Arizona Supreme Court | Ariz. Const. art. III | No. CV-96-0461-SA
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted the four-factor Hancock separation-of-powers test at the state’s highest level, then applied it to strike a legislatively controlled council that exercised executive power, reaffirming that those who make the laws may not also carry them out.
Last updated August 28, 2026. Case: State ex rel. Woods v. Block, Arizona Supreme Court, No. CV-96-0461-SA; 189 Ariz. 269, 942 P.2d 428 (1997); relief granted (statute held unconstitutional).
Scope note: This page provides an educational summary of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Woods v. Block, a precedential ruling in which the court adopted Arizona’s four-factor separation-of-powers test and struck down a statute as a violation of Article III. It is included here because it is the Supreme Court authority behind the separation-of-powers analysis Arizona courts later used to decide where homeowners-association disputes may be heard. This page is educational and is not legal advice.
The takeaway
A legislatively created and controlled body may not be given the power to perform an executive function. A.R.S. section 41-401, as amended in 1996, violated the separation-of-powers provision of Article III of the Arizona Constitution because it empowered the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council, a body the Legislature controlled, to conduct the state’s litigation – an executive function. The court granted relief, holding that the council as then constituted had no authority to act or to expend public money.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- State of Arizona ex rel. Grant Woods, Attorney General (Petitioner)
Arizona Attorney General's Office
Filed the special action seeking to have A.R.S. section 41-401, as amended, declared unconstitutional and to prohibit the council from exercising its powers and spending public money. - W. Mark Sendrow (Counsel)
Arizona Attorney General's Office
Assistant Attorney General for the petitioner. - Nancy M. Bonnell (Counsel)
Arizona Attorney General's Office
Assistant Attorney General for the petitioner.
Respondent Side
- Michael Block (Respondent)
Arizona Constitutional Defense Council
Sued in his official capacity as a member of the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council. - W. Ralph Pew (Respondent)
Arizona Constitutional Defense Council
Sued in his official capacity as a member of the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council. - Steven J. Twist (Respondent)
Arizona Constitutional Defense Council
Sued in his official capacity as a member of the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council. - Neil Vincent Wake (Counsel)
Bryan Cave L.L.P.
Counsel for the respondent council members. - Charles J. Cooper (Counsel)
Cooper and Carvin, P.L.L.C.
Counsel for the respondent council members. - Michael W. Kirk (Counsel)
Shaw Pittman Potts & Trowbridge
Counsel for the respondent council members.
Neutral Parties
- James Moeller (Justice)
Arizona Supreme Court
Authored the opinion of the court. - Thomas A. Zlaket (Chief Justice)
Arizona Supreme Court
Concurred in the opinion. - Stanley G. Feldman (Justice)
Arizona Supreme Court
Concurred in the opinion. - Ruth V. McGregor (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, designated to sit in place of Vice Chief Justice Jones under Ariz. Const. art. VI, section 3; concurred. - Frederick J. Martone (Justice)
Arizona Supreme Court
Filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
What happened
In 1994, the Arizona Legislature created the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council (CDC) to restore, maintain, and advance the state’s sovereignty by taking action, including litigation, that the council deemed appropriate. As originally structured, the CDC worked with the Attorney General, who negotiated its outside-counsel contracts, approved its legal fees, and could direct or assist its attorneys.
The Attorney General and the CDC usually cooperated, but conflicts arose over which cases to bring and how to handle them. Against that background, the Legislature amended the statute in 1996 to remove the Attorney General’s veto and his role as gatekeeper of the council’s funds, and it added two legislators as advisory members.
After the 1996 amendments, the CDC – without the Attorney General – filed motions on behalf of the State of Arizona in federal court, taking positions in part contrary to those the Attorney General was asserting for the state in the same proceedings.
Attorney General Grant Woods filed a petition for special action directly in the Arizona Supreme Court against the council’s members, asking the court to declare A.R.S. section 41-401, as amended, unconstitutional and to prohibit the CDC from exercising its powers and spending public funds.
The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction, held that the Attorney General had standing under the statutes authorizing him to enjoin illegal expenditures and to bring quo warranto actions, and turned to the separation-of-powers question.
Applying the four-factor test, the court concluded the CDC was a body the Legislature created and controlled but that performed an executive function, so the statute violated Article III. The court granted relief and held the council, as constituted, had no authority to act or to spend public money.
Procedural timeline
In 1994, the Arizona Legislature creates the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council (A.R.S. section 41-401), with the Attorney General serving as a check on its litigation and its funds.
In the 1996 session, the Legislature amends A.R.S. section 41-401 to remove the Attorney General's oversight and funding control and to add two legislators as advisory members of the council.
After the amendments take effect, the council files positions in federal court contrary to those the Attorney General is asserting for the state, and Attorney General Grant Woods files a petition for special action (No. CV-96-0461-SA) challenging A.R.S. section 41-401 as amended.
The Arizona Supreme Court holds A.R.S. section 41-401, as amended, unconstitutional under Article III separation of powers and grants relief.
Complete source-document index
This index contains 0 PDFs, 1 other source file from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.
Cap Opinion
Type: Decision or judgment
The published Arizona Supreme Court opinion in State ex rel. Woods v. Block, hosted as a downloadable public-record source used to build this case-file page and to supply a substantive source document.
FAQ
What was State ex rel. Woods v. Block about?
Attorney General Grant Woods filed a special action asking the Arizona Supreme Court to declare A.R.S. section 41-401, as amended in 1996, unconstitutional. That statute created the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council (CDC) and, after the amendments, let it initiate and fund litigation in the state’s name without the Attorney General’s involvement. The court held the statute violated the separation-of-powers clause of Article III of the Arizona Constitution.
What did the court decide?
The court held that the CDC was a body created and controlled by the Legislature, yet the statute empowered it to perform an executive function – conducting litigation to carry out state policy. Because a legislative body was exercising executive power, A.R.S. section 41-401 violated Article III. The court granted relief, holding that the CDC as then constituted had no authority to act or to spend public money.
Why does this case matter for Arizona HOA disputes?
Woods v. Block is the Arizona Supreme Court decision that adopted the four-factor separation-of-powers test first stated by the Court of Appeals in J.W. Hancock Enterprises v. Arizona State Registrar of Contractors. That same test is what the Court of Appeals later used in Gelb v. Department of Fire, Building & Life Safety to strike Arizona’s first administrative-hearing process for homeowner-versus-association disputes. Woods v. Block gives the test its Supreme Court footing.
What is the four-factor test the court adopted?
Drawn from the Kansas decision State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett and adopted in Arizona by J.W. Hancock, the test weighs four non-exclusive factors: (1) the essential nature of the power exercised; (2) the degree of control one branch has over the exercise of the power; (3) the objective of the Legislature in establishing the function; and (4) the practical result of blending the roles. No single factor controls; courts balance them on the specific facts.
Is Woods v. Block still good law, and is this legal advice?
Woods v. Block is a published, precedential Arizona Supreme Court decision and remains a leading authority on separation of powers and administrative adjudication in Arizona. This page is a neutral educational summary, not legal advice; anyone dealing with a specific dispute should confirm the current law and consult a qualified Arizona attorney.
Case Dossier
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Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 189 Ariz. 269, 942 P.2d 428 (1997) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Arizona Supreme Court |
| Decision / key date | July 15, 1997 |
| Judge / panel | James Moeller (author), Thomas A. Zlaket (Chief Justice), Stanley G. Feldman (Justice), Ruth V. McGregor (Court of Appeals judge, designated), Frederick J. Martone (concurring and dissenting) |
| Parties | State of Arizona ex rel. Attorney General Grant Woods (Petitioner) v. Michael Block, W. Ralph Pew, and Steven J. Twist, as members of the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council (Respondents) |
| Governing law |
|
| Topics | Procedure |
| Outcome / holding | A legislatively created and controlled body may not be given the power to perform an executive function. A.R.S. section 41-401, as amended in 1996, violated the separation-of-powers provision of Article III of the Arizona Constitution because it empowered the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council, a body the Legislature controlled, to conduct the state's litigation – an executive function. The court granted relief, holding that the council as then constituted had no authority to act or to expend public money. |
| Primary public source | View hosted source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Reviewed source package | 1 other source file |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 4 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 5 questions |
| Featured download links | 1 download link |
Key Issues & Findings
In 1994 the Arizona Legislature created the Arizona Constitutional Defense Council (CDC) to advance the state's sovereignty by initiating litigation, with the Attorney General serving as a check on its funds and its lawsuits. After conflicts between the Council and the Attorney General, the Legislature amended the statute in 1996 to remove the Attorney General's oversight and let the CDC initiate and fund litigation in the state's name on its own. When the CDC began filing positions in federal court contrary to those the Attorney General was taking for the state, Attorney General Grant Woods brought a special action asking the Arizona Supreme Court to declare A.R.S. section 41-401, as amended, unconstitutional. The court held the Attorney General had standing and that the amended statute violated the separation-of-powers clause of Article III of the Arizona Constitution. Adopting the four-factor test the Court of Appeals had stated in J.W. Hancock, the court found that the CDC was a body the Legislature created and controlled, yet the statute empowered it to perform an executive function, conducting litigation to carry out state policy. Because those who make the laws may not also execute them, the court granted relief and held the CDC, as constituted, had no power to act or to spend public money.
The court first held that the Attorney General had standing. Although the Arizona Constitution does not itself grant the Attorney General independent standing, he had statutory standing under A.R.S. section 35-212 to enjoin the illegal payment of public monies (which permits any ethically permissible argument, including that the spending statute is unconstitutional) and under the quo warranto statute, A.R.S. section 12-2041, to challenge officials exercising authority under an unconstitutional statute.
On the merits, the court examined whether the CDC, which it found to be a legislatively created and controlled body, was exercising an executive function. It applied the four non-exclusive factors the Court of Appeals adopted from State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett in J.W. Hancock: the essential nature of the power exercised, the degree of legislative control, the objective of the Legislature, and the practical consequences. Conducting litigation on behalf of the state to carry out declared policy is an executive function; the Legislature had dominant control over the CDC and, through the 1996 amendments, deliberately removed the executive from any role; the Legislature's objective was to take over that executive function; and the practical result was real conflict, including CDC positions in federal court contrary to those of the Attorney General.
Balancing those factors, the court concluded that all of them showed the CDC was a legislative body performing an executive function, so A.R.S. section 41-401 violated Article III. Having found the statute unconstitutional under Article III, the court did not reach the Attorney General's separate argument under Article V.
Woods v. Block is one of the Arizona Supreme Court's clearest modern statements of the separation-of-powers doctrine, and it is the decision that put the four-factor test on Supreme Court footing. Arizona's Constitution states the separation of powers more explicitly than the federal Constitution, and the court used the four-factor balancing test to decide, on the specific facts, whether one branch had usurped the powers of another.
That same test is the analytical engine Arizona courts later used to decide where certain disputes may be heard. When the Court of Appeals struck Arizona's first administrative-hearing process for homeowner-versus-association disputes in Gelb v. Department of Fire, Building & Life Safety, it applied the four-factor test that J.W. Hancock stated and Woods v. Block adopted. For homeowners, boards, and counsel, Woods v. Block is background authority: it explains the constitutional principle that governs which government body may adjudicate or enforce private disputes, and why the Legislature cannot simply assign that job wherever it likes. This summary is educational and neutral; it is not legal advice.