument adopted by the Respondent’s Board in a 3-2 vote on August 3, 2016. It was purported to correct a clerical error but was ruled to be an invalid substantive amendment to the Declaration.

First Amendment

The amendment to the 2005 Declaration adopted on December 4, 2008, after a vote of 75% of the lot owners. It changed Section 6.8 to allow for different assessment rates for completed and uncompleted lots but inadvertently omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot.”

NT Properties

A company with a financial interest in the undeveloped lots within the HOA. Three members of the Respondent’s Board also had a financial interest in this company, forming the basis of a conflict of interest allegation.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Jay Janicek.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA.

Tribunal

A term used within the decision to refer to the adjudicating body, specifically the Office of Administrative Hearings and the presiding Administrative Law Judge.

Uniform Rate of Assessment

A principle laid out in the 2005 Declaration requiring that annual and special assessments be fixed at a uniform rate for all lots. This was modified by the 2009 First Amendment.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716019-REL


He Sued His HOA and Won. Here’s Why He Still Had to Pay.

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath of Neighborhood Disputes

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant source of tension. It’s a world of rules, fees, and board decisions that can seem arbitrary or unfair. So when a single homeowner decides to take on their entire HOA in a legal battle, it feels like a classic David vs. Goliath story. This is one of those stories—about a homeowner who challenged an improper rule change and an unexpected fee increase. He took his HOA to court and, on paper, he won. But as he discovered, the outcome was far more surprising and nuanced than a simple victory.

——————————————————————————–

1. You Can’t Fix a Seven-Year-Old “Mistake” with a Simple Board Vote.

The core of the dispute began when the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA tried to amend its governing documents with a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” Their goal was to reinsert definitions of “Completed Lots” versus “Undeveloped Lots” that they claimed had been “inadvertently deleted” from a revision seven years prior.

Instead of seeking approval from the homeowners, the Board of Directors passed this “correction” on August 3, 2016, with a simple 3-2 vote. This procedural shortcut triggered the legal challenge.

The Administrative Law Judge unequivocally rejected the HOA’s move. The judge’s reasoning was sharp and logical: the seven-year gap since the original amendment was a critical factor. The sheer passage of time had transformed what the HOA called a clerical correction into what the law considered a substantive change. As such, it required a vote by 75% of the lot owners, not a simple board action.

The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful rebuke:

…after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.

This finding was a crucial victory for the homeowner. It affirmed that HOAs must follow the proper procedures outlined in their own governing documents and cannot use shortcuts to rewrite history, no matter how they frame their intentions.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Legal “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean You Get the Financial Outcome You Want.

Even though the judge invalidated the HOA’s “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error,” she made another, more surprising ruling: the $10.00 annual assessment increase on developed lots—the very fee that sparked the lawsuit—was valid and would stand.

The legal reasoning was buried in the fine print of the HOA’s own documents. A different amendment, one legally passed with a 75% homeowner vote on December 4, 2008, already gave the Board the explicit authority to set different assessment rates. The key language in that valid amendment stated, “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.”

This created the central irony of the case: the HOA took a legally improper path to arrive at a destination they already had a legal right to reach. Interestingly, the HOA board president testified they were acting on the advice of their counsel, suggesting this was less a malicious act and more of a costly legal misstep.

The petitioner, Jay Janicek, won his case on principle. The judge’s order granted his petition and even awarded him his $500.00 filing fee. But he lost on the practical financial issue that started the dispute. The $10 increase remained. It’s a stark illustration of how complex legal documents can be, where one legally sound clause can override a victory on another front.

——————————————————————————–

3. Proving a Conflict of Interest Is Harder Than It Looks.

The homeowner also accused the board of a conflict of interest. He pointed out that three members of the five-person board had a financial stake in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These were the very lots that benefited from the new assessment structure, as their fees remained unchanged while only the developed lots saw the $10 increase. On the surface, it appeared to be a clear-cut case of self-dealing.

However, the judge rejected this claim, ruling that the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict of interest statute was “overbroad.” The judge’s analysis provided a crucial distinction: the board members were not inventing a new power for their own benefit; they were exercising a power explicitly granted to the Board by the homeowners themselves in the 2009 Declaration. The ruling noted that the petitioner’s argument “disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

This takeaway is a sobering one for homeowners. It demonstrates that what might look like a glaring conflict of interest to a layperson may not meet the specific legal standard required to invalidate a board’s actions, especially when those actions fall within the powers already granted by the community’s governing documents.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: A Victory of Principle

In the end, the homeowner walked away with a strange and dual outcome. He successfully proved his HOA acted improperly by trying to amend its rules without a proper vote, yet he could not reverse the financial consequence that drove him to file the suit. The case stands as a powerful reminder for all homeowners: understanding both the procedural rules your HOA must follow and the precise wording hidden deep within its governing documents is absolutely critical. This ruling created a clear divide between procedural justice and financial reality.

This case was a victory of principle over practice—how much is a principle worth when the bottom line doesn’t change?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jay Janicek (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Evan Thomson (attorney)
    Represented Respondent
  • Steven Russo (board member)
    Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA
    President of Respondent; testified
  • Dane Dehler (attorney)
    Thompson Kron, P.L.C.
    Received copy of final order
  • Whitney Cunningham (HOA contact)
    Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA
    Received copy of final order c/o

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Recipient for rehearing request

Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:18:45 (83.7 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:18:51 (794.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716019-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716019-REL


Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (No. 17F-H1716019-REL). It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to aid in understanding the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What was the central action taken by the Respondent’s Board that led to this legal dispute?

3. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument against the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”?

4. How did the Respondent justify its use of a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” instead of a full vote by lot owners?

5. Describe the conflict of interest alleged by the Petitioner against the Respondent’s Board.

6. How did the 2009 First Amendment alter Section 6.8 of the HOA’s 2005 Declaration?

7. What was the direct financial consequence for developed lot owners following the Board’s actions in 2016?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final ruling regarding the validity of the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”?

9. Despite invalidating the Board’s action, what did the Judge decide regarding the increased assessment on developed lots?

10. What was the final order issued in the case, and what was the Respondent required to do?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jay Janicek and Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. Janicek, a lot owner, brought the petition against the Homeowner’s Association to challenge a decision made by its Board of Directors.

2. The Respondent’s Board, by a 3-2 vote, adopted a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” on August 3, 2016. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment to the HOA’s governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was not a simple correction but a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he contended it was an amendment that required approval by a vote of seventy-five percent of the lot owners, not just a Board vote.

4. The Respondent argued that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was merely intended to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of developed versus undeveloped lots, which was inadvertently deleted from the 2009 revision. The Board’s President, Steven Russo, testified that they acted on the recommendation of their legal counsel.

5. The Petitioner alleged a conflict of interest because three members of the Respondent’s Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owns the undeveloped lots. The Petitioner argued that these members stood to benefit from assessment changes that favored undeveloped lots.

6. The 2009 First Amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 and replaced it with new language. This new language explicitly allowed annual dues to be assessed at different uniform rates for “Completed Lots” and “Uncompleted Lots,” a distinction not present in the original uniform rate structure.

7. Following the adoption of the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error,” the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00. The assessment for undeveloped lots was left unchanged.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was an invalid amendment to the Declaration. The Judge found that it was a substantive change that required a vote of the lot owners as specified in A.R.S. §33-1817, and that calling it a correction of a clerical error after seven years “defies logic.”

9. The Judge ruled that the increased assessment on developed lots could stand. The ruling was based on the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment, which expressly permitted the HOA to assess different rates for completed and uncompleted lots, independent of the invalidated “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.”

10. The final order granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate a comprehensive response drawing upon the specific facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to invalidate the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” while simultaneously upholding the increased assessment on developed lots. Explain how both parts of this ruling were supported by different governing documents.

2. Discuss the conflict of interest allegation raised by Jay Janicek under A.R.S. § 33-1811. Why did the Tribunal ultimately reject this argument, and what does this rejection imply about the Board’s authority to set assessments under the Declaration?

3. Trace the evolution of Section 6.8 of the Declaration from the original 2005 version, through the 2009 First Amendment, to the attempted 2016 change. Explain the significance of the “Completed Lots” definition and how its omission and attempted reinsertion became the central point of the dispute.

4. Evaluate the Respondent’s argument that it was simply correcting an inadvertent clerical error. What evidence and reasoning did the Administrative Law Judge use to conclude that this was, in fact, an improper amendment?

5. Describe the legal requirements for amending an HOA declaration as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1817. Explain precisely how the actions of the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Board violated this statute.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge in the administrative hearing, in this case, Suzanne Marwil. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on the facts and applicable laws.

A.R.S. § 33-1811

An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that addresses conflicts of interest for members of an HOA board of directors. The Tribunal found the Petitioner’s interpretation of this statute to be overbroad.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that outlines the legal requirements and procedures for amending an HOA’s declaration. The ALJ found the Respondent violated this statute.

Completed Lots

As defined in the original 2005 Declaration, this refers to any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy, including installed carpets, cabinets, plumbing, etc. This definition was central to the dispute.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration)

The primary governing legal document of the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, which outlines the rules, assessments, and rights of the property owners.

Declaration of Scrivener’s Error

The legal instrument adopted by the Respondent’s Board in a 3-2 vote on August 3, 2016. It was purported to correct a clerical error but was ruled to be an invalid substantive amendment to the Declaration.

First Amendment

The amendment to the 2005 Declaration adopted on December 4, 2008, after a vote of 75% of the lot owners. It changed Section 6.8 to allow for different assessment rates for completed and uncompleted lots but inadvertently omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot.”

NT Properties

A company with a financial interest in the undeveloped lots within the HOA. Three members of the Respondent’s Board also had a financial interest in this company, forming the basis of a conflict of interest allegation.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Jay Janicek.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA.

Tribunal

A term used within the decision to refer to the adjudicating body, specifically the Office of Administrative Hearings and the presiding Administrative Law Judge.

Uniform Rate of Assessment

A principle laid out in the 2005 Declaration requiring that annual and special assessments be fixed at a uniform rate for all lots. This was modified by the 2009 First Amendment.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716019-REL


He Sued His HOA and Won. Here’s Why He Still Had to Pay.

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath of Neighborhood Disputes

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant source of tension. It’s a world of rules, fees, and board decisions that can seem arbitrary or unfair. So when a single homeowner decides to take on their entire HOA in a legal battle, it feels like a classic David vs. Goliath story. This is one of those stories—about a homeowner who challenged an improper rule change and an unexpected fee increase. He took his HOA to court and, on paper, he won. But as he discovered, the outcome was far more surprising and nuanced than a simple victory.

——————————————————————————–

1. You Can’t Fix a Seven-Year-Old “Mistake” with a Simple Board Vote.

The core of the dispute began when the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA tried to amend its governing documents with a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” Their goal was to reinsert definitions of “Completed Lots” versus “Undeveloped Lots” that they claimed had been “inadvertently deleted” from a revision seven years prior.

Instead of seeking approval from the homeowners, the Board of Directors passed this “correction” on August 3, 2016, with a simple 3-2 vote. This procedural shortcut triggered the legal challenge.

The Administrative Law Judge unequivocally rejected the HOA’s move. The judge’s reasoning was sharp and logical: the seven-year gap since the original amendment was a critical factor. The sheer passage of time had transformed what the HOA called a clerical correction into what the law considered a substantive change. As such, it required a vote by 75% of the lot owners, not a simple board action.

The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful rebuke:

…after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.

This finding was a crucial victory for the homeowner. It affirmed that HOAs must follow the proper procedures outlined in their own governing documents and cannot use shortcuts to rewrite history, no matter how they frame their intentions.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Legal “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean You Get the Financial Outcome You Want.

Even though the judge invalidated the HOA’s “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error,” she made another, more surprising ruling: the $10.00 annual assessment increase on developed lots—the very fee that sparked the lawsuit—was valid and would stand.

The legal reasoning was buried in the fine print of the HOA’s own documents. A different amendment, one legally passed with a 75% homeowner vote on December 4, 2008, already gave the Board the explicit authority to set different assessment rates. The key language in that valid amendment stated, “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.”

This created the central irony of the case: the HOA took a legally improper path to arrive at a destination they already had a legal right to reach. Interestingly, the HOA board president testified they were acting on the advice of their counsel, suggesting this was less a malicious act and more of a costly legal misstep.

The petitioner, Jay Janicek, won his case on principle. The judge’s order granted his petition and even awarded him his $500.00 filing fee. But he lost on the practical financial issue that started the dispute. The $10 increase remained. It’s a stark illustration of how complex legal documents can be, where one legally sound clause can override a victory on another front.

——————————————————————————–

3. Proving a Conflict of Interest Is Harder Than It Looks.

The homeowner also accused the board of a conflict of interest. He pointed out that three members of the five-person board had a financial stake in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These were the very lots that benefited from the new assessment structure, as their fees remained unchanged while only the developed lots saw the $10 increase. On the surface, it appeared to be a clear-cut case of self-dealing.

However, the judge rejected this claim, ruling that the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict of interest statute was “overbroad.” The judge’s analysis provided a crucial distinction: the board members were not inventing a new power for their own benefit; they were exercising a power explicitly granted to the Board by the homeowners themselves in the 2009 Declaration. The ruling noted that the petitioner’s argument “disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

This takeaway is a sobering one for homeowners. It demonstrates that what might look like a glaring conflict of interest to a layperson may not meet the specific legal standard required to invalidate a board’s actions, especially when those actions fall within the powers already granted by the community’s governing documents.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: A Victory of Principle

In the end, the homeowner walked away with a strange and dual outcome. He successfully proved his HOA acted improperly by trying to amend its rules without a proper vote, yet he could not reverse the financial consequence that drove him to file the suit. The case stands as a powerful reminder for all homeowners: understanding both the procedural rules your HOA must follow and the precise wording hidden deep within its governing documents is absolutely critical. This ruling created a clear divide between procedural justice and financial reality.

This case was a victory of principle over practice—how much is a principle worth when the bottom line doesn’t change?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jay Janicek (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Evan Thomson (attorney)
    Represented Respondent
  • Steven Russo (board member)
    Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA
    President of Respondent; testified
  • Dane Dehler (attorney)
    Thompson Kron, P.L.C.
    Received copy of final order
  • Whitney Cunningham (HOA contact)
    Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA
    Received copy of final order c/o

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Recipient for rehearing request

Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

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17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716019-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.


Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

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17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716019-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.


Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark Kristopher Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge found Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots during the 2016 board election,. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee,. The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4),.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4), which specifies timing requirements for ballots; the ALJ noted that a meeting ballot did not need to contain a received-by date or be mailed seven days in advance if it had been substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot,,,.

Key Issues & Findings

Ballot must provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.

The use of two substantively different ballots in the March 2016 election violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) because members who did not attend the meeting were unaware of an additional candidate (Eric Thompson) listed on the meeting ballot, thereby denying those members the opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot,. This finding does not require ballots to be identical, but substantive changes must be presented to all members,,.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was granted, and Respondent was ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00,. No other relief was available.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Condominium, Board Election, Absentee Ballot, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • Article VII CC&Rs

Video Overview

https://youtu.be/0-3GaFWuqA8

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 523915.pdf

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17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

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17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

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17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716002-REL


Study Guide: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Paul Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner, Paul Gounder, in his initial petition?

2. Describe the two different ballots used by the Royal Riviera Condominium Association for its March 14, 2016, board election.

3. What were the two primary legal arguments made by the Respondent, Royal Riviera Condominium Association, to defend its actions?

4. What was the initial outcome of the hearing held on October 17, 2016, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky?

5. What was Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil’s final conclusion regarding the alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)?

6. How did Judge Marwil explain her finding that A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4), which deals with ballot delivery timelines, was not violated?

7. How did the Respondent argue that the case was moot, and why did Judge Marwil reject this argument?

8. According to the Final Order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, what specific relief was granted to the Petitioner?

9. What is the standard of proof in this matter, and which party has the burden of proof?

10. What specific action did the Department of Real Estate request be reviewed when it granted the request for a rehearing?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs. The violation occurred by using two substantively different ballots for the election of Board members at the annual meeting on March 14, 2016.

2. The first ballot was an absentee “Mail Ballot” with six candidate names and a blank line for a write-in. The second ballot, handed out at the meeting, was titled “Ballot” and included the names of seven candidates (adding Eric Thompson) but had no space for a write-in candidate.

3. The Respondent argued that it committed no violation because the statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots and that using different absentee and meeting ballots is common practice. It also maintained that the matter was moot because a new election had already occurred in 2017.

4. Following the initial hearing, Judge Diane Mihalsky recommended the dismissal of the Petition on October 18, 2016. She concluded that no statute or bylaw prevented the Respondent from adding the names of willing members to the ballot used at the annual election.

5. Judge Suzanne Marwil found that the use of two substantively different ballots did violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Because members voting by mail were not informed of Eric Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action.

6. Judge Marwil concluded A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4) was not violated because the absentee ballot itself complied with the statute’s requirements for delivery timelines. She reasoned that a meeting ballot would not need to meet these requirements if it were substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot; the problem arose only because the ballots were different.

7. The Respondent argued the case was moot because a new board had been seated in a 2017 election. Judge Marwil rejected this, stating that the fact a new board is seated does not prevent an Administrative Law Judge from finding that a statutory violation occurred in a past election.

8. The Final Order, issued by Commissioner Judy Lowe on June 12, 2017, granted the Petitioner’s petition. It ordered the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

9. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” as stated in A.A.C. R2-19-119(A). Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner has the burden of proof in the matter.

10. In its February 17, 2017, Order Granting Request for Rehearing, the Department of Real Estate specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, and in particular, A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to test a deeper understanding of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal distinction Judge Marwil makes between ballots being “identical” versus “substantively different.” How did this distinction become the central point upon which her decision on A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) turned?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from the filing of the initial petition to the issuance of the Final Order. Discuss the role and decisions of each key actor, including Petitioner Gounder, Respondent Royal Riviera, ALJ Mihalsky, ALJ Marwil, and Commissioner Lowe.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by the Respondent. Why was the argument about “common practice” for homeowners’ associations ultimately unpersuasive, and why did the “mootness” doctrine not apply?

4. Discuss the significance of the specific provisions within A.R.S. § 33-1250(C). How do subsections (C)(2) and (C)(4) work together to ensure fair voting rights for all members of a condominium association, including those who vote by absentee ballot?

5. Examine the relationship between the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings as demonstrated in this case. How do they interact to adjudicate disputes between homeowners and their associations?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and recommendations. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Suzanne Marwil served as ALJs.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. This case centered on the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1250.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona. It granted the rehearing and accepted the final ALJ decision.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated Article VII of its CC&Rs.

Final Order

The concluding and binding decision in an administrative case. In this matter, the Final Order was issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on June 12, 2017, accepting the ALJ’s decision.

A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The Respondent unsuccessfully argued the case was moot because a subsequent election had been held.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency that conducts administrative hearings for other state agencies. The Department of Real Estate referred this case to the OAH for a hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, the Petitioner was Paul Gounder.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means the party with the burden of proof must convince the judge that there is a greater than 50% chance that their claim is true.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to review the decision made in the first hearing. The Petitioner requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial recommendation to dismiss his petition.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Royal Riviera Condominium Association.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716002-REL


Your HOA’s Election Rules Might Be Unfair. This Court Case Explains Why.

Introduction: The Devil in the Details

Living in a community governed by a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex web of rules, regulations, and procedures. While most are designed to maintain property values and community standards, the enforcement of these rules can sometimes feel arbitrary. But what happens when the very process for electing the board that enforces those rules is flawed?

A fascinating legal challenge demonstrates that even a single, seemingly minor discrepancy in an HOA election can have significant consequences. But the victory was anything but certain. In the case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association, the homeowner’s initial petition was actually recommended for dismissal by the first judge. It was only through persistence—requesting a rehearing—that the homeowner ultimately prevailed. This case serves as a powerful real-world example of why procedural fairness in community governance is not just important—it’s legally required—and reveals several surprising lessons for any homeowner who values a fair and transparent election process.

Takeaway 1: “Common Practice” Isn’t a Legal Defense

When challenged on its election procedures, the Royal Riviera Condominium Association’s defense was simple: it was merely following “common practice.” The board argued that many HOAs use a different absentee and in-person ballot, so they had done nothing wrong. However, the Administrative Law Judge disregarded this argument entirely, focusing instead on the explicit requirements of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). This decision provides a crucial lesson for all homeowners: an association’s internal habits or traditions do not override clear legal statutes. If a state law or the community’s own governing documents dictate a specific procedure, the HOA must follow it, regardless of what other associations might be doing. This empowers homeowners by showing that the law, not just internal tradition, is the ultimate authority governing their association’s actions.

Takeaway 2: A “Small” Change Can Invalidate an Election

The dispute in the March 14, 2016 election centered on two different ballots used for the same board election. The mail-in ballot, sent to members voting absentee, listed six names and included a blank line for a write-in candidate. The in-person ballot, distributed to members at the meeting, listed seven names—adding candidate Eric Thompson—and provided no space for write-ins. This difference was not seen as a minor error but as a “substantive” change that fundamentally altered the election. The judge reasoned that members who voted by mail “did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

The judge made a critical distinction about what constitutes a fair process, clarifying that the issue wasn’t about perfection, but equality of opportunity.

Finding this violation does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.

This point is not about minor cosmetic differences like fonts or paper color. It’s about ensuring every single voting member has the exact same set of choices. Adding or removing a candidate on one version of a ballot creates two different elections, disenfranchising one group of voters. This ruling affirms that a fair election requires that all members have an equal opportunity to vote on all candidates and measures.

Takeaway 3: Accountability Matters, Even After the Fact

The association attempted to have the case dismissed by arguing that the issue was “moot.” Because a new election had already been held in 2017 and a new board was in place, the HOA claimed the flawed 2016 election no longer mattered. The Administrative Law Judge explicitly rejected this argument. The decision stated that “the fact that a new board is currently seated does not render the matter moot as the Administrative Law Judge can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.” The final order granted the homeowner’s petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse his $500.00 filing fee. This is an impactful takeaway for any homeowner who feels it’s too late to act. It demonstrates that an HOA can be held legally accountable for past procedural violations, establishing an important precedent for the community and putting the board on notice for future conduct.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The case of Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association is a powerful reminder that procedural fairness, strict adherence to legal statutes, and the vigilance of individual homeowners are essential checks on the power of an HOA board. The core lesson is clear: seemingly small details in an election process can have major legal consequences. Homeowners who take the time to understand the specific laws and bylaws governing their community can successfully challenge their associations. But this case also teaches a deeper lesson about perseverance. Faced with an initial recommendation for dismissal, the homeowner could have given up. Instead, he challenged the ruling and won on rehearing, proving that knowledge combined with conviction is a powerful force for ensuring the principles of fairness and equality are upheld.

Does your own community’s voting process ensure every member has an equal voice, and would it stand up to this kind of scrutiny?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul Gounder (petitioner)
  • Frederick C. Zehm (witness)
    Royal Riviera Condominium Association member
    Testified for Petitioner
  • Marlys Kleck (witness)
    Royal Riviera Condominium Association member
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Mark Kristopher Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen PLC
  • Dan Peterson (property manager)
    Owner of Respondent's management company

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Presided over initial hearing
  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
    Presided over rehearing
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (ADRE staff/HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Also listed as AHansen
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • jmarshall (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Aguirre (staff)
    Transmitted order

Other Participants

  • Eric Thompson (member/candidate)
    Candidate added to meeting ballot
  • Al DeFalco (member/candidate)
    Nominated from the floor

Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner achieved a partial win. The Respondent HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using substantively different ballots which impaired the voting rights of absentee members. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee, but no other relief was granted.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots for the 2016 election. The meeting ballot included a seventh candidate whose name was not on the mail-in ballot, denying members who did not attend the meeting the opportunity to vote for or against all proposed candidates.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

The ALJ concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4). While the meeting ballot lacked the statutory requirements listed in C(4), those requirements apply primarily to absentee ballots, and a meeting ballot does not need to comply if it is substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:06 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:07 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:07 (689.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.


Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner achieved a partial win. The Respondent HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using substantively different ballots which impaired the voting rights of absentee members. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee, but no other relief was granted.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots for the 2016 election. The meeting ballot included a seventh candidate whose name was not on the mail-in ballot, denying members who did not attend the meeting the opportunity to vote for or against all proposed candidates.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

The ALJ concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4). While the meeting ballot lacked the statutory requirements listed in C(4), those requirements apply primarily to absentee ballots, and a meeting ballot does not need to comply if it is substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:33 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:34 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:34 (689.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.