Case Summary
| Case ID | 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG |
|---|---|
| Agency | ADRE |
| Tribunal | OAH |
| Decision Date | 2019-04-22 |
| Administrative Law Judge | Velva Moses-Thompson |
| Outcome | loss |
| Filing Fees Refunded | $0.00 |
| Civil Penalties | $0.00 |
Parties & Counsel
| Petitioner | William P. Lee | Counsel | — |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent | Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two | Counsel | Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq. |
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.
Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.
Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
- A.R.S. § 33-1803
- A.R.S. § 33-1809
Analytics Highlights
- A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
- A.R.S. § 33-1803
- A.R.S. § 33-1809
- A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
- A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
- A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
- Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
- MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
- BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
- Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
- Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf
19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf
Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.
Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.
Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.
Case Overview
Case Name
William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
Case Number
19F-H1918019-REL
Jurisdiction
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Petitioner
William P. Lee
Respondent
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)
Key Dates
– Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
– Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
– Rehearing: April 1, 2019
– Final Decision: April 22, 2019
Core Allegation
The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”
Analysis of Governing Documents
The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
• Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”
• Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.
Amendment
Provision
Amendment #1
Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.
Amendment #2
Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.
Amendment #3
Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.
Rules and Regulations
• 2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.
• May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:
Association Bylaws (1986)
• Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.
Key Arguments Presented
Petitioner (William P. Lee)
• Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.
• Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.
• Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.
• Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.
• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.
Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)
• Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.
• Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.
• No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.
• Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.
• Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.
Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale
The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
• Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.
• Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.
• Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”
Final Disposition
Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”
The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.
Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA
This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?
2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?
3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?
4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?
5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?
6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?
7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?
8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?
9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.
2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.
3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.
4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.
5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.
6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.
7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.
8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.
9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.
10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?
4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.
5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Answer (Legal)
A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.
Bylaws
The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.
Common Area
Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.
Homeowners’ Association (HOA)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.
Petition
A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.
Rules and Regulations
A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.
5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking
For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?
William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.
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1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned
Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.
The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.
The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.
2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations
Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.
The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”
The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.
3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment
Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.
The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.
The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.
4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns
The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:
Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.
The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.
The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.
5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence
In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”
He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.
The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.
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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner
The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.
This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- William P. Lee (petitioner)
Testified on behalf of himself,
Respondent Side
- Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Appeared on behalf of Respondent - Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing, - Barbara (board member)
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy
Neutral Parties
- Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing, - Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,
