CC&R Enforcement | A.R.S. § 12-341.01 | 1 CA-CV 92-0188
Division One construes a “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment” covenant as a whole and holds that a large customized bus is exactly the kind of bulky, nonstandard conveyance the drafters intended to restrict.
Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Arizona Biltmore Estates Association v. Tezak; 177 Ariz. 447, 868 P.2d 1030 (App. 1993); Not stated in the opinion (action filed in Maricopa County Superior Court).
Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.
The rule in one sentence
Construing the declaration of covenants as a whole to give effect to the drafters’ paramount intent, the Court of Appeals held that the Tezaks’ large customized bus was “similar equipment” within the deed restriction on parking a “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment,” notwithstanding the rule that restrictive covenants are strictly construed. Because no Architectural Committee approval had been obtained, the Association was entitled to an injunction requiring the bus’s removal, and the trial court’s contrary summary judgment was reversed.
Case Participants
Neutral Parties
- Arizona Biltmore Estates Association (Appellant)
Non-profit Arizona corporation and homeowners association for the Arizona Biltmore Estates subdivision; plaintiff below and appellant, seeking an injunction to remove the bus. - Robert Tezak (Appellee)
Lot owner in the subdivision who, with his wife, parked the customized bus on the residential property; defendant below and appellee. The bus was registered to “UNO Products, Inc., Robert J. Tezak.” - Nancy Tezak (Appellee)
Co-owner and Robert Tezak’s wife; co-defendant below and co-appellee. - Donald E. Dyekman (Counsel)
O’Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, P.A.
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Arizona Biltmore Estates Association (Phoenix). - Christopher Robbins (Counsel)
O’Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, P.A.
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Arizona Biltmore Estates Association (Phoenix). - Michael P. West (Counsel)
Mariscal, Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander, P.A.
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees Robert and Nancy Tezak (Phoenix). - Donna M. Somsky (Counsel)
Mariscal, Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander, P.A.
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees Robert and Nancy Tezak (Phoenix). - Contreras (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, Department B
Judge who authored the opinion reversing the trial court. - Jacobson (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, Department B
Presiding Judge; concurred. - Lankford (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, Department B
Judge; concurred.
What happened and why it matters
The Arizona Biltmore Estates Association, the homeowners association for a Phoenix-area subdivision, sued lot owners Robert and Nancy Tezak seeking an injunction to remove a large customized bus—weighing more than 29,000 pounds and resembling a commercial bus—that the Tezaks began parking at the back of their residential lot around September 1989. The Association contended the vehicle violated a recorded deed restriction (Article XI, Section 6) barring any “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment” from being kept on the property without approval from the Architectural Committee. The Maricopa County Superior Court denied the injunction and granted the Tezaks summary judgment, reasoning that the bus was not covered by the covenant, and awarded the Tezaks their attorney’s fees. On appeal, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. The court acknowledged that restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free use of property, but explained that the paramount principle is the intent of the parties who drafted the declaration, determined by reading the document as a whole. Considering the “or similar equipment” language together with the declaration’s stated purpose of protecting the value and attractiveness of the property and its many other use restrictions, the court concluded the drafters intended to restrict large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances, and the Tezaks’ bus plainly qualified. The court distinguished a Missouri decision the Tezaks relied on, followed a Washington case reaching the same result on similar facts, reversed, and remanded for entry of summary judgment and an injunction for the Association, while awarding the Association its attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.
Because the interpretation of the deed restrictions presented a question of law, the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo and was not bound by its conclusions of law. The court treated the recorded restrictions as a covenant running with the land that forms a contract between the subdivision’s owners as a whole and each individual lot owner (citing Divizio v. Kewin Enterprises). It first observed that Article XI, Section 6 does not categorically ban the listed conveyances; it bars them only when they have not been approved by the Architectural Committee, and no such approval had been sought or given for the Tezaks’ bus.
The Association conceded the bus was neither a trailer, a camper, nor a boat, and argued instead that it was “similar equipment.” The Tezaks invoked the rule of ejusdem generis—that general words following a specific enumeration are limited by that enumeration unless a contrary intent is clearly shown—and contended that trailers and campers share a feature of temporary living arrangements that their bus lacked. They also urged strict construction, under which ambiguities in restrictive covenants are resolved in favor of the free use of property (citing Duffy v. Sunburst Farms East).
The court rejected the “temporary living arrangements” limitation as implausible, noting that boats are expressly enumerated yet usually contain no living quarters, so adopting that limitation would mean boats should never have been listed. It then explained that although strict construction applies in some circumstances, the cardinal principle in construing restrictive covenants is the paramount intent of the parties, ascertained by reading the declaration as a whole, and that a covenant should not be read to defeat its plain and obvious meaning. The declaration’s recitals stated that the covenants existed to enhance and protect the value, desirability, and attractiveness of the property and the quality of life within the Village, and Section 6 was one of eleven provisions restricting uses that would be unsightly or annoying. Read together, these provisions showed the drafters intended to restrict the display of large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances, and the Tezaks’ very large bus unquestionably fell within that class. The court followed Krein v. Smith (Wash. App.), where a motor home was held covered by a similar restriction after construing the document as a whole, and distinguished Lake St. Louis Community Association v. Leidy (Mo. App.), reasoning that the phrase “or similar equipment” is broader and less limiting than the Missouri covenant’s “trailers of every other description,” and that size was not the only characteristic the drafters intended to restrict. Having found the parking covenant violated, the court did not reach the Association’s alternative argument that the bus also breached the covenant against business or non-residential use.
Tezak is an Arizona illustration of how courts reconcile two competing canons that govern deed-restriction disputes: the rule that restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free use of land, and the overriding principle that the drafters’ intent—gathered from the declaration read as a whole—controls. The decision shows that a catch-all phrase like “or similar equipment,” when read alongside a declaration’s stated purposes and its other use restrictions, can reach vehicles the drafters never specifically named, so long as the vehicle shares the essential character the restriction targets (here, large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances).
For associations and owners alike, the case is a practical reminder that a covenant’s general language is not automatically neutralized by strict construction or by ejusdem generis; the outcome turns on what the governing documents, taken together, were plainly designed to prevent. It also highlights the role of an architectural-approval mechanism—the restriction bars unapproved conveyances rather than banning them outright—and confirms that a prevailing association in a covenant-enforcement action may recover attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. This summary is educational and neutral; it is not legal advice, and results in other disputes will depend on the specific covenant language and facts.
Step-by-step litigation record
FAQ
What was the dispute in Arizona Biltmore Estates Association v. Tezak about?
The homeowners association sued lot owners Robert and Nancy Tezak for an injunction to remove a large customized bus (more than 29,000 pounds, resembling a commercial bus) that they parked on their residential lot. The Association argued the bus violated a recorded deed restriction barring any “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment” from the property without approval by the Architectural Committee. The trial court sided with the owners, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held the bus was covered by the restriction.
Did the deed restriction specifically mention a bus or a motor home?
No. Article XI, Section 6 listed only a “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment.” The Association conceded the bus was not a trailer, camper, or boat and argued it fell within the catch-all phrase “or similar equipment.” The court agreed, concluding that a very large, bulky, self-propelled vehicle of this kind was “similar equipment” within the meaning the drafters intended.
How did the court handle the rule that restrictive covenants are strictly construed?
The court acknowledged that restrictive covenants are strictly construed against those enforcing them, with ambiguities resolved in favor of the free use of property. But it explained that the cardinal principle is the paramount intent of the parties, determined by reading the declaration as a whole, and that a covenant should not be read in a way that defeats its plain and obvious meaning. Strict construction did not override the drafters’ evident intent here.
What is ejusdem generis, and why didn’t it help the homeowners?
Ejusdem generis is a rule that general words following a list of specific items are limited to things of the same kind. The Tezaks argued trailers and campers share “temporary living arrangements” that their bus lacked. The court rejected that limitation as implausible because boats—expressly listed—usually have no living quarters, and because reading the declaration as a whole showed the drafters were targeting large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances, a class the bus plainly fit.
Could the homeowners have kept the bus if they had gotten approval?
The restriction did not ban the listed conveyances outright; it barred them only when they had not been placed or maintained in a manner approved by the Architectural Committee under Article VI of the declaration. In this case, no such approval had been sought or obtained for the bus, so the unapproved vehicle violated the covenant.
Who paid attorney’s fees, and is the decision binding precedent?
The trial court had awarded the Tezaks their fees, but the Court of Appeals vacated that award on reversal and instead awarded the Association its attorney’s fees for both the trial and the appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, with the amount to be set after compliance with the appellate fee rule. The decision is a published Arizona Court of Appeals opinion (177 Ariz. 447, 868 P.2d 1030), so it is precedential.
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 177 Ariz. 447, 868 P.2d 1030 (App. 1993) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Court of Appeals |
| Decision / key date | November 18, 1993 |
| Judge / panel | Contreras (author), Jacobson, P.J., Lankford, J. |
| Parties | A homeowners association (Arizona Biltmore Estates Association) sued lot owners Robert and Nancy Tezak for an injunction to remove a 29,000-pound customized bus parked on their residential lot, contending it violated a recorded deed restriction barring any “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment” kept without Architectural Committee approval. |
| Governing law | |
| Topics | cc-and-rscovenantsarchitectural-reviewattorneys-feesprocedure |
| Outcome / holding | Construing the declaration of covenants as a whole to give effect to the drafters’ paramount intent, the Court of Appeals held that the Tezaks’ large customized bus was “similar equipment” within the deed restriction on parking a “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment,” notwithstanding the rule that restrictive covenants are strictly construed. Because no Architectural Committee approval had been obtained, the Association was entitled to an injunction requiring the bus’s removal, and the trial court’s contrary summary judgment was reversed. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | No raw source-folder files found for this slug |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 7 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 0 download links |
Key Issues & Findings
The Arizona Biltmore Estates Association, the homeowners association for a Phoenix-area subdivision, sued lot owners Robert and Nancy Tezak seeking an injunction to remove a large customized bus—weighing more than 29,000 pounds and resembling a commercial bus—that the Tezaks began parking at the back of their residential lot around September 1989. The Association contended the vehicle violated a recorded deed restriction (Article XI, Section 6) barring any “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment” from being kept on the property without approval from the Architectural Committee. The Maricopa County Superior Court denied the injunction and granted the Tezaks summary judgment, reasoning that the bus was not covered by the covenant, and awarded the Tezaks their attorney’s fees. On appeal, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. The court acknowledged that restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free use of property, but explained that the paramount principle is the intent of the parties who drafted the declaration, determined by reading the document as a whole. Considering the “or similar equipment” language together with the declaration’s stated purpose of protecting the value and attractiveness of the property and its many other use restrictions, the court concluded the drafters intended to restrict large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances, and the Tezaks’ bus plainly qualified. The court distinguished a Missouri decision the Tezaks relied on, followed a Washington case reaching the same result on similar facts, reversed, and remanded for entry of summary judgment and an injunction for the Association, while awarding the Association its attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.
Because the interpretation of the deed restrictions presented a question of law, the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo and was not bound by its conclusions of law. The court treated the recorded restrictions as a covenant running with the land that forms a contract between the subdivision’s owners as a whole and each individual lot owner (citing Divizio v. Kewin Enterprises). It first observed that Article XI, Section 6 does not categorically ban the listed conveyances; it bars them only when they have not been approved by the Architectural Committee, and no such approval had been sought or given for the Tezaks’ bus.
The Association conceded the bus was neither a trailer, a camper, nor a boat, and argued instead that it was “similar equipment.” The Tezaks invoked the rule of ejusdem generis—that general words following a specific enumeration are limited by that enumeration unless a contrary intent is clearly shown—and contended that trailers and campers share a feature of temporary living arrangements that their bus lacked. They also urged strict construction, under which ambiguities in restrictive covenants are resolved in favor of the free use of property (citing Duffy v. Sunburst Farms East).
The court rejected the “temporary living arrangements” limitation as implausible, noting that boats are expressly enumerated yet usually contain no living quarters, so adopting that limitation would mean boats should never have been listed. It then explained that although strict construction applies in some circumstances, the cardinal principle in construing restrictive covenants is the paramount intent of the parties, ascertained by reading the declaration as a whole, and that a covenant should not be read to defeat its plain and obvious meaning. The declaration’s recitals stated that the covenants existed to enhance and protect the value, desirability, and attractiveness of the property and the quality of life within the Village, and Section 6 was one of eleven provisions restricting uses that would be unsightly or annoying. Read together, these provisions showed the drafters intended to restrict the display of large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances, and the Tezaks’ very large bus unquestionably fell within that class. The court followed Krein v. Smith (Wash. App.), where a motor home was held covered by a similar restriction after construing the document as a whole, and distinguished Lake St. Louis Community Association v. Leidy (Mo. App.), reasoning that the phrase “or similar equipment” is broader and less limiting than the Missouri covenant’s “trailers of every other description,” and that size was not the only characteristic the drafters intended to restrict. Having found the parking covenant violated, the court did not reach the Association’s alternative argument that the bus also breached the covenant against business or non-residential use.
Tezak is an Arizona illustration of how courts reconcile two competing canons that govern deed-restriction disputes: the rule that restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free use of land, and the overriding principle that the drafters’ intent—gathered from the declaration read as a whole—controls. The decision shows that a catch-all phrase like “or similar equipment,” when read alongside a declaration’s stated purposes and its other use restrictions, can reach vehicles the drafters never specifically named, so long as the vehicle shares the essential character the restriction targets (here, large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances).
For associations and owners alike, the case is a practical reminder that a covenant’s general language is not automatically neutralized by strict construction or by ejusdem generis; the outcome turns on what the governing documents, taken together, were plainly designed to prevent. It also highlights the role of an architectural-approval mechanism—the restriction bars unapproved conveyances rather than banning them outright—and confirms that a prevailing association in a covenant-enforcement action may recover attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. This summary is educational and neutral; it is not legal advice, and results in other disputes will depend on the specific covenant language and facts.