Marilyn J Fogelsong vs Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, INC

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H050-REL
Agency
Tribunal
Decision Date 8/5/2025
Administrative Law Judge NR
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marilyn J. Fogelsong Counsel Pro se
Respondent Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1380164.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:47:57 (51.8 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1384549.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:48:00 (49.0 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1384804.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:48:04 (7.5 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1393862.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:48:10 (59.6 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1401266.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:48:20 (231.3 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1336348.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:48:24 (157.7 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1348020.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:48:28 (43.9 KB)





Litigation Briefing: Fogelsong v. Park Townhouses Homeowners Association (Case No. 25F-H050-REL)

# Litigation Briefing: Fogelsong v. Park Townhouses Homeowners Association (Case No. 25F-H050-REL)

## Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the legal dispute between Marilyn J. Fogelsong ("Petitioner") and the Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc. ("Respondent" or "Association"), a small eight-unit planned community in Tucson, Arizona. The litigation, spanning from March 2025 through March 2026, centered on Petitioner’s allegations of statutory and governing document violations by the Association’s Board of Directors.

The dispute followed a transition in 2024 from self-management to the hiring of Tucson Realty & Trust Company ("TRT") for professional HOA management. Petitioner, a former Board President and 5% co-owner of a unit, raised four primary issues: conflicts of interest regarding the property manager, unauthorized maintenance of private property, violations of open meeting laws, and breach of fiduciary duties. 

Following an initial hearing in July 2025 (where Respondent failed to appear) and a subsequent rehearing in February 2026, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) denied all of Petitioner's claims. The presiding Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) concluded that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish statutory violations and that several claims were either filed under incorrect statutes or fell outside the Department of Real Estate's jurisdiction.

---

## Detailed Analysis of Key Issues

The litigation was structured around four specific claims filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE).

### Issue 1: Conflict of Interest (A.R.S. § 33-1811)
Petitioner alleged that the Board failed to disclose conflicts of interest when hiring TRT as the HOA property manager. 

*   **Petitioner's Argument:** TRT manages individual rental units for two Board members (Gerald Schwarzenbach and Mark Schlang). Petitioner claimed TRT showed "preferential treatment" by failing to remit parking fines collected from tenants to the HOA and failing to disclose tenant contact information as required by law.
*   **Respondent's Rebuttal:** The Association argued that the dual role of a management company handling both the HOA and individual units was a long-standing practice (over 20 years). Mark Schlang testified that parking fines were not remitted because they could not be authenticated (lacking time/date stamps) and were eventually settled under protest to "clean up" the records.
*   **Judicial Finding:** The ALJ ruled that Petitioner failed to prove that the hiring of TRT constituted a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811. The evidence did not establish that the contract provided an impermissible benefit to Board members or their families.

### Issue 2: Scope of Management (CC&R Paragraph 19)
Petitioner argued that the HOA exceeded its authority by pursuing a painting project for individual townhouses.

*   **Petitioner's Argument:** Paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs restricts HOA management to "common areas" (driveways and specific landscaping). Petitioner claimed the Board used HOA resources to solicit bids for private structures, including her own, without consent.
*   **Respondent's Rebuttal:** The Board clarified that while they solicited a bulk bid to ensure community aesthetic uniformity, they did not use HOA funds for private repairs. Instead, six of the eight owners voluntarily pooled their resources to hire the contractor individually.
*   **Judicial Finding:** The ALJ found no evidence that HOA funds were actually expended on individual units. Because the work was performed as a collaborative effort among willing owners and not mandated as an HOA expense, no violation of the CC&Rs occurred.

### Issue 3: Open Meeting Laws and Records Requests (A.R.S. § 33-1804)
Petitioner alleged that the Board held private meetings without notice and failed to provide requested documents within the statutory 10-day window.

*   **Petitioner's Argument:** Requests for meeting minutes, financial statements, and management proposals made in early 2025 went ignored. Furthermore, a meeting held on February 17, 2025, was provided with only seven days' notice rather than the ten days required by the Bylaws.
*   **Judicial Finding:** The ALJ noted that while the Board admitted to delays in providing records (due to confusion during the management transition), Petitioner pled her case under A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meetings) rather than A.R.S. § 33-1805 (Records Requests). To find a violation under an unpled statute would violate the Respondent's due process. Regarding the February meeting, the notice sent via email was deemed sufficient for a Board meeting under the emergency/regular provisions of the Bylaws.

### Issue 4: Fiduciary Duty (A.R.S. § 10-830)
Petitioner alleged the Board failed to act in good faith and with the care of an ordinarily prudent person.

*   **Outcome:** This issue was **stricken** from both the original and rehearing proceedings. The ADRE and OAH do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under Title 10 (Corporations and Associations); their authority is limited to Title 33 (Planned Communities) and condominium documents.

---

## Key Entities and Roles

| Entity/Individual | Role in Dispute | Key Facts |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Marilyn J. Fogelsong** | Petitioner | Co-owner (5%) of Lot 8; former Board President (2021–2024). |
| **Park Townhouses HOA** | Respondent | 8-unit planned community in Tucson, AZ. |
| **Tucson Realty & Trust (TRT)** | Property Manager | Hired for HOA management Feb 2025; also manages private units for Board members. |
| **Mark Schlang** | Board Treasurer | Long-time owner (since 1984); witness for Respondent. |
| **Gerald Schwarzenbach** | Board Secretary | Designated representative for Respondent; owner since 1997. |
| **Nicole Robinson** | ALJ | Presided over the initial July 2025 hearing. |
| **Jenna Clark** | ALJ | Presided over the February 2026 rehearing. |

---

## Important Quotes with Context

> **"It’s all new to me, but I don’t have a specific question."**  
> — *Marilyn J. Fogelsong (Initial Hearing, 1:21 p.m.)*  
> **Context:** Petitioner's admission at the start of the first hearing, highlighting her status as a self-represented (pro se) litigant navigating administrative law for the first time.

> **"The association chose to find a professional management company to look after our interests because we are owners spread far and wide."**  
> — *Gerald Schwarzenbach (Rehearing Testimony)*  
> **Context:** Explaining the rationale for returning to professional management through TRT after a period of self-management under Petitioner's tenure.

> **"Notice was given on February 10th, which was improper notice because our CCNRs require 10 days notice... and Arizona law does too."**  
> — *Marilyn J. Fogelsong (Rehearing Testimony)*  
> **Context:** Petitioner’s central argument regarding the lack of transparency and statutory compliance in the Board’s decision-making process.

> **"Character is not at issue in an HOA dispute. Neither party shall be permitted to offer character evidence regarding a party or witness."**  
> — *ALJ Jenna Clark (Minute Entry, Feb 9, 2026)*  
> **Context:** A legal ruling issued to prevent the hearing from devolving into personal attacks regarding Petitioner's alleged "systematic attempt to devalue the property."

---

## Actionable Insights

Based on the findings of the Administrative Law Judges and the evidence presented in the case, the following insights are derived for future HOA governance or legal disputes:

1.  **Statutory Precision in Filing:** The denial of Issue 3 (Records Requests) underscores the necessity of citing the correct statute. Filing a records request grievance under A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meetings) rather than § 33-1805 (Records) is a fatal procedural error that an ALJ cannot correct without violating due process.
2.  **Clarifying Management Scope:** To avoid disputes regarding "unsanctioned projects" on private property, Associations should clearly distinguish between HOA-funded maintenance and owner-funded maintenance facilitated by the HOA. In this case, the Board avoided liability because they did not mandate the project or spend Association funds on private units.
3.  **Conflict of Interest Disclosure:** While the court did not find a violation, the friction caused by TRT's dual role suggests that HOAs should formally disclose any business relationships between the management firm and individual board members during open meetings to ensure compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1811.
4.  **Jurisdictional Limits:** Petitioners must recognize that the ADRE only handles matters related to Title 33. Any claims regarding corporate "good faith" or general standards of conduct for directors (Title 10) must be pursued in Superior Court, as they fall outside administrative jurisdiction.
5.  **Documentation of Violations:** For enforcement of fines (e.g., parking), documentation must be robust. The Board’s inability to collect or remit fines in this case stemmed from a lack of "independent verification" (time/date stamps), making the violations legally vulnerable.







Study Guide: Marilyn J. Fogelsong v. Park Townhouses Homeowners Association

# Study Guide: Marilyn J. Fogelsong v. Park Townhouses Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative legal proceedings regarding the dispute between Marilyn J. Fogelsong and the Park Townhouses Homeowners Association (HOA). It covers the core legal issues, the procedural history of the case before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), and the specific statutes and governing documents at the center of the conflict.

---

## Part 1: Key Concepts and Case Summary

### Case Overview
The matter of *Marilyn J. Fogelsong v. Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc.* (No. 25F-H050-REL) involved a homeowner (Petitioner) alleging multiple violations of state statutes and community governing documents by the HOA Board (Respondent). The case underwent an initial hearing in July 2025 and a subsequent rehearing in February 2026.

### The Four Primary Issues
The petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) identified four central legal claims:

1.  **Conflict of Interest (A.R.S. § 33-1811):** Allegations that the Board failed to disclose conflicts of interest when hiring Tucson Realty & Trust (TRT) as the HOA property manager, specifically because TRT also managed individual rental units for Board members.
2.  **Unauthorized Maintenance Projects (CC&R Paragraph 19):** Allegations that the HOA overstepped its authority by directing the property manager to pursue painting and repair projects for individual townhouses, which the Petitioner argued was beyond the scope of common area management.
3.  **Open Meeting Law Violations (A.R.S. § 33-1804 A & F):** Allegations that the Board held private meetings without notice and failed to provide requested material information, such as minutes, financial statements, and budgets.
4.  **Breach of Fiduciary Duty (A.R.S. § 10-830A):** Allegations that the Board failed to act in good faith or with the care of an ordinarily prudent person. Note: This issue was eventually **stricken** because the ADRE and OAH lack jurisdiction over Title 10 corporate statutes.

### Legal Standards and Burdens
*   **Burden of Proof:** In these administrative proceedings, the Petitioner (Fogelsong) maintains the burden of proof.
*   **Preponderance of the Evidence:** The evidentiary standard required. This means the Petitioner must prove that the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence (i.e., more likely than not).
*   **Standing:** The right of a party to bring a legal claim. The Respondent challenged Fogelsong’s standing because she held only a 5% ownership interest in the property, while her son held the remainder. The Tribunal ultimately recognized her standing based on the recorded deed and authorization from her co-owner.

---

## Part 2: Short-Answer Practice Questions

**1. Why was the Petitioner’s claim regarding A.R.S. § 10-830(A) (Issue 4) dismissed without being adjudicated on its merits?**
*Answer:* The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and the Department of Real Estate do not have jurisdiction to enforce Title 10 statutes, which pertain to corporate standards of conduct. Their jurisdiction is limited to Title 33 (Planned Communities/Condominiums) and the community’s governing documents.

**2. What specific evidence did the Petitioner provide to support the "Conflict of Interest" claim regarding TRT Property Management?**
*Answer:* The Petitioner argued that TRT managed individual units for Board members Mark Schlang and Gerald Schwarzenbach. She alleged TRT gave these members "preferential treatment," such as failing to remit parking fines collected from tenants to the HOA and failing to disclose tenant contact information.

**3. What was the HOA Board's defense regarding the failure to provide tenant contact information to the Petitioner?**
*Answer:* The Board (via Mark Schlang) testified that tenant information was withheld because the Petitioner had previously used such information to conduct unauthorized background checks on tenants without the knowledge of the landlords or the tenants.

**4. How did the Tribunal rule on the issue of the HOA painting individual townhouses?**
*Answer:* The claim was denied. The Tribunal found that while the HOA manages common areas, members can vote to delegate private property maintenance to the Association. Evidence showed that six out of eight members voted to pool resources and hire a contractor for a collective painting project.

**5. What procedural error did the Petitioner make when alleging the Board failed to provide records within 10 days?**
*Answer:* The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Laws). However, the Tribunal noted that records requests are governed by A.R.S. § 33-1805. Because the Petitioner did not specifically plead a violation of § 33-1805, the Tribunal could not find the Respondent in violation without infringing on their Due Process rights.

---

## Part 3: Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1.  **The Limits of HOA Authority:** Paragraph 19 of the Park Townhouses CC&Rs grants the HOA authority over "common elements" and "common areas." Analyze the tension between individual property rights and collective HOA action as presented in this case. In your response, consider the Board's argument that the community functioned through a "general plan or scheme of improvements" and the Petitioner’s counter-argument using the *Callaway v. Calabria Ranch* Supreme Court case.

2.  **Evaluating the Preponderance of Evidence:** The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied all of the Petitioner’s claims primarily based on a failure to meet the burden of proof. Detail the specific "indicia of evidence" the Petitioner lacked for Issue 1 (Conflict of Interest) and Issue 3 (Open Meetings). How might a Petitioner better substantiate claims of "favoritism" or "unauthorized meetings" in an administrative tribunal?

3.  **Conflict of Interest in Small Associations:** Park Townhouses consists of only eight units. Discuss the practical and legal challenges of managing a very small HOA where board members are often neighbors and may share the same third-party property management services for their individual rentals. Does the dual role of a management company (managing both the HOA and individual units) create an inherent conflict, or must a "benefit" be specifically proven under A.R.S. § 33-1811?

---

## Part 4: Glossary of Important Terms

| Term | Definition |
| :--- | :--- |
| **A.R.S. § 33-1804** | The Arizona statute governing open meetings for planned communities, requiring notice, agendas, and the right for members to speak. |
| **A.R.S. § 33-1811** | The Arizona statute regarding conflicts of interest; it requires board members to declare a benefit in an open meeting before a vote is taken. |
| **Advisory/Recommended Decision** | The initial decision issued by an ALJ, which is then sent to the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate for final approval, rejection, or modification. |
| **CC&Rs** | Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the primary governing documents that "run with the land" and define the rights and obligations of owners and the HOA. |
| **Common Elements** | Areas within a development owned by the HOA or by all owners collectively (e.g., driveways, streets, recreational facilities). |
| **Due Process Rights** | The legal requirement that the state must respect all legal rights owed to a person, including the right to be informed of specific charges (statutes) being held against them. |
| **In Limine** | A motion made "at the threshold" of a hearing to exclude or include certain evidence or arguments before the proceedings begin. |
| **Preponderance of the Evidence** | The standard of proof in civil and administrative cases; proof that a claim is "more likely than not" to be true. |
| **Rehearing** | A second hearing granted on specific grounds, such as an error in law or the discovery of evidence not supported by the initial findings of fact. |
| **Standing** | The legal capacity of a person to participate in a lawsuit; in this case, established by a 5% interest in a property and co-owner authorization. |
| **Tribunal** | A body of one or more judges (in this case, an Administrative Law Judge) gathered to adjudicate a dispute. |







Behind the Gavel: Lessons from the Park Townhouses HOA Legal Battle

# Behind the Gavel: Lessons from the Park Townhouses HOA Legal Battle

In the world of Arizona property law, justice often comes with a steep price tag. For Marilyn J. Fogelsong, the entrance fee was exactly $2,000. That was the non-refundable "pay-to-play" filing fee required to bring four grievances before the Office of Administrative Hearings on July 16, 2025. 

The dispute centered on the Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, a "micro-HOA" in Tucson consisting of just eight units. But don't let the small scale fool you. What began as a disagreement over management choices and transparency spiraled into a multi-year legal saga that serves as a cautionary tale for any homeowner or board member navigating the administrative labyrinth of HOA governance.

### 1. The Standing Standoff: When is an Owner Not an Owner?
Before the merits of the case could even be weighed, Fogelsong faced a significant procedural hurdle: standing. The Board challenged her right to sue, pointing to her limited ownership stake. Fogelsong had paid $12,000 for a 5% interest in a unit owned by her son, Levi Lazarus.

The Board’s challenge carried a sting of irony. For three years, the Association and its management firm, Tucson Realty & Trust (TRT), had accepted Fogelsong as a voting member; she had even served as the Board President. However, as the legal battle intensified in 2025, the Board pivoted, arguing her "limited stake" disqualified her. While Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark affirmed that standing is "always an issue," the court ultimately applied the preponderance of evidence standard, allowing the co-owner’s voice to be heard.

### 2. Conflict of Interest: Professional Management vs. Personal Ties
The first major legal pivot involved the hiring of TRT. Fogelsong argued that TRT’s dual role—managing the HOA while simultaneously managing individual rental units for Board members Gerald Schwarzenbach and Mark Schlang—created a conflict of interest under ARS 33-1811. 

Fogelsong alleged that this "special relationship" led to unremitted fines and a lack of transparency. The Board’s defense, however, leaned on historical precedent and the practical realities of a small community.

| Petitioner's Allegations | Respondent's Defense |
| :--- | :--- |
| TRT’s dual role (HOA and unit manager) created an undisclosed conflict under ARS 33-1811. | TRT maintained separate divisions; similar arrangements existed for 20 years with previous firms without issue. |
| TRT failed to remit collected parking fines (approx. $350) to the HOA. | Fines lacked date/time stamps and were uncollectible; records were settled under protest during the management transition. |
| The Board and TRT withheld mandatory tenant contact and vehicle information. | Information was withheld as a protective measure because the Petitioner allegedly used prior data to run unauthorized background checks on tenants. |

The ALJ ultimately ruled that Fogelsong failed to prove the TRT contract specifically "benefited" board members in an unlawful manner, noting that the existence of separate management divisions mitigated the claim of a statutory violation.

### 3. The Painting Paradox: Authority vs. Owner Coordination
Issue #2 took the court into the aesthetics of the community. Fogelsong challenged a community-wide painting project, citing Paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs. She argued that while the HOA has authority over "Common Elements" (like the driveway), it had no right to manage or spend HOA funds on individual townhouses.

The 2026 rehearing revealed a crucial distinction for HOA boards: the "pooling of resources." The Board testified that while the HOA could not mandate the work, six out of eight owners had voluntarily contracted with the vendor to improve community aesthetics. Because the project was owner-coordinated and voluntary, the ALJ found no expenditure violation. The Petitioner’s case was further weakened by failing to provide the full text of the CC&Rs during the initial 2025 hearing, illustrating the "failed burden of proof" that haunts many self-represented litigants.

### 4. The "Paperwork Trap": Why Statutory Precision Matters
Perhaps the most frustrating chapter for the Petitioner was Issue #3. Fogelsong alleged that the Board refused to provide meeting minutes, financial statements, and management proposals. In testimony, the Board actually admitted they had failed to provide these records in a timely fashion. 

**However, Fogelsong still lost the claim.**

> **Legal Lesson Learned: The Due Process Trap**
> In administrative law, the court is bound by what is explicitly pled in the petition. Fogelsong alleged violations of **ARS 33-1804** (Open Meeting Laws). However, the failure to provide documents is governed by **ARS 33-1805** (Records Access). Because the wrong statute was cited, the ALJ could not find the HOA in violation, despite the Board’s admission of the delay.

Statutory precision also doomed the notice claim. Fogelsong pointed out that the agenda for the May 5, 2025 meeting was provided only 36 hours in advance, missing the 10-to-50-day requirement. But because the specific subsection (ARS 33-1804(B)) was not properly pled, the court’s hands were tied.

### 5. Jurisdictional Limits: The Stricken Claim
It is vital to note that a fourth issue—an alleged violation of **ARS 10-830** (Corporate Good Faith)—was stricken from the 2026 proceedings entirely. The ALJ ruled that the Department of Real Estate lacks the jurisdiction to enforce corporate "Good Faith" statutes, as its authority is strictly limited to Title 33 (Property) and specific HOA/Condominium governing documents.

### 6. Conclusion: Navigating the HOA Maze
Despite multiple hearings and a motion for summary judgment, Fogelsong’s petitions were ultimately denied. The 2025 and 2026 rulings reinforce a hard truth: in the administrative arena, being "right" about a grievance is only half the battle.

**Key Takeaways for Homeowners:**
1.  **The Burden is Yours:** The Petitioner must prove a fact is "more probable than not." Without time-stamped evidence or full CC&R texts, claims of illegal parking or unauthorized projects often fail.
2.  **Cite with Care:** Confusing "Open Meetings" (33-1804) with "Records Access" (33-1805) is a fatal error. The court cannot "fix" your petition to cite the correct law.
3.  **Understand "Pooling":** An HOA might not have the authority to paint your house, but if your neighbors voluntarily pool their resources, they can effectively bypass HOA expenditure restrictions to achieve community-wide goals.

The final decisions in these cases are now binding. For the residents of Park Townhouses, any further challenge would require an appeal to the Superior Court within 35 days—a final exit ramp in a long and costly legal journey.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Marilyn J. Fogelsong (Petitioner)
    Co-owner of Unit 2467
  • Levi Benjamin Lazarus (Co-owner)
    Son of petitioner
  • Jason Smith (Attorney)
    Retained by Petitioner to evaluate CC&Rs

Respondent Side

  • Gerald Schwarzenbach (Secretary and Respondent Representative)
    Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Owner of Unit 2463
  • Mark Schlang (Treasurer and Witness)
    Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Owner of Unit 2455
  • Andrew F. Vizcarra (Associate Manager)
    Tucson Realty & Trust Company, Management Services, LLC
    HOA property manager
  • Ray Flores (President)
    Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Sasha Flores (Bank Signer)
    Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Wife of Ray Flores

Neutral Parties

  • Nicole Robinson (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presided over the initial hearing
  • Jenna Clark (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presided over the rehearing
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • David Zeinfeld (Observer)
    Homeowner
  • Jodie Schlang (Observer)
  • Deborah Garcia (Broker)
    Tucson Realty & Trust Company

Nicholas Thomas v. Tanglewood Association

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H037-REL
Agency Arizona Department of Real Estate
Tribunal
Decision Date 2025-07-13
Administrative Law Judge KAA
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nicholas Thomas Counsel Pro Se
Respondent Tanglewood Association Counsel Hector Saavedra, Co-President

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H037-REL Decision – 1300705.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:40:08 (49.8 KB)

25F-H037-REL Decision – 1327762.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:40:17 (147.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 25F-H037-REL


Briefing Document: Nicholas Thomas v. Tanglewood Association (Case No. 25F-H037-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the proceedings and outcome of Case No. 25F-H037-REL, a dispute between property owner Nicholas Thomas (Petitioner) and the Tanglewood Association (HOA/Respondent). The case was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, with a final decision issued on July 13, 2025.

The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging that the HOA (1) failed in its duty to perform timely plumbing repairs, rendering his unit uninhabitable, and (2) failed to hire a professional property management company, leading to systemic financial and operational issues.

The HOA countered that the repair delays were not due to inaction but to severe financial constraints and the procedural necessity of securing a majority vote from homeowners for a special assessment. This funding was required for the extensive and costly repairs needed for the property’s aging infrastructure. The HOA highlighted that the Petitioner had never participated in these critical votes.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the Petitioner had not met his burden of proof. The decision concluded that the HOA’s actions were constrained by its financial reality and governing documents, not a breach of duty. The delays were attributed to the failed attempts to secure owner-approved funding via special assessment votes in prior years. The HOA was determined to be the prevailing party, and the Petitioner was ordered to bear his own filing fees.

I. Case Overview

Case Number: 25F-H037-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Nicholas Thomas, owner of Unit 141, Building 4

Respondent: Tanglewood Association (HOA), represented by Co-President Hector Saavedra

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn

Timeline:

Petition Filed: February 7, 2025

Hearing Date: May 16, 2025

Decision Issued: July 13, 2025

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by failing to maintain the property and by not hiring professional management. The matter was referred to the OAH for an evidentiary hearing.

II. Complaint #1: Failure to Repair Plumbing Issue

Petitioner’s Position

The central claim was that the HOA failed to address a severe plumbing issue in a timely manner, which stemmed from common lines outside the Petitioner’s unit.

Timeline of Events:

October 2024: The Petitioner first became aware of a plumbing issue causing the kitchen sink to back up. A private plumber determined the issue was external to the unit.

November 18, 2024: The HOA was formally notified of the problem.

January/February 2025: Communication from the HOA ceased, prompting the Petitioner to file his complaint.

February 18, 2025: The Petitioner canceled the lease with his tenants as the unit was deemed “uninhabitable” due to flooding and a non-functional sink.

Consequences: The Petitioner cited damage to the kitchen floor and walls, the loss of rental income, and the ongoing uninhabitable state of the unit. The water line to the sink was eventually capped in February 2025 to stop the flooding, but this did not resolve the underlying issue.

Key Quote: “The plumbing issue has been in place for 7 months. It has not been addressed. The house is currently unlivable, uninhabitable, still has damage in it. Um, and I do believe the HOA has failed in its required responsibilities to address this issue.” – Nicholas Thomas

Requested Relief:

1. An order for the HOA to fix the plumbing with a specific timeline.

2. Reimbursement of the $500 portion of the filing fee for this complaint.

3. Reimbursement for lost rent.

Respondent’s Position (Tanglewood HOA)

The HOA argued that the delay was a direct result of financial insolvency and procedural requirements stipulated in its governing documents, not negligence.

Systemic Problem: The plumbing issues were not isolated to the Petitioner’s unit but were part of a larger problem with the property’s aging infrastructure, dating back to 1965. A similar issue in another building cost $15,000 to repair two years prior.

Financial & Procedural Hurdles: The estimated cost for the current repairs was initially $15,000 but rose to $50,000. The HOA stated it was “flat broke” with minimal reserves. The CC&Rs mandate a majority vote of over 50% (50.1%) of owners to approve a special assessment for such funding.

Key Quote: “It should be noted that the board cannot increase the dues of the HOA or or ask for an special assessment unless we have a 50.01% vote from the owners. Mr. Thomas hasn’t voted in two three years and the things that he’s been asking for need their vote to make them happen.” – Hector Saavedra

Voting History: Attempts to pass a special assessment failed in 2022 and 2023 due to a lack of owner participation. The Petitioner acknowledged he had never voted.

Eventual Success: In 2025, after significant effort, the HOA secured a 50.35% vote to approve a $70,000 special assessment. This was structured in three phases to ease the financial burden on owners.

Current Action Plan: At the time of the hearing, the HOA had collected approximately $40,000, made a $15,000 down payment to a plumbing contractor, and was scheduling the work. The repairs were set to begin with Building 4, which includes the Petitioner’s unit and was identified as having the most severe damage.

III. Complaint #2: Lack of Professional Management

Petitioner’s Position

This complaint asserted that the root cause of the HOA’s problems was its self-managed, volunteer-run structure, which was incapable of handling the property’s complex needs.

Core Argument: A volunteer board lacks the time, expertise, and resources for effective financial management, enforcement of dues collection (including foreclosure on delinquent owners), and timely handling of maintenance. The Petitioner’s brother, Lucas Thomas, testified that in his 15 years as a property manager, he has consistently seen self-managed HOAs fail to operate correctly.

Alleged Financial Mismanagement: The Petitioner argued the HOA should have been proactively increasing dues up to the 20% annual limit allowed by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1803) without an owner vote, which would have built necessary reserves.

Key Quote: “Every time that there is a self-managed HOA, the volunteers just don’t have the knowledge or the knowhow or the connections to locals that they need to properly facilitate a giant management especially for 42 units.” – Lucas Thomas

Requested Relief:

1. An order for the HOA to hire a professional property management company.

2. Reimbursement of the $500 portion of the filing fee for this complaint.

Respondent’s Position (Tanglewood HOA)

The HOA acknowledged the challenges of a volunteer board but maintained that its primary obstacle was financial, not a lack of willingness to act.

Affordability: The board had discussed hiring a professional management company but concluded it could not afford the expense. They feared that passing the cost to owners would result in even greater delinquency in dues payments.

Volunteer Effort and Investment: The board is comprised of unpaid owner volunteers who live on the property and are personally impacted by the issues. Mr. Saavedra noted the immense personal time and stress involved, stating, “We are working we understand there’s around seven units right now that are vacant just like Mr. Thomas’s. We understand the pain of not being able to collect money from that from rent.”

Invitation to Participate: The HOA extended an invitation to Mr. Thomas to join the board and contribute to finding solutions.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision & Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the Petitioner’s petition on all counts, finding the evidence did not support a conclusion that the HOA had violated its duties.

Final Order:

◦ The Petitioner’s Petition is denied.

◦ The HOA is the prevailing party.

◦ The Petitioner shall bear his own filing fees ($1,000.00).

◦ The OAH does not have the authority to award damages, such as lost rent.

Rationale for Denying Complaint #1 (Plumbing Repair):

◦ The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving the HOA was not performing its duties.

◦ The evidence demonstrated that upon receiving complaints, the HOA hired a vendor and investigated the issue. The subsequent delay was a direct result of the high cost of repair and the HOA’s lack of funds.

◦ The HOA’s governing documents prevent a property manager or agent from spending more than $5,000, even in an emergency, without Board approval. Therefore, an immediate, large-scale repair was contractually and financially impossible without the owner-approved special assessment. The delay was thus a consequence of procedural and financial constraints, not a failure of duty.

Rationale for Denying Complaint #2 (Professional Management):

◦ The ALJ found the hearing record to be “simply vague” on this issue.

◦ It could not be determined whether the HOA ever had a property manager in the past or to whom the “Management Agreement” clauses in the CC&Rs currently apply. Without a clearer record, a violation could not be established.

V. Key Participants & Testimony

Participant

Key Testimony & Contributions

Nicholas Thomas

Petitioner, Owner of Unit 141

Outlined the 7-month timeline of the plumbing failure, the resulting uninhabitability of his unit, and the financial losses incurred. Argued for professional management and acknowledged he had never voted in HOA elections or assessments.

Hector Saavedra

Respondent, Co-President of Tanglewood HOA

Explained the HOA’s financial insolvency, the procedural requirement for a majority owner vote to pass special assessments, and the history of failed votes. Detailed the successful 2025 vote and the current plan to begin repairs. Invited the Petitioner to join the board.

Carl Kesler

Petitioner’s Property Manager

Corroborated the timeline of events and communications with the HOA. Confirmed the plumbing issue was localized to the kitchen and stemmed from a mainline sewer problem. Stated he had never been to the unit in person and did not forward all HOA correspondence to the Petitioner.

Lucas Thomas

Petitioner’s Brother, Former Property Manager

Testified from his 15 years of experience that self-managed HOAs are typically ineffective. Argued that a professional firm is necessary for proper financial management and maintenance, citing a past lawsuit where he forced another HOA to hire a management company, which turned the property around.


Questions

Question

Can I get monetary damages (like lost rent) from my HOA through an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

No, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) does not have the legal authority to award damages.

Detailed Answer

While the OAH can order an HOA to follow its governing documents, it cannot award financial compensation for losses such as lost rent or property damage.

Alj Quote

OAH does not have authority to award damages.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.

Topic Tags

  • damages
  • jurisdiction
  • compensation

Question

If my HOA fails to make repairs due to lack of funds, is it considered a violation?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if the HOA is taking steps to secure funding through a special assessment.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the ALJ found that the HOA could not be held in violation for failing to make immediate repairs when it lacked the necessary funds and was actively seeking a special assessment vote from owners to cover the costs.

Alj Quote

Given its financial situation, HOA determined the overall plumbing issues could not be repaired absent a special assessment to cover those specific and projected expenses… Therefore, the hearing record demonstrates that more immediate action to repair either Petitioner’s plumbing issues or the overall plumbing issues could not have been taken.

Legal Basis

Governing Documents / Financial Feasibility

Topic Tags

  • repairs
  • finances
  • special assessment

Question

Who acts as the 'burden of proof' in a hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove by a 'preponderance of the evidence' that the HOA violated its community documents or relevant statutes.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent HOA violated the alleged CC&R provisions.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standard
  • procedure

Question

Can I force my HOA board to hire a professional property management company?

Short Answer

Likely no, unless you can prove a specific requirement in the governing documents is being violated.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that the homeowner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the HOA was violating its duties by not hiring a property manager, noting the evidence regarding the requirement was vague.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal concludes that Petitioner has not met his burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that HOA was not timely performing 'their duties outlined' in CC&Rs Page 2, Section A; and Management Agreement… regarding property management, the hearing record is simply vague.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Management Agreement

Topic Tags

  • property management
  • board duties
  • self-management

Question

Does an HOA manager have unlimited spending power for emergency repairs?

Short Answer

No, governing documents often place specific dollar limits on spending without board/association approval.

Detailed Answer

The decision cites a management agreement that limits emergency repair spending (e.g., to $5,000) without prior approval from the Association.

Alj Quote

Agent shall not incur liabilities (direct or contingent) which will at any time exceed the aggregate of $5,000.00 … without first obtaining the approval of the Association.

Legal Basis

Management Agreement Contracts

Topic Tags

  • spending limits
  • emergency repairs
  • budget

Question

If I lose my case against the HOA, do I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

No, if the petition is denied, the petitioner is typically responsible for their own filing fees.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered that the Petitioner bear his own filing fees after Tanglewood Association was determined to be the prevailing party.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall bear his filing fees.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Case

Docket No
25F-H037-REL
Case Title
Nicholas Thomas v. Tanglewood Association
Decision Date
2025-07-13
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can I get monetary damages (like lost rent) from my HOA through an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

No, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) does not have the legal authority to award damages.

Detailed Answer

While the OAH can order an HOA to follow its governing documents, it cannot award financial compensation for losses such as lost rent or property damage.

Alj Quote

OAH does not have authority to award damages.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.

Topic Tags

  • damages
  • jurisdiction
  • compensation

Question

If my HOA fails to make repairs due to lack of funds, is it considered a violation?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if the HOA is taking steps to secure funding through a special assessment.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the ALJ found that the HOA could not be held in violation for failing to make immediate repairs when it lacked the necessary funds and was actively seeking a special assessment vote from owners to cover the costs.

Alj Quote

Given its financial situation, HOA determined the overall plumbing issues could not be repaired absent a special assessment to cover those specific and projected expenses… Therefore, the hearing record demonstrates that more immediate action to repair either Petitioner’s plumbing issues or the overall plumbing issues could not have been taken.

Legal Basis

Governing Documents / Financial Feasibility

Topic Tags

  • repairs
  • finances
  • special assessment

Question

Who acts as the 'burden of proof' in a hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove by a 'preponderance of the evidence' that the HOA violated its community documents or relevant statutes.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent HOA violated the alleged CC&R provisions.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standard
  • procedure

Question

Can I force my HOA board to hire a professional property management company?

Short Answer

Likely no, unless you can prove a specific requirement in the governing documents is being violated.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that the homeowner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the HOA was violating its duties by not hiring a property manager, noting the evidence regarding the requirement was vague.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal concludes that Petitioner has not met his burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that HOA was not timely performing 'their duties outlined' in CC&Rs Page 2, Section A; and Management Agreement… regarding property management, the hearing record is simply vague.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Management Agreement

Topic Tags

  • property management
  • board duties
  • self-management

Question

Does an HOA manager have unlimited spending power for emergency repairs?

Short Answer

No, governing documents often place specific dollar limits on spending without board/association approval.

Detailed Answer

The decision cites a management agreement that limits emergency repair spending (e.g., to $5,000) without prior approval from the Association.

Alj Quote

Agent shall not incur liabilities (direct or contingent) which will at any time exceed the aggregate of $5,000.00 … without first obtaining the approval of the Association.

Legal Basis

Management Agreement Contracts

Topic Tags

  • spending limits
  • emergency repairs
  • budget

Question

If I lose my case against the HOA, do I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

No, if the petition is denied, the petitioner is typically responsible for their own filing fees.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered that the Petitioner bear his own filing fees after Tanglewood Association was determined to be the prevailing party.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall bear his filing fees.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Case

Docket No
25F-H037-REL
Case Title
Nicholas Thomas v. Tanglewood Association
Decision Date
2025-07-13
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nicholas Thomas (Petitioner)
    Owner of Unit 141 in Building 4.
  • Carl Kesler (Witness and Property Manager)
    Current property manager for the Petitioner's unit.
  • Lucas Thomas (Witness)
    Petitioner's brother and former property manager.

Respondent Side

  • Hector Saavedra (Co-President and Representative)
    Tanglewood Association
    Represented the Tanglewood Association at the hearing.

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presiding judge who authored the decision.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Copied on transmittal of the hearing order and decision.

Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H030-REL
Agency
Tribunal
Decision Date 2025-06-02
Administrative Law Judge VMT
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Sharon M. Maiden Counsel
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1272425.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:18 (57.7 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1272426.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:22 (49.7 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1282372.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:25 (60.5 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1282375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:28 (9.1 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1284492.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:33 (56.1 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1288176.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:37 (60.1 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1288177.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:40 (7.4 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1293820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:43 (41.1 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1313134.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:47 (114.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 25F-H030-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing:Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative hearing case Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 25F-H030-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Sharon Maiden, a former board member, alleged that the association selectively enforced its bylaws to disqualify her from running for the board and violated Arizona’s open meeting laws by making this decision in a closed executive session.

The central conflict revolved around the interpretation of a 2021 bylaw amendment that shortened board member term limits. The petitioner argued for a prospective application, which would reset the term-limit clock for sitting board members, while the respondent association argued for an interpretation that counted prior service.

On June 2, 2025, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issued a decision denying the petition in its entirety. The judge concluded that the association’s board acted within the bounds of Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)) by holding a closed session to consider legal advice. Furthermore, the judge found that the petitioner failed to prove a bylaw violation, reasoning that the association’s interpretation was consistent with the membership’s clear intent to shorten, not lengthen, the potential tenure of board members.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Number

25F-H030-REL

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Petitioner

Sharon M. Maiden

Respondent

Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Josh Bolen, Esq. (CHDB Law LLP)

Presiding Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petition Allegations

The petition, filed by Sharon Maiden on December 15, 2024, asserted two primary violations by the Val Vista Lakes Community Association:

1. Selective Enforcement of Bylaws: An alleged violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Association’s Bylaws, stemming from the board’s decision to disqualify the petitioner from running for a board position in 2024 based on its interpretation of term limits.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: An alleged violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A), contending that the board failed to hold an open meeting when it made the binding decision to disqualify her candidacy.

Initially filed as a single-issue petition for which a $500 fee was paid, the OAH ordered on March 12, 2025, that the petitioner must either pay an additional $500 to pursue both issues or select one to proceed with at the hearing.

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Procedural History

January 27, 2025: The Arizona Department of Real Estate refers the petition to the OAH for an administrative hearing.

February 4, 2025: Respondent files a Motion to Strike the Petition, arguing the petitioner improperly disclosed attorney-client privileged communications.

February 11, 2025: Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn denies the Motion to Strike. The hearing is continued to March 26, 2025.

March 26, 2025: The first day of the evidentiary hearing is conducted.

April 11, 2025: A further hearing is conducted. At its conclusion, the record is held open to allow for post-hearing briefing.

May 13, 2025: The post-hearing briefing period concludes, and the record is closed.

June 2, 2025: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues the final decision, denying the petition.

Central Dispute: Interpretation of Bylaw Term Limits

The core of the dispute was the interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 of the association’s bylaws, which was amended in 2021. The amendment’s purpose, as testified by multiple witnesses, was to shorten the length of time directors could serve on the board.

Evolution of the Bylaw

2012 Bylaws: Introduced term limits for the first time, establishing a maximum of three consecutive two-year terms (six years total), followed by a required one-year break.

2021 Bylaws: The membership approved a rewrite that reduced term limits to two consecutive elected two-year terms (four years total), followed by a required two-year break.

Both versions of the bylaw contained the following critical sentence: “Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits as follows.” The meaning of this sentence became the primary point of contention.

Competing Interpretations

Position

Argument Summary

Key Evidence and Testimony

Petitioner’s Position (Prospective Application)

The “Commencing with…” language resets the clock. Terms served before the 2021 amendment should not count toward the new, shorter limits. The association’s sudden shift to a retroactive interpretation was selective and targeted.

William Sutell (Former President): Testified the intent was to “reset the clock for everybody.” His 2022 newsletter stating his “term limit of four years is up” was “ineloquent” and meant to express he was tired of serving.
Douglas Keats (Former Board Member): Stated the intent of the rewrite was to “Go forward.”
Historical Precedent: The association, based on a 2016 legal opinion from Goodman Law Group, had allowed Director Cheryl McCoy to serve nine consecutive years despite the 2012 bylaw’s six-year limit.
Legal Opinions: An opinion from Krupnik & Speas in November 2023 stated the 2021 bylaws were prospective, not retroactive.

Respondent’s Position (Prior Service Counts)

The clear intent of the membership and the bylaw committee was to shorten terms. The petitioner’s interpretation creates a loophole allowing sitting board members to serve for 8 or more years, directly contradicting the amendment’s purpose.

Jill Brown (Bylaw Committee Chair): Testified the committee’s intent was to apply the new limits to sitting directors and there was no discussion of “grandfathering” anyone.
Bryan Patterson (Current President): Testified that the membership voted for two two-year terms “and that’s it.”
Sutell’s 2022 Newsletter: Presented as a direct admission from the former president that the four-year limit applied to him based on his service from 2018-2022.
Drafting Logic: The “Commencing with…” clause is a standard legal provision to prevent a new rule from invalidating a board member’s current term, not to erase their entire service history.

Central Dispute: Alleged Open Meeting Law Violation

The second major issue concerned the board’s decision-making process. On October 11, 2024, the board held a closed executive session where it voted 5-4 to accept the legal opinion of its counsel (CHDB Law) and disqualify Ms. Maiden from the ballot.

Competing Arguments

Position

Argument Summary

Key Evidence and Testimony

Petitioner’s Argument (Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A))

The vote to disqualify a candidate was a final, binding decision that must be made in an open meeting. The closed session was not justified under the narrow exceptions of the statute.

Improper Notice: The meeting notice cited the incorrect statute (for condominiums, not planned communities) and was not properly distributed to all board members.
Lack of Statutory Justification: No attorney was present at the meeting, and there was no pending litigation at that specific moment. The agenda item was to “accept opinion,” not simply “receive advice.”

Respondent’s Argument (Compliance with Law)

The executive session was permissible under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1), which allows closed meetings for the “consideration of… Legal advice from an attorney for the board or the association” and matters concerning “pending or contemplated litigation.”

Contemplated Litigation: Testimony indicated that Ms. Maiden had threatened to file an ADR complaint or lawsuit.
Consideration of Legal Advice: The board was reviewing three separate legal opinions regarding Ms. Maiden’s eligibility.
Petitioner’s Participation: Ms. Maiden was present at the meeting, participated in the vote, and did not object to the session being held in private at that time.

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Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ denied Ms. Maiden’s petition on both counts, finding that she failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Ruling on the Open Meeting Law

The ALJ concluded that the board did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Key Rationale: The evidence demonstrated that the board met in executive session “to consider a legal opinion regarding the 2021 Amendment.” This action falls squarely within the statutory exception outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1).

On Disclosure: The statute permits, but does not require, the board to disclose information from such a session after a “final resolution.” As the matter was still being litigated, no final resolution had been reached.

Ruling on the Bylaw Violation

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Article IV of its bylaws.

Key Rationale: The judge focused on the underlying purpose of the 2021 amendment, which testimony from both sides confirmed was to “prevent Board members from serving for long periods of time.”

Rejection of Petitioner’s Interpretation: The decision noted that the petitioner, along with her witnesses, admitted that their interpretation “would have allowed the then-sitting Board Members the right to serve 6, 8, and potentially 10-year term limits.” The ALJ found this outcome would be contrary to the amendment’s purpose.

Jurisdictional Note: The decision explicitly stated that the “issue of selective enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” The ruling was based on the interpretation of the bylaw’s text and intent, not on whether it was applied unevenly.

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that Respondent’s Board violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 or Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws.”






Study Guide – 25F-H030-REL


Administrative Hearing Study Guide: Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source context.

1. What were the two primary legal issues Sharon Maiden raised in her petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association?

2. What was the key phrase in the 2021 bylaws that became the central point of interpretive conflict regarding term limits?

3. According to the hearing testimony, what were the main purposes of the 2021 bylaw committee’s rewrite of the association’s bylaws?

4. Explain the Respondent’s justification for holding a closed executive session on October 11, 2024, to decide on Sharon Maiden’s eligibility.

5. How did the legal opinions from the Goodman Law Group (Ashley Turner) and Krupnik & Spees (Adrien Speed) support the Petitioner’s case?

6. Describe the key piece of evidence the Respondent used involving former board president William (Bill) Sutell to argue against a prospective interpretation of the term limits.

7. What decision did the Board of Directors make during the October 11, 2024, executive session, and what was the final vote count?

8. What procedural issue did Petitioner Douglas Keats identify with the notice for the October 11, 2024, executive session?

9. According to witness Jill Brown, what was the general intent of the bylaw committee and community members regarding the length of board service?

10. What were the final conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge in the June 2, 2025, decision?

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Answer Key

1. Petitioner Sharon Maiden alleged that the Respondent (1) selectively enforced the Bylaws in violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3, and (2) failed to hold an open meeting when it decided to disqualify her from running for the Board, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A).

2. The central point of conflict was the phrase in Article IV, Section 2: “Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits…” The Petitioner argued this indicated a prospective “reset,” while the Respondent argued it did not erase prior service.

3. Testimony from witnesses like Douglas Keats and William Sutell indicated the rewrite was intended to address multiple issues, not just term limits. Key purposes included establishing secret ballots, eliminating the nominating committee which was seen as counter to the CCNRs, and creating a formal procedure for replacing board members based on vote counts rather than board appointments.

4. The Respondent justified the closed session under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1), which allows for closed meetings to consider legal advice from an attorney. The board was discussing three separate legal opinions regarding Ms. Maiden’s eligibility and also noted that Ms. Maiden had contemplated legal action against the association.

5. The Petitioner argued that these opinions demonstrated a consistent historical interpretation by the association’s own general counsels. Both opinions stated that the term limit language in the 2012 and 2021 bylaws should be interpreted prospectively, meaning terms served prior to the adoption of the new bylaws did not count toward the new limits.

6. The Respondent heavily relied on a November 2022 newsletter message from then-president Bill Sutell. In it, Mr. Sutell stated, “This will be my last president’s message to the community as my term limit of four years is up,” which the Respondent argued was an admission that the term limits were not reset by the 2021 bylaw amendment.

7. The Board of Directors voted to accept the opinion of CHDB Law LLP regarding term limits, which effectively disqualified Sharon Maiden from running in the 2024 election. The motion passed with a vote of 5 to 4.

8. Douglas Keats testified that the email notice for the executive session was not sent to him or two other board members (Christine Rucker and Curtis Weile) at their correct addresses, while it was sent to a former board member. He also noted the notice cited an incorrect statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248 for condominiums) instead of the one for planned communities.

9. Jill Brown, who chaired the bylaw committee, testified that the general consensus of the committee and community members was that they did not want directors serving for long periods. The intent was to shorten the available terms to encourage turnover and prevent directors from serving for “excessive amounts of time.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied Sharon Maiden’s petition. The Judge concluded that the Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the closed meeting to consider legal advice was permissible. Furthermore, the Judge found Maiden failed to prove a violation of the bylaws, stating the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to prevent long service periods, and deemed the issue of selective enforcement to be outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

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Essay Questions

Construct detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from across the source documents. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioner and Respondent regarding the proper interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law). Discuss the specific actions taken by the board and how each party framed those actions in the context of the statute’s exceptions for closed sessions.

2. Compare and contrast the testimonies of William Sutell and Douglas Keats with that of Jill Brown. How did their recollections and interpretations of the bylaw committee’s intent differ, particularly concerning whether the new term limits should apply prospectively or retroactively to sitting board members?

3. Trace the evolution of the Val Vista Lakes Community Association’s bylaws regarding term limits from 2012 to 2021. Evaluate the arguments concerning “long-standing practice” and “selective enforcement,” referencing the specific cases of board members Cheryl McCoy, William Sutell, and Sharon Maiden.

4. Examine the role of conflicting legal advice in this dispute. Discuss the different opinions offered by the Goodman Law Group, Krupnik & Spees, and CHDB Law LLP, and analyze how the Board of Directors chose to navigate these contradictory recommendations.

5. The Administrative Law Judge’s final decision states that the “issue of selective enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” Based on the testimony and arguments presented, construct an argument that Sharon Maiden might have made regarding selective enforcement, and explain why the Respondent would have refuted it.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Kay A. Abramsohn and Velva Moses-Thompson served as ALJs.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from members of homeowners’ associations. It referred this case to the OAH.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. Key statutes in this case include § 33-1804(A) and § 32-2199.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

The Arizona statute concerning open meeting laws for planned community associations. It mandates that meetings be open to members but provides specific, limited exceptions for closed (executive) sessions, such as to discuss legal advice.

Bolen, Josh

An attorney with CHDB Law LLP who served as counsel for the Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Brown, Jill

A witness for the Respondent. She served as the chair of the 2021 bylaw committee and was a current board member at the time of the hearing.

Bylaw Committee

A committee established by the board in 2021 to review and recommend changes to the association’s bylaws. Its members included Jill Brown, William Sutell, and Douglas Keats.

Carpenter Hazelwood (CHDB LAW LLP)

The law firm that represented the Respondent. The Petitioner filed an unsuccessful motion to disqualify the firm.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing documents for the community. The 2021 bylaw committee sought to address bylaw provisions that were counter to the CCNRs, such as the nominating committee.

Commencing with…

The key phrase in Article IV, Section 2 of the bylaws that was central to the dispute. The Petitioner argued it signaled a prospective application of term limits, while the Respondent disagreed.

Executive Session

A closed meeting of the Board of Directors, permitted under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) for specific purposes, such as discussing legal advice or pending litigation.

Keats, Douglas

A witness for the Petitioner. He was a former board member who served as secretary of the 2021 bylaw committee.

Maiden, Sharon M.

The Petitioner in the case, a homeowner in Val Vista Lakes and a former member of its Board of Directors who was disqualified from running for a third consecutive term.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH / Tribunal)

The independent state agency that conducted the administrative hearing for this case after referral from the Department of Real Estate.

Patterson, Bryan

A witness for the Respondent. He was the HOA President at the time of the hearing and was Vice President when the vote to disqualify the Petitioner occurred.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Sharon M. Maiden.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this administrative hearing, defined as evidence that is more likely true than not. The ALJ found the Petitioner failed to meet this burden.

Prospective Interpretation

The argument that a new rule or law applies only “going forward” from its effective date and does not consider service or actions that occurred prior to that date. This was the Petitioner’s central argument.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Retroactive Interpretation

The argument that a new rule or law applies to past events, meaning prior service on the board would count against the newly established term limits. This was the Respondent’s position.

Sutell, William (Bill)

A witness for the Petitioner. He is an attorney, a former board president, and served on the 2021 bylaw committee.

Val Vista Lakes Community Association

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners’ association (HOA) in Gilbert, Arizona.






Blog Post – 25F-H030-REL


5 Surprising Lessons from an HOA War Over a Single Sentence

Introduction: The Butterfly Effect of Bylaws

For many homeowners, the rules set by their homeowners’ association (HOA) can feel arbitrary, buried in dense legal documents. But the precise wording of those governing documents has massive, unforeseen consequences—a legal butterfly effect where a minor change creates a major storm. This dynamic was on full display in the case of Sharon Maiden vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, where one seemingly simple sentence sparked a complex, year-long legal dispute.

The case offers a masterclass in the tension between the technical reading of a text versus its clear, underlying intent. It provides surprising insights into law, community governance, and human nature. Here are five key lessons from this HOA war over a single sentence.

——————————————————————————–

1. One Sentence, Two Meanings, and a Mountain of Legal Bills

A 2021 bylaw amendment, designed to reduce board member term limits, lit the fuse for the central conflict. The entire dispute hinged on the interpretation of one introductory phrase, demonstrating just how much can ride on a few words.

The critical sentence from Article IV, Section 2 of the 2021 Bylaws reads:

“Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits as follows.”

This single sentence gave rise to two completely opposite interpretations:

The “Reset” Theory (Petitioner’s view): Proponents argued this language meant the term limit clock reset for all sitting board members. Under this view, their prior years of service didn’t count toward the new, shorter limit. This interpretation seemed solid, even supported by a formal legal opinion from the association’s previous general counsel, attorney Adrien Spees.

The “Look-Back” Theory (Respondent’s view): The association argued the phrase was merely a legal formality to prevent sitting members from being disqualified mid-term. They contended that a board member’s prior service absolutely still counted toward the new limit.

The fact that this ambiguity was enough to fuel a formal administrative hearing shows the high stakes of precise legal drafting. What’s truly surprising is how a standard legal phrase like “Commencing with…” could be interpreted so diametrically as to potentially erase years of board service from the term-limit calculation.

2. The Architect of the Rule Became Its Most Complicated Case

One of the most fascinating aspects of the case involved the testimony of Bill Sutell, the former Board President. Mr. Sutell was in charge when the 2021 bylaw changes were drafted and approved, and he testified in support of the “reset” theory, which would have allowed him and other members to serve longer.

However, the strongest piece of evidence used against his position came from his own hand. In a 2022 newsletter to the community, Mr. Sutell had written:

“This will be my last president’s message to the community as my term limit of four years is up.”

When questioned, he explained the statement was “ineloquent.” He testified he was tired and had a “self-imposed term limit” because he “didn’t want to be a career board member.” This created a paradox where the rule’s architect argued for one interpretation in court while his own public statement seemed to support the opposing view. As community governance analysts, we see a crucial lesson here: for HOA volunteers, informal communications like a newsletter can be scrutinized with the same intensity as a legal document—a trap many well-meaning leaders are unprepared for.

3. Why a “Correct” Interpretation Can Still Be Wrong

The petitioner’s side came to the hearing with what seemed like very strong evidence. They had testimony about the bylaw committee’s intent and presented a formal legal opinion from attorney Adrien Spees that appeared to settle the matter:

“This amendment is prospective not retroactive. The Term limits only apply to directors elected beginning the first annual meeting following November 9th, 2021. Thus, a director who has served for several years before November 9th, 2021 will still be eligible to serve two consecutive terms after November 9th, 2021.”

This seems clear-cut. However, the argument that ultimately won focused not on what the words said, but on what they would do. The fatal blow to the “reset” theory came not from the respondent’s lawyers, but from the petitioner’s own key witnesses. During testimony, both Sutell and another witness, Douglas Keats, admitted that their interpretation would create a massive loophole, allowing sitting board members “the right to serve 6, 8, and potentially 10-year term limits.” This admission was critical. The Administrative Law Judge rejected an interpretation—even one supported by a legal opinion—because it led to an “absurd result” that directly contradicted the stated purpose of the rule, which was to shorten term limits, not accidentally lengthen them for a select few.

4. The Peril of a Closed-Door Meeting

The second major issue was the claim that the board violated Arizona’s open meeting laws. The vote to disqualify Sharon Maiden from the 2024 ballot was not taken in public. Instead, it happened during a closed executive session while she, a sitting board member, was present.

The board justified the closed-door meeting by stating they were discussing legal advice and contemplated litigation, a valid exception under A.R.S. § 33-1804. However, the ALJ’s final decision highlighted a crucial detail:

“Petitioner was a member of the Board at the time of the meeting and did not object to the Board voting on whether Article IV, Section 2 of Respondent’s Bylaws permitted Petitioner to run for the board…”

This offers a stark lesson. A person’s failure to object to a process in the moment can significantly weaken their ability to challenge it later. It’s easy to see why someone might stay silent: they may be intimidated, unsure of the rules, or simply not realize the procedural gravity of their silence. This surprising takeaway underscores that understanding the rules of order as they are happening is critical, because silence can be interpreted as consent.

5. The “Why” Trumped the “What”

The story concluded when the Administrative Law Judge denied the petitioner’s case on both counts. In the face of ambiguous text and competing legal opinions, the judge focused on the fundamental purpose of the 2021 bylaw amendment. The final decision stated:

“…the preponderance of the evidence presented at hearing shows that the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to prevent Board members for serving on the Board for long periods of time.”

In this legal gray area, the underlying intent—the “why” behind the rule—proved more powerful than the technical arguments about the “what.” The judge determined that an interpretation creating 10-year term limits could not possibly align with the members’ vote to prevent people from serving for long periods. The surprising lesson is that even when the text is debatable, the spirit of a rule can become the most decisive factor in its application.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What Your Rules Mean?

The Val Vista Lakes case is a powerful reminder that the words in bylaws are not just suggestions; they have real-world power to shape communities, define rights, and launch costly legal battles. Bylaws are “living documents” in the sense that they have a daily impact, but they are dangerously “dead documents” if members don’t understand them. The consequences are not just financial. At the hearing, former president Bill Sutell gave a poignant final statement explaining his departure from the community he had worked so hard to serve: “I sold my home that this was more than I needed in my retirement.”

This case is a cautionary tale about the human cost of ambiguity. It leaves every HOA member with a final, thought-provoking challenge: When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and are you willing to actively question ambiguity and push for clarity before a conflict arises?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sharon M. Maiden (Petitioner)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Self-represented petitioner and homeowner
  • William Sutell (Witness)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Former board president who testified on behalf of the petitioner
  • Douglas Keats (Witness)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Former board member who testified on behalf of the petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Josh Bolen (Counsel)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Attorney representing the respondent
  • Jill Brown (Witness)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Current board member who testified on behalf of the respondent
  • Bryan Patterson (Witness)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Current board president who testified on behalf of the respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presiding judge who issued the final decision
  • Kay A. Abramsohn (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed a pre-hearing order
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received copies of the orders and decisions

Anne F. Segal vs Prince Court Homeowners Association, INC.

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H032-REL
Agency Arizona Department of Real Estate
Tribunal
Decision Date 2025-05-22
Administrative Law Judge JC
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Anne F. Segal Counsel Pro Se
Respondent Prince Court Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Ehrlich, Esq.

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H032-REL Decision – 1269718.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:38:59 (53.7 KB)

25F-H032-REL Decision – 1269742.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:39:05 (7.8 KB)

25F-H032-REL Decision – 1274756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:39:08 (54.6 KB)

25F-H032-REL Decision – 1274775.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:39:17 (7.9 KB)

25F-H032-REL Decision – 1277633.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:39:22 (48.1 KB)

25F-H032-REL Decision – 1288621.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:39:25 (51.6 KB)

25F-H032-REL Decision – 1308520.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:39:30 (206.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 25F-H032-REL


Briefing Document: Segal vs. Prince Court Homeowners Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcome of the administrative case Anne F. Segal, Petitioner, vs. Prince Court Homeowners Association, Inc., Respondent (No. 25F-H032-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute centered on the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent HOA utilized unlawful procedures to replace the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The petitioner argued that the HOA violated state statutes and the original governing documents by failing to hold sufficient open meetings for discussion, by not providing a proper ballot for a vote, and by circumventing a one-year discussion period intended by the original developer. Key evidence presented by the petitioner included testimony from the community’s original developer, who affirmed his intent for a lengthy, homeowner-driven amendment process, and testimony detailing significant, substantive changes to the CC&Rs that were allegedly not transparently communicated.

The respondent HOA defended its actions by asserting full compliance with Arizona law, particularly A.R.S. § 33-1817, which permits amendments via written consent of a majority of homeowners—a process legally distinct from a formal vote. The HOA maintained that state law superseded any conflicting provisions in the original CC&Rs. The board justified its decision to forgo a large, open-forum meeting by citing perceived “aggressive and threatening” communications from the petitioner, opting instead for a process of email-based “straw polls,” a formal Q&A period with its attorney, and a notarization event for collecting written consent.

Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition. The final decision concluded that the petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof. The ALJ found that the HOA acted lawfully by using executive sessions to obtain legal advice, by amending the CC&Rs through the statutory process of written consent, and that other statutes cited by the petitioner were inapplicable to the case.

Case Overview

The matter involves a formal petition filed on December 22, 2024, by homeowner Anne F. Segal with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The petition alleged that the Prince Court Homeowners Association, Inc. violated multiple Arizona Revised Statutes (§§ 33-1812, 33-1803(B-E), 33-1804, 33-1817) and its own governing documents (initially cited as Article V, later amended to Article VII) during the process of replacing the community’s CC&Rs.

The case was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings, with evidentiary hearings held on March 27, 2025, and May 2, 2025, before Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark. A final decision denying the petition was issued on May 22, 2025.

Key Parties and Witnesses

Name / Entity

Key Contributions

Anne F. Segal

Petitioner, Homeowner

Argued the HOA’s process was unlawful, lacked transparency, and violated open meeting laws and voting rights. Provided testimony and evidence regarding communications and the substance of the CC&R changes.

Prince Court Homeowners Association

Respondent

Defended its amendment process as compliant with state statutes for written consent and justified its communication methods based on legal advice and the petitioner’s conduct.

Mary Beth Snyder

President, HOA Board

Testified on behalf of the HOA (also called as an adverse witness by Petitioner). Detailed the board’s decision-making process, reliance on legal counsel, and rationale for avoiding an open-forum meeting.

Susan Matheson

Vice President, HOA Board

Corroborated Snyder’s testimony. Testified to managing the HOA’s email communications, including the accidental removal of David Zinfeld from the distribution list. Detailed complaints received from other homeowners about the petitioner’s communications.

David Zinfeld

Witness for Petitioner; Original Developer of Prince Court

Testified that he wrote the original CC&Rs with the intent for a year-long, homeowner-led discussion before any amendments. Stated he stopped receiving HOA communications and was not involved in or properly notified of the replacement process.

Dr. Robert Segal

Witness for Petitioner; Husband of Petitioner and Property Manager

Testified to the lack of open meetings and poor communication. Described the proposed CC&R changes as a “heart transplant” and highlighted discrepancies between the board’s “summary of changes” and the actual legal text.

Wendy Ehrlich, Esq.

Counsel for Respondent

Provided legal advice to the HOA board, which formed the basis for their procedural decisions. Argued the case for the Respondent during the hearings.

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge

Presided over the hearings and issued the final decision, concluding the HOA acted lawfully and denying the petition.

——————————————————————————–

Central Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Core Allegations

The petitioner’s case was built on the premise that the HOA’s procedure for replacing the CC&Rs was fundamentally flawed and unlawful.

Violation of Governing Documents (Article VII): The petitioner argued the HOA ignored the original CC&Rs, which, according to the original developer David Zinfeld, intended a one-year period of open discussion prior to any amendment. Zinfeld testified, “I wanted it to be done at least a year beforehand…with discussion and meetings before any amendments should take place.”

Improper Amendment Process: The petitioner contended that the “notarized agreement” process was not a valid “vote” and violated A.R.S. § 33-1812. This process did not provide a formal ballot or an opportunity for homeowners to vote “for or against” the action, effectively silencing dissent.

Violation of Open Meeting Laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804): The petitioner alleged a lack of genuine open meetings where the substance of the new CC&Rs could be debated. Testimony indicated that discussions about the CC&Rs primarily occurred in closed executive sessions, justified by the board as necessary for receiving legal advice.

Inadequate and Misleading Communication: Dr. Robert Segal described the summary of changes provided by the board as misleading and incomplete. He gave specific examples, such as a new rule allowing the board to remove any “objectionable” vehicle, which was not mentioned in the summary provided to homeowners. The petitioner also argued that relying solely on an incomplete and unverified email list was an unreasonable means of notice.

Substantive Overhaul Without Consent: Dr. Segal characterized the changes as a “heart transplant,” not a minor revision. He noted the new CC&Rs gave the board “much more power and authority,” including the ability to raise fees by 20% per year.

Respondent’s Defense

The respondent HOA maintained that its actions were deliberate, based on legal counsel, and fully compliant with Arizona law.

Adherence to Statutory Process (A.R.S. § 33-1817): The HOA’s central defense was that A.R.S. § 33-1817 allows for CC&R amendments through either an “affirmative vote or written consent.” They argued they lawfully chose the written consent path, which does not require a formal ballot under A.R.S. § 33-1812. Their counsel stated, “Article 7 dictated written consent. There was no vote conducted.”

State Law Supersedes Governing Documents: The HOA argued, and noted in its October 14, 2024 email to members, that “The time limitations for CC&R amendments set forth in our current CC&Rs, Article VII… have been superseded by Arizona law which allows CC&Rs to be amended at any time; see A.R.S. § 33-1817.”

Justification for Avoiding an Open Forum: Both Mary Beth Snyder and Susan Matheson testified that the decision not to hold a large, in-person informational meeting was based on legal advice and the board’s concern that the petitioner would “hijack the meeting” due to her perceived “aggressive and threatening” emails and communications. Matheson read excerpts from petitioner’s emails, including phrases like “This unilateral decision of the board is buying a lawsuit” and “I’m willing to legally challenge this effort.”

Reasonable Communication Efforts: The board defended its use of email as a reasonable means of notice. They testified to sending eight separate email communications regarding the CC&Rs, including “straw polls” to gauge opinion, drafts of the new CC&Rs, and a formal Q&A where the board’s attorney answered submitted questions.

——————————————————————————–

Final Adjudication: Administrative Law Judge Decision

On May 22, 2025, Judge Jenna Clark issued a decision denying the petition in its entirety, finding that the petitioner had not sustained her burden of proof.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined a timeline of events from the initial announcement in March 2024 to the notarization event in December 2024. Key findings included:

• The board hired counsel in April 2024 to assist with updating the CC&Rs.

• The association conducted “straw poll” emails in July and August 2024.

• The board held closed executive sessions to discuss legal advice from its attorney regarding the CC&R revisions.

• A draft of the proposed CC&Rs was distributed to members via email on October 14, 2024.

• A Q&A process was conducted, with attorney-provided answers distributed on November 25, 2025.

• The association intentionally did not hold a large open meeting due to concerns over the petitioner’s perceived behavior.

• A majority of homeowners (at least 20 of 39) provided signed and notarized consent agreements.

Conclusions of Law

The ALJ made the following legal conclusions, which formed the basis of the denial:

1. Written Consent is a Lawful Process: The Tribunal found that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) explicitly allows an association to amend its declaration by “an affirmative vote or written consent.” The HOA lawfully chose the written consent method.

2. State Law Supersedes CC&Rs: The provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1817 supersede the edicts outlined in Article VII of the original CC&Rs regarding the amendment timeline.

3. Executive Sessions Were Permissible: The board was permitted under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) to go into executive session to receive legal advice from its attorney, even if the advice was unrelated to pending litigation.

4. Inapplicability of Other Statutes: The statutes regarding voting procedures (A.R.S. § 33-1812) and violation notices (A.R.S. § 33-1803) were deemed inapplicable and irrelevant to the matter at hand, as no formal vote was conducted and no violation notice was issued to the petitioner.

5. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The decision concluded that the petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent had violated any of the cited statutes or its governing documents. The petition was therefore denied.


Questions

Question

Can an HOA amend its CC&Rs by obtaining written consent from homeowners rather than holding a vote?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA is permitted to amend CC&Rs by written consent under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), and voting statutes do not apply to this process.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the association was permitted to modify its CC&Rs by written consent of its members. Because this process falls under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), the statutes governing voting (A.R.S. § 33-1812) are considered unrelated and irrelevant to the proceedings.

Alj Quote

It is clear from the record that the Association … was also permitted to modify or otherwise amend its CC&Rs by written consent of its Members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(A)(1)… Notably, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1812(A) and 33-1803 are inapplicable to the proceedings at bar as unrelated and irrelevant.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Amendments
  • Written Consent
  • Voting Rights

Question

Does state law override CC&R provisions that restrict when amendments can be made (e.g., only every 10 years)?

Short Answer

Yes, A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) supersedes original CC&R restrictions regarding periodic renewal or specific timelines for amendments.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that state statute supersedes 'edicts' in original CC&Rs regarding timing for amendments. Even if the original documents specify a renewal period, the association can amend the documents via the statutory written consent process.

Alj Quote

…permitted to modify or otherwise amend its CC&Rs by written consent of its Members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(A)(1); which supersedes any edicts outlined in Article VII of the original CC&Rs.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Amendments
  • State Statute Supremacy
  • Governing Documents

Question

Can the HOA Board hold a closed executive session to get legal advice if there is no pending lawsuit?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board may meet in executive session to receive legal advice from their attorney, even if it is unrelated to pending litigation.

Detailed Answer

Homeowners often believe legal advice must relate to a lawsuit for a meeting to be closed. However, the ALJ ruled that the Board is permitted to go into executive session to receive legal advice unrelated to pending litigation under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Alj Quote

It is clear from the record that the Association was not only permitted to go into executive session to receive legal advice unrelated to pending litigation from its attorney under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • Open Meetings
  • Executive Session
  • Legal Advice

Question

Is the HOA required to hold an open discussion or town hall meeting before amending the CC&Rs?

Short Answer

No, the tribunal found that there is no requirement to permit members to openly deliberate proposed changes for a specific period if the statutory process is followed.

Detailed Answer

The petitioner argued that the HOA was required to permit open deliberation for at least one year. The ALJ disagreed, ruling that the petitioner did not sustain the burden of proof for this contention, implying statutory compliance for written consent is sufficient.

Alj Quote

Specifically, Petitioner contends that Respondent was required to permit Members to openly deliberate proposed changes to the CC&Rs for at least 1 year… the Tribunal is not in agreement with either of Petitioner’s contentions, and holds that she has not sustained her burden of proof in this matter.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Topic Tags

  • Procedural Requirements
  • Open Discussion
  • CC&R Amendments

Question

Do statutes regarding monetary penalties apply to the process of amending CC&Rs?

Short Answer

No, statutes regarding fines and penalties are irrelevant to the amendment process if no actual violation notice was issued or penalty imposed.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ dismissed allegations regarding A.R.S. § 33-1803 (which governs monetary penalties) because they were inapplicable to a dispute centered on the procedural validity of amending CC&Rs where no fines were levied.

Alj Quote

Notably, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1812(A) and 33-1803 are inapplicable to the proceedings at bar as unrelated and irrelevant. No violations of these statutes have been established by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

  • Penalties
  • Statutory Application
  • Relevance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof in a hearing regarding HOA procedural violations?

Short Answer

The petitioner (homeowner) bears the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

In administrative hearings regarding HOA disputes, it is up to the homeowner filing the petition to prove that their allegations are more probably true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed the alleged statutory and/or governing document violation(s).

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Legal Procedure

Case

Docket No
25F-H032-REL
Case Title
Anne F. Segal v. Prince Court Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2025-05-22
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can an HOA amend its CC&Rs by obtaining written consent from homeowners rather than holding a vote?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA is permitted to amend CC&Rs by written consent under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), and voting statutes do not apply to this process.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the association was permitted to modify its CC&Rs by written consent of its members. Because this process falls under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), the statutes governing voting (A.R.S. § 33-1812) are considered unrelated and irrelevant to the proceedings.

Alj Quote

It is clear from the record that the Association … was also permitted to modify or otherwise amend its CC&Rs by written consent of its Members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(A)(1)… Notably, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1812(A) and 33-1803 are inapplicable to the proceedings at bar as unrelated and irrelevant.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Amendments
  • Written Consent
  • Voting Rights

Question

Does state law override CC&R provisions that restrict when amendments can be made (e.g., only every 10 years)?

Short Answer

Yes, A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) supersedes original CC&R restrictions regarding periodic renewal or specific timelines for amendments.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that state statute supersedes 'edicts' in original CC&Rs regarding timing for amendments. Even if the original documents specify a renewal period, the association can amend the documents via the statutory written consent process.

Alj Quote

…permitted to modify or otherwise amend its CC&Rs by written consent of its Members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(A)(1); which supersedes any edicts outlined in Article VII of the original CC&Rs.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Amendments
  • State Statute Supremacy
  • Governing Documents

Question

Can the HOA Board hold a closed executive session to get legal advice if there is no pending lawsuit?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board may meet in executive session to receive legal advice from their attorney, even if it is unrelated to pending litigation.

Detailed Answer

Homeowners often believe legal advice must relate to a lawsuit for a meeting to be closed. However, the ALJ ruled that the Board is permitted to go into executive session to receive legal advice unrelated to pending litigation under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Alj Quote

It is clear from the record that the Association was not only permitted to go into executive session to receive legal advice unrelated to pending litigation from its attorney under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • Open Meetings
  • Executive Session
  • Legal Advice

Question

Is the HOA required to hold an open discussion or town hall meeting before amending the CC&Rs?

Short Answer

No, the tribunal found that there is no requirement to permit members to openly deliberate proposed changes for a specific period if the statutory process is followed.

Detailed Answer

The petitioner argued that the HOA was required to permit open deliberation for at least one year. The ALJ disagreed, ruling that the petitioner did not sustain the burden of proof for this contention, implying statutory compliance for written consent is sufficient.

Alj Quote

Specifically, Petitioner contends that Respondent was required to permit Members to openly deliberate proposed changes to the CC&Rs for at least 1 year… the Tribunal is not in agreement with either of Petitioner’s contentions, and holds that she has not sustained her burden of proof in this matter.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Topic Tags

  • Procedural Requirements
  • Open Discussion
  • CC&R Amendments

Question

Do statutes regarding monetary penalties apply to the process of amending CC&Rs?

Short Answer

No, statutes regarding fines and penalties are irrelevant to the amendment process if no actual violation notice was issued or penalty imposed.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ dismissed allegations regarding A.R.S. § 33-1803 (which governs monetary penalties) because they were inapplicable to a dispute centered on the procedural validity of amending CC&Rs where no fines were levied.

Alj Quote

Notably, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1812(A) and 33-1803 are inapplicable to the proceedings at bar as unrelated and irrelevant. No violations of these statutes have been established by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

  • Penalties
  • Statutory Application
  • Relevance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof in a hearing regarding HOA procedural violations?

Short Answer

The petitioner (homeowner) bears the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

In administrative hearings regarding HOA disputes, it is up to the homeowner filing the petition to prove that their allegations are more probably true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed the alleged statutory and/or governing document violation(s).

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Legal Procedure

Case

Docket No
25F-H032-REL
Case Title
Anne F. Segal v. Prince Court Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2025-05-22
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Anne F. Segal (Petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf
  • Robert Segal (Witness)
    Husband of Petitioner
  • David Zeinfeld (Witness)
    Original developer of the subdivision

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Ehrlich (Counsel)
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Mary Beth Snyder (Witness)
    Prince Court Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Board President
  • Susan Matheson (Witness)
    Prince Court Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Board Vice President

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presiding ALJ
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Dianna Tidle (Observer)

Jerome L. Glazer vs Heritage Village III Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H039-REL
Agency
Tribunal Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Decision Date 2024-08-23
Administrative Law Judge
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Taylor Kidd Counsel Patrick T. Nackley, Brandon P. Bodea
Respondent Heritage Village III Homeowners Association Counsel Tessa Knueppel, Mark K. Sahl, Charles H. Oldham, Josh Bolen

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H039-REL Decision – 1182719.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:10 (62.8 KB)

24F-H039-REL Decision – 1182767.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:18 (13.4 KB)

24F-H039-REL Decision – 1182769.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:21 (50.0 KB)

24F-H039-REL Decision – 1203525.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:25 (49.3 KB)

24F-H039-REL Decision – 1215299.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:28 (123.4 KB)

24F-H039-REL Decision – 1226570.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:31 (39.7 KB)





Briefing Document: Kidd and Glazer v. Heritage Village III Homeowners Association

# Briefing Document: Kidd and Glazer v. Heritage Village III Homeowners Association

## Executive Summary

This briefing document details the legal proceedings and final decision in the consolidated matters of *Taylor Kidd and Jerome L. Glazer vs. Heritage Village III Homeowners Association* (Case Nos. 24F-H037-REL and 24F-H039-REL). The dispute centered on the Respondent’s approval of a $1.55 million "Landscape Improvement Project" and a subsequent $9,385.24 special assessment per homeowner, conducted without a membership vote.

The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) ultimately ruled in favor of the Petitioners, Taylor Kidd and Jerome L. Glazer. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Association’s governing documents explicitly incorporated the "McCormick Ranch CC&Rs," which require a two-thirds majority vote for capital improvement assessments. Because no such vote was held, the Association was found in violation of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioners' filing fees.

## Procedural History and Case Background

The following table outlines the timeline and administrative milestones of the case:

| Date | Event | Details |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **February 27, 2024** | Petition Filed (Kidd) | Taylor Kidd filed a single-issue petition regarding the landscape project and paid a $500 fee. |
| **February 29, 2024** | Petition Filed (Glazer) | Jerome L. Glazer filed a similar single-issue petition and paid a $500 fee. |
| **May 28, 2024** | Consolidation Order | ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer ordered the cases consolidated for administrative efficiency. |
| **May 28, 2024** | Cease & Desist Denied | The ALJ denied Glazer's request to halt project expenditures, citing a lack of authority to issue such orders. |
| **May 30, 2024** | Original Hearing Date | Postponed due to a medical emergency involving Petitioner Glazer’s domestic partner. |
| **July 19, 2024** | Rescheduled Hearing | Continued again due to a widespread computer outage. |
| **August 9, 2024** | Evidentiary Hearing | Held before ALJ Adam D. Stone. |
| **August 23, 2024** | Final Decision | ALJ Stone ruled in favor of Petitioners, granting their petitions. |
| **September 23, 2024** | Minute Entry | ALJ Stone declined to consider a Motion for Rehearing, stating such requests must go to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. |

## Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

### 1. Incorporation of External Governing Documents
The central legal conflict involved which CC&Rs governed the Association's actions. While the Association’s own CC&Rs were silent on the requirement for a membership vote for capital improvements, Article VII, Section 1 of their documents stated that the McCormick Ranch CC&Rs "are made part hereof and are hereby referenced as to the provisions required for this entire property." 

The McCormick Ranch CC&Rs (Article III, Section 4) explicitly require the "assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes cast by Voting Owners" for special assessments related to capital improvements. The ALJ concluded that the Association could not cherry-pick which parts of the McCormick Ranch CC&Rs applied; the incorporation was total.

### 2. Board Authority vs. Member Consent
The Association, through Board member Jennifer Hutsko, argued that the Board had a fiduciary duty to maintain the property, which was suffering from a 40-year-old failing irrigation system and diseased trees. They contended that since the Association’s specific CC&Rs were silent on voting for maintenance, the Board could act unilaterally. 

The Petitioners successfully argued that the "Landscape Improvement Project" constituted a capital improvement rather than routine maintenance. Consequently, the procedural requirement for a membership vote took precedence over the Board's unilateral decision-making authority.

### 3. Administrative Economy and Efficiency
The Respondent successfully moved to consolidate the Kidd and Glazer cases under ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-109(A). The consolidation was granted to avoid "potentially inconsistent rulings" and to promote administrative efficiency, as both matters involved objections from different homeowners to the same Board action. Despite objections from Taylor Kidd regarding potential delays, the ALJ found that the substantially similar factual and legal issues justified a single hearing.

### 4. Jurisdictional Limits of the OAH
A significant procedural theme was the ALJ's limited authority. When Petitioner Glazer requested a Cease and Desist Order to stop the Association from spending funds on the project, the ALJ denied the request, stating, "The Administrative Law Judge is without the authority to issue such an order in this matter." This highlights that while the OAH can adjudicate violations of community documents, its power to grant injunctive-style relief is restricted.

## Important Quotes with Context

> **"Respondent violated McCormick Ranch CC&R’s Article III, Section 4, as it did not take the required vote, as well as and the Association CC&R’s Article VII, Section 1, by failing to follow the McCormick Ranch CC&R’s in regards to the same."**
— *ALJ Adam D. Stone, Final Decision (August 23, 2024)*. This quote summarizes the legal basis for the ruling, confirming that the Association is bound by the voting requirements of the incorporated documents.

> **"The letter also informed homeowners that there was a project cost of $1,557,950.00, which would be divided amongst the 166 homeowners, resulting in a special assessment in the amount of $9,385.24 per homeowner."**
— *Findings of Fact regarding Taylor Kidd's testimony*. This provides the financial context of the dispute and the scale of the financial burden placed on the homeowners without their consent.

> **"While the Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that the decision to consolidate these matters is not required by the applicable rule, it is certainly permitted in this instance as these matters involve substantially similar factual or legal issues."**
— *ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer, Order Consolidating Matters (May 28, 2024)*. This clarifies the standard for consolidation in administrative hearings, prioritizing "administrative economy."

> **"The document, consisting of Motion for Rehearing, will not be considered as no further action can be taken on the matter. All requests for rehearing must be made directly to the Arizona Department of Real Estate."**
— *ALJ Adam D. Stone, Minute Entry (September 23, 2024)*. This illustrates the finality of the OAH's role and the transition of the case back to the Department of Real Estate for any further administrative appeals.

## Actionable Insights

*   **Review Incorporation Clauses:** Homeowners' associations must carefully review their governing documents for "incorporation by reference" clauses. If an HOA's documents incorporate the rules of a master association (like McCormick Ranch), those rules are legally binding even if they are more restrictive than the HOA's own specific bylaws.
*   **Definition of Capital Improvements:** Boards should clearly distinguish between routine maintenance and "capital improvements." While maintenance may fall under Board authority, major projects—especially those requiring significant special assessments—often trigger mandatory voting requirements.
*   **Special Assessment Procedures:** Before levying a special assessment, Boards must ensure they have met all procedural prerequisites, such as membership votes and quorum requirements, as dictated by the hierarchy of their governing documents.
*   **Reimbursement Risks:** Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), if an Association is found in violation, they are legally required to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fees. In this case, the Association was ordered to pay $1,000 total ($500 to each Petitioner).
*   **Appellate Path:** Parties dissatisfied with an ALJ decision must file their request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order, rather than filing with the Office of Administrative Hearings.







Study Guide: Kidd and Glazer vs. Heritage Village III Homeowners Association

# Study Guide: Kidd and Glazer vs. Heritage Village III Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative legal proceedings between Petitioners Taylor Kidd and Jerome L. Glazer and the Respondent, Heritage Village III Homeowners Association. It covers procedural motions, governing legal standards, the core conflict regarding CC&Rs, and the final administrative decision.

---

## 1. Case Overview and Background

The dispute centered on a proposed **Landscape Improvement Project** initiated by the Heritage Village III Homeowners Association Board of Directors.

*   **The Project:** A $1,557,950.00 landscaping initiative intended to address dead/dying vegetation and a failing 40-year-old irrigation system.
*   **The Assessment:** The project cost was to be divided among 166 homeowners, resulting in a special assessment of **$9,385.24 per homeowner**.
*   **The Dispute:** Petitioners Kidd and Glazer alleged the Board approved this capital improvement and special assessment without the 75% or two-thirds homeowner vote required by governing documents.
*   **The Venue:** The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), acting on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE).

---

## 2. Key Legal Concepts and Standards

### Administrative Procedures
*   **Consolidation (ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-109(A)):** An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) may consolidate pending matters if there are "substantially similar factual or legal issues" or if "all parties are the same." In this case, the matters were consolidated for administrative economy because they involved the same Board action, despite the petitioners being different individuals.
*   **Continuance:** A delay in proceedings. This occurred twice: once due to Petitioner Glazer’s domestic partner's surgery and once due to a widespread computer outage on July 19, 2024.
*   **Jurisdiction:** Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199, the ADRE and OAH have the authority to hear disputes between homeowners and planned community associations regarding violations of community documents.
*   **Burden of Proof:** The Petitioner bears the burden of proving their case by a **preponderance of the evidence**.

### Governing Documents
*   **CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions):** The primary rules governing the homeowners' association.
*   **Incorporation by Reference:** A legal mechanism where one document makes another document part of itself. Here, the Heritage Village III CC&Rs (Article VII, Section 1) incorporated the McCormick Ranch CC&Rs.

---

## 3. Chronology of Proceedings (2024)

| Date | Event | Details |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Feb 27–29** | Petitions Filed | Kidd and Glazer filed separate petitions with the ADRE ($500 fee each). |
| **May 28** | Consolidation Order | ALJ Eigenheer consolidated cases 24F-H037-REL and 24F-H039-REL. |
| **May 28** | Cease & Desist Denied | ALJ Eigenheer ruled the OAH lacked authority to stop HOA spending before a decision. |
| **July 19** | Original Hearing Date | Postponed due to a computer outage. |
| **Aug 9** | Evidentiary Hearing | Held before ALJ Adam D. Stone; testimony provided by Kidd, Glazer, and Board member Hutsko. |
| **Aug 23** | Final Decision | ALJ Stone ruled in favor of Petitioners, finding the HOA violated CC&Rs. |
| **Sept 23** | Minute Entry | OAH declined to hear a Motion for Rehearing, as such motions must be filed with the ADRE. |

---

## 4. Short-Answer Practice Quiz

1.  **What was the specific financial assessment proposed for each homeowner for the landscaping project?**
2.  **According to ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-109(A), what are the two conditions under which an ALJ *may* consolidate cases?**
3.  **Why did the Administrative Law Judge deny Petitioner Glazer’s request for a Cease and Desist Order?**
4.  **What was the primary reason the Association argued they did not need a homeowner vote for the project?**
5.  **Which specific section of the McCormick Ranch CC&Rs requires a two-thirds vote for special assessments related to capital improvements?**
6.  **What was the final ruling regarding the filing fees paid by the Petitioners?**
7.  **What reason was given for the hearing continuance from July 19 to August 9, 2024?**
8.  **To which entity must a party submit a Motion for Rehearing after a final OAH decision has been issued?**

---

## 5. Essay Questions for Deeper Exploration

1.  **The Interplay of Governing Documents:** Analyze how the "incorporation by reference" in Article VII, Section 1 of the Heritage Village III CC&Rs determined the outcome of the case. Why did the ALJ reject the Association's argument that they were only bound by "part" of the McCormick Ranch CC&Rs?
2.  **Administrative Efficiency vs. Individual Rights:** Discuss the arguments made for and against the consolidation of the Kidd and Glazer matters. How does ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-109(A) balance the need for "administrative economy" with the rights of individual petitioners to have their specific grievances heard without delay?
3.  **The Scope of ALJ Authority:** Examine the ALJ’s decision to deny the Cease and Desist Order. What does this reveal about the limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings compared to other judicial venues?

---

## 6. Glossary of Important Terms

*   **Administrative Law Judge (ALJ):** A judge who presides over hearings and adjudicates disputes involving government agencies.
*   **Capital Improvement:** Substantial permanent changes or additions to a property (e.g., the $1.5M landscaping and irrigation overhaul).
*   **Cease and Desist Order:** An order to stop a specific activity.
*   **Consolidation:** The joining of two or more separate legal cases into one because they involve similar issues.
*   **Continuance:** A postponement of a legal proceeding or hearing to a later date.
*   **Minute Entry:** A brief record of the court's actions or rulings on a specific motion or procedural matter.
*   **Preponderance of the Evidence:** The standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, meaning a fact is "more probably true than not."
*   **Special Assessment:** A one-time fee charged to HOA members for a specific project or expense outside the regular annual dues.
*   **Tribunal:** A person or institution (like the OAH) with the authority to judge or determine claims or disputes.







The $1.5 Million Landscape Lesson: How Two Homeowners Successfully Challenged Their HOA Board

# The $1.5 Million Landscape Lesson: How Two Homeowners Successfully Challenged Their HOA Board

### 1. Introduction: The High Cost of Silence
On December 19, 2023, the 166 homeowners of Heritage Village III in Hereford, Arizona, received a holiday "gift" they never requested: a formal notice announcing a massive landscaping overhaul and a mandatory special assessment of $9,385.24 per household. There had been no community vote, no formal presentation of costs, and no opportunity for homeowners to weigh in on a project totaling over $1.5 million.

While many might have simply grumbled at the mailbox, two residents decided to hold their Board accountable. Taylor Kidd, represented by counsel Patrick T. Nackley, and Jerome L. Glazer, appearing *pro se* (representing himself), filed petitions with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. Their challenge against the Heritage Village III Homeowners Association was more than a dispute over grass and trees; it was a fight for procedural transparency and the supremacy of governing documents. Their victory provides a masterclass in how homeowners can successfully check Board overreach.

### 2. The Project That Sparked the Protest
The "Landscape Improvement Project" approved by the Board in 2023 was not a minor facelift. It was a seven-figure overhaul funded entirely by a surprise levy on the residents. The project specifics included:

*   **Total Estimated Cost:** $1,557,950.00.
*   **Individual Impact:** A $9,385.24 special assessment for every homeowner.
*   **The Board’s Justification:** Directors argued the community was suffering from a 40-year-old irrigation system requiring constant patchwork repairs, alongside dozens of dead or diseased trees. They framed the project as a necessary move toward water conservation.

However, the human cost was significant. During her testimony, Ms. Kidd—who purchased her home in 2014 specifically for its lush green grass—noted the Board offered no concrete evidence of water savings to justify the loss of the community's aesthetic character. The Board had prioritized a massive capital replacement under the guise of simple maintenance.

### 3. Procedural Hurdles: Consolidation and Outages
The path to justice was marked by administrative delays and technical failures. The cases (24F-H037-REL and 24F-H039-REL) were eventually consolidated for "administrative economy" because they shared substantially similar legal questions. 

The timeline was stretched by two major events:
*   **A Motion to Continue:** Granted on May 28, 2024, after Petitioner Glazer’s domestic partner required major back surgery.
*   **A Technical Outage:** A scheduled hearing on July 19, 2024, was derailed by a widespread computer outage, pushing the final showdown to August 9, 2024, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Adam D. Stone.

### 4. The Legal Battle: Maintenance Duty vs. Membership Votes
The Board’s defense relied on a common but fatal trap: the belief that their general fiduciary duty to maintain the property gave them a "blank check" to bypass membership approval. They argued that because their specific local CC&Rs were silent on voting for such projects, they could proceed based on a community survey showing 72% support.

The Petitioners countered that the Board was ignoring the community's "Master" documents. The following table highlights the clash:

| The Board's Defense | The Petitioners' Argument |
| :--- | :--- |
| **Claim:** The Board has a fiduciary duty to maintain property; the 40-year-old irrigation system was failing. | **Rebuttal:** A $1.5M replacement of an entire system is a "capital improvement," not routine maintenance. |
| **Claim:** Local CC&Rs are silent on voting requirements for improvements. | **Rebuttal:** McCormick Ranch CC&Rs (Article III, Section 4) require a 2/3 vote for capital improvement assessments. |
| **Claim:** A survey showed 72% of the community supported the project. | **Rebuttal:** A survey is not a legal vote. The McCormick Ranch rules are incorporated by reference and take supremacy. |

**The "Hidden Link":** The Petitioners correctly identified that Article VII, Section 1 of the Heritage Village III CC&Rs explicitly incorporated the McCormick Ranch CC&Rs, stating they were "made part hereof and are hereby referenced."

### 5. The Verdict: Why the "Fine Print" Mattered
On August 23, 2024, ALJ Adam D. Stone issued a definitive ruling in favor of the homeowners. The decision turned on the legal interpretation of the phrase **"including but not limited to."**

The Association argued this phrase limited the incorporation of McCormick Ranch rules to matters of dues and collections. Judge Stone disagreed, ruling that "including but not limited to" is an **inclusive** phrase that expands rather than restricts. By referencing the McCormick Ranch documents, the Association effectively imported the entire suite of homeowner protections, including the requirement for a two-thirds (2/3) membership vote for any **Special Assessment for Capital Improvements.**

The ALJ concluded that the Board committed a clear violation of its governing documents. They could not rebrand a massive construction project as "maintenance" to circumvent the democratic rights of the membership.

### 6. The Cease and Desist Side-Note
Earlier in the dispute, on May 28, 2024, Petitioner Glazer had sought a Cease and Desist order to stop the Board from spending any funds on the project until the hearing concluded. While the Judge eventually ruled that the Board's actions were unauthorized, the request for a Cease and Desist was denied at that time. The ALJ clarified that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the statutory authority to issue injunctive orders, noting that such relief must be sought in Superior Court or another appropriate venue.

### 7. Final Takeaways and Community Impact
This ruling is a significant win for homeowner rights in Arizona. Key lessons include:

*   **Know Your Governing Documents:** Always investigate if your local CC&Rs incorporate a master association’s rules. These "hidden links" often provide the strongest protections against Board overreach.
*   **Surveys are Not Votes:** A Board cannot use a "72% approval" survey to bypass a legally required formal vote. Procedural shortcuts are a breach of fiduciary duty.
*   **The Cost of Non-Compliance:** The HOA was ordered to reimburse the $500 filing fees to both Ms. Kidd and Mr. Glazer.
*   **Project Status:** Because the homeowners acted swiftly, the project had not yet commenced and the assessment had not been officially levied at the time of the ruling.

### 8. Important Notice for Readers
Following the ALJ’s decision, a Minute Entry was issued on September 23, 2024, regarding a Motion for Rehearing. Homeowners and Boards must take note: **The OAH loses jurisdiction the moment a decision is rendered.** Any motions for rehearing must be filed directly with the **Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) Commissioner**, not the OAH. Attempting to file with the OAH after a decision is a procedural dead end.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerome L. Glazer (Petitioner)
    Filed petition pro se.
  • Taylor Kidd (Petitioner)
  • Brandon P. Bodea (Attorney)
    MEDALIST LEGAL PLC
  • Patrick T. Nackley (Attorney)
    MEDALIST LEGAL PLC
    Appeared at hearing as representation for Taylor Kidd.

Respondent Side

  • Charles H. Oldham (Attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
  • Josh Bolen (Attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
  • Tessa Knueppel (Attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Appeared at hearing as representation for Heritage Village III Homeowners Association.
  • Mark K. Sahl (Attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Appeared at hearing as representation for Heritage Village III Homeowners Association.
  • Jennifer Hutsko (Witness)
    Heritage Village III Homeowners Association
    Board of Directors member and Community Planning Committee member; testified for the respondent.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Issued initial procedural orders.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Adam D. Stone (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presided over the hearing and issued the decision.

R.L. Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H034-REL
Agency
Tribunal
Decision Date 2024-05-30
Administrative Law Judge
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner R.L. Whitmer Counsel
Respondent Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners Counsel

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H034-REL Decision – 1169191.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:21:18 (49.5 KB)

24F-H034-REL Decision – 1170407.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:21:22 (53.9 KB)

24F-H034-REL Decision – 1179078.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:21:27 (72.0 KB)





Briefing Document: R.L. Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners

# Briefing Document: R.L. Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners

## Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative proceedings and final resolution of Case No. 24F-H034-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute involved Petitioner R.L. Whitmer and Respondent Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners regarding the legal authority of the Association’s Board of Directors to adopt rules and regulations.

The central conflict rested on whether the Hilton Casitas Board exceeded its authority in August 2016 by adopting rules that the Petitioner argued were reserved solely for the "Council" (defined as the collective of all owners). While the Petitioner sought a summary judgment to invalidate these rules and requested civil penalties against the Association, the Respondent moved for dismissal based on the statute of limitations and the principle of document harmonization.

On May 30, 2024, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Amy M. Haley denied the Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The decision concluded that the Petitioner’s claims were time-barred, as they were filed beyond the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract in Arizona.

---

## Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

### 1. Supremacy of Governing Documents
A primary theme of the dispute was the hierarchy of an HOA’s governing documents. The Petitioner relied on **A.R.S. § 33-1213**, arguing that the Declaration (CC&Rs) is the supreme document and that any conflicting provisions in the Bylaws are invalid. 
*   **Petitioner's Argument:** Section 23.9 of the Declaration reserves the right to adopt and amend rules specifically to the "Council." Since the Council is defined as the collective of owners, any rules adopted by the Board alone are *ultra vires* (beyond their legal power).
*   **Respondent's Argument:** The Respondent contended that the Declaration and Bylaws cover different scopes. They argued that Section 23.9 of the Declaration pertains to the Council's rights and duties, while Article 9, Section 2 of the Bylaws empowers the Board to manage the "operation and use of the property."

### 2. Legal Harmonization vs. Conflict
The parties disagreed on how to resolve perceived inconsistencies between the Declaration and the Bylaws.
*   **The "Harmonization" Rule:** The Respondent cited *Mountain View Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Scott*, stating that governing documents must be read together and harmonized whenever possible. 
*   **The "Conflict" Rule:** The Petitioner argued that harmonization is impossible when a specific power is explicitly reserved for one body (the Council) and then claimed by another (the Board) in a subordinate document.

### 3. Statute of Limitations in HOA Disputes
The case underscores the critical nature of procedural timelines. Under Arizona law (**A.R.S. § 12-548(A)**), the statute of limitations for a breach of contract—which includes HOA governing documents—is six years.
*   **Tolling and Discovery:** The Petitioner argued that the timeline should "toll" from the date of discovery, citing a 2023 Court of Appeals decision that clarified the definition of the "Council." 
*   **The Final Ruling:** The ALJ rejected the tolling argument, finding that the alleged breach occurred on August 19, 2016. Therefore, the Petitioner was required to file the claim by August 19, 2022.

### 4. Civil Penalties and Administrative Oversight
The Petitioner requested civil penalties, alleging the Board was negligent in its duty to update documents that "don't work right now." The Respondent countered that civil penalties require evidence of punitive action or bad faith, which they argued was entirely absent in this matter.

---

## Important Quotes with Context

| Quote | Source | Context |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| "It's clear that the bylaws are subordinate to the declaration." | R.L. Whitmer (Transcript) | Asserting that the Board's rule-making authority in the Bylaws cannot override the Council's authority in the Declaration. |
| "An association's governing documents... must be read together in relation to each other and harmonized if possible." | Emily Mann (Transcript) | Citing Arizona case law to argue that the Board and Council have distinct, non-conflicting rule-making spheres. |
| "The council must still abide by the terms of [the] declaration unless and until it's amended." | R.L. Whitmer (Transcript) | Emphasizing that cumbersome processes (like a full owner vote) do not excuse the Board from following the Declaration. |
| "Petitioner failed to assert such a claim within the requisite six-year period. As a result, Petitioner is now barred by the statute of limitations." | ALJ Amy M. Haley (Decision) | The definitive legal reasoning for dismissing the case and denying the Motion for Summary Judgment. |

---

## Actionable Insights

### For Homeowners and Members
*   **Monitor Board Actions Closely:** If a homeowner believes a Board has exceeded its authority (an *ultra vires* act), legal action must be initiated within six years of the action.
*   **Understand Document Hierarchy:** While Declarations generally prevail over Bylaws, courts and ALJs will attempt to "harmonize" the two if the subject matter can be interpreted as distinct.
*   **Discovery Rule Limitations:** Do not assume that a later court ruling clarifying document definitions will reset the statute of limitations for past Board actions.

### For HOA Boards and Management
*   **Document Consistency:** To avoid litigation, ensure that rule-making authority is clearly delineated and consistent between the Declaration and the Bylaws.
*   **Amending Documents:** As noted in the proceedings, if documents are outdated or "cumbersome," Boards should pursue formal amendments (e.g., the 67% owner vote required for the Declaration) rather than relying on potentially conflicting Bylaw provisions.
*   **Statute of Limitations as a Defense:** Boards facing challenges to long-standing rules should evaluate whether the claims are time-barred under Arizona's six-year contract statute.

### Legal Standards Applied
*   **Breach of Contract:** HOA governing documents (CC&Rs, Bylaws, Rules) are legally treated as contracts.
*   **A.R.S. § 12-548(A):** Establishes the six-year limit for filing claims related to these contracts.
*   **A.R.S. § 33-1213:** Dictates the order of precedence for condominium documents (Declaration > Articles > Bylaws > Rules).







Study Guide: R.L. Whitmer vs. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners (Case No. 24F-H034-REL)

# Study Guide: R.L. Whitmer vs. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners (Case No. 24F-H034-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between R.L. Whitmer and the Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners. It explores the central themes of homeowner association (HOA) governance, the hierarchy of governing documents, and the application of statutes of limitation in breach of contract disputes within a residential community.

---

## Case Overview and Core Themes

The matter of *R.L. Whitmer vs. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners* originated from a dispute regarding the authority of the HOA's Board of Directors to adopt rules and regulations. The Petitioner, R.L. Whitmer, challenged rules adopted by the Board in August 2016, arguing they were created without proper contractual authority. The case highlights critical tensions between the rights of the "Council" (defined as all unit owners) and the powers of the "Board of Directors."

### Central Legal Arguments

1.  **Hierarchy of Documents:** Under Arizona law (ARS 33-1213), the Declaration (CC&Rs) prevails if a conflict exists between it and other community documents, such as the Bylaws or Board rules.
2.  **Ultra Vires Actions:** The Petitioner argued that because Section 23.9 of the Declaration reserves rule-making authority for the "Council" (all 29 owners), the Board's 2016 actions were "ultra vires" (acting beyond its legal power) and therefore invalid.
3.  **Harmonization Principle:** The Respondent argued that governing documents must be read together and harmonized. They contended that Section 23.9 of the Declaration and Article 9, Section 2 of the Bylaws cover different subject matters—Council duties versus property operation—and thus do not conflict.
4.  **Statute of Limitations:** A primary defense used by the Respondent was that the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract (ARS 12-548(A)) had expired, as the rules were adopted in 2016 and the petition was filed after August 2022.

---

## Procedural Timeline

| Date | Event |
| :--- | :--- |
| **August 19, 2016** | The Hilton Casitas Board of Directors votes to adopt new Rules and Regulations. |
| **August 30, 2023** | A lower court of appeals decision provides a ruling on the definition of "Council," which the Petitioner claims tolls the statute of limitations. |
| **April 22, 2024** | Administrative Law Judge Amy M. Haley grants a continuance for the oral argument. |
| **May 13, 2024** | Oral arguments are held regarding the Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment. |
| **May 30, 2024** | The Administrative Law Judge issues a decision denying the Petitioner’s motion and granting the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. |

---

## Short-Answer Practice Questions

**1. According to the Petitioner, who constitutes the "Council" in the Hilton Casitas community?**
*Answer:* According to the Petitioner and the Declaration (Section 1.4), the Council is defined as all the owners of the Casitas.

**2. What is the specific Arizona Revised Statute (ARS) governing the hierarchy of condominium documents?**
*Answer:* ARS 33-1213, which states that the Declaration prevails if a conflict exists with other condominium documents.

**3. Why did the Respondent argue that there was no conflict between the Declaration and the Bylaws?**
*Answer:* The Respondent argued the two documents covered different subject matters: Section 23.9 of the Declaration concerns the Council's rights and duties, while Article 9, Section 2 of the Bylaws concerns the operation and use of property.

**4. What was the ultimate reason the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's complaint?**
*Answer:* The complaint was dismissed because it was barred by the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract, as the action occurred in 2016 and the claim was not asserted by August 19, 2022.

**5. What is the legal requirement for amending the Declaration compared to the Bylaws at Hilton Casitas?**
*Answer:* Amending the Declaration requires the approval of 67% of unit owners, whereas the Bylaws can be amended with a simple majority (50% + 1).

**6. What was the Petitioner's justification for requesting a civil penalty against the HOA?**
*Answer:* The Petitioner argued the Board was negligent in its duty by refusing to update documents despite multiple administrative law decisions against them.

---

## Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1.  **The Principle of Harmonization vs. Document Hierarchy:** Discuss the tension between the legal requirement to "harmonize" HOA documents and the statutory hierarchy that places the Declaration above the Bylaws. How did both parties in this case use these principles to support their conflicting interpretations of rule-making authority?
2.  **The Impact of the Statute of Limitations on Governance:** Evaluate the role of the statute of limitations (ARS 12-548(A)) in this case. Should homeowners be barred from challenging "ultra vires" Board actions if they do not act within six years, or does an invalid rule remain invalid regardless of when it is challenged? Support your argument using the details of the Judge's final decision.
3.  **Contractual Authority in HOAs:** Analyze the Petitioner’s argument that the Declaration is a contract. If the "Council" is defined as all owners, explore the practical and legal implications of requiring a full vote for every rule change versus delegating that power to a Board of Directors through Bylaws.

---

## Glossary of Important Terms

*   **Administrative Law Judge (ALJ):** A judge who oversteps or presides over hearings and makes decisions for government agencies (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings).
*   **Bylaws:** The rules and regulations adopted by an organization for its internal governance and management.
*   **CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions):** Often referred to as the Declaration, these are the primary governing documents that run with the land and bind all property owners.
*   **Council:** As defined in the Hilton Casitas Declaration, the collective body of all 29 unit owners.
*   **Harmonize:** A legal principle requiring that different sections of a contract or governing documents be read together in a way that gives effect to all provisions rather than creating a conflict.
*   **Motion for Summary Judgment:** A request for the court to rule in favor of one party without a full trial, based on the argument that there are no disputed material facts.
*   **Petitioner:** The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition (R.L. Whitmer).
*   **Respondent:** The party against whom a petition is filed (Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners).
*   **Statute of Limitations:** A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated.
*   **Ultra Vires:** A Latin term meaning "beyond the powers"; refers to acts performed by a body (like an HOA board) that exceed the scope of their legal authority.







HOA Governance and the Clock: Lessons from Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas

# HOA Governance and the Clock: Lessons from Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas

### 1. Introduction: The Power Struggle in Modern Communities
The governance of common-interest communities rests upon a delicate contractual balance between the authority of the Board of Directors and the rights of individual homeowners. When a Board exercises power not granted by its founding documents, it commits an "ultra vires" act—acting beyond the scope of its legal authority. The case of *R.L. Whitmer vs. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners* (No. 24F-H034-REL) serves as a stark reminder that even potentially meritorious claims of *ultra vires* governance can be defeated by procedural lapses. At the heart of this dispute is a fundamental question of HOA law: Who holds the ultimate authority to dictate the rules of the community, and how long do owners have to challenge a perceived overreach?

### 2. The Petitioner’s Case: Declaration vs. Bylaws
The Petitioner, R.L. Whitmer, asserted that the Hilton Casitas Board of Directors acted *ultra vires* when it adopted new rules and regulations on August 19, 2016. Central to Whitmer’s argument was the definition of the "Council" found in Section 1.4 of the Declaration, which identifies the Council as the collective body of all 29 unit owners. 

Whitmer argued a "Negative Implication" theory: because the Declaration explicitly reserved the right to adopt rules to the Council, it effectively excluded the Board from doing so. He relied on the hierarchy of documents established by ARS § 33-1213(C), which mandates that the Declaration prevails over the Bylaws in the event of a conflict.

| Governing Provision | Scope of Authority |
| :--- | :--- |
| **Declaration Section 23.9** | Reserves to the **Council** (all 29 owners) the right to adopt, amend, and cancel rules with respect to all aspects of the Council’s rights, activities, and duties. |
| **Bylaws Article 9 Section 2** | Purports to authorize the **Board** to adopt, amend, or repeal rules governing the details of the operation and use of the property. |

Whitmer contended that the Board’s 2016 action was a contractual breach because the power utilized by the Board was a right specifically reserved for the 29-member Council.

### 3. The Association’s Defense: Harmonization and the Law of the Case
Representing the Respondent, Emily H. Mann argued that the Petitioner’s claim of conflict was legally flawed. The Association’s defense was built on the principle of "harmonization." Citing *Mountain View Condominiums vs. Scott*, the Respondent noted that governing documents must be "read together in relation to each other and harmonized if possible."

The Association argued the provisions governed distinct realms:
*   **Council Rights:** Section 23.9 of the Declaration governs the "rights, activities, and duties" of the collective owners.
*   **Property Operations:** Article 9 of the Bylaws governs the "operation and use of the property." 

In this context, "Property" is a specifically defined term in the community’s documents, encompassing all casitas, buildings, and general common elements. By distinguishing between the Council’s high-level rights and the Board’s duty to manage physical improvements and buildings, the Association argued the documents functioned in tandem rather than in conflict.

### 4. The Deciding Factor: The Statute of Limitations
While the substantive debate regarding document hierarchy was significant, the tribunal’s decision ultimately rested on the statutory period of repose. The cause of action accrued upon the adoption of the rules in 2016, making the Petitioner’s 2024 filing untimely under Arizona’s contract law. 

Under ARS § 12-548(A), a breach of contract claim must be initiated within six years of the alleged breach. 

> **Critical Timelines in Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas**
> *   **August 19, 2016:** The date the Board adopted the contested rules and regulations, triggering the accrual of the cause of action.
> *   **August 19, 2022:** The statutory deadline for filing a breach of contract claim under the six-year limitation period.

The Petitioner attempted to argue that the timeline should "toll" (pause) until August 30, 2023, based on the "discovery" of a legal theory in a separate court decision (**LC 202200424**). However, Administrative Law Judge Amy M. Haley adhered to the established date of the act. On May 30, 2024, Judge Haley issued her decision to deny the Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and grant the Association’s Motion to Dismiss, effectively ending the litigation.

### 5. Key Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards
The *Whitmer* decision provides critical insights for HOA governance and dispute resolution in Arizona:

*   **The "Six-Year" Rule:** Governing documents are contracts. Challenges to the validity of Board-enacted rules must be brought within six years of the act. Waiting for a "discovery" of a new legal interpretation—such as the one found in **LC 202200424**—will not generally reset the clock.
*   **Document Hierarchy and Harmonization:** While ARS § 33-1213(C) establishes the supremacy of the Declaration, courts will exert significant effort to "harmonize" seemingly conflicting provisions by narrowing their subject matter (e.g., Council rights vs. property maintenance).
*   **Burden of Proof for Civil Penalties:** Homeowners seeking civil penalties against a Board must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board acted punitively or in bad faith. The *Whitmer* case reinforces that a mere disagreement over document interpretation does not automatically meet this high burden.
*   **The Finality of Limitations:** A statute of limitations serves to provide finality to community operations. Without it, Boards would be unable to rely on long-standing rules, as they would be subject to indefinite legal challenges.

### 6. Conclusion: The Final Verdict
Judge Amy M. Haley’s final order to deny the Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss the complaint serves as a definitive ruling on the importance of legal timelines. The decision underscores that procedural adherence is often just as vital as substantive merit in administrative law. 

For Association Boards, *Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas* highlights the necessity of periodically updating governing documents to resolve ambiguities regarding rule-making authority. For homeowners, the case serves as a clear warning: the moment a governance change is enacted, the clock begins to tick. Vigilance is required to ensure that challenges to potential *ultra vires* actions are filed before the statutory window for relief is permanently closed.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • R.L. Whitmer (Petitioner)
    Representing himself

Respondent Side

  • Emily H. Mann (Attorney)
    Phillips, Maceyko & Battock, PLLC
    Counsel for Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners

Neutral Parties

  • Amy M. Haley (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Senol Pekin v. Artesian Ranch Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H037-REL
Agency
Tribunal
Decision Date 2023-04-10
Administrative Law Judge
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Senol Pekin Counsel Pro Se
Respondent Artesian Ranch Community Association Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq., Daniel S. Francom, Esq., Goodman Law Group

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H037-REL Decision – 1037672.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:04:22 (49.3 KB)

23F-H037-REL Decision – 1041383.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:04:28 (50.6 KB)

23F-H037-REL Decision – 1044671.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:04:33 (166.9 KB)

23F-H037-REL Decision – 1044839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:04:38 (36.5 KB)

23F-H037-REL Decision – 1048179.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:04:43 (105.1 KB)

23F-H037-REL Decision – 1054714.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:04:47 (47.2 KB)





Briefing: Dispute and Resolution – Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch Community Association

# Briefing: Dispute and Resolution - Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch Community Association

## Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the legal proceedings and administrative decisions regarding the dispute between Petitioner Senol Pekin and Respondent Artesian Ranch Community Association. The matter, involving consolidated dockets No. 23F-H034-REL and No. 23F-H037-REL, was heard before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) on March 20, 2023, under the jurisdiction of Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

The Petitioner alleged five distinct violations of the Association’s Bylaws and the Arizona Planned Communities Act (A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Association violated its Bylaws by failing to hold its 2022 annual meeting on the prescribed date and violated state law by prohibiting members from recording open board sessions. Consequently, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party on these issues, and the Association was ordered to reimburse the $1,000 filing fee. Claims regarding the timing of organizational meetings, the authority of the HOA manager to schedule meetings, and the muting of members during Zoom calls were dismissed.

## Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

### 1. Adherence to Governing Documents and Bylaws
A central theme of the dispute was the Association's failure to strictly follow its own Bylaws regarding meeting schedules.
*   **Annual Meeting Requirement:** Bylaws Article II, Section 2.3 requires the regular annual meeting to be held on the second Wednesday of April. In 2022, the Association held this meeting in May instead.
*   **The "Technical Violation" Defense:** The Association argued this was a "technical violation" with no harm to the Petitioner, citing A.R.S. § 10-3701(e). However, the ALJ ruled that while state statute may protect the validity of corporate actions taken during late meetings, it does not provide an exception for failing to adhere to the specific timing requirements set forth in the Bylaws.

### 2. Member Rights and Open Meeting Statutes
The case highlighted the tension between HOA management and member rights under A.R.S. § 33-1804.
*   **Recording of Meetings:** During an October 24, 2022, meeting, the Community Manager informed homeowners they could not record the session. The ALJ found this to be a direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which explicitly permits attendees to audiotape or videotape open portions of meetings. 
*   **Notice and Restrictions:** The Association attempted to require advanced notice for recording, but the ALJ noted that the law prohibits boards from requiring such notice.
*   **Participation and "Muting":** The Petitioner alleged that the Association muted opposing viewpoints during Zoom meetings. The ALJ ruled in favor of the Association on this point, finding that the Petitioner was given several opportunities to speak and that the muting was a response to "generally aggressive" behavior rather than a systematic effort to silence dissent.

### 3. Governance and Administrative Authority
The proceedings clarified the roles of the Board versus the Community Manager (AAM, LLC).
*   **Organizational Meetings:** The Petitioner argued that officers must be elected in a separate, exclusively scheduled organizational meeting. The ALJ disagreed, noting that Bylaws do not require these meetings to be held separately from regular board meetings.
*   **Managerial Agency:** The Petitioner challenged the HOA Manager's authority to schedule board meetings. The ALJ ruled that a Community Manager, as an employee of the management firm (AAM, LLC), may act as an agent of the Board.

### 4. Evidentiary and Procedural Rulings
*   **Subpoenas:** The court managed multiple subpoenas for witnesses including Mandy Rogers, Susanne Roskens, and others. Notably, a subpoena for Dennis Berger was quashed, and the subpoena for Mandy Rogers was limited to her attendance, exempting her from producing documents.
*   **Closure of Record:** Following the March 20, 2023, hearing, the Petitioner attempted to file additional allegations and the Respondent filed a response. These were rejected by the ALJ as the record had officially closed at the conclusion of the hearing.

---

## Important Quotes with Context

| Quote | Context |
| :--- | :--- |
| "Subsequent regular annual meetings shall be held on the second Wednesday of April of each year." | Found in the Respondent’s Bylaws (Article II, Section 2.3), this served as the basis for the finding that the Association was in violation by holding its meeting in May. |
| "The board of directors of the association shall not require advance notice of the audiotaping or videotaping..." | A critical excerpt from A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) used by the ALJ to determine that the Association's prohibition on recording was unlawful. |
| "The section does not provide an exception to the adherence to Bylaws that require a set time for an annual meeting." | The ALJ’s rebuttal to the Association’s defense that their late annual meeting was merely a "technical violation." |
| "Ms. Rogers explained that she placed Petitioner on mute because he was generally aggressive." | Testimony regarding the Association's conduct during the October 24, 2022, Zoom meeting, which the ALJ accepted as a reasonable management of the meeting. |
| "Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party regarding issues 1 and 4... Respondent pay Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000." | The final order regarding the financial consequences of the Association's violations. |

---

## Actionable Insights

### For Homeowners' Association Boards
*   **Strict Bylaw Compliance:** Boards must treat the specific dates and procedures outlined in their Bylaws as mandatory. "Technical violations" regarding meeting dates are still legally actionable and can result in the Association paying the Petitioner's filing fees.
*   **Recording Policy Update:** Associations should immediately cease any policy requiring advance notice for recording open meetings. While boards can adopt "reasonable rules" for recording, they cannot preclude the act of recording itself unless the Association provides its own unedited recording to members.
*   **Managerial Conduct:** Community managers should be trained to clearly distinguish between closed (executive) and open sessions when communicating rules about recording and participation to avoid inadvertently violating state statutes.

### Regarding Dispute Resolution
*   **Record Integrity:** Once a hearing concludes, no further evidence or allegations can be introduced. Parties must ensure all relevant documentation and testimony are presented during the scheduled hearing.
*   **Rehearing Procedures:** If a party is dissatisfied with an ALJ decision, the request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) within 30 days, as the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) loses jurisdiction once a decision is rendered.
*   **Conflict of Interest in Meetings:** As noted in internal Association communications, if a Board member has filed a petition against the Association, they may be required to recuse themselves or log off during executive sessions where their specific legal matter is being discussed with the Association's attorney.







Study Guide: Pekin v. Artesian Ranch Community Association

# Study Guide: Pekin v. Artesian Ranch Community Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative legal proceedings between Senol Pekin (Petitioner) and the Artesian Ranch Community Association (Respondent). It covers the legal framework, procedural history, specific allegations, and final rulings issued by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

---

## I. Case Overview and Legal Framework

### Jurisdiction and Authority
The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) under the authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE). 
*   **Governing Law:** The proceedings are governed by **Title 33, Chapter 16** of the Arizona Revised Statutes, known as the **Planned Communities Act (A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818)**.
*   **Adjudicator:** Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson.

### Case Identification
*   **Petitioner:** Senol Pekin.
*   **Respondent:** Artesian Ranch Community Association.
*   **Docket Numbers:** 23F-H034-REL and 23F-H037-REL (Consolidated).

---

## II. Procedural History and Significant Events

| Date | Event | Description |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| January 25, 2023 | Notice of Hearing | ADRE sets the initial hearing dates. |
| February 28, 2023 | Consolidation Order | The ALJ consolidates the two dockets and sets a single hearing for March 20, 2023. |
| February 28, 2023 | Subpoena Issuance | Subpoenas issued for Mandy Rogers, Susanne Roskens, Dennis Berger, Brock O’Neal, Julie Willoughby, Shelley Nelson, and Sherry Swanson. |
| March 13, 2023 | Order on Subpoenas | Dennis Berger's subpoena is **quashed**. Mandy Rogers' subpoena is limited to attendance (no document production). Other motions to quash are denied. |
| March 20, 2023 | Administrative Hearing | The hearing convenes at 9:00 AM. |
| March 28, 2023 | Minute Entry | The ALJ refuses to consider documents filed after March 20, 2023, as the record was closed. |
| April 10, 2023 | Final Decision | The ALJ issues the official Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. |
| May 8, 2023 | Rehearing Request | A request for rehearing is filed but forwarded to the ADRE as the OAH loses jurisdiction after a decision is rendered. |

---

## III. Summary of Allegations and Judgments

The Petitioner raised five specific issues regarding the Association's adherence to its Bylaws and Arizona law.

### Issue 1: Annual Meeting Frequency
*   **Allegation:** The Association violated Bylaws Article II, Paragraph 2.3 by failing to hold its 2022 annual meeting on the second Wednesday of April.
*   **Evidence:** The Association held the meeting in May 2022 instead of April.
*   **Ruling:** **Violation Found.** While A.R.S. § 10-3701(e) protects the validity of corporate actions despite timing errors, it does not exempt the Association from adhering to its own Bylaws.

### Issue 2: Organizational Meetings
*   **Allegation:** Officers were not elected in a timely or exclusively scheduled Organizational Meeting as required by Bylaws.
*   **Evidence:** The Board appointed officers during a regular board meeting in August 2022.
*   **Ruling:** **No Violation.** The Bylaws do not require the organizational meeting to be held separately from other board meetings.

### Issue 3: Authority to Call Meetings
*   **Allegation:** A meeting on September 22, 2022, was organized by the HOA Manager, who Petitioner argued lacked the authority to call meetings.
*   **Evidence:** Board President Susanne Roskens requested Mandy Rogers (Community Manager) to organize the meeting to address a landscaping issue.
*   **Ruling:** **No Violation.** The Community Manager acts as an agent of the Board.

### Issue 4: Recording Open Sessions
*   **Allegation:** The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by prohibiting the recording of the open session on October 24, 2022.
*   **Evidence:** Mandy Rogers informed homeowners they could not record without clarifying that the rule only applied to closed sessions and stated that the Board required advanced notice.
*   **Ruling:** **Violation Found.** State law explicitly allows audio and video recording of open meetings and forbids the Board from requiring advance notice.

### Issue 5: Participant Participation (Muting)
*   **Allegation:** The Association muted opposing sides during a Zoom meeting on October 24, 2022, preventing them from speaking.
*   **Evidence:** The Petitioner was muted due to "aggressive" behavior, but evidence showed he still had multiple opportunities to speak.
*   **Ruling:** **No Violation.** Boards may place reasonable time and conduct restrictions on speakers.

---

## IV. Short-Answer Practice Questions

1.  **What is the "Preponderance of the Evidence" standard?**
    *   *Answer:* It is a standard of proof where the evidence must show that a contention is "more probably true than not," or has the "most convincing force."

2.  **Which party bears the burden of proof in an OAH hearing regarding a planned community dispute?**
    *   *Answer:* The Petitioner (Senol Pekin) bears the burden of proof to establish violations.

3.  **Why did the ALJ refuse to consider the documents filed on March 27 and March 28, 2023?**
    *   *Answer:* The evidentiary record was closed on the day of the hearing, March 20, 2023.

4.  **According to A.R.S. § 33-1804, what are the rules regarding advanced notice for recording a meeting?**
    *   *Answer:* The board of directors shall not require advance notice of audiotaping or videotaping of open portions of meetings.

5.  **What was the financial penalty imposed on the Respondent for the violations found?**
    *   *Answer:* The Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner's $1,000 filing fee. No other civil penalty was deemed appropriate.

---

## V. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1.  **The Intersection of Corporate Validity and Bylaw Adherence:** Analyze the ALJ's reasoning in Issue 1. How does the decision balance A.R.S. § 10-3701(e) (which validates corporate actions despite timing errors) with the mandatory nature of Association Bylaws?
2.  **Agency and Authority in HOA Management:** Discuss the ruling on Issue 3 regarding the Community Manager's role. To what extent can a third-party management firm (like AAM, LLC) exercise the powers of the Board of Directors?
3.  **Open Meeting Rights vs. Orderly Conduct:** Using Issue 5 as a reference, explore the legal limits of a Board's power to "mute" or restrict participants in a digital meeting format. Where is the line between "reasonable time restrictions" and the suppression of "opposing sides"?

---

## VI. Glossary of Important Terms

*   **Administrative Law Judge (ALJ):** An official who presides over an administrative hearing and serves as the trier of fact and law.
*   **A.R.S. § 33-1804:** The specific Arizona statute governing open meetings, the right to speak, and the right to record meetings within planned communities.
*   **CAAM:** Certified Arizona Association Manager (referencing the title of Mandy Rogers).
*   **Consolidation:** The legal process of joining two or more separate cases (dockets) into one when they involve common questions of law or fact.
*   **Organizational Meeting:** A meeting held within a reasonable time after directors take office to elect officers (e.g., President, Secretary).
*   **Planned Communities Act:** The section of Arizona law (Title 33, Chapter 16) that regulates the formation and management of HOAs.
*   **Quash:** A legal term meaning to nullify or void, specifically used here regarding a subpoena for Dennis Berger.
*   **Respondent:** The party against whom a petition is filed (in this case, the Artesian Ranch Community Association).







HOA Accountability in Action: Key Lessons from the Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch Ruling

# HOA Accountability in Action: Key Lessons from the Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch Ruling

In the complex ecosystem of Arizona planned communities, the relationship between homeowners and their Board of Directors often fractures when governance becomes opaque or rules are applied inconsistently. While many disputes are settled through internal grievance processes, some reach a boiling point where legal intervention is the only path to clarity.

The case of *Senol Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch Community Association* (No. 23F-H034-REL) stands as a significant real-world example of a homeowner successfully seeking recourse through the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). This ruling stands as a cautionary tale for Boards who treat Bylaws as optional and a roadmap for homeowners seeking to enforce statutory transparency.

## The Core Allegations: A Five-Point Dispute

The Petitioner’s challenge centered on five specific allegations, asserting that the Association repeatedly failed to adhere to its own governing documents and Arizona law. According to the Findings of Fact, the dispute involved:

*   **Failure to Hold Annual Meetings:** Violation of Bylaws Article II, Paragraph 2.3 by failing to hold the 2022 annual meeting on the required date.
*   **Improper Election Procedures:** Failure to elect officers during an exclusively and timely scheduled Organizational Meeting.
*   **Unauthorized Meeting Organization:** Alleging a September 2022 board meeting was invalid because it was organized by the Community Manager rather than the Board.
*   **Prohibition of Recording:** Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 by prohibiting a member from recording an open session on October 24, 2022.
*   **Muting of Participants:** Alleging that muting the Petitioner during a Zoom-based meeting prevented "the opposing side" from being heard, in violation of state law.

## Victory for Transparency: The Ruling on Recording and Bylaws

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Petitioner on two critical issues, delivering a stern reminder that internal governing documents carry the weight of law.

### Annual Meeting Violations
The Association’s Bylaws (Article II, Paragraph 2.3) explicitly mandate that regular annual meetings be held on the second Wednesday of April. In 2022, the Association unilaterally moved this meeting to May. The Association defended this as a "technical violation" that resulted in no harm, citing A.R.S. § 10-3701(e). 

However, the ALJ rejected this defense with a nuance every Board must understand: while A.R.S. § 10-3701(e) protects the **validity** of corporate actions taken despite timing errors, it does not provide **immunity** from suit or an exception for associations to ignore their own Bylaws. Adherence to mandated timeframes is a requirement, not a suggestion.

### The Right to Record
The most significant win for transparency involved the Board’s attempt to restrict meeting recordings. 

> **STATUTORY PROTECTIONS: A.R.S. § 33-1804**
> **Arizona law is clear: persons attending open board meetings may audiotape or videotape the proceedings. The Board of Directors cannot require advance notice for recording and cannot preclude it unless the Board itself provides its own unedited recordings to members upon request. Rules may be adopted to govern recording, but they cannot be used to effectively prohibit the practice.**

The ALJ found the Association in direct violation after the Community Manager informed homeowners they could not record and falsely claimed the Board required advance notice.

### Financial and Reputational Outcome
While the ALJ determined a civil penalty was not warranted, the Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s **$1,000 filing fee**. Beyond the dollar amount, the reputational cost of being declared the non-compliant party in a public ruling is a heavy burden for any Board.

## The Limits of Claims: Where the Association Prevailed

The ruling also clarified the boundaries of Board authority, finding in favor of the Association on three counts:

1.  **Organizational Meetings:** The ALJ ruled that Bylaws do not require "organizational meetings" (where officers are elected) to be a standalone event; they may occur within the context of a regular board meeting.
2.  **Management Agency:** The Petitioner’s claim that a meeting was invalid because the HOA Manager organized it was dismissed. The evidence showed Board President **Susanne Roskens** specifically requested Manager Mandy Rogers (of AAM, LLC) to schedule the meeting to address urgent landscaping issues. The ALJ affirmed that management companies act as authorized agents of the Board.
3.  **The "Muting" Threshold:** Under A.R.S. § 33-1804, a Board must allow a "reasonable number of persons to speak on each side." While the Petitioner was muted during a Zoom session due to "aggressive behavior," the ALJ found no violation because the evidence showed Pekin still had several other opportunities to speak. Muting is not an automatic violation if the "opposing side" is still given a reasonable chance to be heard.

## Procedural Reality Check: The Life Cycle of an HOA Dispute

This case illustrates the complex procedural hurdles involved in OAH litigation. For homeowners and boards alike, the timeline is everything:

*   **February 28, 2023:** The ALJ consolidated two separate dockets (23F-H034-REL and 23F-H037-REL) to streamline the hearing.
*   **March 13, 2023:** A significant discovery ruling occurred. The ALJ **quashed the subpoena for Dennis Berger** but maintained subpoenas for Susanne Roskens, Brock O’Neal, and others, demonstrating the limits of who can be compelled to testify.
*   **March 20, 2023:** The official **Record Closing** date. This is the "point of no return" for evidence.
*   **March 27 & 28, 2023:** The Petitioner attempted to file additional allegations and evidence. The ALJ issued a Minute Entry **refusing to consider these filings**, as they were submitted after the record had closed.
*   **Post-Decision:** After the final order in April, the Petitioner sought a rehearing. The OAH issued a Minute Entry stating it lost jurisdiction the moment the decision was rendered. Any further requests for rehearing must be directed to the **Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)**.

## Essential Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

1.  **Bylaws are Not Suggestions:** Even "technical" timing shifts regarding annual meetings are actionable violations. Boards cannot use A.R.S. § 10-3701(e) as a shield to ignore their own governing documents.
2.  **Recording is a Statutory Right:** Boards cannot impose arbitrary hurdles, such as mandatory advance notice, on members wishing to record open meetings. Transparency is a protected right under A.R.S. § 33-1804.
3.  **The Record is Final:** In an administrative hearing, the window for evidence is narrow. As seen with the rejected March 27/28 filings, late submissions—no matter how relevant they seem—will be ignored once the record is closed.

## Conclusion: Seeking Harmony Through Compliance

The *Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch* ruling serves as a vital reminder: transparency is not just a best practice; in Arizona, it is a legal mandate. While the Association prevailed on internal management issues, their failure to respect recording rights and bylaw-mandated schedules resulted in a $1,000 reimbursement order and a public record of non-compliance. To maintain community harmony and avoid the costs of litigation, both homeowners and board members must anchor their actions in a strict reading of A.R.S. § 33-1804.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Senol Pekin (Petitioner)
    Testified on his own behalf
  • Julie Willoughby (Witness)
    Testified for Petitioner; also spelled Julie Willowby in hearing decision
  • Shelley Nelson (Witness)
    Testified for Petitioner; also spelled Shelly Nelson in hearing decision
  • Sherry Swanson (Witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (Attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Artesian Ranch Community Association
  • Daniel S. Francom (Attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Listed in service records for Respondent
  • Susanne Easterday Roskens (Director of Board / Witness)
    Artesian Ranch Community Association
    Testified for Respondent; Board President
  • Mandy Rogers (Community Manager Employee / Witness)
    AAM, LLC
    Employee of Respondent's Community Manager; organized meetings and testified

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Assigned judge who issued the decision and orders
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received administrative copies of orders and decisions

Other Participants

  • Dennis Berger (Subpoenaed Individual)
    Subpoena was quashed
  • Brock O'Neal (Subpoenaed Individual)
    Motion to quash his subpoena was denied

Emery Herbert v. Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association INC

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222047-REL
Agency
Tribunal
Decision Date 2022-08-18
Administrative Law Judge
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Emery Herbert Counsel Pro Se
Respondent Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association Inc. Counsel Maria G. McKee and Josh Bolen (Carpenter Hazelwood Delgado & Bolen LLP)

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222047-REL Decision – 979855.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:52:17 (46.3 KB)

22F-H2222047-REL Decision – 981946.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:52:23 (49.0 KB)

22F-H2222047-REL Decision – 993566.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:52:27 (207.3 KB)





Briefing Document: Herbert v. Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association

# Briefing Document: Herbert v. Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association

## Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the consolidated administrative cases (**No. 22F-H2222047-REL** and **No. 22F-H2222052-REL**) heard on July 11, 2022, before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute involved Emery Herbert (Petitioner) and the Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association Inc. (Respondent/Association) regarding two primary issues: the Association’s alleged failure to promptly repair a roof leak and the legality of a significant monthly dues increase to fund a community-wide roof replacement project.

Following a deep analysis of testimonies and evidence, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision on August 18, 2022, dismissing both petitions. The ALJ concluded that the Association acted within its discretionary authority to manage common areas and that the Petitioner’s interpretation of "prompt repair" under Arizona law was contextually incorrect.

---

## Case Overview and Participants

| Role | Entity | Key Individuals |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Petitioner** | Homeowner (Unit 212) | Emery Herbert |
| **Respondent** | HOA | Lakebrook Villas II HOA |
| **Management** | Property Management | Peterson Company (Lindsay Sherwin) |
| **Contractor** | Roofing Experts | Desert Canyon Roofing (Edwin Escobardia Diaz) |
| **Adjudicator** | Administrative Law Judge | Kay A. Abramsohn |

---

## Analysis of Key Themes

### 1. Maintenance vs. Capital Improvement
A central conflict was whether the total "rip and replacement" of the community’s 44-year-old roofs constituted "maintenance" or a "capital improvement." 

*   **Petitioner’s Position:** Based on IRS definitions and the scale of the $362,586 project, the Petitioner argued the work was a capital improvement. Under Section 9 of the Declaration, any capital expenditure exceeding $2,500 requires a 75% vote of the owners.
*   **Respondent’s Position:** The Association argued the roofs had reached the end of their shelf life and that "patching" was no longer a viable professional recommendation. They framed the project as necessary maintenance to restore the common elements to their original functional state.
*   **Legal Outcome:** The ALJ ruled that the Association exercised its authority under Section 13 of the Declaration. This section provides broad discretionary power to the Board to determine "cash requirements" necessary to manage and operate the condominium, including repairs and renovations to common areas.

### 2. Statutory Interpretation of "Prompt Repair"
The Petitioner alleged a violation of **A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)**, claiming the Association failed to provide a "prompt repair" for a leak reported in March 2022.

*   **The "Access" Proviso:** The Association argued—and the ALJ agreed—that the "prompt repair" requirement in A.R.S. § 33-1247(A) applies specifically to damage caused *by the Association* when they are granted access to a unit to perform work. 
*   **General Upkeep:** For general maintenance of common elements, the statute requires the Association to be responsible for upkeep, but the ALJ found that the timing and deliberation of a community-wide replacement project (begun in late 2021) constituted reasonable action by the Board.

### 3. Drainage vs. Foam Roofing Failure
There was significant technical disagreement regarding the cause of the leaks in Building M.

*   **The Drain Theory:** Petitioner provided evidence (including a 2019 report and a plumber's statement) suggesting that clogged internal cast-iron drains were the true cause of the leaks, meaning a roof surface replacement would not solve the problem.
*   **The Foam Theory:** The Association’s roofing contractor testified that the polyurethane foam was deteriorated and separating from the pipes, allowing water intrusion. He stated that while drains might be clogged, the roof surface failure was the primary issue. He committed to water-testing drains once the roof was "opened up" and involving a plumber if damage was found.

---

## Significant Quotes with Context

### On Statutory Obligations
> "The association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit... If damage is inflicted on the common elements or any unit through which access is taken, the unit owner... or the association... is liable for the prompt repair of the damage."
*   **Context:** **A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)**. This was the foundation of Petitioner's first claim. The ALJ eventually determined the "prompt" requirement was limited to damage occurring during unit access.

### On HOA Funding Strategy
> "This is NOT a special assessment; it is an increase to your regular monthly HOA fees."
*   **Context:** **Association Notification Letter (April 20, 2022)**. The HOA raised monthly fees from $303 to $885 for seven months to fund the $362,586 project, intentionally avoiding the "special assessment" label to bypass a membership vote.

### On Board Discretion
> "The Management Committee shall have discretionary powers to prescribe the manner of maintaining and operating the Condominium Project and to determine the cash requirements... Every such reasonable determination... shall, as against the owner, be deemed necessary and properly made."
*   **Context:** **Declaration Section 13**. This language was cited by the ALJ as the legal basis for the Board's authority to raise dues for the roof project without a 75% vote.

### On Necessary Maintenance
> "At this time, repairs can't be done... you're still going to get leaks... they're going to spend a lot more money than what they are right now. So that’s why... we highly recommended repairs not to be done."
*   **Context:** **Testimony of Edwin Escobardia Diaz (Desert Canyon Roofing)**. He justified the full replacement over patching, which helped the HOA argue that the project was "maintenance" rather than an "improvement."

---

## Actionable Insights

### For Homeowners
*   **Context of "Promptness":** Under Arizona condominium law (A.R.S. § 33-1247), an HOA’s duty to perform "prompt" repairs is specifically linked to damage they cause while accessing a unit. General maintenance of common elements is subject to the Board’s reasonable deliberation and timeline.
*   **Evidence of Causation:** In disputes involving leaks, having a written expert report (from a plumber or roofer) is critical. The Petitioner’s experts refused to provide written statements, which weakened her argument that the HOA's roof replacement would not fix the underlying drainage issue.

### For HOA Governance
*   **Regular vs. Special Assessments:** The distinction between "maintenance" and "capital improvement" is vital. This case confirms that Boards have broad discretion to classify large-scale replacements (like roofs) as maintenance, allowing them to fund the project via regular assessment increases (Section 13) rather than special assessments (Section 10/9) that require community votes.
*   **Master vs. Sub-Association Rules:** The Association successfully argued that certain restrictive amendments (limiting fee increases to 5%) belonged to a Master Association (Lake Biltmore Village) and did not apply to the specific sub-association’s internal dues for its own roofs.
*   **Deliberation Records:** The HOA’s victory was supported by a paper trail showing they began discussing the roof condition and seeking bids as early as 2019, demonstrating "reasonable deliberation" rather than negligence.







Case Study Guide: Herbert v. Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association

# Case Study Guide: Herbert v. Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive analysis of the consolidated legal matters between Petitioner Emery Herbert and Respondent Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association Inc. (HOA), as heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings in July 2022.

## 1. Case Overview

*   **Petitioner:** Emery Herbert (Unit owner since February 2022).
*   **Respondent:** Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association Inc.
*   **Administrative Law Judge:** Kay A. Abramsohn.
*   **Docket Numbers:**
    *   **22F-H2222047-REL (Petition1):** Focused on roof leaks, maintenance of common elements, and the interpretation of "prompt repair."
    *   **22F-H2222052-REL (Petition2):** Focused on the categorization of a $362,586 roof replacement project and the legality of increasing monthly dues without a membership vote.

---

## 2. Key Legal Framework

The proceedings centered on the interpretation of Arizona statutes and the HOA’s governing documents:

| Authority | Specific Provision | Content/Application |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)** | Upkeep of the Condominium | Establishes that the association is responsible for the maintenance, repair, and replacement of common elements. |
| **HOA Declaration** | **Section 1(e)** | Defines "common areas and facilities" to include roofs, exterior walls, and pipes. |
| **HOA Declaration** | **Section 1(g)** | Defines the "unit" as the space enclosed by the interior surfaces of the finished perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings. |
| **HOA Declaration** | **Section 9** | Outlines assessments. Requires a 75% membership vote for "capital improvements" exceeding $2,500. Provides an exception for reconstruction due to fire or "other casualty." |
| **HOA Declaration** | **Section 13** | Grants the Board discretionary power to determine the "cash requirement" needed to manage, operate, and maintain the project. |

---

## 3. The Core Disputes

### Issue A: Roof Leak and Maintenance (Petition1)
Petitioner Emery Herbert discovered a leak in her second bedroom on March 29, 2022, following a rainstorm. She argued the HOA violated **A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)** by failing to provide a "prompt repair."

*   **Petitioner’s Position:** The HOA neglected the drains for years (citing a 2019 report). The delay in repair caused the spread of black mold (*Stachybotrys*) behind the drywall and in the roof insulation.
*   **HOA’s Position:** The 40-year-old foam roofs had reached the end of their life and could no longer be patched effectively. The HOA was already implementing a comprehensive community-wide replacement plan.
*   **Legal Finding:** The Judge ruled that the "prompt repair" clause in A.R.S. § 33-1247(A) specifically applies to damage the HOA causes to a unit while *accessing* it to perform repairs. Because the HOA was acting on a broad plan for 40-year-old roofs, it did not violate the statute.

### Issue B: Assessment Increase vs. Special Assessment (Petition2)
In April 2022, the HOA increased monthly dues from **$303 to $885** for the remainder of the year to fund a $362,586 roof project ($4,074 per unit).

*   **Petitioner’s Position:** Ripping off and replacing a roof is a "capital improvement" under IRS and accounting standards. Per Section 9, any capital expenditure over $2,500 requires a 75% vote. The HOA called it "maintenance" simply to bypass the vote and gain the power to place liens for non-payment.
*   **HOA’s Position:** Replacing a roof to its original state to prevent water intrusion is "maintenance," not an improvement or upgrade. Section 13 grants the Board authority to increase regular assessments to cover necessary repairs and renovations.
*   **Legal Finding:** The Judge concluded the HOA properly exercised its authority under Section 13 to determine cash requirements for repairs and renovations. Petitioner failed to prove the project was a capital improvement requiring a vote under Section 9.

---

## 4. Short-Answer Practice Questions

1.  **On what date did the Petitioner first report the roof leak, and how much time elapsed before the hearing?**
    *   The leak was reported on March 29, 2022. The hearing took place on July 11, 2022, approximately 104 days later.
2.  **According to the HOA's roofer, Edwin Escobardia Diaz, why were patch repairs no longer recommended for the community?**
    *   He testified that the foam was deteriorated to the point where patches would still result in leaks, and a full tear-off was necessary to inspect for underlying rotten wood.
3.  **What was the specific amount of the monthly HOA fee increase, and how many months was it scheduled to last?**
    *   The fee increased by $582 (from $303 to $885) for seven months.
4.  **How did the Judge interpret the term "prompt repair" in A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)?**
    *   The Judge interpreted it as applying to damage caused by the association or a unit owner during the process of taking access through a unit to perform repairs.
5.  **Which building was used as a comparison because its roof was already replaced by February 2022?**
    *   Building "C."
6.  **What did witness Colton Hoover testify regarding the classification of the roof project?**
    *   As an audit associate and accountant, he testified that a total rip-and-replace project should be classified as a capital improvement rather than maintenance.

---

## 5. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1.  **Maintenance vs. Capital Improvement:** Evaluate the arguments presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the classification of the roof replacement. Discuss how the IRS and Cornell Law definitions provided in the source context conflict with the HOA’s interpretation of "maintenance" under Section 13.
2.  **Statutory Interpretation:** Analyze the Judge’s decision to dismiss Petition1. Do you agree with the narrow interpretation of "prompt repair" in A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)? Consider the implications for homeowners if an HOA delays repairs for common elements that cause ongoing damage to private units.
3.  **Fiduciary Discretion vs. Member Rights:** Discuss the balance of power between an HOA Board and its members as evidenced in the Petition2 dispute. Examine the Board’s use of Section 13 (regular assessment) to fund a large-scale project versus the membership’s right to a vote under Section 9 (special assessment).

---

## 6. Glossary of Important Terms

| Term | Definition Based on Source Context |
| :--- | :--- |
| **A.R.S. § 33-1247** | The Arizona statute governing the upkeep of condominiums and the responsibilities of the association versus unit owners. |
| **Capital Improvement** | Defined by the Petitioner (via Cornell/IRS) as an alteration or repair that increases a structure's useful life or value by at least $10,000. |
| **Common Elements** | Parts of the condominium property (like roofs, exterior walls, and pipes) that are not part of individual units and are maintained by the HOA. |
| **Declaration (CC&Rs)** | The legal document that establishes the rules, responsibilities, and assessment powers of the Homeowners Association. |
| **Maintenance** | Defined by the HOA as actions taken to preserve property or restore it to its original condition to prevent failure, such as the roof replacement. |
| **Petitioner** | The party who files a petition or complaint; in this case, Emery Herbert. |
| **Respondent** | The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Lakebrook Villas II HOA. |
| **Special Assessment** | A one-time or specific charge for a major project (like a capital improvement) which, under this HOA’s Section 9, may require a 75% membership vote. |
| **Stachybotrys** | A genus of molds, referred to in the documents as "black mold," found in the Petitioner’s unit/roof cavity following the leak. |







The $350,000 Roof Dispute: Key Lessons from a Recent HOA Legal Battle

# The $350,000 Roof Dispute: Key Lessons from a Recent HOA Legal Battle

### 1. Introduction: When Maintenance Meets the Law
In a high-stakes consolidated hearing before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (Case Nos. 22F-H2222047-REL and 22F-H2222052-REL), a fundamental conflict erupted between homeowner Emery Herbert (Petitioner) and the Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association (Respondent). The dispute serves as a landmark case study in the tension between a homeowner's right to "prompt" repairs and an HOA board’s authority to manage aging infrastructure through community-wide capital projects.

The judicial inquiry hinged on the distinction between routine maintenance and capital improvements, the technical realities of 40-year-old infrastructure, and the expansive discretionary powers granted to boards under their governing documents. At the heart of the battle was a $362,586 roof replacement project that saw monthly assessments skyrocket from $303 to $885.

### 2. The "Prompt Repair" Paradox: Interpreting A.R.S. § 33-1247
The Petitioner’s first challenge (Petition1) alleged that the Association failed to provide a "prompt repair" for a leak discovered on March 29, 2022. The Petitioner argued that the leak—which caused significant interior damage and mold—was a maintenance failure related to clogged drainage systems. To support this, the Petitioner cited a 2019 roof inspection report that ranked her specific building (Building M) as being in the "Best Condition" in the community, with no blistering.

However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) clarified that the statutory requirement for "promptness" is far more narrow than many homeowners realize.

> **Legal Nuance: A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)**
> The term **"prompt"** in this statute specifically applies to damage **inflicted on a unit or common element during the act of the Association accessing a unit** to perform repairs. It is an access-based liability trigger. Because the Association did not damage the Petitioner’s unit while attempting to reach a common element, the "prompt repair" clock under this specific statute never legally started ticking.

While the Petitioner viewed the delay as negligence, the Association demonstrated that they had been deliberating on a community-wide solution since December 2021. The ALJ ruled that the timing of repairs and replacements remains within the Association’s discretionary authority.

### 3. Maintenance or Capital Improvement? The $2,500 Trigger
The second petition (Petition2) challenged the funding of the $362,586 project. The Petitioner argued that a total roof replacement constituted a "capital improvement" under Section 9 of the Declaration. This section contains a critical "trigger": **no single improvement in the nature of a capital expenditure exceeding $2,500 shall be made without a 75% vote of the owners.**

Additionally, the Petitioner argued that an amendment to the Lake Biltmore Village master declarations capped fee increases at 5% without a vote.

| Feature | Petitioner’s Claim | Board’s Legal Stance |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Classification** | Capital Improvement (New Asset) | Necessary Maintenance (Restoring Asset) |
| **Voting Trigger** | Section 9: 75% vote for costs over **$2,500** | Section 13: Discretionary Board Power |
| **Fee Cap** | 5% Cap (Master Association Amendment) | No Cap (Specific Lakebrook II Declaration) |
| **Technical View** | "Best Condition" building needs patch only | 40-year roofs are beyond their functional life |

The ALJ found that the project was not a "new" improvement but a necessary restoration of the common elements to their original functional state. Crucially, the judge determined that the Board's authority under Section 13 superseded the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the $2,500 threshold and the 5% cap.

### 4. The Power of the Board: Understanding Section 13 Discretion
The Association’s victory rested on the broad language of Section 13 of the Lakebrook Villas II Declaration. This section acts as a "wild card" for Board authority, granting the Management Committee the power to:

*   **Determine Cash Requirements:** Decide the aggregate sum necessary to manage and operate the project.
*   **Adjust Assessments:** Increase or diminish assessment amounts throughout the year as needed to meet estimated expenses.
*   **Prescribe Maintenance Standards:** Determine the manner in which the buildings and common areas are maintained.

The ruling highlighted a powerful blockquote from the Declaration:
> "Every such reasonable determination by the Management Committee within the bounds of the Act and this Declaration shall, as against the owner, be deemed necessary and properly made."

This "reasonableness" standard allows boards to bypass membership votes for massive expenditures if the work is deemed essential for the continued operation and maintenance of the community.

### 5. Reality Check: 40-Year-Old Roofs and Technical Necessity
Expert testimony from Edwin Escobardia of Desert Canyon Roofing provided the technical justification for the Board’s "maintenance" classification. Escobardia testified that the 40-year-old foam roofs had reached the end of their functional life, making professional patching impossible.

Key technical findings included:
*   **The Patching Failure:** On aged, deteriorated foam, new patch material will not bond. Attempting patches would be a waste of Association funds as they would not stop the leaks.
*   **Sub-Surface Inspection:** Full removal is necessary to inspect the underlying wood structure for rot and damage—a critical step that surface-level patches cannot accomplish.
*   **Mitigation Limits:** The Association’s "inaction" regarding tarps was explained as a technical limitation; in the Petitioner's case, the leak was near a plumbing pipe where the foam was too deteriorated to support a tarp or a "band-aid" fix.

### 6. Conclusion: Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards
In the Final Administrative Law Judge Decision ordered on **August 18, 2022**, the ALJ dismissed both petitions. The ruling confirmed that the Association did not violate the law or its governing documents by implementing the $362,586 project via a massive assessment increase without a vote.

**Lessons Learned:**

*   **Statutory Limits:** A.R.S. § 33-1247(A) is not a general "speed of repair" law. It is specifically tied to damage caused by the Association during unit access.
*   **Governing Docs Override Definitions:** While the IRS or a dictionary might define "replacement" as a capital improvement, the specific wording of a Declaration (like Section 13) can legally reclassify it as "necessary maintenance."
*   **The Discretionary Power Clause:** Homeowners must look for "Discretionary Power" clauses in their CC&Rs. These clauses often nullify voting requirements (like the $2,500 Section 9 cap) if the Board can show the expense is for the "operation and management" of the community.
*   **Technical Evidence Matters:** Expert testimony regarding the "functional life" of infrastructure can override even a recent inspection report (like the 2019 "Best Condition" ranking for Building M) if the expert proves a community-wide emergency exists.

Homeowners are strongly advised to review the specific "Discretionary Power" and "Common Expense" sections of their CC&Rs before initiating legal action against a board's financial decisions.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Emery Herbert (Petitioner)
    Represented herself
  • Colton Hoover (Witness)
    Walker and Armstrong CPAs
    Homeowner and Audit Associate
  • Hildelu Sandoval (Witness)
    Homeowner at Lakebrook Villas II
  • Luv Brito (Witness)
    Homeowner at Lakebrook Villas II

Respondent Side

  • Maria G. McKee (Attorney)
    Carpenter Hazelwood Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association Inc.
  • Josh Bolen (Attorney)
    Carpenter Hazelwood Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent Lakebrook Villas II Homeowners Association Inc.
  • Lindsay Sherwin (Witness)
    Peterson Company
    Community manager for Lakebrook Villas II
  • Edwin Escobar Diaz (Witness)
    Desert Canyon Roofing
    Half owner of Desert Canyon Roofing

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Steven Schmidt v. Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222040-REL
Agency Arizona Department of Real Estate
Tribunal
Decision Date 2022-07-13
Administrative Law Judge JC
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Steven J. Schmidt Counsel Pro Se
Respondent Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc. Counsel Michael S. Shupe, Esq. (Goldschmidt Shupe, PLLC)

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – 2022 04 22 ADRE Response HO22-22040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:49:43 (95.9 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – 973190.pdf

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22F-H2222040-REL Decision – 975956.pdf

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22F-H2222040-REL Decision – 983362.pdf

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22F-H2222040-REL Decision – Date of Hearing Recieved.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:49:57 (169.0 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – HO22-22040_Notice_Petition.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:50:03 (521.1 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – Notice of Hearing .pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:50:09 (1792.3 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – Response to Petition – 4.22.22.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:50:22 (127.2 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – 2022 04 22 ADRE Response HO22-22040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:46:29 (95.9 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – 973190.pdf

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22F-H2222040-REL Decision – 975956.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:46:36 (54.8 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – 983362.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:46:40 (165.5 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – Date of Hearing Recieved.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:46:44 (169.0 KB)

22F-H2222040-REL Decision – HO22-22040_Notice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2222040-REL Decision – Notice of Hearing .pdf

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22F-H2222040-REL Decision – Response to Petition – 4.22.22.pdf

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Briefing Document: Steven Schmidt v. Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc.

# Briefing Document: Steven Schmidt v. Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc.

## Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative hearing and subsequent decision regarding a dispute between Steven Schmidt (Petitioner) and the Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc. (Respondent/Association). The central conflict involved the interpretation of the Association's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically concerning the allowable square footage of a detached accessory structure.

The Petitioner sought to construct a 1,441-square-foot detached garage, arguing that the CC&Rs allowed for a size based on 40% of his "Dwelling Unit," which he interpreted as the total structure including his existing attached garage and porches. The Association denied the application, contending that "Dwelling Unit" refers only to the livable square footage of the home. Following a formal hearing on June 23, 2022, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark ruled in favor of the Association, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the CC&Rs.

---

## Case Overview and Procedural History

| Item | Details |
| :--- | :--- |
| **Case Number** | 22F-H2222040-REL (ADRE Case # HO22-22/040) |
| **Petitioner** | Steven Schmidt (Homeowner, Lot 9) |
| **Respondent** | Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc. |
| **Administrative Law Judge** | Jenna Clark |
| **Primary Issue** | Interpretation of CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7 (Accessory Structure size) |
| **Petition Date** | March 21, 2022 |
| **Hearing Date** | June 23, 2022 |
| **Decision Date** | July 13, 2022 |

### Background
In May 2019, the Petitioner submitted plans to the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for a detached garage project. The Association issued three separate denial letters between July 2019 and February 2020. The primary reason for denial was that the proposed 1,441-square-foot structure exceeded the allowable size limits dictated by the CC&Rs.

---

## Analysis of Key Themes

### 1. The Definition of "Dwelling Unit"
The crux of the legal dispute was the definition of the term "Dwelling Unit" as used in CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7. 

*   **The Provision:** "Accessory structures shall be limited to 5% of the lot area or forty percent (40%) of the main Dwelling Unit, whichever is less."
*   **Petitioner's Interpretation:** Argued that a "Dwelling Unit" is the entire physical structure. Under this view, his dwelling unit totaled 4,438 square feet (2,820 livable + 1,002 attached garage + 616 porches). This would allow an accessory structure of up to 1,775 square feet.
*   **Respondent's Interpretation:** Maintained that "Dwelling Unit" is a defined term separate from garages and porches. Under this view, the Petitioner’s dwelling unit was only the 2,820 square feet of livable space, limiting the accessory structure to 1,128 square feet.

### 2. Contractual Hierarchy and Internal Consistency
The Association’s counsel, Michael Shupe, argued that the CC&Rs must be read as a whole. He pointed to specific definitions in Article I:
*   **Section 1.15:** Defines "Dwelling Unit" as a building or portion of a building designed for use as a "Residence."
*   **Section 1.29:** Defines "Residence" as a lot together with the "residential Dwelling Unit, garage, patio and other Improvements."

By listing "Dwelling Unit" separately from "garage" and "patio" in the definition of "Residence," the Association argued the drafters intended these to be distinct categories.

### 3. Lay Interpretation vs. Legal Precision
The Petitioner, appearing on his own behalf, emphasized a "lay interpretation" of the documents. He argued that as a non-lawyer, he perceived the dwelling unit to be the total structure. He contended that if "Dwelling Unit" only meant livable space, other sections of the CC&Rs—such as those regarding solar panels or antennas being permitted on a "Dwelling Unit"—would imply those items could not be placed on garages or porches, which he deemed "nonsense."

---

## Important Quotes with Context

### From Petitioner Steven Schmidt
> "The clear intent of the CC&Rs is to treat the dwelling unit as an entire structure, including the garage and porches... The Association has ignored the language of their own CC&Rs and design guidelines."
*   **Context:** Closing argument during the June 23 hearing, where Schmidt emphasized that the physical architecture of the home should dictate the calculation.

> "I read the CC&Rs. I perceive them in good taste to mean what I have defined that they mean... The CC&Rs do not begin by [saying] 'you must get a contract expert to read and interpret for you, Mr. Owner.'"
*   **Context:** Rebuttal argument addressing the Association's reliance on technical legal definitions found in the "Definitions" section of the CC&Rs.

### From Respondent’s Counsel (Michael Shupe)
> "As a matter of contract interpretation, you look at the entire contract... one of the principal ideas is to look at the express language and find out if there's any ambiguity."
*   **Context:** Arguments made during the hearing to justify why the ARC looked at the "Definitions" section of the CC&Rs rather than just Section 7.7.

### From Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
> "It is clear from the record that a 'Dwelling Unit' can only consist of a portion of a building that is distinct from other structures and improvements like garages and patios."
*   **Context:** Found in the "Conclusions of Law" section of the final decision, explaining why the Petitioner’s calculation was rejected.

---

## Data Points and Square Footage Calculations

The following table reflects the data used by the ALJ to reach the final decision:

| Structure Component | Square Footage |
| :--- | :--- |
| **Livable Area (Home)** | 2,820 |
| **Attached Garage** | 1,002 |
| **Covered Front Porch** | 289 |
| **Covered Rear Porch** | 327 |
| **Petitioner's Claimed "Dwelling Unit" Total** | **4,438** |
| **Calculated "Dwelling Unit" per ALJ Decision** | **2,820** (Livable Only) |
| **Petitioner's Proposed Detached Garage** | **1,441** |
| **Max Allowable Size (40% of 2,820)** | **1,128 (Approx.)** |

*Note: The ALJ decision explicitly noted that with a livable area of 2,820, the maximum allowable square footage for an accessory structure is capped at 1,141.2 (though 40% of 2,820 is 1,128, the decision mentions 2,853 as a figure in one instance, leading to the 1,141.2 cap).*

---

## Actionable Insights

*   **Definition Primacy:** Homeowners and Associations must prioritize the "Definitions" section of their governing documents. Even if a specific section (like Article 7.7) seems clear in isolation, defined terms carry their specific meaning throughout the entire document.
*   **Burden of Proof:** In administrative hearings of this nature, the Petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a "preponderance of the evidence." Lay interpretations, however logical they may seem from a spatial or architectural perspective, often fail to overcome specific contractual definitions.
*   **Consistency in Denials:** The Association's success in this matter was supported by their consistent application of the 2,500-square-foot minimum livable space requirement (Section 7.6) and the consistent separation of "livable" space from "garages/patios" in both the CC&Rs and Design Guidelines.
*   **Administrative Process:** The case highlights the utility of prehearing conferences to identify stipulated facts, which streamlined this hearing by removing factual disputes and focusing solely on the legal interpretation of terms.







Case Analysis Study Guide: Schmidt v. Catalina Ridge Community Association

# Case Analysis Study Guide: Schmidt v. Catalina Ridge Community Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing regarding the dispute between Steven Schmidt (Petitioner) and the Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc. (Respondent). It is designed to assist in understanding the nuances of contract interpretation within the context of homeowners' association (HOA) governance.

## I. Case Overview and Key Concepts

### Central Legal Issue
The primary conflict in this case is the interpretation of **Article 7, Section 7** of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, the parties disagreed on the method for calculating the allowable square footage of an "accessory structure" (in this instance, a detached garage).

### The Mathematical Conflict
The CC&Rs state that an accessory structure is limited to **5% of the lot area** or **40% of the main Dwelling Unit**, whichever is less. While the lot area was not in dispute, the definition of "Dwelling Unit" was the crux of the case.

| Component | Petitioner’s Calculation | Respondent’s Calculation |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Livable Square Footage** | 2,820 | 2,820 |
| **Covered Front Porch** | 289 | Excluded |
| **Covered Rear Porch** | 327 | Excluded |
| **Attached Garage** | 1,002 | Excluded |
| **Total "Dwelling Unit" Base** | **4,438 sq. ft.** | **2,820 sq. ft.** |
| **Allowable Accessory Size (40%)** | **1,775 sq. ft.** | **1,128 sq. ft.** |

### Key Legal Principles
*   **Absolute Source Fidelity:** The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) must interpret terms based on the definitions provided within the governing documents (CC&Rs and Design Guidelines).
*   **Contract as a Whole:** Under legal principles of contract interpretation, a document must be read in its entirety to ensure no provision is rendered meaningless or contrary to another.
*   **Burden of Proof:** In these proceedings, the Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a **preponderance of the evidence** that the Association violated the community documents.

---

## II. Short-Answer Practice Questions

**1. On what date did the Association issue the initial denial letter for the Petitioner's detached garage project?**
*Answer: July 25, 2019.*

**2. According to CC&R Article 7, Section 7, what is the maximum height allowed for an accessory structure?**
*Answer: Twenty (20) feet.*

**3. What was the square footage of the detached garage proposed by Steven Schmidt?**
*Answer: 1,441 square feet.*

**4. The Association’s Design Guidelines (Section 3.2.2) require a minimum livable square footage of 2,500. What specific areas are explicitly excluded from this minimum requirement?**
*Answer: Garages, porches, Guest Houses, and patios.*

**5. Why did the ALJ strike "Stipulated Finding of Fact number 11" during the hearing?**
*Answer: There was a point of contention regarding a typographical error in the date (noting February 5, 2022, instead of 2020), meaning it was no longer a stipulated (agreed-upon) fact.*

**6. What was the final decision rendered by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark on July 13, 2022?**
*Answer: The petition was denied because the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.*

**7. How much was the filing fee paid by the Petitioner to the Department of Real Estate to initiate the dispute?**
*Answer: $500.00.*

---

## III. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

### 1. The Conflict of Definitions
Compare the Petitioner's "lay interpretation" of the term "Dwelling Unit" with the Respondent's "contractual interpretation." How did the inclusion of Section 1.15 and Section 1.29 of the CC&Rs influence the ALJ's final decision? In your answer, address why the ALJ concluded that a "Dwelling Unit" must be distinct from structures like garages and patios.

### 2. Procedural Requirements of Administrative Hearings
The pre-hearing conference established several strict deadlines for both parties. Discuss the importance of the **Subpoena deadline**, the **Disclosure deadline**, and the **Pre-hearing memorandum**. How do these procedural steps ensure a fair hearing, and what are the consequences of failing to adhere to them (e.g., the admission of exhibits or the calling of witnesses)?

### 3. Demonstrative Evidence vs. Formal Record
During the hearing, the Petitioner utilized "demonstrative evidence" (large-scale plans on easels). Explain the ALJ's ruling on why these large visual aids were not admitted into the formal evidentiary record. Discuss the practical challenges of "spatial arguments" in a recorded administrative setting and the alternative solutions suggested by the court.

---

## IV. Glossary of Important Terms

*   **Accessory Structure:** Structures including, but not limited to, detached garages and guest homes, which are subject to specific size and height limitations under the CC&Rs.
*   **ARC (Architectural Review Committee):** The body within the Association responsible for reviewing and approving or denying construction and modification applications on lots.
*   **Bates Stamps:** Numerical page labels used on exhibits to ensure that all parties and the court can easily reference specific pages during testimony and deliberation.
*   **CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions):** The enforceable contract between an HOA and its property owners that governs property use and community standards.
*   **Dwelling Unit:** As defined in CC&R Section 1.15, any building or portion of a building situated upon a lot designed and intended for use and occupancy as a residence by a single family.
*   **In Limine (Motions in Limine):** Housekeeping issues or motions raised at the onset of a hearing to limit or prevent certain evidence from being presented.
*   **Livable Square Footage:** The interior residential space of a home, which, according to the Association’s guidelines, excludes non-livable areas such as garages, porches, and patios.
*   **Preponderance of the Evidence:** The standard of proof in civil and administrative matters, meaning the evidence shows that a contention is "more probably true than not."
*   **Stipulated Facts:** Facts that both the Petitioner and Respondent agree are true before the hearing begins, allowing the court to focus only on the remaining points of legal or factual dispute.







Building by the Numbers: Lessons from a 1,441-Square-Foot Garage Dispute

# Building by the Numbers: Lessons from a 1,441-Square-Foot Garage Dispute

## Introduction: The High Stakes of Home Improvements
For many homeowners, the ultimate property goal is the addition of a sprawling detached workshop or a custom multi-car garage. However, in communities governed by Homeowners Associations (HOAs), these architectural dreams are often tethered to the cold, hard math of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Navigating these rules requires more than just a set of blueprints; it requires a surgical understanding of how your community defines its building limits.

The case of *Steven Schmidt v. Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc.*, adjudicated before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), serves as a cautionary tale for any homeowner. What began as a request for a 1,441-square-foot detached garage devolved into a multi-year legal battle over a single mathematical definition. The central conflict? The specific method used to determine the allowable size of an accessory structure.

## The Core Conflict: The "40% Rule" Explained
The dispute originated when Petitioner Steven Schmidt proposed a 1,441-square-foot standalone garage. The Catalina Ridge Architectural Review Committee (ARC) denied the project, asserting it exceeded the size limitations set forth in **CC&R Article 7.7**.

To understand the denial, one must look at the community's "lesser of" formula for accessory structures. Under Article 7.7, a structure is limited to:
*   5% of the total lot area; or 
*   40% of the "main Dwelling Unit," whichever is less.

In this case, the Petitioner's lot was approximately 46,300 square feet. A 5% calculation would have allowed for a massive 2,315-square-foot structure. Consequently, the "40% of the main Dwelling Unit" rule became the controlling—and far more restrictive—cap. The entire case hinged on two opposing interpretations of what "Dwelling Unit" actually means:

*   **The Petitioner’s View:** The "Dwelling Unit" should encompass the home's total physical footprint, including livable space, the attached garage, and porches.
*   **The Association’s View:** The "Dwelling Unit" is a legal term referring strictly to the livable, conditioned square footage of the home.

## The Calculation Clash: Homeowner Math vs. HOA Math
The following table highlights the significant gap created by these two interpretations. While the Petitioner used a base of 4,438 square feet to justify his project, the ALJ ultimately adopted the Association's more conservative figures.

| Component | Petitioner’s Calculation (Total Footprint) | Association’s Calculation (Livable Only) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Livable Area | 2,820 sq. ft. | 2,853 sq. ft.* |
| Front Porch | 289 sq. ft. | (Excluded) |
| Rear Porch | 327 sq. ft. | (Excluded) |
| Attached Garage | 1,002 sq. ft. | (Excluded) |
| **Total Base Area** | **4,438 sq. ft.** | **2,853 sq. ft.** |
| **Allowable 40% Cap** | **1,775.2 sq. ft.** | **1,141.2 sq. ft.** |

*\*Note: While the Petitioner estimated his livable space at 2,820 sq. ft., the ALJ utilized the Association's calculated figure of 2,853 sq. ft. to determine the final legal cap. Under the HOA's math, the proposed 1,441 sq. ft. garage exceeded the limit by nearly 300 square feet.*

## The Legal Deep Dive: Definitions Matter
In the courtroom, "common sense" interpretations of space often fail when compared to the specific language of a contract. To resolve the dispute, ALJ Jenna Clark performed a deep dive into the **Article I** definitions of the CC&Rs, specifically contrasting **Section 1.15 (Dwelling Unit)** with **Section 1.29 (Residence)**.

The ruling relied on the legal principle of ***Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius***—the idea that the express mention of one thing excludes others. The ALJ highlighted Section 1.29, which defines a "Residence" as:

> “'Residence' means any subdivided Lot shown on the Plat, together with the residential **Dwelling Unit, garage, patio and other Improvements** thereon..."

By listing "Dwelling Unit," "garage," and "patio" as separate items in a series, the contract legally establishes them as distinct, mutually exclusive entities. If the "Dwelling Unit" already included the garage and patio, listing them separately would make those words redundant—a violation of standard contract interpretation rules. Furthermore, the Association pointed to **Section 7.6**, which explicitly excludes garages and porches when establishing minimum livable square footage requirements (2,500 sq. ft.).

The Petitioner argued that if you exclude garages and porches, the community's minimum size requirements become "nonsense" because a house cannot exist as livable space alone. The ALJ rejected this functionalist view, favoring a textualist approach: the document says what it says, regardless of the homeowner's personal logic.

## The Final Verdict: Why the ALJ Ruled for the HOA
On July 13, 2022, the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) issued its final decision. ALJ Jenna Clark ruled in favor of the Catalina Ridge Community Association. 

The ALJ concluded that under the governing documents, a "Dwelling Unit" is a specific portion of a building intended for residential occupancy and is legally distinct from improvements like garages and patios. Because the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to show the HOA had violated the CC&Rs, and failed to do so, the Association's denial was upheld. The 1,441-square-foot garage was officially denied for exceeding the 1,141.2-square-foot cap.

## Key Takeaways for Homeowners
As a consultant, I see these disputes frequently. Here are the strategic lessons to take from the *Schmidt* case:

1.  **Livable Area $\neq$ Physical Footprint:** In the world of HOAs, your "house" may be 4,000 square feet of stucco and roof, but its "Dwelling Unit" size—the number used for regulatory caps—is likely limited to your conditioned, livable square footage.
2.  **Definitions Overrule Reality:** Do not rely on dictionary definitions or "common sense." Always check the "Definitions" section of your CC&Rs first. If a term like "Residence" or "Improvement" is defined there, that definition is the only one that matters in court.
3.  **The Burden of Proof Bias:** In an administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests on the homeowner. If the contract language is even slightly in favor of the Association’s interpretation, the "tie" effectively goes to the Board unless you can prove a clear, express violation of the rules.

## Conclusion: Navigating Your Next Project
The *Schmidt* case is a sobering reminder that a difference of just 300 square feet can lead to a multi-year legal battle and thousands of dollars in wasted planning. Precise language in community documents exists to maintain neighborhood character and consistency, even when that language leads to difficult math for the individual homeowner.

Before you invest in professional plans or architectural renderings, consult with your Architectural Review Committee (ARC). Ask them specifically for their "base calculation" of your dwelling unit. Understanding the community’s "rules of the road" and their specific definitions is the only way to ensure your project moves from the drawing board to the backyard without a legal detour.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Steven J. Schmidt (Petitioner)
    Catalina Ridge Community Association
    Homeowner of Lot 9

Respondent Side

  • Michael S. Shupe (Counsel for Respondent)
    Goldschmidt Shupe, PLLC
  • Susan Workman (President)
    Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc.
  • Phyllis Kapellen (Vice-President)
    Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc.
  • Gina Batali (Secretary)
    Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc.
  • Jason Boyd (Director)
    Catalina Ridge Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Daniel Y. Jones (Division Manager)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (Legal Secretary)
    Office of Administrative Hearings

Thomas W Sweeney v. Warner Ranch Landing Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120027-REL
Agency Arizona Department of Real Estate
Tribunal
Decision Date 2021-02-04
Administrative Law Judge
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded
Civil Penalties

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas W. Sweeney Counsel Pro Se
Respondent Warner Ranch Landing Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120027-REL Decision – 852845.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:31:56 (102.5 KB)





Briefing Document: Sweeney vs. Warner Ranch Landing Association (Case No. 21F-H2120027-REL)

# Briefing Document: Sweeney vs. Warner Ranch Landing Association (Case No. 21F-H2120027-REL)

## Executive Summary
On February 4, 2021, Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella issued a decision in the matter of *Thomas W. Sweeney vs. Warner Ranch Landing Association*. The dispute centered on whether the Warner Ranch Landing Association (the Respondent) violated community CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions) by increasing annual assessments in 2021. The Petitioner, Thomas W. Sweeney, contended that a 10% assessment increase exceeded the allowable limit defined in the community documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petition. The ruling established that the Board of Directors acted within its authority under Article 8, Section 8.1.5 of the CC&Rs and complied with Arizona statutory limits (A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)). The decision clarifies the distinction between the "Maximum Annual Assessment"—a calculated ceiling that grows annually—and the actual assessment levied by the Board.

---

## Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

### 1. Interpretation of Section 8.1.5 (Maximum Annual Assessment)
The core of the dispute was the interpretation of how the "Maximum Annual Assessment" (MAA) is calculated and applied. Under Section 8.1.5, the MAA for 1987 was set at $840.00. For every subsequent year, the MAA increases by the greater of:
*   The percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI); or
*   Five percent (5%).

The Board is not required to levy the full amount of the MAA each year. However, the document specifies that choosing not to levy the full amount does not prevent the Board from raising assessments to the full MAA in future years. The Respondent demonstrated that if the MAA had increased by 5% annually since 1988, the allowable maximum in 2021 would have been $4,412.81—far exceeding the actual 2021 assessment.

### 2. Statutory vs. Contractual Limits
The case highlighted the interplay between community-specific CC&Rs and Arizona state law.
*   **CC&R Section 8.1.5:** Allows for an annual increase in the *Maximum* assessment ceiling by at least 5%.
*   **A.R.S. § 33-1803(A):** A state statutory safeguard that prevents Homeowners Associations (HOAs) from imposing a regular assessment more than 20% greater than the previous fiscal year’s assessment.

The Association's 10% increase in 2021 was found to be legally permissible because it was both below the calculated MAA ceiling and well within the 20% statutory limit.

### 3. Board Discretion and Financial Obligations
The Association provided testimony that the 10% increase was necessary to address inadequately funded reserves for community projects, specifically road improvements. The ALJ noted that Section 8.1.5 explicitly allows the Board to meet increases in utility and insurance obligations without member approval, provided they stay within the statutory 20% limit.

### 4. Burden of Proof in Administrative Hearings
A significant factor in the dismissal was the Petitioner’s failure to meet the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The Petitioner offered personal interpretations of the CC&Rs but provided no external evidence or data to support the claim that the Association had exceeded its authority.

---

## Important Quotes with Context

### On the Calculation of Assessments
> "The Maximum Annual Assessment for any fiscal year shall be equal to the Maximum Annual Assessment for the immediately preceding fiscal year increased at a rate equal to the greater of: (a) the percentage increase... in the Consumer Price Index... or (b) five percent (5%)."
— **Context:** This excerpt from Section 8.1.5 of the CC&Rs defines the formula used to determine the legal "ceiling" for assessments.

### On Board Authority
> "Nothing herein shall obligate the Board to levy, in any fiscal year, Annual Assessments in the full amount of the Maximum Annual Assessment... and the election by the Board not to levy... shall not prevent the Board from levying Annual Assessments in subsequent fiscal years in the full amount of the Maximum Annual Assessment."
— **Context:** This provision protects the Board’s right to increase dues significantly in a single year (up to the MAA) even if they have kept dues low in prior years.

### On the Burden of Proof
> "Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Article 8.1.5 of its CC&Rs... 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'"
— **Context:** The ALJ explains that the Petitioner must prove the violation is more likely than not; simply disagreeing with the Board's math or interpretation is insufficient.

---

## Actionable Insights

| Stakeholder | Insight/Action |
| :--- | :--- |
| **HOA Boards** | **Maintain Historical MAA Records:** Boards should keep a continuous record of the "Maximum Annual Assessment" calculations dating back to the community's inception to justify current increases. |
| **HOA Boards** | **Reserve Funding Transparency:** Communicating that increases are tied to specific projects (e.g., road improvements) provides a clear rationale for exercising the right to increase assessments. |
| **Homeowners** | **Distinguish MAA from Actual Levies:** Homeowners should understand that the "Maximum Annual Assessment" in many CC&Rs is a theoretical ceiling that grows every year, regardless of whether the actual dues collected grow at the same rate. |
| **Homeowners** | **Evidentiary Requirements:** When filing a petition with the Department of Real Estate, petitioners must provide concrete evidence (financial records, professional audits, or data) rather than relying solely on personal interpretations of community documents. |
| **Legal Counsel** | **Statutory Overlays:** Always evaluate assessment increases against the 20% statutory cap (A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)), as this often serves as the practical limit even if the CC&Rs allow for a higher "Maximum" ceiling. |







Study Guide: Sweeney vs. Warner Ranch Landing Association

# Study Guide: Sweeney vs. Warner Ranch Landing Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Thomas W. Sweeney and the Warner Ranch Landing Association (No. 21F-H2120027-REL). It covers the legal frameworks, key arguments, and the interpretation of community documents that shaped the Administrative Law Judge's decision.

---

## I. Core Case Overview

The case centers on a dispute regarding the legality of a 10% increase in annual homeowner association (HOA) assessments for the year 2021. The Petitioner, Thomas W. Sweeney, alleged that the Respondent, Warner Ranch Landing Association, violated Article 8, Section 8.1.5 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by implementing this increase.

### Key Legal Frameworks
*   **Article 8, Section 8.1.5 of the CC&Rs:** Governs the calculation of the "Maximum Annual Assessment." It establishes a base rate ($840.00 in 1987) and allows for annual increases based on the greater of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or 5%.
*   **A.R.S. § 33-1803(A):** An Arizona statute that prohibits an HOA from imposing a regular assessment that is more than 20% greater than the immediately preceding fiscal year's assessment.
*   **A.R.S. § 32-2199:** Grants the Arizona Department of Real Estate the authority to hear petitions concerning violations of planned community documents.

---

## II. Summary of Arguments

### The Petitioner’s Position
Thomas W. Sweeney argued that the Respondent exceeded the allowable assessment increase. His primary points included:
*   **Interpretation of 8.1.5:** He asserted that the 5% increase mentioned in the CC&Rs only applies if the Consumer Price Index no longer exists.
*   **Assessment History:** He noted that assessments remained flat at $820.00 semi-annually from 2011 to 2017, increased by 5% in 2018, and reached $925.40 semi-annually in 2020. He contended the 2021 increase should have been limited to a lower amount ($962.70 semi-annually).
*   **Motive:** He suggested the 10% increase was a response to the membership rejecting a special assessment.

### The Respondent’s Position
The Warner Ranch Landing Association argued that the increase was well within both contractual and statutory limits:
*   **The "Greater Of" Clause:** The Association interpreted Section 8.1.5 as allowing an automatic increase in the "Maximum Annual Assessment" by the greater of the CPI or 5% each year, regardless of whether the Board actually levied that full amount.
*   **Cumulative Maximum:** Testimony indicated that if the 5% increase had been applied annually since 1988, the 2021 Maximum Annual Assessment would have been $4,412.81.
*   **Actual vs. Maximum:** The 2021 assessment was set at a level significantly lower than the calculated maximum allowable assessment ($2,324.00 less than the maximum).
*   **Statutory Compliance:** The 10% increase from the 2020 assessment was lower than the 20% cap mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1803(A).

---

## III. Short-Answer Practice Questions

1.  **What was the original Maximum Annual Assessment for each lot in 1987?**
    *   *Answer:* Eight Hundred Forty Dollars ($840.00).
2.  **According to Section 8.1.5, what two metrics are compared to determine the annual increase of the Maximum Annual Assessment?**
    *   *Answer:* The percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and five percent (5%). The Board uses whichever is greater.
3.  **Under what specific circumstances can the Board increase the Maximum Annual Assessment without member approval, even if it exceeds the standard rate?**
    *   *Answer:* To meet increases in premiums for required insurance coverage or charges for utility services necessary for the Association's performance.
4.  **What is the statutory limit for annual assessment increases according to A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)?**
    *   *Answer:* The increase cannot be more than 20% greater than the immediately preceding fiscal year's assessment.
5.  **Who bears the burden of proof in this administrative hearing, and what is the required evidentiary standard?**
    *   *Answer:* The Petitioner bears the burden of proof by a "preponderance of the evidence."
6.  **Why did the Association Board decide to raise the 2021 assessment by 10%?**
    *   *Answer:* Because the Association's reserves were not adequately funded for planned projects, such as road improvements.

---

## IV. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1.  **The Difference Between "Levied Assessments" and "Maximum Annual Assessments":** Analyze the Board's authority to levy assessments at a rate lower than the maximum allowable limit. How does the election *not* to levy the full maximum in one year affect the Board's ability to levy the full maximum in subsequent years according to Section 8.1.5?
2.  **Statutory vs. Contractual Limits:** Discuss the interplay between A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and the community's CC&Rs. If a community's CC&Rs allow for a certain increase, but state law sets a different cap, which takes precedence in the context of this case?
3.  **The Role of Judicial Interpretation in CC&R Disputes:** The Administrative Law Judge relied on a "plain reading" of Section 8.1.5. Evaluate the Petitioner's interpretation that the 5% increase was a contingency for the disappearance of the CPI versus the Judge's interpretation of the word "or." How do specific grammatical structures influence the outcome of HOA disputes?

---

## V. Glossary of Important Terms

| Term | Definition |
| :--- | :--- |
| **A.R.S.** | Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona. |
| **Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)** | A judge who serves as the trier of fact in hearings conducted by government agencies. |
| **Annual Assessment** | Regular fees collected from homeowners to fund the operations and maintenance of a planned community. |
| **CC&Rs** | Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules and operations of a common-interest community. |
| **Consumer Price Index (CPI)** | A measure published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics that examines the weighted average of prices of a basket of consumer goods and services. |
| **Maximum Annual Assessment** | The theoretical ceiling for regular assessments as calculated by the formula provided in the CC&Rs. |
| **Petition** | A formal written request to a government authority (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for a hearing on a specific dispute. |
| **Preponderance of the Evidence** | The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that the claim is "more probably true than not." |
| **Respondent** | The party against whom a petition is filed (in this case, the Warner Ranch Landing Association). |
| **Special Assessment** | A one-time fee levied by an HOA for a specific project or emergency, often requiring a membership vote. |







Understanding HOA Assessment Limits: Lessons from Sweeney v. Warner Ranch Landing Association

# Understanding HOA Assessment Limits: Lessons from Sweeney v. Warner Ranch Landing Association

### 1. Introduction: The Shock of the Assessment Increase
For many homeowners, the arrival of the annual HOA budget is met with a sense of trepidation. When that notice arrives with a significant hike—perhaps 10% or more—the immediate reaction is often one of disbelief. Residents frequently ask: "Can they really do this without a vote?"

The case of *Thomas W. Sweeney vs. Warner Ranch Landing Association* (No. 21F-H2120027-REL), adjudicated in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, serves as a masterclass in the mechanics of community association finance. In my experience reviewing HOA litigation, these disputes rarely stem from malice, but rather from a fundamental misunderstanding of "Maximum Annual Assessments." This post explores the legal boundaries of board authority and how a decades-old formula can create a surprising "ceiling" for modern dues.

### 2. The Case Profile: A Dispute Over the Numbers
The conflict began when homeowner Thomas W. Sweeney filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged that his association had overstepped its bounds by imposing a 10% increase for the 2021 fiscal year.

*   **Petitioner:** Thomas W. Sweeney
*   **Respondent:** Warner Ranch Landing Association
*   **The Document in Question:** Article 8, Section 8.1.5 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
*   **The Allegation:** The Petitioner asserted that the Association increased annual assessments in violation of the specific mathematical limits established in the CC&Rs.

### 3. The 1987 Legacy: How a Decades-Old Formula Dictates Today's Dues
To understand why the homeowner lost this case, one must look at the "latent power" hidden in the community’s governing documents. Section 8.1.5 of the Warner Ranch CC&Rs establishes a "Maximum Annual Assessment" (MAA) that began at $840.00 in 1987.

**The Compounding Formula**
Unless two-thirds of the membership votes for a higher amount, the MAA for any given year is the previous year’s maximum increased by the **greater** of:
*   (a) The percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI); or
*   (b) Five percent (5%).

**The "Math Gap" and Latent Power**
What many homeowners miss—and what I always emphasize to boards—is that this 5% increase is **compounded annually**. Because the Association did not levy the full 5% increase every year since 1987, they effectively built a "bank" of authorized but unlevied assessment power. 

A critical distinction exists between the **Maximum Allowable Assessment** (the legal ceiling) and the **Actual Assessment** (what you pay). The Board is never obligated to levy the full maximum. However, their restraint in past years does not forfeit their right to "catch up" toward that cumulative ceiling in the future.

### 4. Homeowner’s Misconception vs. The Legal Reality
The Petitioner’s case rested on a restrictive reading of the CC&Rs, whereas the Board relied on the compounding math of the last 30 years.

| Homeowner’s Misconception | The Board's Legal Reality |
| :--- | :--- |
| Argued the 5% increase only applied if the Consumer Price Index (CPI) ceased to exist. | The "plain reading" of the word "or" allows the Board to choose whichever rate is higher (CPI or 5%). |
| Believed a 10% increase was an illegal overreach because members had previously rejected a special assessment. | Provided expert testimony showing that since the CPI rarely exceeded 5% since 1987, the 5% compounding rule was the valid benchmark. |
| Claimed the 2021 semi-annual assessment should have been capped at $962.70. | Demonstrated that the 2021 "ceiling" could have legally reached **$4,412.81**. The actual 2021 assessment was just $1,898.50—a massive **$2,324.00 "cushion"** below the maximum. |

### 5. The Statutory Safety Net: Arizona's 20% Rule
While the CC&R formula establishes the internal "ceiling," state law provides an overriding "safety net" that prevents boards from utilizing their latent power too aggressively in a single year. 

Under **A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)**, an Arizona HOA is prohibited from imposing a regular assessment that is more than 20% greater than the assessment from the immediately preceding fiscal year. In the *Sweeney* case, the Community Manager testified that while the CC&R cumulative ceiling was over $4,000, the Board was still bound by this 20% year-over-year statutory cap. Since the Board only implemented a 10% increase to address underfunded reserves for road improvements, they remained well within both the community's internal limits and the state's statutory protections.

### 6. The Verdict: Why the Judge Dismissed the Petition
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella dismissed the petition, ruling that the Association had acted entirely within its authority. The ruling highlighted three key points:

*   **The "Plain Reading" Principle:** The judge found the language in Section 8.1.5 unambiguous. The word "or" creates a choice, and the Board was entitled to use the 5% compounding method to determine the maximum ceiling.
*   **The Insurance/Utility Exception:** The judge noted that the Board can even exceed the standard formula (though still remaining subject to the 20% statutory cap) to meet rising costs for insurance premiums and utilities without a member vote.
*   **The Burden of Proof:** Most importantly, the judge noted the Petitioner offered no evidence or expert data to support his claims, relying solely on his personal interpretation of the text.

### 7. Key Takeaways for Homeowners and HOA Boards
The *Sweeney* decision offers several actionable insights for navigating community finances:

1.  **Calculate the Cumulative Ceiling:** Understand that your "Maximum Assessment" likely grows every year regardless of what you are currently paying. This "latent power" allows boards to implement increases without a vote as long as they stay under that compounded total.
2.  **Respect the Statutory Cap:** Remember that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) is your primary protection. Even if a 30-year-old CC&R formula suggests a massive increase is "legal," the 20% annual cap serves as the ultimate check on the Board's year-over-year power.
3.  **Establish the Burden of Proof:** For homeowners considering a legal challenge, personal disagreement is not evidence. To win an administrative hearing, you must provide data or expert testimony that proves the Board exceeded both the cumulative CC&R ceiling and the statutory cap.
4.  **Communicate Reserve Funding Needs:** Boards should be transparent about the "why" behind an increase. In this case, the Board justified the hike by citing underfunded reserves for road improvements—a prudent move that usually withstands judicial scrutiny.

### 8. Final Summary
The tension between maintaining a community’s infrastructure and keeping assessments low is a constant challenge for HOA boards. As *Sweeney v. Warner Ranch Landing Association* demonstrates, boards often have significantly more "latent" authority to raise dues than homeowners realize. To avoid the expense and stress of administrative hearings, boards should prioritize clear communication about how their "maximum" is calculated, while homeowners should recognize that a 10% increase—while painful—is often a legally sound exercise of the board’s duty to protect the association’s long-term financial health.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas W. Sweeney (Petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Austin Baillio (Counsel)
    Warner Ranch Landing Association
    Esq., represented Respondent
  • Christopher Reynolds (Community Manager / Witness)
    Warner Ranch Landing Association
    Provided testimony on behalf of Respondent
  • Michael Goldberg (Vice-president of the Board / Witness)
    Warner Ranch Landing Association
    Provided testimony on behalf of Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate