Caroline Brown v. Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc.: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

CC&Rs & Insurance Covenants | Breach of Contract | CV2011-008669

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a homeowner argued her association breached the community’s Declaration by procuring a blanket insurance policy whose repair proceeds were not made payable to the unit owner and the association jointly, as the CC&Rs required. The court held the association’s breach was clear — it was no defense that the insurance company, not the association, decided how the checks would be issued — while the owner’s separate unjust-enrichment claim against the repair contractor failed because any enrichment did not come at her expense. Liability was decided on summary judgment; the case settled before a damages trial.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Caroline Brown v. Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C., et al. (Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc.), Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-008669.

Scope note: This page covers Caroline Brown v. Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C., et al. — including defendant Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (“CVIA”) — Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-008669, as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the November 30, 2011 under-advisement ruling on the defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings and the June 25, 2012 under-advisement ruling granting the homeowner partial summary judgment on contract liability; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated October 30, 2013, records that the court was advised the case had settled and placed the matter on the inactive calendar for dismissal on December 23, 2013; the settlement terms and any final dismissal order are not part of the collected minutes, so damages were never adjudicated. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the homeowner partial summary judgment on contract liability against the association. There was no dispute that the community’s Declaration required CVIA to “procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the Owners” such that “proceeds payable from [it] shall be payable to the Unit Owner and the Association jointly,” and CVIA did not argue that it had done so. The court held it was no defense that CAU — the insurance company — rather than CVIA decided how the checks would be issued: it was CVIA’s obligation to make sure, if necessary by express contract language, that checks would issue as the Declaration required, and if CAU would not agree there were many other insurance companies. In the court’s words, “CVIA’s breach is clear.” The owner’s separate unjust-enrichment claim against the repair contractor, Pinnacle Restoration, was rejected on the pleadings because any enrichment was not at her expense, and the contractor was awarded $12,500 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The case settled in October 2013 before damages against the association were tried.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Caroline Brown (Plaintiff)
    Unit owner in the Camelback Village community who paid insurance premiums to the association and had to contract for work as a result of the contractor’s alleged nonperformance; won partial summary judgment on contract liability against the association in June 2012.
  • Mark DePasquale (Counsel)
    Counsel for Plaintiff Caroline Brown throughout the case, appearing at the November 2011 and June 2012 oral arguments and the case-management conferences.

Respondent Side

  • Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (CVIA) (Defendant)
    Community association whose Declaration (CC&Rs) required it to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners, with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly; held in breach of that covenant on summary judgment.
  • Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. (Defendant)
    Contractor engaged to perform covered repairs; won judgment on the pleadings on the owner’s unjust-enrichment claim in November 2011 and was awarded $12,500 in attorneys’ fees plus $241 in costs. Its dismissal was later taken up on appeal, and the trial court vacated the July 2013 trial so all claims could potentially be tried together.
  • Erin E. McManis (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. at the November 23, 2011 oral argument and the April 16, 2012 status conference.
  • Thomas P. Burke II (Counsel)
    Counsel for Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. from the June 2012 summary-judgment argument through the 2013 trial-setting conferences.
  • Elizabeth L. Fleming (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. on behalf of Thomas Burke II at the June 18, 2013 status conference.
  • Patrick J. Van Zanen (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Defendant Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. at the November 23, 2011 oral argument on the motions for judgment on the pleadings.
  • Brian D. Myers (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Defendant Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. at the June and July 2013 status conferences.

Neutral Parties

  • Dean M. Fink (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the November 2011 judgment-on-the-pleadings ruling, the June 2012 partial-summary-judgment ruling, the fee award, and the motion-in-limine rulings.
  • Michael Barth (Commissioner)
    Superior-court commissioner to whom the May 2011 Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings were assigned; the collected minutes show both defendants going on to litigate the case.

What happened

Caroline Brown owned a unit in the Camelback Village community, governed by Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (“CVIA”) under the community’s CC&Rs. According to the complaint as recited in the court’s rulings, CVIA had the right, which it exercised, to “procure a blanket insurance policy [which] shall insure each of the Units within the Properties,” and the Declaration required that proceeds payable from that policy be payable to the unit owner and the association jointly. Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. was contracted to perform covered repairs. Brown sued both CVIA and Pinnacle in 2011, and in May 2011 applied for default judgments against each; the court routed those applications to Commissioner Michael Barth’s default-judgment process, and both defendants went on to litigate the case.

Both defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Judge Dean M. Fink heard argument on November 23, 2011. In a November 30, 2011 under-advisement ruling the court split the case. Pinnacle won: Brown’s unjust-enrichment claim failed because a defendant must be enriched at the claimant’s expense, and any enrichment here “was by the CVIA and/or its insurer, not by Ms. Brown” — her impoverishment from having to contract for work after Pinnacle’s alleged nonperformance did not enrich Pinnacle, and her insurance premiums went to CVIA, not the contractor. An alternative third-party-beneficiary theory could not be considered because it was never pled. CVIA lost its motion: while a “blanket” policy is a single policy on the entirety — so individual owners could not each be named insureds — the CC&Rs still obligated CVIA to insure the individual owners and to make proceeds payable to them and the association “jointly,” and to that extent the complaint stated a breach-of-contract claim. The duplicative good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim was left in, and the court declined to resolve on the pleadings whether CVIA owed Brown a fiduciary duty.

The Pinnacle side of the case then wound down at the trial level. The court denied Brown’s motion for new trial on March 6, 2012, explaining that her theory depended “not on what the insurance policy under which Pinnacle was contracted said, but on what it should have said,” and that it was unrealistic to impute to “a simple contractor” knowledge of CVIA’s specific contractual obligations to her. On April 11, 2012 the court awarded Pinnacle $12,500 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 — some, but not all, of what it requested under the Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warner factors — plus $241 in taxable costs, and a judgment in Pinnacle’s favor was signed on June 4, 2012.

Meanwhile Brown moved for partial summary judgment on contract liability against CVIA. The court gave CVIA a Rule 56(f) continuance to take discovery before responding, then heard argument on June 18, 2012 — declining to consider CVIA’s untimely supplemental response. In the June 25, 2012 under-advisement ruling, the court granted the motion. There was no dispute the Declaration required CVIA to procure a blanket policy insuring the owners with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly, and CVIA did not argue that it did so. Nor was it a defense that CAU — the insurance company — and not CVIA decided how the checks were issued: it was CVIA’s obligation to make sure, “if necessary by including express language in the contract,” that checks would issue as the Declaration required, and “if CAU would not agree, there are many other insurance companies.” The court concluded: “CVIA’s breach is clear.”

With liability established, the case moved toward a damages trial. A four-day jury trial was set for July 30 through August 2, 2013, but on June 18, 2013 the court vacated it after discussing the Court of Appeals’ decision on Pinnacle’s unjust-enrichment claim and the possibility of resetting the trial so all claims could be tried at one time; at a July 1, 2013 conference the court was advised Pinnacle would be filing a Petition for Review, and the jury trial was reset for December 10 through 13, 2013. An August 15, 2013 ruling on motions in limine framed the damages issues: CVIA was liable for the consequential damages of its breach, so Brown could not recover for work she chose to undertake “outside what should have been in CVIA’s policy” — but whether the money she used came from another insurance company, such as the Farmers payments at issue in the motion, or out of her own pocket was immaterial. The court granted the motion as to Mutual Management and CAU and denied it as to Pinnacle.

The trial never happened. On October 30, 2013 the court was advised the case had settled. It placed the matter on the inactive calendar for dismissal on December 23, 2013 unless a judgment or stipulation for dismissal was filed first, deemed all pending motions moot, and vacated the December trial and the final trial-management conference. The settlement terms do not appear in the collected minute entries.

Procedural timeline

Step 2011-05-20 / 2011-05-23 Brown applies for default judgments against Pinnacle Restoration and CVIA; the court routes the applications to Commissioner Michael Barth’s Rule 55(b) default process. Both defendants go on to litigate.
Step 2011-10-04 The court orders a mandatory settlement conference and refers the case to the ADR office for appointment of a judge pro tempore.
Step 2011-11-23 Oral argument on Pinnacle’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and CVIA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; matter taken under advisement.
Step 2011-11-30 Under-advisement ruling: Pinnacle’s motion granted — unjust enrichment fails because any enrichment was by CVIA and/or its insurer, not at Brown’s expense; CVIA’s motion denied — the complaint states a claim that CVIA breached the CC&Rs’ blanket-insurance and joint-payment obligations.
Step 2012-03-06 Brown’s motion for new trial on the Pinnacle ruling is denied; her theory rested on what the policy “should have said,” which did not implicate the contractor.
Step 2012-03-26 CVIA is granted a Rule 56(f) continuance to take discovery before responding to Brown’s motion for partial summary judgment; oral argument set for June 18, 2012.
Step 2012-04-11 The court awards Pinnacle $12,500 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and $241 in taxable costs against Brown.
Step 2012-06-04 Judgment in favor of Pinnacle Restoration is signed (noted in the June 14, 2012 minute entry).
Step 2012-06-18 Oral argument on Brown’s motion for partial summary judgment on contract liability against CVIA; the court declines to consider CVIA’s untimely supplemental response and takes the matter under advisement.
Step 2012-06-25 Under-advisement ruling grants Brown partial summary judgment on contract liability: CVIA did not argue it procured the required blanket policy with proceeds payable jointly, and “CVIA’s breach is clear.”
Step 2012-12-03 A four-day jury trial is set for July 30 – August 2, 2013.
Step 2013-06-18 The court vacates the July 2013 trial after discussing the Court of Appeals’ decision on Pinnacle’s unjust-enrichment claim and the possibility of trying all claims together.
Step 2013-07-01 The court is advised Pinnacle will be filing a Petition for Review; the jury trial is reset for December 10–13, 2013.
Step 2013-08-15 Motion-in-limine ruling frames damages: CVIA is liable for consequential damages of its breach; work outside what the policy should have covered is not recoverable, but the source of Brown’s funds (another insurer or her own pocket) is immaterial.
Step 2013-10-30 The court is advised the case has settled; the matter is placed on the inactive calendar for dismissal on December 23, 2013, pending motions are deemed moot, and the December trial is vacated.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/caroline-brown-v-camelback-village-improvement-association/raw/: 26 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2011-05-20

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 2 2011-05-23

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 3 2011-08-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2011-10-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 5 2011-10-07

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 6 2011-10-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 7 2011-11-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 8 2011-11-30

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 9 2012-02-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 10 2012-02-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 11 2012-03-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2012-03-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2012-03-26

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 14 2012-03-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 15 2012-04-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 16 2012-04-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 17 2012-06-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 18 2012-06-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 19 2012-06-25

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 20 2012-10-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 21 2012-12-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 22 2013-06-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 23 2013-07-01

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 24 2013-08-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 25 2013-08-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 26 2013-10-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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FAQ

What exactly did the association do wrong?

The community’s Declaration required CVIA to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners, with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly. In the June 25, 2012 ruling the court noted CVIA did not argue that it had done so, and rejected its defense that the insurance company (CAU) — not the association — decided how the checks were issued. It was the association’s obligation to make sure, if necessary by express contract language, that checks would issue as the Declaration required; if the insurer would not agree, the court observed, “there are many other insurance companies.” On that record, “CVIA’s breach is clear.”

Did the homeowner win the case?

She won on liability against the association: the June 2012 ruling established as a matter of law that CVIA breached the CC&Rs. But damages were never decided by a court — the case settled in October 2013 before the December 2013 jury trial, and the settlement terms are not in the minute entries. Against the contractor, Pinnacle Restoration, she lost at the trial level and was ordered to pay $12,500 of Pinnacle’s attorneys’ fees plus $241 in costs, although that dismissal was later the subject of a Court of Appeals decision and a planned Petition for Review whose outcomes are not stated in the collected minutes.

What is a “blanket” insurance policy, according to the court?

In its November 30, 2011 ruling the court explained that a blanket policy “is a single policy covering the entirety, not a conglomeration of policies each covering one unit.” Because owners have no insurable interest in each other’s units, they cannot each be named insureds on the single policy — but that did not excuse the association from its separate CC&R obligations to insure the individual owners and to make proceeds payable to the owner and the association jointly.

Why did the claim against the repair contractor fail?

Brown sued Pinnacle Restoration for unjust enrichment, but the court held that a defendant must be unjustly enriched at the claimant’s expense. Any enrichment from Pinnacle’s alleged failure to perform flowed to CVIA and/or its insurer, not from Brown, and her insurance premiums were paid to CVIA, not to the contractor. The court also declined to consider a third-party-beneficiary theory because it was never pled, and on the motion for new trial it added that Brown’s argument depended on what the insurance contract “should have said” — something that could not be imputed to “a simple contractor.”

What damages could the homeowner have recovered from the association?

The August 15, 2013 motion-in-limine ruling drew the line: CVIA was liable for the consequential damages of its breach, so damages deriving from Brown’s decision to undertake work outside what should have been in CVIA’s policy were not recoverable. At the same time, where the money came from was immaterial — whether Brown funded her share through another insurance company (the ruling addressed Farmers Insurance payments) or out of her own pocket did not reduce CVIA’s liability. The case settled before a jury put a number on those damages.

Is this ruling binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent, and this case ended in a settlement rather than a final trial judgment. It is still instructive reading: it shows a court taking a CC&R insurance covenant literally — the association had to deliver exactly the joint-payment arrangement the Declaration promised — and refusing to let the association shift responsibility to its insurance company.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2011-008669 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateJune 25, 2012
Judge / panelHon. Dean M. Fink
PartiesCaroline Brown (Plaintiff, unit owner) v. Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (Defendant) and Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. (Defendant, repair contractor)
Governing law
Topics
cc-and-rsattorneys-feesprocedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted the unit owner partial summary judgment on contract liability against the association, holding that the Declaration undisputedly required CVIA to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly, that CVIA did not argue it had done so, and that it was no defense that the insurance company rather than the association decided how the checks were issued — “CVIA’s breach is clear.” The court separately granted the repair contractor judgment on the pleadings on the owner’s unjust-enrichment claim and awarded it attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package26 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap15 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A unit owner in the Camelback Village community sued her association (CVIA) and the contractor hired to perform covered repairs, Pinnacle Restoration, over how insurance proceeds for repair work were handled. The community’s Declaration required CVIA to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners, with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly. In a November 30, 2011 under-advisement ruling on the defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings, the court dismissed the owner’s unjust-enrichment claim against the contractor — any enrichment was by the association and/or its insurer, not at her expense — while holding the complaint stated a breach-of-contract claim against the association. In a June 25, 2012 under-advisement ruling the court granted the owner partial summary judgment on contract liability: CVIA did not argue it had procured the required policy, and it was no defense that the insurance company (CAU) decided how checks were issued, because it was CVIA’s obligation to make sure checks issued as the Declaration required. “CVIA’s breach is clear.” The contractor recovered $12,500 in fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01; an appeal over its dismissal led the court to vacate the July 2013 trial, and the case settled in October 2013 before damages were tried.

Key Issues & Findings

The November 30, 2011 judgment-on-the-pleadings ruling split the case between the two defendants. Against Pinnacle Restoration, the unjust-enrichment claim failed because it is not enough that a defendant is enriched — it must be enriched at the claimant’s expense (citing Western Corrections Group, Inc. v. Tierney). Any enrichment from Pinnacle’s alleged nonperformance ran to CVIA and/or its insurer, and Brown’s insurance premiums were paid to CVIA, not the contractor, so as far as Pinnacle was concerned she was receiving its services gratuitously; an unpled third-party-beneficiary theory could not be considered. Against CVIA, however, the complaint stated a claim: a “blanket” policy is a single policy covering the entirety, so owners could not each be named insureds, but the CC&Rs still obligated CVIA to insure the individual owners and to make proceeds payable to the owner and the association jointly. The duplicative good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim was left in place, and the fiduciary-duty question was held unsuitable for resolution on the pleadings.

The dispositive June 25, 2012 ruling on Brown’s motion for partial summary judgment rested on the undisputed text of the Declaration: CVIA was required to procure a blanket policy insuring the owners such that proceeds “shall be payable to the Unit Owner and the Association jointly,” and CVIA did not argue that it did so. The court rejected the association’s attempt to shift responsibility to its insurance company: it was no defense that CAU, not CVIA, made the decision on how to issue the checks, because it was CVIA’s obligation to make sure — if necessary by including express language in the contract — that checks would be issued as the Declaration required, and “if CAU would not agree, there are many other insurance companies.” On that record the court found CVIA’s breach “clear” and granted summary judgment on contract liability.

Later rulings defined what the breach was worth. In its August 15, 2013 motion-in-limine ruling the court held CVIA liable for the consequential damages of its breach: to the extent Brown’s alleged damages derived from her decision to undertake work outside what should have been in CVIA’s policy she could not recover, but whether she funded the work through another insurance company (such as the Farmers payments) or out of her own pocket was immaterial. The court also awarded Pinnacle $12,500 in fees and $241 in costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 after weighing the Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warner factors, awarding some but not all of the fees requested. The damages questions never reached the jury: after a Court of Appeals decision on the Pinnacle unjust-enrichment claim prompted the court to vacate the July 2013 trial so all claims could potentially be tried together, the parties settled, and on October 30, 2013 the case was placed on the inactive calendar for dismissal.

Why It Matters

The case is a pointed example of a court holding an association to the letter of its own CC&Rs. The Declaration promised owners a specific insurance arrangement — a blanket policy with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly — and the court treated the association’s failure to deliver that arrangement as a clear breach, expressly refusing to let it hide behind its insurance company’s check-issuing practices. For associations, the lesson is that delegating performance to a vendor does not delegate the covenant; for owners, it shows that insurance and repair-proceeds provisions in a declaration are enforceable contract terms.

The case also illustrates the risk of suing the wrong party: the owner’s unjust-enrichment claim against the repair contractor was dismissed on the pleadings because any enrichment did not come at her expense, and she was ordered to pay $12,500 of the contractor’s attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Finally, it is a reminder that many HOA wins end quietly — liability was decided on summary judgment, but the case settled before any jury valued the damages, and as a superior-court decision it binds only the parties.

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