Elizabeth, Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-04-04
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Elizabeth Flint Counsel
Respondent Citation Gardens Cooperative #1 Counsel Andrew Vizcarra

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1816(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent, Citation Gardens Cooperative #1, does not meet the statutory definition of a planned community, and therefore, the statute prohibiting the denial of solar panels (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1816, as the ALJ determined a cooperative's purposes and functions are separate and distinct from those of a planned community, excluding it from the planned community definition.

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of request to install solar panels

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1816(A) by prohibiting the installation of a solar energy device, arguing the Cooperative qualifies as a planned community. Respondent argued it was a Cooperative Corporation, not a planned community, and the statute did not apply.

Orders: No action is required of Respondent in this matter, and the petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1816
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Solar Energy Device, Planned Community Definition, Cooperative Housing, Statutory Applicability, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1816
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

https://open.spotify.com/episode/51A2icH0TP8dmKblCZUFAY

Decision Documents

23F-H026-REL Decision – 1030738.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:11 (53.2 KB)

23F-H026-REL Decision – 1046844.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:15 (104.2 KB)

Questions

Question

Does the Arizona law protecting a homeowner's right to install solar panels apply to housing cooperatives?

Short Answer

No. The ALJ ruled that housing cooperatives do not fit the legal definition of a 'planned community,' so the solar protection statute (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply to them.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a member of a cooperative sought to install solar panels, citing A.R.S. § 33-1816, which prevents planned communities from prohibiting solar devices. The judge determined that while the definition of a planned community does not explicitly list cooperatives as an exclusion, the nature and purpose of a cooperative are distinct enough that they do not fall under the planned community statutes. Therefore, the cooperative was not legally required to permit the installation.

Alj Quote

Although the definition of a planned community does not expressly exclude a cooperative, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community, as their purposes and functions are separate and distinct.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802; A.R.S. § 33-1816

Topic Tags

  • solar panels
  • cooperatives
  • planned community definition

Question

What happens if the HOA or respondent fails to attend the administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The hearing proceeds without them.

Detailed Answer

If the respondent (the HOA or Cooperative) has been properly notified of the hearing time and date but fails to appear or request a continuance, the Administrative Law Judge will conduct the hearing in their absence. The petitioner will still present their case, but the respondent loses the opportunity to defend themselves in person.

Alj Quote

Consequently, given that Respondent was properly noticed of the hearing, the hearing proceeded in Respondent’s absence.

Legal Basis

Procedural Due Process

Topic Tags

  • hearing procedure
  • attendance
  • default

Question

Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The petitioner (typically the homeowner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The person bringing the complaint must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not up to the HOA to disprove the claims initially; the homeowner must affirmatively establish that the HOA violated the governing documents or statutes.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Is a housing cooperative considered a 'planned community' under Arizona law?

Short Answer

No, a cooperative is legally distinct from a planned community.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that a planned community generally involves real estate owned/operated by a nonprofit where owners are mandatory members. A cooperative, however, is formed to acquire, own, and operate a housing project where members hold shares. The judge ruled that these are separate legal concepts with different purposes, meaning statutes specific to 'planned communities' do not automatically apply to cooperatives.

Alj Quote

Respondent is a nonprofit corporation that was formed for the purpose of acquiring, owning and operating a cooperative housing project… the Administrative Law Judge concludes that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802

Topic Tags

  • definitions
  • cooperatives
  • planned community

Question

What is the standard of evidence required to win a hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

To win, the evidence must show that the claim is 'more probably true than not.' This is a lower standard than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' used in criminal cases. It means the evidence must incline a fair mind to one side even slightly more than the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Common Law / A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • legal standards

Case

Docket No
23F-H026-REL
Case Title
Elizabeth Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1
Decision Date
2023-04-04
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Does the Arizona law protecting a homeowner's right to install solar panels apply to housing cooperatives?

Short Answer

No. The ALJ ruled that housing cooperatives do not fit the legal definition of a 'planned community,' so the solar protection statute (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply to them.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a member of a cooperative sought to install solar panels, citing A.R.S. § 33-1816, which prevents planned communities from prohibiting solar devices. The judge determined that while the definition of a planned community does not explicitly list cooperatives as an exclusion, the nature and purpose of a cooperative are distinct enough that they do not fall under the planned community statutes. Therefore, the cooperative was not legally required to permit the installation.

Alj Quote

Although the definition of a planned community does not expressly exclude a cooperative, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community, as their purposes and functions are separate and distinct.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802; A.R.S. § 33-1816

Topic Tags

  • solar panels
  • cooperatives
  • planned community definition

Question

What happens if the HOA or respondent fails to attend the administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The hearing proceeds without them.

Detailed Answer

If the respondent (the HOA or Cooperative) has been properly notified of the hearing time and date but fails to appear or request a continuance, the Administrative Law Judge will conduct the hearing in their absence. The petitioner will still present their case, but the respondent loses the opportunity to defend themselves in person.

Alj Quote

Consequently, given that Respondent was properly noticed of the hearing, the hearing proceeded in Respondent’s absence.

Legal Basis

Procedural Due Process

Topic Tags

  • hearing procedure
  • attendance
  • default

Question

Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The petitioner (typically the homeowner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The person bringing the complaint must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not up to the HOA to disprove the claims initially; the homeowner must affirmatively establish that the HOA violated the governing documents or statutes.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Is a housing cooperative considered a 'planned community' under Arizona law?

Short Answer

No, a cooperative is legally distinct from a planned community.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that a planned community generally involves real estate owned/operated by a nonprofit where owners are mandatory members. A cooperative, however, is formed to acquire, own, and operate a housing project where members hold shares. The judge ruled that these are separate legal concepts with different purposes, meaning statutes specific to 'planned communities' do not automatically apply to cooperatives.

Alj Quote

Respondent is a nonprofit corporation that was formed for the purpose of acquiring, owning and operating a cooperative housing project… the Administrative Law Judge concludes that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802

Topic Tags

  • definitions
  • cooperatives
  • planned community

Question

What is the standard of evidence required to win a hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

To win, the evidence must show that the claim is 'more probably true than not.' This is a lower standard than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' used in criminal cases. It means the evidence must incline a fair mind to one side even slightly more than the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Common Law / A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • legal standards

Case

Docket No
23F-H026-REL
Case Title
Elizabeth Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1
Decision Date
2023-04-04
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Elizabeth Flint (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf and testified.

Respondent Side

  • Andrew Vizcarra (respondent representative)
    Tucson Realty & Trust Co. Management Services, L.L.C.
    Did not appear at the hearing; also referenced verbally as 'Andrew Biscara'.

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings

Other Participants

  • James Knupp (Acting Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on the service list for the Order Setting Hearing dated Feb 2, 2023.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on the service list for the Decision dated April 4, 2023.
  • AHansen (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of case documents via email address.
  • vnunez (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of case documents via email address.
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of case documents via email address.
  • labril (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of case documents via email address.

Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Green Elephant

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222036-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-04-29
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel
Respondent Green Elephant Development LLC Counsel Ronald E. Huser, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102, 32-2199 et seq., 33-1802(4), 41-1092, ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-111(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was denied, and the case was vacated and remanded due to lack of jurisdiction. The OAH determined the Petitioner failed to meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' required for the Department of Real Estate to have authority over the dispute.

Why this result: OAH lacked authority to hear the dispute because Petitioner failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Association met the definition of a 'planned community' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4). Specifically, there was no evidence of real estate ownership, roadway easements, mandatory membership, or mandatory assessments.

Key Issues & Findings

OAH jurisdiction over the dispute based on whether the Petitioner is a 'planned community.'

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated setback requirements in the Declaration of Restrictions (Section 5). Respondent moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law, arguing OAH lacked jurisdiction because Petitioner failed to prove it met the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under ARS § 33-1802(4).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition was denied. Respondent’s motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law was granted. The matter was vacated and remanded to the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-111(4)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Jurisdiction, Planned Community Definition, Setback Violation, Judgment as a Matter of Law, Voluntary Membership
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-111(4)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-112
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222036-REL Decision – 958968.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:40 (45.8 KB)

22F-H2222036-REL Decision – 962071.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:43 (53.3 KB)

22F-H2222036-REL Decision – 966017.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:47 (143.0 KB)





Study Guide – 22F-H2222036-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2222036-REL”, “case_title”: “Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Green Elephant Development LLC”, “decision_date”: “2022-04-29”, “alj_name”: “Jenna Clark”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Does the Arizona Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction over every type of homeowner association dispute?”, “short_answer”: “No, the Department only has jurisdiction over disputes involving a “planned community” as defined by statute.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ decision clarifies that the Department’s jurisdiction is limited to disputes between an owner and a “planned community” association. If an association does not meet the statutory definition of a planned community, the administrative court cannot hear the case.”, “alj_quote”: “This matter falls outside the Department’s jurisdiction pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et seq., regarding a dispute between an owner and a planned community association.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102, 32-2199”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “planned community definition”, “administrative authority” ] }, { “question”: “What are the specific requirements for an association to be legally considered a ‘planned community’?”, “short_answer”: “A planned community must own/operate real estate (or maintain roadways) and have a declaration mandating membership and assessments.”, “detailed_answer”: “According to Arizona statute cited in the decision, a planned community requires three elements: 1) The association owns/operates real estate or holds easements to maintain roadways; 2) The declaration explicitly states owners are mandatory members; and 3) The declaration explicitly states owners are required to pay assessments.”, “alj_quote”: “a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation… and in which the declaration expressly states both that the owners of separately owned lots, parcels or units are mandatory members and that the owners are required to pay assessments to the association for these purposes.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal definitions”, “planned community”, “assessments”, “mandatory membership” ] }, { “question”: “If my HOA membership is voluntary, can the HOA take me to an administrative hearing?”, “short_answer”: “No, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacks authority over voluntary associations.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the evidence shows that membership is voluntary rather than mandatory, the association does not qualify as a planned community. Consequently, the administrative law judge must dismiss the case for lack of authority.”, “alj_quote”: “Because the evidence failed to establish, at a minimum, that the Association is a planned community, OAH does not have any authority to consider a dispute between the Association and Respondent”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2), 41-1092”, “topic_tags”: [ “voluntary membership”, “jurisdiction”, “dismissal” ] }, { “question”: “Who has the burden of proof in a hearing regarding an alleged violation?”, “short_answer”: “The Petitioner (the party filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The party bringing the action must prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. This includes proving that the tribunal has jurisdiction and that the specific violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence first that this matter is properly before the OAH and then that Respondent violated Section 5 of the DECLARATION.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “procedure” ] }, { “question”: “Does an HOA need to provide actual measurements to prove a setback violation?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, specific evidence of the actual construction dimensions is required.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ noted that the HOA failed to provide evidence that construction had factually taken place that exceeded the specific setback requirements (e.g., 7ft side, 20ft front). Without measurements or factual proof of the construction’s location relative to property lines, the violation cannot be established.”, “alj_quote”: “[N]o evidence was submitted to establish… that any construction has factually taken place… which exceeds the DECLARATION’S 7ft side setback and 20ft front setback property requirements.”, “legal_basis”: “Preponderance of the Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “evidence”, “setbacks”, “violations” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA considered a ‘planned community’ if it does not own any common areas?”, “short_answer”: “No, the association must own real estate or hold easements for maintaining roadways.”, “detailed_answer”: “A critical component of the legal definition of a planned community is that the association must own and operate real estate or hold specific maintenance easements. Failure to prove this ownership prevents the association from being classified as a planned community under the statute.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that it owns and operates any real estate, or that it has an easement or covenant to maintain roadways.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)”, “topic_tags”: [ “common areas”, “property ownership”, “planned community definition” ] }, { “question”: “What is the standard of proof used in these administrative hearings?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is whether the contention is more probably true than not. This is described as the greater weight of the evidence or superior evidentiary weight.”, “alj_quote”: “A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “preponderance of evidence” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 22F-H2222036-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2222036-REL”, “case_title”: “Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Green Elephant Development LLC”, “decision_date”: “2022-04-29”, “alj_name”: “Jenna Clark”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Does the Arizona Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction over every type of homeowner association dispute?”, “short_answer”: “No, the Department only has jurisdiction over disputes involving a “planned community” as defined by statute.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ decision clarifies that the Department’s jurisdiction is limited to disputes between an owner and a “planned community” association. If an association does not meet the statutory definition of a planned community, the administrative court cannot hear the case.”, “alj_quote”: “This matter falls outside the Department’s jurisdiction pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et seq., regarding a dispute between an owner and a planned community association.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102, 32-2199”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “planned community definition”, “administrative authority” ] }, { “question”: “What are the specific requirements for an association to be legally considered a ‘planned community’?”, “short_answer”: “A planned community must own/operate real estate (or maintain roadways) and have a declaration mandating membership and assessments.”, “detailed_answer”: “According to Arizona statute cited in the decision, a planned community requires three elements: 1) The association owns/operates real estate or holds easements to maintain roadways; 2) The declaration explicitly states owners are mandatory members; and 3) The declaration explicitly states owners are required to pay assessments.”, “alj_quote”: “a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation… and in which the declaration expressly states both that the owners of separately owned lots, parcels or units are mandatory members and that the owners are required to pay assessments to the association for these purposes.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal definitions”, “planned community”, “assessments”, “mandatory membership” ] }, { “question”: “If my HOA membership is voluntary, can the HOA take me to an administrative hearing?”, “short_answer”: “No, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacks authority over voluntary associations.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the evidence shows that membership is voluntary rather than mandatory, the association does not qualify as a planned community. Consequently, the administrative law judge must dismiss the case for lack of authority.”, “alj_quote”: “Because the evidence failed to establish, at a minimum, that the Association is a planned community, OAH does not have any authority to consider a dispute between the Association and Respondent”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2), 41-1092”, “topic_tags”: [ “voluntary membership”, “jurisdiction”, “dismissal” ] }, { “question”: “Who has the burden of proof in a hearing regarding an alleged violation?”, “short_answer”: “The Petitioner (the party filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The party bringing the action must prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. This includes proving that the tribunal has jurisdiction and that the specific violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence first that this matter is properly before the OAH and then that Respondent violated Section 5 of the DECLARATION.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “procedure” ] }, { “question”: “Does an HOA need to provide actual measurements to prove a setback violation?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, specific evidence of the actual construction dimensions is required.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ noted that the HOA failed to provide evidence that construction had factually taken place that exceeded the specific setback requirements (e.g., 7ft side, 20ft front). Without measurements or factual proof of the construction’s location relative to property lines, the violation cannot be established.”, “alj_quote”: “[N]o evidence was submitted to establish… that any construction has factually taken place… which exceeds the DECLARATION’S 7ft side setback and 20ft front setback property requirements.”, “legal_basis”: “Preponderance of the Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “evidence”, “setbacks”, “violations” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA considered a ‘planned community’ if it does not own any common areas?”, “short_answer”: “No, the association must own real estate or hold easements for maintaining roadways.”, “detailed_answer”: “A critical component of the legal definition of a planned community is that the association must own and operate real estate or hold specific maintenance easements. Failure to prove this ownership prevents the association from being classified as a planned community under the statute.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that it owns and operates any real estate, or that it has an easement or covenant to maintain roadways.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)”, “topic_tags”: [ “common areas”, “property ownership”, “planned community definition” ] }, { “question”: “What is the standard of proof used in these administrative hearings?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is whether the contention is more probably true than not. This is described as the greater weight of the evidence or superior evidentiary weight.”, “alj_quote”: “A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “preponderance of evidence” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert Chiffelle (HOA President/Petitioner Rep/Witness)
    Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Also referred to as Bob Chappelle.
  • Jeremy Lyons (HOA Treasurer/Observer)
    Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Also referred to as Mr. Lions; submitted the petition on behalf of Petitioner.
  • Missy Lopez (Observer)
    Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Dr. B. Paul Scott (Architectural Committee member/Observer)
    Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Mike Goldwater (Previous HOA President)
    Camelback Del Este Homeowners Association, Inc.

Respondent Side

  • Ronald E. Huser (Respondent Attorney)
    Huser Law Firm
  • Bryant Aplass (Respondent Co-Owner/Director/Witness)
    Green Elephant Development LLC
    Co-owner and member; also referred to as Bryant Alpass/Applas; role listed as Director of Business Development.
  • Cody Sperber (Respondent President/Witness)
    Green Elephant Development LLC
    Also referred to as Cody Fergburgger.
  • Garrett Schmidt (Respondent Rep/Witness)
    Green Elephant Development LLC
  • Reggie Martinez (Witness)
    Green Elephant Development LLC

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (Legal Staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted Minute Entries.
  • Miranda Alvarez (Legal Secretary)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted ALJ Decision.

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:06 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:07 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:18 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:18 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:11 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:11 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716018-REL


Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative legal case involving Thomas Satterlee and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. It covers the core legal issues, arguments, and final rulings as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision and the Final Order from the Department of Real Estate.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central legal question that Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil had to decide?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, argue that the case should be dismissed?

4. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4), what specific criteria must an entity meet to be legally defined as a “planned community”?

5. What two key arguments did the Petitioner, Thomas Satterlee, present to persuade the Office of Administrative Hearings to accept jurisdiction over his case?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge address the Petitioner’s point about a previous case presided over by Judge Douglas?

7. Explain the legal principle that “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived” and how it was applied in this decision.

8. What was the final recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge, and what does the term “with prejudice” signify in this context?

9. What final action was taken by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

10. Although the petitions were dismissed, what alternative path was the Petitioner advised he could still pursue?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas Satterlee, who served as the Petitioner, and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who brought the case, and the Respondent is the party against whom the case was filed.

2. The central legal question was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions. The case hinged on determining if the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant the OAH authority to hear the dispute.

3. The Respondent argued for dismissal by filing a motion to vacate, alleging that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They contended they were not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because the association did not own or operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

4. To be defined as a “planned community,” an entity must be a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by, or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways by, a nonprofit corporation or association of owners. The owners of separate lots are mandatory members required to pay assessments to the association for these purposes.

5. The Petitioner argued that the OAH should exercise jurisdiction because a former Administrative Law Judge (Douglas) had previously done so in a different case involving the same parties. He also argued that the Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the law governing planned communities.

6. The Administrative Law Judge reviewed the prior decision by Judge Douglas and found that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction had not been raised or considered in that case. Therefore, Judge Douglas’s prior action did not set a binding precedent on the jurisdictional question.

7. This principle means that a court’s or agency’s fundamental authority to hear a type of case is determined by statute and cannot be created by the agreement, consent, or failure to object (estoppel) of the parties involved. In this case, even if the parties had previously acted as if the OAH had jurisdiction, the judge was required to dismiss the case because the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were not met.

8. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that the petitions be dismissed “with prejudice.” This means the dismissal is final and the Petitioner is barred from filing the same claim again within the same administrative forum (the OAH).

9. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in full. The Commissioner issued a Final Order on July 7, 2017, formally dismissing the petitions with prejudice.

10. The Petitioner was advised that he remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction. This means he could pursue his claims against the Respondent in the appropriate state court system as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the provided source material.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Marwil to reject the Petitioner’s arguments. Discuss the specific statutes and case law she cited (e.g., Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas) and explain how they supported her conclusion that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Discuss the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802. How did the pre-2014 and post-2014 definitions of a “planned community” differ, and why was the Respondent found not to qualify under either definition?

3. Explore the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction as presented in the case documents. Explain why it is a critical issue that cannot be waived by the parties or established by estoppel, citing the legal authorities mentioned in the decision (Ariz. Bd. of Regents and Swichtenberg).

4. Evaluate the Petitioner’s arguments for jurisdiction. Why might he have believed that the previous ruling by Judge Douglas and the language in the community’s documents were sufficient grounds for the OAH to hear his case, and why were these arguments ultimately unpersuasive from a legal standpoint?

5. Trace the procedural history of the case from the filing of the Respondent’s motion to the Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Describe each key step and the role played by the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and often issues a recommended decision to an agency head. In this case, Suzanne Marwil.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which is the complete body of laws enacted by the Arizona State Legislature.

Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who has the authority to adopt, reject, or modify the recommended decisions of an ALJ. In this case, Judy Lowe.

Consolidated Matters

Two or more separate legal cases (in this instance, No. 17F-H1716022-REL and No. 17F-H1716018-REL) that are combined into a single proceeding for efficiency.

Estoppel

A legal principle that prevents a party from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what they have previously stated or agreed to by their own actions. The decision notes jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel.

Motion to Vacate

A formal request made to a court or administrative body to cancel or set aside a prior judgment, order, or hearing.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The Arizona state agency responsible for conducting impartial administrative hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a formal complaint or petition, bringing a case before a court or administrative body. In this case, Thomas Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development where an association owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways, and where property owners are mandatory, assessment-paying members.

Recommended Order

The proposed decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge following a hearing or argument. This order is not final until it is adopted by the relevant agency director or commissioner.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or administrative agency to hear and decide a particular type of case. Its absence is a fatal flaw that cannot be overlooked or waived.

With Prejudice

A legal term for the dismissal of a case, indicating that the action is final and the petitioner is barred from bringing the same case on the same grounds before that same body again.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716018-REL



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17F-H1716018-REL

2 sources

These sources document the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. The initial source contains the Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, which recommends the dismissal of Satterlee’s petitions due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction is based on the finding that the Property Owners Association does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” because it does not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant, which are requirements under Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802. The second source, a Final Order from the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, accepting the recommendation that the consolidated matters be dismissed with prejudice. Both documents confirm that Satterlee’s only recourse is to pursue his claims in a court of competent jurisdiction.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas Satterlee (petitioner)
    Represented himself

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Handled mailing of the Final Order and addressed requests for rehearing
  • Douglas (former ALJ)
    Former ALJ who exercised jurisdiction in a prior related case (15F-H1515008-BFS)

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:57 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:57 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.