Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL-RHG Decision – 733509.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-09T17:24:55 (38.6 KB)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

——————————————————————————–

Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

——————————————————————————–

Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:45 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:49 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

——————————————————————————–

Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

——————————————————————————–

Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Patricia Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski Counsel
Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied and dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The documents requested (an email string among Board members) were informal communications and were not considered official records of the association because the Board never took formal action on the incident.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Board created or possessed any official documents related to the incident that they failed to produce, as the emails were deemed private, informal communications rather than official records.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to produce association records (un-redacted email string)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents, specifically an un-redacted email string among Board members concerning an incident where Petitioner's husband allegedly harassed potential property buyers.

Orders: Petition dismissed because the documents sought (un-redacted emails) were informal communications, not official records of the association required to be produced under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner records request, association records, informal communications, board quorum, records disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – 705044.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:46 (136.8 KB)

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918028-REL/684134.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:50:03 (149.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Briefing: Wiercincthe ki v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s demand for association records related to a June 19, 2017, incident where her husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly accosted and verbally abused potential buyers of a neighboring property, causing the sale to fail.

The Petitioner filed a claim alleging the Respondent violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents related to the Board of Directors’ handling of the incident. The case evolved through two distinct phases:

1. Initial Hearing (January 2019): The Petitioner argued that because a quorum of the Board discussed the incident via email, they were required to create official records (e.g., minutes of a formal decision), which were not produced. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied this petition, ruling that informal email discussions among volunteer board members do not constitute “official Board business” requiring formal action or record-keeping.

2. Rehearing (April 2019): After being granted a rehearing, the Petitioner changed her legal theory. She argued that the email chain itself constituted an official association record and demanded that the Respondent produce a fully un-redacted version. The Respondent maintained the emails were private communications provided as a courtesy and that names were redacted due to Mr. Coates’ documented history of “bullying and intimidating people.”

Conclusion: The ALJ dismissed the petition again, affirming the initial ruling. The Judge concluded that the email chain was not an official “record of the association.” Consequently, the Respondent was under no statutory obligation to produce it, let alone provide an un-redacted copy. The Judge found the Respondent’s decision to redact names was “not unreasonable” given the circumstances.

Case Background and Procedural History

The Parties

Name/Entity

Patricia Wiercinski

Petitioner; homeowner and member of the Respondent association.

Wayne Coates

Petitioner’s husband; central figure in the alleged incident.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.

Respondent; the Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.

Michael “Mike” Olson

President of the Respondent’s Board of Directors.

Gregg Arthur

Director on the Respondent’s Board; also a realtor.

Joe Zielinski

Director on the Respondent’s Board.

Kathy Andrews

Community Manager for the Respondent, employed by Hoamco.

John Allen

An HOA member who was attempting to sell his lot in June 2017.

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Office of Administrative Hearings.

Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Counsel for the Respondent, Goodman Law Group.

The Precipitating Incident (June 19, 2017)

On or about June 19, 2017, potential buyers, along with their builder, architect, and son, were visiting a lot for sale on Puntenney Rd. owned by John Allen. The lot was located across the street from the residence of Patricia Wiercinski and Wayne Coates. An incident occurred where Mr. Coates allegedly emerged from his home and confronted the visitors. According to emails later provided, Mr. Coates was “belligerent and cursing,” “verbally abusive,” and exhibited “extreme aggressive behavior,” telling the party that nothing was for sale and they needed to leave immediately. The potential buyers subsequently withdrew their interest in the lot, explicitly citing the confrontation.

Legal Proceedings

October 18, 2018: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce records of its deliberations and actions regarding the June 2017 incident.

January 10, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Diane Mihalsky.

January 22, 2019: The ALJ issues a decision denying the petition.

Post-January 2019: Petitioner requests a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grants the request.

April 22, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

May 1, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing the petition.

The Central Evidence: The Email Communications

The primary evidence in the case was an email chain from June 2017 that the Respondent voluntarily produced to the Petitioner, with the names of non-members (the potential buyers and their real estate agent) redacted. The communications reveal the immediate aftermath and concern surrounding the incident.

Key Excerpts from the Emails

From a Potential Purchaser (June 19, 2017):

Formal Account from Potential Purchasers (June 20, 2017):

From the Real Estate Agent (June 20, 2017):

From Board Director Gregg Arthur (June 20, 2017):

From Board Director Joe Zielinski (June 20, 2017):

Analysis of Legal Arguments and Rulings

Petitioner’s Arguments

1. Initial Argument: The Petitioner contended that the email discussion among a quorum of the Board legally constituted an informal meeting to discuss association business. As such, the Board was required to memorialize its decision, even a decision to take no action, in official records like meeting minutes. The failure to produce such records was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

2. Rehearing Argument: Shifting her legal theory, the Petitioner argued that the email chain itself was an “official record of the association.” She claimed a right to an un-redacted copy, stating that she and Mr. Coates “had a right to know who was accusing Mr. Coates of belligerence.”

Respondent’s Defense

Nature of Communications: The Respondent argued the emails were informal, private communications on personal servers between volunteer board members who are also neighbors. They were not official records kept in the course of association business.

Lack of Formal Action: The Board never voted, met in an executive or open session, or took any official action regarding the incident. Testimony confirmed that only two of the board members replied to the initial email.

Absence of Authority: The Respondent’s position was that the incident, while serious, was a personal dispute between neighbors and did not violate the association’s CC&Rs or bylaws. Therefore, the Board had no authority or jurisdiction to take official enforcement action.

Justification for Redactions: Board President Mike Olson testified that names were redacted because “Mr. Coates had a history of bullying and intimidating people.” This was done to protect the potential buyers and their agent from potential harassment.

Administrative Law Judge’s Determinations

The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both decisions, finding decisively in favor of the Respondent.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805.

“Official Records” Defined: The ALJ drew a clear distinction between informal discussion and official business. The ruling stated: “…the mere fact that a quorum of Board members may discuss a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not end up taking any action to make a matter board business.”

No Obligation to Create Records: The Judge found no statute requiring an HOA board to create a formal written record about topics they discuss informally but ultimately take no action on, calling such a requirement an “unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers.”

Ruling on Redacted Emails: In the rehearing decision, the ALJ concluded that because the email string was not an official record, the statute did not require the Respondent to provide it at all. Therefore, the Respondent was not obligated to provide an un-redacted version. The judge also noted the reason for the redaction “does not appear unreasonable.”

Final Order: Both petitions were denied and dismissed.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski and Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms, all based on the provided Administrative Law Judge Decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their roles?

2. What specific event on June 19, 2017, initiated the conflict that led to this case?

3. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner in her original petition filed on October 18, 2018?

4. Why did the Respondent’s Board President, Mike Olson, state that the names in the email string were redacted?

5. In the initial hearing, what did the Petitioner argue the Board was required to do after discussing the incident, even if it chose not to act?

6. What was the legal conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge following the first hearing on January 10, 2019?

7. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing of the case?

8. How did the Petitioner’s primary legal argument change between the first hearing and the rehearing?

9. According to the testimony of community manager Kathy Andrews, what types of documents are considered official records of the Association?

10. What was the final determination regarding the status of the email string and the Respondent’s obligation to produce an un-redacted version?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The Petitioner is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a complaint alleging the association violated state law. The Respondent is the homeowners’ association defending against the petition.

2. The initiating event was an incident where the Petitioner’s husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly acted belligerent, cursed at, and was verbally abusive to a potential buyer, their family, and their architect who were viewing a property for sale across the street from the Petitioner’s home. The potential buyers were so disturbed by the encounter that they decided to remove the lot from their list of considerations.

3. The Petitioner’s core allegation was that the Respondent had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents related to the Board’s deliberations, decisions, and actions concerning the June 19, 2017 incident involving her husband.

4. Mike Olson testified that the names of the potential purchasers and their real estate agent were redacted from the email string because Mr. Coates has a documented history of bullying, intimidating, and threatening people. The redaction was done to protect these individuals from potential harassment.

5. In the initial hearing, the Petitioner argued that if the Board decided not to take action against her husband over the incident, it was required to make a formal motion and arrive at a formal, written decision to that effect. She claimed she never received such a document or evidence that the Board addressed it in an official meeting.

6. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed that the Respondent had failed to produce, as the email discussions were informal and did not constitute official Board business.

7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing by alleging misconduct on the part of the Administrative Law Judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request, though the decision noted the Commissioner did not specify what the misconduct was or how it should have changed the outcome.

8. In the rehearing, the Petitioner changed her argument from claiming the Board failed to produce a formal decision to arguing that the email string itself constituted an official record of the Association’s business. Consequently, she contended that A.R.S. § 33-1805 required the Respondent to produce a fully un-redacted copy of it.

9. Kathy Andrews testified that official records include matters of record regarding the Association’s business, such as governing documents, architectural guidelines, Board and general meeting minutes, and anything submitted to the Board for action. Because the Board took no action on the June 19, 2017 incident, the email was not included in the Association’s archived records.

10. The final determination was that the email string was not an official record of the association but rather an informal communication. Therefore, A.R.S. § 33-1805 did not require the Respondent to provide an un-redacted version, and the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the legal distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between informal discussions among board members and official association business. How was A.R.S. § 33-1805 applied in this context, and what precedent might this set for volunteer HOA board members?

2. Discuss the evolution of Patricia Wiercinski’s legal argument from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each argument and explain why the second argument was also ultimately unsuccessful.

3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it applies to this case. Explain what the Petitioner was required to prove and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the judge to conclude she had not met this burden in either hearing.

4. The Respondent voluntarily provided the redacted email string after the petition was filed. Discuss the strategic implications of this action and how it influenced the proceedings. Furthermore, analyze the justification provided for the redactions and the judge’s assessment of its reasonableness.

5. Based on the testimony from individuals like Mike Olson, Gregg Arthur, and Kathy Andrews, construct a comprehensive narrative of the events and communications following the June 19, 2017 incident from the perspective of the HOA Board. How did their collective testimony undermine the Petitioner’s claim that official records were being withheld or that the emails constituted official business?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge, Diane Mihalsky, from the Office of Administrative Hearings who heard the evidence and issued the legal decisions.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner, which stipulates that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

An Arizona Revised Statute stating that a quorum of a board of directors meeting informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions, regardless of whether a vote is taken.

Department, The

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and adjudicate petitions from and about homeowners’ associations.

Hoamco

The property management company employed by the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association. Kathy Andrews is an employee of this company.

June 19, 2017 Incident

An altercation where Wayne Coates allegedly engaged in belligerent, cursing, and verbally abusive behavior towards potential property buyers, causing them to lose interest in the property.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners’ association for the Long Meadow Ranch East development in Prescott, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

Patricia Wiercinski, a homeowner in Long Meadow Ranch East and a member of the Respondent association who filed the legal petition.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard the Petitioner was required to meet. It is defined as proof that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc., which was the defendant in the petition filed by Patricia Wiercinski.

Wayne Coates

The husband of the Petitioner, Patricia Wiercinski. His alleged actions during the June 19, 2017 incident are the central subject of the dispute.

An acronym for the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, mentioned in an email as a potential agency to file charges for disorderly conduct/harassment.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


4 Shocking Lessons from One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA

Introduction: The Perils of Neighbor Disputes

Most people who live in a planned community harbor a quiet fear of two things: a “neighbor from hell” and a legal dispute with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA). For one Arizona homeowner, those fears collided in a dramatic fashion. When her husband was involved in an incident with prospective buyers of a neighboring lot, she took her HOA to court to demand records of the board’s discussions. The resulting public legal documents provide a masterclass in community association law, revealing several shocking and counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living under an HOA.

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1. Takeaway 1: A “Neighbor from Hell” Can Literally Destroy a Real Estate Deal

The case began with a single incident on June 19, 2017. According to court filings, the homeowner’s husband, Wayne Coates, first confronted the wife and son of a builder viewing a vacant lot across the street. The prospective buyers described Mr. Coates’ behavior as “belligerent and cursing,” telling them that “nothing was for sale around here and they shouldn’t be snooping around.” The wife and son then drove up to inform the builder and architect of the hostile encounter.

The confrontation was so severe that it directly caused the potential buyers to walk away from the deal. They documented their experience in an email that eventually became part of the court record.

In closing when we returned one thing that stands out is would we want to live next to this type of behavior of [a] neighbor? The answer is no, this lot was one that we had in our top 2 Lots as a consideration for purchase but due to the volatile potential of this man, we have decided at this point to remove it from our list.

This case is a rare and powerful illustration of tortious interference with a business relationship in a community association context, providing unambiguous, written proof—from the aggrieved party themselves—that a single resident’s conduct directly caused a quantifiable financial loss to a neighbor.

2. Takeaway 2: Your HOA Board’s Private Emails Aren’t Always “Official Records”

The homeowner, Patricia Wiercinski, filed the lawsuit because she believed an email discussion about the incident among a quorum of the HOA board members constituted official business. Therefore, she argued, those emails were “official records” of the association that she had a legal right to inspect.

In a surprising decision, the court disagreed. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that just because board members informally discuss a topic via email does not automatically make it official HOA business or create an official record. This is especially true if the board never takes any formal action on the matter.

The judge’s reasoning was grounded in the practical realities of volunteer-run corporations. To treat every informal chat as official, recordable business would impose “an unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers who are not compensated for their time who are may be neighbors and who may also be friends, in addition to being Board members.” This ruling reinforces a crucial legal boundary between governance and informal communication. It protects a board’s ability to “think out loud” and explore issues before committing to a formal course of action, an essential function for effective volunteer leadership.

3. Takeaway 3: An HOA’s Power Isn’t Unlimited

After learning that Mr. Coates’ actions had killed a property sale, some board members were immediately and deeply alarmed. They recognized the potential damage to property values for everyone in the community. Board member Gregg Arthur expressed this urgency in an email to his colleagues:

Wayne thru his actions appears to have interfered with and destroyed a property sale. We need to meet and take action on this matter as it will have a broad and chilling effect amongst the realtor community… action needs to be taken and quickly to prevent this from happening again.

Despite this initial alarm, the board ultimately took no formal action against Mr. Coates. Why? Because after reviewing the situation, they determined that the incident was a personal dispute between neighbors. Critically, his conduct did not violate any specific provision of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), bylaws, or other governing documents.

This decision underscores a vital legal principle: an HOA’s authority is fundamentally contractual, derived solely from the powers granted to it in its governing documents. It is not a governmental body with general police powers. Its authority is strictly limited to enforcing the community’s written rules, not policing all neighborhood conduct.

4. Takeaway 4: A Lawsuit Can Create a Devastating—and Public—Record

The petitioner’s goal was straightforward: to force the HOA to produce an un-redacted copy of the board’s private email chain. The result of her legal action, however, was a textbook example of the “Streisand Effect,” where an attempt to suppress information leads to it being publicized far more widely. In her attempt to access a private record, she created a permanent, public legal record that contained far more damaging information about her husband than the emails she sought.

Because of the lawsuit, the following details about Mr. Coates are now cemented in publicly accessible court documents:

• The full, detailed account from the potential buyers describing his “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational” behavior.

• A statement from a board member, Joe Zielinski, referencing Mr. Coates’ “arrest record and prison term and criminal history.”

• Sworn testimony from the HOA President, Mike Olson, explaining that names were redacted from the original email because Mr. Coates has a “history of bullying and intimidating people.”

The irony is devastating. In her quest to unmask the identities of her husband’s accusers in a private email, the petitioner inadvertently created a permanent, public, and deeply unflattering legal record that now constitutes a matter adjudicated by a court.

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Conclusion: The High Cost of Conflict

This single, unfortunate neighborhood dispute offers powerful lessons for anyone living in a planned community. It clarifies the real-world impact of resident behavior on property rights, sets a clear boundary on what constitutes an “official” HOA record, demonstrates the legal limits of an HOA’s power, and serves as a sobering warning about the unforeseen consequences of litigation. It leaves us with a final, critical question to ponder: When conflict arises in a community, what is the true cost of escalating it, and is the official record you might create worth the price?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Wiercinski (petitioner)
  • Wayne Coates (petitioner's husband)
    Involved in the June 19, 2017 incident

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
  • Michael Olson (board member)
    President of Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Gregg Arthur (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Kathy Andrews (property manager)
    HOAMCO
    Community Manager; testified as witness
  • Jim Robertson (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Joe Zielinski (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Boris Biloskirka (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board (identified as former in one source)
  • Tom Reid (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Decision transmittal clerk

Other Participants

  • John Allen (HOA member)
    Property owner attempting to sell lot (also spelled Allan)
  • [Redacted Name] (potential purchaser/witness)
    Includes potential buyers, builder, builder's wife, son, and architect involved in the incident
  • [Redacted Name] (real estate agent/witness)
    Real estate agent(s) associated with John Allen's property