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Leckey, Richard M. vs. Dreamland Villa Community Club

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Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089008-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2009-01-26
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome false
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Richard M. Leckey Counsel —
Respondent Dreamland Villa Community Club Counsel Jeffrey B. Corben, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Respondent’s Constitution Article V, Section 1; By-Laws Article X, Sections 1 and 3; By-Laws Article XI, Section 3 and 3(c)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent's motion to dismiss. The single issue raised by Petitioner regarding proxy votes from 2004 pre-dated the enabling legislation for the OAH's jurisdiction (effective Sept 21, 2006), which does not have retroactive effect. Furthermore, the ALJ ruled that the Respondent's Constitution is not a planned community document subject to OAH jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction over acts occurring prior to enabling legislation and over the Association's Constitution.

Key Issues & Findings

Validity of 404 signatures used as proxy votes

Petitioner challenged the validity of proxy votes from 2004. Respondent argued the act pre-dated enabling legislation and the Constitution is not a planned community document.

Orders: Respondent's Request to Dismiss Petition granted; matter vacated.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • A.R.S. §§ 41-2198
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B)
  • Ayala v. Hill, 136 Ariz. 88

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089008-BFS Decision – 206585.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:35:45 (75.4 KB)

08F-H089008-BFS Decision – 206585.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:50 (75.4 KB)

Administrative Law Decision: Leckey v. Dreamland Villa Community Club

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative decision in Case No. 08F-H089008-BFS, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute involved Petitioner Richard M. Leckey and Respondent Dreamland Villa Community Club regarding the validity of a 2004 vote that transitioned the Respondent from a voluntary club into a planned community.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the petition on jurisdictional grounds. The ruling established three critical points:

• Statutory Limitations: Administrative agencies possess only the powers granted by statute and lack common law or inherent powers.

• Non-Retroactivity: The enabling legislation providing for administrative hearings in planned community disputes (effective September 21, 2006) does not apply retroactively to acts occurring in 2004.

• Document Definition: A community’s “Constitution” does not qualify as a “planned community document” under A.R.S. § 33-1802, placing it outside the tribunal’s oversight.

Core Dispute and Allegations

The case originated from a January 2004 balloting process conducted by the Dreamland Villa Community Club. This vote resulted in the organization becoming a “planned community”; prior to this, it operated as a voluntary club.

The Petitioner’s Claims

The Petitioner challenged the validity of 404 signatures used during the 2004 balloting. While initially identified as proxy votes, the Petitioner later filed a “Correction of Testimony” clarifying that the signatures in question were counted as either regular or absentee ballots.

The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent violated specific internal governance documents:

• Constitution: Article V, Section 1.

• By-Laws: Article X, Sections 1 and 3; Article XI, Sections 3 and 3(c).

The Discovery Argument

The Petitioner argued that although the act in question occurred in January 2004, he did not become aware of the alleged violations until November 2007. This date of discovery fell after the effective date of the legislation (September 21, 2006) that authorized the Office of Administrative Hearings to oversee such matters.

Jurisdictional and Statutory Framework

The decision heavily emphasized the limited scope of administrative tribunals compared to general courts.

Limits of Agency Power

Citing Ayala v. Hill, the ALJ noted that the Office of Administrative Hearings has no common law or inherent powers. Its jurisdiction is strictly confined to:

1. Determining if an association violated provisions of “planned community documents” (defined as Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, or Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions [CC&Rs]).

2. Determining if an association violated A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16.

Definition of Planned Community Documents

A primary point of contention was whether the Respondent’s Constitution fell under the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The ALJ concluded that the Constitution is not a planned community document as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802. Consequently, the tribunal lacked the authority to address any alleged violations of that specific document.

Legal Analysis and Findings

The Respondent moved for dismissal based on the timing of the events and the nature of the documents involved. The ALJ’s analysis focused on the following factors:

Analysis of Enabling Legislation

The legislation enabling the Office of Administrative Hearings to resolve planned community disputes became effective on September 21, 2006. The ALJ found that:

• The legislation does not provide for retroactive effect.

• A cause of action must come into existence or continue to exist after the effective date of the legislation to be heard.

• The 2004 balloting was a discrete act that occurred prior to the enabling legislation.

Determination on “Ongoing” Disputes

The ALJ rejected the notion that the discovery of the act in 2007 brought the matter within the tribunal’s reach. The ruling stated that the matter did not present an “ongoing or current dispute within the spirit and intent of the enabling legislation.” Because the act itself was pre-legislative, the ALJ determined it did not give rise to a cause of action that could be brought before the tribunal.

Final Decision and Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that because the central issue pertained to an act occurring before the effective date of the enabling legislation, no cause of action existed for the tribunal to adjudicate.

Key Rulings:

• Dismissal of By-Law Claims: It was unnecessary to address the alleged violations of the By-Laws because no valid cause of action existed under the non-retroactive statute.

• Dismissal of Constitutional Claims: The tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the Respondent’s Constitution. Even if the Constitution were a planned community document, the claim would still fail due to the timing of the act.

Final Order: The Respondent’s Request to Dismiss Petition was granted, and the matter was vacated from the docket. Per A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A), the order represents the final administrative decision and is not subject to requests for rehearing.

Administrative Law Study Guide: Leckey v. Dreamland Villa Community Club

This study guide examines the administrative law decision in the matter of Richard M. Leckey v. Dreamland Villa Community Club (No. 08F-H089008-BFS). It focuses on issues of jurisdiction, the retroactivity of legislation, and the definition of planned community documents.

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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the provided administrative decision. Each answer should be between two and three sentences.

1. What was the central issue Richard M. Leckey raised during the pre-hearing conference?

2. How did the legal status of the Dreamland Villa Community Club change as a result of the January 2004 balloting?

3. Which specific internal documents did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument regarding the timing of the alleged violations?

5. How did the Petitioner attempt to justify the timing of his petition despite the event occurring in 2004?

6. According to the decision, what defines the limits of the power and duties of the Office of Administrative Hearings?

7. What is the specific jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding planned community disputes?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) refuse to address the alleged violations of the Respondent’s Constitution?

9. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the retroactivity of the enabling legislation?

10. What was the final outcome of the case and what is the status of the ruling?

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Part II: Answer Key

1. What was the central issue Richard M. Leckey raised during the pre-hearing conference? The Petitioner sought to challenge the validity of 404 signatures used as ballots during a January 2004 vote. These signatures, which were counted as either regular or absentee ballots, were the basis for the Respondent becoming a planned community.

2. How did the legal status of the Dreamland Villa Community Club change as a result of the January 2004 balloting? Prior to the January 2004 action, the Dreamland Villa Community Club operated as a voluntary club. Following the balloting and the counting of the contested signatures, the organization transitioned into a “planned community.”

3. Which specific internal documents did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated? The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent violated Article V, Section 1 of its Constitution. Additionally, he alleged violations of Article X (Sections 1 and 3) and Article XI (Sections 3 and 3(c)) of the Respondent’s By-Laws.

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument regarding the timing of the alleged violations? The Respondent argued that the act complained of occurred in 2004, which predated the September 21, 2006, effective date of the enabling legislation. Consequently, they maintained that no violation could be found because the law providing for administrative hearings was not yet in effect.

5. How did the Petitioner attempt to justify the timing of his petition despite the event occurring in 2004? The Petitioner argued that while the act itself occurred in early 2004, he did not become aware of the alleged misconduct until November 2007. He contended that because his discovery of the act happened after the September 2006 effective date, the petition should be considered valid.

6. According to the decision, what defines the limits of the power and duties of the Office of Administrative Hearings? The powers and duties of administrative agencies like the Office of Administrative Hearings are strictly limited to those granted by statute. They do not possess any common law or inherent powers beyond what is specifically authorized by the legislature.

7. What is the specific jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding planned community disputes? The Office has limited jurisdiction to determine only if an association violated provisions of its planned community documents (such as Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, or CC&Rs) or A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16. Jurisdiction is explicitly defined under A.R.S. §§ 41-2198 and 41-2198.01(B).

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) refuse to address the alleged violations of the Respondent’s Constitution? The ALJ concluded that the Respondent’s Constitution does not qualify as a “planned community document” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802. Therefore, the tribunal lacked the legal jurisdiction to determine whether a violation of that specific document had occurred.

9. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the retroactivity of the enabling legislation? The ALJ determined that the enabling legislation does not provide for any retroactive effect and only applies to causes of action that come into existence after the effective date. Because the disputed signatures were from 2004, the matter did not represent a current or ongoing dispute within the spirit of the law.

10. What was the final outcome of the case and what is the status of the ruling? The ALJ granted the Respondent’s request to dismiss the petition and vacated the matter from the OAH docket. Under A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A), this order constitutes the final administrative decision and is not subject to requests for rehearing.

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Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the case facts and legal principles outlined in the source context to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.

1. Statutory Authority and Administrative Jurisdictions: Discuss the significance of the ruling that administrative agencies lack “common law or inherent powers.” How does this principle protect or limit the rights of parties like Leckey?

2. The Principle of Non-Retroactivity: Analyze the ALJ’s reasoning for dismissing the petition based on the effective date of September 21, 2006. Why is the date of the “act” prioritized over the Petitioner’s “date of discovery”?

3. Defining Planned Community Documents: Examine the distinction the ALJ made between a “Constitution” and “planned community documents” under A.R.S. § 33-1802. What are the legal implications for an organization when its primary governing document is ruled outside the jurisdiction of a specialized administrative tribunal?

4. Procedural Dismissal vs. Merit Review: The ALJ decided it was “unnecessary to address the alleged violations” of the By-Laws because no cause of action existed. Evaluate the efficiency and fairness of dismissing a case on jurisdictional grounds before examining the actual merits of the alleged violations.

5. The Transition from Voluntary Club to Planned Community: Based on the context of the case, discuss the legal complexities involved when a voluntary organization seeks to become a regulated planned community, specifically regarding the validity of the balloting process.

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1802

The specific Arizona Revised Statute that defines what constitutes a “planned community document.”

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues decisions for administrative agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Cause of Action

A set of facts sufficient to justify a right to sue to obtain money, property, or the enforcement of a right against another party.

Common Law Powers

Authority derived from judicial decisions and custom rather than from specific statutes; the OAH was ruled not to possess these.

Enabling Legislation

A statute that grants new authority to a government official or agency, such as the law allowing administrative hearings for planned communities effective Sept. 21, 2006.

Jurisdiction

The official power of a legal body to make legal decisions and judgments regarding specific types of cases or documents.

Petitioner

The party who presents a petition to a court or administrative body (Richard M. Leckey in this matter).

Planned Community Documents

Specific legal filings including Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that govern a planned community.

Proxy Vote

A ballot cast by one person on behalf of another; in this case, the Petitioner initially challenged signatures used as proxy votes.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who responds to the allegations (Dreamland Villa Community Club in this matter).

Retroactive Effect

The application of a law to events that took place before the law was passed; the ALJ ruled the enabling legislation had no such effect.

Voluntary Club

The legal status of the Respondent prior to the 2004 vote, distinguishing it from a mandated planned community.

Why the Past Stays in the Past: 4 Surprising Lessons from the Dreamland Villa Legal Battle

The 404-Signature Dispute

In the matter of Leckey v. Dreamland Villa Community Club, homeowner Richard M. Leckey challenged the very foundation of his community’s status. The conflict centered on a 2004 vote that transformed Dreamland Villa from a “voluntary club” into a “planned community,” a shift that fundamentally altered the rights and obligations of every resident.

Leckey targeted 404 signatures used during that January 2004 balloting, which he initially described as proxy votes before clarifying in a “Correction of Testimony” that they were counted as regular or absentee ballots. This case highlights a frustrating reality: what happens when you discover a potential injustice years after the ink has dried on the deal?

The great irony of the Leckey case is that the truth regarding those 404 signatures was never actually investigated. Because of rigid jurisdictional boundaries, the court never reached the “what” of the alleged fraud; it was entirely defeated by the “where” and the “when.”

The “Non-Retroactive” Barrier

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the case primarily because the enabling legislation allowing the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to oversee such disputes did not take effect until September 21, 2006. Since the controversial vote occurred in 2004, the tribunal determined it simply lacked the authority to look backward in time.

This serves as a critical lesson for homeowners: when new laws are passed to provide protections or oversight, they rarely reach back to heal old wounds. In the eyes of the administrative court, the timeline is a hard wall that cannot be breached, regardless of the merit of the underlying claim.

The Myth of “Inherent Power”

Homeowners often walk into a hearing assuming that any judge has the “inherent power” to right a clear wrong. However, as an “Information Architect” of HOA law must warn, the OAH is not a general common law court; it is a creature of statute with a very narrow, pre-defined “menu” of powers.

Unlike a Superior Court judge, an Administrative Law Judge cannot exercise “broad justice” or create equitable remedies unless the legislature specifically wrote that power into the law. If the statute doesn’t explicitly say the judge can do it, the judge cannot do it.

The Structural Loophole of Document Labels

A major component of Leckey’s challenge involved the “Constitution” of the Dreamland Villa Community Club. Here, the court revealed a structural loophole: the OAH’s jurisdiction is strictly limited by A.R.S. §§ 41-2198 and 41-2198.01(B) to specific “planned community documents.”

In Arizona, this “menu” of reviewable documents typically includes Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and CC&Rs. Because the governing document in question was labeled a “Constitution,” the ALJ concluded it was not a planned community document under A.R.S. § 33-1802, leaving the court without the power to even address whether its provisions were violated.

For the homeowner, this is a vital architectural warning: the label of a document can determine your level of legal protection. A community governed by a “Constitution” rather than traditional “Bylaws” may inadvertently—or intentionally—bypass the administrative oversight meant to protect homeowners.

The Discovery Rule vs. The Statutory Clock

Leckey argued that while the signatures were collected in 2004, he did not discover the alleged issue until November 2007—well after the 2006 enabling legislation was in place. He believed this “discovery” should bring his case within the court’s timeframe.

The ALJ rejected this argument, taking a hardline stance on the statutory clock. The court ruled that for a dispute to be heard, the underlying act must be “ongoing or current within the spirit and intent of the enabling legislation,” rather than a completed act from the past that was only recently discovered.

This highlights the high cost of delayed discovery in administrative law. The court prioritizes the finality of the effective date over the homeowner’s personal timeline of awareness, effectively locking the door on historical grievances.

A Final Thought for Homeowners

The dismissal of the Dreamland Villa case serves as a stark reminder that in the world of HOA litigation, jurisdiction and document structure are often more important than the facts of the grievance. If your community is undergoing a transition, “real-time” vigilance is your only true protection; once the statutory window closes, it rarely opens again.

As more voluntary clubs transition into formal planned communities, we must ask: how can homeowners ensure transparency at the moment of change? If the courtroom doors are locked to the past, the only way to protect the future of a community is to get the “architecture” of the governing documents right the first time.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard M. Leckey (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Jeffrey B. Corben (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed in mailing distribution
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed in mailing distribution

Price, Maribeth -v- Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089012-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2009-01-26
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome dismissed
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Maribeth Price Counsel —
Respondent Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association Counsel —

Alleged Violations

n/a

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition with prejudice and vacated the hearing following a Stipulated Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties.

Why this result: The parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.

Key Issues & Findings

Dismissal

The matter was dismissed based on a Stipulated Motion to Dismiss.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge granted the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Complaint with Prejudice and vacated the hearing.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: dismissed

Cited:

  • 2

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089012-BFS Decision – 206537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:36:31 (57.0 KB)

08F-H089012-BFS Decision – 206537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:09:15 (57.0 KB)

Administrative Briefing: Maribeth Price vs. Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association (Case No. 08F-H089012-BFS)

Executive Summary

This briefing outlines the final administrative resolution of the matter Maribeth Price vs. Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association. Following a stipulated motion filed by both parties, the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings has formally dismissed the petitioner’s complaint with prejudice and vacated all scheduled proceedings. This order, issued on January 26, 2009, serves as the final administrative decision regarding the dispute originally filed with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.

Case Overview

The matter involved a legal dispute between an individual petitioner and a nonprofit homeowner association. The proceedings were conducted under the jurisdiction of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Petitioner: Maribeth Price

• Respondent: Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association (an Arizona nonprofit corporation)

• Case Number: 08F-H089012-BFS

• Presiding Official: Lewis D. Kowal, Administrative Law Judge

Procedural Timeline and Final Action

The resolution of this case was reached through mutual agreement between the involved parties, leading to the following sequence of events:

• January 23, 2009: The Office of Administrative Hearings received a “Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Complaint with Prejudice and Request to Vacate Hearing.”

• January 26, 2009: The scheduled hearing was officially vacated from the Office of Administrative Hearings docket.

• Final Disposition: In accordance with the joint motion, the petition—initially filed with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety—was dismissed with prejudice.

Legal Authority and Status

The dismissal of this case is governed by specific Arizona Revised Statutes. Under A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A), the order issued by Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal constitutes the final administrative decision for this matter. By dismissing the case “with prejudice,” the order signifies a permanent end to the specific claims raised in the petition.

Key Stakeholders and Legal Representation

The following table identifies the legal representatives and departmental contacts involved in the distribution of the final order:

Entity/Role

Name and Affiliation

Location

Administrative Law Judge

Lewis D. Kowal

Phoenix, AZ

Departmental Oversight

Robert Barger, Director (Attn: Debra Blake)

Dept. of Fire Building and Life Safety, Phoenix, AZ

Legal Counsel

Troy B. Stratman, Esq. (Mack Drucker & Watson, P.L.L.C.)

Phoenix, AZ

Legal Counsel

Mark K. Saho, Esq. (Carpenter Hazelwood Delgado & Wood, PLC)

Tempe, AZ

Conclusion

The matter of Price vs. Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association has been concluded without a full evidentiary hearing. The use of a stipulated motion indicates that the parties reached a settlement or mutual agreement to terminate the litigation, resulting in a final administrative order that vacates all future hearings and removes the case from the active docket.

Study Guide: Price v. Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association Legal Proceedings

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal documents pertaining to the case of Maribeth Price versus Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association. It is designed to facilitate a deep understanding of the procedural actions, parties involved, and the final resolution of the matter within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

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Part 1: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the information provided in the source context.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this administrative case?

2. What specific office was responsible for overseeing this matter, and where is it located?

3. What was the nature of the motion received by the Office of Administrative Hearings on January 23, 2009?

4. What was the specific outcome regarding the hearing originally scheduled for January 26, 2009?

5. Who served as the presiding official over this matter, and what is their formal title?

6. According to the order, what is the legal status of the decision rendered on January 26, 2009?

7. Under which Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) is the finality of this administrative decision established?

8. With which state department was the original petition filed before reaching the Office of Administrative Hearings?

9. Which individuals or entities were designated to receive mailed copies of the final order?

10. What is the official case identification number for this proceeding?

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Part 2: Quiz Answer Key

1. The Parties: The Petitioner is Maribeth Price, and the Respondent is the Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association. The Respondent is identified as an Arizona nonprofit corporation.

2. The Venue: The matter was handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. This office is located at 1400 West Washington, Suite 101, Phoenix, Arizona 85007.

3. The Motion: On January 23, 2009, the office received a Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Complaint with Prejudice. This filing also included a Request to Vacate the Hearing that had been scheduled for January 26, 2009.

4. The Hearing Status: In accordance with the stipulated motion, the hearing was officially vacated from the Office of Administrative Hearings docket. This means the scheduled legal proceeding was cancelled and will not take place.

5. Presiding Official: The order was issued and signed by Lewis D. Kowal. His official title is Administrative Law Judge.

6. Finality of Decision: The document explicitly states that the order serves as the final administrative decision for the case. By dismissing the petition and vacating the hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings concluded the matter.

7. Statutory Authority: The finality of the administrative decision is supported by A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A). This statute is cited to provide the legal basis for the order’s conclusion.

8. Original Filing Department: The original petition was filed with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. The matter was subsequently transitioned to the Office of Administrative Hearings for adjudication.

9. Recipients of the Order: Copies were transmitted to Robert Barger (Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety), Troy B. Stratman of Mack Drucker & Watson, P.L.L.C., and Mark K. Saho of Carpenter Hazelwood Delgado & Wood, PLC.

10. Case Number: The proceeding is cataloged under case number 08F-H089012-BFS. This number is used to identify the specific dispute between Maribeth Price and the Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association.

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Part 3: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the provided source context to develop detailed responses to the following prompts. (Answers not provided).

1. The Significance of Stipulation: Analyze the role of a “Stipulated Motion” in the context of this case. How does a mutual agreement between a Petitioner and a Respondent change the trajectory of an administrative hearing?

2. Administrative Hierarchy: Discuss the relationship between the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety and the Office of Administrative Hearings as suggested by the path of Maribeth Price’s petition.

3. Legal Finality: Explain the implications of an order being designated as a “final administrative decision” under A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A). Why is it necessary for an Administrative Law Judge to explicitly state this in the order?

4. Dismissal with Prejudice: Explore the legal weight of dismissing a complaint “with prejudice” within the framework of a dispute involving a Homeowners Association. What does this term imply about the Petitioner’s ability to refile the same claim?

5. Procedural Efficiency: Evaluate the process of “vacating” a hearing. How does the receipt of a motion just three days prior to a scheduled hearing (January 23 to January 26) reflect the administrative handling of legal dockets?

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding official (in this case, Lewis D. Kowal) who hears and decides cases for a state or federal agency.

A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A)

The specific Arizona Revised Statute cited as the authority for the finality of the administrative decision.

Dismissal with Prejudice

A final judgment on the merits of a case which prevents the petitioner from bringing the same lawsuit or complaint again in the future.

Docket

The official schedule or list of cases to be heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Final Administrative Decision

An order that concludes the agency’s involvement in a case, making it the definitive ruling on the matter at the administrative level.

Nonprofit Corporation

The legal status of the Respondent, Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association, indicating it is organized for purposes other than turning a profit for shareholders.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding or petition (in this case, Maribeth Price).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is required to answer a legal claim (in this case, Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association).

Stipulated Motion

A formal request made to the court or judge in which both parties (Petitioner and Respondent) have agreed upon the terms.

Vacate

To cancel or annul a scheduled legal proceeding, such as a hearing.

Study Guide: Price v. Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association Legal Proceedings

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal documents pertaining to the case of Maribeth Price versus Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association. It is designed to facilitate a deep understanding of the procedural actions, parties involved, and the final resolution of the matter within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

——————————————————————————–

Part 1: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the information provided in the source context.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this administrative case?

2. What specific office was responsible for overseeing this matter, and where is it located?

3. What was the nature of the motion received by the Office of Administrative Hearings on January 23, 2009?

4. What was the specific outcome regarding the hearing originally scheduled for January 26, 2009?

5. Who served as the presiding official over this matter, and what is their formal title?

6. According to the order, what is the legal status of the decision rendered on January 26, 2009?

7. Under which Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) is the finality of this administrative decision established?

8. With which state department was the original petition filed before reaching the Office of Administrative Hearings?

9. Which individuals or entities were designated to receive mailed copies of the final order?

10. What is the official case identification number for this proceeding?

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Part 2: Quiz Answer Key

1. The Parties: The Petitioner is Maribeth Price, and the Respondent is the Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association. The Respondent is identified as an Arizona nonprofit corporation.

2. The Venue: The matter was handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. This office is located at 1400 West Washington, Suite 101, Phoenix, Arizona 85007.

3. The Motion: On January 23, 2009, the office received a Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Complaint with Prejudice. This filing also included a Request to Vacate the Hearing that had been scheduled for January 26, 2009.

4. The Hearing Status: In accordance with the stipulated motion, the hearing was officially vacated from the Office of Administrative Hearings docket. This means the scheduled legal proceeding was cancelled and will not take place.

5. Presiding Official: The order was issued and signed by Lewis D. Kowal. His official title is Administrative Law Judge.

6. Finality of Decision: The document explicitly states that the order serves as the final administrative decision for the case. By dismissing the petition and vacating the hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings concluded the matter.

7. Statutory Authority: The finality of the administrative decision is supported by A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A). This statute is cited to provide the legal basis for the order’s conclusion.

8. Original Filing Department: The original petition was filed with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. The matter was subsequently transitioned to the Office of Administrative Hearings for adjudication.

9. Recipients of the Order: Copies were transmitted to Robert Barger (Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety), Troy B. Stratman of Mack Drucker & Watson, P.L.L.C., and Mark K. Saho of Carpenter Hazelwood Delgado & Wood, PLC.

10. Case Number: The proceeding is cataloged under case number 08F-H089012-BFS. This number is used to identify the specific dispute between Maribeth Price and the Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association.

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Part 3: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the provided source context to develop detailed responses to the following prompts. (Answers not provided).

1. The Significance of Stipulation: Analyze the role of a “Stipulated Motion” in the context of this case. How does a mutual agreement between a Petitioner and a Respondent change the trajectory of an administrative hearing?

2. Administrative Hierarchy: Discuss the relationship between the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety and the Office of Administrative Hearings as suggested by the path of Maribeth Price’s petition.

3. Legal Finality: Explain the implications of an order being designated as a “final administrative decision” under A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A). Why is it necessary for an Administrative Law Judge to explicitly state this in the order?

4. Dismissal with Prejudice: Explore the legal weight of dismissing a complaint “with prejudice” within the framework of a dispute involving a Homeowners Association. What does this term imply about the Petitioner’s ability to refile the same claim?

5. Procedural Efficiency: Evaluate the process of “vacating” a hearing. How does the receipt of a motion just three days prior to a scheduled hearing (January 23 to January 26) reflect the administrative handling of legal dockets?

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding official (in this case, Lewis D. Kowal) who hears and decides cases for a state or federal agency.

A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A)

The specific Arizona Revised Statute cited as the authority for the finality of the administrative decision.

Dismissal with Prejudice

A final judgment on the merits of a case which prevents the petitioner from bringing the same lawsuit or complaint again in the future.

Docket

The official schedule or list of cases to be heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Final Administrative Decision

An order that concludes the agency’s involvement in a case, making it the definitive ruling on the matter at the administrative level.

Nonprofit Corporation

The legal status of the Respondent, Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association, indicating it is organized for purposes other than turning a profit for shareholders.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding or petition (in this case, Maribeth Price).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is required to answer a legal claim (in this case, Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association).

Stipulated Motion

A formal request made to the court or judge in which both parties (Petitioner and Respondent) have agreed upon the terms.

Vacate

To cancel or annul a scheduled legal proceeding, such as a hearing.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Maribeth Price (Petitioner)

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    H/C ATTN

Other Participants

  • Troy B. Stratman (Attorney)
    Mack Drucker & Watson, P.L.L.C.
    Listed in transmission copy list; specific party representation not explicitly stated in text.
  • Mark K. Saho (Attorney)
    Carpenter Hazelwood Delgado & Wood, PLC
    Listed in transmission copy list; specific party representation not explicitly stated in text.

Burns, Jack L. -v- Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 07F-H067030-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2009-01-23
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome dismissed
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jack L. Burns Counsel —
Respondent Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel —

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ordered the petition dismissed with prejudice and the hearing vacated based on a Stipulation to Dismiss received from the parties.

Key Issues & Findings

Dismissal

The parties submitted a Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice.

Orders: Petition dismissed with prejudice and hearing vacated.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: dismissed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

07F-H067030-BFS Decision – 206446.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T04:45:50 (56.4 KB)

07F-H067030-BFS Decision – 206446.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:20:29 (56.4 KB)

Legal Briefing: Burns v. Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the final administrative resolution of the matter Jack L. Burns v. Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 07F-H067030-BFS). Following a formal “Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice” received on January 20, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal issued an order dismissing the petition and vacating the scheduled hearing. This action constitutes the final administrative decision regarding the petition originally filed with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.

Case Overview and Jurisdiction

The matter was adjudicated within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, located in Phoenix, Arizona. The proceedings involved a dispute between a private petitioner and a homeowners association.

• Petitioner: Jack L. Burns

• Respondent: Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association

• Case Number: 07F-H067030-BFS

• Administrative Authority: The order was issued under the authority of A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A).

Procedural History and Resolution

The case reached its conclusion through a voluntary agreement between the parties rather than a full evidentiary hearing.

• Stipulation to Dismiss: On January 20, 2009, the Office of Administrative Hearings received a “Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice.” A dismissal with prejudice signifies that the matter is permanently settled and cannot be refiled.

• Administrative Order: On January 23, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal signed the “Order Dismissing Petition and Vacating Hearing.”

• Finality of Decision: The order explicitly states that it serves as the final administrative decision concerning the petition filed with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.

• Docket Action: As a result of the dismissal, the matter was officially vacated from the Office of Administrative Hearings docket.

Involved Entities and Legal Representation

The following table details the regulatory bodies and legal counsel associated with this case:

Entity Type

Name/Firm

Representative(s)

Regulatory Agency

Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

Robert Barger (Director); Debra Blake

Legal Counsel

Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC

James Wood, Esq.; Jason E. Smith, Esq.; Carrie H. Smith, Esq.; Chad P. Miese, Esq.

Legal Counsel

Stoops, Denious Wilson & Murray, P.L.C.

Thomas A. Stoops, Esq.; Stephanie M. Wilson, Esq.

Conclusion

The litigation between Jack L. Burns and Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association concluded in January 2009 through a formal dismissal. The issuance of the order by the Administrative Law Judge finalized the proceedings, removing the case from the active docket and providing a definitive administrative resolution to the underlying petition.

Study Guide: Burns v. Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association Administrative Order

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the legal document titled “Order Dismissing Petition and Vacating Hearing” issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It focuses on the procedural conclusion of the dispute between Jack L. Burns and the Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association.

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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions using 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the source context.

1. Who are the primary petitioner and respondent in case No. 07F-H067030-BFS?

2. What specific document was received by the Office of Administrative Hearings on January 20, 2009?

3. What was the final outcome for the petition originally filed with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety?

4. Who served as the Administrative Law Judge for this matter, and on what date was the order finalized?

5. What does the order state regarding the status of the hearing previously scheduled for this case?

6. Under which Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) is this order considered the final administrative decision?

7. Which individual and department were designated to receive a mailed copy of the order on behalf of the state?

8. What is the physical address of the Office of Administrative Hearings where this order originated?

9. Which law firm listed in the document is located in Tempe, Arizona?

10. How many different law firms are identified as receiving copies of the order, excluding the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety?

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Part II: Answer Key

1. The petitioner is Jack L. Burns, and the respondent is the Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association. This legal matter was adjudicated under the case number 07F-H067030-BFS.

2. The Office of Administrative Hearings received a “Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice.” This document was the catalyst for the subsequent dismissal of the petition and the vacation of the hearing.

3. In accordance with the filed stipulation, the petition was dismissed with prejudice. Consequently, the matter was officially removed from the Office of Administrative Hearings docket.

4. The Administrative Law Judge for this case was Lewis D. Kowal. He signed and finalized the order on January 23, 2009.

5. The order explicitly states that the hearing for this matter is vacated. This action follows the dismissal of the petition and signifies that the scheduled proceedings will no longer take place.

6. The order is designated as the final administrative decision pursuant to A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A). This citation provides the legal authority for the finality of the judge’s ruling.

7. The copy was transmitted to Robert Barger, the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. It was specifically addressed to the attention of Debra Blake.

8. The Office of Administrative Hearings is located at 1400 West Washington, Suite 101, Phoenix, Arizona 85007. The office can also be reached via the provided phone number, (602) 542-9826.

9. The firm Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC is located in Tempe. Their specific address is 1400 E. Southern Ave., Suite 400, Tempe, AZ 85282.

10. Two law firms are identified: Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC, and Stoops, Denious Wilson & Murray, P.L.C. These firms represent the legal counsel involved in the case beyond the state department.

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Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the provided source context to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.

1. Procedural Termination: Analyze the procedural steps that led to the termination of the case between Jack L. Burns and Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association. Explain the significance of a “Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice” in concluding administrative litigation.

2. Jurisdictional Oversight: Discuss the roles of the various administrative bodies mentioned in the document. How do the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety interact based on the distribution of this order?

3. Statutory Authority and Finality: Examine the importance of A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A) in the context of this order. Why is it necessary for an Administrative Law Judge to cite specific statutes when dismissing a petition?

4. Legal Representation: Identify the multiple legal entities and individuals involved in the case. Based on the “copy transmitted” section, describe the diversity of legal counsel and departmental officials required to be informed of a final administrative decision.

5. The Role of the Administrative Law Judge: Based on the text of the order, describe the responsibilities and authorities of Lewis D. Kowal. How does his signature transform a stipulation between parties into a final administrative action?

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over trials and adjudicates disputes involving administrative agencies.

A.R.S.

Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Dismissed with Prejudice

A final judgment on a case that prevents the petitioner from filing another lawsuit on the same claim.

Docket

The official schedule or list of cases pending in a court or administrative office.

An official proclamation by a judge that defines the legal relationships between the parties to a hearing or directs a specific step in the proceedings.

Petition

A formal written request or document filed by a petitioner to initiate a legal or administrative proceeding.

Petitioner

The party who presents a petition to a court or administrative body; in this case, Jack L. Burns.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association.

Stipulation

A formal agreement between opposing parties regarding some aspect of the legal proceedings.

Vacate

To cancel or render void a scheduled event, such as a hearing or a previous order.

Finality in the Desert: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Decades-Old HOA Legal Battle

Homeowners Association (HOA) wars are legendary for their bitterness, often feeling like endless cycles of bureaucracy and mounting tension. For many residents, the legal path to resolving these conflicts feels like an expensive maze with no clear exit. However, looking back at historical case filings provides a rare glimpse into how these high-stakes battles eventually find a definitive, quiet conclusion.

The 2009 case of Jack L. Burns vs. Hunter Creek Ranch Homeowners Association serves as an ideal case study for this procedural closure. While the specific grievances of the parties are left out of the final order, the administrative record of its resolution offers three surprising lessons on the reality of HOA law in Arizona.

The Surprising Venue for HOA Justice

There is a distinct irony in imagining a government body associated with sirens and safety inspections adjudicating a community property dispute. Yet, this petition was filed not in a traditional civil court, but with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. This administrative quirk highlights a unique structure where a department focused on physical safety also manages the delicate intricacies of homeowner petitions.

This oversight provides a specialized, structured alternative to the often-congested civil court system in Maricopa County. By utilizing the Office of Administrative Hearings, parties can navigate community-governance issues through a formal process that is both rigorous and geographically anchored.

The Power of the “Stipulation to Dismiss”

In the legal world, a dramatic courtroom victory is often less effective than a mutual ceasefire. Although the parties were represented by professional counsel from established firms—including Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC and Stoops, Denious Wilson & Murray, P.L.C.—they ultimately bypassed a judge’s ruling. Instead, the matter was resolved through a “Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice,” signaling a permanent end to the conflict.

A stipulation is a powerful tool because it implies a settlement or resolution reached between the Petitioner and Respondent themselves rather than a forced outcome. By dismissing the case “with prejudice,” both Jack L. Burns and the HOA ensured the matter was closed forever and could never be refiled.

The Weight of Administrative Finality

The finality of these community disputes is backed by the full weight of Arizona statutory authority. In this instance, Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal issued an order that serves as the “final administrative decision” under A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A). This legal designation ensures that once the judge’s pen hits the paper, the administrative chapter for the community is officially and legally shut.

The act of “vacating” the hearing serves as the ultimate shutdown of the state’s legal machinery. When Judge Kowal marked the document “Done this day” on January 23, 2009, he effectively cleared the docket and released both parties from the burden of further litigation. This signature represented the exact moment the legal engine stopped, and the dispute ceased to exist in the eyes of the law.

Conclusion and Forward-Looking Reflection

The case of Burns vs. Hunter Creek Ranch demonstrates the quiet, procedural way that even the most complex community disputes eventually reach their end. It serves as a reminder that behind every legal filing is a human conflict seeking a resolution that the law can finally authorize.

In our own community disagreements, is a mutual “stipulation” always a better victory than a courtroom battle? Perhaps the most important takeaway is that even a one-page dismissal represents the end of a significant chapter, allowing a community to finally move forward.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jack L. Burns (petitioner)

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
  • Debra Blake (agency staff)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety

Other Participants

  • James Wood (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC
    Esq.
  • Jason E. Smith (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC
    Esq.
  • Carrie H. Smith (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC
    Esq.
  • Chad P. Miese (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC
    Esq.
  • Thomas A. Stoops (attorney)
    Stoops, Denious Wilson & Murray, P.L.C.
    Esq.
  • Stephanie M. Wilson (attorney)
    Stoops, Denious Wilson & Murray, P.L.C.
    Esq.

Renner, Patrick vs. Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089005-BFS
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-12-23
Administrative Law Judge Brian Brendan Tully
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patrick Renner Counsel —
Respondent Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association Counsel Kurt M. Zitzer; Kevin T. Minchey

Alleged Violations

Article 15

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the Respondent's Motion to Compel Arbitration and dismissed the Petition. The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to follow the mandatory dispute resolution procedures in the CC&Rs, which required binding arbitration after mediation failed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to submit the dispute to binding arbitration as required by CC&Rs Article 15.5.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to Follow Dispute Resolution Provisions

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to enter mediation. The ALJ found that mediation occurred but failed, and under CC&Rs Article 15.5, the Petitioner was required to submit the dispute to binding arbitration rather than filing a Petition with the Department.

Orders: Respondent's Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted; Petition is dismissed; Petitioner ordered to comply with Article 15 (Arbitration).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Article 15
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089005-BFS Decision – 204829.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:35:25 (77.2 KB)

08F-H089005-BFS Decision – 204829.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:46 (77.2 KB)

Briefing Document: Renner v. Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding the dispute between Petitioner Patrick Renner and Respondent Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association (Case No. 08F-H089005-BFS).

The core of the dispute centers on the enforcement of the dispute resolution provisions outlined in the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Following a previously settled petition, the Petitioner alleged that the Respondent failed to engage in mediation as required. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that while mediation was attempted and ultimately failed, the Petitioner bypassed the contractually mandated next step—binding arbitration—by filing a second administrative petition.

The ALJ concluded that the Respondent had complied with the CC&Rs, while the Petitioner had not. Consequently, the Respondent’s Motion to Compel Arbitration was granted, and the Petition was dismissed.

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Case Overview

Entity

Detail

Case Number

08F-H089005-BFS

Petitioner

Patrick Renner

Respondent

Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Brian Brendan Tully, Administrative Law Judge

Date of Decision

December 23, 2008

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Procedural History and Background

The Initial Petition

The current case represents the second petition filed by Patrick Renner against the Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association. The first petition was resolved through a settlement agreement where both parties agreed to utilize the dispute resolution provisions found in the community’s CC&Rs. That initial case was dismissed following the settlement and reached finality as neither party appealed the decision to the Superior Court.

The Second Petition

The Petitioner filed the instant case with the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, alleging that the Respondent failed to follow the CC&Rs’ dispute resolution provisions following the closure of the first case. Specifically, the Petitioner claimed the Respondent refused to enter into mediation.

In response, the Respondent filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration on November 21, 2008. Following a prehearing conference on December 10, 2008, the ALJ evaluated whether the parties had adhered to their contractual obligations.

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Contractual Framework: Article 15 Dispute Resolution

The conduct of the parties is governed by Article 15 of the CC&Rs, which stipulates that all claims must be resolved exclusively through specific procedures. The hierarchy of resolution includes:

1. Negotiation (Article 15.2): The parties must first attempt to resolve disputes through negotiation within a prescribed timeframe.

2. Mediation (Article 15.4): If negotiation is unsuccessful, the dispute must be submitted to mediation under the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or another mutually agreed-upon independent mediator.

3. Binding Arbitration (Article 15.5): If mediation fails to resolve the dispute, the claimant is required to submit the matter to binding arbitration.

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Analysis of the Dispute Resolution Process

The evidence presented during the proceedings established a timeline of the parties’ attempts to resolve their conflict:

• Failure of Negotiation: The parties were unable to reach an agreement through initial negotiation.

• Engagement in Mediation: The parties moved to mediation, agreeing to use Marc Kalish as a private mediator. To reduce costs, the parties permitted the mediator to participate via telephone.

• The Mediation Impasse: A tentative settlement was reached during mediation; however, the Respondent subsequently refused to execute the written agreement. The Respondent then requested a second mediation session.

• Mediator’s Conclusion: Mediator Marc Kalish informed the parties that further mediation efforts would be a “waste of the parties’ money and [his] time,” effectively declaring the mediation process a failure.

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Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge reached the following conclusions based on the sequence of events:

• Compliance of Respondent: The Respondent was found to have complied with the requirements of Article 15. The refusal to sign a tentative agreement and the subsequent failure of the mediation process did not constitute a breach of the CC&Rs.

• Failure of Petitioner: The ALJ determined that the Petitioner was the party who failed to comply with the CC&Rs. Rather than proceeding to binding arbitration as required by Article 15.5 after the mediation failed, the Petitioner improperly filed a second petition with the Department.

• Prevailing Party Status: Because the Petitioner did not adhere to the mandatory contractual procedures, he was not deemed the prevailing party. Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(A), the Petitioner is not entitled to the reimbursement of filing fees.

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Final Administrative Order

The Office of Administrative Hearings issued the following orders:

1. Motion to Compel Arbitration: The Respondent’s motion is granted. The parties are directed to proceed to binding arbitration pursuant to Article 15.5 of the CC&Rs.

2. Mandatory Compliance: The Petitioner is ordered to comply with all provisions of Article 15 of the CC&Rs regarding the current dispute.

3. Dismissal: Case No. HO-08-9/005 (Docket No. 08F-H089005-BFS) is dismissed.

Appeal Rights

This order constitutes the final administrative decision and is not subject to a request for rehearing. Any party wishing to appeal must file a complaint in the Superior Court within 35 days of the service of this decision, as per A.R.S. § 12-904(A). Service is considered complete upon personal delivery or five days after the decision is mailed to the party’s last known address.

Study Guide: Renner v. Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Patrick Renner and the Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association. It focuses on the application of dispute resolution provisions within community association governing documents and the procedural requirements for legal recourse in such matters.

Short-Answer Quiz

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this administrative case, and what is the nature of their relationship?

2. What was the resolution of the first petition filed by the Petitioner?

3. On what grounds did the Petitioner file the second petition against the Respondent?

4. According to Article 15.2 of the CC&Rs, how must claims between the parties be resolved?

5. What does Article 15.4 of the CC&Rs dictate regarding the selection of a mediator?

6. Under what conditions does Article 15.5 require a claimant to submit to binding arbitration?

7. Who was selected as the private mediator for the parties’ second dispute, and why did he participate via telephone?

8. Why did the mediation process between the Petitioner and Respondent ultimately fail?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final ruling regarding the second petition and the Respondent’s motion?

10. What are the specific requirements for a party wishing to appeal the final administrative decision?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Patrick Renner, designated as the Petitioner, and the Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association, designated as the Respondent. This is a legal dispute between an individual homeowner and his homeowners association regarding the enforcement of community rules and procedures.

2. The first petition was resolved through a settlement agreement between the parties, the essential terms of which were read into the record. Because neither party appealed the decision to the Superior Court, the case reached finality and was dismissed.

3. The Petitioner filed the second petition alleging that the Respondent failed to follow the dispute resolution provisions of the CC&Rs after the first case closed. Specifically, the Petitioner claimed that the Respondent failed to enter into mediation as required.

4. Article 15.2, titled “Agreement to Resolve Certain Disputes Without Litigation,” states that the parties contractually agreed that all claims must be resolved exclusively through the procedures set forth in Article 15. This mandates that the parties use the specific internal dispute resolution framework rather than proceeding directly to outside litigation.

5. Article 15.4 provides that if negotiation fails, a party may submit the dispute to mediation under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Alternatively, the parties may use an independent mediator or mediation service selected by mutual agreement.

6. Article 15.5 stipulates that if the mediation process is unsuccessful in resolving the dispute, the claimant is then required to submit the matter to binding arbitration. This represents the final step in the internal dispute resolution hierarchy defined by the CC&Rs.

7. The parties mutually agreed to use Marc Kalish as their private mediator. He participated via telephone to accommodate the parties and save them the personal appearance costs associated with traveling to Flagstaff.

8. Although a tentative settlement was reached, the Respondent refused to execute the written agreement and demanded a second mediation session. The mediator, Mr. Kalish, subsequently informed the parties that further mediation would be a waste of time and money, effectively ending the process.

9. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and ordered the Petitioner to comply with Article 15.5 of the CC&Rs. Consequently, the second petition was dismissed because the Petitioner had failed to pursue binding arbitration before filing with the Department.

10. A party must file a complaint to review the final administrative decision within thirty-five days of the decision being served. Service is considered complete upon personal delivery or five days after the decision is mailed to the party’s last known address.

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Essay Questions

1. Hierarchy of Dispute Resolution: Analyze the progression of dispute resolution steps mandated by Article 15 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Petitioner’s decision to file a second petition with the Department was deemed a failure to comply with this hierarchy.

2. The Role of Mediation in Contractual Disputes: Discuss the mediation process as described in the text, including the roles of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and private mediators. How does the text characterize the limitations of mediation in ensuring a resolution?

3. Procedural Finality and Appeals: Examine the legal standards for finality in administrative decisions as presented in the case. What are the consequences of failing to appeal a decision, as seen in the transition between the first and second petitions?

4. Contractual Obligations vs. Administrative Filing: Evaluate the conflict between the Petitioner’s right to file a petition with the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety and his contractual obligations under the CC&Rs. Why did the CC&Rs take precedence in this ruling?

5. The “Prevailing Party” and Financial Responsibility: Discuss the legal reasoning behind denying the Petitioner’s request for filing fee reimbursement. How is the status of “prevailing party” determined in this administrative context according to A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(A)?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01 / 41-2198.02(A): Arizona Revised Statutes governing the filing fees and the reimbursement of those fees for parties involved in administrative hearings regarding homeowners associations.

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over administrative hearings, hears arguments, and issues binding decisions or orders.

• American Arbitration Association (AAA): A national organization that provides alternative dispute resolution services, including mediation and arbitration.

• Binding Arbitration: A formal dispute resolution process where an impartial third party makes a final, legally enforceable decision that the parties are contracted to follow.

• CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions): The governing documents of a community association that outline the rules, regulations, and contractual obligations of the members and the association.

• Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety: The state agency responsible for overseeing certain aspects of homeowners association disputes in this jurisdiction.

• Mediation: A collaborative process where a neutral third party (mediator) assists disputing parties in reaching a voluntary agreement.

• Motion to Compel Arbitration: A legal request asking the court or judge to order a party to honor a contractual agreement to resolve a dispute through arbitration rather than litigation or administrative petitions.

• Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal or administrative action by filing a petition.

• Prevailing Party: The party in a legal proceeding that succeeds on the main issues and is often entitled to certain recoveries, such as filing fees.

• Respondent: The party against whom a legal or administrative action is filed.

• Settlement Agreement: A voluntary agreement between parties to resolve a dispute, often resulting in the dismissal of pending legal actions.

When Mediation Fails: 4 Hard Truths About HOA Legal Battles

1. Introduction: The “Forever Dispute” Trap

There is a specific, grinding frustration reserved for homeowners who believe they have reached the end of a legal battle, only to find themselves trapped in a loop. It is the “forever dispute”—a scenario where a settlement is reached, yet the conflict continues to evolve until the “resolution process” itself becomes the new battlefield.

In the case of Renner vs. Ponderosa Trails Unit 8 Community Association, we see a classic cautionary tale of a strategic tactical error. The Petitioner sought justice through the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, only to have his case dismissed. The surprising reality is that the Petitioner actually helped build the trap that snared him: by settling his first petition and agreeing to follow the community’s private dispute resolution rules, he effectively locked the door to administrative relief for all future related claims.

2. Takeaway 1: Even Professional Mediators Have a Breaking Point

In this matter, the parties attempted to resolve their issues through a private mediator, Marc Kalish. In a clear attempt to manage resources, the parties even agreed to let Mr. Kalish participate via telephone to save the costs of a personal appearance in Flagstaff. However, after a “tentative settlement” was reached, the Respondent (the HOA) refused to sign the written agreement and demanded a second mediation session.

When the mediator was asked to continue, he recognized that the process had reached a terminal dead end. He provided a blunt assessment that serves as a warning to anyone over-relying on mediation:

From a strategic standpoint, mediation is a tool for assistance, not a guarantee of resolution. Even when one party is perceived as obstructive, a mediator has no power to force a signature; they can only signal when the process has shifted from a productive negotiation to a total drain on resources.

3. Takeaway 2: The Contract is King (The Power of CC&Rs)

The legal foundation of this dismissal rested on Article 15 of the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Article 15.2 dictates that all claims shall be resolved “exclusively” in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Article.

This is where the Petitioner’s earlier settlement became a “contractual bottleneck.” Because the first petition was dismissed based on a settlement where the parties agreed to the CC&R process, those terms became the exclusive path forward. By signing the deed to a home in an HOA, a homeowner often unknowingly signs away their right to go directly to a state department or court. From a strategic perspective, this is a total forfeiture of leverage; you are bound to a private resolution ladder that must be climbed one rung at a time, regardless of how much you may prefer a judge’s intervention.

4. Takeaway 3: You Can’t Skip the “Binding Arbitration” Step

The primary error in this case was the Petitioner’s failure to recognize a “condition precedent.” The CC&Rs established a clear, mandatory hierarchy:

• Article 15.4 (Mediation): If negotiation fails, parties move to mediation.

• Article 15.5 (Binding Arbitration): If mediation is unsuccessful, the claimant shall submit the dispute to binding arbitration.

After mediation failed following the HOA’s refusal to sign the tentative agreement, the Petitioner made a fatal tactical move: he bypassed Article 15.5 and filed a second petition with the Department. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that following the exact sequence of a dispute resolution clause is not optional. You cannot return to an administrative agency simply because the mediation phase was frustrating. Arbitration was not just a suggestion; it was a prerequisite for a valid claim.

5. Takeaway 4: The Losing Side of “Winning”

The final ruling by Administrative Law Judge Brian Brendan Tully resulted in a total dismissal of the case. While the Petitioner viewed the HOA as the party obstructing the settlement, the Judge found that the Respondent had complied with the dispute resolution provisions, while the Petitioner had not.

The consequences were both procedural and financial:

• Motion to Compel Arbitration: The Judge granted the HOA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, legally forcing the Petitioner back into the very private process he had spent months trying to escape.

• Lack of Fee Reimbursement: Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(A), only a “prevailing party” is entitled to an order requiring the opposing party to pay their filing fees. Because the Petitioner was not the prevailing party, he was denied any reimbursement for the costs of filing a petition that was ultimately dismissed.

The irony is sharp: the Petitioner turned to the Department to compel the HOA to act, but the legal system instead compelled the Petitioner to return to a private arbitration table dictated by the HOA’s own governing documents.

6. Conclusion: The Final Pivot

The Renner case serves as a masterclass in the weight of private contract obligations. For homeowners and associations alike, it demonstrates that “dispute resolution” is a rigid contractual framework, not a flexible suggestion. Once you agree to a specific hierarchy of remedies, that path becomes your only map.

As we evaluate the balance between private CC&Rs and the desire for judicial oversight, we must ask: In the pursuit of a “settlement,” are you inadvertently signing away your future access to the public justice system? In the world of HOAs, the “day in court” you were promised may very well be a mandatory, private, and costly seat at an arbitrator’s table.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patrick Renner (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Kurt M. Zitzer (Respondent Attorney)
    Meagher & Greer, P.L.L.P.
  • Kevin T. Minchey (Respondent Attorney)
    Meagher & Greer, P.L.L.P.

Neutral Parties

  • Michael G. Wales (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Vacated the scheduled hearing; ordered prehearing conference
  • Brian Brendan Tully (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed the decision
  • Marc Kalish (Mediator)
    AAA
    Private mediator agreed upon by parties
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on transmission
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on transmission

Hogue, Thomas vs. Shadow Moutain Villas Condominiums

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089011-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-12-22
Administrative Law Judge Brian Brendan Tully
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $2,500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Hogue Counsel —
Respondent Shadow Mountain Villas Condominiums Counsel —

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1247

Outcome Summary

Default judgment entered against Respondent for failure to answer. ALJ found Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1247 and CC&Rs by failing to maintain common element drainage, causing flooding. Petitioner prevailed on the merits and was awarded filing fees and a civil penalty was imposed. Petitioner's claim for monetary damages for repairs was denied due to lack of administrative jurisdiction.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain common elements (drainage)

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to maintain proper drainage of Common Elements, resulting in flooding of Petitioner's unit. Respondent failed to answer the petition.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1247 and Article 5 of the CC&Rs; reimburse Petitioner's $550.00 filing fee; pay a $2,500.00 civil penalty.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $2,500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1247
  • CC&Rs Article 5

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089011-BFS Decision – 204771.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:36:23 (79.9 KB)

08F-H089011-BFS Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/08F-H089011-BFS/204771.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-17T05:30:39 (79.9 KB)

08F-H089011-BFS Decision – 204771.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:24:09 (79.9 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Thomas Hogue vs. Shadow Mountain Villas Condominiums

Executive Summary

On December 22, 2008, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Brian Brendan Tully issued a Decision on Default against Shadow Mountain Villas Condominiums (Respondent) regarding a petition filed by Thomas Hogue (Petitioner). The dispute centered on the Respondent’s failure to maintain common elements and drainage systems, which resulted in significant flood damage to the Petitioner’s unit.

Due to the Respondent’s failure to file a timely answer to the petition, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner by default. The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $2,500.00 to the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, reimburse the Petitioner’s $550.00 filing fee, and comply with state statutes and community governing documents. While the Petitioner incurred over $1,400 in repair costs, the ALJ noted that the administrative forum lacks the jurisdiction to award compensatory damages, which must be sought in civil court.

Case Background and Allegations

The matter (No. 08F-H089011-BFS) was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition submitted by Thomas Hogue on approximately October 20, 2008.

Core Grievances

The Petitioner alleged that on July 6, 2008, the Respondent committed specific acts or omissions that violated condominium regulations:

• Failure to Maintain: The Respondent failed to maintain drainage systems and common elements.

• Property Damage: This failure caused the Petitioner’s condominium to suffer significant flood damage during the monsoon season.

• Statutory Violations: The Petitioner cited a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1247, which pertains to the maintenance of condominiums.

Procedural Default and Legal Findings

The decision was reached primarily through a “Default,” as the Respondent failed to engage in the administrative legal process.

Timeline of Default

• Notification: Department staff mailed a Notice of Petition to the Respondent on approximately October 2, 2008.

• Receipt: On October 30, 2008, the Department received a certified mail receipt signed by the Respondent, confirming they had received the notice.

• Failure to Respond: Per A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), the Respondent was required to submit a written response within 20 days. No response was filed.

• Legal Admission: Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(F), the failure to file an answer is legally deemed an admission to the factual allegations in the petition.

Statutory and Document Violations

The ALJ concluded that the Respondent was in violation of both state law and the specific governing documents of the community:

• A.R.S. § 33-1247: General statutory requirement for condominium maintenance.

• Article 5 of the CC&Rs: Specifically covers “Condominium Maintenance and Repair,” requiring the association to maintain common elements to avoid issues such as flooding.

Analysis of Damages and Aggravating Factors

The ALJ’s decision highlighted several factors that weighed against the Respondent, as well as the limitations of the administrative forum regarding financial recovery.

Financial Impacts to Petitioner

The Petitioner documented specific financial losses resulting from the flooding:

• Repair Costs: $1,433.05 spent on the interior of the unit.

• Compensatory Damages: $500.00 claimed by the Petitioner.

Jurisdictional Limitation: The ALJ explicitly stated, “This administrative forum does not permit an award to Petitioner for damages.” The Petitioner was advised that claims for repair costs and compensatory damages must be addressed in a civil court of competent jurisdiction.

Aggravating Factors

The ALJ identified three “strong matters in aggravation” regarding the Respondent’s conduct:

1. The failure to maintain Common Elements that led to the flooding.

2. The failure to ameliorate the damage caused to the Petitioner’s unit.

3. The failure to respond to the legal Petition.

Final Order and Compliance Requirements

The ALJ issued a structured order to penalize the Respondent and ensure future compliance with state and community regulations.

Requirement

Recipient

Amount

Deadline

Filing Fee Reimbursement

Petitioner

$550.00

Within 40 days of Order

Civil Penalty

Dept. of Fire, Building and Life Safety

$2,500.00

Within 60 days of Order

Statutory Compliance

Compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1247 and CC&Rs

Immediate/Ongoing

Enforcement and Appeal Rights

• Finality: This is a final administrative decision and is not subject to a request for rehearing.

• Enforcement: The order is enforceable through contempt of court proceedings in the Superior Court.

• Appeals: Any party wishing to appeal the final decision must file a complaint within 35 days of service, as per Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: Thomas Hogue v. Shadow Mountain Villas Condominiums

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law judge decision regarding the dispute between Thomas Hogue and Shadow Mountain Villas Condominiums. It explores the legal mechanisms of the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, the consequences of default in administrative proceedings, and the jurisdictional limits of administrative hearings.

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Part 1: Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source context.

1. What was the core allegation made by Thomas Hogue in his petition against Shadow Mountain Villas Condominiums?

2. What role does the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety play in homeowner or condominium association disputes?

3. Why was the Administrative Law Judge’s decision issued “on default”?

4. According to the document, what specific statute and internal document did the Respondent violate regarding maintenance?

5. How much was the filing fee paid by the Petitioner, and what was the final ruling regarding this fee?

6. Why did the Administrative Law Judge deny the Petitioner’s request for $1,433.05 in repair costs and $500.00 in compensatory damages?

7. What were the “matters in aggravation” cited by the judge in this case?

8. What is the significance of A.R.S. § 41-2198(B) regarding the finality of the judge’s order?

9. What are the financial penalties imposed on the Respondent aside from the reimbursement of the filing fee?

10. What is the process and timeframe for a party to appeal this final administrative decision?

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Part 2: Answer Key

1. Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent failed to maintain proper drainage and common elements of the property. This failure resulted in significant flood damage to the Petitioner’s condominium unit during the monsoon season on or about July 6, 2008.

2. Role of the Department: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B), the Department serves as the state agency where homeowners or condominium associations file petitions for hearings regarding disputes. It has the authority to receive petitions, collect filing fees, and refer matters to the Office of Administrative Hearings.

3. Decision on Default: The decision was issued on default because the Respondent failed to submit a written response to the Notice of Petition within the required 20-day timeframe. By failing to answer, the Respondent was legally deemed to have admitted to the factual allegations contained in the petition.

4. Violated Statutes and Documents: The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1247, which pertains to the maintenance of condominiums. Additionally, the Respondent failed to adhere to Article 5 of the CC&Rs (Condominium Maintenance and Repair).

5. Filing Fee Ruling: The Petitioner paid a nonrefundable filing fee of $550.00 to the Department upon filing. As the prevailing party, the judge ordered the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner the full $550.00 within 40 days of the order.

6. Denial of Damages: The judge noted that the administrative forum does not have the jurisdiction to permit an award for damages. To seek the $1,433.05 in repair costs and $500.00 in compensatory damages, the Petitioner must file a claim in a civil court of competent jurisdiction.

7. Matters in Aggravation: The judge identified three factors in aggravation: the Respondent’s failure to maintain common elements leading to the flood, the failure to ameliorate the resulting damage to the unit, and the failure to respond to the legal petition.

8. Finality of the Order: Under A.R.S. § 41-2198(B), an order from an assigned Administrative Law Judge is a final administrative decision and is not subject to a rehearing. It is legally binding and can be enforced through contempt of court proceedings in the Superior Court.

9. Financial Penalties: In addition to the fee reimbursement, the Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $2,500.00 to the Department. This payment was required within 60 days of the order, unless granted an extension by the Department.

10. Appeal Process: A party may appeal the decision to the Superior Court by filing a complaint within 35 days of the decision being served. Service is considered complete upon personal delivery or five days after the decision is mailed to the party’s last known address.

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Part 3: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the provided source context to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.

1. The Impact of Procedural Default: Discuss how the Respondent’s failure to answer the petition shifted the burden of proof and determined the outcome of this case. How does A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(F) define the legal weight of a failure to respond?

2. Administrative vs. Civil Jurisdiction: Analyze the limitations placed on the Administrative Law Judge regarding the awarding of relief. Why could the judge levy a civil penalty and order fee reimbursement but not award repair costs or compensatory damages?

3. Statutory Obligations of Condominium Associations: Examine the responsibilities of a condominium association as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1247 and Article 5 of the CC&Rs based on the findings of this case. What are the consequences for a failure to maintain “Common Elements”?

4. The Role of Aggravating Factors in Administrative Law: Evaluate how the Respondent’s conduct—both before and during the legal process—influenced the judge’s decision-making. How do “matters in aggravation” impact the severity of the final order?

5. Enforcement and Finality: Explain the legal mechanisms that ensure an Administrative Law Judge’s decision is followed. Discuss the relationship between the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Superior Court in terms of enforcement and the appeals process.

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1247

The specific Arizona Revised Statute cited regarding the maintenance of condominium properties and common elements.

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The statute granting the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety the authority to receive petitions and facilitate hearings for homeowner disputes.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding official who reviews the facts, applies the law, and issues a final decision in administrative disputes.

Aggravation

Factors or circumstances that increase the severity of a violation or justify a harsher penalty, such as failing to ameliorate damage or ignoring a legal petition.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents of a condominium or planned community (specifically Article 5 in this case).

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine (in this case $2,500.00) imposed by the judge for violations of statutes or community documents, payable to the state department rather than the petitioner.

Common Elements

The shared areas and infrastructure of a condominium complex, such as drainage systems, that the association is responsible for maintaining.

Default

A failure to fulfill a legal obligation, specifically the Respondent’s failure to file a written answer to the petition within the 20-day statutory limit.

Petitioner

The party who initiates the legal action by filing a petition (Thomas Hogue).

Respondent

The party against whom a legal action is brought (Shadow Mountain Villas Condominiums).

When Silence Costs $3,000: The Price of HOA Arrogance

1. Introduction

Imagine waking up to the roar of an Arizona monsoon, only to find the storm has followed you inside. As water rushes into your living room, you realize the HOA’s neglected drainage system has failed. You do the “right thing”—you document the damage, you reach out for help, and you file a formal petition. Then, you wait. And you wait. But instead of a repair crew, you get total, stony silence from your Board of Directors.

For Thomas Hogue, this wasn’t just a hypothetical nightmare; it was the reality of his life at Shadow Mountain Villas. However, as the case of Thomas Hogue vs. Shadow Mountain Villas Condominiums proves, an HOA’s “ostrich strategy”—burying its head in the sand and ignoring legal notices—is a form of procedural suicide. Today, we’re looking at a cautionary tale that reveals the surprising power of Arizona’s administrative hearing process and the heavy price an association pays when it treats a legal summons like junk mail.

2. Silence as an Admission of Guilt

In the world of community law, silence isn’t a strategy; it’s an admission. When Mr. Hogue filed his petition, the association was served a formal Notice of Petition by the state. Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), the HOA had exactly 20 days to provide a written answer. They didn’t just miss the deadline; they ignored the process entirely.

This arrogance triggered a “Decision on Default.” By failing to participate, the HOA committed the ultimate legal “own goal.” Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(F), because the association failed to file an answer, they were legally deemed to have admitted to every single factual allegation Mr. Hogue made. As the Administrative Law Judge noted:

Ignoring a legal problem is the fastest way to lose your right to a defense. By the time the Judge took the bench, the HOA had already “confessed” to its own negligence.

3. The High Cost of Maintenance Neglect

The facts of the case, now legally undisputed due to the default, painted a grim picture of failed stewardship. On July 6, 2008, the association’s failure to maintain common drainage elements led to significant flooding in Mr. Hogue’s unit. This wasn’t just a maintenance lapse; it was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1247 and Article 5 of the community’s own CC&Rs.

The financial “teeth” of the administrative process were applied swiftly. The Judge ordered the following:

• A $2,500.00 civil penalty.

• The mandatory reimbursement of the Petitioner’s $550.00 filing fee.

There is a biting irony here. The cost to simply clear a drain or fix a pipe is often a pittance. Instead, the HOA’s neglect turned a routine maintenance task into a $3,050.00 legal bill.

4. The Administrative “Dead End” for Damages

While this case is a victory for homeowner rights, it also highlights a critical jurisdictional limit that every resident must understand. In Finding of Fact #11, the Judge acknowledged that Mr. Hogue spent 1,433.05∗∗oninteriorrepairsandsoughtanadditional∗∗500.00 in damages.

However, the Office of Administrative Hearings—which operates under the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety—is not a “one-stop shop” for money. While the Judge found the HOA liable, the law does not allow this specific administrative forum to award compensatory repair costs to the homeowner. Note the payee: the $2,500.00 fine goes to the State Treasury, not the victim.

Homeowners Must Still Seek Recovery in Civil Court This is the “Administrative Dead End.” Mr. Hogue walked away with his 550.00∗∗feereimbursed,buttoactuallyseeacheckforhis∗∗1,433.05 in repairs, he would have to take this final administrative ruling and file a separate action in a “civil court of competent jurisdiction.” The administrative victory proves the HOA broke the law, but a civil judge must be the one to order them to pay for the carpet.

5. “Matters in Aggravation” and Finality

The Judge’s ruling didn’t pull any punches regarding the HOA’s behavior, citing “matters in aggrevation” [sic]. This is a legal term of art essentially meaning the HOA made a bad situation worse. The Judge specifically pointed to the HOA’s failure to “ameliorate the damage”—they didn’t just cause the flood; they stood by and watched the damage sit there. This, combined with their contemptuous silence toward the legal petition, is precisely why the civil penalty reached $2,500.00.

Boards should take note: this decision is not a suggestion. Per A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(B), this order is a final administrative action. It is not subject to a rehearing. If the HOA refuses to pay the State its fine or the homeowner their fee, the order is enforceable through contempt of court proceedings in the Superior Court.

6. Conclusion: A Lesson in Accountability

The Hogue v. Shadow Mountain Villas case is a reminder that homeowners are not powerless. Arizona statutes like A.R.S. Title 33 provide the shield, and the administrative process provides the sword. While the “split” between state penalties and civil damages is a hurdle for homeowners, the “teeth” of the law are very real for negligent boards.

When an association ignores its duty to maintain the property and then ignores a legal summons, it isn’t “saving money”—it’s gambling with the community’s coffers. Is your board’s ego and lack of responsiveness worth a $2,500.00 “default” lesson from the State? If they aren’t proactive today, they might be paying for it tomorrow.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas Hogue (Petitioner)

Neutral Parties

  • Brian Brendan Tully (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on service list
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on service list

Riem, Karl -v- Rancho Antigua Condos

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089009-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-12-19
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Karl Riem Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Antigua Condos Counsel —

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Outcome Summary

The Respondent failed to respond to the petition and a Notice of Default was entered. The Administrative Law Judge ruled the Respondent in default and designated the Petitioner as the prevailing party. However, because the Petitioner failed to cite specific statutory provisions or governing documents in the petition, the ALJ could not award substantive relief beyond the reimbursement of the $550.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Default Judgment / Failure to Cite Provisions

Respondent failed to submit a response to the Petition and was held in default. However, Petitioner did not cite any provision of A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16 or any provision of any planned community or condominium document allegedly violated. Consequently, relief was limited to the filing fee.

Orders: Respondent is in default and Petitioner is the prevailing party. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089009-BFS Decision – 204670.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:35:56 (54.6 KB)

08F-H089009-BFS Decision – 204670.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:59 (54.6 KB)

Administrative Ruling: Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos

Executive Summary

On December 19, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal issued an Order of Default and Award of Filing Fee in the matter of Karl Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos (No. 08F-H089009-BFS). The ruling followed a Notice of Default entered on October 31, 2008, after the Respondent failed to answer the Petitioner’s allegations.

While the Respondent was found to be in default and the Petitioner was named the prevailing party, the relief granted was strictly limited to the reimbursement of the $550.00 filing fee. This limitation was due to a significant deficiency in the Petition: the failure to cite specific statutory violations or governing document breaches. Consequently, while the allegations were deemed admitted by statute, they did not provide a legal basis for substantive relief beyond the recovery of costs.

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Case Overview

The following table summarizes the administrative and legal context of the proceedings:

Category

Details

Case Number

08F-H089009-BFS

Petitioner

Karl Riem

Respondent

Rancho Antigua Condos

Presiding Official

Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal

Administrative Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (Phoenix, Arizona)

Overseeing Agency

Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

Date of Order

December 19, 2008

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Procedural History and Findings

The Entry of Default

The matter was initiated via a Petition submitted by Karl Riem to the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. The Respondent, Rancho Antigua Condos, failed to submit a response to the Petition. Under the administrative rules governing the Department:

• On October 31, 2008, the Director of the Department entered a Notice of Default based on the Respondent’s failure to answer.

• Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), in the event of a default, the allegations contained within a Petition can be “deemed admitted.”

Deficiencies in the Petition

Despite the Respondent’s default, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) identified critical technical omissions in the Petitioner’s filing. The Source Context notes that the Petitioner “did not cite any provision of A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16 or a provision of any planned community or condominium document that was allegedly violated by Respondent.”

Because the Petition lacked citations to specific laws (Chapters 9 or 16 of Title 33) or specific internal condominium documents, the ALJ determined that substantive relief could not be justified, even though the allegations were technically admitted through the default process.

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Final Order and Award

Based on the findings of the Office of Administrative Hearings, the following mandates were issued:

1. Prevailing Party Designation: The Respondent is officially in default, and the Petitioner, Karl Riem, is designated as the prevailing party.

2. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The Respondent is ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for the filing fee in the amount of $550.00.

3. Compliance Timeline: The Respondent must complete this reimbursement within forty (40) days of the date of the Order (December 19, 2008).

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Distribution and Service

The original Order was transmitted to the following parties:

• Robert Barger, Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety (Attn: Debra Blake).

• Karl Riem (Petitioner) at his Scottsdale, Arizona residence.

• Rancho Antigua Condos (Respondent) via Cuellar Realty Services in Phoenix, Arizona.

Study Guide: Administrative Hearing Case No. 08F-H089009-BFS

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal proceedings between Karl Riem and Rancho Antigua Condos. It is designed to facilitate an understanding of the procedural outcomes and legal limitations inherent in default judgments within the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.

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Part 1: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source text.

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this specific case?

2. What was the primary reason for the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety to enter a Notice of Default?

3. Why was the Petitioner unable to receive any relief other than the reimbursement of his filing fee?

4. According to A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), what happens to the allegations in a Petition when a default occurs?

5. What specific amount was the Respondent ordered to pay the Petitioner, and for what purpose?

6. Who was the Administrative Law Judge who presided over this matter and issued the order?

7. What is the deadline for the Respondent to fulfill the order for reimbursement?

8. Which two chapters of A.R.S. Title 33 were specifically mentioned as not being cited in the Petition?

9. Where is the Office of Administrative Hearings located, according to the document?

10. To whom was the original copy of the order transmitted on behalf of the Department of Fire Building and Life Safety?

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Part 2: Answer Key

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this specific case? The Petitioner is Karl Riem and the Respondent is Rancho Antigua Condos. The case was filed under the number 08F-H089009-BFS.

2. What was the primary reason for the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety to enter a Notice of Default? The Notice of Default was entered because the Respondent failed to submit a response to the Petition. This notice was officially entered on October 31, 2008.

3. Why was the Petitioner unable to receive any relief other than the reimbursement of his filing fee? The Petitioner did not cite any specific violations of A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16, or any specific community or condominium documents. Because no specific legal violations were alleged, the judge could not award further relief beyond the filing fee.

4. According to A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), what happens to the allegations in a Petition when a default occurs? Under this statute, the allegations contained in the Petition can be “deemed admitted” in the event of a default. This means the facts of the petition are accepted as true because they were not contested.

5. What specific amount was the Respondent ordered to pay the Petitioner, and for what purpose? The Respondent was ordered to pay $550.00 to the Petitioner. This payment was specifically for the reimbursement of the Petitioner’s filing fee.

6. Who was the Administrative Law Judge who presided over this matter and issued the order? The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was Lewis D. Kowal. He signed the Order of Default and Award of Filing Fee on December 19, 2008.

7. What is the deadline for the Respondent to fulfill the order for reimbursement? The Respondent is required to reimburse the Petitioner within forty days of the date of the Order. The Order was issued and signed on December 19, 2008.

8. Which two chapters of A.R.S. Title 33 were specifically mentioned as not being cited in the Petition? The document specifically notes that the Petitioner failed to cite provisions from A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16. These chapters generally govern community or condominium legalities.

9. Where is the Office of Administrative Hearings located, according to the document? The Office of Administrative Hearings is located at 1400 West Washington, Suite 101, Phoenix, Arizona 85007. Their listed phone number is (602) 542-9826.

10. To whom was the original copy of the order transmitted on behalf of the Department of Fire Building and Life Safety? The original was transmitted to Robert Barger, the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. The transmission was marked to the attention of Debra Blake.

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Part 3: Essay Format Questions

Instructions: Use the information from the source text to develop detailed responses to the following prompts.

1. The Importance of Statutory Citations: Analyze how Karl Riem’s failure to cite specific provisions of A.R.S. Title 33 or condominium documents affected the outcome of the case. Discuss why a “prevailing party” might still fail to receive substantive relief.

2. The Role of Default in Administrative Law: Explain the procedural implications of a Respondent failing to answer a Petition. Detail how the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety handles such failures and the legal assumptions made under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D).

3. Administrative Law Judge Authority: Discuss the role of Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal in this case. Evaluate his decision to grant a default judgment while simultaneously limiting the award to the filing fee.

4. Timeline and Compliance: Trace the timeline of this case from the Notice of Default to the final order. Explain the significance of the 40-day reimbursement window provided to the Respondent.

5. Service and Notification: Describe the administrative process for transmitting orders and notices as evidenced by the distribution list at the end of the document. Identify the key stakeholders involved in receiving the legal results.

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S.

Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who hears and decides cases for an administrative agency, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Default

A failure to perform a legal duty or respond to a legal proceeding, such as failing to submit a response to a Petition.

Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

The state department responsible for oversight and enforcement related to fire safety, building codes, and community/condominium disputes.

Filing Fee

The administrative cost paid by a Petitioner to initiate a case; in this matter, the fee was $550.00.

Notice of Default

A formal document entered by a director or judge noting that a party has failed to respond to a legal action within the required timeframe.

A formal instruction or decision issued by a judge (in this case, Lewis D. Kowal) that mandates specific actions or determines the outcome of a case.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition (Karl Riem).

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal proceeding that is deemed successful; despite receiving limited relief, the Petitioner was named the prevailing party due to the Respondent’s default.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or legal action is filed (Rancho Antigua Condos).

Source Fidelity Note: This study guide is based entirely on excerpts from the “204670.pdf” document regarding Karl Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos.

Why “Winning” Your Case Isn’t Always a Victory: Lessons from an Administrative Default

1. Introduction: The High Cost of a Quiet Courtroom

In the pursuit of legal redress, many litigants imagine the “gold standard” of outcomes: a scenario where the opposition fails to respond, leading to an automatic victory. From a strategic perspective, however, a procedural win is often a hollow shell if it lacks a substantive foundation. The case of Karl Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos (No. 08F-H089009-BFS) serves as a stark reminder that even when the other side remains silent, the burden of pleading remains with the petitioner.

Processed through the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, this case illustrates how a failure to establish a statutory nexus can turn a “win” into a net loss of time and resources. For the petitioner, the “high cost” was not just the filing fee, but the forfeiture of any meaningful relief due to a fundamental failure of pleading.

2. The Default Trap: When Silence is an Admission, but Not a Guarantee

The procedural timeline of this matter began with a significant tactical advantage for the Petitioner. On October 31, 2008, the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety entered a Notice of Default against the Respondent, Rancho Antigua Condos, following their failure to submit a formal response to the Petition.

Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), a default allows the Administrative Tribunal to deem the factual allegations in the petition as admitted. While this technically designates the Petitioner as the “prevailing party,” a Legal Insights Strategist must recognize this as a double-edged sword. Admitting the facts does not automatically equate to proving a legal violation that warrants a specific remedy. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is still bound by the statutory framework of the initial filing.

The final Order emphasizes this distinction:

3. The Citation Gap: Why Specificity is the Soul of Legal Relief

The primary obstacle in Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos was a critical “citation gap.” Despite the Respondent’s default, ALJ Lewis D. Kowal noted that the Petitioner failed to state a claim upon which substantive relief could be granted. Specifically, the Petitioner did not cite any provision of A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 9 (the Arizona Condominium Act) or Chapter 16 (the Planned Communities Act), nor any specific governing documents of the condominium association.

In Arizona property law, these chapters function as the “constitutions” of dispute resolution. Without anchoring allegations to these statutes, a Petitioner fails to establish the necessary statutory basis for a cause of action. The OAH cannot manufacture a legal theory or invent a remedy that the Petitioner has not explicitly requested through proper statutory citation.

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4. The $550 Victory: A Breakdown of the Final Award

The final Order, issued on December 19, 2008, resulted in what can only be described as a pyrrhic victory. Although the Petitioner “won” the case, the lack of substantive legal grounding meant that the only recovery permitted was the restitution of the costs required to initiate the hearing.

Summary of the Orders issued by ALJ Lewis D. Kowal:

• Notice of Default: Confirmed the Respondent’s default status based on the Director’s October 31 entry.

• Prevailing Party Designation: Officially named Karl Riem as the prevailing party in the administrative matter.

• Reimbursement Window: Ordered the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner’s $550.00 filing fee within forty days of the December 19, 2008, Order.

From an analytical standpoint, the Petitioner ended the dispute in the exact financial position they occupied before the filing, minus the significant “opportunity cost” of the time invested in the litigation.

5. Conclusion: The Importance of a Solid Foundation

The Riem case serves as a masterclass in the importance of preparation and legal precision. In administrative law, the tribunal’s power is not broad; it is specific and tethered to the law. A “win” by default does not relieve a petitioner of the duty to build a solid evidentiary and legal foundation. Simply identifying a grievance is insufficient; one must bridge the gap between a perceived wrong and the specific legislative acts—such as the Arizona Condominium and Planned Communities Acts—that govern it.

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Ponder This

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Karl Riem (petitioner)

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

Coon, Horace E. vs. Indian Hills Airpark Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089002-BFS
Agency —
Tribunal —
Decision Date 2008-11-17
Administrative Law Judge BBT
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded —
Civil Penalties —

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Horace E. Coon Counsel —
Respondent Indian Hills Airpark Association Counsel —

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089002-BFS Decision – 202581.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:35:05 (92.8 KB)

08F-H089002-BFS Decision – 202581.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:40 (92.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Coon v. Indian Hills Airpark Association (No. 08F-H089002-BFS)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative hearing between Horace E. Coon (Petitioner) and the Indian Hills Airpark Association (Respondent). The dispute centered on the Respondent's alleged failure to provide financial and accounting records as required by Arizona law and the association's bylaws.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Brian Brendan Tully presided over the matter, ultimately dismissing the petition. The core of the ruling established that providing records in an electronic format satisfies statutory requirements for document disclosure. Additionally, the decision clarified that administrative proceedings do not qualify as "actions" for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees under the cited precedent.

Case Overview and Timeline

Detail Information
Case Number 08F-H089002-BFS
Petitioner Horace E. Coon
Respondent Indian Hills Airpark Association
Hearing Date November 4, 2008
Decision Date November 17, 2008
Presiding Judge Brian Brendan Tully
Statutory Basis A.R.S. § 33-1805; A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B)
Procedural History

The Petitioner filed a single-count petition on July 7, 2008, following a records request made on May 29, 2008. The matter was handled by the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety and forwarded to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a formal adjudication.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Statutory Compliance in Document Disclosure

The primary conflict involved the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the provision of association records. The Petitioner argued that the association failed to provide the requested financial/accounting records, rendering them "unavailable" for his complaint. However, the Respondent demonstrated that it maintained records electronically and had provided them on a computer disk.

The ALJ ruled that the association's method of delivery was sufficient. By utilizing A.R.S. § 44-7007(A) and (C), the court found that electronic records hold the same legal standing as paper records in fulfilling disclosure obligations.

2. The Format of Records: Electronic vs. Paper

A significant point of contention was whether a member has the right to demand paper copies over electronic formats. The Petitioner contended he was entitled to paper documents. The court rejected this, noting that:

  • The association's records were natively electronic (stored on a treasurer's laptop and backed up to an office computer).
  • Furnishing the documentation in an electronic format was "appropriate" and supported by applicable statutes.
3. Technical Obstacles and Good Faith Efforts

The record indicates a technical failure occurred when the Respondent's treasurer inadvertently applied a personal password to the disk provided to the Petitioner. Upon notification, the treasurer created a new disk with a generic password. While the Petitioner claimed he still could not access all data, the ALJ found that the Respondent had complied with the request, suggesting that technical difficulties do not necessarily equate to a statutory violation if the association makes reasonable efforts to provide access.

4. Limitations on Financial Recovery

The decision underscored the limitations regarding the recovery of costs in administrative hearings:

  • Filing Fees: Because the Petitioner was not the "prevailing party," he was not entitled to the reimbursement of his filing fee under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(B).
  • Attorney's Fees: The Respondent's claim for attorney's fees was denied. The ALJ cited Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc. to establish that an administrative proceeding is not an "action" that triggers the awarding of such fees.

Important Quotes and Context

"Respondent’s furnishing of the requested documentation in an electronic format was appropriate."

  • Context: Finding of Fact No. 12. This addressed the Petitioner's claim that he was entitled to paper copies. The ALJ found no evidence or statutory requirement that mandated paper over electronic media.

"Pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-7007(A) and (C), the electronic record supplied by Respondent to Petitioner complies with the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805."

  • Context: Conclusion of Law No. 3. This is the legal pivot of the decision, linking the electronic transactions statutes to the planned community records disclosure laws.

"Respondent’s claim for attorney’s fee must be denied because an administrative proceeding is not an 'action' for which attorney’s fees can be awarded."

  • Context: Conclusion of Law No. 5. This clarifies the financial risks for parties in these types of disputes, noting that even a successful Respondent cannot recover legal fees in this venue.

Actionable Insights

For Homeowner and Planned Community Associations
  • Digital Validity: Associations can confidently fulfill record requests using electronic media (disks, emails, etc.), especially if the records are natively stored in that format.
  • Password Protocols: When providing electronic records, associations should ensure that security measures (like passwords) are generic or clearly communicated to avoid claims of non-compliance due to "inaccessibility."
  • Storage Redundancy: The Respondent’s practice of backing up the treasurer’s laptop to an office computer was noted as part of their standard record-maintenance procedure.
For Association Members
  • Format Flexibility: Members should be prepared to accept electronic records. Demanding paper copies may not be legally enforceable if electronic records are provided.
  • Burden of Proof: The Petitioner carries the burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence). Merely stating that data is inaccessible is insufficient to prove a violation if the association has attempted to provide it.
Legal and Procedural Realities
  • Finality of Decisions: Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings in these matters are final and not subject to rehearing, though they are enforceable through the Superior Court via contempt proceedings.
  • Cost Management: Parties should be aware that they are unlikely to recover attorney’s fees in this specific administrative venue, regardless of the outcome.

Case Analysis Study Guide: Horace E. Coon v. Indian Hills Airpark Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Horace E. Coon v. Indian Hills Airpark Association (No. 08F-H089002-BFS). It outlines the jurisdictional framework, factual background, legal conclusions, and procedural outcomes of the dispute regarding a member's access to association records.

Key Concepts and Legal Framework

The following legal principles and statutes govern the adjudication of disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona, as demonstrated in this case:

1. Jurisdictional Authority
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B): Authorizes the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety ("Department") to receive petitions regarding disputes between homeowner associations (HOAs) and their members.
  • Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH): An independent agency that conducts formal hearings for petitions forwarded by the Department.
  • Scope of Authority: Per A.R.S. § 41-2198, the OAH is limited to adjudicating complaints regarding compliance with A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16 (Planned Communities) and the respondent's specific governing documents.
2. Statutory Records Access
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805: Sets the standard for a member's right to access association records.
  • A.R.S. § 44-7007(A) and (C): Validates the use of electronic records. In this case, providing records on a computer disk was ruled sufficient to satisfy the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1805.
3. Procedural Standards
  • Burden of Proof: Under A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner carries the burden of proof.
  • Standard of Proof: The case is decided based on a "preponderance of the evidence" (A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)).
  • Finality: Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(B), an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in these matters is the final administrative action and is not subject to rehearing.

Case Summary: Findings of Fact

Entity/Person Role
Horace E. Coon Petitioner; Member of the Indian Hills Airpark Association.
Indian Hills Airpark Association Respondent; The planned community association.
Brian Brendan Tully Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presiding over the case.
David Paul Miller Association Treasurer responsible for record-keeping.

The Dispute: On May 29, 2008, the Petitioner requested financial and accounting records from the Respondent. The Respondent maintains records electronically on a laptop and a backup office computer. On June 12, 2008, the Treasurer provided the records on a computer disk.

Complications:

  1. Accessibility: The initial disk was locked with the Treasurer's personal password. A second disk was eventually provided with a generic password.
  2. Format: The Petitioner claimed he could not access all data and argued that he was legally entitled to paper copies rather than electronic formats.

The Ruling: The ALJ found that the Association complied with the request. The law does not require paper copies if electronic copies are provided. Consequently, the Petition was dismissed.

Glossary of Important Terms

Term Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues decisions for administrative agencies.
A.R.S. Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Burden of Proof The obligation of a party (in this case, the Petitioner) to provide enough evidence to support their claim.
Electronic Record A record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.
Planned Community A real estate development where owners are mandatory members of an association (governed by A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16).
Preponderance of the Evidence The standard of proof requiring that a fact is more likely than not to be true.
Prevailing Party The party in a lawsuit who wins on the main issues; typically eligible for certain fee reimbursements if allowed by statute.

Short-Answer Practice Questions

  1. What specific Arizona statute authorizes the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety to handle HOA disputes?
  • Answer: A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B).
  1. Who bears the burden of proof in an OAH hearing regarding a planned community dispute?
  • Answer: The Petitioner.
  1. According to the ALJ's decision, is an association required to provide paper copies of records if they offer the records in an electronic format?
  • Answer: No. The ALJ ruled that furnishing documentation in an electronic format is appropriate and supported by A.R.S. § 44-7007.
  1. Why was the Respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees denied?
  • Answer: Because an administrative proceeding is not considered an "action" for which attorney’s fees can be awarded under Arizona case law (Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc.).
  1. If a Petitioner loses their case, are they entitled to have the Respondent pay their filing fee?
  • Answer: No. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(B), only a prevailing party may be entitled to the filing fee.

Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. Electronic vs. Physical Records: Analyze the impact of A.R.S. § 44-7007 on the transparency requirements of planned communities. Does the transition to electronic record-keeping enhance or hinder a member's right to access information under A.R.S. § 33-1805? Use the facts of the Coon case—specifically the password and accessibility issues—to support your argument.
  1. The Limitations of Administrative Remedies: Discuss the jurisdictional limits of the Office of Administrative Hearings as outlined in this case. Why might the legislature limit the OAH to specific chapters of the Arizona Revised Statutes, and what are the implications for homeowners who may have grievances that fall outside these specific statutes?
  1. The Role of the Treasurer in Association Governance: In this case, the Treasurer's use of a personal password initially blocked the member's access to records. Evaluate the responsibilities of association officers regarding the separation of personal and professional data. How does this case serve as a precedent for how associations should handle electronic document requests?

Digital Records and HOA Disputes: Key Lessons from Coon v. Indian Hills Airpark Association

1. Introduction: The Conflict Over Access

In aging airpark communities and established HOAs across the country, the transition from paper to pixels is often met with resistance. The shift from physical filing cabinets to digital storage frequently sparks a high-stakes question of transparency: is an HOA legally required to provide physical paper copies, or is a digital file enough to satisfy the law?

The case of Horace E. Coon vs. Indian Hills Airpark Association serves as a definitive roadmap for this modern dilemma. It explores the intersection of traditional record-keeping statutes and the reality of 21st-century technology, ultimately answering whether a member's preference for paper can override an association's right to provide electronic access.

2. The Case Narrative: From Request to Courtroom

The dispute arose in mid-2008 when the Petitioner, Horace E. Coon—who appeared personally (pro se) throughout the proceedings—sought specific financial and accounting records from the Indian Hills Airpark Association. The Association, represented by Jonathan Olcott, Esq., attempted to fulfill the request digitally, leading to a series of technical hurdles that ended in an administrative hearing.

The timeline of the dispute highlights the friction between good-faith efforts and technical complications:

  • May 29, 2008: Petitioner submitted a written request for records maintained by the Association.
  • June 12, 2008: The Respondent’s treasurer, David Paul Miller, provided the requested documentation to the Petitioner on a computer disk.
  • The Technical Hiccup: Upon receiving the disk, the Petitioner could not open the files. Mr. Miller, then at his home in Oregon, realized he had inadvertently protected the disk with a personal password.
  • The Resolution: Rather than disclosing his personal credentials, Mr. Miller created a second disk with a generic password and delivered it to the Petitioner.

Crucially, despite having received the second disk and the means to access the files, the Petitioner filed a formal complaint on July 7, 2008. His primary contentions were:

  • Accessibility Issues: A claim that he still could not access all the data on the disk.
  • Format Demand: An allegation that the Association "failed to act" by not providing the records in a physical paper format.

3. Legal Deep Dive: The Status of Electronic Records

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Brian Brendan Tully was tasked with determining whether electronic production met the requirements of Arizona law. The Petitioner argued that A.R.S. § 33-1805—the statute governing the inspection of records—entitled him to paper copies.

The ALJ rejected this interpretation, noting that modern statutes have "neutralized" the traditional legal preference for paper.

Legal Note: The Significance of Electronic Records Under A.R.S. § 33-1805, HOAs must make records available for examination. However, the ALJ ruled that this obligation must be read in conjunction with the Arizona Electronic Transactions Act, specifically A.R.S. § 44-7007(A) and (C). These statutes establish that: 1. A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form. 2. If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies that law. Consequently, the ALJ found that the electronic disk supplied by the Association complied fully with the "writing" requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

The ALJ’s findings clarified that a technical glitch, such as a password error that is subsequently corrected, does not constitute a "failure to act." The Association demonstrated it had acted in good faith by maintaining electronic backups on both a laptop and an office computer and by providing the Petitioner with the means to access them.

4. The Cost of Litigation: Fees and Outcomes

On November 17, 2008, the ALJ issued a final order dismissing the petition. While the Association was the prevailing party, the financial outcome underscores a major "pain point" for HOA Boards involved in administrative disputes.

Claimant Request Final Ruling
Requested physical access/paper copies of financial/accounting records Dismissed: Electronic records were found to be legally appropriate and compliant.
Reimbursement of the $500.00 filing fee Denied: The Petitioner was not the prevailing party under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(B).
Respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees Denied: Under the precedent of Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., administrative hearings are not "actions" where fees can be awarded.

For Boards, the takeaway is sobering: even if you win, you may still be responsible for your own legal costs. Because this was an administrative proceeding through the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rather than a "court action," the Association could not recover the fees spent on their legal counsel, Jonathan Olcott, Esq.

5. Strategic Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

The Coon case serves as a warning that technical diligence and cooperation are always preferable to the rigid environment of an OAH hearing.

For Homeowners
  • Accept Digital Formats: Legally, an HOA is not obligated to provide paper copies if an electronic equivalent exists. Refusing a disk or digital file in favor of paper is a losing legal strategy that will likely lead to a dismissed petition.
  • The Burden of Proof: In an OAH proceeding, the Petitioner carries the burden of proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." To succeed, you must prove the Association willfully withheld records. A technical error or a password mistake that the Board attempts to fix does not constitute a refusal to provide records.
For HOA Boards
  • Utilize Association-Owned Storage: In this case, the treasurer used a personal laptop and a personal password, which caused the initial friction. Boards should use association-owned cloud storage or dedicated devices to ensure records remain accessible regardless of a specific director's location.
  • Standardize File Formats: To avoid "failure to act" allegations, provide records in universal, non-proprietary formats such as PDF or Excel. Using standard formats and generic passwords for record production minimizes the Petitioner's ability to claim the data is "inaccessible."

Ultimately, Coon v. Indian Hills Airpark Association confirms that as long as the information is accessible and usable, the medium—whether digital or physical—remains at the Association's discretion. In the realm of community governance, a functional digital file is just as good as a stack of paper in the eyes of the law.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Horace E. Coon (Petitioner)
    Appeared personally

Respondent Side

  • Jonathan Olcott (Attorney)
    The Brown Law Group
    Esq., represented Indian Hills Airpark Association
  • David Paul Miller (Treasurer)
    Indian Hills Airpark Association

Neutral Parties

  • Brian Brendan Tully (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
  • Debra Blake (Contact)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety

Holzman, Andrew -v- Emerald Springs Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089003-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-10-28
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Andrew Holzman Counsel —
Respondent Emerald Springs Homeowners Association Counsel Jason Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&R Sec. 3.16(1); CC&R Sec. 3.27

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Respondent (HOA), finding that the Board acted appropriately in approving a 5-foot pool fence despite CC&R restrictions limiting height to 4 feet. The ALJ concluded that the HOA is required to comply with the County ordinance mandating a minimum 5-foot height for pool fences, which overrides the conflicting CC&R provision.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prevail because the CC&R provisions sought to be enforced were contrary to a County ordinance requiring higher fences for safety.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of fence height restrictions regarding neighbor's pool fence

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by approving a neighbor's plan for a pool fence at least 5 feet in height, whereas the CC&Rs restrict fence height to 4 feet. The HOA argued it must comply with a County ordinance requiring pool fences to be a minimum of 5 feet.

Orders: No action is required of the Association with respect to the Petition.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089003-BFS Decision – 201322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:35:17 (95.3 KB)

08F-H089003-BFS Decision – 201322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:42 (95.3 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Holzman v. Emerald Springs Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

The dispute in Andrew Holzman v. Emerald Springs Homeowners Association (No. 08F-H089003-BFS) centers on the conflict between private residential restrictive covenants and municipal safety ordinances. The Petitioner, Andrew Holzman, alleged that the Emerald Springs Homeowners Association (the “Association”) violated its Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving a neighbor’s pool fence that exceeded height limitations.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that while the Association’s CC&Rs mandate a maximum fence height of four feet for certain areas, La Paz County ordinance requires pool safety fences to be a minimum of five feet high. The ruling concludes that an association cannot be compelled to enforce CC&Rs that conflict with the law. Consequently, the Association’s approval of the five-foot fence was upheld as a necessary compliance with county safety requirements.

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Case Overview and Parties

Location

Andrew Holzman

Petitioner

Lot 24, Emerald Springs

Emerald Springs HOA

Respondent

Phoenix/La Paz County, Arizona

Waymen & Carolyn Dekens

Involved Third Party

Lot 23, Emerald Springs (Neighbors)

The dispute arose when the owners of Lot 23 proposed extensive landscaping, including a pool with waterfalls and a safety fence. Mr. Holzman, residing on the adjacent Lot 24, challenged the approval on the grounds that the fence would obstruct his view of the Colorado River.

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Alleged Violations of CC&Rs

The Petitioner cited two specific sections of the Association’s CC&Rs as the basis for his complaint:

1. Section 3.16(1): Stipulates that fences and walls starting 130 feet from the front property line and extending toward the river may not exceed four feet in height and must be of an “open type face.”

2. Section 3.27: Mandates that back and front yard fences must not exceed four feet in height (open type), while side yard fences must not exceed six feet (constructed of wood, concrete block, or similar materials).

The core of the Petitioner’s argument was that the Association approved a fence for Lot 23 that reached at least five feet in height, thereby violating the four-foot restriction in Section 3.16(1) and the back yard provisions of Section 3.27.

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Findings of Fact

Board Approval and Meeting Discrepancies

On June 21, 2008, the Association Board met to discuss the proposed pool for Lot 23. The nature of this meeting and the subsequent approval were subjects of significant testimony:

• Petitioner’s View: Mr. Holzman, attending telephonically, contended that the Board approved the construction of the pool and fence despite his concerns about view obstruction.

• Association’s View: The Board President testified that the Board only approved the “concept” of the pool, conditioned on future engineering surveys and landscaping plans. They argued no formal written plans were approved during that session.

• Official Record: Meeting minutes and subsequent emails from the Board Secretary (Judy Jerrels) indicated that plans were indeed “passed around” and “conditionally approved,” with the understanding that revised plans would follow.

The Conflict of Regulations

The ALJ found the following facts critical to the final determination:

• County Requirements: It was undisputed that La Paz County requires pool fences to be a minimum of five feet in height.

• Board Recognition: During the June 21 meeting, the Board acknowledged the County’s five-foot requirement and received a legal opinion stating that CC&Rs do not prohibit pools on community lots.

• ALJ Determination: The ALJ concluded that the Board did approve a plan involving a fence of at least five feet in height to ensure compliance with the County ordinance.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions of Law

Supremacy of Law over CC&Rs

The primary legal conclusion of the ALJ is that municipal ordinances take precedence over private restrictive covenants when the two are in direct conflict.

• Compliance Necessity: The Association is legally required to comply with County ordinances. It cannot be compelled by its members to enforce CC&R provisions (the four-foot height limit) that would cause a homeowner to violate safety laws (the five-foot pool fence requirement).

• Appropriateness of Action: Because the Board acted to align its approval with legal mandates, its decision was deemed appropriate.

Prevailing Party and Attorney Fees

Despite the ruling in favor of the Association, the Respondent’s request for attorney fees was denied based on the following:

• Statutory Limitations: Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, attorney fees are awardable in an “action.” However, citing Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., the ALJ noted that an administrative proceeding does not constitute an “action” for the purposes of this statute.

• Lack of Governing Authority: The Association failed to cite any specific provision in its own governing documents that would allow for the recovery of fees or costs in this type of administrative proceeding.

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Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that no action is required of the Association regarding Mr. Holzman’s Petition. The decision was finalized on October 28, 2008, upholding the Association’s right to prioritize county safety ordinances over the height restrictions found in the CC&Rs.

Study Guide: Holzman v. Emerald Springs Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Andrew Holzman and the Emerald Springs Homeowners Association. It explores the legal conflict between community-specific Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and municipal ordinances, specifically regarding property improvements and safety requirements.

Short-Answer Quiz

1. What was the primary legal conflict at the center of this dispute?

2. Identify the specific sections of the Emerald Springs CC&Rs that the Petitioner alleged were being violated.

3. What were the specific height and material requirements for fences as outlined in Section 3.27 of the CC&Rs?

4. Why did Andrew Holzman object to the proposed fence on Lot 23?

5. How did the Board meeting on June 21, 2008, contribute to the dispute?

6. What was the legal justification for the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruling in favor of the Homeowners Association regarding fence height?

7. Describe the conflicting testimony regarding the existence of “plans” for the pool on Lot 23.

8. What role did Judy Jerrels’ emails play in the Board’s defense?

9. On what grounds did the ALJ deny the Respondent’s request for attorney fees?

10. What are the requirements for a party to appeal this final administrative decision?

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Quiz Answer Key

Question

Answer

The conflict involved a discrepancy between the Emerald Springs CC&Rs, which limited certain fences to 4 feet in height, and a La Paz County ordinance, which mandated that pool fences be a minimum of 5 feet in height. The case questioned whether an HOA could be forced to follow its own rules when they contradict local law.

The Petitioner alleged violations of Section 3.16(1), regarding fence heights and types for properties extending toward the river, and Section 3.27, which governs the height and construction materials for back, front, and side yard fences.

Under Section 3.27, back and front yard fences were restricted to a 4-foot maximum height and required an “open type” design. Side yard fences were permitted to be up to 6 feet in height and could be constructed of wood, concrete block, or similar materials.

Holzman, residing on Lot 24, was concerned that a 5-foot fence installed by his neighbors on Lot 23 would obstruct his view of the Colorado River. He also claimed the neighbors had previously agreed to move the pool and eventually remove the fence.

During this meeting, the Board conditionally approved the concept of a pool for Lot 23. While the Petitioner argued this constituted a formal approval of a fence violating CC&Rs, the Board maintained it was a conceptual approval contingent on future engineering surveys and updated landscaping plans.

The ALJ concluded that the Association cannot be compelled to abide by CC&R provisions that are contrary to law. Because the County ordinance required a 5-foot minimum for pool safety, that law superseded the 4-foot restriction in the CC&Rs.

Holzman contended that by conditionally approving “plans,” the Board had authorized specific construction. Conversely, Board President Sherri Mehrver testified that no formal written plans or engineering surveys had been submitted yet, and the “plans” mentioned in minutes referred only to a diagram.

Jerrels’ emails from July 17, 2008, suggested that revised plans were still expected from the owners of Lot 23. This supported the Board’s argument that they had not yet given final approval to specific construction details, such as side yard fencing materials or exact height.

The ALJ ruled that an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which is the statute used to award attorney fees. Additionally, the Association failed to provide any provision within its own governing documents that allowed for such an award in this type of proceeding.

A party must commence an action to review the decision by filing a complaint within 35 days of the decision being served. Service is considered complete upon personal delivery or five days after the decision is mailed to the party’s last known address.

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Essay Questions

1. The Supremacy of Law over Private Agreements: Analyze the ALJ’s decision that Emerald Springs could not be compelled to follow CC&Rs that contradict County ordinances. Discuss the implications this has for homeowners associations when drafting and enforcing private community standards.

2. Evidentiary Interpretation of Board Minutes: Evaluate the weight given to the June 21, 2008, Board minutes. How did the phrasing “conditionally approved plans” create ambiguity, and how did the ALJ reconcile this phrasing with the testimony of Ms. Mehrver and the emails of Ms. Jerrels?

3. Property Rights and View Obstruction: Andrew Holzman’s primary grievance was the obstruction of his river view. Discuss the balance between an individual’s aesthetic enjoyment of their property and the legal necessity of safety regulations (like pool fencing) as presented in the case.

4. Administrative vs. Judicial Proceedings: Using the ALJ’s ruling on attorney fees as a baseline, compare the legal nature of an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings to a standard civil “action.” Why does the law distinguish between the two regarding the recovery of legal costs?

5. The Role of Conditional Approval in Governance: The Board approved the “concept” of the Dekens’ pool while awaiting further surveys. Discuss the risks and benefits of HOAs granting conditional approvals before receiving finalized engineering and landscaping plans.

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Glossary of Key Terms

• A.R.S. § 12-341.01: A specific Arizona Revised Statute regarding the recovery of attorney fees; the ALJ ruled this did not apply to administrative hearings.

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over administrative hearings, such as Lewis D. Kowal in this matter, to adjudicate disputes involving state agency actions or regulated communities.

• CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing documents of a homeowners association that dictate the rules for property use, maintenance, and architectural standards within the community.

• Conditional Approval: A status granted to a project or plan that is accepted in principle but requires further documentation, surveys, or modifications before final authorization.

• Lot 23: The property owned by the Dekens, where the proposed pool and fence were to be installed.

• Lot 24: The property owned by the Petitioner, Andrew Holzman, located adjacent to Lot 23.

• Open Type Face Fencing: A style of fencing required by the Emerald Springs CC&Rs for certain areas to preserve views; contrasted with solid walls or blocks.

• Ordinance: A law or regulation enacted by a municipal body, such as La Paz County, which in this case mandated specific heights for pool safety fences.

• Petitioner: The party who initiates the legal proceeding or appeal; in this case, Andrew Holzman.

• Respondent: The party against whom a legal petition is filed; in this case, the Emerald Springs Homeowners Association.

When Rules Collide: 3 Surprising Lessons from the Emerald Springs HOA Legal Battle

I. Introduction: The Battle for the View

In the world of deed-restricted communities, homeowners often pay a significant premium for aesthetic certainty. Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are designed to offer a guarantee that a neighbor’s renovation will not infringe upon a skyline or a river view. However, a fundamental tension exists between these private restrictive covenants and the police power of local government.

This conflict reached a boiling point in Holzman v. Emerald Springs Homeowners Association, a dispute that began when a homeowner sought to protect his view of the Colorado River from a neighbor’s proposed pool and safety fence. The case, heard before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), provides a sobering look at the hierarchy of legal authority and the procedural traps that can leave an association vulnerable.

II. Takeaway 1: The Supremacy of Municipal Safety Ordinances

The central dispute in Holzman involved a direct contradiction between the Emerald Springs CC&Rs and La Paz County law. Sections 3.16 and 3.27 of the community’s governing documents were explicit: fences located 130 feet from the front property line and extending toward the river were capped at four feet in height. These provisions were intended to maintain a “step-down” effect to preserve the scenic corridor.

However, the owners of Lot 23 proposed a pool, and La Paz County ordinance required all pool enclosures to be a minimum of five feet in height for public safety. The ALJ determined that when a private contract (the CC&Rs) and a government safety ordinance collide, the ordinance prevails.

This creates a profound “Catch-22” for both associations and homeowners. A buyer may invest in a property specifically for its contractually protected views, yet that property right can be effectively extinguished by a change in local safety codes. The HOA, meanwhile, finds itself in the ironic position of being legally compelled to allow—and even facilitate—a violation of its own governing contract.

III. Takeaway 2: The Power of Admissions and Informal Minutes

The Holzman case underscores the danger of informal board governance and the legal weight of internal communications. During the June 21, 2008, Board meeting, the association discussed the pool project on Lot 23. The Petitioner, Andrew Holzman, attended telephonically and was unable to see the visual aids presented.

While the Association later argued that it had only approved a “concept” and that no formal plans were submitted, evidence suggested otherwise. A July 17, 2008, email from the Association’s secretary, Judy Jerrels, proved decisive. In the email, Jerrels admitted that “plans were passed around at the meeting for the attending membership to view.” This admission undermined the Board’s defense and led the ALJ to conclude that a “conditional approval” had indeed occurred.

For HOA boards, the lesson is clear: any recognition of a project in official minutes or officer correspondence can be construed as a formal action. The distinction between a “concept” and a “plan” is often lost if the administrative record shows the Board allowed the project to move forward.

IV. Takeaway 3: Winning the Merits Does Not Guarantee Legal Fees

Perhaps the most frustrating outcome for the Emerald Springs HOA was the financial resolution. Although the Association successfully defended its decision to follow county law, and the ALJ ruled that the Petitioner was not the prevailing party, the HOA was denied the recovery of its attorney fees.

The ALJ cited a critical distinction in Arizona law regarding fee shifting. Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, fees are generally awardable to the prevailing party in “actions” arising out of contract. However, citing Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., the ALJ noted that an administrative hearing is not an “action” for the purposes of that statute.

To avoid being left with a significant legal bill even after a victory, associations must ensure their governing documents are specifically tailored for administrative forums. To maximize the chances of fee recovery, associations should prioritize:

• Explicit Provision for Administrative Forums: CC&Rs should explicitly state that the prevailing party is entitled to fees in any “legal proceeding, including administrative hearings.”

• Broad Definition of “Action”: Governing documents should define “action” or “litigation” to encompass Department of Real Estate or other administrative adjudications.

• Specific Statutory Citations: Ensure that any demand for fees references both contract law and the specific language of the association’s bylaws.

V. Conclusion: The Reality of Deed-Restricted Living

The Holzman v. Emerald Springs decision serves as a clinical reminder that HOA governance does not exist in a vacuum. While CC&Rs are binding private contracts that provide a sense of community control, they remain subordinate to the requirements of public safety and local government.

Ultimately, the case highlights the fragility of aesthetic protections when they meet the “police power” of the state. It forces a difficult realization for every resident of a common-interest community: If your community’s safety and your community’s aesthetics are in direct conflict, which one would you expect the law to choose? As the Emerald Springs battle demonstrates, public safety and municipal law will prevail every time.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Andrew Holzman (petitioner)
    Owner of Lot 24; appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC
    Represented Emerald Springs Homeowners Association
  • Sherri Mehrver (witness)
    Emerald Springs Homeowners Association
    Former Board President; testified at hearing
  • Judy Jerrels (board member)
    Emerald Springs Homeowners Association
    Secretary of the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Waymen Dekens (neighbor)
    Owner of Lot 23; neighbor proposing the pool/fence
  • Carolyn Dekens (neighbor)
    Owner of Lot 23; neighbor proposing the pool/fence
  • Robert Barger (agency official)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of decision copy
  • Debra Blake (agency official)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of decision copy; Attention line

James, Lon vs. Corte Bella Country Club Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089001-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lon James Counsel —
Respondent Corte Bella Country Club Association Counsel Angela Potts

Alleged Violations

Section 3.14
A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed. The claim regarding the Bylaws was precluded by mandatory ADR provisions in the CC&Rs. The claim regarding the open meeting statute was dismissed because an in camera review proved the closed meeting fell within valid statutory exceptions (personnel matters).

Why this result: Mandatory ADR clause in governing documents and statutory exceptions for closed meetings applied.

Key Issues & Findings

Allegation of Violation of Sec 3.14 of Bylaws

Petitioner alleged that the Board held a closed meeting to discuss and vote on a proposal to realign the Board, refusing homeowner permission to attend.

Orders: Dismissed based on requirement of Article XVII of CC&Rs that requires such disputes be resolved by alternative dispute resolution.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Bylaws Section 3.14
  • CC&Rs Article XVII

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (open meeting)

Petitioner alleged the May 5, 2008 closed meeting violated open meeting statutes.

Orders: Dismissed; the meeting fell within statutory exceptions.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089001-BFS Decision – 199085.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:34:54 (96.0 KB)

08F-H089001-BFS Decision – 199085.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:36 (96.0 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Lon James v. Corte Bella Country Club Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative law decision (Case No. 08F-H089001-BFS) regarding a dispute between Lon James (Petitioner) and the Corte Bella Country Club Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated community bylaws and Arizona state law by holding a closed Board meeting on May 5, 2008.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Lewis D. Kowal, dismissed the petition in its entirety. The ruling was based on two primary factors:

1. Jurisdictional Preclusion: Claims regarding Bylaw violations were subject to mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as per the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

2. Statutory Compliance: An in camera review of evidence determined that the closed meeting held by the Board fell within the legal exceptions provided by A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically regarding personnel matters and confidential information.

Case Overview and Procedural History

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety under A.R.S. 41-2198.01 (B). The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent held a closed meeting to vote on board realignment, refusing homeowner participation in violation of Community Bylaws (Section 3.14) and A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

08F-H089001-BFS

Petitioner

Lon James

Respondent

Corte Bella Country Club Association

Hearing Date

September 16, 2008

Presiding Judge

Lewis D. Kowal

Final Action

Petition Dismissed

Analysis of Legal Issues and Rulings

1. Alleged Violation of Section 3.14 of Community Bylaws

The Petitioner argued that the Respondent failed to adhere to the open meeting requirements established in the community’s own bylaws.

• Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent moved for dismissal of this claim, citing Article XVII of the CC&Rs, which mandates that disputes relating to the interpretation or enforcement of governing documents must be resolved via ADR.

• Petitioner’s Counter-Argument: The Petitioner contended that ADR provisions only applied to the design or construction of property improvements.

• Judicial Conclusion: The ALJ found that the ADR provisions should be read in the “disjunctive.” The provisions apply not only to construction improvements but also to claims arising from the “interpretation, application or enforcement” of the Respondent’s governing documents. Consequently, the claim was precluded from the administrative hearing.

2. Alleged Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law)

The core of the dispute involved a meeting held on May 5, 2008, from which homeowners were excluded.

• Legal Exceptions: Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), boards may hold closed meetings for specific reasons. The Respondent cited the following exceptions:

◦ A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(2): Pending or contemplated litigation.

◦ A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(3): Personal, health, or financial information about an individual member, employee, or contractor.

◦ A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(4): Matters relating to job performance, compensation, or specific complaints against an individual employee or contractor.

3. Evidentiary Review and Methodology

To determine if the closed meeting was legal without disclosing confidential information to the Petitioner, the ALJ utilized an in camera review process.

• Review of Documents: The Respondent submitted eleven documents under seal. The Respondent argued that presenting this evidence in open court would force the disclosure of information they were legally required to keep confidential.

• Judicial Precedent: The ALJ cited Griffis v. Pinal County and Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. (2006) as guidance for performing an in camera review to balance the principles of public hearings against the necessity of preserving confidentiality.

• Findings: Following the review, the ALJ informed the parties that the meeting was “properly held as a closed meeting” because the purpose fell within at least one of the statutory exceptions.

• Petitioner’s Offer of Proof: The Petitioner was allowed to make an “Offer of Proof” regarding the evidence he would have presented. The ALJ noted that some of the information in the Petitioner’s own offer actually supported the conclusion that the meeting involved a personnel matter, which is a permissible reason for a closed session.

Final Determinations and Financial Rulings

Dismissal of the Petition

The ALJ issued a ruling from the bench dismissing the petition. The Petitioner was not considered the prevailing party and was therefore denied reimbursement for his filing fee.

Request for Attorneys’ Fees

In its response to the petition, the Respondent requested an award for attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The ALJ denied this request based on the following:

• Definition of “Action”: Citing Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., the ALJ noted that an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” in the context of A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

• Governing Documents: The Respondent failed to cite any specific provision within its own governing documents that would provide for an award of fees in such a proceeding.

Final Order

The petition was dismissed. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-2198.04(A), this order constitutes the final administrative decision. While it is not subject to a request for rehearing, it may be appealed to the Superior Court within thirty-five days of service.

Administrative Law Study Guide: Lon James v. Corte Bella Country Club Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law proceedings between Petitioner Lon James and Respondent Corte Bella Country Club Association (No. 08F-H089001-BFS). It examines the legal interpretations of association bylaws, open meeting statutes, and the procedural mechanisms used by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to resolve disputes within a country club association.

Section 1: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source context.

1. What primary allegation did the Petitioner make regarding the board meeting held on May 5, 2008?

2. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge preclude the claim regarding the violation of Section 3.14 of the Bylaws?

3. How did the Respondent’s interpretation of Article XVII of the CC&Rs differ from the Petitioner’s interpretation?

4. What was the Respondent’s justification for requesting an “in camera review” of specific documents?

5. Which Arizona Supreme Court case did the ALJ use as guidance for conducting an in camera review, and what was that case about?

6. According to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), what are the three specific exceptions cited by the Respondent for holding a closed meeting?

7. What is an “Offer of Proof,” and how did the Petitioner’s offer impact the ALJ’s decision?

8. Why did the ALJ determine that the Respondent was not entitled to an award for attorney’s fees?

9. What is the finality status of the Order issued by ALJ Lewis D. Kowal, and is it subject to a rehearing?

10. What are the specific requirements and timelines for a party wishing to appeal this final administrative decision?

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Section 2: Answer Key

1. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent held a closed Board Meeting to discuss and vote on a proposal to realign the Board. He argued that refusing homeowners permission to attend or participate violated Community Bylaws 3.14 and A.R.S. § 33-1804.

2. The ALJ precluded this claim because Article XVII of the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) requires such disputes to be resolved by alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This mandatory provision barred the claim from being adjudicated in the current administrative hearing.

3. The Petitioner argued that the ADR provisions in Article XVII only related to the design or construction of property improvements. The Respondent argued the provisions should be read disjunctively, applying to any claims relating to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the governing documents.

4. The Respondent asserted that the evidence justifying the closed meeting was inextricably intertwined with confidential information that could not be disclosed publicly. They requested an in camera review so the ALJ could verify the meeting’s legality without exposing protected data.

5. The ALJ cited Griffis v. Pinal County and Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. (2006). In that case, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for an in camera review to determine if personal emails on a government system were considered public records.

6. The exceptions included: (2) pending or contemplated litigation; (3) personal, health, or financial information about an individual member, employee, or contractor; and (4) matters relating to job performance, compensation, or specific complaints against an individual employee.

7. An Offer of Proof is a summary of testimonial and documentary evidence a party would have presented; in this case, the Petitioner’s offer actually supported the conclusion that the meeting fell under a personnel matter exception. It did not change the ALJ’s finding that the closed meeting was held in accordance with the law.

8. The ALJ ruled that an administrative proceeding is not an “action” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which is necessary for attorney’s fees to be awardable. Furthermore, the Respondent failed to cite any provision in its own governing documents that provided for such an award in this type of proceeding.

9. The Order is the final administrative decision and is not subject to a request for rehearing under A.R.S. § 41-2198.04(A). It is considered enforceable through contempt of court proceedings.

10. A party may appeal by filing a complaint within thirty-five days of the date the decision was served. Service is considered complete upon personal delivery or five days after the final decision is mailed to the party’s last known address.

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Section 3: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the case details to provide in-depth analysis for the following prompts.

1. Mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): Analyze the significance of the ALJ’s decision to dismiss the Bylaw violation claim based on the CC&Rs. Discuss how the interpretation of “disjunctive” language in governing documents can impact a member’s right to an administrative hearing versus mandatory mediation or arbitration.

2. Transparency vs. Confidentiality: Evaluate the tension between the “open meeting” requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 and the exceptions allowed for board meetings. Discuss whether the in camera review process is an effective compromise for protecting individual privacy while ensuring association accountability.

3. The Role of Judicial Precedent in Administrative Law: Examine how the ALJ utilized Griffis v. Pinal County to justify procedural steps in this case. Why is it important for administrative law judges to look to Supreme Court decisions regarding public records when handling private association disputes?

4. Statutory Interpretation of “Action”: Contrast the legal definitions of an “administrative proceeding” and an “action” as they relate to the recovery of attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. What are the implications for litigants who prevail in one forum versus the other?

5. Burden of Proof and the “Offer of Proof”: Discuss the procedural purpose of an Offer of Proof in a hearing. Analyze the irony in this case where the Petitioner’s own offer of proof reinforced the Respondent’s legal standing regarding the “personnel matter” exception.

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Section 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The Arizona Revised Statute governing the requirement for open meetings within certain associations, including specific legal exceptions.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

A process, such as mediation or arbitration, required by governing documents to resolve disputes outside of traditional court or administrative hearings.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that outline the rules and regulations of a planned community or association.

In Camera Review

A private review of sensitive or confidential documents by a judge in their chambers (or “in chambers”) to determine their relevance or admissibility without disclosing them to the opposing party or the public.

Offer of Proof

A presentation made to the judge for the record when a party is not permitted to introduce certain evidence or testimony, describing what that evidence would have shown.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a petition or legal claim in an administrative hearing (in this case, Lon James).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or legal claim is filed (in this case, Corte Bella Country Club Association).

Under Seal

Records or documents that are kept confidential and are not available for public inspection, often used during an in camera review.

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal proceeding that wins the case; here, the ALJ determined the Petitioner was not the prevailing party and thus not entitled to fee reimbursement.

Disjunctive

A grammatical or legal term indicating that items in a list (often separated by “or”) should be considered separately or as alternatives rather than collectively.

Behind Closed Doors: What a Recent Arizona HOA Ruling Reveals About Your Rights as a Homeowner

Most homeowners buy into a community under the comforting illusion that their dues purchase a front-row seat to the governance of their neighborhood. There is a common expectation that transparency is the default setting and that “open meeting” laws provide an unbreakable shield against secret governance.

In the arena of HOA law, however, transparency is often the first casualty of a well-drafted executive session. The case of Lon James vs. Corte Bella Country Club Association serves as a sobering cautionary tale of a “legal lockout.” When James challenged a closed-door meeting held to “realign the board,” he discovered that the legal framework governing HOAs often prioritizes board confidentiality over homeowner participation, leaving residents on the outside looking in.

This ruling highlights four critical takeaways that reveal just how tilted the playing field can be when a homeowner dares to challenge the association’s inner workings.

Takeaway 1: The “Open Meeting” Law Has Serious Loopholes

While A.R.S. § 33-1804 generally mandates that board meetings remain open to all members, the law provides broad exceptions that act as a legal shield for boards. In the Corte Bella case, the board met privately to discuss a proposal to “realign the board.” To a homeowner, a structural change in leadership sounds like a matter of public interest. To the law, however, it is frequently a protected personnel matter.

The ultimate irony in this case? The Petitioner’s own “Offer of Proof”—the evidence he intended to use to win—actually backfired. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) noted that James’s own testimony unintentionally supported the HOA’s claim that the meeting was legally closed as a personnel matter. It is a high-value lesson for any litigant: sometimes your own evidence proves the board’s right to exclude you.

Takeaway 2: The Judge Can See Evidence You Can’t (The In Camera Review)

One of the most significant tactical disadvantages a homeowner faces is the “In Camera Review.” To determine if the board’s secrecy was justified, the judge reviewed 11 sealed documents privately. James was never allowed to see the very evidence being used to dismiss his case.

This “secret” review is not an automatic right for associations; it is a hard-fought legal maneuver. In fact, the ALJ initially refused the HOA’s request for the review. It was only after a persuasive oral argument that the judge pivoted, balancing public hearing principles against the board’s need for confidentiality. Using the precedent of Griffis v. Pinal County, the court confirmed that a judge can review documents behind a “black box” to determine if they fall under public record exceptions. For the homeowner, this means fighting an opponent when the most critical evidence is invisible to you.

Takeaway 3: Your Right to Sue May Be Precluded by Your Own CC&Rs

Before you ever get to argue the merits of your case, you must survive the trapdoors buried in your own governing documents. In this case, James’s claim regarding a violation of Section 3.14 of the Bylaws was dismissed before it even reached the hearing stage.

The HOA successfully argued that Article XVII of the CC&Rs mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The judge applied a “disjunctive” reading of the law—meaning that because the document used the word “or,” the ADR requirement wasn’t restricted to hammers-and-nails construction issues. Instead, it applied to any claim relating to the interpretation or application of the governing documents. This is a common “ADR trap”: if your CC&Rs are written this way, your path to a standard administrative hearing is effectively blocked.

Action Item: Review your CC&Rs specifically for “disjunctive” language in your ADR or arbitration clauses. If the clause applies to construction or interpretation, you may be signing away your right to a public day in court.

Takeaway 4: Winning Doesn’t Mean Your Legal Bills Are Paid

In the administrative arena, victory often feels like a hollow financial win. In the Corte Bella ruling, even though the HOA successfully defended its actions and saw the petition dismissed, the judge denied their request for attorney’s fees.

The reasoning is a technicality that every homeowner should memorize: an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” under Arizona law. Therefore, the statutes that typically allow a winner to recover fees in a contract-related lawsuit simply do not apply. This creates an administrative dead-end where both sides typically bear their own costs regardless of the outcome, making these battles a “lose-lose” for the bank accounts of both the individual and the community at large.

Conclusion: The Price of Participation

The Corte Bella ruling reinforces the substantial power HOA boards wield. By utilizing statutory exceptions, securing private judicial reviews, and leaning on mandatory ADR clauses, boards can effectively shield their most critical decisions from member oversight.

This leaves us with a difficult reality regarding the price of participation. If the most significant board decisions—those involving board realignment, litigation, and personnel—are legally permitted to occur behind closed doors, how can homeowners truly ensure accountability? Understanding these legal boundaries isn’t just about winning a case; it’s about recognizing the steep climb required to see what’s happening behind the curtain.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lon James (Petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Angela Potts (Respondent Attorney)
    Ekmark & Ekmart, LLC
    Esq.

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on mailing/service list
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on mailing/service list

Bittner, Elmer -v- Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H088018-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-09-02
Administrative Law Judge Brian Brendan Tully
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Elmer Bittner Counsel —
Respondent Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association Counsel Franklyn D. Jeans, Esq. and Nicole S. Cassett, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Declaration Paragraph 32.6

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Association's governing documents did not authorize unequal assessments based on garage size. The Association was ordered to cease the practice and refund the Petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Unequal Assessments based on garage size

Petitioner challenged the Association's practice of charging higher assessments for units with 2-car garages compared to 1-car garages. The Respondent admitted the governing documents did not support this allocation.

Orders: Respondent shall abide by its governing documents in future assessments of Unit owners irrespective of the size of a Unit owner's garage unless documents are amended.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198
  • Declaration Paragraph 32.6

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H088018-BFS Decision – 197550.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:34:47 (102.0 KB)

08F-H088018-BFS Decision – 197550.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:30 (102.0 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Bittner vs. Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative law judge (ALJ) decision in the matter of Elmer Bittner vs. Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association (Case No. 08F-H088018-BFS). The dispute centered on whether the Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association (Respondent) possessed the legal authority under its governing documents to charge unequal common element dues based on the number of garage spaces in a unit.

The ALJ determined that the Respondent’s governing documents do not authorize tiered assessments based on garage size. Despite the Respondent’s long-standing practice of charging higher rates for two-car garage units, the court found no legal basis for this distinction in the Association’s Declaration or subsequent amendments. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to cease unequal assessments and reimburse the Petitioner for his filing fees.

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Case Overview and Jurisdiction

Parties Involved

• Petitioner: Elmer Bittner, owner of a residence with a two-car garage within the Greenfield Glen development in Mesa, Arizona.

• Respondent: Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association, an entity whose powers are subject to specific governing documents and Arizona law.

Statutory Authority

The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B), which authorizes the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety to receive petitions regarding disputes between homeowners’ associations and their members. The jurisdiction of the Office is limited to ensuring compliance with A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16 and the specific planned community documents of the association.

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The Core Dispute: Unequal Assessments

The Petitioner challenged a dues structure that had been in place since approximately March 22, 1988. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated the condominium and community documents by implementing the following monthly rate disparity:

Unit Type

Common Element Dues

2-Car Garage Unit

$70.58

1-Car Garage Unit

$57.75

Procedural Limitation

The ALJ ruled that the Petition could only address issues occurring after September 21, 2006, the effective date of the relevant statutes (A.R.S. § 41-2198, et seq.). The central legal question was narrowed to whether the Respondent’s governing documents provided the authority since September 2006 to assess owners at different rates based on garage capacity.

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Analysis of Governing Documents

The ALJ reviewed several key documents to determine the Respondent’s authority:

1. Original Declaration (1985): The Declaration of Horizontal Property Regime and Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

2. Amendments (1986, 1989, 1994): Various recorded amendments to the original Declaration.

3. Clarification and Amendment Agreement (1987): Specifically, the addition of Paragraph 32.6.

Findings Regarding Paragraph 32.6

The Respondent cited Paragraph 32.6 as a potential source of authority. However, the ALJ’s analysis found this paragraph irrelevant to the current assessment practice:

• Scope: Paragraph 32.6 pertains specifically to the “Platting of Additional Property.”

• Purpose: It outlines how the “share of Common Expenses” should be calculated for units added to the Declaration at a later date, providing a formula for pro-rata portions if the number of units added differs from the original platting plan.

• Application: The document specifies that the calculation examples provided were intended only to illustrate the method for calculating assessments for added units and were not intended to reflect actual dollar amounts or general assessment practices for existing units.

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Respondent’s Admissions and Internal Challenges

In its answer to the complaint, the Respondent made several critical admissions that undermined its legal position:

• Lack of Support: The Respondent admitted that the Petitioner’s claim regarding unequal assessments was “endemic of a problem” and that the practice was not supported by Section 32.6 or any other provision in the Declaration.

• Loss of Institutional Knowledge: The Respondent stated that “no one currently serving on the Board of Directors… or Unit owners available to the Board can explain what Section 32.6 was intended to cover or how it was intended to be applied.”

• Attempted Reformation: The Board indicated they were attempting to pass an amendment to align the Declaration with past assessment practices. However, they expressed “fear” that the amendment would not pass, as it requires a 75% favorable vote of all unit owners.

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Conclusions of Law and Final Order

Legal Conclusions

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner carried the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

2. Unauthorized Assessments: The Respondent’s governing documents do not grant the authority to impose unequal assessments based on whether a unit has a one-car or two-car garage.

3. Compliance: The Respondent must abide by its governing documents, which, in their current state, require equal assessments.

Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following mandates:

• Cease Unequal Assessments: The Respondent must assess all unit owners equally, regardless of garage size, unless and until the governing documents are legally amended to provide for unequal assessments.

• Reimbursement of Fees: As the prevailing party, the Petitioner is entitled to the recovery of his filing fee. The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner $550.00 within 30 days of the decision (September 2, 2008).

• Finality: This decision is the final administrative action and is enforceable through contempt of court proceedings.

Study Guide: Elmer Bittner vs. Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Elmer Bittner and the Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association. It examines the legal dispute regarding assessment dues, the interpretation of governing documents, and the final decision rendered by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

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Review Quiz

1. What was the core allegation made by Elmer Bittner in his petition against the Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association? Elmer Bittner alleged that the Association changed common element dues from an equal rate to an unequal rate based on garage size. Specifically, he challenged the assessment of $70.58 for units with two-car garages compared to $57.75 for units with one-car garages, arguing this violated the condominium’s governing documents and Arizona law.

2. Which state agencies were involved in the processing and adjudication of this dispute? The Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety is authorized by statute to receive petitions regarding disputes between homeowner associations and their members. Once received, these petitions are forwarded to the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent agency, for a formal hearing and decision.

3. Why was the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s review limited to issues occurring after September 21, 2006? The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the petition could not address issues predating the effective date of A.R.S. § 41-2198, et seq. Because this specific statute became effective on September 21, 2006, the judge narrowed the dispute to whether the Association had the authority to assess unequal rates from that date forward.

4. According to the Findings of Fact, what are the primary governing documents of the Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association? The governing documents include the original 1985 Declaration of Horizontal Property Regime and Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, as well as several amendments. These amendments were recorded in Maricopa County in February 1986, August 1987, August 1989, and December 1994.

5. How did the 1987 Clarification and Amendment Agreement (Paragraph 32.6) describe the calculation of assessments for added units? Paragraph 32.6 stated that the share of common expenses for units added to the Declaration must be equal to the pro rata portion that would have been borne if the property had been platted according to the original Exhibit “B.” It provided a mathematical example showing that if a parcel intended for 21 units was replatted for 14, the expenses would be redistributed so the total amount collected remained consistent with the original plan.

6. What admission did the Respondent make in its Answer regarding the practice of unequal assessments? The Association admitted that it had levied unequal assessments based on garage spaces for a number of years. However, it explicitly stated that this practice was not supported by Section 32.6 or any other provision in the Declaration, and that current board members could not explain the original intent of that section.

7. What plan did the Association’s Board of Directors outline to resolve the discrepancy between their practices and the Declaration? The Board planned to submit an amendment to the Unit owners to align the Declaration with past assessment practices. If the required seventy-five percent favorable vote was not obtained, the Board intended to appeal to the Superior Court of Maricopa County to reform the Declaration.

8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this administrative matter, and who carries it? Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner (Elmer Bittner) carries the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to prevail in the matter is a preponderance of the evidence.

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final legal conclusion regarding the Association’s authority to charge different rates? The judge concluded that the Respondent’s governing documents, including the specific language in paragraph 32.6, did not grant the Association the authority to impose unequal assessments based on garage size. Consequently, the Association was ordered to abide by its documents and assess units equally in the future.

10. Aside from the change in future assessment practices, what financial restitution was ordered? Because the Petitioner was the prevailing party, the judge ordered the Respondent to pay the Petitioner his $550.00 filing fee. This payment was required to be made within 30 days of the date of the decision.

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Answer Key

1. Answer: The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated governing documents by charging higher common element dues for two-car garage units (70.58)thanforone−cargarageunits(57.75).

2. Answer: The Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety (received the petition) and the Office of Administrative Hearings (conducted the formal hearing).

3. Answer: The statute granting the authority for such administrative hearings (A.R.S. § 41-2198) did not become effective until September 21, 2006.

4. Answer: The 1985 Declaration and four subsequent amendments/agreements dated 1986, 1987, 1989, and 1994.

5. Answer: Assessments for added property must be a pro rata portion of common expenses based on the original platting density; if fewer units are built than originally planned, each unit pays a higher share to cover the total expenses.

6. Answer: The Association admitted that unequal assessments were “endemic of a problem” and conceded that no provision in the Declaration actually supported the practice.

7. Answer: They attempted to pass an amendment requiring 75% approval and, if that failed, planned to seek a court-ordered reformation of the Declaration.

8. Answer: The Petitioner carries the burden of proof, and the standard is “preponderance of the evidence.”

9. Answer: The judge found that the governing documents did not authorize unequal assessments and ordered the Association to cease the practice until or unless the documents are legally amended.

10. Answer: The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $550.00 filing fee within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

1. Statutory Limitations on Administrative Relief: Discuss the implications of the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling to exclude issues predating September 21, 2006. How does the effective date of a statute (like A.R.S. § 41-2198) impact the ability of a homeowner to seek redress for long-standing association practices?

2. Interpretation of Governing Documents: Analyze the Association’s admission that its assessment practices were not supported by its own Declaration. Why is strict adherence to the written Declaration critical in the management of a homeowners association, and what are the risks of “past assessment practices” that deviate from these documents?

3. The Complexity of Paragraph 32.6: Explain the logic of the “pro rata portion” calculation described in the 1987 Amendment. How does this provision attempt to protect the Association’s budget when the density of a development changes, and why was it insufficient to justify the garage-based assessments in this case?

4. The Amendment Process and Legal Reformation: The Association expressed fear that a 75% vote for an amendment would not pass. Compare the process of member-led amendments to the legal process of “reforming” a Declaration through the Superior Court. What are the democratic and legal hurdles involved in each?

5. The Role of the Petitioner in Administrative Law: Evaluate the role of Elmer Bittner as the Petitioner. Given that he had the legal recourse to sue since 1988 but waited until 2008, discuss how the administrative hearing process provides a different or more accessible avenue for justice compared to traditional litigation.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 41-2198

The Arizona Revised Statute that authorizes the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety to receive petitions regarding HOA disputes.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over hearings and makes decisions in disputes involving government agencies.

Assessment

The amount of money a homeowner is required to pay to the association for common expenses and maintenance.

Common Expenses

The costs associated with the operation, maintenance, and repair of the common elements of a condominium or planned community.

Declaration

The primary governing document (CC&Rs) that outlines the rights and responsibilities of the association and the unit owners.

Horizontal Property Regime

A legal structure for property ownership, commonly used for condominiums, where individuals own units and share common areas.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition (in this case, Elmer Bittner).

Platting / Replatting

The process of creating or changing a map (plat) showing the divisions of a piece of land into individual units or lots.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning that the claim is more likely to be true than not true.

Pro Rata

A proportional allocation or distribution based on a specific factor (such as the number of units).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed (in this case, the Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association).

The 20-Year “Garage Tax”: What One Arizona Homeowner’s Victory Teaches Us About HOA Power

The Hook: The Hidden Cost of Living in an Association

For most residents of planned communities, monthly Homeowners Association (HOA) dues are accepted as a necessary evil—the price of admission for clean streets and shared amenities. We pay them under a contract of trust, assuming the Board is following the law. But what happens when that trust is broken by a David-versus-Goliath struggle against institutional overreach?

Elmer Bittner, a resident of the Greenfield Glen Homeowners Association in Mesa, Arizona, looked at his bill and realized something was fundamentally wrong. For years, he and other residents were being subjected to what can only be described as “unauthorized taxation.” Bittner discovered he was being charged significantly higher monthly dues than his neighbors for one reason: he had a two-car garage. This discovery sparked a legal showdown at the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings that exposed how easily an HOA can drift into illegal financial practices under the guise of “tradition.”

Takeaway 1: Longevity Does Not Equal Legality

One of the most alarming aspects of Bittner v. Greenfield Glen is the sheer duration of the injustice. The unequal assessment practice began on March 22, 1988, yet it took until 2008 for a legal ruling to stop it. This 20-year “garage tax” persisted because of institutional inertia—the dangerous tendency of homeowners to assume a rule is valid simply because “that’s the way it’s always been.”

While the unfairness spanned two decades, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) highlighted a critical hurdle for civic-minded homeowners: the law often has a short memory. The ALJ ruled that the case could only address issues arising after September 21, 2006—the effective date of A.R.S. § 41-2198. This serves as a vital lesson: your right to challenge HOA overreach often depends on specific, modern legal tools that may not have existed when the original “tradition” began. The financial discrepancy was stark:

Takeaway 2: The “We Don’t Know Why” Defense

When forced to justify why they were overcharging residents, the Association’s defense was a masterclass in absurdity. In Section 14 of the Findings of Fact, the Board essentially admitted they were enforcing a financial penalty that they themselves did not understand.

The Association attempted to hide behind “Section 32.6” of the governing documents. However, a deeper look at the 1987 Clarification and Amendment Agreement reveals that Section 32.6 was actually titled “Platting of Additional Property.” It was a clause meant to handle the shapes and sizes of units when adding new land to the development—not a license to charge different rates for garage space. The Association’s own admission in their Answer to the Complaint was a stunning display of incompetence:

For a governing body to demand money based on a clause they cannot explain is more than just a mistake; it is a breach of fiduciary duty.

Takeaway 3: The Governing Documents Are Final (Until They Aren’t)

The ALJ made it clear: an HOA must abide by its written documents, regardless of past practices. The Board at Greenfield Glen knew they were on shaky ground and attempted to “align” the documents with their illegal practices through a post-facto amendment. However, they faced a terrifying hurdle: the requirement for a 75% favorable vote of all Unit owners (voting or not).

This “voting or not” provision is a trap for modern homeowners. In this system, a neighbor’s apathy—simply failing to return a ballot—is legally recorded as a “No” vote. This makes reforming even an illegal practice nearly impossible. Rather than admitting fault when the vote seemed likely to fail, the Board planned a secondary aggressive maneuver: they intended to “appeal to the Superior Court… to reform the Declaration.” Essentially, the Board was prepared to spend the community’s own money on high-stakes litigation to force a legal change that would have validated their past unauthorized assessments.

Takeaway 4: The Small Victories Matter

The ruling was a definitive win for homeowner rights. The ALJ didn’t just suggest a change; he issued a mandate. The Association was ordered to cease unequal assessments and refund Bittner’s $550 filing fee.

For the individual homeowner, these administrative hearings are a powerful equalizer. They offer a venue to seek justice without the crushing initial costs of a Superior Court lawsuit. Perhaps most importantly, the ALJ’s decision has “teeth.” The order specifically notes that it is “enforceable through contempt of court proceedings.” This means that if an HOA decides to ignore the ruling and continue its unauthorized taxation, the Board could face the full weight of the judicial system.

Conclusion: A Final Thought for the Modern Homeowner

The victory of Elmer Bittner is a testament to the power of a single homeowner with a copy of the Declaration and the courage to ask “why?” It highlights a disturbing reality: many HOAs operate on a foundation of “tradition” and “past practice” that contradicts the very laws they are sworn to uphold.

If you looked at your HOA’s founding documents today, would the fees you pay actually be in writing, or are you paying for a tradition that doesn’t legally exist?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Elmer Bittner (petitioner)
    Appeared personally

Respondent Side

  • Franklyn D. Jeans (HOA attorney)
    Beus Gilbert, PLC
  • Nicole S. Cassett (HOA attorney)
    Beus Gilbert, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Brian Brendan Tully (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on mailing distribution
  • Debra Blake (Agency staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on mailing distribution